4

HOW CITIZENS VIEW TAIWAN'S NEW DEMOCRACY

Yu-tzung Chang and Yun-han Chu

TAIWAN'S YOUNG DEMOCRACY is endowed with a sizable middle class, a well-educated population, and a vibrant and highly internationalized economy with a relatively flat wealth distribution. It also enjoys the advantage of having emerged from an unusually smooth and peaceful transition process, during which the incumbent elite carried out a series of incremental changes that transformed the political system from an authoritarian party-state system to a democratic one-party dominant regime and subsequently to a competitive multiparty system.[1] However, the peaceful transition process left the new democracy burdened with two unresolved authoritarian legacies: First, there is widespread nostalgia for the seeming efficacy of the authoritarian era. Second, China's claims on Taiwan produces a unique set of challenges for the young democracy: an unsettled status in the international system, a looming military threat from mainland China, and a polarized internal conflict over national identity.

Under the circumstances, one might wonder how much progress Taiwan could really make in transforming the political culture that sustained the one-party authoritarian regime for four decades. To what extent have authoritarian legacies limited the options and shaped the nature of the new regime? To what extent has the new regime been able to promote

congruent shifts in popular orientations toward democracy? What challenges does Taiwan face in furthering democratization? And what are the prospects for democratic consolidation?

To address these questions, this chapter uses first-wave East Asia Barometer survey data collected through face-to-face interviews of randomly selected eligible voters during July 2001.

1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Our survey was conducted about a year after the first victory of an opposition-party presidential candidate in Taiwan's history. The March 18, 2000, election of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian marked the culmination of a transition process that began in 1987 with the opposition party's formal establishment under the regime of authoritarian ruler Chiang Ching-kuo (president 1978–1988). Chiang's death meant that his successor, Lee Teng-hui (president 1988–2000), completed the abolition of martial law that Chiang had begun. When the DPP assumed power, the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) had ruled Taiwan for fifty-five years after emigrating from mainland China near the end of the protracted Chinese Civil War (1927–1949).

The peaceful transition of power presented a classic opportunity to consolidate the new democracy. To do so, both the newly installed ruling party and the former ruling party had to tackle the young democracy's deficiencies and weaknesses left to them by Taiwan's distinctive political history. For the first time in history, they had to work toward their goals in the unfamiliar roles of oppositional parties.

The democratization process faced at least four obstacles. First, in Taiwan, regime transition did not involve *redemocratization* but *democratization*. Unlike many third-wave democratizers elsewhere, Taiwan was a society with no prior democratic experiences. It had been governed as a colony of Japan (1895–1945) and then as a provincial-level unit of the authoritarian Republic of China (ROC) under the KMT from 1945 onward.[2] In 1949 the KMT imposed martial law, under which it banned many elements of the institutional infrastructure for liberal democracy, including a free press, independent judiciary, autonomous civic associations, and opposition political parties. The party-state instituted various forms of corporatist control over social groups and economic sectors. The small political opposition, known as the *dangwai* ("outside the KMT"), because it was forbidden to organize

itself as a political party, faced grave difficulties in building broad-based social support for its political reform agenda (Chu 2001).

Second, unlike some of the authoritarian regimes that fell in the third wave, Taiwan's regime was a deeply rooted Leninist-style party system that had been in existence for four decades and was well known for its resiliency and stability (Winckler 1984). In Latin America, the military was able to return to the barracks when its authoritarian rule was no longer sustainable. There was no such natural fallback for Taiwan's ruling party, which was blended into the state in both organizational and personnel terms. Partisan control of the mass media, military, judiciary, and bureaucracy was institutionalized. This structural fact imposed dual impediments to Taiwan's democratization—the need to separate the ruling party from the state apparatus and the need to depoliticize the military-security apparatus. The first challenge is similar to the major constraint on transitions from authoritarianism in Eastern Europe. The second is similar to the major constraint on the transitions from authoritarianism in Latin America.

Third, unlike most Latin American and Eastern European cases, the political opening in Taiwan was not triggered by any major socioeconomic crisis or external market shock. To be sure, it drew some of its momentum from the exogenous shock of American diplomatic derecognition of Taiwan in 1979, when Washington normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing. But since the KMT's management of the economy had continued to pay off in growth rates averaging 8.73% in the period leading up to the transition, there was no popular demand for major socioeconomic reform.[3] Mass defection from the ruling party looked unlikely. The prodemocracy opposition lacked the leverage to impose political reforms on the incumbent elite with means utilized elsewhere, such as large-scale strikes or mass rallies of the economically disadvantaged.

Finally, the transition to democracy in Taiwan involved more than just a legitimacy crisis of the regime. It also called into question the legitimacy of the state—its claims over sovereignty status, boundary of jurisdiction, and what its citizenship encompasses. At the start of the transition, the KMT considered Taiwan a province of China, not an independent state (a position that it would modify later, during the course of the transition under Lee Teng-hui). The opposition leaders had long linked the goal of democratization to the issue of Taiwanese identity, claiming that democracy entailed self-determination and the right to independence from China. The opposition used identity in lieu of socioeconomic dissatisfaction to mobilize public support for democratization, so the demand for democratization

became for many citizens an expression of identity. This merging of issues made the transition more intensely conflictual than elsewhere because the identity issue, much like the issue of ethnic conflict in some other transitions, involved a symbol of worth on which there was no compromise. In Taiwan's case, however, the issue of identity did not bear the threat of state disintegration, as it did, for example, in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, because Taiwan was already de facto autonomous. What was involved was the question of whether to claim de jure independence at the risk of eliciting a military reaction from China. Even though there was no risk of tearing the state in Taiwan apart, the dangers of internal political polarization and of external intervention were real.

Despite these obstacles, three historical conditions made a peaceful extrication from authoritarian rule politically manageable. First, the KMT's official ideology and the constitutional arrangements it brought over from the mainland contained democratic elements. The party propounded the Three People's Principles of its founder, Sun Yat-sen, and claimed to be exercising authoritarianism as a period of "tutelage" until the society was mature enough to implement democratic self-rule. The constitutionally mandated state structure included a hierarchy of local elections and a national-level legislature (the Legislative Yuan) that was in principle elected, although its full reelection had been stalled because of separation from the mainland. As Taiwan society became increasingly wealthy and educated, tutelage seemed less defensible and martial law—justified as a response to the national emergency caused by "communist rebellion"—also grew less credible as China entered the period of "reform and opening" and became a quasi-ally of the United States.

Second, the KMT had started recruiting native Taiwanese members (as opposed to those who had immigrated from the mainland) and establishing local electoral machines throughout the island as early as the 1950s, allowing it to face the prospect of democratic transition with strong roots in local political society. In the late 1970s the KMT began to promote native Taiwanese to leading party and state positions, giving it a high expectation of surviving democratic competition at the leadership level as well.

There was also a contingent factor that facilitated the transition. Chiang Ching-kuo, the last authoritarian strongman, lacked a credible successor within either his family or the broader mainlander party elite. He had already appointed a Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as his vice president, and as illness encroached Chiang did nothing to disturb Lee's claim to the succession. In keeping with the constitution, Lee succeeded Chiang as president,

and ended up serving two and a half four-year terms (1988–2000). To the surprise of many, Lee emerged as a potent democratic reformer, completing the transition that Chiang had barely begun. He carried out the series of democratizing reforms that would culminate in Chen Shui-bian's presidential victory in 2000, while holding in check the tendency of the entrenched incumbent elite within the party-state to restrict the scope of democratic reform. Meanwhile, in mainland China affairs, he redirected the regime toward fostering the growth of Taiwanese identity and away from commitment to broad Chinese nationalism, changing Taiwan's stance on cross-strait issues in ways that established greater separation from the mainland.

Thanks to these facilitating conditions, democratic transition proceeded more smoothly and quickly than observers expected (Cheng 1992; Winckler 1992). First social mobilization, in the form of various movements of the 1980s and early 1990s, loosened the grip of the authoritarian state on civil society at the grassroots level. Then in 1986 a genuine competitive party system came into being when Chiang Ching-kuo allowed the formation of the DPP, which competed in elections for so-called supplementary seats in the Legislative Yuan. Third, Chiang Ching-kuo declared the end of martial law in 1987. With the end of martial law, the provisions of Taiwan's constitution returned to effect. The constitution had been written in China in 1946, setting up institutions to rule over the entire country. But Lee sponsored amendments which refitted the constitution for rule over the actual territory of the Republic of China, consisting of Taiwan and several smaller islands. On that basis, Taiwan's new democracy finally held a series of founding democratic elections starting with the first reelection of the National Assembly (the constitution-amending body) in 1991, the first reelection of the Legislative Yuan in 1992, and then the first-ever popular election for president in 1996. Lee himself won this election, but the next presidential contest in 2000 saw the elite turnover that is the defining culmination of a democratic transition.

But the smoothness and swiftness of the transition was not an unalloyed blessing. Many residual authoritarian elements were preserved and rolled over into the new regime, leaving a series of challenges for the new democracy to face as it slogged along the road toward consolidation. The first issue was the politicization of the military and security apparatus. This privileged branch of the state had long been a political instrument of the KMT and was prominently featured in its formal power structure. Until the end of Lee's presidency, the KMT leadership continued the practice of placing political surveillance on its political rivals both within its own party and the opposition in the name of national security.

Second, the new competitive party system was endowed with the established patterns of ubiquitous presence of partisan politics in all organized sectors of the society (including the civil service, mass media, academia, religious groups, secondary associations, and unions), all-encompassing social mobilization in electoral contests, and a monopoly by political parties in elite recruitment and organizing the political process. The omnipresent political parties almost eliminated free public discourse and stifled the development of autonomous civil society. While the opposition parties (there were several besides the DPP) aimed to curtail the reach of the dominant party, they themselves were forced to try to become mirror images of the KMT in order to compete with it.

A third problematic legacy was the lack of a level playing field for competitors in the party system. During the period of authoritarian repression, the opposition had not been able to establish itself as a viable alternative to the KMT. It lacked both the grassroots electoral machinery and the national level policy experience that made the KMT such a formidable organization. During and after the transition, the KMT resisted pressure to relinquish its grip on electronic mass media, especially the three national television networks, and its ownership of large, privileged, profitable, quasi-public business enterprises. The KMT's undisrupted hegemonic presence in many local electoral constituencies aggravated the prevalent problem of so-called money politics and mafia politics with troubling implications for the legitimacy of Taiwan's new democracy. With the opening of an electoral avenue to national power, structured corruption was quickly transmitted into the national representative bodies. This tendency toward corruption was exacerbated by the speedy indigenization of the KMT's power structure in the early years of the new democracy. In short, democratic competition weakened the institutional insulation that had formerly protected the party's central leadership from the infiltration of social forces via interpersonal connections and lineage networks.

Fourth, as already noted, the issue of national identity shaped the new democratic system around the clash of apparently irreconcilable emotional claims about Taiwan's statehood and the identity of its people. Mirroring Taiwan's internal conflict, a cross-strait standoff continued between the two competing nation-building processes, as China attempted to impose its one-country–two-system model on Taiwan and vowed to use military force if necessary to stop any move toward independence. Lee Teng-hui tried to moderate the internal conflict over national identity by calling for the formation of "a sense of shared destiny among the twenty-one million people [residents of Taiwan]" and backing away from the KMT's historical com-

mitment to the principle of a unified China (Lee 1997). But KMT-DPP electoral competition tended to focus on this issue, unintentionally inviting further external intervention. This, in turn, has created an additional burden on the new democracy. The perceived need to deter a potential military threat and contain the political infiltration of China has visibly clashed with the respect for political pluralism, minority rights, and due process.

Last but not least, an important challenge that Taiwan's new democracy faced at the end of Lee Teng-hui's tenure was the underdevelopment of constitutionalism. Among the third-wave democracies, Taiwan's democratic transition was often cited as a unique case where a quasi-Leninist party not only survived an authoritarian breakdown but also capitalized on the crisis to its advantage.[4] From the late 1980s through the late 1990s, with the principles of popular accountability and open political contestation steadily becoming more legitimized and institutionalized, the KMT managed to keep its political dominance largely intact through an impressive streak of electoral successes (Tien and Chu 1998). Under these circumstances, Lee Teng-hui, in his dual capacities as national president and KMT party leader, managed four phases of constitutional revision between 1990 and 1997. The passage of these constitutional amendments carried a strong flavor of unilateral imposition. For the expected era of continued one-party dominance, Lee designed a semipresidential system, somewhat akin to that of the French Fifth Republic, that gave great authority to both the legislature and the cabinet, but allowed the president to control these branches of government behind the scenes in his role as leader of the ruling party. Although the Temporary Articles, which had authorized martial law, were abolished, some of their key elements were transplanted into the new constitutional amendments, including the emergency power of the president and the creation of the National Security Agency under the presidential office. In the name of presidential prerogative, the military and security apparatuses continued to evade direct supervision by the Legislative Yuan.

Because of these elements of strongman government, the ensemble of Lee's constitutional revisions failed to achieve broad and deep legitimation.[5] Even more seriously, the constitutional arrangements proved to have been poorly designed for the unanticipated scenario of a divided government. This came up after the DPP unexpectedly won the presidency in 2000 with only 39.3% of the vote (thanks to a split in the KMT camp), while the KMT retained control over the Legislative Yuan.

Despite such challenges, a majority of Taiwan's electorate held an optimistic outlook for the dawning of a new political epoch and wished Chen

Shui-bian well. In a postelection survey, 78% of the electorate said that their view of Taiwan's future had stayed the same or become more optimistic after the election.[6] During the first month of his presidency, Chen Shui-bian's approval rate surged to 77%.[7] In particular, he was applauded for his conciliatory gestures toward Beijing.[8]

But great expectations soon soured. Chen Shui-bian's governing capacity was circumscribed by the fact that he had been elected without a majority of the popular vote as well as by his party's minority status in the parliament. The standoff between a combative president and a hostile parliament escalated from competition over control of the legislative agenda to a crippling deadlock. Together, the KMT and another sizeable party that had broken off from it, the People First Party (PFP), blocked many major legislations introduced by the DPP government. In return, the DPP cabinet refused to implement some of the laws passed by the legislature, accusing it of transgressing executive power. The KMT-PFP coalition then blocked more bills and froze the government budget, and the vicious cycle went on. Both sides exhausted all possible legal means to strangle one another. These endless political battles appalled and alienated the electorate.

At the most fundamental level, the power struggle between the two camps involved the cultural survival of their die-hard supporters. The conflict was about who has the power to decide who we are and what to teach children in school, with the state becoming the arena of an identity struggle. As zealots of the two camps competed to gain control of the state apparatus and use its power to steer cross-strait relations, erect a cultural hegemony, and impose their vision of nation-building, they paid little attention to civility, compromise, tolerance, due process, and rule of law, all essential elements to make a liberal democracy work. This race to the political bottom eroded the contending political elites' commitment to due process and shook the faith of both sides in the openness and fairness of the political game.

The electorate also experienced deterioration in the quality of governance on other fronts. The most shocking experience came from a seemingly unlikely realm—the economy. Suddenly, in public eyes, Taiwan's political system seemed to lose much of its capacity to deliver material security and prosperity, which citizens had taken almost for granted. The year 2001 saw the beginning of the worst economic recession since the oil crisis of 1972 and 1973. From 2001 to 2003, the economy contracted by 2.2%, the currency depreciated about 12%, and the stock market plummeted by more than 40%. By March 2003, the effective unemployment rate climbed to 7.51%, which

was a shocking experience for many. It was to stay above 7% for the rest of Chen Shui-bian's first term.[9]

Another major disappointment was the stalling of the most promising reform dividend that a historical power rotation should have brought: the elimination of both the structural corruption embedded in the island's electoral politics and the collusive ties between politicians and big business. Waves of new revelations damaged the credibility of the DPP leadership, who had long projected themselves as crusaders for clean politics. Tycoons with close ties to the president were awarded lucrative business deals and cushy appointments. State-owned assets were sold to well-connected conglomerates at fire-sale prices. The promise of clean government turned out to be an illusion.

In the summer of 2001, when the first-wave East Asia Barometer survey was implemented in Taiwan, the island's new democratic regime was under considerable strain. To most of the electorate, the gap between the promise and reality of democracy was glaring. It was at this juncture that we sought to examine to what extent Taiwan's new democracy had acquired a robust popular base of legitimation with both widespread and strongly felt attachments to the democratic regime and dwindling support for nondemocratic alternatives. An assessment of the extent of the public's normative commitment to democracy tells us much about how far Taiwan's political system had traveled toward democratic consolidation at this early stage of its evolution.

2. THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

Taiwan respondents' ideas about the meaning of democracy were generally similar to those elsewhere in Asia (see chapter 1, table 1.3). The overwhelming majority of views were positive. The largest proportion of respondents understood democracy as either (or both) "freedom and liberty" and "political rights, institutions, and processes"; that is, in ways consistent with the standard Western understanding of liberal democracy. The second strongest cluster of ideas associated democracy either with general and positive ideas like "popular sovereignty," "people's power," or "a government that cares what people think" (24.1%), or with the notion of "by and for the people" (17.1%). Such ideas look away from rights and institutions toward government's substantive representation of popular interests. Looking across Asia, the proportion of persons holding liberal-democratic ideas of democracy was lower in Taiwan than in most of the other new democracies in our survey,

while the proportion of persons holding populist views was higher than anywhere else in the region.

In Taiwan as elsewhere in the region, few people (6.3%) understood democracy in terms of social equality and justice, and even fewer (1.4%) in terms of the market economy. In most East Asian newly industrializing societies (with the exceptions of South Korea and Mongolia) democratic transition was not accompanied by a popular demand for economic reform or social redistribution. Social equity was not a salient issue in Taiwan because economic prosperity had been widely distributed under the export-led development strategy of the old regime.

In short, when respondents from Taiwan evaluated their new democratic regime, they were likely to be applying either the standards of liberal democracy or of populism. In the former case, people define democracy to be political liberty and democratic procedures. In the latter case, people define democracy as government that serves the public's interests. Some respondents see democracy as a combination of both.

Our historical review suggested that the new regime marked a distinct advance over the old regime in the first of these two areas but was less clearly superior in the second. How did the public see it? First we will explore how far respondents believed the regime had changed in the direction of democracy, and then we will look at their perception of the democratic system's performance as a government.

3. EVALUATING THE TRANSITION

In asking respondents to compare the level of democracy of the old and the new regimes, we defined the old regime in Taiwan as the system prior to the abolition of martial law in 1988. The current regime was the one in place under Chen Shui-bian at the time of the survey in 2001. We grouped the scores that respondents gave the two regimes into four categories: 1–2 stands for very dictatorial, 3–5 somewhat dictatorial, 6–8 somewhat democratic, and 9–10 very democratic.

3.1. PERCEPTIONS OF PAST AND CURRENT REGIMES

Table 4.1 shows that a broad majority (72.7%) perceived the current regime as being somewhat or very democratic. This represented a substantial change,

compared with the 62% who perceived the former regime as somewhat or very dictatorial. The mean rating of the two regimes shifted markedly, from 4.4 for the old regime—solidly in the dictatorial range—to 7.3 for the new regime, the second-highest mean rating for a new regime in our survey after Thailand. Figure 4.1 indicates that 73.9% of our respondents saw the magnitude of shift from the old to the new regime as two or more points in the direction of democracy on the scale of 1 to 10.

The view of an epochal change, however, was not unanimous. In a pattern found among the Asian new democracies also in Korea and the Philippines, a sizable minority of respondents from Taiwan (20.3%) believed that the system in the martial law era was already somewhat democratic. Seventeen point one percent saw no change, or change in a negative direction, including a small handful of highly disgruntled respondents who saw backsliding in the dictatorial direction of up to 9 points on the scale. This strong minority perception that the old system was already democratic probably reflects the fact that, according to some commentators, the KMT system was a "soft authoritarian regime," in the sense that it allowed for limited pluralism and local level electoral contestation (Winckler 1984). The

TABLE 4.1 PERCEPTIONS OF PAST AND CURRENT REGIMES: TAIWAN

(Percent of respondents)

REGIME TYPES	PAST REGIME	CURRENT REGIME
Very dictatorial (1–2)	12.6	1.3
Somewhat dictatorial (3–5)	49.4	13.0
Somewhat democratic (6–8)	18.2	53.0
Very democratic (9–10)	2.1	19.7
DK/NA	17.7	12.9
Total	100.0	100.0
Mean on a 10-point scale	4.4	7.3

Notes: Regime types are based on the respondent's ranking of the regime on a scale from 1, "complete dictatorship," to 10, "complete democracy." Scores of 5 and below are degrees of dictatorship and scores of 6 and above are degrees of democracy.

N = 1415.

DK/NA = Don't know/no answer.



FIGURE 4.1 Perceived Regime Change: Taiwan

highly negative views of a small number of respondents toward the new regime probably reflected the involvement of Taiwan's transition with the issue of identity. Some of the respondents holding strong Chinese identities probably thought of the DPP regime as having violated or as intending to violate their rights.

Based on respondents' ratings of past and current regimes, we identified six patterns of perceived regime change (see chapter 1, table 1.7). As in most countries in Asia, the largest proportion of respondents from Taiwan (48.4%) rated the old regime as somewhere in the dictatorial range and the new regime in the lower range of democratic scores (6, 7, or 8), the pattern we label "moderate change to democracy." There were also substantial proportions who held each of two contrasting views: one group saw both the old and the new regimes as democratic (19.2%, "continuing democracy") and another (16%) viewed the change to democracy as dramatic, meaning the old regime was dictatorial and the new regime scored 9 or 10 on the democracy scale. Such a range of opinion reminds us that holistic evaluations of regimes are subjective, with citizens perceiving varying intensities of repression and varying degrees of freedom in any given regime. Divergent perceptions about the magnitude of regime change were noticeable as well in the survey results from South Korea and the Philippines.

3.2. COMPARING REGIME PERFORMANCE

One way that a newly installed democratic regime can win the loyalty of citizens is by providing better government than the old regime. Conversely, poor performance may foster doubts about democracy as a whole or about some of the new regime's institutions. We asked respondents to compare the performance of the current and former regimes with respect to nine major areas of activity in two domains, democratic performance and policy performance (see table 4.2). On these nine indicators, we asked our respondents whether things have become worse, stayed the same, or become better.

Much as in Asia's other new democracies (except for Thailand), overall satisfaction with government is generally speaking not on the rise. As measured by both the mean ratings and the percentage difference indices, the curve starts from highly positive assessments of improvements in the two areas of political freedom that we asked about, descends to modestly positive judgments about equal treatment under the law, independence of the judiciary, and cracking down on corruption, and enters negative territory in assessments of the new regime's performance in the areas of income distribution, economic development, and, worst of all, law and order.

Most respondents saw large positive changes in the freedoms of speech and association. In this their perceptions were consistent with the judgment of such outside observers as Freedom House. Freedom House gave Taiwan an average score of 5 on political rights and 4.8 on civil liberties (on a seven-point scale with 7 as the lowest) for the five years from 1983 to 1988 and raised the score to an average of 1.8 on political rights and 2 on civil liberties for the five years from 1996 to 2001 (Freedom House 2005). The new regime was more democratic than the old, and respondents from Taiwan knew it.

But in other respects they were not so positive. Close to half of our respondents felt that there was no bottom-line change in popular influence over government despite the improvement in civil liberties. They considered themselves just as powerless as they had been under martial law, while another 15% felt even more disempowered than before. The same phenomenon of increased political liberties with stagnant political influence appears in the EAB results from Korea and the Philippines, and, according to Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton, is a common phenomenon in established

TABLE 4.2 **PERCEIVED PERFORMANCE OF CURRENT AND PAST REGIMES: TAIWAN**

	MEAN[a]	SD[a]	NEGATIVE CHANGE[b]	POSITIVE CHANGE[b]	NO CHANGE[b]	PDI[c]	VALID %[d]
Democratic performance							
Freedom of speech	1.11	0.99	9.0	81.3	9.8	72.3	93.8
Freedom of association	1.15	0.80	3.6	83.9	12.6	80.3	86.2
Equal treatment	0.55	0.96	14.4	59.3	26.3	44.9	92.2
Popular influence	0.25	0.93	15.0	37.9	47.1	22.8	85.2
Independent judiciary	0.31	1.01	20.4	49.9	29.7	29.4	77.0
Average	0.67	0.94	12.5	62.4	25.1	50.0	86.9
Policy performance							
Anticorruption	0.27	1.11	23.2	49.6	27.2	26.5	88.2
Law and order	-0.58	1.14	57.6	22.8	19.6	-34.8	94.1
Economic development	-0.37	1.26	54.7	31.7	13.6	-23.0	93.0
Economic equality	-0.29	1.12	39.9	26.7	33.4	-13.2	90.2
Average	-0.24	1.16	43.8	32.7	23.5	-11.1	91.4

Notes: N = 1415.

Past regime is defined as pre-1987.

[a] Scale ranges from -2 (much worse) to +2 (much better).
[b] Percent of valid sample.
[c] PDI (percentage difference index) = percent seeing positive change minus percent seeing negative change.
[d] Percent of sample giving a valid answer to this question.

democracies as well (2000). We explore some of the causes of this attitude in section 4.1.

Opinions were sharply divided on the new regime's anticorruption efforts. Although about half of the respondents thought the situation had become better, the other half was almost equally divided between those who said that the regime's anticorruption efforts were either no more effective (27.2%) or even less effective (23.2%) than those of the martial law regime. This divergent assessment suggests that the many revelations of political scandals implicating high-ranking officials in the period since the end of martial law had cut both ways with the public. Some people noticed that more and more corrupt officials and politicians were being brought to trial; others were shocked by revelations concerning the extent and magnitude of political corruption. This point is explored further in section 4.2.

In contrast, opinions on the new regime's inability to crack down on crime and maintain law and order were overwhelming negative, with 57.6% of the respondents believing that the situation had become worse than during the martial law regime. This popular perception is consistent with official statistics, which show that from 1992 and 2002 criminal offenses increased by a whopping 117%.[10] However, depending on one's occupation, domicile location, and other social variables, some people were more likely to be victims of crime than others. So, divergent assessments of the ability of the new regime in delivering law and order still existed, with 22.8% of respondents experiencing positive change and 19.6% no change.

The economic slowdown that started in the late years of Lee Teng-hui's presidency and turned into a recession in 2001 inevitably affected the public's assessment of the post–martial law regime's economic performance. Taiwan's GNP grew at an average annual rate of 8.73% between 1983 and 1988, but slowed to 3.32% between 1996 and 2001, and began to contract in 2001. A majority of respondents perceived a negative change in the government's economic performance since the transition. Nor did respondents give the post–transition regime high marks on whether "the gap between the rich and poor has narrowed." Nearly three-quarters saw either no change or negative change. By objective standards they were again right. Income distribution in Taiwan's economy scored a Gini coefficient of 0.295 in the last years of the martial law regime (from 1983 to 1988), a remarkable record among developing countries. But a few years after the transition, during the period from 1996 to 2001, the average annual score rose to 0.329, and it reached 0.35 in 2001. Although this was still impressive by world standards, it represented a worsening trend.[11]

4. APPRAISING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS

The effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on citizens' belief in their own capacity to perform as citizens and their confidence in various institutions of state and society. In this section we examine three of these attitudes.

4.1. POLITICAL EFFICACY

To estimate Taiwan citizens' perceived participatory capacity, respondents were asked about their self-perceived ability to understand the complexities of politics and government and their perceived capacity to participate in politics (see chapter 1, table 1.4).

Roughly half (60.8%) of respondents in Taiwan believed they could neither understand nor participate in politics, while those who felt capable of both amounted to only 10%. These findings are similar to those from other East Asian democracies. To assess further the perceived efficacy of popular participation, we asked respondents how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: "The nation is run by a powerful few and ordinary citizens cannot do much about it," and "People like me don't have any influence over what the government does." On both statements, 35% of our respondents disagreed. Taken together only one-sixth (16%) disagreed with both statements, while 44.5% agreed with both. These figures are once again similar to those from other East Asian democracies.

4.2. POLITICAL CORRUPTION

In most new East Asian democracies, the most troubling development under the new regime in the eyes of the citizens was the encroachment of money politics. As shown in table 4.3, in Taiwan almost twice as many (47.5%) of our respondents thought that most national officials were corrupt as believed that they were not (25.8%). Respondents thought things were even worse at the local level. There, as many as 56.5% of respondents thought that officials were corrupt, while only 23.9% believed that they were not.

The cross-tabulation in table 4.3 suggests that the two evaluations were correlated. If one believed that most officials were corrupt at the local level, one tended to believe that the same was true for the national government

TABLE 4.3 PERCEPTION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION AT NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS: TAIWAN

(Percent of total sample)

	NATIONAL GOVERNMENT					
LOCAL GOVERNMENT	Hardly anyone is involved	Not a lot of officials are involved	Most officials are corrupt	Almost everyone is corrupt	DK/NA	Total
Hardly anyone is involved	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.4	1.8
Not a lot of officials are involved	0.8	**14.7**	3.5	0.1	3.0	**22.1**
Most officials are corrupt	0.3	7.6	**35.2**	2.0	5.3	**50.4**
Almost everyone is corrupt	–	0.6	1.6	3.3	0.7	6.1
DK/NA	0.2	0.6	1.3	0.3	**17.3**	**19.7**
Total	1.9	**23.9**	**41.8**	5.7	**26.7**	**100.0**

Notes: N = 1415.

Blank cell means no cases.

Percentages above 10 are in boldface.

and vice versa. In China, by contrast, the perception of corruption was concentrated at the local level and in Japan, it was concentrated at the national level. Taiwan had the highest percentage of respondents who reported that most officials were corrupt at both levels.

Yet, surprisingly, only 23.5% of respondents from Taiwan said that they or their family members had personally witnessed corruption or bribe-taking in the past year. This percentage was lower than in Korea, Thailand, or Mongolia, even though in Korea and Thailand concern over corruption was less pronounced than in Taiwan. This suggests that the concern over corruption in Taiwan was produced as much by the dynamics of posttransition political and media competition as by the growth of corruption itself. After the transition, the political parties and the media associated with them produced a stream of revelations about scandalous behavior on the part of Lee Teng-hui's associates and Chen Shui-bian's confidants. These stories promoted the belief that once Taiwan became democratized, political corruption spread into national politics and reached the core of government. These findings remind us not to conflate perceived corruption with actual corruption. But they take away nothing from the damage that can be done to a regime's legitimacy by the perception, however created, that corruption is widespread.

4.3. TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

If citizens think that the system is governing poorly, they tend to withdraw their confidence from the public institutions that they blame for these deficiencies. And their level of trust in specific institutions affects their support for the regime as a whole. Figure 4.2 reveals both the strengths and the weaknesses of Taiwan's emerging political system as seen by its citizens. On the positive side, respondents saw the new democracy as endowed with a trustworthy military, civil service, local governments, election commission, and courts (in that descending order), all key parts of an effective state. The public also respected the integrity of the key civil society actors, the NGOs, who can be expected to play a key role in the future deepening of Taiwan's democracy. But the public showed more distrust than trust for the television networks and national government. The island's four television networks were necessarily politicized, as they are tied to either the government or political parties. The first two are owned by the government, the third belongs to the KMT, and the fourth, which was licensed in 1997 as a concession



FIGURE 4.2 **Trust in Institutions: Taiwan**

to the opposition, is owned by a consortium of DPP political figures and donors. The privately-owned cable television stations, which arrived around the mid-1990s and steadily outperformed the networks in attracting viewers, have enjoyed more credibility than the networks. But it became increasingly difficult for any cable station not to take a partisan stand, because cutthroat competition compelled them to find a niche market in a highly polarized political environment. Newspapers were driven by the same market and political forces, and might appear to be more politicized as they usually gave more coverage to political news. This is the reason why in our survey newspapers suffered an even lower level of trustworthiness.

Most respondents dismissed the trustworthiness of what are arguably the two key institutions of representative democracy: political parties and parliament. Their distrust of these institutions stemmed from both the long-term trend of the encroachment of money politics and, more apparently, the effect of Taiwan's divided government under its semipresidential constitution after Chen Shui-bian's election. After only a year of endless, nasty battles between political parties and gridlock on the parliamentary floor, egged on by the partisan media, citizens' respect for these core institutions had apparently worn thin when our survey was taken.

4.4. SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS

So far we have seen that citizens formed sophisticated and complex views of the degree of democratization from the old regime to the new, governmental performance in different domains, and trustworthiness of different institutions. The question, "How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in our country?" allowed us to compare affect toward the regime in general across the eight East Asian cases. In Taiwan, the question had the added advantage of having been used in one of our previous surveys. This allowed us to compare citizens' evaluation of the system's overall performance in 1996 (after Taiwan's first popular election for president, when Lee Teng-hui won) with 2001 (the time of our survey and one year after the island's first power rotation).

Table 4.4 shows that in 1996 more than two-thirds of the citizens were largely satisfied with the way democracy worked in Taiwan (including 4.4% who were very satisfied and 62.8% who were fairly satisfied), while close to one-third were dissatisfied. Five years later, the level of satisfaction had

TABLE 4.4 SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS IN TAIWAN

	1996	2001
Very satisfied	4.4%	4.4%
Fairly satisfied	**62.8%**	**49.0%**
Not very satisfied	**30.2%**	**41.6%**
Not at all satisfied	2.6%	5.0%
Mean	2.31	2.47
SD	0.6	0.66
Valid Cases	1256	1270

Source: Comparative Studies of Electoral System in Taiwan (1996); East Asia Barometer Survey in Taiwan (2001).

Note: Percentages above 30 are in boldface.

dropped considerably. Only 54.4% of respondents were satisfied (including 4.4% very satisfied and 49% fairly satisfied). The percentage of dissatisfied citizens increased to 46.6%. As with other attitudes reported above, this surely reflected the escalation of partisan conflict after the 2000 power rotation and the fact that Chen Shui-bian had come to office without a majority of the popular vote.

A correlation analysis confirms that the measure of satisfaction with how democracy works determines people's attitudes toward various aspects of incumbent and government performance. After controlling for education, age, and income, satisfaction with the way democracy works in Taiwan was associated, at the $p<.05$ or higher level of statistical significance, with the following attitudes: evaluation of the economy today, evaluation of the economic trend over the past five years, sum score of perceived changes in democratic performance (from table 4.2), sum score of perceived changes in policy performance (also from table 4.2), sum score of perceived corruption at local and national levels (from table 4.3), and satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent Chen Shui-bian. Satisfaction with how democracy works is thus a reflection of attitudes toward both the incumbent and government policy performance (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

TABLE 4.5 SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS: CORRELATION ANALYSIS

	SATISFACTION WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY WORKS
Years of formal education	-0.142**
Age	-0.031
Income	-0.061*
Evaluation of the economy today	0.125**
Evaluation of the economy over the past five years	0.110**
Satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent	0.323**
Sum score of the perceived changes on political dimension	0.276**
Sum score of the perceived changes on policy output dimension	0.223**
Sum score of the perceived corruption at local and national level	-0.148**

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

5. POPULAR COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

When political and economic problems shake the public's faith in the performance of a particular regime and their trust in its institutions, this may or may not call into question their commitment to democratic principles of legitimacy. For example, chapter 7 shows that Japanese citizens remain committed to democracy as the only legitimate of government despite feeling alienated from many aspects of Japan's political system. In Taiwan, to what extent was citizens' commitment to democratic politics undermined by the problems the nation faced at the start of its experiment with democracy?

Over the years, political scientists have grappled with the concept of democratic legitimacy, trying different measurement strategies with mixed successes. We conceive of democratic legitimacy as a multifaceted phenomenon with no single indicator up to the task. We therefore devised a

dual-cluster battery to assess the level of popular commitment to democratic legitimacy. The first cluster focuses on people's belief in the desirability, suitability, superiority, priority, and efficacy of democracy.[12] The second cluster assesses popular attitudes toward four authoritarian alternatives: rule by a strong leader, military rule, one-party rule, and rule by experts. Democracy is consolidated—it is "the only game in town"—when citizens not only believe in it, but consider alternatives to it unacceptable.

5.1. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Table 1.8 in chapter 1 shows the extent to which respondents from Taiwan supported democracy (in the five dimensions that we asked about) in comparison with samples elsewhere in Asia. A majority of respondents from Taiwan considered democracy both desirable and suitable. But in both cases the majorities were the smallest among the eight regimes studied.

Moreover, as shown in figure 4.3, of the 72.2% who said that they desired democracy, close to a third only wanted democracy in the 6–7 range of our scale, that is, a moderate level of democracy rather than full democracy. The mean level given by all respondents for the democracy they desired was 7.7, less than a half point above the average level respondents gave for where



FIGURE 4.3 Desirability and Suitability of Democracy: Taiwan

they thought the political system already was. On suitability, 25.5% of our respondents gave a score between 1 and 5, and 23.8% gave a score between 6 and 7, registering negative views or lukewarm affirmation of democracy's suitability for Taiwan. Together they outnumber the fewer than 40% who gave a score of 8 or above. Apparently, the way democracy had worked in Taiwan had not yet convinced a large number of people about democracy's suitability. A modest mean of 6.75 and a large standard deviation (2.02) also underscore the divergence of people's views on this issue.

On the other three variables (effectiveness, preferability, and priority), respondents from Taiwan are clustered with Hong Kong respondents in giving the lowest percentages of support for democracy among countries in the region. While 40% of Taiwan respondents said that "democratic government is always preferable under all circumstances," nearly a quarter (23.2%) said that under some circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one. A substantial proportion of our respondents (25.9%) said they "don't care whether we have democratic or nondemocratic regime." In a nutshell, there are more people in Taiwan who are skeptical about democracy's superiority than people who believe in it. When respondents were forced to choose between democracy and economic development, the twin aspirations of most developing societies, democracy lost favor to development by a ratio of more than 5 to 1, with only 10.5% of respondents believing that democracy is more important. In contrast, almost two-thirds supported the view that economic development is more important.



FIGURE 4.4 Democratic Support: Taiwan

On our 6-point index of overall attachment to democracy, as shown in figure 4.4, only about 7.4% of Taiwan's electorate responded affirmatively to all five questions, with an additional 18.9% responding affirmatively to four out of five questions. Nowhere else in the region did such a high proportion of respondents (28.9%) give only zero or one prodemocracy response, and nowhere except in Hong Kong were there so few respondents (26.3%) who gave four or five prodemocracy responses. In short, positive support for democratic legitimacy had not yet taken hold in Taiwan.

5.2. REJECTION OF AUTHORITARIAN ALTERNATIVES

Even where positive support for democracy is weak, the system can survive because the public sees no viable alternatives. Table 1.9 in chapter 1 shows that respondents from Taiwan differed little from other Asian populations in their rejection of authoritarian options. They stood close to the middle of the pack both in the mean number of items rejected and in the percentages that rejected each specific item. The lowest level of rejection was addressed to the item we labeled "strong leader." This question asked respondents to agree or disagree with the statement, "We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things." The nearly one-third who agreed with this idea were expressing a combination of exasperation with Taiwan's parties and elections and nostalgia for the effectiveness of rule under Chiang Ching-kuo.



FIGURE 4.5 **Authoritarian Detachment: Taiwan**

The intensity of detachment from authoritarianism is shown in figure 4.5, which counts the total number of antiauthoritarian responses per respondent. The contrast with figure 4.4 is striking, in that a full 50% of the sample rejected all four nondemocratic alternatives, the third-highest percentage among our eight Asian countries. On the other hand, this means that in Taiwan, as elsewhere in the region, half the respondents were willing to consider at least one authoritarian alternative and many of them more than one. In sum, authoritarianism remains a formidable potential competitor to democracy.

5.3. OVERALL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

Figure 4.6 combines the information on democratic support and authoritarian detachment to identify constituencies ranging from the strongest supporters to the strongest opponents of democracy (see the notes to table 1.11, chapter 1, for a description of how these categories are defined). Judging from this measure, the cultural foundation of Taiwan's new democracy is not robust. However, supporters of one kind or another made up half the population, the second-lowest proportion among the seven countries for which these data were compiled (we did not include China in this part of the study). There were also significant numbers of "skeptical supporters" (18.96%), who rejected most authoritarian alternatives but harbored many



FIGURE 4.6 **Patterns of Commitment to Democracy: Taiwan**

reservations about democracy. Including the opponents, the mixed, and the skeptical supporters, nearly half of the public does not accept democracy as "the only game in town."

6. EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Even if citizens retain doubts about democratic principles, a new democracy may generate such a sense of momentum that it makes other forms of government appear irrelevant. To assess whether this bandwagon effect might be occurring, we asked respondents where they expected Taiwan to be in five years on a 10-point scale from complete dictatorship to complete democracy. The results are displayed in table 4.6. Fewer than one-third of respondents thought the regime would be "very democratic" in five years. An even larger number (32.3%) said that they didn't know, or declined to answer, which was a 19.4% jump from the percent of current nonresponses. Apparently, this question is not an easy one to answer for many respondents from Taiwan. For those who did answer, the average expectation for the size of the advance over the present level was a modest

TABLE 4.6 CURRENT AND EXPECTED FUTURE REGIME TYPE: TAIWAN

(Percent of respondents)

RATING	CURRENT REGIME	FUTURE REGIME	CHANGE[a]
Very dictatorial (1–2)	1.3	0.6	-0.8
Somewhat dictatorial (3–5)	13.0	7.9	-5.0
Somewhat democratic (6–8)	53.0	29.6	-23.4
Very democratic (9–10)	19.7	29.6	9.8
DK/NA	12.9	32.3	19.4
Total	100.0	100.0	
Mean on a 10-point scale	7.3	7.9	0.6

Notes: N = 1415.

Future regime is five years from time of survey.

Scale runs from 1, "complete dictatorship," to 10, "complete democracy."

[a] Change in percent of respondents rating the regime at the given level when the object of evaluation shifts from the current to the future regime.

six-tenths of a point on the scale of ten, the second lowest in the region after Japan. Also, a relatively large standard deviation (1.90) suggested that people held widely differing expectations for Taiwan's political future. This high level of uncertainty reflects people's anxiety about Taiwan's long-term political future, in particular its future relationship with mainland China.

We combined respondents' views of the current and future state of affairs to describe seven types of views about change in Taiwan and elsewhere in the region (see chapter 1, table 1.12). This shows that close to one-third of respondents in all three Chinese political systems—China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—were unsure about what the future would hold. Among those who gave level-of-democracy scores for both the current and future regimes, it was the Hong Kong respondents who were most pessimistic (39% expecting authoritarian persistence), the mainlanders who were most optimistic (43% expecting developing democracy, defined as moving from a lower to a higher level of democracy), and the Taiwan sample who were most divided, with 80% split among the three categories of struggling democracy, developing democracy, and consolidating democracy. By the metric of this table, the Taiwan sample was not markedly more pessimistic than those of other new democracies such as Korea, Mongolia, or the Philippines, where many respondents expected limited democratic transition or struggling or developing democracy.

7. CONCLUSION

Our findings do not suggest that democracy in Taiwan is in imminent danger of reversal, but they show that public support for the new order is fragile. On the one hand, a majority of Taiwan citizens at the time of our survey recognized the changes that had taken place in the areas of political freedom, rule of law, and opportunities for citizen participation. A substantial percentage thought that democratization had brought more effective control of political corruption. A majority reported guarded optimism about the island's democratic future.

On the other hand, just as Taiwan experienced its first transfer of power after democratic transition, many saw the transition from a one-party authoritarian regime to a competitive democratic system as an incremental political change rather than a quantum leap. A large majority saw deterioration in the capacity of the political system to deliver economic growth,

social equity, and law and order. A sizable minority considered the current political system to be more corrupt and less responsive to their voices and concerns than the old regime. The proportion of people who said they were dissatisfied with the way democracy works rose to almost equal the proportion who said they were satisfied. Because Taiwan's citizens experienced a variant of soft authoritarianism that was seemingly less corrupt and more efficacious than democracy in delivering social stability and economic development, democracy faces a demanding standard to prove its worth.

A large majority of Taiwan citizens expressed distrust for the key institutions of representative democracy, in particular parliament and political parties. This distrust is fed by the perception of corruption at both national and local levels of government, and by the perceived deteriorating state of some aspects of governance. Unfortunately, there has been no quick fix for the institutional deficiencies built into the constitution since our survey was taken. Constitutional amendments have been discussed, but to be implemented they must first gain the support of a three-quarters majority in the Legislative Yuan, something that would require precisely the political cooperation that the current institutional setup militates against.

If the new democratic regime has not gained points for performance, neither could it count for legitimacy on deep reserves of normative commitment to democracy among the public. The proportion of citizens who harbored either professed reservations about democracy or lingering attachments to authoritarianism remained substantial. Indeed, by some measures citizens in Taiwan demonstrated the lowest level of commitment to democracy among the new East Asian democracies at the time of our survey. Only about half of the population rejected all authoritarian alternatives. This might have something to do with the political upheaval surrounding the historical power rotation following the 2000 presidential election. But the level of popular skepticism toward democracy has been lessened only slightly since then.[13] In the years after our survey, Taiwan continued to experience political traumas, including protracted gridlock between the president and the legislature, intense polarization over the twin issues of state and national identity, the bitterly disputed 2004 presidential election (which led the opposition to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent president, Chen Shui-bian), and grave charges of corruption against the presidential family that generated calls for President Chen's resignation.

Taiwan's electorate does not share a common vision of the democratic future. Their uncertainty and division on this and other issues flows in large part from Taiwan's unique contested status in the international system and

the domestic clash between two irreconcilable claims about national identity. As long as the island's status as a state remains unresolved, Taiwan's new democracy will have a hard time consolidating.

NOTES

1. For the concept of the party-state see Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 47. Sartori's definition of a party-state system corresponds to what Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore termed "a single-party authoritarian system." See Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1970). A one-party dominant regime refers to a democracy characterized by a ruling party with large and seemingly permanent majority. See T. J. Pemple, "Introduction," in *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes*, ed. T. J. Pemple (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
2. For more on the historical background, see Thomas Gold, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986).
3. This is the average GNP growth rate between 1950 and 1988 calculated from *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2005* (Taipei: Council of Economic Planning and Development, 2005).
4. The old KMT resembled Leninist regimes as far as the symbiosis between the party and the state and the way the party-state organized and penetrated the society are concerned. For the quasi-Leninist features of the KMT, see Tun-jen Cheng. "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 42 (July 1989): 471–499. However, it is also important to point out that on many important scores the KMT regime was quite different from the Leninist regimes of the former Soviet bloc. Unlike the communist regime, the KMT was long associated with the West; it had ample experience with private property rights, markets, and the rule of law; and it enjoyed the support of a distinctive development coalition. For a full treatment of the Leninist legacy in the Eastern European context, see Beverley Crawford and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California International and Area Studies, 1996).
5. For the controversies over constitutional reform, see Yun-han Chu, "Consolidating Democracy in Taiwan: From *Guoshi* to *Guofa* Conference," in *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China*, ed. Hung-mao Tien and Steve Yui-sang Tsang (New York: St. Martins Press, 1998).
6. The postelection survey was carried out in June 2002 and organized by a research team led by Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu of National Taiwan University under the auspices of the Comparative Study of Electoral System (CSES) Project. Please visit the CSES website (www.cses.org) for details.

7. Based on the TVBS Poll of June 19, 2000, available at: http://www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll_center/default.asp.
8. To dispel the widely held apprehension that his presidency might cause rupture to cross-strait relations, in his inaugural address Chen made his "Four No's pledge": no to declaring independence, no to changing Taiwan's formal name from the Republic of China, no to enshrining Lee Teng-hui's controversial idea of "special state-to-state relations" in the Constitution, and no to holding a referendum on formal independence.
9. *The United Daily News*, March 22, 2003. In the case of Taiwan, the effective unemployment rate, the so-called broad measure, is on average 2.3% higher than the official unemployment rate (the so-called narrow measure), which excludes laid-off people who have stopped looking for jobs.
10. The figure is computed from *TaiMin diqu xingshi anjian tongji 1973–2003* [Statistics of criminal cases in the Taiwan-Fujian region, 1997–2003], published by Taiwan's Criminal Investigation Bureau.
11. The income distribution statistics were calculated from various issues of the annual Household Income Survey Report published by Taiwan's Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.
12. Please refer to chapter 1 for elaboration on measuring support for democracy. The exact wording of these questions can be found in appendix 4.
13. Two follow-up surveys have found a similar pattern of fragile popular support for democracy, although the level of normative commitment among Taiwan's electorate has slightly recovered from the depression observed in 2001. For instance, we found that the percentage of respondents believing that "democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government" has increased from the low of 40.4% (2001) to 42.2% (2003) and 47.5% (2006). But it has not yet climbed over the 50% threshold. Please refer to Yun-han Chu, "Taiwan's Year of Stress," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 43–57, and Yu-tzung Chang, Yun-han Chu, and Chong-Min Park, "Authoritarian Nostalgia in Asia," *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 3 (July 2007): 70.