

Georgia After the ‘Rose Revolution’

The theme of this book is ‘Georgian Security Sector Governance after the ‘Rose Revolution’’. After the downfall of Shevardnadze’s authoritarian regime, apostrophied by many Western observers as ‘mild’, and therefore worthy of support, there have been definite changes in how security is perceived. ‘Good governance’ means introducing fundamental political changes according to the principles and practices of democracy. Although the countries that we recognize as democratic do not have completely identical political mechanisms, methods and procedures for governance, it is not difficult to determine whether a political system is democratic or not. For Georgia, as for all transition countries, the first important matter on the reform agenda was setting up the structure of governance, that is, writing constitutions and laws, erecting political institutions, and making them work. External experts who assess how well security sector governance functions in those countries designated as ‘new democracies’ sometimes neglect to take into account the fact that they indeed are new; that they have not had the many years, even many centuries, that the Western countries have had to develop the ways and means, the habits and customs, of their Executives and Legislatures.

The notion of what comprises the security sector is enlarging. It is no longer understood in terms of traditional military-political institutions such as the armed forces, intelligence, and command and control systems. A publication *Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform* prepared by the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom says that ‘in broad terms the security sector comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within it’. Accordingly, police, justice, public and nongovernmental organizations can also be included in the security actor’s list. As the understanding of security sector governance, so also has the understanding of security policy been broadened over the years. Security is the field of endeavour not only for the national Defence Ministries and Security Councils. International organizations and various development agencies also pay attention to it. If a country intends to become a member in full standing of the Euro-Atlantic community—and Georgia has declared its intent to do that—it has to have good governance over the security sector. Georgia, therefore, has to take into account internationally accepted notions on what security is and how it is properly governed.

In Georgia, the security sector and its governance have encountered particular problems which arise from its history and recent politics. There are parts of the country that have set themselves up as separate entities professing to enjoy sovereign rights, and that has led to clashes and the presence of international organizations. Georgia’s

domestic political development has been interrupted by a military coup, followed by the rule of Shevardnadze, which was terminated by a mass popular movement, the 'Rose Revolution'. How Shevardnadze's rule came to its end was seen worldwide, but Georgia still has to cope with its heritage, including insidious and far-reaching corruption which hindered and distorted the development of democratic governance in every political endeavour, notably in the security sector.

After the Revolution, an analysis of Georgia's security sector stated that when looking at the various stages of the reform process in Georgia that:

The requirements for the various sectors are fairly clear. In the military it requires a move from quantity to quality, a reduction of numbers and an enhancement of capability to provide a more flexible military which is interoperable with NATO and with other western forces. In the Interior Ministry it means moving from Interior troops in the military model to a gendarmerie force which is essentially an enhanced police component. In border security it means changing the military Border Guards to a largely civilianized security agency for border security and control, which is again essentially a form of police control. In the Security Ministry it means moving to a plain-clothes agency basis, with no place in the prosecuting procedures. The thread which runs through all these requirements is that of demilitarization, for security is not just about tanks in the modern era. It also means the acceptance of some form of democratic oversight and an understanding of how to apply that without it turning into an unreasonable and potentially dangerous form of political control'.¹

The rejection of the politics of manipulation and deceit, steeped in corrupt practices, was the reason for the 'Rose Revolution'. In order to investigate what has taken place after it, the authors of the study, necessarily, have to take into account what happened before, because Shevardnadze during his years in power created a political structure which had to be dismantled. This book has four parts. It starts with democracy, security, and reform which considers the structure of political framework, the status of reform when the new Government assumed office, and achievements – because there were positive developments and an initial movement in the right direction. The book then continues with a section on political elites, the media, and non-governmental organisations, that is, some of the governmental and non-governmental actors who have moved reform forward or deterred it, before moving on to deal with the presence of international organisations and foreign presence. The study concludes with an assessment of the progress of transformation and Georgia's progress

¹ Sir Garry Johnson, 'Security Sector Governance in Southern Caucasus,' Anja H. Ebnöther and Gustav E. Gustenau eds., *Security Sector Governance in Southern Caucasus, Challenges and Visions* (Vienna and Geneva: DCAF, 2004), p. 53.

toward the West as well as the eastwards thrust of NATO and the EU toward the Black Sea region.

Democracy, Security, and Reform

The survey of political and security transformation opens with Mindia Vashakmadze's 'Democracy and Security: The Legal Framework of Security Sector Governance'. Georgia's governance framework has been built over a number of years and in separate stages; the most recent one came with amendments to the Constitution made in February of 2004. The governance system was built during politically troubled times and it has been wrought by domestic events. Georgia has a presidential political system, not a parliamentary one, but so do some of the other transition states. In such systems, the powers of the Executive need to be balanced by the powers of the Legislature. During the years before the 'Rose Revolution', Shevardnadze's personal and arbitrary decisions led to many acute problems in state-building, the establishment of democracy, and the approach to dealing with security threats.

In terms of civilian control over the military, Georgia's legal structure is strong. However, in the main, it is Presidential control. The parliamentary sector within the legal framework is not strong. It is difficult to balance a strong Executive if democratic control; accountability in particular, is not institutionalised through an effective Parliament. Furthermore, even well constructed and balanced Constitutions supplemented by various laws concerning security sector governance are not enough to establish effective democratic control over security and defence in the new democracies. The Georgian Parliament and other parts of the Government have had a difficult time in implementing the everyday management of governance - the mechanisms, routines, and habits of parliamentary procedure and work. Vashakmadze explores Georgia's experience, placing it against the background of recent developments in other fledgling legislatures of the new democracies, while focusing attention on Georgia's particular constitutional provisions and the political weaknesses that arise from them.

Upon assuming office, Georgia's new Government undertook broad and far-reaching reform of the security sector. There were Constitutional amendments. In the transition states, Constitutions need to provide, among other things, a clear hierarchy of civilian control, and define the authority of the Head of the State, the Head of the Government, and the responsibilities of senior civilians in Ministries and institutions of the security establishment. The role of the parliamentary sector is not large, and the recent Constitutional amendments of 2004 did not tip the balance of policy making toward strengthening the Parliament. There have, however, been changes in the Ministries of Defence, Interior, the Border Guards, and intelligence organisations.

To some extent, democratic control and reform of security sector governance are a domestic necessity; to some extent, there are external policy considerations. Georgia's new Government has declared a firm course toward NATO and it has EU membership in mind. Both of these

institutions pay attention to security and defence transformation and both are concerned with the political and democratic side of reform. They observe who carries out security governance reforms and how, not just the results. NATO and the EU examine the role of Parliaments in defence and security affairs, how domestic policies strengthen democracy and the rule of law, the extent of transparency and accountability, and the observance of the principle of separation of powers and judicial independence. Georgia has to observe these requirements.

The development of Georgia's security sector governance is a field that is not easy to explore. First, there is a shortage of research, analysis, and publications, at least little on the various aspects and elements influencing the security sector and its reform. Second, what research there is on issues relevant to security sector governance has the appearance of a patch-work quilt. There is no comprehensive assessment; studies have mainly focused on separate aspects; the various threads are not brought together, at least not in a way which would allow an evaluation of the overall situation of governance. In order to bring the threads together and to gain a basic overview on the current state of security sector reform in Georgia, a stock taking project, based on expert interviews, was launched in September 2002. Up-dates were made continuously, the latest carried out in January 2004. The result of this endeavour is given in two Chapters of this book by Antje Fritz.

The first one is 'Security Sector Reform in Georgia: Status'. It is based on the interviews and several questionnaires. The evaluation presented by the study is a selection of general questions on the current state of security sector reform in Georgia, prospects for the upcoming years, and on recommendations and priorities seen by the experts in view of the reform process. The objective was to get a broad overview on the prospects of security sector reform in Georgia by Georgian experts who work in the field of security policy. The picture given is deliberately focused on those factors and aspects of security sector reform, which are - according to the interviewees - currently relevant and therefore have an impact on the ongoing developments.

The study provides us with a range of Georgian views, varied and informal, not policy statements issued by policy makers or summaries by outside observers. As could be expected, the respondents find difficulties and weaknesses in the status of the country's security sector governance. Nonetheless, they also find achievements and positive trends, which are described in a following chapter 'Security Sector Governance: Achievements'. Georgia faces major, evident challenges and obstacles. But there have been positive developments and steps taken in the right direction. In assessing them, the study finds four significant trends: a perceptible tendency towards transparency enhancement, a positive and ongoing process in training and professionalisation of the Armed Forces; a slow but promising and sustained system change in overall security governance; and efforts to adapt and coordinate international assistance.

As a positive starting point, none of the challenges to security sector reform are seen by the Georgians as insurmountable problems,

whereas in the recent Soviet past – the memory of which has not faded much – they would have been impossible to deal with. As is pointed out by a member of the Defence and Security Committee of Georgia's Parliament interviewed for the 'Study', a very important stage has already been reached simply because threats and challenges are dealt with as distinct and transparent issues of political concern, they are being brought to light and public recognition, and therefore, once identified, they need to be addressed and tackled.

Civil Society, Media, Elites

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, its highly structured internal controlling institution, the Communist Party, fell apart. Nonetheless, when Georgia's new political and economic structure was assembled, much of it included segments of the old one. In Georgia, as in many other former Soviet republics, 'The "powers" themselves in substantial part comprise the descendants or associates of people who had power before, not to say the products of elite institutions and the mentalities which they instilled. In these conditions it is not surprising – indeed it is almost inevitable – that "democracy" is limited to elections and that elections have been managed and manipulated'.² This was said about Ukraine but it is relevant to Georgia as well. However, the observation was made before the 'Rose' and 'Orange' Revolutions and as we know in both countries the attempt of the 'powers' to manage and manipulate elections failed utterly.

Segments of the old elites survived after 1991, although in altered forms and a new guise. The subject is explored by Zurab Chiabershvili and Gigi Tevzadze in a Chapter on 'Power Elites'. Shevardnadze was a prominent member of the old Soviet *nomenklatura*, from 1972-1985 the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Georgia, thereafter the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. As the President of Georgia from 1995 until the 'Rose Revolution' he had considerable Presidential powers, he augmented them by political manoeuvres, and he built a secretive, convoluted 'Shevardnadze clan' as a political support organisation. Furthermore, in the first years of independence, the younger members of the former *nomenklatura* of the organisationally-defunct *Komsomol* managed to get control over the banking sector and became, to a large extent, Georgia's economic elite.

There however has been change as well as continuity. Under Shevardnadze Georgia lived in political and social setting that certainly was different from the previous one. The Chapter 'Power Elites' explores the emergence of elites in economy, in the state administration, as regional elites, and as political parties and groups in Georgia's Parliament. The elites inhabited a structure that was built during the time of Shevardnadze, much of it by President himself and his cohorts. Under the post-Communist banners of 'capitalism' and 'market reform', the emerging elite networks transformed old bureaucratic power into

² James Sherr, *Security, Democracy, and 'Civil Democratic Control' of Armed Forces in Ukraine* Conflict Studies Research Centre (January 2001), p. 2.

financial power. Shevardnadze's structure, the establishment that he built, was swept away by the Rose Revolution. Twelve years before, so was the Soviet structure although its remnants were restructured. Georgia again might experience transformation and continuity.

A study 'State-Building in Georgia: Unfinished and at Risk?' by the Netherlands Clingendael Institute of International Relations describes the time and political conditions at the point of transition. The opposition parties, joined by the struggle against Shevardnadze, needed to sharpen their programmatic content and profile and consolidate their coalition within a short period of time. This also implied a vision for elaborating an economic reform strategy, which would have taken time even in calm working conditions. However, so tells the study 'State-Building':

In the elections, opposition parties—not entirely innocent of fraud themselves during the previous election—fought *around* the power apparatus in competition against each other. This obstructed rather than progressed pluralist competition. Anti-Shevardnadze slogans were principally a means of securing public support.... Only two opposition parties, United Democrats and the National Movement, were credible opposition parties; most of the others would have willingly agreed to enter into any coalition that would ensure their participation in government'.³

When the ballots were counted, the credible opposition had pushed opportunism as well as Shevardnadze from the political stage.

If we consider the spectrum of Georgia's society and organisations engaged in political and public affairs, there were, nonetheless, definite changes from 1991 onwards. Two new entities appeared—organisations that we can designate political and social elites—the media and non-governmental organisations. The media no longer were under government control. Non-governmental organisations could act independently. Their influence in politics and in security sector governance is investigated in two Chapters by Marina Kokashvili, 'The Mass Media and Politics in Georgia' and Duncan Hiscock, 'Domestic and International NGOs and Security Sector Governance in Georgia'.

The political role of mass media in transition countries is often analysed alongside that of parliaments, executives, political parties and elections. Indeed, media has been quite influential in determining the type of political regime, particularly during the period of transition to democracy in the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. The opportunities for the media to influence the political climate have appeared as a result of the diminishing role of political parties as intermediaries between state elites and citizens, on the one hand, and increasing influence of international factors on the domestic political arena, on the other. Although it is hard to quantify the direct impact of media on political behaviour and decision-making processes, it is clear that media fills

³ Martina Huber, *State-Building in Georgia: Unfinished and at Risk?* (Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', February 2004), p. 27.

important gaps in social and political communication, and can serve as a powerful factor in consolidating democracy.

As was the case of Georgia's old Soviet political structure, the media structure — uniform, Communist Party controlled, state funded — also disintegrated and then re-emerged from the rubble. A large part of the media, notably television, remained in the hands of the state but it no longer was an outlet of overt propaganda. For the rest of it, as 'Mass Media and Politics' relates, the new arrangements were made in a different fashion. The Government no longer controls the media, although there are state broadcasts, although it has attempted to influence it through official and illicit means. Much of the media is in the hands of private controllers. In this sense, the media are free, at least from state control. However, there are further questions, as to the influence of the media, particularly in relationship to democracy building. Kokashvili's study explores this issue, concluding with media power and influence in the turbulent political events of 2003 and 2004.

The forced but nonetheless peaceful removal of Shevardnadze was a strong signal of the power of civil society as a political determinant in Georgia. The independent media are reckoned to be a part of civil society and, alongside the media, Georgia has developed other societal sectors or groups. Duncan Hiscock considers the role of non-government organisations, the NGOs, in security sector governance in Georgia. As the country continues to undergo huge changes and it is difficult to predict exactly how things will look once the dust has settled. The 'Rose Revolution' of November 2003 and the subsequent election of Mikhail Saakashvili as President in January 2004 led to a large number of new appointments at both ministerial and senior official level. Many of those who entered the government have close links to civil society actors; indeed, a lot of them previously worked for NGOs themselves.

Improved co-operation between the state and civil society is clearly desirable in a period of large-scale reform. The new administration has initiated reforms to the Ministries of the Interior, Defence, and State Security significantly altering the form and quality of governance in the security sector. Several NGO representatives have been active, both formally and informally, advising those who are designing and implementing the reforms. Some are from organisations that have in some way focused on military and security matters in the past. Others are from organisations that may not have worked specifically on such issues but are concerned to see that reforms promoting democracy, good governance and the rule of law apply to the security sector

Hiscock provides the reader a summary of what Georgia's NGOs have done so far in the field of security sector governance, gives an overview of the direction of their efforts, and identifies some of those which are currently involved in advising on or monitoring the emerging reforms. The focus of the chapter is largely on the interaction between the national government and civil society in Tbilisi. However, attention is given to the situation in three other areas which have specific security dynamics: the autonomous region of Adjara, and the separatist regions

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This acquaints the reader with the situation across the territory that is formally recognised as belonging to the state of Georgia.

International Presence and Foreign Influence

Georgia has been troubled by ethnic strife and breakaway territories. Kornely Kakachia's chapter on 'Problems of Post-Conflict Public Security Management in Georgia' seeks to establish how democratic security sector governance can be made possible under the given circumstances. International organisations, the UN and OSCE, have attempted to alleviate the conflicts. There are also foreign troops deployed — Russian ones, though political correctness would make it necessary to call them 'CIS peacekeepers' (with not a single non-Russian present) — whose presence has not been welcomed by the Georgians. In particular, opposition to Russia's presence come from the new Government. Three chapters in this section are devoted to the conflicts, unsolved and solved; the presence and work of international organisations, successful and unsuccessful; and the stationing of Russian troops, examining the origins of their presence, their legitimacy, and prospects for being stationed in Georgia.

The map of the Southern Caucasus, if drawn along the lines of territories inhabited by various national groups, is among the most complex of the former Soviet Union. The political consequences are that within Georgia one can find the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the Autonomous Republic of Adjara (which, however, recently lost its long-time political leader and status), and the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia. As related by Heidemaria Güler in the Chapter on 'International Organisations and National Representatives in Georgia: History, Meaning, and Purpose of Mediation', the reasons for the ethnic variety and political divisiveness go far back into history. Sometimes they reach very far back into the past and through many centuries; at other times, to more recent and deliberate policies of the Soviet Union. The consequence of these national, religious, and cultural differences and divisions has, on occasions, brought conflicts. Neither resolved by Georgia nor by outside forces, the aftermath of the 'Rose Revolution' did make a difference in one place: Adjara.

The quarrel between Adjara and the Georgian Government never turned into a military clash like the ones in Abkhazia or South-Ossetia. Adjara was a domestic political issue. Its 'President' Abashidze ruled it as his own private political preserve. Abashidze's own political party, 'Revival' (or 'Renaissance') at times was the second largest party in Georgia's Parliament. On the surface, it claimed to oppose Shevardnadze; covertly it was in alliance with him. However, as the author wryly remarks: '[Abashidze] never went to Tbilisi out of fear of being murdered'. He would survive the Rose Revolution and Shevardnadze's fall only by a few months, there was a smaller upsurge in Adjara that ended with the ouster of Abashidze who since then has lived in Russia, safe and sound, once he got out of Georgia.

Although the situation in Adjara has settled down, conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been more intractable, the latter one flaring up again in 2004. Describing their course and current status, the author concludes with a question: What is the sense of conflict solution mechanisms introduced by international organisations and how successful have they been in the Southern Caucasus? So far their success lies in the fact that larger military clashes could be contained; the conflicts were frozen. But can one characterize international efforts as successful if after twelve years no permanent solution is in sight? Or are the conflicting parties themselves averse to permanent solutions, fearing that they might have to compromise too much and would be opposed by their population or electorate? The status quo gives Abkhazia and South Ossetia the possibility to claim that they are independent. Although they are not recognised as such by the international community, they are able to exercise some of the powers of sovereignty. Moreover, unresolved conflicts can be used by the involved parties as a permanent excuse for not dealing with other detrimental domestic developments.

The obdurate separatist movement in Abkhazia is one in which the international community has been deeply involved. The background of the conflict, the nature of different institutions' involvement, and an assessment of the likelihood of a solution is related in 'International Military Conflict Prevention, Observer Missions, and Military Cooperation in Georgia' by Axel Wohlgemuth. During Soviet rule, Abkhazia was an Autonomous Republic with a population of some 530,000 people, of whom Georgians were nearly half of the population. Only some 18 per cent were ethnic Abkhaz, with Armenians and Russians as the other two most numerous groups. When the Soviet Union crumbled, Abkhazia demanded independence from Georgia and open clashes began in August 1992. By September 1993 the Abkhaz side, with external assistance, won the conflict. At least half of the population — some 300,000 persons in all — were displaced to other areas of Georgia or abroad. Abkhazia's independent status has not been recognised by the international community.

Abkhazia is a tangle of problems involving conflict, refugees, and its future political status. The international community has been engaged there since August 1993, when a United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established by a Security Council Resolution. Efforts by the United Nations and the Russian Federation to have a cease fire led to "Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces" on May 1994. UNOMIG's work is based on one of the most extensive mandates of all UN peace missions ranging from the observation of the ceasefire to a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict.

The overarching goal of the peace process is a comprehensive settlement. It would define the political status of Abkhazia within the state of Georgia. It would help bring about a safe return of refugees. Despite all efforts, no settlement has been achieved. Confrontational elements remain and small successes do not make a solution. It would be a naïve hope, Wohlgemuth concludes, for a quick end to the mission. Hopes for progress still lie on the shoulders of the Abkhaz

administration and the new Georgian President. That said, despite shortcomings, the peace process has had its achievements. The two sides are talking, directly and frequently, on a wide variety of issues which they did not do several years ago. All the necessary mechanisms to introduce change are at hand. What is required is sufficient political will on the part of the two sides to make the best use of these instruments in the context of firm public security guarantees to melt a frozen conflict and move toward a settlement.

The presence of foreign military forces on Georgia's territory has been a persistent security and political problem since it achieved independence. The foreign forces in question are Russian ones and the pressing question to Georgians is: when will they leave? The question remains unanswered. Mindia Vashakmadze considers the origins and legality of their presence in a Chapter 'Deployment of Foreign Forces in Georgia: Status, Prospects, Legitimacy'. Negotiations over their future have been going on for years and since the 'Rose Revolution' have moved closer to the centre of the stage. Their continuing presence comes from political stratagems and their aim is pursuing sphere of influence policies. Another reason for their deployment comes from security concerns; some of them function as peacekeeping forces. Usually, the case of Russia in Georgia is placed in the framework of regional security and examined along the lines of power politics — Russia *versus* Georgia. But it also is inextricably linked with issues of legitimacy and national sovereignty.

Vashakmadze therefore deals with the deployment of Russian forces in Georgia by examining the legitimacy of their *de facto* presence, their current status and prospects of a prolonged presence. The legality of the deployment of foreign forces in Georgia has been repeatedly called into question by the Georgian authorities, especially by the Parliament. Georgia's pursuit of policy *vis-à-vis* Moscow concerning Russian military deployment - or withdrawal - has not however been consistent. President Shevardnadze's tactical manoeuvres shifted, they were not straightforward, but the new Government unfortunately inherited the political arrangements that he made.

Legality in international relations must, as a rule, reflect agreed-upon national policy. In this regard, as Vashakmadze argues, when it comes to a long-term military presence of foreign forces of one country in the territory of another, sovereign, or the receiving state, all aspects of international law have direct relevance. A thorough examination of the legal case which can be presented by Georgian authorities would answer the question: is the status and presence of foreign troops legitimate or not? The consistency of state policy (which, as it happens, was policy chosen by Shevardnadze) must be based upon the principle of the free and full consent of the host state to foreign military presence. Inconsistencies in the state's position may have come about as the result of external factors such as the use or threat of force by a foreign power or extensive political and economic pressure. Furthermore, inconsistencies can arise from internal factors, in particular from a lack of political consensus within the state. In this respect, the exclusion of the principal security sector actors, especially the Parliament, from the

formation of the nation's policy on foreign military presence, can be considered to be a reason for invalidating agreements struck by the President. Vashakmadze concludes that Georgia's Parliament never actually consented to foreign troop presence. Thereby, Russia stands on dubious legal ground.

Prospects and Conclusions: From Revolution to Reform

A new Government has been in power for over a year. It has had time to decide on its policy priorities, develop plans, publish a National Security Policy Document, and implement changes in the security sector. Writing on the 'Emerging Security Sector Governance in Georgia: Problems and Prospects', Dov Lynch observes that even though the Republic of Georgia has had an independent existence for well over a decade, it remains logical to discuss security sector governance as an emerging question. For much of the early 1990s, applying the notion of 'security sector governance' to a state torn by war and barely on its feet would stretch the concept too far. Reform is under way with considerable changes taking place throughout 2004. Saakashvili is struggling within an inherited, misshapen system with peculiar and distorted political 'rules of the game' which materialized under Shevardnadze. The situation is characterised by fragmented and deeply under-funded power agencies, subjective forms of control over them, weak civilian oversight, intense corruption, no legitimacy in society at large, and the absence of a concept of overall reform. Therefore, 'Emerging Security Sector Governance' first delineates the objective difficulties that have affected Georgia's security sector from 1992 onward in order to bring to light the wide range of the dilemma. Second, it examines the nature of 'the security sector game' as it crystallised by the rules of the game during the last years of the Shevardnadze Presidency. Third, it explores the strengths and weaknesses of the first steps taken by the new leadership in 2004 made to change the rules of the game. The concluding section proposes some general principles for reforming the Georgian security sector.

Where should Georgia's transformation head and in what fashion? If Georgia is to move towards healthy reform of the security sector, Lynch writes, the principles can be summed up as follows. The new government must sustain its push for healthy security sector governance relying on its own energy and determination; it should get away from counting on external support for direction and energy. Reform must be comprehensive; it must embrace all parts of the security sector. It must be deep; there must be more to it than personnel changes and cases of corrupt officials legally persecuted; the process must be root-and-branch in its span. Moreover the new government should make clear to the Georgians themselves and to other states and institutions its vision of Georgia's future, how it comprehends and evaluates the main security threats, and how it proposes to respond to them. This requires a National Security Concept, known to and debated by the public. The Concept should eliminate ambiguity and make a new universe of expectations for Georgia's policy in the future clear to all actors,

domestic and foreign. Finally, the new government must pick the right battles for its first year in power in order to sustain popular support and avoid social disenchantment. The main challenges that concern Georgian society are those of welfare, education, healthcare and stability. Settlement of the question of territorial control will be easier once Georgia itself is visibly able to stand on its own.

If there are some principles the Georgians should observe, there are some for the international community as well, Lynch notes. The international community should check and balance the policy directions taken by the new government so that it will retain a focus on reform and the priority of strengthening the institutions of state. The international community needs to rethink the concept of security sector governance to include those elements that are beyond Tbilisi's control, as in Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Finally, international actors must coordinate their actions amongst themselves in assisting Georgian security sector, in order to achieve a better synergy of effort.

Security sector governance is being dealt with, as described by Shorena Lortkipanidze in 'Security Sector: Initiatives and Activities'. An enhanced political will to implement reforms and to transform the whole political system is definitely present in Georgia today and plays an important role in the creation of a new security environment. The major goal is the formation of security structures, their management, financial support, and the coordination of activities within a framework of democratic control over them. In Georgia security sector reform requires democratic supervision and public support, which in turn calls for an increased sophistication and understanding in these matters in an arena outside the previously closed worlds of the defence and security professionals of the state.

The new leadership made the first steps initiating structural changes in governance without much hesitation. A 'National Security Policy Concept' has been debated and published. The objectives of reorganization have been identified as the establishment of the civilian control of the Ministry of Defence, the streamlining of the Ministry and General Staff, the clear division responsibilities of the functions of Ministry of Defence and General Staff. Reforms in education and decentralization are currently underway. Major internal changes have taken place. The State Department of Border Guards was integrated into the Ministry of Interior. The Intelligence Department was incorporated into the Ministry of State Security. The Military Doctrine, approved by the Parliament, defines military forces of Georgia as follows: the Armed Forces of Georgia, Border Guard Forces, Interior Ministry Troops, and other armed formations.

Jozsef Boda and Kornely Kakachia elaborate in more detail Police and Interior Ministry relevant reforms, areas often neglected by states receiving external security sector reform assistance via 'defence diplomacy' platforms which all too often dwell on the minutiae of defence reform whilst unreformed fiefdoms with untransparent and unaccountable coercive powers are built up elsewhere in the security sector. Notably, in Georgia such problems are already being avoided via a nascent security sector reform programme beyond the defence sphere.

There are many pressing tasks, difficult to accomplish in a short period of time. The lines of responsibility, authority and accountability are not clear or well comprehended. The system of promotions has been centralized in various Ministries. Georgia has not made a transition from the Soviet to the Western approach to defence planning and management and this has been an obstacle to the reforming process. The Armed Forces have suffered from harmful budget shortages.

There have been rapid changes among senior civilians and the military. This has been perceived differently by the society, the media, and the political opposition, with criticism voiced by the latter. The disorder caused by political turbulence and appointments to high state positions by the former revolution activists are two problems that illustrate the issues facing Georgia today. On the one hand, the country's security sector is in immediate need of rapid transformation; on the other, it demands competence in carrying out the required tasks. What little knowledge Georgia's civilians did have of defence planning was coloured by the Soviet heritage. This shortcoming has been the unfortunate situation in every transitional country; in Georgia there has been, and still is, a lack of national governmental capacity, of people with overall competence for defence policy formulation and planning and expertise is needed in ministries, parliamentary committees, and presidential offices.

In many ways the general security situation of Georgia can be said to have improved. But the main concern is to have a thorough assessment of security threats. Piecemeal improvement without an overall framework will not suffice. The major document, a national security concept, has been slow in coming. It is expected by the Parliament and, assuming that it is developed appropriately (previous attempts to generate a national security concept fell far short of what was needed, according to the International Security Advisory Board), security sector governance has to proceed at a measured and certain pace.

Finally, there is the increasing proximity of 'the West' to Georgia described in the concluding chapter 'The West, the Black Sea and Georgia' written by Jan Arveds Trapans. In this study, 'the West' is largely — though not entirely — defined in terms of NATO and the EU. Georgia intends to join both of them and is developing plans and policies for that purpose. Both NATO and the EU are moving eastwards; NATO has reached the Black Sea and the EU presumably will do so as well within a few years. To both of them, security in the countries of the Black Sea area and the South Caucasus is important even if they do not anticipate including the respective countries in their membership soon or, perhaps, not at all.

As NATO and the EU move eastward, their policy makers assess contiguous areas — the Baltic, the Balkans, and the Black Sea areas — in terms of security problems, that is, potential threats emanating from them. Because Georgia is in the South Caucasus and in the Black Sea area, it will be placed in the context of difficulties and threats arising from one area or the other. This is not necessarily to Georgia's disadvantage. If threats are to be removed or at least moderated, it

cannot be accomplished without a Georgia's sustained participation. Both NATO and the EU have developed security sector governance programmes, and an important issue for Georgia's policy makers is to decide on what working relations they can establish with 'the West'.

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