

# Collective Identity as Agency and Structuration of Society

*The Israeli Example\**

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## The Problem

Filling the gap that lies between the individual, replete with a free will that appears in different degrees of unpredictable social conduct, and the whole or systematically structured society is one of the major puzzles in sociology and the social sciences. The problem is how to conceptualize and theorize the existence of the individual to match the concepts that we have of institutions, societies, and cultures. After all, it is the individual that provides our hard data, while institutions, cultures, and societies are theoretical constructs or metaphysical entities.

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### *The Empty Agent*

The first substantial efforts to fill this gap were the Parsonian and Mertonian generalized actor theories and the fragmented role-player framework.<sup>1</sup> Both theories, however, eliminated the possibility of choice and the existence of alternative social action. Action outside of an acceptable margin was automatically categorized as deviant, and even when roles appeared to conflict, all of the alternatives for conflict resolution were built into the system. The result was an over-socialized image of individuals who were objectified as good or bad products of the system.

After four decades of extensive criticism of structuralism, functionalism, and their various derivatives, the weaknesses of the theories are well known. However, this has not produced convincing alternative theories on the macro- or middle-range levels that can deal with basic problems, such as locating the individual as an actor in social processes, as was suggested by philosophers such as Husserl and Wittgenstein. One of the most ambitious and promising attempts to retheorize the role of the individual in social processes is Anthony Giddens' structuration theory.<sup>2</sup> At the core of the theory are individuals, known as agents—apparently, agents of the social system—who do not create systems or cultures per se, but “produce or transform them, remaking what is already made in the continuity of *praxis*.”<sup>3</sup> Agents are autonomous, knowledgeable, and skillful, though never fully aware of their action. Agents' actions are always bound by historical-situational contexts, compounded by given power structures that are not of the agents' choosing. However, agents are never fully culturally preprogrammed; they have a wide range of knowledge about their world and can explain rationally the reasons and motives for their action.<sup>4</sup>

Every action involving agents combines three major dimensions that can be thought of as a loop: unacknowledged conditions of action, which are anchored in sets of rules and resources (e.g., the capitalistic regime or widespread use of money rather than barter); the action itself—including verbal behavior—during which agents and their counterparts in social interaction monitor and rationalize their actions and motivations; and the unintended consequences of the action, which may or may not change the initial conditions on the micro or macro level.<sup>5</sup> The continuous feedback generated by the movement around the loop is the process of structuration, to use the Giddensian neologism. To the degree that the flow is regular and uniform—institutionalization, in non-Giddensian terminology—the *praxis* is repro-

duced or alternatively shaped into new practices. Thus, “structure is both a medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices,”<sup>6</sup> an approach that brings the entire theory dangerously close to tautology.<sup>7</sup> However, Giddens does not give deterministic or historical priority to any particular form of either production of new practices or reproduction of old conducts; correspondingly, no universalistic needs are implicitly or explicitly assumed, for either collectivities or actors.<sup>8</sup> Giddens has contributed enormously to the understanding of the mechanics of production and reproduction of cultures and collectivities on various levels, and provides partial insight into the link between the individual and the social system. However, the term “agent” remains devoid of any significant social content and is no less metaphysical than any other traditional structuralist or poststructuralist term. Agent and agency must be everything or nothing. We aim to merge two different approaches and levels of analysis, and then to test our proposal empirically. The theoretical approach that we use to complement that of Giddens is the collective identity approach at different levels of the social order. Our empirical test consists of a case study comparing the Israeli Jewish population to the Israeli Arab population.

### *Social Agents as Carriers of Social Identity*

Every valid collective identity—that is, one that is held by substantial numbers of a real or imaginary collectivity and defines the boundaries and rules within this collectivity—must also be a personal identity. In other words, many people sharing a common identity, implying a degree of loyalty and active or passive membership in a collectivity, confirm that a specified identity is indeed collective. The identities are an integral part of the social construction, transformation, and dismantling of collectivities on diverse levels. We assume that every social actor, or agent,<sup>9</sup> has a relatively limited repertoire of personal or collective social identities (SIs), constructed by the individual’s desire for membership in a specific collectivity and culture. However, like Giddens’ agent in the loop structure, almost every chosen identity simultaneously determines the relevant collectivity for the individual at a given time and place, also constituting, in an aggregate with other individuals, the collectivity itself. Thus, even identities that possess different meanings<sup>10</sup> are the common denominator and societal space of the collectivity in its Giddensian meaning, lending a patterned consistency to the construction of societal boundaries.

Some SIs are mutually exclusive, such as male and female. Some are clustered, such as White Anglo-Saxon Protestant. Others are hierarchically ordered by their generalizability across situations. However, most SIs compete for preferential status within a particular person, and as such, they are a part of an ongoing sociopolitical struggle in every collectivity, including struggles over alternative SIs and the content of them.

Consciously or unconsciously, certain SIs can be prioritized over alternative SIs. In addition, an agent's identity can be changed by shifting an SI, or emphasizing one over the other, depending on place, time, and the nature of the participant in the social interaction. Our central theoretical assertions in this paper are that SIs are implanted into agents by the agents' very membership in a collectivity and the traits constructed by a specific culture, leading the agents toward specific social conducts, and that the agent's flexibility of choices within certain margins of an SI is a major mechanism of the structuration process, or the process of continuous production and reproduction of a social order. By social order we mean the forming of institutions and organizations that include the shaping of their cultural meanings,<sup>11</sup> or the fusion between institutional structure and the accepted rules of the game.

Many social theorists deal with different aspects of SIs, but none have placed them in the larger context of structuration or any other forms of the production and reproduction of social order. Some focus on SIs as an expression of social categorization and group relationships.<sup>12</sup> Others deal with the relative importance of diverse components of an SI.<sup>13</sup> Still others focus, theoretically and empirically, on the behavioral aspects of an SI, such as voting behavior or partisan support.<sup>14</sup> We examine several strategic SIs that, when adopted by an agent from the larger repertoire, determine large parts of the social order as carried, produced, and reproduced by that agent. We demonstrate how strategic SIs work within the context of the sociopolitical processes of contemporary Israeli society, and show the existence, within this society, of competing sociopolitical orders.

SI theories offer sociopsychological perspectives for analyzing social identification and group behavior that allows for the distinction between "us" and "them," or in-groups and out-groups.<sup>15</sup> According to such theories, people tend to classify themselves and others into diverse social categories, such as religion, gender, or age group, using different bases of categorization. A self-concept has two components: a personal identity, which includes the idiosyncratic characteristics of the individual, based on physical attributes, abilities, and psychological traits; and a collective identity, which

includes the major group classifications in that society.<sup>16</sup> Social behaviors and the process of structuration can be viewed as resulting from the interactions between two or more individuals who are influenced by their personal characteristics or the social groups to which the individuals belong.<sup>17</sup> Social groups and categories determine individuals' behaviors if and only if the individuals identify themselves with the group. Identification develops when agents see themselves as culturally and socially tied to the collectivity and its successes, failures, privileges, and lack of privileges.

The literature lists many factors that contribute to the formation of group identification and specific SIs.<sup>18</sup> The most relevant for our case is the distinctiveness of the group's values and practices compared with those of other groups, which provide individuals with a sense of unique identity;<sup>19</sup> the group's prestige, which may affect the individual's self-esteem;<sup>20</sup> and the salience of the out-group that strengthens the awareness of the in-group.<sup>21</sup> We consider all of these factors as a particular case of structuration, production, and reproduction of collectivities at the various analytical levels, from a nuclear family to an entire society, which the identities define as their boundary.

The factors involved in group identification tend to strengthen social categorizations and augment societal cleavages; especially when they are of a bipolar, either-or nature, they intensify conflicts among groups. According to Turner,<sup>22</sup> when an intense conflict exists between two subcultures, interactions among members of the collectivities will be more strongly influenced by their actual or imaginary membership than when no conflict exists. Consequently, individual members of the collectivities will find it difficult to deal with each other as individuals, and instead tend to treat all members of the out-group uniformly.

However, a person belongs to several collectivities at the same time and may identify with more than one of them. This often leads to complicated relationships among components of social identities that represent different social orders. In each society, the strain among SIs is based on the specific diversifying issues prevalent in the society, but the consequences are the same: Agents must choose among the specific identities that the categorization leads to, thus limiting identification to groups that do not conflict with one another. In some societies, such avoidance is impossible. Israeli Arabs may see themselves as both Palestinian and Israeli; Canadians may see themselves as both French Quebecois and Canadian; before the breakup of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavs could have seen themselves as Slavs, Croats, or

Muslims. At the same time, all such individuals may feel themselves as belonging to a specific locality.

Is one component of identity more central than others? Some researchers<sup>23</sup> claim that class is the most important ingredient of social identity. Others<sup>24</sup> emphasize the pluralistic nature of social identity, claiming that there is no a priori or theoretically based preference for placing class over all others. Priority is determined according to the issue that the agent deals with<sup>25</sup> or the agenda in a particular society.<sup>26</sup>

We expect that, to the extent that a specific identity attracts a cluster of other identities, it becomes a code for a given social order, and thus is located in a central systemic position. In societies in which national rights are unsettled, people tend to define themselves in regional or nationalistic terms and emphasize this aspect of their SI more than class. In societies in which religion is the major basis for social strife, people define themselves by the religious component of their SI—whether the conflict is between religion and secularism, as it is in Spain, or between two religions, as it is for Catholics and Protestants in Ireland and Hindus and Muslims in India.

### *The Israeli Context*

Several somewhat overlapping bipolar cleavages exist in Israel today, including those among political ideologies, religion, ethnic origin, and socioeconomic factors.<sup>27</sup> The cleavages operate in tandem when sociopolitical issues are at stake and form bases for SIs, making the demographic lines of demarcation very clear. Whether or not they are bipolar, cleavage-based identities can exacerbate social conflicts or be the result of such conflicts. Whenever several cleavages overlap, the motivation for agents to produce or reproduce particular social orders is greater than that resulting from a single cleavage.<sup>28</sup> Israeli Jews are deeply divided regarding the peace negotiations in the Middle East. More religious Jews of Mizrahi origin and with lower education and socioeconomic status tend to be right wing and oppose territorial concessions; consequently, they are thought of as agents of an ethnocentric social order. More secular Jews of Ashkenazi origin and with higher education and socioeconomic status tend to be left wing, support territorial concessions, and have a compromising political attitude toward the conflict; they are considered as structuring a civic and universalistic social order. Class is a part of these cleavages, but not a singular or transcending factor as Marshal, Ross, Newby, and Vogler claim.<sup>29</sup>

We posit that the overlaps and centrality of political, religious, ethnic, and class identities, together with a high degree of politicization in a mobilized society,<sup>30</sup> create a tendency toward extremist either-or cleavages. This leads Israelis—Jews and Arabs—to a clash of identities on two levels: between the collectivistic and individualistic dimensions of SI, and among the components within each dimension. As the collectivistic identity and the individualistic identity are inherently antithetical,<sup>31</sup> different, opposing, and competing social orders may be formed.

The collectivistic codes of both Jews and Arabs dictate the precedence of collective over individual needs. All members of the collective society are expected to contribute to attaining the collective's goals as much as they can, with whatever resources they have. Personally attaining wealth and power is regarded as less valuable and important than improving the welfare of the collective, and personal gains are to be made through achieving collective goals rather than individual actions.<sup>32</sup> The individual is seen as a bearer of collective ideals, and commitment to them makes him or her subordinate to their imperative.<sup>33</sup>

Two basic collective identities have formed for both Jews and Arabs, representing two distinct social orders. Jews may identify with a Jewish identity, which excludes from the collectivity all non-Jewish citizens but includes all Jewish people in the Diaspora, and an Israeli identity, which includes all Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of the state. Arabs may identify with an Arab identity, which is related to broader loyalties that imply affiliation with larger entities, and a Palestinian identity, which has territorial and nationalistic connotations. For both Jews and Arabs, the first collectivistic identity represents an ethnocentric and particularistic social order. The second represents a universalistic social order, based on civic virtues.

The dichotomy between particular and universal arises because Israel is not only a self-declared Jewish nation-state of Jewish citizens, but also belongs to Jewish people across the world, which is the essence of Zionist ideology. This feature of Israel is illustrated by the Law of Return, which entitles all Jews and their close relatives to immigrate to the country. Other laws and regulations give the state and the Jewish Agency—the local arm of the World Zionist Organization—authority to enact a series of affirmative action measures that favor the Jewish population in the state.

The individual dimension of SI, however, designates the opposite goals, emphasizing the idea of self-fulfillment that is prevalent in Western societies. According to this ideal, each person strives to develop his or her capabilities

to lead a fuller life. A person's major loyalty is to himself, or to his immediate family.<sup>34</sup> All members of the society are meritocratically evaluated, with those who rate higher accorded higher rewards. Material well-being is one of the major indicators of the individual's attaining these goals. As participation in the labor market is the main venue through which the ideal may be attained, it can increase the salience of professional identity. Though self-fulfillment applies more weakly to Israelis than to Americans or Europeans, and is more relevant to professional workers than to blue-collar workers or to the unemployed, it can conflict with the collectivistic identity.

### *Collective Jewish Identities*

Eisenstadt<sup>35</sup> focused on the major components of the collectivistic Zionist identity and the distinction between its particularistic (Jewish and religious) and universalistic (socialist, nationalist, and liberal) principles. One of the salient features of political Zionism is that it purported to be not merely a nationalist ideology, but strove to integrate two value premises that, in principle, conflicted: "the collective particularism of Jewish aspiration to an independent National state, and the universalism of modern Western civilization . . . Both sets of premises . . . become fundamental components of the legitimation of the State of Israel. In political practice, however, they necessarily clashed."<sup>36</sup>

The precarious balance among all of the aspects of collective Jewish identity, always problematic and inherently conflicting, has gradually changed, leading to the weakening of the collectivistic ideology because of demographic transformations, changes in the relative power of different social groups, and the relationship with the Arab world.<sup>37</sup> By the early 1970s, the majority of the Jewish population in Israel was composed of immigrants from Islamic countries or their descendants, and they had not completely assimilated as the Zionist establishment had hoped. The more recent immigrants' estrangement from socialist values, which contradicted their more traditional values, kept growing, as did their dissatisfaction with its institutions.

In the late 1970s, the majority of the Asian-African Jewish voters rejected the socialist Labor Party in favor of right wing or religious parties. In the 1977 elections, the ideological and political situation changed drastically, and the regime was transferred to the basically populist and capitalist<sup>38</sup> Likud Party and its coalition of right wing and religious parties. This switch is considered the result of the Asian and African Jews' disillusionment with



the existing sociopolitical system, in which they occupied inferior social, political, and economic positions,<sup>39</sup> or the strengthening of their nationalistic and religious orientations.<sup>40</sup> The right wing and religious coalition, with its pronounced populist and individualist ideology, reflected the social changes that had taken place. The ideology also legitimized and delegated higher status to the Mizrahi culture and value system.<sup>41</sup>

After gaining social legitimacy, Jews from Islamic countries reverted to the more traditional and religious values that the secular socialist ideology tried to force them to eschew as part of its attempt to create the so-called new Israeli man. The strengthening of religious tendencies could not be delegitimized because it translated Zionist aspirations into religious aspirations and fit with the nationalistic premises of the ruling right wing.<sup>42</sup> Kimmerling<sup>43</sup> claims that the strengthening religious trends can be seen even earlier than the 1970s, in the movement of the national-religious strata toward the center of society and in the inclusion of Jewish heritage studies in the secular national schools' curriculum. He shows<sup>44</sup> that in 1974, Jewish identity was already stronger than Israeli identity for both religious and secular Jews.<sup>45</sup> Auran also found a continuous increase in the valence of Jewish identity and a corresponding decrease for the Israeli identity.<sup>46</sup>

The Arab-Israeli conflict has also contributed to the shift in power within Israel that has changed the Israeli identity structure. After the 1967 war, Israel expanded its borders, and nationalists desired to keep and settle the occupied territories. However, the principles upon which the occupation was justified and rationalized undermined the state's Zionist and socialist premises. As the Labor government's ability to reconcile the contradictions deteriorated, the right wing Likud party gained power. Its more pronounced, religion-based nationalistic ideology legitimized the continued occupation. National resources were channeled into housing projects, road construction, and the massive settling of the territories, which became the right wing coalition's highest priority. There are now 120,000 Jews living in the occupied territories, and the proportion of religious people among them is higher than elsewhere in Israel.<sup>47</sup>

The nationalist activities shifted the debate, from the socioeconomic sphere between socialist and capitalist ideologies to the political sphere focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of the occupied territories. The shift may have important implications for SI and the further strengthening of the bipolarity between Jews and Arabs in the social

structure of Israel. It may have also enhanced the centrality of the primordial Jewish aspect of the collective identity.

### *Collective Arab Identities*

Arabs that remained in Israel after the great exodus from the country in 1948<sup>48</sup> were objects of attempts to shape them into an obedient and loyal minority. They were separated from their fellow Palestinians outside Israel's boundaries physically, culturally, and politically, and there was an attempt to build a separate Israeli-Arab identity<sup>49</sup>—one of the Israeli authorities' most powerful tools in their efforts to Israelify the Palestinians, mostly by way of highly selected contents in school curricula.<sup>50</sup>

In the first stage, the attempt to create a new minority, quasi-ethnic but not national collectivity and identity was impressively successful; until 1967, the Arabs of Israel tended to adopt the Israeli Arab identity, albeit with some difficulty.<sup>51</sup> However, after their reunion with the Palestinians of the occupied territories, Arabs in Israel adopted a strategy of compartmentalizing their identity among different spheres of activity, adopting, following Hofman and Rohana,<sup>52</sup> “a predominant nationalistic identity combined with civic aspects of Israeliness.” Rouhana<sup>53</sup> distinguished three circles of identity: an instrumental participatory level in the polity, defined by Israeli identity; an intermediate-value circle, such as lifestyle, political culture, and gender relations, which shared both the Israeli and a new Palestinian identity; and a deep sentimental and loyal feeling of common fate, monopolized by the Palestinian identity. In short, a new Israeli Palestinian identity was created. Smootha<sup>54</sup> adds what he called a trend of political radicalization among the Arab minority, accompanied by a new sense of political power, leading several intellectuals to demand cultural autonomy for themselves, such as by creating an Israeli-Palestinian university able to teach and study independently of oppressive Jewish hegemony.

### *Other Identities*

Conflict may arise among individual level identities as well. Research in other societies has shown several individual identities to be central to individuals: the family, occupation, gender, locality, and ethnicity. So far, the centrality of these identities has not been thoroughly examined in the Israeli context, as research has focused on the relationship between political attitudes and de-

mographic characteristics. Arian and Shamir<sup>55</sup> show that political attitudes such as left versus right have become “super issues,” political labels that parties use as cues to motivate people. The left-right distinction, considered by many<sup>56</sup> to be an important generalized frame for political orientation in advanced industrial societies, has a different meaning for each society. In Israel it designates much more than economic ideology. Moore,<sup>57</sup> Peres,<sup>58</sup> and Shapiro<sup>59</sup> point to the strong relationships that exist among class, ethnic origin, religiosity, and education. Religious Jews and working-class people of Asian or African origin, who have less education, tend to vote for right wing or religious parties. Nonreligious European or American Jews who have more education tend to vote for left-wing parties. Peres and Yuchtman-Yaar<sup>60</sup> also show that the same groups who vote for right wing parties tend to be less democratic than those who vote for the left. In this case, we may refer to the voter as another behavioral aspect of agency.

This paper attempts to combine several dimensions of SIs. Acting as agents and structuring the society means, among other things, giving relative weight to diverse SI components in a social order, which is one dimension of the process. Creating different configurations and relations among SI components is another dimension. Combining them emphasizes, first, the different weights of Jewishness versus Israeliness, to the exclusion of all of the other possible components of an agent’s identity and the variable combinations among them; then it turns to the interaction among multiple identities.

It remains to be seen which of the identities is more salient in Israeli society, what happens when identities do not overlap or create conflicting loyalties, and how the identities create different and competing—or perhaps hegemonic—social orders. We accept the notion that the relative salience of social identities varies by the issue at stake, but believe that some of the identities attain transcendent stature so that they remain salient and central regardless of the issue at hand, and are produced and reproduced in the basic social order.

## Research Method

### *The Sample*

The sample is a national probability sample of the Jewish and Arab population in Israel (excluding kibbutzim) in 1991. The respondents’ ages range from twenty to seventy years. The proportions of the categories of gender, ethnic origin, and geographic location in the sample correspond to those

of the entire Jewish population in 1991, as reported by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics. Data were collected in structured interviews conducted at the respondents' homes. The sample includes 1,447 respondents (of which 251 are Arab citizens), 45 percent of whom are non-workers (e.g., housewives, pensioners, students, unemployed). Incomplete questionnaires (2 percent) were excluded from further analysis.

### *Variables and Measures*

In addition to the SI components, the relevant questions and measures presented in the paper represent diverse sociopolitical attitudes and a variety of demographic characteristics. These were used to give us additional knowledge about the content of the social order structured by the agents. Table 2.1 specifies these attitudes and demographic characteristics and their frequencies.

### *Components of SI*

Jewish respondents were asked to rank nine components of SI; Arabs ranked eleven. The question for Jewish respondents was stated: "Each person has different things that characterize him. Here is a list of nine characteristics. Please rank those that characterize you most by order of their importance. Write (1) for the most important characteristic, (2) for the second in importance, and so forth. There is no need to rank characteristics that are not important for you." Arab respondents ranked two additional identities, being Palestinian and being a villager or townsperson. For Arabs and other minorities, the religious identity was changed to Muslim, Christian, Druze, or others. Table 2.1 presents the components and their ranks; the frequencies of only the combined first and second ranks and the non-rankings are presented. The value (o) means that the respondent did not rank the specific item at all. Such values were later recoded as 10 (or 12 for Arabs) to create a linear continuum. Thus, the lower the value, the higher the ranking of that component.

### *Measures of Social and Political Involvement*

Assuming that the respondents are agents who produce and reproduce social orders, and that different clusters of attitudes and behaviors define diverse social orders, we presented respondents with questions about social

and political attitudes and behavior. One of the cluster of items asked: "In the last 5 years, were you a member in any of the following (whether an active member or not)?" Answers ranged from 1 for active members, 2 for nonactive members, 3 for nonmembers, to 4 for irrelevant. Membership items included 1 for apartment house committees, 2 for parent-teacher associations, 3 for community committees, 4 for workers' committees, 5 for labor unions, 6 for a synagogue, mosque, or church, 7 for voluntary organizations, 8 for economic organizations, 9 for a political movement or group (not a political party), and 10 for a political party. A factor analysis shows that there are two major dimensions of sociopolitical activity. The first represents involvement in public-sphere organizations, such as labor unions, synagogues, mosques, churches, or economic or political organizations, usually falling in the realm of so-called civil society. The second dimension represents activities closer to home, for which the person's involvement contributes directly to his own or family's life, such as household and community committees and parent-teacher associations.

Table 2.1 Measures and their frequencies (percent)

Measure	Jewish frequency		Arab frequency	
	0	1 or 2	0	1 or 2
<i>Social identity components</i> <sup>a</sup>				
Profession	47.3	20.6	39.2	16.4
Being Israeli	28.3	42.6	41.4	8.8
Family	18.5	59.1	36.3	20.4
Being Jewish/Arab	27.0	43.3	21.5	43.0
Place of residence	65.8	6.2	48.6	6.4
Political attitudes (left wing or right wing)	72.2	2.9	44.6	10.8
Ethnic origin	75.3	1.9	33.5	21.6
Religious or secularist	63.0	9.2	43.0	10.4
Gender	60.8	10.6	39.8	14.4
Being Palestinian (Arab sample only)	25.1	40.6		
<i>Political ideology</i> "To which of the following political/ideological movements do you feel closer?"				
1. To the Labor movement	37.2		27.7	
2. To the center	7.1		5.2	

(continued)

Table 2.1 Measures and their frequencies (percent) (continued)

	Jewish frequency	Arab frequency
3. To right-of-center movements	46.0	3.0
4. To Jewish religious parties	9.7	1.7
5. To Arabic parties (Arab sample only)		62.3
<i>Territorial solution</i> "In general, are you more for territorial annexation as a solution or for territorial concessions?"		
1. Tend much more toward annexation	24.3	2.8
2. Tend a little more toward annexation	22.4	1.8
3. Leave the situation as is	18.3	76.9
4. Tends a little more toward concessions	7.5	12.4
5. Tends much more toward concessions	27.5	
<i>Influence</i> "Do you feel that people like you have influence over what is happening in the state?"		
1. Have a lot of influence	5.7	4.8
2. Have some influence	23.1	16.4
3. Have very little influence	30.4	32.8
4. Have no influence at all	40.8	46.0
<i>Military capability</i> "In your opinion, to what degree can the Israeli defense forces protect Israel in time of danger?"		
1. Very high degree	64.1	36.7
2. High degree	21.8	33.9
3. Quite high	9.5	21.4
4. Quite low	2.1	6.9
5. Low	1.3	0.8
6. Very low or none	0.8	0.4
<i>Social obedience</i> "Some claim it is the duty of citizens to obey the laws of the state in all circumstances. Do you agree with this claim?"		
1. Fully agree	39.5	30.0
2. Agree	38.5	40.0
3. Do not agree	17.6	22.4
4. Totally disagree	4.3	7.6
<i>Emigration plans</i> "Do you consider leaving the country for an extended period time?"		
1. Yes, intend to leave soon	2.4	1.2
2. Considering it	3.7	4.4
3. Rarely consider it	7.4	9.6

Table 2.1 Measures and their frequencies (percent) (continued)

	Jewish frequency	Arab frequency
4. Do not consider it at all	86.5	84.9
<i>Private protection</i> “How much are you willing to pay a private organization to guard your home and neighborhood?” (0. not willing to pay 1. 20 NIS; 7. 500 NIS or more) <sup>b</sup>		
	Jewish (percent)	Arab (percent)
	Med = 20–50	Med = 500 +
<i>Gender</i>		
1. Men	46.0	51.4
0. Women	54.0	48.6
<i>Age</i>		
20–24	13.4	11.6
25–29	14.0	11.2
30–34	12.2	15.5
35–39	12.7	13.5
40–44	11.6	7.6
45–49	6.7	13.9
50–54	6.0	10.4
55–64	9.5	10.8
65 +	13.9	5.6
<i>Education</i>		
1. No schooling at all	1.7	–
2. Up to 4 years	1.1	8.4
3. 5–8 years	10.2	18.7
4. 9–10 years	11.4	20.7
5. 11 years	8.1	8.4
6. 12 years	31.6	18.3
7. 13 or more years non-academic education	17.1	11.6
8. 13 or more years academic education	18.9	8.0
<i>Religion</i> “How do you define yourself?”		
1. Orthodox religious	3.9	0.4
2. Religious	11.0	15.9
3. Traditional	26.8	32.7
4. Secular, maintain some of the tradition	23.4	33.9

(continued)

Table 2.1 Measures and their frequencies (percent) (*continued*)

	Jewish frequency	Arab frequency
5. Secularist	30.3	15.1
6. Antireligion	4.6	2.0
<i>Family size</i> "How many people live in your household?" (continuous, 1–9)		
<i>Employment</i> "Are you employed?"		
1. Yes	55.6	50.2
2. No (housewife, student, unemployed, pensioned)	44.4	49.8
<i>Income</i> "To which of the following monthly income categories does the combined income of yourself and your family members who live at home belong?" (scale of 1–9, 1 = up to 700 NIS; 9 = over 5,000 NIS; Med = 27002250)		
<i>Father's ethnic origin</i>		
1. Asian-African, Muslim	47.6	71.7
2. Israeli, Christian	11.0	16.3
3. European-American, Druze and Cherkess	41.4	12.0
<i>Immigration</i> (not asked in the Arab sample)		
1. Born in Israel	53.3	
2. Came before 1940	5.1	
3. 1941–1947	2.9	
4. 1948–1954	14.2	
5. 1955–1960	5.1	
6. 1961–1967	6.5	
7. 1968–1973	4.6	
8. 1974–1979	3.0	
9. 1980 +	5.3	

<sup>a</sup> 0 = did not rank the component. 1 or 2 = first or second choice.

<sup>b</sup> \$1 = approximately 2.8 NIS at the time of the research.

Another cluster of questions aimed to reveal respondents' orientations toward the public realm of civil society, that is, the extent to which the agent carried and reproduced the state-produced order. The question read: "Indicate, for each of the following, whether the issue should be dealt with by the citizens or by the state." Answers ranged from 1 for "much better if the citizens dealt with it" and 3 for "should be dealt with equally by the citizens and the state" to 5 for "much better if the state dealt with it." The



spheres of the state's authority were tested by situations such as 1 for building kindergartens and day care centers, 2 for helping factories with financial problems, 3 for absorbing new immigrants, 4 for aiding settlers in new settlements far from cities but within the 1948 borders, 5 for aiding settlers in new settlements beyond the 1948 ceasefire line or in the occupied territories, 6 for supporting the needy, such as the elderly or battered wives, 7 for imposing law and order, 8 for dealing with suspects of terrorist actions, and 9 for interfering with groups that attempted to undermine the state. A separate factorial analysis for Jewish and Arab respondents showed that the issues form the same three dimensions: 1 for security issues (items 7–9); 2 for economic issues (items 2, 4, 5); and 3 for social support (items 1, 3, 6). The analysis shows that the state is always expected to shoulder most of the responsibility for the above issues. Responsibility for security is attributed almost totally to the state; economic issues are seen as better dealt with by the state; and social issues as shared by the government and citizens.

Table 2.1 presents all of the additional questions that were used and the response frequency to each of their categories.

## Analysis

### *Overview*

Our analysis focused on the central or most often ranked SI components of both groups. Components included family, being Jewish or Arab, being Palestinian (for the Arab sample only), being Israeli, and profession (see Table 2.1). Broadly speaking, the collectivistic identities—Israeli and Jewish for the Jewish sample, Palestinian and Arab for the Arab sample—are highly prominent, and the percentages in both samples are very similar. In the Jewish sample, 43.3 percent ranked Jewish identity in first or second place, and in the Arab sample, 43.0 percent ranked Arab identity as first or second. In addition, 42.6 percent of Jews ranked Israeli first or second, and 40.6 percent of the Arabs ranked Palestinian first or second. Interestingly, 28.3 percent of the sample of Jews ignored being Jewish altogether and 27 percent ignored the Israeli component; among the Arabs, 21.5 percent and 25.1 percent ignored being Arab and Palestinian, respectively. Thus, the generalized collective identities in the two samples seem to be of the same salience. Most of the Arab citizens of Israel do not consider themselves Israelis. This particular identity was ranked highly by very few Arabs (less

than 9 percent) and ignored or rejected by many of them (over 40 percent). The Israelification policy of the Arab-Israeli citizen seems to have failed.

Though their meanings are perceived as diametrically opposed or even antithetical, the two collectivistic aspects of SI—the Jewish-Israeli dichotomy and the Arab-Palestinian dichotomy—represent similar facets of the respective SIs. Considering oneself Jewish is not only the more traditional and religion-oriented basis for collectivistic identity, but also one of the major aspects underpinning the meaning of being Israeli.<sup>61</sup> We suspect that this accounts for the surprisingly low ranking of the direct identity of being religious or secular. Jewishness absorbs religiosity and Israeliness covers being secular. The same can be said of the Arab and Palestinian identities: The first is the more traditional and basic identity and the second is the more recent and highly politicized one. Thus, the broader aspect of Jewishness or Arabness somewhat justifies being Israeli or Palestinian and seeing Israel or Palestine as the homeland, which is also the core of the conflict between the two entities.

Examining the other components shows that for Jewish respondents, the most important single component of social identity is not a collectivistic one, but rather the family.<sup>62</sup> Approximately 40 percent of Jewish respondents ranked it as the most important component and about 20 percent ranked it as their second choice. The family component is the least ignored or rejected of all nine components: only 18.5 percent of the respondents did not specify it at all as part of their identity. In the Arab sample, the salience of the family component is much lower: Only 20 percent chose it as one of their major identities, and over 36 percent did not rank it at all.

Professional identity was also ranked higher by Jews than by Arabs, but the differences are not as prominent. Approximately 21 percent of the Jews and 16.4 percent of the Arabs ranked their occupation as first or second in importance. About 47 percent of the Jews and 39.2 percent of the Arabs did not rank it at all. Those who chose their profession as their central SI component also form a distinct group. Choice of this component seems to indicate that in both samples, some respondents have espoused the self-fulfillment and self-enhancement ideologies prevalent in Western societies.

However, most respondents ranked two components or more, so that most of the respondents—67.2 percent of the Jews and about half of the Arabs—chose at least one other major identity in addition to their primary one. Table 2.2 presents these combinations. The analysis of this distribution supports Kerlinger's assumption of attitudinal dualism.<sup>63</sup> In the Jewish sample, identities seem to consist of two sets of juxtaposed components. Jew-

ish and Israeli constitute one continuum, the collectivistic dimension, and family and profession constitute the second continuum, the individualistic dimension. Thus, choosing one component on a specific continuum reduces the probability of ranking the other as very high. In the Arab sample, in which ethnic identity—differentiating among Muslims, Christians, Druze, and Circassians—is more often ranked than either family or profession, the dualistic model is less clear, and the ethnic component seems to represent an intermediate level that is neither individualistic nor entirely collectivistic.

Especially in the Jewish sample, we expected to find that when more than one identity was ranked, the first and most highly ranked identity would be from one continuum and the second from the alternative continuum, so that those who ranked an individual identity, such as family or profession, as their first choice would rank a collective component—Jewish or Israeli in the Jewish sample, Arab or Palestinian in the Arab sample—as their second choice, and vice versa. Table 2.2 shows that this is not always the case. Though it is true for family identity in the Jewish sample, it is less correct for professional identity. Half of the 67.2 percent who ranked two of the major components in the first two places put family together with a collective identity, but less than 10 percent of those who ranked two major components put professional identity together with a collective identity. Instead, professional identity was most often combined with another individual component, namely, the family identity. The combinations are more heterogeneous in the Arab sample. No clear preference can be detected, except the Arab Palestinian combination, as 20 percent of the Arab sample ranked them together.

It is possible that Jews who chose family as the major component did not necessarily reject collective identities and the values they entail, but those who chose profession as the major component did reject collective identities. The familial order is not in competition with the other competing collective identities, and choosing one of the collective or individual components does not mean ignoring the rest of the continuum: The narrower and broader identities can coexist even though they often represent contradictory values. In the Jewish sample, 22 percent of those who ranked two major components chose the two collective identities and 18 percent chose individual components. In the Arab sample, 40 percent chose the two major collective identities together and 6.5 percent chose the two individualist identities. This seems to indicate that the Jewish Israeli collectivity in the 1990s is a less recruited and politicized order than is the Arab Palestinian collectivity.

Table 2.2 Combination of major social identities

Variable	Absolute frequency	Relative frequency
<i>Jewish sample</i>		
Jewish Israeli	15.0	22.0
Israeli family	17.0	25.3
Jewish family	17.0	25.3
Israel profession	3.8	5.7
Jewish profession	2.0	3.0
Family profession	12.0	18.0
Other combinations	32.8	—
	100.0	100.0
<i>Arab sample*</i>		
Arab Palestinian	20.0	40.3
Palestinian family	4.4	8.9
Arab family	3.6	7.3
Palestinian profession	2.0	5.7
Arab profession	4.0	8.1
Family profession	3.2	6.5
Palestinian Israeli	2.8	5.6
Arab Israeli	0.4	0.8
Palestinian ethnicity	1.1	8.9
Arab ethnicity	4.8	9.7
Other combinations	50.4	—
	100.0	100.0

<sup>a</sup> The added categories for the Arab sample capture the differences between the two samples.

The combination of identities leads to espousing less extreme positions on the related sociopolitical attitudes than either of the specific identities espouse alone. It may also indicate the individuals' ambiguous distinctions between these components, or an ability to tolerate partial incongruity to attain a transcendent goal that both identity components, as codes of distinct societal orders, promote.

### *Structuring the Social Order*

*The Familial Order.* Looking at the correlates of the specific identities (see Table 2.3), we discover additional differences between the two samples. In the Jewish sample, family identity, which is the highest ranked component,

is more important for women than for men, and younger people rank it very high. It is salient among the traditional but not highly religious, among those who vote for parties that are in the center of the left-right continuum and oppose territorial annexation, and among those who believe that civil obedience is obligatory in all situations and at all times. More than others who do not consider the family to be an important component of their SI, the family group believes that the state should take care of its underprivileged social groups or classes, such as the elderly, battered wives, and new immigrants.

The carriers of individual identities—family and profession—among the Arab sample also form distinct profiles. However, whereas the professional identity has similar meanings for Jews and Arabs, the family identity is different. The family identity in the Arab sample is politically distinct from both the collectivistic Arabic identities and the Jewish family identity. Arabs who rank family as their major identity component are less committed to living in Israel and show a greater willingness to emigrate. They are also willing to pay more for added private protection. Unlike the other groups, they are not demographically defined. We hesitate to conclude that those who place their family highest believe that the best way to protect their family is to leave the area for other places that offer better opportunities, because we lack information as to why people choose specific identities and not others. Still, the data seem to indicate that such an interpretation is possible. If being family-oriented has the same meaning for Jews and Arabs, then the means to achieve family goals is the exact opposite for the two groups: For the Jews, maximizing life opportunities means living in Israel; for the Arabs, it means leaving Israel.

### *Jewish Agents*

*The Jewish Order.* The agents of Jewish identity are highly attached to the country and will not consider emigration from it. They also strongly support territorial annexation. It is thus hardly surprising that they are staunch supporters of right wing or religious parties, and that many among them are very religious, more so than those who chose any other SI components. Their sociopolitical attitudes are in accord: They tend to be socially obedient and believe that the law should always be maintained. They do not organize or join protests, and they trust in the ability of the government and the armed forces to take care of their safety. The only social activity they are involved in, if any, is in the synagogues they belong to. They are also a distinct

Table 2.3 Spearman correlations with the major identity components

Variable	Jewish identity	Israeli identity	Family identity	Professional identity
<i>Political ideology</i>				
(left* = 1, else = 0)	0.185***	-0.105***	-0.044	-0.60*
(center = 1; else = 0)	0.84**	-0.090**	0.024	0.71*
(right = 1; else = 0)	-0.116***	0.055	-0.030	-0.047
(religious = 1; else = 0)	-0.256***	0.133***	0.135***	0.172***
<i>Territorial solution</i>				
(1 = yes; 2 = not at all)	-0.071*	-0.059*	-0.031	0.135***
<i>Dedicated to neighborhood</i>				
(1 = very; 4 = not at all)	0.065*	-0.003	-0.018	-0.069*
<i>Private protection</i>				
(1. 20 NIS; 7. 500 NIS or more)	0.064*	0.059*	0.032	-0.059*
<i>Influence</i>				
(1 = yes; 4 = none)	0.040	0.087**	-0.044	0.054
<i>Social obedience</i>				
(1 = yes; 4 = no)	0.065*	0.068*	0.070*	0.011
<i>Protest</i> (1 = yes; 4 = no)	-0.070*	-0.018	0.006	0.017
<i>Religion</i> (1 = orthodox; 6 = antireligion)				
	0.384***	-0.157***	-0.078**	-0.238***
<i>Sex</i> (1 = men; 0 = women)	-0.006	-0.040	0.169***	-0.099**
<i>Age</i> (20–65+)	0.011	-0.073*	-0.042	0.223***
<i>Education</i>				
(1 = none; 8 = academic)	0.131***	-0.030	0.002	-0.289***
<i>Employment</i>				
(1 = working; 0 = not working)	0.109***	-0.083**	-0.004	-0.241***
<i>Income</i>				
(1 = less than 700; 9 = 5000+)	0.138***	-0.050	-0.098**	-0.187***
<i>Family size</i>				
(1.1 person; 9. 9 or more)	-0.093**	0.063*	-0.023	0.121***
<i>Father's origin</i>				
(1 = Eastern; 2 = Israeli; 3 = Western)	0.140***	-0.051	-0.12	-0.063*
<i>Immigration</i>				
(1 = Israeli born; 9 = 1980 + )	-0.035	0.071*	-0.016	0.083**
<i>Role of the state:</i>				
Factor 1 (security)	0.59*	0.036	0.027	-0.016
Factor 2 (economic)	-0.051	-0.057	0.012	-0.104**
Factor 3 (social)	-0.044	0.040	-0.074	-0.050

Table 2.3 Spearman correlations with the major identity components

Variable	Jewish identity	Israeli identity	Family identity	Professional identity	
<i>Social and political involvement:</i>					
Factor 1 (public sphere)					
Factor 2 (private sphere)	0.061*	0.030	0.026	0.070	
	-0.025	0.007	0.046	-0.52	
Variable	Identity	Identity	Identity	Identity	Identity
<i>Political ideology</i>					
(Arab parties = 1, else = 0)	-0.286***	-0.297***	0.170**	0.0.69	0.162**
(left = 1, else=0)	0.130*	0.259***	-0.044	-0.090	-0.183**
(center, right, religious = 1)	0.208***	0.073	-0.241***	0.077	0.085
<i>Territorial solution</i>					
(1 = annexation; 5 = concession)	0.023	-0.044	0.052	0.116	0.152*
<i>Emigration plans</i>					
(1 = yes; 2 = not at all)	0.094	-0.073	0.035	0.116	0.170**
<i>Dedicated to neighborhood</i>					
(1 = very, 4 = not at all)	-0.123	0.001	-0.112	0.066	-0.125*
<i>Private protection</i>					
(1. 20 NIS; 7. 500 NIS or more)	0.118	-0.009	-0.050	-0.121	0.022
<i>Military ability to protect</i>					
(1 = high; 6 = low)	-0.022	-0.118*	-0.064	-0.098	-0.084
<i>Influence</i>					
(1 = yes; 4 = none)	0.134*	0.205***	0.040	-0.041	0.065
<i>Social obedience</i>					
(1 = yes; 4 = no)	-0.019	-0.133*	0.149*	0.006	-0.128*
<i>Protest</i>					
(1 = yes; 4 = no)	0.067	0.188**	-0.081	-0.027	-0.000
<i>Religion</i>					
(1 = Orthodox; 6 = antireligion)					
<i>Sex</i>					
(1 = men; 0 = women)					
Age (20-65+ )	0.026	-0.125*	-0.121*	-0.014	-0.206***
	-0.016	-0.061	-0.010	0.061	-0.092
	0.008	0.053	-0.062	0.049	0.206***
<i>Education</i>					
(1 = none; 8 = academic)	-0.175**	-0.147*	0.062	0.002	-0.213***

(continued)

Table 2.3 Spearman correlations with the major identity components

Variable	Identity	Identity	Identity	Identity	Identity
<i>Employment</i> (1 = working; 0 = not working)	-0.100	-0.043	-0.131*	-0.072	-0.127**
<i>Income</i> (1 = less than 700; 9 = 5000+)	0.019	-0.104	-0.007	0.027	0.015
<i>Family size</i> (1 = 1 person; 9 = 9 or more)	-0.104	-0.255***	0.072	0.014	0.035
<i>Ethnic origin</i> (1 = Muslim; 0 = Christian, Druze, and Cherkess)	-0.107	-0.253***	0.160**	0.006	0.013
<i>Immigration</i> (1 = Israeli born; 9 = 1980+ )	—	—	—	—	—
<i>Role of the state</i>					
Factor 1 (security)	-0.088	0.038	-0.049	0.013	-0.071
Factor 2 (economic)	0.083	0.034	-0.040	0.007	0.061
Factor 3 (social)	-0.004	-0.029	-0.153*	-0.076	-0.018
<i>Social and political involvement:</i>					
Factor 1 (public sphere)	0.149*	0.114	-0.154*	0.065	0.045
Factor 2 (private sphere)	0.103	0.150	0.011	-0.031	-0.038

The different categories are in accord with the different patterns of response.

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ .

demographic group, tending to be of Asian or African origin, less educated, with big families and low incomes. Many among them are unemployed.

***The Israeli Order.*** Like those agents who rank Jewish as their most important SI, those who rank Israeli as their most important component are strongly attached to the country, but the bases and justifications for attachment are different. For the agents of the Jewish order, the justification is primordial and religious, that is, it is the land of the Bible or the land of our forefathers. For the agents of the Israeli order, it is a shelter granted to the Zionist Jews by the United Nations in 1948. Like those with a strong Jewish identity, the Israelis trust the ability of the government and the armed forces to protect them, and tend to be passive and obedient citizens.

In all of the other criteria, the two orders based on collectivistic identities vary. Those with a strong Israeli identity tend to be left wing and feel that they have influence and control over national processes. They believe



that the state should intervene in national security and economic processes, such as helping factories in financial difficulties, building new settlements, fighting crime, and keeping law and order. They are much more involved in their communities, at home and in schools. Demographically, their social profile is the complete antithesis to that of the Jewish order carriers: they are secular, Israeli-born or of Western origin, in which case they are older and not new immigrants. Most of them are older, employed with mid-level incomes, and have small families.

*The Profession-Based Order.* The social profile of those who ranked their profession highest seems somewhat alienated. They believe in their ability to influence national processes, but they are not attached to their communities or to the country, and consider emigrating from Israel more than do all of the other groups. Also, they do not trust the government and the armed forces to keep them safe, and their obedience is conditional; they do not believe that people should be obedient under any situation to authority. Politically, they are mostly left-wing. If they are involved in any social activity, it is one from which they or their families benefit directly. Their demographic profile is also different: they tend to be highly educated, Israeli-born or of Western origin, young men, mostly employed and with high incomes. They are also the least religious group, with many more holding active antireligious orientations. It seems that these are the carriers of individualistic orientations, much more so than the other types of agents. As in other societies, this group of younger, highly educated secularists seems to be the harbinger of social and value changes.<sup>64</sup> Those who define themselves in professional terms among the Arab sample are very similar to their Jewish counterparts: They accept the Israeli party system and tend to be leftist, they are considering emigration, and they are less dedicated to their communities and locales. They are also employed, more highly educated, and secular.

### *Arab Agents*

*Arab Order.* Among the Arab sample, those who ranked the Arab identity as their major identity tend to vote for Arab parties rather than for the larger Israeli parties. They seem to reject the whole spectrum of the political system that is dominated by Jews. The lack of correspondence between this identity and a territorial solution may be because about 90 percent of Arabs

desire territorial concessions. People in this category believe in their ability to influence political processes, they do not think that additional (paid) protection is necessary, and they are strongly attached to their communities and locales. The Arab identity is tied to being Muslim, so that Muslims—whether religious or not—place this identity higher than do Christian Arabs. Their education is also higher, and they are active in the public sphere.

*Palestinian Order.* Those who chose Palestinian as their most salient identity form a different social category. Even more than those who chose Arab as their major identity, they reject the Israeli political parties and favor Arab parties. They are Muslim and highly religious. They also believe in their ability to influence political processes, but unlike those with a strong Arab identity, they actively participate in social and political protest and do not believe that social obedience should always be maintained. Demographically, they tend to have large families, low incomes, and high levels of education. Taken together, these indicators seem to point to a more rebellious order, or to greater frustration with the existing system in which they occupy inferior socioeconomic positions.

*Arab Israeli Order.* Very few Arabs chose Israeli as their major identity, but they form a distinct group. More among them are Christian or Druze; fewer are Muslims. They tend to have smaller families and be more socially obedient. It also seems that this group is less politically defined than those who define themselves as Palestinian or Arab. Their political attitudes are less clear-cut, and they do not feel that they have social or political influence, or external control over their environment.

### *Pure Orders*

Most of the respondents do not carry single and unambiguous societal orders, but rather mixed and sometimes contradictory elements that differ only by the weight they give them. However, some—and, we guess, the more influential, salient, and active agents—carry, produce, and reproduce pure orders. To detect them, we used a partialed-out analysis in which incongruous choices, such as when two major identities at the polar ends of the same continuum were ranked as first and second choices, were removed from the analysis, so that only those who gave an unrelated identity as their second choice were analyzed. This analysis examines the less conflicting combina-

tions of components in the social order. We performed the analysis for the four major identities of the Jews; for the Arab sample, we considered only the Palestinian Arab combination because they were the only significantly overlapping identities. Table 2.4 presents the new correlations.

*Pure Israeli Jewish Orders.* Analyzing the Jewish sample shows that the patterns have changed for all of the examined identities, but the profiles of the Jewish and professional identities changed more drastically. Those who ranked family as their major identity but did not choose profession as their second identity are significantly against emigration from Israel. This may be because those with Jewish or Israeli identities are against emigration, and those identities are often chosen as the second-ranking identity by those who ranked family first.

Most of the attitudes of those who ranked Israeli but did not rank Jewish as their second identity have strengthened. Their feeling of control or influence has strengthened, they believe more strongly in Israel's military capability, and fewer among them plan to emigrate. In addition, they tend to be more traditional than those who chose both Israeli and Jewish components. Though they are not religious, they do not reject the religious parties.

The Jewish non-Israeli identity seems to be more extremist than the Jewish and Israeli combination. Those who choose this identity support annexation more strongly and believe in Israel's military capability to a greater degree than those with the combined Jewish Israeli identity. They are also more strongly attached to their communities and oppose emigration from the country more than any other group. In addition, those who rank being Jewish as their major identity but not being Israeli as their second identity feel they have more influence on sociopolitical occurrences in Israel than the Jewish-Israeli identity combination. These changes may be due to the tendencies of the pure identities to carry a more simplistic order.

The most significant changes occurred for those who chose professional identity but did not rank the family as their second identity. In this case, the reduced number of respondents influenced the significance of relationships. But the change seems deeper than that: Those who choose two individual identities tend to opt much more for an individualistic social order than those who choose only one such identity. Hence, the two individualistic trends strengthen and enhance each other. When those who chose family as their second identity are removed from the analysis,

Table 2.4 Spearman correlations with partialled-out identity components

Variable	Jewish identity (N = 687)	Israeli identity (N = 677)	Family identity (N = 949)	Professional identity (N = 630)	Arab identity (N = 149)	Palestinian identity (N = 145)
<i>Political ideology</i>						
(Arab parties = 1, else = 0)	—	—	—	-0.305***	-0.349***	—
(left = 1, else = 0)	0.206***	-0.098**	-0.035	-0.140**	0.072	0.267***
(center = 1, else = 0)	0.088*	-0.057	0.014	-0.095*	0.202	0.131
(right = 1, else = 0)	-0.099**	0.074*	-0.032	-0.013	—	—
(religious = 1, else = 0)	-0.297***	0.046	0.151***	0.206***	—	—
<i>Territorial solution</i>						
(1 = annexation;						
5 = concession)	0.233***	-0.085*	-0.064*	-0.007	0.029	-0.075
<i>Emigration plans</i>						
(1 = yes; 2 = not at all)	-0.131***	-0.117**	-0.065*	0.093*	0.096	-0.022
<i>Dedicated to neighborhood</i>						
(1 = very; 4 = not at all)	0.096**	0.026	-0.023	-0.064	-0.133	0.025
<i>Private protection</i>						
(1 = 20 NIS; 7 = 500 NIS or more)	-0.013	-0.003	-0.048	0.088*	-0.072	-0.112
<i>Military ability to protect</i>						
(1 = high; 6 = low)	0.081*	0.89*	0.047	0.010	0.046	-0.179*
<i>Influence</i>						
(1 = yes; 4 = none)	0.091*	0.134***	-0.052	0.065	0.156	0.244**
<i>Social obedience</i>						
(1 = yes; 4 = no)	0.68	0.096	0.103**	-0.044	-0.090	-0.177*

Table 2.4 Spearman correlations with partialled-out identity components

Variable	Jewish identity (N = 687)	Israeli identity (N = 677)	Family identity (N = 949)	Professional identity (N = 630)	Arab identity (N = 149)	Palestinian identity (N = 145)
<i>Protest</i>						
(1 = yes; 4 = no)	-0.086*	-0.039	-0.022	-0.026	0.131	0.250**
<i>Religion</i>						
(1 = Orthodox; 6 = antireligion)	0.420***	-0.066	-0.91**	-0.238***	0.151	-0.141
<i>Sex</i>						
(1 = men; 0 = women)	0.001	-0.036	0.165***	-0.089*	0.012	-0.100
<i>Education</i>						
(1 = none; 8 = academic)	0.141***	-0.016	0.028	-0.190***	-0.153	-0.074
<i>Employment</i>						
(1 = working; 0 = not working)	0.090*	-0.052	0.004	-0.231***	-0.084	-0.063
<i>Income</i>						
(1 = less than 700; 9 = 5000+)	0.126***	-0.056	0.111**	-0.183***	-0.063	-0.162
<i>Family size</i>						
(1 = 1 person; 9 = 9 or more)	-0.168***	0.018	-0.005	0.025	-0.141	-0.300***
<i>Father's origin</i>						
(1 = Eastern; 2 = Israeli; 3 = Western) (For Arabs: Muslims = 1, else = 0)	0.144***	-0.040	-0.049	-0.060	-0.182*	-0.384***

(continued)

Table 2.4 Spearman correlations with partitioned-out identity components (continued)

Variable	Jewish identity (N = 687)	Israeli identity (N = 677)	Family identity (N = 949)	Professional identity (N = 630)	Arab identity (N = 149)	Palestinian identity (N = 145)
<i>Immigration</i>						
(1 = Israeli born; 9 = 1980+)	-0.002	0.102**	-0.048	0.006	—	—
Age	0.007	-0.086*	-0.063	0.158***	-0.035	-0.026
<i>Role of the state:</i>						
Factor 1 (security)	0.059*	0.036	0.027	-0.016	0.038	0.125
Factor 2 (economic)	-0.051	-0.057	0.12	-0.104**	0.028	0.090
Factor 3 (social)	-0.044	0.040	-0.074	-0.050	-0.082	-0.046
<i>Social and political involvement:</i>						
Factor 1 (public sphere)	0.061*	0.26	0.025	0.46	0.164*	0.112
Factor 2 (private sphere)	0.030	0.070*	0.007	0.052	0.077	0.102

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ .

collective values seem to moderate their alienation: fewer among them consider emigration or doubt the ability of the state and the armed forces to protect them, but at the same time they are the only category willing to pay for private protection agencies. Also, the group that chose profession as their primary identity but not the family as a second choice is less distinct demographically: Family size and ethnic origin are not significant for this group as they were for those who chose both profession and family as their major identities.

*Pure Israeli Arab Orders.* Among partialled-out identities in the Arab sample, we focus only on the Arab and Palestinian identities. The minimal overlapping in the other identities does not justify the analysis. Comparing the correlations in Tables 2.3 and 2.4, we find that here too, the separated identities tend to represent and reproduce more extremist orders than the combined identities. Both the Arab but not Palestinian and Palestinian but not Arab identities support specific Arab parties more than the combined identities do. The Arab identity holders who did not choose Palestinian as their second identity do not oppose leftist parties as do those with combined identities, though they still reject right wing parties. This may be interpreted as a willingness to cooperate with the Israeli left to attain common goals, and to accept the Israeli order. Also, the Arabs but not Palestinians tend to be more orthodox than those with combined identities, the partialled-out Arab and Palestinian identities are more typical of Muslims, and it seems that Muslims tend to separate these identities more than do Christians.

The Palestinian, non-Arab identity seems even more extremist. Strongly supportive of Arab parties and movements, they reject the Israeli identity, belittle Israeli military capability, and believe in their ability to influence social and political processes. They are also much less obedient and more willing to protest.

In sum, for both Jews and Arabs, an agent who carries two collective identities seems to moderate the sociopolitical order because the combination creates conflicting loyalties and demands. Sociopolitical conflicts are sharpened when people choose less conflicting identities. Choosing two individualistic identities strengthens attitudes and sharpens the demarcation lines among competing orders. SIs exist independently of specific political or social issues and their components are meaningful to individuals even when an issue is not specified. Thus, there is no single identity component that is salient for all Israelis.

## Discussion

This paper proposes a synthesis between two distinct sociological traditions—one a general theoretical approach and the other a more empirically based tradition—to deal more meaningfully with the basic problem of sociology, that is, the production and reproduction of the social order. The analyses seem to validate and support our hypothesis that social identity has a broader meaning than is usually given to it in sociological theory, which almost always disconnects identities from their role in the formation of social order and change. Locating the term and essence of the identities in the context of the construction of social orders—and perhaps disorders and changes, topics that we did not touch upon at this stage<sup>65</sup>—we suggest a new way to look upon identities, agency, and the meaning of social order, as well as the methodology of its investigation.

In this case, the question of causality, that is, whether social order determines identity or vice versa, is not so crucial because we assume a continuous interplay between agent and structure. The model assumes that as free-floating identities exist in the system, so the possibility of an agent to adopt some of them exists, giving different weights for specific elements and for diverse combinations of these elements. However, the numbers and combinations of identity elements are limited. Many elements of a unified identity carried by agents, or their mixtures, were not present or were statistically negligible. Such rare configurations did not constitute parts of the social order, but might be the nucleus for formations in future orders and potential structures. We assume that situational constraints, present cultures and structures, and internal and external social control tend to minimize the possible combinations of major identities. A given order probably also attempts to influence the contents of already existing identities, such as the meaning of femininity and masculinity, by rewarding or punishing different ways to perform gender roles.

In conclusion, we have not forgotten that individuals belong by free choice or ascriptive ties to real and concrete social groups and collectivities, and that they are even born into specific identities. Our point is that they can play with other options. We tested a part of our thesis within a very specific context, using a sociologically convenient case, in which an ongoing battle between different components of the society over the preferred order is closely connected with the collective identities, but at the same time, this *kulturkampf* has not erupted into a chaotic civil war (yet?) and the battle



over order is still managed within the boundaries of certain accepted rules. The cost of using such a well-defined case seems to be to marginalize the role of additional identities that we suspect in other case studies would be more central to the structure of the system, such as religion, gender, or locality. However, despite the relatively restrictive character of the Israeli case, by examining agency through identities, we have demonstrated how a large margin of possible choices and combinations of diverse identities is given to agents, making possible the constitution of alternative orders.