

Chapter 6

Consolidating the Security Sector in Post-Conflict States: Polish Lessons from Iraq

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1 Introduction

The growth in the number of weak or failing states around the world raises the risk that the frequency of conflicts will remain on the rise. Collectively or through individual states' efforts the international community will be forced to take a stand in defence of the principles on which the UN Charter is based. Consequently, interventions are likely to become more common. Whether a post-conflict state falls back into violence will depend foremost on how effectively the security sector has been consolidated.

The tasks associated with re-establishing lasting security are often subsumed under the concepts of nation-building or post-conflict reconstruction. James Dobbins, a former U.S. special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, currently at RAND, has defined nation-building as “the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy.” Such a definition implies a key role performed by the military in ensuring a return to “normalcy”. Another term - post-conflict reconstruction – may, however, better reflect the nature of the engagement of an intervening power and international organisations. Robert Orr, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Strategic Planning at the US State Department considers this to be “efforts by the United States and other actors to help local actors build

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up a minimally capable state in four key areas: governance; social and economic well-being; and justice and reconciliation.” In essence then, it is an effort to assist and empower local stakeholders so as in time they may reclaim ownership of the security sector.

States in post-conflict situations suffer from a shortage or lack of effective uniformed personnel required in order to maintain security. Where there are local security forces these often necessitate re-building, transforming or reforming. This is usually the case when an intervention heralds a regime change. The security sector includes all organisations authorized to use, or order the use of force to protect the security of the state and its citizens. As defined by a leading authority in this field, Nicole Ball, the security sector encompasses the following elements:

- i) the security forces (armed forces, police, paramilitary and intelligence services);
- ii) the relevant ministries and offices within the executive branch charged with managing and monitoring the security forces (such as ministries of defence, finance, internal and foreign affairs, national security councils, as well as budget and audit offices);
- iii) informal security forces;
- iv) the judiciary and correctional system;
- v) parliamentary oversight committees
- vi) private security firms;
- vii) civil society.²

Security sector reform (SSR) is a systematic, multi-faceted process whereby the mission and organisation of the various components of the security sector are adjusted in such a way as they conform to the principles of security sector governance (SSG). These principles entail that: (1) responsibility for security policy must remain in the hands of democratically-elected civilian authorities; (2) security providers should

² Nicole Ball, “Transforming Security Sectors: The World Bank and IMF Approaches” in *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 45-66.

be controlled by these authorities and a division of institutional competencies should be set by the constitution; (3) security policy ought to be transparent; (4) the national security arena should be inclusive, and shaped, in addition to government officials, also by civil society actors such as NGOs.³ Although some norms, principles and standards in SSG have been agreed upon and codified (*vide* the OSCE Code of Conduct), no universal or ideal-type paradigms exist, which can be applicable in all post-conflict situations. The main transmitters of norms and values in this area have been multilateral institutions. These have been the UN at the global level and, regionally, organisations such as NATO, OSCE or the EU.

Recent years have witnessed a spate of interventions – including actions taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and Congo. Although the mandate of the mission in each case has differed, they all sought to rectify a situation that threatened the security not only of the population within a war-torn country, but also regional security. Because a durable reestablishment of security tends to be measurable in at least a decade rather than years, finding a definitive answer to the question whether the international community has succeeded in SSR should be left to the future. This particular study will be limited largely to the challenges of security sector reform in Iraq as viewed on the basis of the experiences of the Polish stabilisation forces. Because the stabilisation and reconstruction of Iraq is an on-going challenge, an attempt to draw conclusions as to what are the ingredients and means of handling a comprehensive security sector reform would be too ambitious. Instead, this study will seek to extrapolate some Iraqi lessons for future security sector reforms in post-conflict states.

³ Rafał Domisiewicz, “The Challenges of Reconstructing the Security Sector in Iraq”, paper presented at the 16th meeting of the PfP Consortium Euro-Atlantic Security Study Group in Cracow, 22 September 2003.

2 Polish Contribution to Stabilisation and Reconstruction in Iraq

2.1 A Point of Entry

On the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 1441 (of 8 Nov. 2002), 678 (29 Nov. 1990) and 687 (3 April 1991), Poland, as a member of the US-led “coalition of the willing”, participated in Operation “Iraqi Freedom” aimed at ousting the regime of Saddam Hussein.⁴ After the end of major combat operations in April 2003, Poland agreed to the US request to help stabilise and rebuild Iraq. The then Polish Minister of Internal Affairs, Krzysztof Janik expressed interest in taking on this mission, pointing out that Polish experts *“could support the Iraqi police force logistically, organisationally, we could train them, help them take advantage of modern equipment and teach them ways of functioning in a democratic society.”*⁵ Arriving in Iraq to assume command of the Multinational Division-Central-South (MND) on 3 September 2003 Poland learned quickly that it faced an atypical post-conflict scenario. The first commander of the Multinational Division, Gen. Andrzej Tyszkiewicz admitted: *“we were going in to enforce peace, however upon arrival in Iraq, we realised that there were offensive activities still taking place, for which we were unprepared and in which we were prevented from participating by nature of our mandate.”* Therefore - to use an expression employed by Walter Slocombe – the Coalition confronted the challenge of “security sector reform ‘under fire.’”⁶

To be fair, the allies shared much of the responsibility for failing to prevent the collapse of law and order which accompanied transition from combat to post-conflict reconstruction. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz said candidly, *“The current level of terrorist activity is higher than we had anticipated. It is*

⁴ Around 200 Polish soldiers took part in combat, including GROM (Mobile-Operational Reaction Group) and FORMOZA (Naval Frogmen Group) special forces, a chemical decontamination unit as well as ORP *Kontradmiral X. Czernicki* logistical ship.

⁵ “Rumsfeld prosi Polskę”, AOL.PL (16 April 2003).


⁶ Walter B. Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire’” in A. Bryden and H. Hänggi, *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Lit Verlag, Münster, 2004.

partly caused by mistakes made by the coalition shortly following the end of military operation in Iraq.” Not only was there no integrated planning to effect seamless transition from combat to stabilisation, but the Allies also lacked the capabilities needed to address a panoply of reconstruction tasks.

Undaunted by the challenges Poland was determined to help stabilise and rebuild Iraq, which it saw as a potential model of democratic reform that would be attractive to other nations in the region. Poland embarked on a stabilisation mission with the following objectives in mind (see Fig. 1):

- i) to assist in rebuilding a stable and secure Iraqi statehood, modernising and democratising Iraqi state and society;
- ii) to pave the way for rebalancing Polish presence in the future by reducing the military component and, correspondingly, strengthening Polish political, economic and cultural activities;
- iii) strengthening the image of Poland as a reliable ally, playing an active and effective role in areas outside of Europe.

Figure 1 The main responsibilities of the Multinational Division-Central-South (MND)



Source: Gen. Lech Konopka, “Irak w Ocenie Sztabu Generalnego WP: Prognoza Rozwoju Sytuacji”, as well as author’s own information.

The Polish Foreign Ministry has maintained a political-coordinating role in overseeing Polish efforts in Iraq. The terms of reference for Polish activities were spelled out in the *The Concept of the Participation in the Rebuilding and Reconstruction of Iraq*, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 1 July 2003. Operational details of the mission had been agreed to by Poland and the US in a MoU negotiated between the US CENTCOM and the Polish MoD. As the political transformation in Iraq got underway, Poland made sure it had agreement from the new Iraqi authorities to conduct activities in the country. Consequently, the Polish provision of training and equipment for the Iraqi military was regulated in a bilateral agreement on cooperation signed in October 2004 by Polish MoD and the Iraqi Defence Ministry represented by Secretary-General of the Ministry, Dr. Bruska Shaways.

As a primary objective of Polish activities in Iraq the *Concept* saw the consolidation of Iraqi statehood and the establishment of democratic governance. For this goal to be achieved, security, public order and the safeguarding of Iraqi territorial sovereignty would have to be ensured. Once these goals had been met, power could be transferred to the Iraqis. The preferred outcome of this transfer would be the consolidation of democratic governance, based on the rule of law, democratic institutions as well as the development of a cooperative policy by Iraq towards its neighbours. Such a *finalité politique* would facilitate the accelerated modernisation of Iraqi polity, society and economy. These have been the benchmarks for progress.

2.2 The Role of the Multinational Division – Central-South in Security Sector Reform

Poland commands the Multinational Division – Central-South (MND), based in the central-south-western part of Iraq. Prior to Spain's troop withdrawal in 2004, which left open the space they had occupied to US control, the Polish zone of responsibility was 80,000km² in size and occupied by 5.2 million Iraqis - 80% of them Shia Muslims - living in 5 provinces (Karbala, Babil, An Najaf, Al-Qadisiyah and Wasit). The division originally consisted of 25 national components. The biggest of these were the Polish, Spanish and Ukrainian units. The withdrawal of

Spanish forces, together with troops from nearly all Central American states, then forces from Thailand and the Philippines, reduced the size of the MND from approx. 8,300 to 6,000 troops from 15 states.⁷ The MND had been tasked with conducting stabilisation operations in the central-southern zone aimed at creating conditions conducive to transferring military and civilian authority to the Iraqis. The main tasks of the division involved:

- maintaining security and public order within the area of MND responsibility;
- assisting in the delivery of essential supplies and rebuilding infrastructure (e.g. electricity, water, sanitation equipment and medical aid);
- collecting and safeguarding military equipment that belonged to the former Iraqi Army;
- assisting in the setting up and training of the new Iraqi security forces;
- assisting in the process of establishing new local governance authorities.

In order to help the commander of the MND fulfil such a broad mandate, the relevant Polish ministries sent senior advisers in charge of the respective political affairs (a representative of the Foreign Ministry), economic matters, cultural and social issues.

The core of the Multinational Division had been formed by the Polish Military Contingent (*Polski Kontyngent Wojskowy* – PKW), responsible for 2 provinces. Its size has evolved in response to the assessment of how much progress has been made in transferring security to the Iraqis. While maintaining order and stabilisation (*stabilisation mission*) has been the main focus of the mission of the first PKW contingent (fall 2003-spring 2004), the 4th rotation has concentrated on assisting and training Iraqi security forces (*stabilisation-training mission*). Following Iraqi elections in January 2005, Poland pulled out 800 soldiers, leaving a force of 1,700 with additional reserves at a stand-by readiness at home.

⁷ Several MND member states have announced their intention to pull troops out of Iraq in 2005. They include Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Czech Republic and El Salvador.

The contingent will probably be reduced by hundreds more troops by the end of the current year, marking the expiry of the UN mandate (UNSCR 1546), or, withdrawn after the conclusion of the 6th rotation in 2006. Polish Defence Minister Janusz Szmajdziński contemplated such a move in April 2005. However, the Polish government left the decision for a new government, which will assume power following the 2005 Polish parliamentary elections.⁸

2.2a Training the Iraqi Security Forces

Poland as a Lead Nation (LN), together with other countries participating in the Multinational Division, has trained thousands of Iraqi National Guard, Police and Border Guard personnel.⁹ For this purpose, the Division runs a Regional Academy of Iraqi Security Forces in Al-Kut. In 2003-2004, the MND helped organise, train and equip three battalions of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC; renamed the Iraqi National Guard) – 2,700 troops; two battalions of the Border Police (BP) – 535 officers; the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) – 12,000 guards posted at some 1,200 installations in Iraq; as well as the New Iraqi Police (NIP) – 15,000 officers in 79 police stations. In all, 16,000-30,000 soldiers and officers of the new Iraqi security structures have been trained under the watch of the MND.¹⁰

Designated officers from the MND HQ are currently training officers as well as nurses, communications and logistical experts, drivers and mechanics who make up the 8th Division of the new Iraqi Army's Land Forces. They hone such skills as patrolling, servicing convoys, search

⁸ The withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq will not mark the end of Polish involvement in SSR in post-conflict states. Warsaw has made a commitment to NATO that in August 2007 it will deploy the HQ of the Multinational Corps North-East to Afghanistan in order to assume a half-year command of the 9th rotation of ISAF. To date, the activities of Poland in Afghanistan have been limited largely to cooperation with US forces in Operation "Enduring Freedom" (90 soldiers at a base in Bagram near Kabul).

⁹ "Mniej polskich żołnierzy w Iraku", BBC Polish Service, 14 Dec. 2004.

¹⁰ Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, "Przebieg Misji, Realizacja Zadań, Współdziałanie z Sojusznikami", *Trudna Stabilizacja: Doświadczenia i Wnioski z Sojuszniczego Współdziałania Pierwszej Zmiany Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Działaniach Pokojowych w Iraku*, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa, 2004, p. 61. Please note that the precise quantitative data on the results of training is not available.

and rescue missions as well as rapid reaction. Assistance given to the Iraqi military is also based on the partnership concept. Units at the battalion level of the Iraqi army are paired with MND units, which give advice and monitor their progress. Further opportunities for Poland to conduct training in a bilateral framework are being discussed. The Iraqi Defence Ministry, for example, has expressed an interest in training fighter jet and helicopter pilots in Polish air force academies as well as military engineers at Warsaw's Military Technical University (WAT).¹¹

The Multinational Division has also devoted attention to organising the new Iraqi police and training judicial and correctional services. It has helped repair and equip police stations, building some from scratch. The new police units have been equipped with vehicles, communications devices and other standard issue equipment.¹² The MND forces have taught the police officers anti-terrorist techniques as well as rapid response skills. The first PKW rotation oversaw training of 150 correctional services personnel and repaired prisons as well as detention spots. It also organised six programmes of instruction in human rights and budgeting for judges, prosecutors and investigators.

The quality of much of the newly-trained Iraqi security personnel is admittedly rather poor. That is because the priority has been to shape recruits quickly so they may be put on the street as soon as possible, so as to free up foreign troops. The performance of policing by Iraqis was also intended to help win the confidence of the Iraqi people and, thanks to increased security, to ensure their loyalty to the new Iraqi authorities. Lt.-General Waldemar Skrzypczak, commander of the 4th PKW rotation pointed out that the selection of Iraqi officers to military command posts does not seem to have been well thought-out.¹³ Recruitment of unreliable individuals, despite the best efforts of MND intelligence personnel who conduct background checks (with the help of the Iraqi police and the use of Coalition databases) will remain a problem. The

¹¹ According to Roman Baczyński, chairman of Poland's biggest exporter of military equipment to Iraq, "Bumar" in *Irak – Dziś, Irak – Jutro, Prognozy Przemysłowej Współpracy z Polską*, *Irak 2004: Ku Normalności*, Akademia Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa, 2004, p. 90.

¹² Mieczysław Bieniek, "Stabilizacja II – Osiągnięcia i Porażki", *Irak 2004*, p. 36.

¹³ "Co słycać w Iraku", *Polska Zbrojna* (20 March 2005), p. 30.

newly-trained police have often proven ineffectual. During the uprising of Mukkada al-Sadr some police officers joined his ranks while others deserted their posts.¹⁴ Others have been accused of human rights abuses. In a situation where Saddam Hussein's former functionaries, including his fedains, as well as officers of the dreaded Mukhabarat (the secret police), have joined the terrorist and criminal underground, it takes courageous young Iraqi men to enlist in the new security services. Officers and recruits are targeted by the insurgents and terrorists who seek to disrupt the formation of the security sector. No immediate solution to this problem may be at hand. Security will only be improved once the overall political situation stabilises.

The MND has made substantial contribution to demining as well as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). Polish engineers have helped remove thousands of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and landmines, dismantle arms depots and destroy old ammunition stocks. They have set up a central arms depot in An Najaf, where weaponry could be stored safely. In 2003-2004, the engineering units of the MND removed mines in an area covering 30,000km² (including clearing access routes across the minefields laid on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier), destroyed about 640 thousand pieces of UXO and secured approximately 1,400 tons of ammunition. Polish soldiers found protecting about 18 sites, some 30,000km² in area, a very manpower-intensive operation. Left unattended, however, materials from these depots would sooner or later fall into the hands of terrorists or Baathists who use them to produce Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Some arms caches had been looted before the Coalition forces arrived. The MND has also coordinated the buy-back weapons program to encourage Iraqis to hand in their guns and ammunition and conducted search missions confiscating weapons in private hands. The saturation of the country with weapons ("a gun culture") will, nevertheless, remain a serious problem for the new authorities in the future.

The MND personnel, on their own or jointly with Iraqi security forces, have conducted thousands of round-the-clock patrols as well as

¹⁴ Raul A. Kosta, "Operacja Pokojowa w Iraku w Kontekście Wojny z Terroryzmem", *Trudna Stabilizacja*, p. 196.

checkpoint runs. Thanks to the joint patrols more troops were out on the streets, therefore enhancing confidence of the locals. Officers from the division have supervised the arrests of suspects and units of its military gendarmerie have guarded temporary detention centres. The MND has closely assisted Iraqi security forces during times of heightened security alert, especially during religious holidays and other important events (for instance, recent elections or the introduction of new currency), and has checked for illegal migrants. The division troops have assisted in deporting thousands of individuals who were found to be illegally crossing the border from Iran, Syria or Saudi Arabia.

Porous borders complicate SSR in Iraq. Many parts of the Iraqi frontier with Syria, Saudi Arabia, as well as Iran, are disputed.¹⁵ While the Saudi-Iraqi border in the central-southern zone (130 km) sits largely on a desert and does not include any transportation lanes, requiring simple monitoring, the border with Iran (140 km) is, for the most part, a wide-open expanse of land. In effect, Shia extremists, terrorists, including suicide bombers, have been able to enter Iraq this way. In order to address this situation, the MND forces have helped train the Iraqi Border Guard, restore its infrastructure and assisted it in managing checkpoints on roads leading from the Iranian-Iraqi border as part of “Operation Border”.


2.2b Rebuilding the Institutional Infrastructure and Fostering Local Ownership

The MND has been involved in rebuilding the institutional infrastructure of the security sector. This has been the task of *Civil-Military Cooperation* (CIMIC) units, and within them – *Governorate Support Teams* (GST, also known as Government Support Teams), headquartered in each of the provinces under division control (see Fig. 2). These units have also been running Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACC) and Civil Military Operation Centres (CMOC) tasked with coordinating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian work has been important for strengthening the

¹⁵ Raul A. Kosta, “Operacja Pokojowa w Iraku w Kontekście Wojny z Terroryzmem”, *Trudna Stabilizacja*, p. 193.

bond with the local stakeholders (a struggle to “win hearts and minds”). As an example, the division has assisted in the rebuilding of schools, construction of roads and other civilian infrastructure, as well as the purification of water for drinking.

Figure 2 An Organisation of the Governorate Support Team (GST)



Source: Multinational Division CS.

According to the testimony of a former Polish liaison officer attached to the Coalition Forces HQ, the enormous challenges facing CIMIC took the Polish military by surprise. It has been forced to constantly adjust the CIMIC structures and their activities.¹⁶ Thanks to this adaptation process, together with the experience accumulated along the way, CIMIC could expand and better perform tasks essential for anchoring security sector governance. The CIMIC and GST personnel have been meeting regularly with officials from the municipal and provincial councils as well as with religious leaders. Maintenance of open channels of communication and an emphasis on transparency helped convey the MND objectives to Iraqi elites, building up good will. In the long term, entrenching ties between SSR donors and local stakeholders would help to empower the latter. In a society as divided into ethno-religious groups, tribes and clans as Iraq, good links with the political leaders would also harness public support for the work of the MND, including security sector reform. As an example, after the first PKW commander had paid a visit to Great Ayatollah Mudaresim, an authority figure for Shia Muslims, the cleric issued a public statement, in which he praised the work of Polish troops. The Shia leader spoke also of the unique opportunity Iraq faced of becoming a democracy.¹⁷ Armed with such a “mandate” from a local leader, the Polish forces could go on about their daily business confident of the support of the local population.

MND has contributed to rebuilding structures of local governance. It has on-staff specialists in public administration, customs, health care, education, judicial system, energy, economy, banking and finance, agriculture and irrigation, housing and infrastructure, environmental protection, as well as conservation of the antiquities and archaeology. The GSTs have been helped by personnel seconded from the Research Triangle Institute (RTI), an American NGO, which advises on public administration and trains civil servants. A bottom-up buttressing of local governance complemented the attention and resources the US has

¹⁶ Dariusz Saletra, “Wykonywanie Zadań Współpracy Cywilno-Wojskowej i ich Wpływ na Strukturę oraz Działalność Dywizji Centralno-Południowej w Iraku”, *Trudna Stabilizacja*, p. 186.

¹⁷ On the basis of a personal recollection by Gen Marek Ojrzanowski, “Współpraca Dowództwa Brygady z Władzami i Miejscową Ludnością”, *Trudna Stabilizacja*, p. 94.

lavished on re-establishing central government institutions. It has brought other benefits for Iraq. The reversal of the decades-long pattern of centralised rule in favour of greater provincial autonomy has not been welcomed by everyone; much less has it proved workable in all places. Some of the disillusionment with decentralisation may be traced to the paternalistic nature of Iraqi society, which sat well with a concept of a unitary state. Other reasons have to do with meanders of democratic politics. Some provincial authorities, for instance, have complained that no money has flowed from Baghdad which would help pay for the services they were now responsible for delivering. Other local leaders simply claimed power without much support among the local public. Of course, decentralisation aimed at fostering more regional and local autonomy may be the only solution available for an Iraqi society marked by sectarian cleavages. However, as experience outside Baghdad has shown for such a remodelling of the political system to work there must first be effective local structures to take up governance challenges. Unfortunately, many local Iraqi structures of public authority would not have weathered the storm of changes without the capacity-building assistance provided by the MND.

Much of the work the CIMIC and GST has been doing may be regarded as helping familiarise the Iraqi people with democratic accountability. Some CIMIC centres, for instance, became known as “complaint centres”, for they were places where ordinary Iraqis could come, voice their concerns expecting a hearing, if not immediate help from their interlocutors. The attention they received from the MND staff and local aids helped tame people’s inflated expectations as to the ability of the new authorities to ameliorate a difficult livelihood. The CIMIC and GST brought some grievances to the Iraqi authorities, in this way accustoming them to the need to respond to popular concerns. The liaison function of the GST vis-à-vis the polity and the citizenry was an effort to introduce a new political culture to Iraq. The lesson local politicians learned that they ought to respond to the concerns of citizens would bear fruit in a future system of accountability and civilian oversight of the security sector.

The majority of Iraqis appreciated the work done by the Governorate Support Teams. As a matter of fact, some locals found it useful that foreigners kept in check local officials, some of whom were accused of incompetence, nepotism or corruption. Certain issues brought to the attention of the CIMIC/GST required legal aid. Fortunately, there was usually a legal officer at hand based in each of the provincial CIMIC HQ. Again, without exaggerating the effects of the MND grassroots work, one could regard legal assistance as helpful for anchoring the rule of law in Iraq.

Transparency of public bureaucracy, public access to information – is a fundamental value in security sector governance. The GST and CIMIC have cultivated extensive contacts with the Iraqi media providing journalists with news and information about the work of the Coalition. Even though such a move was dictated by operational contingencies – psychological operations (PsyOps) and intelligence collection (HUMINT) – it has facilitated media oversight of the security sector. Iraqi journalists have jumped at the opportunity to cooperate with the MND staff. They received basic radio equipment, printers and other gadgets essential to the trade from the MND. The division has also disseminated information directly to the public. For example, the first PKW rotation set up a free internet café at a local venue. MND representatives have sat in meetings of the municipal and provincial councils. In view of the old saying that “information is power”, public outreach via Iraqi media or directly contributes to the creation of a civil society. SSR can be successful if there is a civil society that can track developments in the security sector, and voice its views on security matters.

Poland has also sought to address one of the trickiest issues in SSR, namely recruitment and staffing in the new security sector. Polish civilian and military commanders in Iraq, taught by Poland’s experience of overcoming the heritage of a communist past have reacted critically to the inflexible, wholesale manner in which the US has applied the de-Baathification policy. The US decision to disband the former Iraqi army has also been greeted with criticism in Poland. With a stroke of a pen, the US created a large pool of angry, unemployed young men – ideal

fodder for insurgents or terrorists. Polish analysts have also taken a more holistic, longer-term view of Shia radicalism, preferring political as opposed to military means to deal with it. In fact, deputy Polish foreign minister, Bogusław Zaleski remarked candidly that mistakes the Coalition had made account in large part for Shia radicalism and their resort to violence.¹⁸ As a corrective to dangerous sectarian strife, Polish analysts have put hope in the moderation that will come about as radical clerics are integrated into the political mainstream. A policy of deliberate exclusion would remove any hope that Iraq's ethnic groups reach consensus on the future shape of Iraq, its political system or security policy.

2.3 Polish Contribution to Reforming the Security Policy Framework

Consolidation of security sector reform will prove difficult for Iraq, which lies in a region, where only two fully-fledged democracies exist (Turkey and Israel), which has witnessed many wars in recent decades and where the "security dilemma" has not been ameliorated by any worthwhile platform of institutionalised cooperation. For Iraq to become a democratic state it has to shape a democratic security policy, upholding the principles of the inviolability of borders, good-neighbourly cooperation, as well as a sensible armaments policy. Poland has sought to transfer some of its own experience with recalibrating security and defence policies in the wake of systemic change. As an example, Warsaw has been hosting 3 Iraqi students who study at the Diplomatic Academy of the Polish Foreign Ministry. They attend courses on international relations, security cooperation, the apparatus and mechanisms of foreign policy-making in a democratic system and other issues pertaining to foreign policy. They attend lectures together with Polish students – future adepts of diplomacy. Such an experience, plus the networking benefits, will prove valuable for young Iraqis, especially those who desire a diplomatic career. They are able to learn from the experiences of a country that has not only become a consolidated

¹⁸ Bogusław Zaleski, "Meandry Irackiej Współczesności", *Irak 2004*, p. 43.

democracy but has joined in the security of a community of like-minded states – the North Atlantic Alliance which guards against the renationalisation of security, as well as a democratic community *sui generis* - the European Union, where security policy is becoming more and more a subject of supranational cooperation. This example, although at present not possible to emulate in the Middle East, may hold the key to guaranteeing peace in that region. The Iraqis learn at the MFA Diplomatic Academy a fundamental tenet of security sector governance – that security policy is shaped and run by civilians. This is yet another novelty for Iraqi people. They had grown used to seeing strong men in uniform guide Iraqi security and defence policy. An outcome of this has been well-known – the wars Iraq waged with neighbours, Iran and Kuwait, as well as organised terror against minorities, including the Kurds.

Poland had seconded policy experts in Iraq to work in the structures of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – until its dissolution in June 2004. After the expiry of contracts, some experts have turned to advising Iraqi government institutions. Poland plans to maintain *senior advisors* at the Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defence (at least 6 MoD officers seconded to the Senior Advisor's office in the Iraqi MoD), Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as Ministry of Finance. It also has plans for the secondment of advisors to ministries dealing with economic affairs, including communication and construction.

2.4. NATO Training Mission

In an ideal post-conflict scenario, international organisations, best suited to specific areas of security sector reform, would pool their comparative advantages and pilot reform programmes. This has not happened in Iraq. The intervention was contested by countries denying that there had ever been authorisation for the use of force. Although Poland had maintained that there were legal-normative grounds for intervention, it nevertheless saw that the reconstruction of Iraq would not succeed if countries, other than those that had participated in the intervention, along with multilateral organisations, shirked from the responsibility to stabilise and

rebuild the country. Especially so since the UN Security Council endowed UN member states with that responsibility by virtue of resolutions 1483¹⁹ and 1511.²⁰ Apart from relevant UN agencies, Warsaw saw NATO as the most useful vehicle for carrying out tasks related to security sector reform. However, convincing all NATO members to contribute to reinforcing security in Iraq has proved arduous. The main difficulty lay in assuaging the concerns of those Allies, who feared that the entry of NATO to Iraq would constitute an ex-post facto legitimisation of the intervention, which some of them had opposed in the first place, or worse – drag the Alliance into combat. The green light for bringing NATO to enter Iraq²¹ came at the North Atlantic Council summit in Istanbul on 28 June 2004. The terms and details of NATO assistance in training Iraqi security forces were ironed out at the North Atlantic Council on 30 July 2004. After further difficult and lengthy negotiations over the form of NATO aid, chain of command as well as financing, the Alliance agreed to initiate the NATO Training-Implementation Mission in Iraq (NTIM), transformed - according to 9 December 2004 NAC decision - into the NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I). It has been tasked to support Iraqi authorities in rebuilding national security institutions and training security forces personnel.

One of the main projects the Alliance has considered for SSR is the establishment of NATO Training, Education and Doctrine Centre in Iraq (TEDC). It will be mandated with coordinating Iraqi security, personnel training as well as assisting Iraqis in the preparation of military doctrines. Around 300 NATO instructors are supposed to train more than 1,000 Iraqi officers annually, including those employed at the Ministries of Defence and Interior. Members of the General Staff are

¹⁹ UNSC 1483 “... appeals to Member States and concerned organizations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq...” (1).

²⁰ UNSC 1511 “... determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and authorizes a multinational force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq...” (13).

²¹ It must be pointed out that in June 2003, NATO agreed to assist Poland in the logistical, force-generation and intelligence aspects of forming the Multinational Division-CS.

also supposed to be trained at the TEDC due to open its doors officially in September of this year. In addition to NTM-I, Alliance members have been conducting training for Iraqi officers at NATO facilities in Germany and Norway as well as schools located on member states' territory or in third states (Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). This activity is supposed to be financed through a special fund totalling approximately 3.5 million euros.

The Alliance, moreover, is supposed to help provide equipment for the Iraqi security forces. The Training and Equipment Coordination Group set up at NATO HQ will be responsible for this. It will have at its disposal a special fund of between 50 and 100 million euros.

The Multinational Division has declared readiness to provide protection for NATO assets, if and when they would be operating in the zone of MND responsibility. Poland participates directly in NTM-I. The Polish Military Contingent has deployed a transport platoon, a force protection unit as well as a medical team (32 soldiers in total) in support of the TEDC. Poland has also dispatched an advance team of 6 instructors to help in the work of TEDC. From February to May 2005, Polish general Bronisław Kwiatkowski served as deputy head of TEDC.

Like other Alliance members, Poland has also conducted training for Iraqi security officers outside the NATO/NTM-I framework. In February 2004, the Polish Ministry of Interior sent a 10-member strong (unarmed) contingent of police officers to train Iraqi police officers at the International Training Centre within the International Police Academy in Amman (Jordan). The police officers deployed to Jordan had participated in peacekeeping missions in the past. They were given lectures as well as practical training in defence tactics, intervention techniques, driving skills, firing, as well as riot control.

2.5 *EU Training Mission EUJUST LEX*

Much of the same acrimony that stemmed from the Iraqi crisis, handicapping post-conflict cooperation in NATO, has also inhibited the EU approach towards Iraq. For a long time, to Poland's dismay, it steered clear of any engagement in the country. Eventually, the need to bridge the transatlantic divide and prevent a regional spillover of violence pushed the EU into action. On October 2004, the European Commission dispatched a fact-finding mission to Baghdad. The Commission recognised that Iraq faced a critical need for assistance in security sector reform, especially in recreating an effective judicial system backed up by strong law enforcement. Acting upon its recommendations, the European Council in November 2004 presented the then Iraqi Prime Minister Ilija Allawi with an offer of EU assistance, mainly financial, developmental and also in terms of support for UN activities in Iraq, as well as training Iraqi personnel. After difficult negotiations, mainly over where to conduct proposed training - in Iraq, as preferred by Poland among others, or, in the EU states - an option supported by France - on 21 February 2005 the EU Council agreed to deploy the EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (EUJUST – LEX).

The Political and Security Committee (PSC) has decided to treat the rule of law program as part of the ESDP mission dedicated to reforming the penitentiary system in Iraq. It envisages organising 13 courses for approximately 500 high and mid-level management staff representing the judicial and the penitentiary security sectors, as well as seven courses in criminal law to be offered to 250 people, mainly senior criminal investigators, annually. Iraqi officials will be taught methods of running the judicial and correctional system, as well as the workings of internal affairs systems in general. Thanks to EU assistance, Iraq may reach the goal of having 10,000 Iraqi Correctional Service personnel employed by 2005. For security reasons, as well as a lack of appropriate infrastructure in Iraq, the EU has decided to conduct training in facilities located in EU member states. Europeans have opted for a so-called gradual approach, meaning that once the security situation in Iraq improves, it may be possible to organise some of these programs in-theatre. The operational

phase of the mission is supposed to start in July this year and is expected to last one year. The common costs of running the Liaison Office in Baghdad and the Coordination Office in Brussels as well as transport will come to 10 million euro paid out of the CFSP budget. A retired British police officer, Steven White, was nominated on 8 March 2005 as Head of the EU Integrated Rule Law Mission.

Poland has decided to organise and finance a course in criminal law to be given at the Police Training Centre near Warsaw (Legionowo). The course would be addressed for senior rank police officers as well as investigative judges. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has assumed the lead role in organising the course.

3 **Winning the Peace – Lessons from Iraq**

The activities Poland has pursued in the area of Iraq that is under MND responsibility (see Fig. 3) have had to be coordinated with the nation-wide security sector reform which is under the auspices of the US-led Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC).

Figure 3 Polish contribution to security sector reform in Iraq

Mission	Activities	Institution in Charge
▪ Establishment of Iraqi defence ministry	▪ Secondment of 6 officers to the CPA Military Advisory Team at the Office of the Iraqi MoD Senior Advisor	▪ MoD
▪ Rebuilding and training the police	▪ Training by the Polish Military Contingent (PKW) as well as Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration (MIAA) instructors in Jordan and Poland (as planned)	▪ MoD, MIAA
▪ Training the Civil Defence Corps	▪ PKW training	▪ MoD
▪ Training the Border Guard	▪ PKW training, in cooperation with MIAA (also plans to train staff in Poland)	▪ MoD, MIAA

▪ Training the Antiquities Protection Service	▪ PKW training	▪ MoD, Ministry of Culture
▪ Transformation of Iraqi armed forces	▪ DDR, training of lower rank officers ▪ PKW training	▪ MoD
▪ Supporting the reconstruction of the educational system	▪ Rebuilding schools and vocational institutions, ensuring security of educational facilities as well as expanding the curriculum of Iraqi schools; ▪ Participation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) units and Governorate Support Teams (GST) in coordination with Iraqi Civilian Defence Corps and the Facilities Protection Service	▪ MoD, Ministry of Education
▪ Rebuilding the financial system	▪ Participation of PKW units in coordination with the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service; ▪ Assistance by the Polish Ministry of Finance representative at the Iraqi Finance Ministry ▪ Plans to train finance and banking staff in Poland	▪ MoD, Ministry of Finance and the Polish National Bank
▪ Rebuilding the judicial system	▪ Conducting repairs and supplying equipment for courts, prisons and detention centres ▪ Participation of CIMIC and GST	▪ MoD
▪ Supporting law and order	▪ Expansion of infrastructure, reinforcement of police stations ▪ Participation of PKW units as well as CIMIC and GST experts	▪ MoD, MIAA
▪ Protection of NGO and other international organisation's convoys	▪ Participation of PKW combat and logistical units	▪ MoD
▪ Civilian expert support for the Coalition	▪ Secondment of civilian specialists, including political advisors, to CPA structures	▪ MFA, MoD

Provisional Authority		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advisory role of Polish specialists attached to Iraqi government institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secondment of Polish specialists to Iraqi ministries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MFA, MoD, Ministry of Economy, MIAA as well as Ministries of Finance, Infrastructure, Agriculture, Environment and Culture
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training Iraqi diplomatic cadres 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training of 3 junior diplomats at the MFA Diplomatic Academy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MFA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training of the Fire Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plans under consideration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MIAA

Source: Polish MFA

This does not mean, however, that the experiences of the Americans, British and Poles, each of whom has administered a certain part of Iraq, were the same. Particularly for the US forces, which managed areas affected strongly by the Sunni insurgency as well as Shia violence the job involved, in addition to SSR, leading counter-insurgency offensives. The Polish forces had different Rules of Engagement (ROE) as its mandate revolved around stabilisation tasks. Therefore, the following lessons for consolidating SSR (see Fig. 4) derived from the Polish experience in Iraq may or may not be the same ones which other Coalition members would necessarily come up with.

Figure 4 Consolidating Security Sector Reform: Lessons from Iraq

	Actions required for consolidation of SSR	Rationale
1.	SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY	When conditions warrant it, the intervening coalition should conduct military operations mandated by a legitimating international authority (e.g. UN SC or the North Atlantic Council). Post-conflict transformation, also sanctioned by an international authority, should be

		subject to its oversight. Multilateral institutions should be directly involved (e.g. UN agencies, NATO, EU, World Bank).
2.	INTEGRATED, COHERENT STRATEGIC PLANNING AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT	Peace enforcement operations or any other type of intervention require an a priori comprehensive planning. The strategy should encompass all phases of military activity as well as post-conflict reconstruction. Relevant government and/or international organisation's agencies should take part in planning. This will make it possible to direct best resources to the most appropriate ends.
3.	FILLING THE POST-CONFLICT SECURITY VACUUM. DISARMAMENT AND EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL.	The intervention forces, trained in advance in law enforcement, and backed up by proper civilian capabilities, should take control of security once combat operations have come to an end. Irregular forces must be reigned in. Mines and unexploded ordnance need to be cleared.
4.	INITIATING THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE	The rule of law needs to be re-established promptly. This requires a speedy reestablishment of governance structures, including interim political authorities – initially supervised by the coalition staff. Officials of the discredited regime need to go through a vetting process before re-employment. Some institutional continuity, however, would be an asset. Such a unifying force could be an army, though purged of officer cadres convicted of human rights abuses.
5.	BUILDING NEW DEFENCE STRUCTURES AND SECURITY SERVICES	A stabilisation force, although essential for deterring challenges to the new authorities, cannot remain in the country indefinitely without risking the wrath of local population. It should at once begin training defence and security personnel that would be able to relieve foreign troops, thus moving forward the timeline for withdrawal.
6.	ENSURING REGIONAL STABILITY AND PROMOTING NEIGHBOURLY COOPERATION	If the borders are porous they need to be tightened up against incursions by foreign saboteurs, terrorists, intelligence agents as well as other subversive elements. In order to limit the damage from destructive, self-serving interference by neighbours, the intervening states should engage them in dialogue and cooperation. SSR donors should make their intentions transparent as well as ask for any help possible to re-establish security (e.g. keeping in check radicals opposed to intervention

		in neighbouring countries and tightening control of illegal transfer of weapons as well as money used to fund insurgent or terrorist groups.)
7.	PUBLIC EDUCATION AND INFORMATION CAMPAIGN	Systemic transformation should enjoy support of the local population. For this to bear fruit, the intervention coalitions should focus on communication, empowerment of a fledgling civil society, as well as consult each major step undertaken with the local stakeholders. The aim would not be to impose western solutions upon the post-conflict state. Changes should be brought in preferably in an evolutionary manner, in such a way as they do not clash with local ways, but affect gradually and over the long term a transformation of the indigenous political culture.
8.	TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP TO THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS	Consolidation of the security sector would be complete once sovereign decision-making rests in democratically-elected authorities and security sector governance becomes entrenched.

Source: R.D.

3.1 Advance Strategic Planning

The starting point for security sector reform is planning for post-conflict reconstruction as part of the intervention strategy. Both civilian and military departments should be involved. Even though conditions in a post-conflict state will likely force changes in the SSR blueprints, one cannot proceed with reform in a conceptual vacuum. Hence, there is a need for integrated strategic planning (pre-conflict, intervention and post-conflict phases of intervention); information management (transparency of information, public relations); as well as resource management (capacity building as a priority, capabilities drawn from diplomatic, military and development quarters);

3.2 Nature of the Post-Conflict Security Environment

The more volatile the post-conflict security environment, the longer and the more difficult the consolidation of SSR becomes. The end of the

combat phase of Coalition intervention in April 2003 did not generate a permissive environment in which security sector reform could be initiated. Obstacles to reform have come from terrorism, insurgency and civil disorder. The list of enemies of the new proto-democratic order is long and includes inter alia:

- Saddam Hussein loyalists as well as Sunni neo-nationalists, most of whom come from the former dictator's stronghold in the Sunni triangle around Baghdad and Hussein's birthplace Tikrit;
- terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda, especially jihadists taking orders from Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi;
- Shia militants (e.g. members of the Mahdi's militia) who seek establishment of a theocratic regime;
- criminal gangs, including weapons smugglers, carjackers and kidnappers.

These security spoilers share one thing in common: they use intimidation and violence in order to destabilise the situation in the country and turn the wrath of ordinary Iraqis, angered by insecurity, against the new Iraqi authorities, thus undermining support for Coalition policies. Common criminality has, de facto, become a strategic "force multiplier" in Iraq.²²

3.3 *Filling the Security Vacuum*

It is necessary for the intervention forces to fill the security void by assuming basic law and order functions as soon as military activities cease. Lawlessness cannot be justified under any circumstances. The tolerance the US showed towards looters at the start of post-conflict transition, which it justified as a welcome release of pent-up frustration with the old regime, instead of predisposing the population to the new political masters actually alienated it. Personal safety is the most important value for an individual, whether he/she lives in the prosperous West or in a country emerging from war.

²² Christopher Aaron, "Kidnappings endanger reconstruction in Iraq", *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 2005, p. 9.

3.4 *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*

It is important that SSR be sequenced properly. Disarming and demobilising combatants and restoring security services are the priority tasks. The Iraqi experience, albeit not comparable with other peace enforcement situations, showed that a simple demobilisation may cause more harm than good. The former US administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer, dissolved the 400,000-strong Iraqi Army in order to remove the central pillar of the Iraqi regime. However, the Army had also been the only unifying force in a society riven by sectarian factions. Dismantling it deprived the Coalition of a potentially useful tool with which to reimpose order and security. Other effects have already been described: causing pauperisation of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, contributing to their political alienation and, in effect, forcing former servicemen to join the criminal underground. Effective reintegration would likely be very difficult under these circumstances.

Another contentious issue relates to ensuring central monopoly over the use of force. Disarming paramilitary groups is one avenue, in which this can be achieved. In Iraq, the strongest paramilitary forces have been the Kurdish Peshmergas and the Shia religious militias. An attempt simply to disarm these groups would invite serious political backlash as well as violent resistance. A better alternative approach might be to try co-opting these groups and integrating them into the new security sector. An analysis of the conditions in a post-conflict state should determine the best solution. For it would be simplistic to assume that, as a rule, all paramilitary forces constitute a threat to SSR.

3.5 *Host Country Capabilities*

The multi-ethnic, multi-religious nature of Iraqi society complicates SSR. Even though Saddam Hussein resolved to enforce national unity, persecuting those who resisted (e.g. the Kurds) his overthrow revealed how fragile the Iraqi state had been and how total its subordination to the dictator had become. As soon as the regime unravelled the self-identification and loyalties of the Iraqis reverted to their most enduring,

elemental forms – the family, the clan or tribe. To compound problems religion, taking on fundamentalist shades, now permeates Iraqi political culture.

On the “plus” side, however Iraq has a fairly large educated population (a literacy rate of 58%), which could facilitate the introduction of security sector governance. In spite of gross socio-economic problems, the abundance of oil and gas should help yield resources necessary for consolidating SSR.

3.6 *Regional Support*

Security sector reform in a post-conflict state needs the support of neighbouring countries. With the exception of Turkey, Iraq is surrounded by non-democratic states. Each has reasons to be suspicious of efforts to anchor democracy in Iraq. For Iran, this would equal the consolidation of US – and – by extension – Israeli influence at its gates. For Syria - a military dictatorship - the overthrow of the Baath regime has removed its ideological ally. While Kuwait may well be interested in the transformation of Iraq, the baggage of the past will delay normalisation of bilateral relations. Turkey appears preoccupied by the Kurdish question. What is worse, according to media accounts citing US intelligence sources, some of Iraq’s neighbouring states have either turned a blind eye or actively supported the flow of agents, weapons and other means in support of the Iraqi insurgency.

Aware of the complexity of the regional situation in 2003, Polish Foreign Minister at the time, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, visited regional capitals for meetings with the leaders of Iran, Kuwait and other countries in order to explain the reasons why Polish forces would be sent to Iraq. While this has helped smooth the take-over of Polish responsibilities in the Shia part of the country – most exposed to Iranian influence, the best of diplomatic finesse could not secure the long-term support of the whole Middle East.

The post-conflict state can, however, not welcome regional support. The Iraqis have been weary of any neighbour's offer of assistance for fear this would be tantamount to interference. That is why, a proposal, the Saudis once made, to lead a Muslim stabilisation force in Iraq was rebuffed by the new Iraqi authorities. The same fate met a similar suggestion from Turkey. In contrast, the offers of training of Iraqi security personnel on foreign territory, for example, in Jordan, have been accepted.

3.7 *Legitimacy and Clarity of Mission*

If regional conditions are not propitious for SSR, it becomes all the more important to obtain the support of the international community. Poland lobbied hard to get the UN involved in Iraq's reconstruction. It welcomed the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq as mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003. Although the bombing of the UN HQ in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 had dealt a devastating blow to the mission, the UN has recovered returning to the country as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq – UNAMI. In Resolution 1483, the UN also recognised the contribution of the United States and the United Kingdom, deemed the occupation powers²³ – to restoring security and stability in Iraq and urged non-Coalition countries to help in this endeavour. The UNSC upheld the mandate of stabilisation troops in Resolution 1511 of 16 October 2003. Thus, the mission undertaken by Poland enjoyed international legitimacy and had a clear mandate – to help stabilise Iraq, in particular through helping build security sector capacity.

3.8 *Civil-Military Cooperation*

CIMIC units play an indispensable role in spearheading SSR at the end of combat operations, before the deployment of substantial non-military

²³ Under the terms of the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 the Occupying Power should be responsible for - *inter alia* - restoring and ensuring 'public order and safety'.

capabilities.²⁴ In the view of Polish Defence Minister, Jerzy Szmajdziński, one of the most important lessons the Polish military picked up from Iraq is that the Armed Forces have to be able to take on non-military tasks.²⁵ These are mainly providing “security and support to institutions and organisations as well as local authorities, giving medical and humanitarian aid, engineering as well as reconstruction of facilities and infrastructure destroyed during the war.”²⁶ According to Gen. Józef Flis, commander of the Warsaw-based National Defence Academy, CIMIC units should be staffed by specialists in local culture and religion, architects, construction engineers, restorers of antiquities, doctors, advisors in self-government, as well as experts in drawing business plans. The availability of expertise and the speed of entry and assumption of interim security sector responsibilities make CIMIC a tool of first resort at the end of the military phase of intervention.

3.9 Cooperation with the NGO's

Cooperation of the military with NGOs is an important aspect of SSR. Polish officers have admitted candidly that army-NGO relations in Iraq have not always been smooth. Neither side can bear full blame as there have been many reasons underlying the friction. Probably the biggest of these involved the clash of cultures. The military operates on the basis of strict hierarchy, with top-down decision-making, while NGOs operate far more flexibly in the field. In addition, the NGO mission leaders may be quite young, which could be cause for tension when in communication with military counterparts, often in the rank of general.²⁷ These problems must be addressed in future situations. In general terms, there has not been a great deal of NGO-military interaction in Iraq, since

²⁴ In an interesting note, Polish commanders observed that the rationale for Civil-Military Cooperation is not well understood by countries outside of NATO. Ukrainian battalions deployed in Iraq, for instance, did not contain CIMIC units. Neither did Latin American states. Polish experts had to fill the CIMIC needs in areas under the responsibility of troops from these countries.

²⁵ Jerzy Szmajdziński, “Wprowadzenie”, *Irak 2004*, p. 11.

²⁶ Gen. Józef Flis, commander of the National Defence Academy, “Wystąpienie Komendanta AON Otwierające Konferencję”, *Trudna Stabilizacja*, p. 8.

²⁷ Saletra, “Wykonywanie Zadań...”, *Trudna Stabilizacja*, pp. 186-191.

violence has deterred most NGOs save for the most determined organisations.

3.10 Transfer of Experience

What has been unique about the assistance Poland gave to Iraq in building up security sector capacity is that that, as a donor country, it has itself gone through security sector reform accompanying transition from communism to democracy. That transition was certainly of a different magnitude, taking place under far more conducive internal and external circumstances than those faced by Iraq. Nevertheless, thanks to this experience, Polish troops could take on the Iraqi challenge with what many Polish commentators emphasized was a feeling of empathy for the Iraqi people.

Polish military and civilian personnel brought up the issue of experience in meetings with Iraqi officials. This experiential, “human factor” has turned out to be a valuable asset, easing communication problems, building up trust, and plainly showing the Iraqis that the donor state does not seek to impose simply textbook solutions, but solutions that have helped it traverse the path to democracy.

3.11 Avoiding a Clash of Cultures

An intervening state has to try to adjust its perceptual lenses and methods taking into account local culture. One of the difficulties the US has faced in Iraq was that the intervention, as the Foreign Policy Centre study suggested, “signified the forcible intrusion of Western power and Western values into an Islamic country with its own proud cultural and religious history.”²⁸ It was conceivable that a climate of mutual estrangement would mar post-conflict recovery.

²⁸ Correlli Barnett, “Post-Conquest Civil Affairs: Comparing War’s End in Iraq and in Germany”, *Foreign Policy Centre*, February 2005.

Poland has been keen to avoid mistakes resulting from a clash of cultures. Before the deployment of Polish troops to Iraq, on 12 June 2003, the Polish Foreign Ministry invited scholars from the Middle East and the Arabic world and experts in Islamic studies to take part in a consultative meeting. The participants agreed that a respect for the traditions, culture and religion of the Iraqis is a decisive factor that will determine the success or failure of the mission.²⁹ Poland also had conducted a much-publicised recruitment of experts in Arabic culture.³⁰

3.12 Accountability for Human Rights Abuses. Recruitment and Staffing.

Accountability for past human rights violations is an integral element of transition. It may be facilitated either through the justice and reconciliation committee model, as in South Africa, or formal court proceedings before national or international tribunals. The Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes against Humanity has been established. The process of accountability, although it may have a short-term corrosive effect on public life, deserves the support of the international community as it marks a sharp break with the past and creates a better atmosphere for democratic politics.

The reconstruction of government institutions in a post-conflict state is bound to run into personnel policy problems. Iraq has proved no exception. A restrictive vetting process based on a “debaathification” policy may conflict with the intention to transfer ownership to the Iraqis (“Iraqi-isation”), because it restricts a pool of expertise. Reliance on members of the Iraqi émigré community to address human resource shortages is no substitute. While Iraqis who had spent time in the West bring with them a body of experience, Western know-how and a progressive mentality, they also run the risk of alienating the local

²⁹ „Doświadczenia i wnioski z przygotowania i udziału pierwszej zmiany dywizji międzynarodowej w misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku”, *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych*, Warszawa, 2004, p. 8.

³⁰ Gen. dr Józef Flis, “AON wobec Irackich Doświadczeń”, *Irak 2004*, p. 118.

population through close association with the intervening powers. There is no easy way to square this dilemma.

Another issue complicating SSR may be a preferential treatment of one ethnic group or clan over another in the recruitment into the security forces. Saddam Hussein promoted fellow Sunni Arabs, who were in a minority in Iraq, to higher officer ranks. If the Shia Arabs now institute policies of reverse discrimination this may spell trouble for the new Iraqi security sector. A great degree of flux in personnel policy may likewise undermine SSR. According to Gen. Kwiatkowski, deputy head of NATO's training mission in Iraq (TEDC), many officers who went through training are uncertain as to whether they will retain their positions within the security structures if elections affect a purge of personnel.

3.13 Embedding the Post-Conflict State in a Regional Security Framework

A future democratic Iraq may have a difficult time persuading its neighbours that it is not simply an agent of US influence in the region. Regional "status quo" powers, fearful of the domino effect of the "democratic contagion" might try to restrict the room for Iraq's diplomatic manoeuvre. In order to address this issue the international community, with the United Nations in lead, should support initiatives designed to fill the institutional void in the Middle East, in particular by 'locking' in Iraq's neighbours in an effective security cooperation network. The OSCE might be a model for such a framework of cooperation. In practice, realising this objective may be extremely difficult in the short or even medium-term. Outstanding issues concerning the Israeli-Arab conflict, as well as Iran's nuclear ambitions, would first have to be resolved before any progress could be made in institutionalising regional security.

In the face of these obstacles, a long-term commitment to Middle East security is, however, required of multilateral organisations. Thanks to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), designed to "contribute to long-

term global and regional security and stability,” a dialogue with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as well as enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), NATO appears well-suited for this role. Depending on progress in democratic consolidation Iraq could emerge as one of the most important strategic partners of the West in the Middle East. In the meantime, NATO, preferably in tandem with the EU, which has signed cooperation agreements with the GCC members as well as other Mid-East states and with UN’s patronage, should help ensure that regional conditions are conducive to reforming Iraq. The challenge will be to use the combined weight of NATO and the EU on the one hand to provide a regional security blanket, enabling seamless transition in Iraq, and on the other to share Euro-Atlantic experiences (OSCE) in order to engender cooperative security in the Middle East.

3.14 Addressing the Capabilities Gap on the Donor Side

Speaking before the parliamentary Committee for National Security and Public Security on the 50th anniversary of Polish participation in peacekeeping (22 October 2003) the then Deputy Foreign Minister Sławomir Dąbrowa noted that: *“contemporary peacekeeping missions have a very complex range of tasks to fulfill. These require not only the capabilities necessary to end the conflict as fast as possible and maintain stability, but also to engage in the civilian sphere of activities, such as the reestablishment of state institutions and economic infrastructure, the rebuilding of local self-government as well as promoting good governance at all levels.”*³¹ Awareness of the complexity of tasks has not led to any serious augmentation of capabilities for SSR. The prevailing “ad-hocism” in the planning for post-conflict reconstruction impedes a sustained post-conflict recovery. The military, despite having received little training, are asked to take over law enforcement functions;³² there are shortages of policing

³¹ Transcript no. 958 of the 102 session of the Committee of National Defence and Public Security (22 October 2003).

³² As an example, at the beginning of the Iraq mission the Polish Military Police found supervision of the detention centres where Iraqi suspects were held a difficult chore. NATO procedures (STANAG 2085 - NATO COMBINED MILITARY POLICE and NATO MILITARY POLICE DOCTRINE AND PROCEDURES) could not substitute for

capabilities and civilian-military interaction falters. As a result, it has been estimated that 40% of post-conflict countries fall back into fighting.

Major contributors to peace enforcement have started addressing the capabilities gap. The UK, for example, is establishing the interdepartmental Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit. It will include about 40 core staff and a deployable capacity of 400 from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development. The mixing of civilian and military cultures should help match respective planning capacities. Influenced no doubt by its own experiences in Iraq, in July 2004, the US State Department founded the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Canada, a traditional contributor to peacekeeping, has enhanced cooperation between the Department of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in light of the concept of the interlinked 3Ds: defence, development and diplomacy.

Because Poland is a relative newcomer to the post-conflict reconstruction, institutional reform of similar magnitude has not yet taken place. However, the country's increased activity within the EU and NATO has forced a lot of conceptual work together with some institutional innovations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will this year set up a department for development assistance. The establishment of a department solely focused on developmental aid should augment policy coordination in this field, raising its profile, as well as strengthen links with major actors in post-conflict reconstruction, the ministries of defence, finance and internal affairs. The MFA experts have been giving thought to the best ways of integrating security sector reform into developmental assistance, in part inspired by increased interest in this issue within the OECD.³³

specialised training. Waldemar Gut, "Doświadczenia i Wnioski z Udziału Żołnierzy Żandarmerii Wojskowej w Pierwszej Zmianie PKW w Składzie Sił Stabilizacyjnych w Republice Iraku", *Trudna Stabilizacja*, pp. 168-171.

³³ See, for example, *Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice*. OECD. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, 2004.

Regarding the UN as an organisation potentially best adept at post-conflict reconstruction, Poland has supported reinforcement of UN capabilities in this field. Focus on UN reform is well-justified. *The Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, released on 29 November 2004, has observed that *there is no place in the UN system to assist countries in their transition from war to peace* (XV.261). In light of the Report's recommendation that "The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance" (VII.177), Poland has championed a proposal for the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission. It would be entrusted with a responsibility i.a. "to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary" (XV.263-264). Polish Foreign Ministry welcomed the fact that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan backed up the proposal in his report of 21 March 2005 *In Larger Freedom: Security, Development and Human Rights For All*.

Poland has also supported strengthening EU capabilities in 'post-conflict rehabilitation'³⁴ and state capacity-building after conflict. The *European Security Strategy* has set as one of the strategic objectives of the Member States "putting failed states back on their feet." The EU has been meeting this commitment in the on-going operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Republic of Congo. Because "civilian crisis management helps restore civil government", as the European Security Strategy noted, the EU Member States have been building up a pool of rapidly deployable civilian capabilities to assist post-conflict states. They have already established rapid reaction capabilities in the following four priority areas: police, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection, the EU. Since effective policing is essential in the post-combat phase of intervention, in which the boundaries between military operations and law enforcement tend to be blurred, France, Netherlands,

³⁴ EU defines it as: "an overall, dynamic and intermediate strategy of institutional reform and reinforcement, of reconstruction and improvement of infrastructure and services, supporting the initiatives and actions of the populations concerned, in the political, economic and social domains and aimed towards the resumption of sustainable development."

Italy, Spain and Portugal have started forming the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).

The Force should be made up of 800-900 officers, deployable within 30 days, with a pool of 2,300 reinforcement reserves on standby. Poland has expressed an interest in joining the EGF. For this purpose, it intends to create four Special Units (*Oddziały Specjalne*) of the Military Gendarmerie, composed of 2,000 officers in total, all fully professional by 2006. Two of these units have already been set up, though they are scheduled to be operationally ready by the end of the current year. One Special Unit will be designated for the EGF, and another will join NATO's Multinational Gendarmes Force Brigade. Although the Special Units have been trained primarily for counter-terrorism and in supporting military operations, they will also take part in stabilisation and police training missions, which the EU has assumed will form part of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The European Gendarmerie Force should help fill a gap, which, as the conclusion of the "Iraqi Freedom" operation showed, opens up when the military ceases combat operations before the stabilisation force arrives.

Since NATO is the main platform for Polish defence collaboration, Warsaw has naturally been interested in the development of a full range of Allied military and non-military capabilities. The centre of gravity for NATO operations has been shifting out-of-area. Yet, even though the Alliance has taken on responsibilities in Iraq and Afghanistan it has been judged ill-equipped to handle post-reconstruction tasks.³⁵ Two studies published recently have addressed the issue of augmenting NATO capabilities in this field. In its January 2003 report *Play to Win*, the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,³⁶ set up by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that a multinational Integrated Security Support Component (ISSC) should be created within NATO. The ISSC would structure, train and equip selected units within the NATO Response Force for discharging tasks

³⁵ See, for example, Vladimir Socor, "Raising NATO's 'Relevance' Question in Afghanistan", *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, Oct. 15-17, 2004.

³⁶ It included such renowned experts as i.a. Walter Slocombe, John Hamre and Richard Holbrooke.

related to post-conflict reconstruction. Authors of the report also suggested that the ISSC should complement European efforts to create a European Rapid Reaction Force.³⁷

Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler of the National Defence University, in a September 2004 study titled *Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force* recommended a build up of the NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force (SRF). It would complement NATO force structures in so far as the NATO Response Force would be deployed in rapid, forced-entry missions, major combat operations would be handled by high readiness forces such as the Allied Rapid Reaction Force, leaving the SRF in charge in a post-conflict phase of operations. The SRF would be equipped with capabilities in military policing, psychological operations, civil affairs, judicial expertise, election monitoring, public administration and civil engineering. Whichever solution is accepted by the Alliance Member States, an augmentation of NATO capabilities in post-conflict reconstruction, particularly security sector reform, would enable it to better face the challenges of the new strategic environment.³⁸

³⁷ See “Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, CSIS and the Association of the U.S. Army, Washington DC, Jan. 2003. At <http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/playtowin.pdf>.

³⁸ Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, “Needed – A NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Force”, *Defense Horizons*, No. 45, Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University, Sept. 2004.