

Conclusions

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The end of the Cold War has brought about a profound change in international security and consequently in the missions assigned to the armed forces and the other components of the security sector. This transformation was further accelerated by the hideous terrorist attack of 9/11. This book, which builds on papers originally written for the Security Sector Track of the Annual Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes in Bucharest in June 2004, tries to assess what the new task of combating terrorism implies for the various elements of the security sector, and how it interrelates with other transformations the security sector is undergoing.

The challenge faced by armed forces and the security sector in general is characterised by the following key factors:

First, traditional interstate conflict remains a possibility in certain parts of the world (on the Korean peninsula or between India and Pakistan to cite but two examples). Moreover, the United States, the world's only surviving superpower, has with its shift toward a strategy of preemption and the campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated its will to continue to use force against what it considers rogue states or countries posing a threat to its national security. Nevertheless, traditional interstate conflict has today clearly become the exception. In most parts of the world, the enemy from within has replaced the enemy from without. Civil war and internal strife have become the most common form of conflict in all too many parts of the world. As a result, two trends must be distinguished. On the one hand, the heavy armoured formations of the Cold War era have quickly become obsolete; on the other hand, the need to be able to participate in international peace support operations (PSO) has added a complex and demanding new task to most armed forces. The range of missions stretches here from peace-keeping to peace enforcement, stabilization, and securitization. Each one of them requires highly specialized training, new structures and skills, and new equipment. All of them demand from the armed forces the ability to cooperate closely with civilian authorities in a highly complex postconflict situation.

Second, globalization has not been restricted to the economy, but has also lead to a further strengthening of organized international crime and the emergence of strategic terrorism with a global reach. This real-

ity is further accentuated by the growing attractiveness of methods of asymmetric warfare as a result of the overwhelming military superiority of the United States in “traditional” conflicts. These new threats cannot be coped with by armed forces alone, but put the entire security sector (armed forces, police forces, border guards, intelligence and state security agencies, paramilitary forces, and specialized law enforcement agencies) to the test. The need for cooperation between these different components is evident, from the fusion of intelligence to a clear division of labour and coordinated joint action. The security sector must be understood as a set of communicating vessels. None of the components of the security sector has been prepared for this, least of all the armed forces (as the early days of the U.S. occupation of Iraq have amply demonstrated). It took NATO much time to develop armed forces capable of joint and combined operations. This is no longer good enough. Today, the ability to conduct integrated operations—that is, operations together with all other components of the security sector—must be added to the set of necessary skills.

Third, the collapse of the armour-heavy Soviet threat, the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and the transition of the U.S. (and very few other) armed forces toward network-centric warfare have combined to render the structure and equipment of most armed forces if not obsolete then outdated and outclassed. In times of strained government finances, it will be simply impossible to engage at the same time in the necessary transformation of the armed forces and to equip other law enforcement agencies with all the necessary tools to face the new terrorist and organized crime challenges. As a result, traditional procurement patterns will have to give way to integrated approaches also in this area – particularly in the areas of information warfare, intelligence, communications, UAV, sensors, and optronics.

The chapters in this book have highlighted that none of the armed forces of the world – not even those of the United States – can escape these trends. The new task of combating terrorism, which has been added to an already all too heavy burden of different mission requirements, will have profound repercussions.

The challenge can take different forms. The United States, sinking ever deeper into the Iraqi quagmire, is facing the prospect of either having to reintroduce the draft or to abandon its ability to fight simultaneously more than one conflict. Iraq absorbs today nine out of ten regular U.S. Army divisions and puts such a drain on the National Guard that many fear for its future. A similar threat of imperial overstretch is faced by the British armed forces. For new NATO members like Poland (first enlargement wave) or Romania (second wave), the problems are even more fundamental. These countries have to undergo in parallel four complex reorganisations: (1) To complete the transition from Warsaw Pact-type armed forces to NATO compatible structures (from ministe-

rial structures all the way down to equipment); (2) the creation of rapid reaction components for PSO; (3) to catch up with RMA and the age of network-centric warfare; and (4) to move from defence to security sector reform. Most of them have hardly embarked on this difficult road – and all of them are desperately looking for expertise on how to square this circle. Even neutral Switzerland is confronted by new tasks: More than half of the Army's service days have, in 2003, been consumed by subsidiary missions in favour of civilian authorities for essentially anti-terror missions (guarding diplomatic missions and the UN, reinforcing the border guards, and protecting the G-8 meeting in Evian and the World Economic Forum in Davos). Many highly trained units (armour, artillery, and engineers) had to be committed to essentially guard duties in cooperation with the police – while at the same time the need for sophisticated new equipment (for example, all-weather-capable aircraft to guard the skies, modern information warfare tools) is more acutely felt. The idea has, at one point, been floated in Switzerland whether the new situation does not require transforming the Defence Department into a "Security Department" by subordinating to the same Minister not only the armed forces but also border guards and possibly some additional components of the security sector.

Yet the impact of the new task of combating terrorism is felt no less by the other components of the security sector – as the chapters on police and gendarmerie forces and on border guards and intelligence agencies have stressed.

No less significantly, private military companies and private security companies mushroom in this new climate. PMC/PSC form today the largest single component of the Israeli economy and show a financial turnover larger than the far from modest Israeli defence budget. In California, there are six private security agents for every policeman. Even in peaceful Switzerland their number has, over the last decade, doubled from 5,000 to over 10,000. It is indicative – and frightening – that the United States cannot even state how many employees of PMCs and PSCs are today operating in Iraq. The best estimate ranges anywhere between 15,000 and 25,000.

This leads to another – and perhaps the most significant – problem. Civilian and parliamentary oversight over the increasingly complex security sector of a globalized world gets increasingly difficult. At the governmental level, civilian control over the security sector lies in the hand of several ministers. Parliaments usually have no committee in charge of the entire sector. PSOs run by international organisations suffer, very often, under a dual democratic deficit – parliamentary control being in these cases much more difficult for home parliaments and nonexistent at the international level.

Parliamentary control can, moreover, easily be outfoxed through the use of PMCs and PSCs in an ever more bewildering number of roles.

There is still no international convention asking for the most rudimentary regulations in this area: An agreement which security and state functions can and which cannot be outsourced to private contractors, an obligation for PMC/PSCs to register, requirements for compulsory training standards (including, for instance, the Geneva Conventions) for PMC/PSCs used in more demanding roles, minimal standards for rules of operation and engagement for PMC/PSCs, and the obligation for governments to check, through rigorous inspections, whether these training and other professional standards are being respected by the contractors.

The problems addressed in this book are all too real. They will not go away, but grow in importance. We cannot afford to ignore them.

The PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes can in this context play a useful, if not significant, role. There is a clear need for those who work in the various components of the security sector to define the strategy for the future, and for those who are called upon to translate that strategy into concrete training programmes, to meet one another and exchange information in a productive forum. There is indeed no single forum that brings together in the Euro-Atlantic world those who are in charge of the various security sector elements and those in charge of the key training institutions of that security sector. There are venues for each component (for example, the NATO Defence College's "Conference of Commandants" for the heads of Military Academies), but there is no venue where the directors of military academies can meet with their counterparts from the worlds of police, border guards, gendarmerie, or other security sector agencies. The situation is, in this respect, grim with respect to NATO; it is worse for the European Union (which lacks its equivalent of a PfP programme) – and disastrous with respect to the OSCE and the UN.

One of the great benefits offered by the Consortium was to first bring together and then network people who would otherwise not meet. It therefore seems highly recommendable that the Consortium's Annual Conference should become the international meeting point of the heads and training institutions of the entire security sector. If the goal is to progress from joint or combined operations toward integrated operations, then the philosophy, the operational concepts and culture, and the strengths and limitations of each security sector component cannot be learned painstakingly (and at a high price) on the ground, but must be integrated into the training curricula of the various security sector components from the very beginning. Similarly, it will be crucial to regularly compare notes on the threat, the resulting adaptation of counter-threat strategies, and the implications for training, procurement, and interagency cooperation. Finally, the Consortium is one of the few venues which, after the Istanbul Summit, can broaden its circle of participants

to include the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern worlds – a prerequisite if any progress is to be made in the future.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which is heading the Consortium's Security Sector track, will work to make this vision come true.