

# Terrorism and the International Security Agenda since 2001

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## Introduction: Action, Reaction, Re-evaluation

The use of terror as a weapon against enemies, in the sense of an excess of brutality designed to shock and intimidate, is probably as old as mankind. It is still a ubiquitous phenomenon in every kind of conflict, and few if any actors can claim never to have resorted to it. What we refer to today as “terrorism” is generally understood to be something much more specific: the activity of groups that for a political/ideological rather than criminal purpose employ violence against non-combatants in non-war circumstances and often against an ultimate target that is stronger than themselves. This is admittedly an imprecise, inexperienced description, and the experts themselves have never managed to find a formal, legal definition of terrorism that can be universally agreed upon and universally applied.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the international community has been sufficiently aware of terrorism as a threat to security, and sufficiently united as to its undesirability, to take concrete measures against it since at least 1937.<sup>2</sup> In more recent times, waves of terrorist action and corresponding peaks of international concern can be identified from all three of the closing decades of the twentieth century. The radical effect of one day’s events—the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda on 11 September 2001 against the United States—on the world’s thinking and behaviour thus calls for a special explanation, over and above the fact that they came after some years of global decline in terrorist activity. It may be found in the nature of the attacks, their target, and of the subsequent reactions.

First, the destruction of New York’s World Trade Centre and the assault on the Pentagon by flying hijacked civilian aircraft into them horrified and gripped the world’s imagination, through the magnitude of the loss of life and material destruction, the use of aircraft as weapons,

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<sup>1</sup> See G. Simpson, “Terrorism and the law: past and present international approaches,” *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armament, Disarmament and International Security* (OUP for SIPRI), August 2003.

<sup>2</sup> When the League of Nations adopted a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.

the small number of hijackers involved, and the simplicity of their equipment. This was mass-effect, “hyper-terrorism” of a kind rarely if ever experienced in the modern world. Second, the fact that the attacks succeeded against the United States, the world’s (now) sole superpower, made them a particularly stark illustration of the *asymmetrical* nature of terrorism: a weapon of the weak against the strong, a technique apparently not susceptible to being blocked or deterred by any kind of traditional power or defence. Also important was the identity of the adversary and the reason why the United States became a target. Al Qaeda was not a home grown terrorist movement, nor one stemming directly from any former U.S. act of power or defeat at the United States’ hands. It was led by a Saudi millionaire whose original motives included outrage at the U.S. troop presence in Saudi Arabia during the 1992 Gulf War, but its ideology had grown into a generalized hatred of the West’s power and secularized lifestyle and of those in the Islamic world who colluded with it. This was *transnational*, globalised terrorism of a kind distinct from most previous movements tied to specific local grievances and well-delineated fields of action. Third and not least, the United States reacted both with the outrage of a community shocked into recognizing its vulnerability and with the full force of the superpower and world leader that it was. President George W. Bush declared “war” on terrorism and pursued with great energy two essentially novel lines of action: (1) a huge new programme for the United States’ own “homeland security”; and (2) a doctrine and practice of overseas intervention designed to punish the terrorists and their abettors and to anticipate further attacks.<sup>3</sup> The conceptual reflection of this policy was the notion of “pre-emptive” attack, enshrined in the United States’ new National Security Strategy of 2002<sup>4</sup>—where it was envisioned also as a response to threats connected with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and humanitarian outrages like genocide. Its practical results were the U.S. military actions first against Afghanistan (October 2001) and then against Iraq (March 2003), resulting in the fall of previous anti-American *regimes* in both countries.<sup>5</sup>

The United States’ new agenda inevitably also became the world’s agenda. It spread initially on the tide of international sympathy after the 9/11 attacks, boosted by others’ increased threat awareness, but was

<sup>3</sup> For a description of these measures, see chapter 1, sections II-III, of *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (as note 1 above).

<sup>4</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, with foreword by President George W. Bush, 17 September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> See the chapters by A. Cottey on Afghanistan in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (as note 1) and on Iraq in *SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armament, Disarmament and International Security* (OUP for SIPRI), September 2004.

driven also by deliberate U.S. efforts to mobilize allies and institutional tools both old and new for its campaign. Although the Bush Administration has widely been charged with “unilateralism” in its responses, the Americans did not actually act alone at any critical juncture, including the invasion of Iraq. The point stressed by their leaders (most explicitly by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld)<sup>6</sup> was rather that they did not intend to wait for anyone’s *permission*—including where applicable an institutional mandate—before taking the actions deemed necessary for their nation’s security. In reality, the United States did make use of multilateral tools after 9/11 in numerous ways, including the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution against terrorist financing,<sup>7</sup> the introduction of new doctrines and policies at NATO to better adapt that alliance’s capabilities for worldwide operations including potential antiterrorist ones, the initiative taken in the framework of the International Maritime Organization to lay down new global standards for port security, and the steps taken in numerous multilateral export control groups to decrease the risks of dangerous weapons and technologies falling into terrorist or “rogue state” hands.

The United States took like-minded military partners along with it when attacking both Afghanistan and Iraq, made new aid and cooperation partnerships with several developing-world countries struggling with terrorism, and set up a new would-be permanent multination group called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).<sup>8</sup> Other actions taken by the United States on its national authority had a decidedly multilateral impact, such as tighter visa rules, the demand for provision of more data on airline passengers arriving in the United States, or the demand for tighter pre-shipping checks on U.S.-bound container traffic. Last but not least, other organizations like the European Union and regional cooperation structures elsewhere in the world—ASEAN, African Union, MERCOSUR, etc.—adopted a wide range of new antiterrorism (and/or antiproliferation) measures of their own under the combined impetus of U.S. urgings, their own growing sense of threat, and in at least some cases a desire to show that the threat could be handled in wiser and better ways than those the United States had chosen.

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<sup>6</sup> It was he who said on 31 January 2002: “The mission makes the coalition, not the coalition the mission” (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef2.html>).

<sup>7</sup> UNSCR 1373 (28.09.2001), which established a new UN Counterterrorism Committee (<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373>); see also the chapter by T. Biersteker in A. Bailes and I. Frommelt, *Business and Security: Public-Private Sector Relationships in a New Security Environment* (OUP for SIPRI), May 2004.

<sup>8</sup> For the official PSI webpage, see <http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm>.

At the time this book was being prepared in mid-2004, the sense that the United States' choice of reactions was not, in fact, optimal has come to dominate international perceptions and debate. It is not that the reality of transnational mass-impact terrorism can be questioned or that Al Qaeda has been exposed as a paper tiger. On the contrary, its leader Usama bin Laden remains at large, and it has carried out attacks with large casualties and growing frequency since 9/11 in many countries and continents, including (on 11 March 2004) in the European city of Madrid. The problem is rather that the downfall of its Taliban protectors in Afghanistan seems hardly to have cramped Al Qaeda's style, while the failure (so far) to control internal security in Iraq following Saddam Hussein's ouster has opened up a new front and perhaps an enduring battlefield<sup>9</sup> for its attacks. The United States' declaration of "war" seems merely to have brought hundreds (at least) of dedicated new recruits to Al Qaeda's ranks, while multiplying even more dramatically the tally of its general sympathizers throughout the Islamic world.<sup>10</sup> The other difficulties experienced in rebuilding Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the limitations of the United States' (or anybody's) military power when it comes to actually curing terrorism-related problems, as distinct from lancing the boil. The United States' refusal to respect institutional constraints, resentment at the extraterritorial effects of many of its actions, and the latest revelations about failings in its own antiterrorist preparations before 9/11, its misevaluation and misuse of intelligence as a basis for armed actions afterwards, and various kinds of wrongdoing (both mistreatment of prisoners and corruption) associated with its occupation of Iraq,<sup>11</sup> have all combined to leave even the United States' traditionally closest friends in Europe and elsewhere divided, dismayed, and disillusioned about the quality of American leadership.

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<sup>9</sup> See the chapter by Professor R. K. Gunaratna in this volume.

<sup>10</sup> According to a Zogby International opinion survey reported in the *Financial Times* (page 4) on 24–25 July 2004, the overwhelming majority of respondents in six Arab countries said their attitude was more shaped (negatively) by U.S. actions than by American "values." A clear majority, including 90% of respondents in Saudi Arabia, also believed the U.S. action in Iraq would bring more chaos and terrorism and less democracy than before.

<sup>11</sup> A series of postmortem inquiries notably in the United States and Britain produced reports in the first half of 2004 pointing to failures in the collection, analysis, and public use of Iraq-related intelligence; in the United States' antiterrorist precautions before 9/11; in the treatment of Iraqi citizens detained by coalition forces after the fighting in the spring of 2003; and in the allocation and conduct of private contracts for security-related and commercial transactions in occupied Iraq. The U.S. Supreme Court in July 2004 ruled against the practices being used by the Administration for detaining terrorist suspects (mostly captured during the Afghanistan operation) at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

In the first flush of antiterrorist solidarity after 9/11, it was difficult to get an audience (or, indeed, adequate research funds) for alternative views or for new work on other dimensions of security.<sup>12</sup> In the present atmosphere of recoil and reassessment, there is a corresponding risk of undervaluing what has actually been achieved over the last two or three years. It has been very difficult to track any productive results from the United States' high spending on homeland security,<sup>13</sup> but that does not mean that the newfound attention to internal security and homeland defence—otherwise tending to be neglected in the Northern Hemisphere after the end of the Cold War—was a mistake in principle or will be unfruitful in the longer run. The efforts made since mid-2003 to reunite and rebuild both NATO and the European Union seem likely to shape these institutions' course more profoundly than the rifts over Iraq that preceded them. The world now awaits the results of the High Level Panel appointed by the UN Secretary-General following debate at the 2003 General Assembly, which will aim to produce prescriptions for using the international community's resources against "new threats" (including asymmetrical ones) in a globally acceptable manner.<sup>14</sup> It remains also to be seen what lessons the U.S. citizenry and their leadership will draw from the costs of the specific solutions attempted by George W. Bush in Iraq. But there is already plentiful evidence that terrorism and proliferation can and will be combated in less violent, risky, and unpopular ways, including by the United States itself—which has very deliberately (and in the face of hard-line criticism) avoided violence over these years in other important cases of concern, such as in the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Iran, Syria, Libya, and the terrorist-plagued Middle East.

The present volume represents a wide range of views and professional perspectives. All its writers, however, aim to avoid fashion-driven and one-sided judgments by examining the real-life effects and implications—positive, negative, or undetermined—of the new evidence of, concern about, and reactions to transnational terrorism. Their contributions are grouped around a particular range of issues relating to de-

<sup>12</sup> "Responding to 9/11: Are Think Tanks Thinking Outside the Box?", report dated 31 July 2003 by Dr J. McGann of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at Philadelphia. See <http://www.fpri.org>.

<sup>13</sup> The new immigration checks and detentions of suspects under the United States' new Patriot Act have notoriously failed to catch any proven terrorists, but they have uncovered a significant number of other offences—see chapter 1, section II in *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (note 5 above).

<sup>14</sup> For the Secretary-General's announcement of his plans at the General Assembly, see <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?id=517>; and for full information on the members of the Panel who were appointed in Nov. 2004, see <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?info-cusID=848.Body=xxxxx8.Body1=>.

fence and security management by state and multilateral actors, including the dimension of democratic answerability. This rather specific focus allows the issues in question to be illuminated from different viewpoints and in depth. In what remains of this introductory chapter, I will highlight the main themes, then end with some remarks on other topics that could contribute to a comprehensive understanding of terrorism's and counterterrorism's effects in the modern world.

## Back to the Definition Problem, Forward to a Better Balance?

Does it actually matter how terrorism is defined? The question is warranted, since the nature and antecedents of many terrorist acts are clear beyond debate, and several types of defensive action and response can satisfactorily be based on a more or less “fuzzy” consensus among actors. The studies in this volume bring out that a lack of definition or competing definitions can nevertheless cause trouble in several ways. If a line cannot be drawn between terrorism proper and other types of politically motivated violence (especially within states), there is a risk that the “terrorism” label will be improperly exploited against the latter by the powers-that-be and—in the present climate—may be used to attract outside aid and support with ultimately illogical and counterproductive effects. Again, the more the international community wishes to “legislate” formally and universally on matters like the prevention of terrorist financing and the consistent judicial handling of terrorist offences, the more it will be hampered by lack of an agreed legal statement on what terrorism is and/or who the terrorists are.<sup>15</sup> For the security components of an optimal antiterrorism policy, however, distinctions and definitions *within* the broad phenomenon of terrorism are almost equally important. Several writers here emphasize the importance of understanding why and how Al Qaeda is different from previously familiar terrorist movements, above all in its manner of networking and propagation. It cannot be “hit” or decapitated in any simple manner and its appeal to its supporting constituencies is so broad, almost “existential,” that an equally broadly based campaign to rehabilitate ideas of peace and coexistence—waged with the help of, not against, the Islamic authorities—seems required in response. If this is accepted, the converse point is also

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<sup>15</sup> UNSCR 1373 on terrorist financing did not attempt a definition of terrorism but called for action against terrorist groups and individuals. Unfortunately, several different lists of the latter have been produced and used by leading actors like the United States and European Union. See Biersteker, as note 7 above.

worth stressing: namely that a great deal of terrorism still exists in the world that is not of the Al Qaeda model, and not even necessarily directed against the West. It includes transnational groups using terrorist methods to pursue quite different causes such as animal rights, at one end of the spectrum, and numerous highly localized, conflict-linked or “insurrectionary” movements often of a low-tech and relatively low-impact nature at the other. The international community would be ill-advised either to drape the latter retrospectively in the mantle of Al Qaeda (that is, by interpreting linkages for mutual aid between such groups as Al Qaeda-type networking and “franchising”), or to diminish the care and attention it gives to them because of the new salience of genuinely transnational threats.

Getting these distinctions right is also a first step toward something that most authors in this book explicitly or implicitly plead for: that is, getting transnational terrorism (TNT) in proportion and revisiting the *balance* between the efforts we devote to it and to other pressing demands of security policy. This challenge has many different levels and facets:

- When it comes to directly countering (preventing, containing, defeating) TNT, should we be guided by the metaphor and principle of waging “war” or by something different? Even if the “war” metaphor has merit, do we accept the case made initially by U.S. theorists that some of the familiar principles of war such as the possibility of deterrence and of negotiated cease-fires do not apply, and that terrorists or terrorist supporters captured in the course of combat operations are not “prisoners of war”?
- When it comes to dealing with the “causes” of terrorism, how do we identify these causes, and how do they differ between terrorist leaders and followers, between TNT in its pure form and partly or totally issue-linked terrorism, and so forth? How do we balance our analysis and our allocation of resources between supposed material causes and political, cultural, and psychological ones? Can the case be made that “we” (speaking here of developed Western-style democracies) cannot be who we are without stimulating some degree of asymmetrical terrorist response?
- How do we adjust the balance of attention, priority, and resource distribution between (1) terrorist phenomena that only (directly) hurt the West; (2) terrorist phenomena that hurt everybody and/or hurt other regions exclusively; (3) non-terrorist threats that hurt everybody, such as global disease epidemics and climate change; and (4) non-terrorist threats that hurt the developing world more than us, including old-fashioned (non-terrorist) conflict?

- How do we fine-tune the trade-off between protecting the physical security of nations and citizens and preserving their personal and civil liberties and quality of life?

This last question has several sub-issues of its own that are worth dwelling on here, because of the way they interact with some of the operational topics dealt with below. It may be addressed at the level of security versus freedom and normalcy for the ordinary citizen—how important is the goal of protection (which can never actually be total or guaranteed) as against the freedom and ease of movement, free speech and free association, data privacy, and freedom from wrongful imprisonment? Is it desirable to ask citizens to look out for one another’s’ suspicious behaviour, and is it sensible, given that even the greatest experts today would have trouble in picking out true terrorists on sight? How far can one go in targeting specific communities known to be susceptible to the terrorist virus without making the already hard challenge of maintaining trust and harmony in multiethnic social systems even harder? How far is it reasonable to warn and alarm citizens without knowing also how to *enable* them to do the right thing before, during, and after an actual emergency?

A second set of issues arises when considering political systems and principles both at the nation-state and international levels. How far can we safely go in tightening up law enforcement and judicial practices with respect to suspected terrorists and increasing the mandate and effectiveness of the intelligence community without endangering values that are fundamental to law-based Western democracy and setting ourselves on the slippery slope towards a “police state”? This problem is posed in a more acute form when coupled with the idea of a never ending “war” on terrorism, because short-term emergency measures are self-evidently less dangerous than ones introduced with unlimited duration. It connects up with the fact that powers and resources assigned under counterterrorism programmes always seem to tilt the constitutional balance toward the executive, making it harder for elected representative institutions to exercise proper scrutiny.<sup>16</sup> This is not just a problem of the United States, but has attracted much attention in Europe, where governments’ reaction to new transnational threats has (not illogically) been to create new collective policies and new centralized resources and competences in the transnational framework of the

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<sup>16</sup> This is particularly so when expeditionary military operations (or one-off strikes like that made by U.S. forces against a terrorist target in Yemen in 2002) constitute a major and preferred form of antiterrorist action, since the elected leaders even of the most democratic countries normally have extensive “war powers,” allowing them to conduct such operations with minimal parliamentary control or consultation.



European Union. The European Parliament has little or no chance to question and scrutinize these new measures and there is concern that they have been pushed through in a way that also marginalizes national assemblies. They will fall to be implemented in an expanded union of twenty-five countries, where the ex-Communist members may not have the same longstanding “civil society” checks and balances to prevent abuse. They also come at a time when concern is surging, especially in the richer EU countries, about illegal migration and bogus asylum-seekers—leading some observers to worry that supposedly antiterrorist controls may be misapplied in practice for other discriminatory and restrictive purposes.<sup>17</sup>

A third layer of the security-versus-values problem, though perhaps less explored in this volume, concerns the effects on the *international* society of the West’s new counterterrorist agenda and of actions taken in its name. One well-known concern is that the West risks discrediting the whole notion of free-market participatory democracy and alienating even the more reform-minded constituencies abroad by acting in what may be seen as a selfish, unprincipled, and oppressive manner against weaker opponents it associates with the “new threats.” The charge of hypocrisy is stronger when it can build on weaknesses now exposed in the West’s evidence and justification for armed actions and on cases of disrespect for law and democracy within the West’s own jurisdiction. Then there is the risk that Western aid given to countries and regimes identified as allies against terrorism (or as needing to be defended against it) may end by propping up undemocratic regimes and turning a blind eye to, or even materially aiding, their internal human rights abuses.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> On the last point, see e.g., the chapter by M Caparini, especially sections IV-V, in *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* (as note 1 above). At the conceptual level, some Western analysts have objected to the way latest policy trends have “securitized” issues formerly better placed in the context of (for example) internal law and order. This concern is understood if it relates to the risk that such issues will increasingly be handled in an adversarial, coercive, and zero-sum style. But the terminology is perhaps unfortunate, since modern definitions of (at least) “human” security have included internal security and societal dimensions for some time already, and since modern security research is directed in large part to finding ways that are *not* adversarial, coercive, or zero-sum to handle even the most traditional and “hard-core” security problems.

<sup>18</sup> Different aspects of this problem are illuminated by Uzbekistan, a country formerly rewarded with military aid by the United States in return for, for example, basing facilities for the war in Afghanistan, but to which the United States had to cut off aid in mid-2004 because of blatant democracy abuses; and Libya, whose economic and political rehabilitation the United States and the United Kingdom pushed through in 2004 following its renunciation of WMD but at a time when its internal arrangements remained dictatorial.

Other more detailed problems include the growing concern that the United States' tougher visa rules introduced after 9/11 have cut the level of admissions of foreign students and researchers to the United States, on a scale out of all proportion to the possible number of really suspect applicants, thus further worsening the prospects for cross cultural understanding between the United States and others as well as diverting helpful revenues to foreign academic bodies.<sup>19</sup>

## Security Actors: New Roles, New Interplay?

As nations with longstanding domestic terrorism problems well know, any counterstrategy worthy of the name must (1) combine military, internal security, border control, and intelligence resources in the front line; and (2) balance and coordinate them with other levers of influence and change (economic, social, political, educational) over the longer term. A particular strength of this volume is the detailed attention it pays to these challenges and the way it relates them to wider ongoing currents of security sector change and reform in North America and the wider Europe.

In these regions, at least, the pressure created by counterterrorism strategy that focuses on new-style homeland security and expeditionary military action coincides with dynamics that have been working ever since the end of the Cold War to deemphasize traditional territorial defence and deprioritise the force and equipment types most tightly linked with it. Professionalisation, specialization, and burden-sharing, mobility and flexibility, and preparedness to operate in cross-sector and multifunctional partnerships going far beyond the old concept of CIMIC (civil-military cooperation)—these are demands that would be facing the OSCE area's military establishments today, even if 9/11 had never happened. The question of whether and how uniformed military forces should support the civil authorities in dealing with homeland emergencies would be raised by (for instance) floods and droughts, major pollution disasters, nuclear accidents, epidemics, power outages and interruptions of supply, or major strikes and civil disturbances, even if none of these were ever triggered by or associated with terrorists. Countries with an exportable surplus of military capacity would be called upon to use it in the form of international peace operations (under whatever flag) because of the direct and indirect damage that conflicts in other regions are seen as doing to developed-world interests, even if none of these conflicts had causes specifically linked with terrorism or involving

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<sup>19</sup> See the Annex by Phyllis Bonanno in A. Bailes and I. Frommelt eds., *Business and Security* (as note 7 above).

the West's own terrorist enemies. And since terrorism is often a secondary cause or consequence of conflict, especially when combined with "weak state" phenomena and/or ideological and ethnic differences, Western peacemakers might find themselves contending with the challenge of terrorism in the field of operation (or "insurgency," as British military doctrine prefers to name it) even if they were wholly innocent of terrorism at home.

This is a longer way of saying that the new preoccupation with counterterrorism is not the first or the only modern historical trend to open up the question of *what armed forces are for* in the present environment, or of how they should relate to other agencies and forces of order and protection, both when operating at home and abroad. And this in turn should warn us against drawing hasty or facile conclusions about what changes are necessary, feasible, and tolerable in light of the latest threat reassessment. A first-order question is to what extent military power is a good response at all to terrorist threats, and—as noted above—experience in Afghanistan and Iran (not to mention ongoing Israeli/Palestinian problems or the Russian performance in Chechnya) have already introduced plenty of caveats into that debate. Very interesting second-order issues explored in this volume include:

- To what extent can the soldier reasonably and rationally be expected to take on a "constable" or "guardian" role, both at home and abroad? If he/she does play a part in internal order and in support of law and justice operations, i.e. against terrorists, what changes does this demand in overall military organization, equipment, training, and individual capacity and initiative? What balance of firmness, confidence, and "hearts and minds"—winning activities is required for successful counterinsurgency actions?
- Conversely, how far can police and gendarmerie-style and border protection capabilities be mobilized and exported to support or even replace military interventions, including those linked with terrorism? What extra complications arise when agencies normally used to support domestic law and national boundaries are placed in a foreign environment?
- Does the optimal solution lie not in the mixing and blurring of roles but in the better combination of military and non-military capabilities for a given operation? What types of mutual understanding, respect, and coordination are needed to allow the effective deployment of these different kinds of expertise while retaining unity of command?

To return to the argument made above: even if good answers could be found to all these questions, it would still be necessary to stand back and ask to what extent the next stage of military reform (national and

institutional) should be geared to *precisely these terrorist-related desiderata*, and how far they need to be traded off against other remaining tasks and roles of armed forces, including (even if only residually) those of territorial self-defence.

The contributions in this volume that focus on the challenges for police, border control, and intelligence services offer some interesting analytical parallels. These professions too are being driven to focus simultaneously on new dangers within the home territory and with the identification and combating of threat factors at very long range. They are called upon increasingly to operate within a framework of globally- or institutionally-set regulations and with a wide range of international partners, some less familiar and congenial than others. The culture shock involved for them will often be greater than for the military, given that the latter (at least in the Western world) has been operating for decades in an environment of cooperative defence and multilateral control, while allied nations' police and intelligence experts have worked apart and even competitively. Intelligence, much more persistently than military work, has continued to be viewed as a zero-sum game and intelligence exchange as a place for "*juste retour*." Leaving aside such intangible obstacles, however, the specific problems for policing, frontier security, and intelligence seem very similar to those for the military. Flexibility, multitasking, and adaptation to new threats (and their new characteristics) are of the essence; high technology must be paired with improved individual insight and initiative; and greater risks must be faced when using infiltration techniques (if they are possible at all), such as when special forces have to operate deep in enemy territory. Intersector partnerships must become closer, but there are "bad" and "good" routes to coordination, and one of the "bad" tracks would be to shift police responsibilities too far and too openly toward intelligence work. A broader issue, which applies across the range of these activities and also across military ones, is how feasible and how wise it is for the opponents of terrorism to learn from and copy terrorism's (especially TNT's) characteristic forms of organization. It is tempting to draw parallels between Al Qaeda-type networking and U.S. forces' "network-centric warfare"; but while a near-empathetic understanding of terrorist methods is clearly vital, the urge to imitation needs several rounds of second thoughts. The style of the defender can rarely be that of the attacker, and this is particularly so when the defender wishes to remain consistent, democratically answerable, and within the international law, while the attacker draws his strength from being everything that is the opposite.

In the present environment, multinational institutions are an important category of "actors," and some of the contributions in this volume discuss their roles. Naturally, they look most closely at the institutions central to European security—NATO and the European Union—

though it would have been worth acknowledging also the relevance of the OSCE and Council of Europe (notably in the “values”-balancing context). The EU is correctly portrayed as an organ more truly central to the fight against terrorism than NATO ever could be, (1) because of its general power to pass legislation directly applicable within its members’ jurisdiction and thus to address (*inter alias*) the non state transactions so crucial for terrorist dynamics; (2) because of its specific “Justice and Home Affairs” policies, which were rapidly developed and extended to deal with terrorism in two main bursts of activity (early 2002 and Spring 2004 after the Madrid bombings); and (3) because it can bring such a wide range of tools—financial, economic, humanitarian, functional, political, and diplomatic, as well as military—to bear upon a given terrorism-related challenge abroad. NATO, nevertheless, remains an important framework for addressing the aspects of the challenge more directly geared to military structures and operations—not just among member states but also with its major outside partners like Russia and Ukraine; and its longstanding civil defence and emergency planning expertise should perhaps be drawn upon even more energetically than hitherto to illuminate the “homeland defence” aspect of the problem. Larger questions that this book cannot answer are whether the EU’s wider and NATO’s relatively narrower competences in this currently agenda-topping field reflect a more general shifting of leadership in the European security domain from one institution to the other; how far the main axis of United States/Europe coordination and debate is therefore shifting from the North Atlantic Council to the U.S./EU relationship (expressed through direct dialogue but also in other settings like the UN and G8); and whether the EU is structurally and politically mature enough to grasp and properly carry this growing burden.

## Final Remarks and Other Questions

There is always a trade off between coherence and comprehensiveness, and some interesting aspects of the effects of terrorism and counterterrorism since 2001 are necessarily lacking from this volume. One is the thorny question of how seriously to take, and how to deal with, the linkage between terrorism and the wrongful acquisition or use of WMD. Links between terrorism and organized crime are less open to dispute and interpretation but nonetheless have been relatively little explored in the recent literature. Another large topic is the role of the private sector as a target for terrorism, as the milk cow for practical countermeasures like transport security, as terrorism’s potential facilitator (through money laundering, trafficking, etc.), and as government’s po-

tential partner in both preventive and corrective antiterrorist measures.<sup>20</sup>

Generally speaking (though not exclusively), this volume's authors deal with the terrorism challenge as seen from a Western or Northern viewpoint. They do not explore at any length the possibly diverging implications of local, conflict-linked, "intra-South" terrorist attacks or the even sharper conundrums they pose for democratic development. They cannot do more than hint at second-order effects of the West's short-term burst of antiterrorist energy, such as the diversion of attention and resources from other security challenges at home and abroad or the sudden hike in U.S. military expenditures for terrorist-related wars and homeland defence, with all its implications for fiscal and trade balances and for financial stability in general. They illuminate generic aspects of the terrorism/conflict linkage but do not go into the way that the counterterrorism agenda may have influenced the actual pattern of armed conflict and conflict resolution in the years since 9/11.<sup>21</sup>

As noted in the opening section above, international opinion on the 9/11 attacks and the way with which they were dealt is already going through a phase of revisionism that has readdressed and recoloured almost every point in the picture. Just as the failure to find WMD in Iraq does not mean that WMD proliferation has ceased to pose an acute threat in other countries and other contexts, it would be a tragedy if the (often fully justified) second thoughts now dominating the debate on terrorism should dampen and divide the energies still needed to combat this very real menace. For the sake not just of the transatlantic community but all parts of the world, it is essential that the current phase of reflection—as mirrored also by the contents of this book—should be used as an opportunity to "*reculer pour mieux sauter*."<sup>22</sup> The next phases of antiterrorist and counterterrorist policy in the developed West and the entire world have nothing to lose and everything to gain from looking difficulties and contradictions in the face, from admitting mistakes, and from placing terrorism (especially TNT) in a more finely balanced proportion to other older, new, and even newer threats to humanity.

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<sup>20</sup> The private-sector implications of the "new threats" agenda, but also of other current security preoccupations, are explored in the *Business and Security* volume mentioned in note 7 above.

<sup>21</sup> A discussion of this question based on the evidence so far available is included in the analytical chapters on Armed Conflicts of both *SIPRI Yearbook 2003* and *SIPRI Yearbook 2004* (notes 1 and 5 above).

<sup>22</sup> "Draw back to better jump forward."