# Emerging Countries and International Cooperation

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Emerging countries, which have come to the fore of the international economic scene in recent years, are also highly involved in the sphere of development cooperation. For some, this represents a re-emergence (Russia, new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe, China); others, such as South Africa, India and Brazil, are newcomers to international development financing. The methods of intervention that these new actors use is currently altering the field of international cooperation, affecting the practices of DAC (Development Assistance Committee)[1] member country donors and multilateral institutions as well as the countries and regional cooperation organizations that benefit from this development aid.[2]

Having become, or again become, purveyors of aid, emerging countries have more or less explicitly developed cooperation policies with several countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. But most of them remain recipients of aid from DAC/OECD member countries and international financial institutions, even if the aid received represents only a minute portion of their development financing.

1 Specific OECD cooperation programmes are currently in place Brazil, China and Russia. The OECD also conducts a number of specific activities with other non-member countries, for instance Chile, India and South Africa.

2 In speaking of international cooperation, this article refers only to international cooperation for development. Economic, commercial and military cooperation will therefore not be discussed.

figure 66: **Official development assistance (ODA), donors and recipients, 2006**




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This dual status of recipient and donor adds complexity to international relations (Tubiana 2007, Severino 2006). For in this historically very unique context, non-emerging developing countries, particularly the least developed countries (LDCs), will radically alter the rules of international negotiation for development financing; the functioning of the fora that coordinate aid, international bodies such as the OECD, the World Bank and the European Commission, will be similarly altered.

## Emerging countries as donors

### *A historical overview*

The involvement of emerging countries on the international development cooperation scene is not a new phenomenon. During the 1950s, over 95% of public development aid was supplied by the "founders" of the DAG (Development Assistance Group working within the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), precursor of the DAC/OECD). The only donor that rivalled these founding countries (the United States, France, Germany, and Belgium in particular) in the Cold War context was the Soviet Union, with the financing of the Aswan Dam in Egypt. During the 1960s, aid from COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) member states was sent to countries having the same political orientation (such as Mali, Guinea, etc.), while students—particularly African ones—were educated in European Communist countries and in China, then a nonaligned country already involved in Africa in building urban infrastructure (stadiums, public buildings etc.).

With the first oil crisis in 1973, OPEC countries and their financial institutions became significant emerging actors in development financing, accounting for nearly 30% of the world's official development assistance (ODA). Some major projects, such as the irrigation and hydroelectric dams on the Senegal River in the framework of OMVS (the Senegal river basin authority), were mainly financed by OPEC funds, as were major highway projects south of the Sahara. In the 1970s IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) was founded to finance agricultural programmes. During the 1980s and 1990s, over 95% of world ODA was again supplied by DAC member countries and those belonging to the international financial institutions. Cooperation between emerging countries and developing countries has only really been affirmed or reaffirmed since the early 2000s.

Statistical monitoring of the flow of aid on an internationally harmonized basis—the only real way to gauge actual development initiatives—remains very difficult, but a few avenues can nevertheless be mapped out. As regards non-DAC OECD donor countries, statistics show that a country such as South Korea or Turkey supplies significant volumes of aid by comparison with other DAC donor countries (Greece and Portugal) and OPEC countries (Kuwait), even if these volumes remain lower than aid from all the other donors.

The volumes of aid from China, Brazil, India and even South Africa are not counted by the DAC, as these countries do not report their figures or use harmonized definitions of statisti-

figure 67: **Official Development Assistance (ODA) by non-DAC member donors, 2001-2005**




Source: Compied by Jean-Jaques GABAS, from the DAC/OECD Chair Report, Paris, OECD 2006.

Sciences Po / CERI et Atelier de cartographie, March 2008 cal categories. Only more or less reliable estimates are therefore available: some data reflect annual payments, others reflect pledges to finance over an unspecified number of years. Financial conditions generally remain confidential since aid policy continues to be considered a strategic element of foreign policy. As for the specific content of these aid policies, the often very vague outlines of what may be implemented locally in each state have to be filled in by surmise.

### *China in Africa*

Development aid disbursed by China remains obscure, the various statistics being difficult to compare as they are incomplete and the sources are unreliable. According to the 2003 and 2006 editions of the *China Statistical Yearbook*, total Chinese aid amounted to about US$970 million in 2005, compared with $650 million in 2002 (Lancaster 2007). But for many observers and analysts, the flows are actually much higher, varying between 1 and 2 billion US dollars. Official Chinese statistics apparently only take into account Foreign Trade Ministry data.[3] The portion allocated to Africa apparently amounts to 30%-50% of the total. These overall and very uncertain estimates show the scope of aid and make China a donor on the same level as Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark.

China's strategy in Africa[4] is particularly interesting in that it is a reflection of a real public policy constructed around a set of highly coherent actions (Gabas 2006). Africa is and has always been a major diplomatic issue between Beijing and Taipei (Taylor 1998). Any cooperation agreement between an African country and China can only be made if it breaks with Taiwan. The primary basis for cooperation is not a partnership in the sense spelled out by the DAC in March 2003 in its Principles for Effective Aid, but reciprocal advantages with more or less clear compensation in terms of economic or trade advantages upon signature. Cooperation agreements are systematically presented as a win-win venture between the two parties. The compensation materializes as access to mineral raw materials and forest concessions (Coussy & Gabas 2007) and aid liaison.

China, in its dealings with Africa, observes a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs and thus in questions of governance. This attitude contrasts with the principles of intervention set out by donors such as the World Bank or the European Union, which allocate aid according to the criteria of "good govern-

3 The Chinese authorities seemed to want to model their practices on administrative and political forms of aid management. They are pondering the creation of a specific agency and have made contacts with the DFID (Department for International Development) in the United Kingdom, the Swedish International Developmemt Agency, the Canadian government and USAID (United States Agency for International Development) (Lancaster, 2007).

4 Chinese foreign policy aiming to guarantee its supply of raw materials and open its markets does not only apply to Africa. In fact, Latin America, the second-largest destination of Chinese FDI after Asia, which receives 60% of it, received nearly 16% of Chinese FDI in 2004 (Santiso, 2006). Conversely, Brazil is also investing in China.

ance". China is only interested in a country's political stability, seen as conducive to economic exchanges. This orientation enables it to maintain relations with pariah states such as Sudan, practice arms policies that contravene Western rules, reject the universal application of human rights principles, and advocate non-interference as the foundation of foreign policy initiative. The six main themes of Chinese foreign policy (Gabas 2006) shed light on the country's strategy in Africa: securing oil and raw material supplies; establishing more and more private companies involved in infrastructure construction; providing incentives for establishing a diaspora; signing bilateral trade agreements; and an assertive development cooperation strategy, and lastly, military cooperation policy. This situation perturbs DAC donor cooperation policies: their allocation criteria are at odds with China's, and the international consensus on the fight against poverty, i.e. the Millennium Goals, are not shared by the Chinese authorities. As for debt reduction initiatives (Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, HIPC), in certain countries these are accompanied by phenomena of re-indebtedness on an unknown scale. However, in December 2007, China's coming on board as an IDA (International Development Association) donor for the 2008-2013 period can also be analyzed as the sign of the desire for coordination with other donors. But the lack of conditionality that still characterizes Chinese aid to the present day is perceived, rightly or wrongly, by African states as a fundamental aspect that gives them real bargaining power with respect to all donors, which may enable them to break free from historic relationships often perceived as too overbearing, and whose effectiveness, in addition, is widely disputed (Gabas 2002).

### *Indian uniqueness*

India is considering regional or bilateral accords (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements, CECA) with Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Russia and the European Union. Although the aim of these agreements has to do with increasing trade and investment flows, they nevertheless have effects on development aid policies. The Indian Development Initiative project emphasizes a new lending instrument: India could borrow capital on international markets and refinance projects, particularly in Africa south of the Sahara. Over 85% of these loans—amounting to between \$300 million and \$400 million, ten times the 2004/2005 amount—would be tied and would thus have to be spent in India. Furthermore, Delhi backs NEPAD programmes to the tune of between \$200 million and \$500 million in a credit line at Eximbank for West Africa, in the context of its TEAM-9 (Techno-Economic Approach for Africa-Indian Movement) programme. India wants to share with African countries the benefit of its expertise in areas such as information technology, pharmaceutical manufacturing and health care. Nevertheless, aid as a means to finance development is presented with a risk of increased dependence with regard to the donors, which points to the limits of aid as a development factor.[5]

### *The African situation*

South Africa's development aid policy was the focus of debate at an ANC (African National Congress) conference in June 2007. An annual contribution by the South African International Development Agency (SAIDA), an agency based within the Foreign Affairs Ministry or the Treasury, of aid ranging from 0.2 % to 0.5% of GDP was considered. This agency would concentrate on the major issues facing the continent, providing aid to countries in post-conflict situations and on the road to democratization; it would thus be conditional. Such development aid policy is part of South Africa's broader foreign policy, which rests on three pillars: consolidation of the African agenda, and South-South and South-North cooperation. Regarding the latter aspect, South Africa is demanding a strategic partnership with the European Union similar to the one engaged with China, Brazil, India and Russia.

Prior to 1989, Hungary and Czechoslovakia devoted 1% of their GDP to development aid for "brother" countries such as Ethiopia and Angola, from which several thousand students were trained in the universities of Central Europe. In the same way, many Malian and other African students were trained in Russia. These states put an end to their cooperation policy in the 1990s, restarting it in the early 21st century with neighbouring countries, especially those in the Balkans and Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and further-off socialist countries like Vietnam. The overall contribution of countries that entered the EU after 2004 remains marginal and only concerns Africa to a very small extent. The Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) that have expressed the desire to join the DAC are seeking to share their experience of political, economic and institutional transition, and make no secret of the fact that their aid also fits within an international security objective.

All things considered, emerging countries will in the medium term become real actors in the field of development cooperation. The areas of food aid, regional conflict resolution, international debt and relations between the EU and Africa are good illustrations of this new international situation. If the total flow of food aid for the 1998-2006 period is analyzed, one notes a general downward trend with significant inter-annual fluctuations. The total volume went from 8.4 million grain equivalent tons in 1998 to 6.7 million in 2006.

5 India refused international emergency aid during the December 2004 tsunami. Aid earmarked for India hardly represents more than 0.1% to 0.2% of its GDP in recent years. But one must keep in mind the subtle game India was playing in the 1960s in its diplomatic relations and cooperation agreements, which enabled it to receive financing both from the United States and the USSR.

In this context, China considerably increased its food aid to reach 576,000 grain equivalent tons in 2005, a significant volume by comparison with European aid, which amounted to 1.6 million grain equivalent tons the same year; in 2006, it dropped back down to 144,000. This aid, basically directed at food emergencies in Asia, particularly in North Korea, only rarely concerns the African continent. If the volumes allocated remain low in certain African countries, they are programmed without any consultation with other donors. But food crisis situations are increasingly complex: conflicts in one country produce effects in the subregion to which it belongs and more generally on the functioning of grain and food markets. Poorly programmed and poorly targeted food aid can have considerable adverse effects on populations.

As regards conflict resolution, South Africa now plays a major role in Africa and in particular in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The latter country, however, has just borrowed $5 billion from China to be repaid in raw materials. The situation is becoming more complex in Africa, where South Africa is devising its own cooperation policy without at all consulting the new donor China.

Now that the credit-worthiness of African countries has been restored through multiple bilateral and multilateral debt foirgiveness initiatives, donors have defined a reasoned process of re-indebtedness in a conditional framework, so as not to fall back into the debt/cancellation cycle, taking into account each state's debt-burden threshold (Djoufelkit-Cottenet 2007). The re-indebtedness process, necessary for development financing, is subject to conditions. But several African states are very tempted to go further into debt than the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF) allows, with emerging countries—because of the virtual lack of conditionality. Although the latter pay lip service to a need for coordination, they stray from it in practice when it comes to implementing their policies in the various states.

Lastly, as paradoxical as it may seem, emerging countries are at the heart of renegotiation of the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, as illustrated by President Abdoulaye Wade's recent statement: "If Europe doesn't want to form the new EU-ACP partnership, the Chinese will do it faster and cheaper." The President of Senegal also declared: "It's not because there's Darfur that you can't invest in Africa," considering that EU's excessive caution regarding investment in Africa could largely be compensated by emerging country investment, from China in particular. But more basically, the traditional donors believe they hold the key to "good aid practices" and consider that emerging countries must adopt directives from the various international bodies (the DAC, the United Nations, etc.). According to F. Bourguignon,[6] "the World Bank

6 He moreover finds that "the duration and interest rates of loans granted by the World Bank to emerging countries are close to market conditions; the attribution procedure is very involved. Some large countries thus decide to do without, such as Mexico which borrowed $29 million in 2007, peanuts compared with the billion dollars that used to be commonly requested. The World Bank might just disappear from these countries." (*Le Monde*, 13 November 2007).

table 6: **Official development assistance in selected emerging countries**

| | South Africa | India | China | Brazil |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Volume of ODA* (2003-2005)<br><br>*flow behavior* | 650<br><br>*stable* | 1100<br><br>*unstable* | 1500<br><br>*rising* | 180<br><br>*stable* |
| Private transfers * | 5000 (in 2005)<br><br>*very unstable* | 5114 (in 2005)<br><br>*rising* | 19205 (in 2005)<br><br>*rising* | -764 (in 2003), +20734 (in 2005)<br><br>*very unstable* |
| Five largest donors | European Commission, United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany | World Bank, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, European Commission | Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, World Bank | Japan, Germany, France, United States, Netherlands |
| Population** | 45 | 1094 | 1300 | 186 |
| Per capita GDP *** | 4900 | 720 | 1740 | 3460 |
| ODA/GNP | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0% |

Sources: DAC/OCDE data. * = current USD millions, ** = millions of inhabitants, *** = current USD.

currently does a poor job of handing on the experience it has accumulated, because it has a tendency to utter uniform recommendations and doctrinaire formulas."

## Emerging countries as recipients of aid

Emerging countries receiving bilateral or multilateral cooperation programmes have rather specific development financing profiles if one takes into account aid volume, private transfers and the main partners.

Depending on the donor, the pace and the degree of intervention can be fairly different, revealing divergences in economic or even geostrategic issues in these countries. On the other hand, most bilateral cooperation takes place in similar areas with an emphasis on the question of global public goods.

In the four emerging countries of South Africa, India, Brazil and China, we note the ongoing involvement of Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan. For various reasons related to their history and foreign policy, these three last countries enter into development cooperation agreements without ever mentioning the word "aid", contrary to what DAC members do with respect to the LDCs.

Germany for instance considers that cooperation with countries such as China should fall within a "strategic partnership", because of attendant environmental issues. The areas of intervention are enlightening. The aim of German assistance is to foster dialogue, build scientific networks and promote staff exchanges between the various administrations in charge of managing aid. But the most original direction involves setting up triangular cooperation programmes between Germany, an emerging country and a developing country, often an LDC. Given the very nature of economic growth in "anchor countries" (China, India, and Pakistan, Thailand, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Turkey) and the issue of governance and regional security, taking account of global public goods (primarily environmental ones) constitutes another, more general aspect of its strategic cooperation. German cooperation thus does not consider China (or Brazil, India or South Africa) as mere "recipients" of aid, because these countries have the capacity to build their own poverty reduction policies. In terms of modalities, Germany's financial resources are allocated to China in the form of loans on near market conditions, with Chinese compensation for each cooperation project. The policy of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is very similar to Germany's, and emphasizes the environmental question as well as individual freedoms in the case of China. The 2005-10 CIDA plan announced a substantial increase in aid without giving figures. With Brazil, cooperation agreements are more focused on reducing inequalities. With Russia, the programmes date back to 1991 and have to do with governance and measures to accompany the transition process.

France has only recently taken an interest in emerging countries.[7] A particular feature of French aid is high concentration in a "priority solidarity zone" ("*zone de solidarité prioritaire*" or ZSP) grouping 55 countries, 45 of which are in Africa. Among the 20 most aided countries, 14 are on the African continent. The Emerging Country Reserve[8] represents 300 million euros out of a total ODA volume which in 2006 amounted to 8,445 million euros. The main themes of intervention presented in the Gaymard report (2006) are higher education, interventions in the field of global public goods and support for private French companies. The report's conclusions, sanctioned by the Védrine report (2007), placed particular emphasis

7 The French development agency, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), was authorized to intervene in Thailand, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Egypt and China in October 2003, and in Indonesia after the tsunami of 26 December 2004. In 2006, The Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) authorized the AFD, whose mandate was broadened in 2001, to intervene in India, Brazil and Indonesia (not only in the context of reconstruction operations) in an experimental capacity as well as in South Africa after the transition in 1994.

8 The following countries are eligible for an emerging country reserve (RPE) according to country specific conditionalities: China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Montenegro, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, South Africa, Vietnam, Algeria, Albania, Armenia, Mongolia, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Uzbekistan and Serbia.

on the need for European and US capacities of persuasion to raise social and environmental norms (this point intersects with the issue of funding for global public goods). France's Interministerial Committee on International Cooperation and Development (CICID) moreover considers that exploitation of mineral resources in Africa will take place in a tense international context owing to the growing involvement of emerging countries (Strategic Policy Paper 2007).

The French development agency AFD (Agence Française de Développement) frames its activities in emerging countries in Asia in a development bank strategy. In fact, AFD commitments in Asia reached over 459 million euros in 2005, compared with 119 million the year before. During the same period, by way of comparison, commitments to Mediterranean countries have regularly declined to reach 297 million euros in 2006. AFD loans to fund global public goods, such as the construction of energy-efficient homes and the building of hydraulic infrastructure, wind farms and other innovative renewable energy projects, are all investment opportunities that involve China, India and Brazil, countries whose energy needs in urban and industrial development are considered a threat to the global environment.

In the context of decentralized cooperation, the Rhône-Alpes region experience focused on scientific cooperation with China is an original one, as are the experiments with triangular cooperation initiated by Montreuil (in the eastern Paris suburbs) with Mali and Vietnam. Even if the latter country is not (yet) ranked among emerging countries, this sort of cooperation, albeit on a very limited scale, deserves attention for the economic, social and political repercussions it can have locally (the Cercle de Yélimané in Mali, Hai Duong province in Vietnam).

The European Union in its cooperation with South Africa supports the reform process and stresses the reduction of social and regional inequalities. This is a strategic partnership with a country that has a major influence in Africa and often speaks in the name of emerging countries: "Like Europe, South Africa is committed to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, to the abolition of the death penalty and to combating terrorism. Both share a strong belief in the multilateral system of collective security and in the prime responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security." (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "Towards an EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership" [COM(2006) 357 final, not published in the Official Journal]).

In East Asia, the EU considers China a key actor in maintaining a regional balance and improving relations with its neighbours: India, Russia, the Central Asian countries and Japan. In this region, security is the main issue mentioned by Brussels (see the Commission policy paper for transmission to the Council and the European Parliament, 10 September 2003, "A Maturing Partnership – Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations", updating the European commission's communications on EU China relations of 1998 and 2001 [COM(2003) 533 final]).

The European Union and India maintain close relations which have developed exponentially in recent years as regards their philosophy and objectives. The Commission has proposed a new strategy (see the "Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee of June 16, 2004: an EU-India Strategic Partnership" [COM (2004) 430 final, not published in the Official Journal]). Its objectives are as follows:

- international cooperation through multilateralism, including promoting peace, combating terrorism, non-proliferation and human rights;
- enhanced commercial and economic interaction, in particular through sectoral dialogue and dialogue on regulatory and industrial policy;
- cooperation on sustainable development, protecting the environment, reducing climate change and combating poverty;
- continuous improvement of mutual understanding and contacts between the EU's and India's civil society.

These objectives are however taking a long time to be achieved.

US development aid policy has been substantially reoriented since George Bush's re-election in 2004. Development assistance constitutes the third pillar of his foreign policy after diplomacy and defence. The major orientation is one of "transformational diplomacy". Condoleezza Rice defines this approach as follows: "To work with our many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people – and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system…"[9] American aid policy has adopted specific instruments and forms of action according to groups of countries in an overall perspective of democratization and the fight against terrorism. The "emerging country" category does not exist as such for those official US purposes, even if diplomatic missions have been strengthened in these countries as they have been in countries in transition. Numerous attempts to support pro-democratic organizations in China, Russia and Vietnam have moreover been thwarted by these countries' authorities.

### *Alliances and multiple strategies*

In this early 21st century, relations of cooperation between traditional DAC donors and emerging countries are very different from those practiced by the DAC member states and the LDCs. It is more often a question of strategic partnership, and

9 Georgetown University, Washington, January 2006.

emphasis is placed on the consolidation of future markets, scientific and technological cooperation and intervention in the area of global public goods. For the donors, the faster increase in inequalities in emerging countries is the main threat to their stability. Engagement in this cooperation takes on different forms depending on DAC member states. Germany has been extremely open for a number of years, whereas in France interest is only recent.

In many newly emerging countries, development financing, although considered as a policy in its own right, remains marginal. Even if China's official discourse advocates coordination among DAC donors as well as with multilateral agencies, a lack of coordination and harmonization of aid procedures can be noted in most countries. There can be no doubt, moreover, that China's or South Africa's strategy in Africa or Latin America, or India's policy with respect to East Africa, have major consequences on the bargaining power of the recipient states. Henceforth, states are negotiating with several donors each with different strategies, and a subtle game is taking hold, based sometimes on alliances but on competition as well.

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