Chapter 1. A Model for Analyzing Reciprocal Relations Between the Jewish and Arab Communities


4. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Social Differentiation and Stratification (Glenview: Foresman, 1971).


6. The fourth main possibility is that the immigrant society absorbs the local population.

7. That is, neither the prices of the merchandise nor their quantities were determined by the laws of supply and demand, but were to a large degree dependent
8. David Horowitz claims that between 1920 and 1940, lands worth close to nine million Palestinian pounds were sold to Jews, “and this stream of capital necessarily had a great influence on the creation of a middle class within the Arab population.” See David Horowitz, The Development of Palestinian Economy (Tel Aviv: Bialik Institute, Dvir, 1948) (in Hebrew) and Said Sadek, Palestine in the Claws of Imperialism (Cairo: Committee for Editing and Printing, 1946), 61–76 (in Arabic).


10. Jewish agriculture was the first sector to become economically profitable; then other spheres received profitable impetus. The port of Tel Aviv replaced that of Jaffa, not only as an organization, but also as a facility based entirely on skilled Jewish labor. The immigration wave of 1938–46 supplied the Jewish workforce in other areas as well, such as construction and citrus growing.

11. See Baruch Kimmerling, The Economic Interrelationships between the Arab and Jewish Communities in Mandatory Palestine (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 1979) and ESCO, Jewish, Arab, and British Policies. The Middle Eastern version of these syncretic cultures was designated by the concept of Levantinism. Albert Hourani characterizes it as living according to ethical standards adapted from other sources rather than independently generated. See Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford, 1963), 46. A fascinating description of the process of selectively internalizing values imported into the Middle East is given in Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958).

12. Joseph Klausner, A Word of Truth and Peace about the Arabs’ Fear of Zionism (Jerusalem: al-Salam, 1924) (in Arabic) and Mussa (Moshe) Smilanski, The Jewish Imperialism and the Fellah (Jerusalem: Malul, 1940) (in Arabic). Both were published in Arabic to try to reach the educated Arab reader and influence him to see Zionism as a blessing to indigenous Arabs. For the Brith Shalom Group and the idea of binationalism, see Susan Lee Hattis, The Bi-National Idea in Palestine During Mandatory Times (Haifa: Shikmona, 1970).

13. See, e.g., Jaber Shibli, Conflict or Cooperation in Palestine (Jerusalem, Jordan: al-Umma, 1950), 20 (in Arabic) and Jaber Shibli, Society to Safeguard al-Aqsa Mosque and Other Muslim (Holy) Places, Proclamation (Jerusalem: Dar al-Itam, 1934) (in Arabic).

15. “Youths left their families and the traditional society,” Israel Kolatt tells us, “and the young watchmen and laborers have begun to wear Arab dress and conform to the customs of their neighbors.” The third wave of immigrants saw this as part of the decadence of the new Jewish society. See Israel Kolatt, “Eliezer Schohat and the Poel HaTzair,” in I. Shapiro, ed., Eliezer Schohat (Tel Aviv: Am-Oved, 1973), 49 (in Hebrew).


18. See Yehoshua Porath, Emergence. See also M. Sarkis and D. Jalli, Zionism and the Unification (Cairo: Raamsses, 1933) (in Arabic).


26. Lewis Coser, Functions of Social Conflict, 93.

27. The Muslim-Christian associations were political organizations created immediately after the British conquest to emphasize the shared Muslim-Christian opposition to fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration. They were organized into a flimsy federation of branches throughout the country with a shared charter. Usually the association in Jerusalem served as the center. At the Third Palestinian Congress in Haifa on December 13, 1920, representatives of the associations chose the Arab Executive Council. A description and analysis of the growth, activities, and demise
of the Muslim-Christian associations can be found in Yehoshua Porath, "Political Organizations of the Palestinians."

28. See report L/4, file IIB in the Zionist Archives.


31. This is the anniversary of Saladin’s victory over the Christians in 1187. Thus a report in the newspaper *Al-Jami‘a al Arabiya* (August 17, 1932) on the battle of Hittin opined that the time had come for Palestinians to be reliberated.


34. Zvi Sussman, *Wage Differentials and Quality within the Histadrut*, 51.


38. See Haim Arlozoroff in his letter of June 30 to Dr. Weizmann. Haim Arlozoroff, *Jerusalem Diary* (Tel Aviv: Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel, n.d.), 334 (in Hebrew). Arlozoroff was the most prominent leader of the Jewish polity The opposite side reached similar conclusions, and Amin al-Hussaini and other leaders even expressed them publicly. See, e.g., *Al-Jami‘a al-Arabiya*, September 23, 1931.


47. G. Z. Israeli claims that one of the reasons that the Arabs joined the Communist Party was “the chance to meet Jewish girls.” The same author claims that many of the active party workers married Jewish women, including

48. Of course other questions can be raised about the changes in the mode of interaction, such as the pace of the change, degree of suddenness, and many other questions about social change.

49. Usually in concrete situations the choice of a behavioral strategy toward the opposing side is not made according to rational considerations, as game theory would have it, but also by accounting for social restraints and basic codes that are profitable in the system. It is also difficult to generalize from the decisions of an isolated player in a multi-round game to those of an entire social system.


51. Concrete contact was also minimal. Thus Assaf points out that “of all the extensive Hebrew literary activity which has developed in this period (the Mandatory period), only one book has been translated into Arabic, and this is a book on child care.” M. Assaf, Arab-Jewish Relations in Palestine (1860–1948) (Tel Aviv: Educational and Cultural Projects of the Histadrut, 1970), 281 (in Hebrew).

Chapter 2. Collective Identity as Agency and Structuration of Society


6. Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, 4.

8. Ira J. Cohen, “Structuration Theory and Social Praxis,” in Anthony Giddens and Jonathan Turner, eds., Social Theory Today (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987) 273–308. This is a very brief and superficial summary of Giddens’ rich and innovative approach, but due to the limitation of space we cannot do justice to his theoretical work.


10. That different individuals assign different meanings and interpretations to the same identity, or that the same identity assumes different content in any culture, does not weaken the identity’s importance. Such ambiguities are built into any cultural term and make its togetherness possible; at the same time, they help us to explain social changes that are the basis for many kulturkampfs.


31. See Chapter Four.


34. In the case of Arab society in Israel, we may consider loyalties to the extended family (the hamula) as a semi-individualistic orientation because of the interchangeability of the two types of families.


38. We use the term populist capitalism following Shapiro’s definition: “Populism is composed of a distinct political ideology and a political structure. Populism is not an ideology of social change. It is designed for groups that feel deprived and cut off from the dominant culture . . . Populism is against the establishment, not against the state.” Yonathan Shapiro, “Political Sociology in Israel: A Critical View,” in E. Krausz, ed., Politics and Society in Israel (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1985), 24.

39. Yonathan Shapiro, “Political Sociology in Israel.”

40. Though of immense importance, the militarist aspect of the ideology has less direct bearing on the labor market in this context, and thus, it is not elaborated here; see Chapter Five in the present volume for an extended discussion of militarism.


43. See Chapter One of the present volume.

44. Based on Uri Farago, Stability and Change in the Jewish Identity of Working


55. Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, “The Primarily Political Functions of the Left-Right Continuum.”


59. Yonathan Shapiro, “Political Sociology in Israel.”


64. Ronald Inglehart and Scott Flanagan, “Value Change in Industrial Societies.”

65. A longitudinal study is necessary for that, though such research could tell us the possible implications of such changes. Also, further research is necessary to ascertain which factors influence choices of specific identity combinations, or in line with our approach, how the social order is constituted in the field, rather than being simply the presumption of a circular process between the individual and the order.

Chapter 3. The Formation Process of Palestinian Collective Identities

1. The extensive survey was carried out in June, July, and August 1992. The representative sample included 2,500 Palestinian households in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Arab Jerusalem. See Marianne Heiberg, “Opinions and Attitudes,” in Marianne Heiberg and Geir Ovensen, eds., *Palestinian Society in Gaza, West Bank, and Arab Jerusalem: A Survey of Living Conditions* (Oslo: Fagbevegelsens, 1993), 249–312. The survey did not include Israeli Palestinian citizens or Palestinians in the diaspora. The great discrepancies between men and women regarding their identities are almost self-evident. Islam appears to impose great restrictions on women, who are divided between the two major competing components of the Palestinian collective identities: the traditional family and Palestinian nationalism. The same level of strength of the familial identity was found in a Jewish Israeli sample, but not among the Israeli Palestinians who expressed a strikingly different structural pattern of their collective identity, preferring Arabism and Palestinism, and pushing the familial identity into a relatively marginal position. See Chapter Two.


what and how national identities are constructed, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.


6. Changing identities are also a way to recruit people to cope with hardships, such as foreign rule, uncertainties of social change, and modernization. Thus, Liah Greenfeld perceived nationalism as a tool for political modernization, contrary to Gellner, who saw nationalism as outcome of modernity. It is the elites’ privilege to be sovereign first; later, it is extended to the entire people. See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

7. Recent literature examines the state as a conceptual variable, measured by its roots in a particular society’s culture and tradition. See J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 522–559.


10. Originally, the *umma* was used to denote a man’s tribe, community, kinfolk, or people, and was later accepted as the Islamic concept of the “community of all the believers in God and his prophet Muhammed.” The notion was juxtaposed to the individual person, the concept of which does not exist without being a part of the organic moral community of the *umma*. However, Sylvia Haim’s analyses of modern Arab nationalist thought, especially that of Sati’ al-Husri, who was influenced by German Romanticism, asserted that the notion has been modernized and Westernized and can unequivocally be understood as a nation in the European sense. See Sylvia G. Haim, “Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism,” in Walter Z.


13. The Syrian General Congress, claiming to be the representative of Greater Syria (i.e., Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, including Transjordan), declared independence on March 8, 1920. The declaration also demanded a federation between Iraq and Syria, because they “possess linguistic, historical, economic, natural and racial ties, which make the two regions dependent on each other.” See Sati’ al-Husari, The Day of Maysalun (Beirut: al-Maqsuf, 1945), 246–273 (in Arabic). Al-Husri himself was a prominent ideologue of a secular pan-Arab nationalism. This was a clash with French imperial power, which, following the post–World War I armistice among the great powers, was supposed to rule the territory. Al-Husri was very close to Amir Faysal during his abortive trial to establish the Syrian state in 1918–1920; see also Muhammad Muslih, “The Rise of Local Nationalism in the Arab East,” in The Origins of Arab Nationalism, 189–203.

incorporated the territory into the empire in 1516 after taking it from the Mamluks. During the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent and Selim II (1520–1574), there was a temporary economic revival, including renewal of Jewish settlement in Tiberias by Don Joseph Nasi, a banker and counselor of Selim.

15. Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry*, second ed. (London: Macmillan, 1990), 6. Many modern Jewish thinkers claim the same about the Judaism, which is perceived as a religion that has hidden within it, since the first exile of the Jews, strong ingredients of modern nationalism. Many other nationalistic ideologies—e.g., Irish, Polish, Italian—include strong religious ingredients.


18. See Justine McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Mandate Period and the Mandate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 10. In 1860, in the twelve cities of Palestine, there were an estimated 90,000 city dwellers. Twenty years later, there were 120,000 city dwellers. Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, “The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine during the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century According to Western Sources,” in Moshe Ma’oz, ed., *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period* (Jerusalem: Magness, 1975), 68 (in Hebrew).

19. *Shabab* literally means “youth”; however it was generalized for people who cut their traditional familial loyalties and became an urban underclass.


21. In 1799, Ahmed Pasha al-Jezzar, the Ottoman governor of Acre, turned back the advancing French revolutionary army of Napoleon, enhanced Haifa and its region, and subsequently imposed a lengthy siege on Jaffa, forcing the Ottoman governor to flee. For a brief period, Jezzar became the first master of a part of the territory later known as Palestine. He benefited from the initial stages of the European Industrial Revolution, trading cotton and grain for firearms to equip his soldiers. See Joel S. Migdal and Baruch Kimmerling, “The Shaping of a Nation: Palestinians in the Last Century of Ottoman Rule,” *New Perspectives on Turkey* 10 (Spring 1994):
75–94. Other powerful and nearly autonomous governors (*walis*) of the territory were Tahir, Sulayman, and 'Abdallah Pashas.

22. This following the 1864 Provinces (*Wilayat*) Act: The northern district (*sanjaq*) of Acre (including Akka or Acre, Haifa, and Tabarya or Tiberias), Safat, and the mountain region of al-Balq' (including Nablus, Janin, and Tulkarem) were a part of the province (*wilaya*) of Beirut. The country’s central areas were included into the province of Damascus, which also held the districts of Hawran and Amman. The district of Jerusalem was the only one that included pure Palestinian subdistricts (*aqdiya*), namely Yafa (Jaffa), Gazza, Hebron, and Beersheba.


24. Albert Hourani asserted that the Tanzimat’s intention was to strengthen the control of the central government in Istanbul, the consequence of which was to empower the local leadership. Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reforms and the Politics of Notables,” in William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers, eds., *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 41–60.

25. Other large, wealthy aristocratic families in Mount Nablus were Shak’s, Misris, Tuqans, ‘Abd al-Hadis, Nimrs, Qasims, and Jarrars. Jaffa was the center for the Dajanis, Qasims, Bitars, Bayydas, Abu Khadras, and Tayyans. Ramla had the Tajis and al-Ghusayns. In Gaza, the Shawwas’ and Husaynis’ local branches possessed estates of orchards, textiles, pottery, and soap industries. The ‘Amrs controlled the Hebron area for a century, manufacturing glass products and breeding sheep and goats, and the Shuqayrs had a base in Acre. Only in Haifa was there a Maronite family such as Bustani and Greek-Orthodox families of Hakim and Nassar. Some intermarriage (*musahara*) eventually took place among the large clans, such as between Nashashibis and Jabris or ‘Alamis, or Khalidis and the wealthy Salam clan of Beirut. For a brilliant and detailed description of the Nablusian families and their role in the economic and social development of the territory, see Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1990* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). He also demonstrated the intensive regional trade networks developed by these families, contrary to the initial image that only the coastal region urban families were involved in international trade.

26. From the late nineteenth century until the 1920s, Arab and Palestinian nationalists perceived the lands of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine as a unitary geographical, cultural, political, and economic unit under the umbrella of Greater Syria (*Bilad esh-Sham*). We will see later how, why, and when the Palestinians attached and detached themselves from this identity.

27. For a full description of the rebellion and its suppression, see Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, *Palestinians*, Chapter 1.
28. Even the poll tax on the non-Muslim minorities (dhimmis), the Christians, and Jews was abolished. This had a far-reaching symbolic impact, ending the dominant status of Muslims in the country and creating a universalistic notion of “citizenship” for all subjects of the Egyptian state. This was a major change in the stratified Muslim world order. However, the dhimmis also played a central role in the regional economy, as merchants, tax collectors, and financiers of the local strongmen’s military and economic enterprises. The Muslim’s position was also undermined by the Egyptian emancipation, which included the minorities in the local councils (majlis idare). Thomas Philipp, “Jews and Arab Christians: Their Changing Position in Politics and Economy in Eighteenth-Century Syria and Egypt,” in Amnon Cohen and Gabriel Baer, eds., *Egypt and Palestine: A Millennium of Association* (868–1948), (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), 150–166.


30. For detailed documentation, see Asad Jibrail Rustum, *The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Disturbances in Palestine, 1834*, Oriental Series no. 11. (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1938); Asad Jibrail Rustum, *A Corpus of Arabic Documents Relating to the History of Syria under Mehemet ‘Ali Rasha*, vols. 1–5 (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1929–1934). For an account of some of the events from the perspective of the notable families, such as the Jabel Nablus Nimr family, who supposedly remained loyal to the Ottomans over the entire period of the revolt, see Ihsan al-Nimr, *Ta’rikh Jabal Nablus wa’l-Balqa*, vols. 1–2 (Damascus, 1938). This author argues that the idea of rebellion against the Egyptians was raised during a *hajj* journey of Nimrs and other sheikhs to Mecca, giving the halo to the Nimrs and
a religious meaning to the revolt. A large number of sources are in Mohammed Sabry, *L’empire egyptien*.


32. Bernard Lewis, *History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 12. Importantly, Lewis warned that there is a danger in the processes of “recovering history,” and if it is done for political purposes, it can lead to fabricating or suppressing facts and events, resulting in “invented history.” See Eric Robert Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Los Angeles: University of California, 1982). In our context, such an invented history is the claim that the ancient Canaanites were in fact Arabs who pre-dated the first Israelite tribes. See Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, *Urubat Bayt al-Maqdis* (Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization, 1969); or Muhammad Adib al-‘Amir, *Urbat Filastin* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Asriyya, 1972).


35. For an excellent description of the rise of Jaffa as a modern commercial port city, see Ruth Kark, *Jaffa: A City in Evolution*, trans. Gila Brand (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben Zvi, 1990). However, Kark ignores the place of Jaffa as the modern Arab commercial center of the territory, and in general underplays and blurs the basic Arabic character of the city.

36. Von Moltke, then the German military envoy in Istanbul, published a plan to establish Palestine as a Jewish autonomous state under German control. See Mordechai Eliav, “German Interests and the Jewish Community in Nineteenth Century Palestine,” in *Ottoman Reforms*. 426–427. Guizot wished to internationalize Palestine in the framework of a French Levant, similar to a plan by Palmerston and other British politicians and intellectuals.

37. Shimon Shamir, “The Impact of Western Ideas on Traditional Society in Ottoman Palestine,” in *Ottoman Reforms*, 507–516; Hisham Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals*

38. This assumption goes beyond Edward Carr’s assertion that a geographical unit can serve as a source of collective consciousness. See Edward Hallet Carr, Nationalism and After (New York: Macmillan, 1945). It also deals with the criticism regarding the invention of an as-yet-nonexistent Palestinian identity by going beyond the general historiographical tendency to consider a territorial unit as corresponding with events that happened long before and after the analyzed period. Here I suggest a methodology that treats a population of a territory as a single analytical unit over a period of about a hundred years. In sociological terms, this is considered a case study.


40. Usually the Balfour Declaration is contrasted with the exchange of a letter between Husayn, the so-called Sherif of Mecca, and the British envoy in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, which states that “Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of Arabs in all the regions within all the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca” (October 24, 1915). The Sherif’s demands, as well as the British limits, did not included areas of relevance to Palestine. On the British dual obligations, promises, and interpretation of the letters, see Elie Kedourie, The Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). In 1916, Britain and France divided much of the Middle East among themselves into zones of influence (via the Sykes-Picot agreement). See Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1922 (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956), 128. Following a meeting in San Remo in April 1920, the Sykes-Picot agreement was implemented, and the allies decided to put Syria and Lebanon under French mandate and Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Palestine under British mandate. In 1921, the Palestine Mandate was cut into two territories to be granted to another son of Husayn Abdullah, his own emirate; this territory became Transjordan. The League of Nations confirmed these arrangements and granted them international recognition. The boundaries of Palestine were finalized in an Anglo-French convention in March 1923.

41. In many ways, this perception was anachronistic. Since the Young Turks coup of 1908, the whole empire had undergone a Turkification process, accompanied almost from the beginning by the secularization, modernization, and centralization
of the bureaucracy. Thus, in the Nablus area, the government displaced the local Arab notables (of the Tuqan, Abd al-Hadi, and Hammad clans) from their posts with Turkish civil servants. The Nablusites reacted with stormy demonstrations, demanding the return to power of Sultan Abdulhamid and the rules of shari'a. Zeine Nour-Ud-Din Zeine, *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With Background Study of Arab Turkish Relations in the Near East* (New York: Caravan, 1973).

42. See Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East*, 76.


45. *Qawn* is used as “people” rather than “nation”; however, both are possible, depending on period and context.


47. The *al-Karmil* weekly, published in Haifa, was founded in 1908 by Najib Nasser, a Palestinian pharmacist settled in Tiberias, with the major aim of fighting Arab land sales to Jews. *Filastin* (Palestine), founded as a bi-weekly by the al-‘Isa cousins in Jaffa in 1911, became the largest-circulating Arab newspaper in the country. The boundaries of the geographical region envisioned by the title are unclear. The paper changed loyalties several times in the course of the local struggle between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis. See Rashid Khalidi, “The Role of the Press

48. Quoted by Mohammad Muslih, *Origins of Palestinian Nationalism*, 181, from Akram Zu’aytir’s unpublished manuscript. The Congress included delegates of Muslim-Christian associations from most of the major towns in the country. On these, see the following section of this paper.

49. The origin of the name was coined after the Philistines, a maritime people probably from Phoenician culture who settled the coastal plain of the country in 1190 B.C., at the same time that the mythological Hebrew tribes lead by Jehosuah conquered most of the Land of Canaan and annihilated most of the local inhabitants. King David defeated the Philistines in a series of bitter battles, and they disappeared from history. A long time after these events, following a series of Judean rebellions against their Hellenistic and Roman rulers, the second Jewish Temple was destroyed by the Roman Empire in 70 A.D. In 135 A.D., most of the Jews were exiled, effectively destroying the Jewish polity. The Romans then renamed the territory using the Philistine title. When in 635–7 Arab warriors captured the territory from the Byzantines, they called it *jund* (military district) *Filastin*. These semihistorical and semimythological events, which occurred 2,000 to 3,500 years ago, are still used and abused in the historiography of the present struggle for the land of Palestine.

50. Most of the Jewish population rejected or did not take advantage of most of the goods and services that the colonial state provided, as they attempted to build an independent parallel system, or a state within a state. For this see Baruch Kimmerling, “State Building, State Autonomy and the Identity of Society: The Case of the Israeli State,” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 6, no. 4 (1993): 396–430.


53. Jewish immigration was limited to the so-called absorption capacity of the country, measured by the amount of overall unemployment. Nadav Halevy, “The Political Economy of Absorptive Capacity: Growth and Cycles in Jewish Palestine,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (October 1983): 456–469.


56. Since the 1910s, most of the tenants removed from land purchased by Jews received alternative parcels, compensation, or both. To avoid ethnic or national clashes, the Jews purchased land only when the Arab tenants had been removed by the original Arab owners. Skilled entrepreneurs, specializing in the land market, appeared on both the Arab and Jewish sides. See Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory.


58. The Christian Arabs were about 15 percent of the Arab population of the country, belonging to various churches and congregations. During the Ottoman period, the Christian Arabs were often threatened with enmity and treated on a formal level as a minority group in a similar manner to the Jews. Several times when there were disturbances in the country, such as during the rebellion against Muhammed 'Ali's regime, the Muslims directed pogroms toward Christian communities. Later, some of the most prominent Palestinian and pan-Arab nationalists were of Christian origin.

59. At the same time and under the influence of developments in Syria and other similar phenomenon in Europe, some semi-clandestine organizations and clubs were established. Here the boundaries between cultural, political, and semi-military activities were highly blurred. If the MCAs were associations of the established notables and elite groups, the clubs were venues for younger and more radical intelligentsia. The most important organizations were the al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary Club) and al Nadi al-'Arabi (The Arab Club). Al-Muntada was very active in 1919–1921, mostly dominated by a Nashashibi coalition, but also included some Husaynis, developing a hard core anti-Zionist, pan-Arab ideology. Al-Nadi was an offshoot of the Damascus-based al-Fatat and shared al-Nadi's ideology, but was dominated by a coalition of younger Nablusian and al-Husaynis. The Jamiiyyat al-Ikha wal-Afaf, a grassroots association composed mainly of policemen and other lower officials in the British civil service, prepared to execute Arabs who cooperated or sold land to Jews, but seemed to have been dissolved by British intelligence in 1918–19. Mohammad Muslih asserts that during Faysal's regime in Damascus, some Palestinians formed paramilitary organizations, collecting arms and recruiting members to struggle against the British and Jews in Palestine. See Mohammad Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism, 171–172.
60. The Jewish Agency for Palestine was the official local branch of the World Zionist Organization, and was recognized by the Mandate as the representative of the Zionist Jewish community. The Arabs demanded the same recognition for the Executive Committee. The British agreed, so long as the Arabs recognized the legitimacy of the Mandate. The Arab leadership refused, anxious not to appear to accept the Balfour Declaration. Thus, de jure, the Arab Executive was never recognized, but for all practical purposes the British referred to it as a fully recognized leadership. See Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of Palestinian National Movement*, 1974.

61. The pan-Syrian or pan-Arabic identities and their formulation as a political goal never completely disappeared from the Palestinian public agenda. They were brought up again by several delegates during the Fifth Congress (Nablus 1922), and were a part of the 1930s Istiqlal Party platform. Led mainly by men who had been associated with Faysal, it was also part of one of the slogans used by rebels in 1937–38 and imposed on Palestinian refugees in camps under Egyptian and Syrian rule during the 1950s and early 1960s.

62. Under the Ottoman law and millet system of autonomous religious communities, Christian Arabs were considered to be a minority group like the Jews. However, they were the most educated and wealthy of the mainly urban Arab population. In the Palestinian historiography today, the past and present discrimination of the Christian Palestinians and the occasional tensions among the Muslims and Christians are regarded as taboo subjects, as they contradict the conception of the Palestinians as one unified nation.


64. Al-Husayni’s first Palestinian activity was to exploit Nabi Musa, a local popular religious, mainly folkloric festival, which he tried to convert into a country-wide religious event.

65. A very interesting case is an attempt in the early 1930s to establish a memorial day for Salah al-Din (Saladin) and his Hittin victory (1187) over the Crusaders, which led to the dismantling of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (1099–1187). However, when it became clear that such a commemoration would hurt the Christians, it was canceled. Arab historiosophy has often drawn parallels between the Crusaders and the Zionist settlement as an example of how a technologically superior foreign power conquered the country, but was not able to hold it for a long period of time.

66. See Baruch Kimmerling, “A Model for Analysis of Reciprocal Relations be-


### Chapter 4. Between Primordial and Civil Definitions of the Collective Identity


2. Virtually all Zionist philosophers have expressed this concept. See, e.g., the comprehensive introductions to Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea: A Historical Analysis and Reader* (New York: Doubleday and Herzl, 1959); Shlomo Avineri, *The


5. In certain contexts, religions with particularly universalistic and supernatural overtones, such as Catholicism and Islam, may foster and consolidate national movements. The Polish Revolution of the mid-1980s combined social protest with clearly religious intentions. The same is true of nationalism in many Muslim countries, which seek to participate in the pan-Islamic movement through more particularistic nationalist frames of reference. Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 227.

6. Several Orthodox rabbis took part in the First Zionist Congress, but when their hopes of imbuing Zionism with an exclusively religious character were not realized, they ceased their participation in and support of the movement. The First Zionist Congress, originally due to take place in Munich, was moved to Basel because of severe opposition by the German Rabbinate. On July 6, 1897, the Executive of the Organization of German Rabbis officially condemned Zionism, considering it to be “contradictory to the objectives of Judaism, as expressed in the Bible and subsequent religious sources.” The Orthodox Agudat Israel Party, the largest worldwide Jewish political party until the destruction of European Jewry, displayed strong and consistent opposition to the Zionist idea, considering it to be an even greater danger than secularism, perhaps because of Zionism’s use of religious symbols. Agudat Israel’s approach to Zionism, in both Palestine and the rest of the world, became ambivalent only after the Holocaust and especially after the successful establishment of the state of Israel and its subsequent battles against the surrounding Arab environment. See Menachem Friedman, Society and Religion: The Non-Zionist Orthodox Community in Palestine (Jerusalem: Yad Ben Zvi, 1977, pp. 219–226 (in Hebrew).

7. Utter rejection of traditional Jewish life was already inherent in the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala) revolution and in the processes of secularization that accompanied it. Zionism, which, with some reservations, had inherited this approach from the Haskala and its socialist wing, naturally placed strong emphasis upon productivity and upending the social pyramid.
8. Zionism maintains a very complex attitude toward anti-Semitism. Obviously, anti-Semitism is a pathological and detestable phenomenon, but as such, Zionism cannot define itself as a direct reaction to anti-Semitism. Zionism is prepared to consider anti-Semitism as a factor in emigrating from a country of origin, but not as a pull toward Zion. Nevertheless, the very existence of anti-Semitism constitutes a necessary condition for rejecting all other Jewish alternatives to Zionism, such as assimilation, ethnic-religious integration in democratic and developing societies, or participation in revolutionary movements for a changing world order—a by-product of which will be the disappearance of the Jewish problem.


12. This was essentially a later reaction, resulting largely from the trauma induced by the Sabbetaian and Frankist movements. which attempted to achieve an immediate mass implementation of Judaism's nationalist foundations, disregarding both internal and international political conditions. The relationship between the Sabbetaian and Frankist movements and Zionism—or at least certain components thereof—posed some difficulty for the Zionist movement, as it was both a subject for self-criticism and an attack from the outside, especially regarding Zionism's irrational or messianic dimensions. See Jacob Katz, “Israel and the Messiah,” Commentary 73, no. 1 (January 1982): 34–41, and Janet O'Dea, “Religious Zionism: Between Messianism and Realism,” Bitemzut Hagola 83/84 (1978): 44–49 (in Hebrew).

13. Within the political framework of the pre-state Jewish communities in Palestine, and later in the state of Israel, there were two additional reasons for the rather moderate form of Zionist socialist ideologies. First, as Ben-Gurion declared, the Jews had to change from class to nation, that is, attain predominance within the collectivity by demanding a series of compromises, both with their political rivals for the sake of forming coalitions and within a consociational framework. Second, the Soviet Union's generally hostile attitude toward Zionism did not encourage a positive attitude toward Marxism, even causing Zionists to reject the extremist elements within the system to the point of cooperating with the British (as in the 1920s) in fighting communism and the far left. The reaction was mediated by the Soviet stand regarding the claims of the Arab national movement,
which divided the left within the system. This constituted an additional incentive for the centripetal tendencies of the Zionist left.


15. This term is the Hebrew for “citizen,” a label referring to the non–labor sector in the Jewish community, roughly similar to the French term “bourgeois.”


18. Due to a combination of economic and political factors, especially regarding local patterns of land ownership, the original Zionist enterprise was constructed in areas peripheral in biblical Jewish history and symbolism, namely, the coastal plain and the Jezreel and Jordan valleys, which were part of Philistia. The core territory in the hilly regions of Judea and Samaria was opened to Jewish settlement only after the 1967 war, except for Jerusalem and other limited regions. See Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory, 147–182, 225–228.


23. These statistics are consistent with all other findings in this area. See Gallup Poll, Maariv, August 4, 1971; Gesher 18 (1972): 108; Pori Poll, Haaretz, September 2, 1973; and I. Shelach, Indications Towards Secular Religion in Israel (Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Kaplan School of Economics and Social Science, 1975) (in Hebrew).


25. The concept of Eretz Israel also has a non-primordial, more civic connotation, referring to the small, intimate collectivity that strives for equality among people and within society. The term “Eretz Israel,” which is connected with the pre-state, socialistically oriented Jewish community in Palestine, today arouses nostalgia among many veteran settlers who have been largely alienated from the traditional power centers since the 1977 change in government. Eretz Israel is also characterized by a large measure of secular familialism.
31. Jewish immigration from Yemen commenced as early as 1882 and was purely religious in nature in that it did not confront modern nationalism. Nevertheless, it differed from previous traditional Jewish pilgrimages, in which Jews came to die and be buried in the Holy Land or to participate in a community of scholars. Yemenite immigration had a proto-political character, as it was motivated by rumors that Palestine had passed or was about to pass to Jewish control. See Y. Nini, “Yemenite Immigrants in Eretz Israel (1882–1914),” *Cathedra* 5 (1977): 30–82 (in Hebrew).
32. The key elements of Zionism are immigration to Palestine, readiness to establish a Jewish collectivity, preparedness for immediate implementation, and the personal and collective sacrifice to attain these objectives.
36. Israel has no formal constitution; rather, there are regular parliamentary laws and a number of basic laws that, when compiled in a single unit, form a sort of constitution. Basic laws are distinguished from ordinary laws in that a special majority is required to amend them. One of the reasons for the absence of a constitution is that its enactment would have underscored the dilemma regarding the basic laws upon which the collectivity was to be founded: Would they be those of a modern civil state or those of a Halachic-Jewish state?
37. The more religious members of the population left their social, political, and economic ghettos and attempted to change the system’s basic rules of the game. Simultaneously, they were also running a completely modern society under conditions of conflict with the external environment, especially because the Jewish
religion does not reject modern technology. So long as the religious population lives as a subsociety, it may obtain services from the overall society, such as security, health, public transportation, and communications, without necessarily being bound to the principles of Halacha. Such is not the case, however, if the society is run according to the millennia-old, rigidly interpreted religious codex, which has undergone so little change. Without an official church, degrees of freedom in its interpretation are limited. In Judaism, there is no possibility of adapting Halacha to the demands of modern man beyond its relatively narrow horizons.

The aforementioned restrictions notwithstanding, two institutions have been established to find technological solutions to the economic, social, and security problems demanded by expanding religious Judaism to activities that were previously closed or supplied as services by the external society. Jerusalem’s Institute for Science and Halacha seek technological solutions to ad hoc problems, such as medical treatment that does not violate the Sabbath, operating within the essential framework delineated by Halacha alone. The Tzomet Institute, at the new Judean settlement of Alon Shvut, was established with similar objectives, although its basic guidelines are somewhat different: the latter institution will also consider extra-Halachic factors (national objectives, settlement, and the like).


40. The Jewish religious codex includes an abundance of land-related precepts, such as the Sabbatical year, the calendar, activity cycles, and the ban on sale of land to non-Jews, that significantly affect daily behavior and economic and social transactions in Eretz Israel. The precepts were fixed and reinforced in the Diaspora only through ritualization, and have no significance in the conception of the collectivity of the state of Israel, which, as indicated earlier, is not a Halachic concept. The rise in the permeability of boundaries between the religious sector and other social segments of the collectivity enabled a greater shift toward the Eretz Israel type. See the lecture by Menachem Friedman, “Religion and Politics in Israel,” delivered at the annual conference of the Israel Sociological Society, Haifa, February 16–17, 1983.


42. One example of this phenomenon concerns the manner in which the Lebanese war of 1982 was conducted, as well as its societal meanings and consequences. The war stimulated strong protests, compelling the political center to act in a more universalistic manner. One of the salient features of the aftermath of active warfare has been the re-crystallization of a religious-political stream that emphasizes the humanistic and universalistic messages of Judaism.
Chapter 5. State Building, State Autonomy, and the Identity of Society

1. One major limitation of the state-society paradigm is its inability to distinguish clearly between the government and the state, especially when discussing the specific implementation of policy. I propose an analytical distinction between the government and the state by introducing the notions of identity and state’s logic.


3. This excludes several enclaves of ultra-Orthodoxy, which traditionally maintained partially separate and parallel institutions toward the state, mainly for ideological and theological reasons. Menachem Friedman, “The State as a Theological Dilemma,” in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989). The Israeli state’s relations with different citizen and noncitizen Palestinian populations are discussed later.

4. This statement is conditional because it refers mainly to the income taxes of wage earners, especially in the public and government sectors of the economy. Real taxation of the self-employed is much less impressive. Israel’s portions of undeclared incomes were estimated at between 5 and 15 percent of gross national product (GNP), while those of Western Europe are about 10 percent of GNP. Ben-Zion Zilberfarb, “Estimate of the Black Market in Israel and Abroad,” *Economic Quarterly* 122 (1984): 319–322 (in Hebrew), and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, “The Social Meanings of Alternative Systems: Some Exploratory Notes,” in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society*, 156–157.


15. If the change in regime is accompanied by changes in the social and political boundaries of the collectivity, which lead to changes in the collective identity, the emerged state may differ substantially from the former state. A transition from an autocratic or totalitarian system to a democratic system is a change in regime but not in identity. The Hungarian identity of postcommunist Hungary is not different from its identity during the communist era. However, in the decomposition of the Soviet Empire, the Russian identity was restructured along with the national-ethnic identities of the other states of the federation. In the decomposition of the former Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing and boundary redrawing took place. No doubt we are witnessing a rebuilding of old and new primordial identities.


20. The Mandatory boundaries were originally intended to include large areas that are today part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In light of the British commitments to Sherif Hussein of Arabia, in 1922 the Emirate of Transjordan was created for Abdullah ibn Hussein, and the areas were excluded from the jurisdiction of the British Palestinian state. See Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 142–169; and Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People* (New York: Free Press, 1993).

21. This political concept was rendered obscure deliberately so as not to be highly committed to the final form and scope of the Jewish polity. For the Zionists, in practical terms, the reference was to a future sovereign Jewish state. The reason for the lack of clarity was the desire to overcome opposition, both within Great Britain and among the Arabs of the Middle East and especially in Palestine, and not to contradict Britain’s so-called dual obligation expressed in the MacMahon letters to the Sherif of Mecca.


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25. It would appear that both Jewish and Palestinian social historians, for partisan reasons, have tended to de-emphasize the part played by the colonial state in this process. For a description of the Mandate’s crucial role as a state, in making and implementing rules and functioning with a clear policy and authoritative bureaucracy in rural Arab Palestine, see Ylana N. Miller, *Government and Society,* and in a more subtle way, Jacob Reuveny, *The Administration of Palestine.*


29. I do not find direct historical evidence to confirm these two assumptions, yet without them, the British policy at the stage when a national home was granted to the Zionists, as well as the clear-cut shift in policy in the mid-1920s, cannot be understood.


31. Prima facie, avoiding transfer of lands from Arabs to Jews does not require the colonial state’s legislative intervention. However, in a situation of internal cleavage, internal social control over this kind of deviance is limited. See Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory.*


34. Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society.*

35. Yonathan Shapiro, *Democracy in Israel.*


37. The Jewish commonwealth could be established only by the coming of the Messiah, and Zionism was considered as a false messianic movement, which, like previous messianic movements, would end as a great catastrophe for the Jewish


42. Yair Aharoni, State-Owned Enterprises in Israel and Abroad (Tel Aviv: Gomeh, 1979) (in Hebrew).


44. Yonathan Shapiro, Democracy in Israel.


46. Baruch Kimmerling, ed., Israeli State and Society.


49. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants.


53. See Chapter 6.

54. Lev Luis Grinberg, Split Corporatism.

55. Ian Lustick, Arabs in a Jewish State.


58. Some attempts have been made recently, but they have not made much political impact.


62. The Lavon Affair was an internal conflict within the Mapai ruling party that finally led to a split and David Ben-Gurion’s departure from the party. The official controversy was around Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon’s role in a security mishap in Egypt in 1954, and the way that the investigation should have been handled. In fact, the struggle was between the party’s old guard and its young generation, headed by Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan. Ben-Gurion tried to use the younger generation to regain his personal statist control over the party. After he failed, he formed a new party, Rafi, and later withdrew from politics altogether.

63. Yonathan Shapiro, *Democracy in Israel*.


67. See Chapter 6.


76. The autonomy supposed to be granted to peoples and not to lands is along the lines of Moshe Dayan’s attempt in the late 1960s to make a functional division of rule between lands ruled by the Israelis and peoples ruled by the Jordanians. In the long run, the envisioned solution probably presumed a confederation or federation of the Palestinian enclaves with Jordan. But it is unlikely that the Bedouin-dominated Hashemite kingdom can change its very identity by including the highly politicized Palestinians into its state. To do so would mean a very quick Palestinization of Jordan, and not the re-Jordanization of the Palestinians. Here we have again a question of state identity.


78. Paradoxically, Algeria proves this thesis, even though it appears to be a perfect example of a pure settler state-building effort. Algeria was considered to be an indivisible part of the French fatherland, even though apart from the settlers there (the so-called *pieds noirs*) and elements in the right wing and the armed forces, most of the French did not perceive the territory located on the other side of the Mediterranean sea to be an inseparable part of the French state. It was relatively easy for De Gaulle, when he came to power, to destroy this non-obligating consensus and construct a different sociopolitical reality. In France, outside of an extremist minority, there was neither a wide perception that losing Algeria might endanger France’s very existence nor a religious sense that the loss would destroy the cosmic order. Most Jewish Israelis understand losing control over the territories of West Bank, Gaza Strip, and even the Syrian [Golan] Heights in both senses.


80. One of the conspicuous implications or costs of the transformation of the Israeli state into a binational system of control was the reversal of roles played by the Israeli armed forces: The basic character of Israeli forces as preserving the existence of a state that was invaded and besieged from outside changed to an that of an internally-oriented police force, or a community-militia force, guarding the interests and the domination of one community in its contest against its rival. Gideon Aran, “The Beginning of the Road from Religious Zionism to Zionist Religion,” *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).
81. While the Israeli Arabs or Palestinians are citizens who enjoy many civil rights, they are not really a part of the state, which defines itself as belonging to the entire Jewish people rather than to the citizens who live within the state's boundaries. Yoav Peled, “Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship,” *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (June 1992): 432–443. See also Chapters One and Eight of this volume.

82. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory*.


84. Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel*.


87. See Ilan Peleg and Ofira Seliktar, *The Emergence of a Binational Israel*. Peleg and Seliktar called this new entity The Second Republic, but I prefer to label it the Israeli State in contrast to the state of Israel, established in the territorial and population framework that followed the 1948 war.


**Chapter 6. Patterns of Militarism in Israel**


Pacific Sociological Review 16, no. 2 (April 1973): 139–152, who defined Israel as a “garrison state,” (144) but his familiarity with Israeli society and its military was highly questionable.


28. The basic situation will not change even if some form of autonomy is granted to the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Even if Israel’s armed forces leave populated areas, real power will still remain in Israel’s hands. Only the transfer of real authority to another sovereign entity will end the situation of coercive surveillance and control over the Palestinians that has persisted since 1967.


35. This is an essentially unbalanced and unstable situation, as each social orga-
nization that has repute and access to sources of power is blocked; or, alternatively, each one tries to convert its prestige into political strength.


37. See Martin Shaw, Post-Military Societies, 9: “The war perceptions of the potential adversary are clearly defined as ‘militarist.’ ‘Our own’ military activities, however, may not even be counted as war preparations; they are more likely to be seen as a part of ‘defence’ or ‘deterrence’ policy, the professed aim of which may be to avoid war rather than to fight it. An ambivalent attitude toward power and toward power being wielded by Jews followed Zionism after its inception (and is reflected in the writings of such figures as Berdichewsky and Max Nordau); a kind of counter-history has developed around this ambiguity—a view that perceives the deployment of power by Jews, who thus act ‘like all nations,’ has emerged. At its extreme, contemporary Jewish philosophy exercised by apologist writers like Emil Fackenheim utilizes the example of extreme Jewish vulnerability—especially the Holocaust period during which Jews were entirely victimized by the use of coercive power—to accord legitimacy to Israel’s deployment of unrestrained violence against ‘the gentiles.’” An intriguing review of the ambivalent Jewish response to the responsibilities and vagaries of power and force since the emergence of a modern Jewish national movement, and then later with the establishment of the state of Israel, can be found in David Biale, Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 133–176. This study, however, does not address the issue of militarism directly.


39. The most manifest examples are the development of Israel’s nuclear arms potential in the 1950s and 1960s, known as the “delicate matter” in the lexicon of the time, and the clumsy espionage and sabotage affair in Egypt, encoded as “the rotten business,” which turned in 1960–61 into the Lavon Affair.


42. See John J. Johnson, The Military and Society.

43. Dominant regional or ethnic units that ordinarily bridge religious cleavages, such as Yoruba, Fulani-Hausa, or Ibo, or militarist coalitions that join different units and use their control of armed forces to rule over smaller, weaker elements. The most evident example here is the departure of Ibo Biafra from the Nigerian federation in 1967, a step that caused a bloody civil war won in the end by the so-called Federal Army in January 1977.


47. This definition bears a resemblance to Michael Mann’s judgment, yet it is less sweeping than Mann’s conception, which avers that “militarism [is] a set of attitudes and social practices which regards war and preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity.” See Michael Mann, “The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism,” New Left Review 162 (March/April 1987): 34.

48. The use of the concept of national security is preferable to other terms, as it is widely based and encompasses other spheres. Another advantage of this term, and of the classification of the culture as civilian militarist, is the emphasis on the civilian aspect—that is, civilian experts can also be engaged in national security matters that include political considerations; they might even elevate this realm to the level of science. Such an approach giving high priority to the sphere of national security, and to anything that is or may be connected to security, represents a type of ideology.


50. From the state’s establishment to the present day, military service has been obligatory. Today, the length of service is three years for men and two years for women. Yet the minister of defense retains the authority to release from service any person or group on his own authority, and release so-called declared (i.e., religious observant) girls, students of traditional Jewish religious academies (yeshivot), Muslim Arabs, and all other types of Arabs, except Druze and Circassian. Christian Arabs and Bedouins can volunteer for service. Among large portions of the young Druze generation, military service has come to be perceived as a good career opportunity and source of social mobility. Being included in or excluded from universal and compulsory military service has become, on occasion, a cause of sociopolitical bargaining. See Baruch Kimmerling, “Determinants of the Boundaries and Framework of Conscription: Two Dimensions of Civil-Military Relations in Israel,” Studies in Comparative International Development 14, no. 1 (1979): 22–41.


aim to facilitate outside control of regions of the West Bank and political settlements found within densely populated Palestinian areas. The latter are slated to be dismantled when autonomy is granted to a Palestinian administration.


54. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, 104–137.


58. For descriptions of how society and realities are constructed and restructured, the reader may consult Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966); and Bruce Lincoln, Discourse and the Construction of Society.


60. See the detailed analysis of the institutional and value system in Israel connected to preparation for war and conduct of war in Baruch Kimmerling, The Interrupted System: Israeli Civilians in War and Routine Times (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1985). As for the value system, see Asher Arian, Ilan Talmud, and Tamar Herman, National Security and Public Opinion in Israel (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 83. This research team summarized parts of its findings as follows: “The ‘religion of security’ is an apt metaphor for considering the phenomenon of security in Israel. Just as a child is born into a certain religion, so too is the Israeli born into a very difficult geopolitical world with its attendant dilemmas. Just as a child accepts unquestioningly the religion he was born into and some basic answers he received... so too the Israeli child absorbs at a very early age the basics of the core-belief of national security.” The socialization is so deep that when samples of youngsters were asked if service in the Israeli armed forces was to become completely voluntary, would they still volunteer for service, around 90 percent expressed their willingness to serve, about 60 percent being ready to serve for the same customary three years. Moreover, the volunteering for special units or officer courses that involve high risk and physical and mental stress and hardship—such as paratroopers, reconnaissance, or commandos—always rates higher than the actual needs of the armed forces. See Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier, Contribution in Military Studies, no. 52 (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 61–62; and Ofra Meizels, Reuven Gal, and Eli Fishoff, “World Perceptions and Attitudes of Israeli High School Students towards Issues of Military and National Security,” mimeographed research report, The Israeli Institute of Military Studies, Zichron Yaacov, 1989, 51–58. For the military service as a basic factor in shaping individual as well as sociological generational personalities, attitudes and life cycles, see Amia Lieblich, Transition to


64. For some reason, in Carmi and Rosenfeld's analysis, socialist or communist regimes cannot be militarist. See Shulamit Carmi and Henry Rosenfeld, “The Emergence of Militaristic Nationalism.” In reality, such regimes can, of course, be militarist—see, e.g., the typology that appears in Perlmutter's analysis of military regimes and the party-army regime type. See Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics.


67. The research and development up to the construction of a prototype for a super-advanced combat plane (the Lavi) was carried on, only to be interrupted, after the investment of 1.5 billion dollars, when the United States refused to continue to finance the development and production of the plane.


The first crude manipulation of security-related symbols transpired on July 5, 1961, when a small rocket (Shavit 2) was launched several days before a national election. The missile’s purpose was defined as weather research, but the pictures released to the public emphasized the presence of the prime and defense minister (Ben-Gurion) who wore a military uniform, as well as to the chief of staff (Major General Zevi Tzur), and others. The timing of the destruction by Israeli aircraft of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1984 was also surely part of the ruling party’s electoral campaign. However, for a long time, the most important abuse of security needs was the military censorship of the mass media, deployed many times from the 1950s to the 1970s. See Dina Goren, Secrecy and the Right to Know (Ramat Gan: Turtle-dove, 1979).

An apt example of this dynamic is the law that bans political contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership in exile, on grounds of prevention of terrorism or state security; a small number of people have been judged and imprisoned after they violated this law.


Only much later, in the 1970s, was this demographic policy severely criticized, because it applied mainly to lower-class families of Eastern origin and reinforced their poverty and marginality in Israeli society. But even this criticism was made in security terms, arguing that Israel did not need many low-quality soldiers, lacking instead higher-quality warriors.


One of the cultural conventions is that girls have to be protected from combat, and especially from captivity. One of the most potent scare rumors of the 1973 war was that some soldier-girls were taken prisoner by Egyptian forces and raped.


Eyal Ben-Ari, “Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian


87. Sara Helman, “Conscientious Objection.”

88. Eyal Ben-Ari, “Masks and Soldiering.”

Chapter 7. The Social Construction of Israel’s National Security


2. For example, many more Israelis were killed and injured in car accidents than in all of the fighting with the Arabs and Palestinians. However, deaths in the latter group are heavily mourned and commemorated by the entire Jewish collectivity; those killed in car accidents are regarded as a private loss.


6. One classic example of this technique and its application was made by Nachman Ben-Yehuda in his analysis of the construction of the Massada myth and its place and role in Israeli culture, collective memory, and identity. Without assuming its absolute historical correctness or truth, Ben-Yehuda took the Yosephus Flavius text about the story of Massada and explained, step-by-step, how and why it was reconstructed and absorbed into the Zionist master narrative. See Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *The Massada Myth: Collective Memory and Mythmaking in Israel* (Madison,
7. An interesting example of distinguishing between objective and constructed reality is the relation between academic historiography and collective memory. The academic historiography is supposed to be objective, but is constantly infected by myths and recruited to support national and other claims. The collective memory is by definition highly selective, full of myths and narratives both constructed and invented; however, many times, it contains a factual core around which the memory was built. The opposing views on the roots of nationalism evokes a similar controversy. Anthony D. Smith considers nationalism to have an authentic and ethnic ancient nuclei of nationalism, while Ernest Gellner and Eric J. Hobsbawm see it as a modern invention of interested middle-class intellectuals. See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of the States* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford and London: Blackwell, 1983); and Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

8. See also Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, *Moral Panics.*

9. This secrecy itself is worthy of a comparative sociological analysis and research.

10. In Israel most of the high-ranked professional officers are obliged to leave the armed forces around the age of forty-five. Promotion of combat officers is rapid, and the technique is up-or-out. This provides to the labor market large numbers of reserve officers looking for second careers. Some are absorbed into the political, economic, and educational spheres, but others go to universities and other research centers, mainly developing so-called strategic studies. The veterans bring with them their recently demobilized buddies, and maintain their connections with their friends and previous subordinates in the military. Thus, a large and elaborate system of “old boys” is established, the field dominated almost exclusively by ex-military officers.

11. The defense establishment in Israel is a complex composed of the “civilian” Ministry of Defense, the general staff, the diverse intelligence services, mostly under the umbrella of the prime minister’s office, and the military industry. Two independent bodies are supposed to exercise control over the entire apparatus. The first is the parliamentary committee for foreign and security affairs, but it lacks any long-run planning branch and is occupied only by ongoing issues. The second is the state comptroller, but this body has authority and responsibility only to surveil purely financial and ethical management.

12. Yadin was the head of operations branch of the Israeli unified armed forces, officially established on May 31, 1948. Yaacov Dori was nominally the first chief of staff, but Yadin actually conducted the war due to Dori’s illness. On November 9, 1949, Yadin officially replaced Dori as chief of staff.


15. About 800,000 Arab inhabitants lived in the territories before they fell under Jewish control after the 1948 war. Fewer than 100,000 Arabs remained under Jewish control after the cease fire. An additional 50,000 were included within the Israeli state’s territory following the Israel-Jordan armistice agreements that transferred several villages of the so-called triangle to Israeli rule.

16. Plan D was also efficient for the interstate stage of the war because the Arab states’ military doctrines were trapped in the outdated conception that advancing military troops must conquer and destroy any settlement or resisting forces on their way, so as not to leave their rear or flanks open to guerrilla warfare. Had the Arabs used an alternative doctrine of quick advances toward the enemy’s large centers and concentrations of its main forces, they probably would have achieved a completely different outcome in the 1948 war.


19. Most of the Muslim and sometime the Christian Arab villages were considered hostile by definition, but even when some were defined as friendly, they were removed, as happened to the Maronite villages of Bir’m and Iqrit and the Muslim downtown quarter of Haifa. See Baruch Kimmerling, “Sovereignty, Ownership and Presence in the Jewish–Arab Territorial Conflict: The Case of Bir’m and Iqrit,” *Comparative Political Studies* 10, no. 2 (July 1977): 155–176.

20. This also postponed for many years the dilemma between holding more Arab lands and being a binational entity.


23. During the 1960s and 1970s, the words to one of the most popular songs in Israel read, “All the world is against us” (*ha’olam qulo negdenu*), including the subtext that God would save and protect the Israelis.

25. Except Beit Haarava and Qaliya, which were considered far away from the defense system, it was decided not to abandon any Jewish settlement. Most of the Jewish settlements except those of Etzion Bloc in the Jerusalem area succeeded in defending themselves or were reconquered by Jewish forces during the war.

26. Each settlement prepared to be defended separately.


28. This was the case many times along the Jordan river valley, where Palestinian guerrilla fighters tried to infiltrate from the east to the West Bank.

29. This was the case with officers identified with Hashomer Hatzair, the left wing of the Labor Society, who were suspected of being communists and pro-Soviets, and with Achdut Haavoda, members of which were considered as subversive to Mapai’s control over the military and the state. See Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 101. This was also linked to the important political and strategic decision to align with the “Western bloc” as the Cold War started.


31. All the new immigrants had to be “reborn” as new healthy, proud, physically developed, and secular men and women. However, the model that they had to adopt was far closer to the Ashkenazi ideal than to that of the Mizrahim. Thus, the military, by its universal conscription policy, produced and reproduced the inherent inequality within the Israeli society of the 1950s and 1960s. The ethnic division of roles and ranks were very clear: The G.I. Joes were the easterners and the officers were the westerners. See Sammy Smooha, “Ethnicity and Military in Israel: Theses for Discussion and Research,” Medina, Mimshal Ve’Yechasim Benleuiyim 22, no. 5 (Winter 1984): 5–32 (in Hebrew), and Yagil Levy, Trial and Error: Israel’s Route from War to De-Escalation. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 40–42. Only during the 1980s and 1990s was the social mobility of a part of the Mizrahi Jews, as well as religious youth, reflected in the social structure of the military corps up to the top of the chain of command.

32. The solution was found in the dual structure of the military. Separate large regiments, such as the Golani Brigade, were created for the masses, while small and exclusive elite units, such as Unit 101 and later the paratroopers, were composed of loyal veteran soldiers. Sometimes the recruitment to elite units was made based on personal and informal relationship, reinforcing the old boys’ system.


34. See Chapter Six.

35. For a while after the 1973 war, Major General Mordechai Gurr explained it through the doctrinaire needs of creating masses of firepower, expanding the heavy
and medium-size artillery and armor, resembling very much the initial Soviet military doctrine.

36. As Major General Ehud Barak became chief of staff, he made his well-known declaration that he wanted to make the Israeli military small and smart, which implied that it was big and stupid. It does not seem that he was able to fulfill his desire.

37. From 1950 to 1954, Israeli retaliations were sporadic, militarily poor in execution, and categorized more as revenge. From February 1955 on, larger and more skilled military units formed for this goal executed the retaliatory raids. The most notable raids were against an Egyptian military base in Gaza and a civilian Jordanian village of Qalqilia on October 11, 1956.


39. Each agreement included in its preamble a declaration that the armistice agreement would be followed by a peace agreement between the belligerent sides. However, the Arab states demanded that Israel withdrawal to the partition borders and allow Palestinian refugees to return. Israelis regarded both conditions as unacceptable.


46. Most states did not recognize the 1949 armistice lines—the Green Line—as a basis for Israel’s permanent borders, and Israeli control over so-called West Jerusalem and a part of the Negev desert was considered unacceptable. After Israel's
second withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the first being in 1948, most of the international community de facto recognized the Green Line border. After the 1967 war, the Green Line was almost sanctified.

47. This was the period of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal, which led to a Franco-Israeli pact. Advanced aircraft and armor inundated the region. Moshe Dayan, as chief of staff, transformed the special prestigious Unit 101, built for retaliations, and made it the core of the elite paratrooper corps.


50. David Ben-Gurion, the premier and defense minister, developed a temporary political-military doctrine that Israel cannot afford to initiate a war itself without the overt or covert support of a superpower. This was one of the reasons for Ben-Gurion’s reservations about Israel’s adventurous attack on Egypt in June 1967. The other face of this cautious strategy was that Israel identified itself with a colonial war par excellence.


52. Two issues should be added. First, aside from the declared objective of the Suez-Sinai war—the assurance of international free navigation through the Egyptian nationalized canal—the overt objective was to overthrow the Egyptian president, Gamal Abd al-Nasser, and damage the Nasserist pan-Arab ideology. Second, immediately after the spectacular Israeli victory, Ben-Gurion euphorically declared a Third Israeli Commonwealth and intended to annex the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip to the Israeli state. Thus, for a second time, military victory awakened irredentist tendencies that promptly disappeared following international pressures.

53. Usually, Joshua Prawer, the author of two monumental volumes on the history of the Crusades, The Crusader Kingdom (1972) and Crusader Institutions (1980), denied any analogy or connection between the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Israeli state. However, in the late 1980s, in some press interviews, he was ready to make these analogies. In 1960, the young poet Daliah Rabikowich published an enigmatic poem titled “The Hittin Battle.”

54. See, e.g., Yitzhak Rabin’s talk in memory of Yitzhak Sadeh, Tel Aviv, September 21, 1967.


57. Ariel Levite, Offensive and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1988), 40–44.

59. It was also an election season in Israel, and the government was afraid that the opposition would accuse them of manipulating public opinion and abusing the Jewish Israeli population to be recruited unconditionally under the security banner. The doctrinal concern was also valid: If Israel would adopt total mobilization any time an Arab state concentrated troops, the Israeli society and economy would collapse without shooting a single bullet. Between 1962 and 1967, the Egyptians at least twice concentrated troops near the Israeli border; the Israelis responded by silently and partially mobilizing, and the Egyptians withdrew their troops.

60. The delay was unintentional, caused by hesitations within the political leadership to wage a war without the umbrella of a superpower and disagreements with the general staff, which pushed to open the war. After constituting a so-called national unity government and adding 1956 war hero Moshe Dayan to the government as minister of defense, following popular pressures, the Eshkol government was persuaded to strike.

61. The prominent philosopher Yeshayahu Leibovich, Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, the labor movement elder stateman, and others made such proposals.

62. Only a small fringe of the Israeli ideological domain thought of the peninsula in sentimental and religious terms—Mount Sinai being the mythological place where God granted to his people the Ten Commandments—and considered it as a part of Greater Israel. However, the long territorial strip between Gaza and Sharm-a-Sheikh was sanctified by the civil religion of security and raison d'état. Thus, Dayan's unforgettable slogan: "Better no peace with Sharm-a-Sheikh than peace without Sharm-a-Sheikh."

63. Some Israeli strategists, such as Colonel Matitiyahu Peled, argued against the static conception of line maintenance or area defense versus flexible and mobile defense strategy by means of combined armor and mechanized infantry. See Ariel Levite, *Offensive and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1988), 106 (in Hebrew). The majority of military strategists, however, were enchanted by the passive line maintenance doctrine. Similar doctrines were adopted for the Jordan valley, the Jordan River, and the lower part of the eastern hilly region as a security asset.

64. Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians*.

65. See Chapter Nine.

66. See Chapter Four.


68. Such as demonstrations, parades, establishing dummy settlements, or random revenge actions against Palestinians.

69. If Israeli Arab citizens could find some room within the secular definition of the state, its citizenship rhetoric, and its Israeliiness, despite the legal discrimination
built into the Israeli state, from the primordial Jewish definition of the collectivity, they were still completely excluded and alienated.


71. The very definition and construction of the intifada as a war was highly controversial. If the situation was warlike, la guerre comme a la guerre, and the military should have been permitted to use any degree of violence to win. However, if the intifada was defined as a popular uprising against oppression, the legitimacy of using the military at all became questionable.

72. A small and cleft entity between West Bank and Gaza Strip and blocs of Jewish settlements cannot be considered as an existential threat to Israel, especially when Israel was supposed to control the airspace, major passages, and water sources.

73. See Chapter Eleven.

74. Rabin tried to distinguish between security-necessary settlements and political or ideological settlements. However, after so many years of Emuni rhetoric, what seemed for Rabin as self-evident was puzzling for a great portion of the Jewish public.

75. The successor of historical Revisionist Zionist and Herut parties, and Etzel and Lehi militant undergrounds.

76. The major reason that it was not done before and will not ever be done is that such an annexation would advance the Israeli state toward becoming a de jure and not just a de facto binational state.

77. There are many indications that, starting in 1971, Sadat made similar or identical proposition to Golda Meir; however, her government preferred territorial assets to abstract peace.


80. Several months before the war, Ariel Sharon tried to prepare the public by accusing the PLO of being one of the major obstacles for implementing the autonomy for the Palestinians of the occupied territories agreed upon in Camp David. See Ariel Sharon, “Ariel Sharon’s Perceptions of National Security—A Undelivered Talk,” December 19, 1981, in A. Yariv, ed., War by Choice (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1985), 158 (in Hebrew).

81. In a way, this includes even the 1973 war. Israeli and other intelligence services warned about Egyptian intentions to open a war. Most of the Israeli strategists considered the Sinai Peninsula a vast trap for the rapidly recovered Egyptian armor, and tended to let them to fall into the trap. The surprise was tactical and not strategic, and spoke to the efficiency of mobile personal antitank and new ground-to-air missiles with which the Soviets had equipped the Egyptian forces. The tactical surprise would have been strategic if the Egyptian command
could have exploited the immediate success and advanced their troops faster. Israel did not initiate the 1973 war, but did not avoid it, either, despite the information it possessed.


85. The Sabra and Shatilla massacre of Palestinians by the Israeli-allied Maronite militia in September 1982 caught enormous domestic and worldwide public attention, protest, and moral indignation. Following the massacre, a committee of inquiries found indirect Israeli responsibility and recommended removing the minister of security from any security-related roles, which precipitated his resignation.

86. U.S. emissaries periodically inspected the Dimona reactor, but such inspections were probably more symbolic than instrumental.


89. All of the Arab countries, and not just Israel, are highly vulnerable in that they have large concentrations of population in narrow strips of land, along either coasts or rivers. Egypt is even more vulnerable to conventional attacks because destroying the Aswan dam could sweep most of Egypt literally out to sea. Meanwhile, an Arab or Islamic nuclear attack on Israel could damage holy sites for Islam and hurt the Palestinian and Jordanian populations.

90. Possessing nuclear weapons, and being technologically capable of building them, also became an issue of national pride and symbol of patriotism. Thus, after Pakistan conducted its nuclear experiments—Pakistan’s bomb is considered as “Islamic”—leading its people and those of several other Islamic states to euphorically celebrate its nuclearization.


93. Recently, several Israeli intellectuals told me about their concern and anxiety about an ultranationalistic, national religious, and irrational government being
formed in the country that would use its nuclear power deliberately (personal communication).

94. On October 5, 1986, the London Sunday Times published a large report about Israel’s nuclear power and the reactor at Dimona. The material was mainly supplied by a former technical worker of the plant, Mordechai Vanunu. Vanunu was kidnapped from Rome by Israeli agents five days before the article was published and sentenced to eighteen years in prison for treason. According to the Sunday Times, Israel possessed in the late 1980s between 100 to 200 atomic, thermonuclear, and neutron warheads. Vanunu became an international cultural hero of peoples and intellectuals who are struggling against nuclear weapon proliferation, but in Israel, less than a handful of persons accepted his motives as ideological and idealistic. Public campaigns to make his prison conditions more humane—to say nothing of being freed after serving two-thirds of the sentence, as is usual—failed.


97. During the last decade, close to one million new immigrants entered the country, mainly from the former Soviet republics. This new wave of immigrants is expected to change the social, cultural, economic, and military fabric of the country.


Chapter 8. Jurisdiction in an Immigrant-Settler Society

1. Adel Qa’adan et al. v. Israel Land Authority et al., HCJ 6698/95.


3. About 93 percent of Israel’s lands are national or nationalized. Only 6 to 7 percent of total lands are registered with the Land Registry Bureau and titled as private lands. See Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, 1983).
4. In 1952, the State of Israel, the World Zionist Organization, and its local branch, the Jewish Agency, signed a special pact permitting the Jewish Agency to act as an autonomous body in absorbing new immigrants and establishing and developing new settlements, granting the agency control over lands and their allocation. The pact was made part of the body of Israeli legislation by the Status of the Jewish Agency Law of 1952. At the same time, the state transferred 3 million dunums of land (one acre is approximately 4.2 dunums), mainly abandoned Arab property, to the Jewish Agency. Jewish Agency regulations absolutely ban the leasing of land to non-Jews.


6. Moreover, Kedar wrote: “It is worthwhile to contrast the [Israeli] Court’s escape from the past with the radical change that taking place in some older settlers’ states . . . Thus the Australian Supreme Court, which until the last decade refused to recognize land rights of aborigines, began recently to reframe the legal and political discourse by laying down its famous *Mabo v. Queensland* (1992) and *Wik v. Queenesland* (1996) decisions. In *Mabo* the Court rejected the legal doctrine of ‘terra nullius,’ which categorized Australia as an empty continent, and instead recognized aboriginal title[s]. Similar moves can be observed in High courts of other settler societies such as New Zealand and Canada. . . . It gives the hope to the prospect of constructing a common and equitable future for these divided societies.” See Alexander Kedar, “First Step.”


8. Ronen Shamir, “‘Landmark Cases,’” 797.


11. For a more descriptive and analytical discussion of this, see Baruch Kimmerling, *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society and the Military* (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).


13. The frequent equation of the Jewish religion with Judaism may also be explained partially by the legitimacy problem raised by the Jewish-Arab conflict and the impossibility of its resolution. This antagonistic situation has strengthened religiosity and religiously fundamentalist groups that amplify the conflict, thereby creating a vicious cycle of hostilities. See Baruch Kimmerling, “Anomie and Inte-
igration in Israeli Society and the Salience of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 9, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 64–89.


15. The Law of Return—the unconditional right to immigrate to Israel and automatically receive full citizenship and a fixed absorption basket of extra benefits—includes the close non-Jewish kin of every Jewish person, even those three generations apart. Following the recent waves of immigration from the former Soviet republics, 300,000 non-Jews supposedly immigrated to Israel. Because maintaining a demographic balance with the Arabs, mainly the Palestinians, along with controlling land, is considered the core of the conflict, unofficially the Israeli state also welcomes non-Jewish immigrants.


17. During a conference devoted to commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of the Universal Rights of Man, Michael Ben-Yair, the former attorney general of Israel, delivered remarks that focused on Israel’s human rights record since 1967. Ben-Yair expressed remorse for a string of state crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians, over and above the expropriation of their lands. His list consisted of occurrences that any reasonable person would have included: mass administrative detentions without trial, destruction of homes, sanctioning of expulsions and torture by the legislature and the courts, and even kidnapping from other states’ territories. “We will stand trial before history,” shouted Ben-Yair, “for these serious infringements on the human rights of the Palestinians.” See Michael Ben-Yair, “Human Rights, since ’67,” *Haaretz*, December 13, 1998.

18. Even the judicial decisions made regarding the Kfar Qassem massacre were thrown onto judicial history’s trash heap of forgotten verdicts. This amnesic inclination extended even to the term “black flag,” which Judge Benjamin Halevi originally applied to orders he labeled “unambiguously illegal,” and which was never used. The ruling was considered irrelevant to any concrete situation. Apparently, in the eyes of Israeli society, no order given since then has been unambiguously illegal.


20. Because the Israeli state wanted to preserve its hegemony over its citizens, a complete constitution was never drafted. Instead, it was decided that a constitution would gradually come into formation through drafting basic laws.

21. The only two institutions that, over the years, have consistently earned the nearly absolute trust of the public are the military and the Supreme Court. An in-depth sociological and cultural analysis of the meaning of this juxtaposition, and whether there is indeed any connection between the two, would be interesting. See, Ephraim Yaar-Yuchtman and Yochanan Peres, *Between Consent and Dissent:..."
22. Establishing its unofficial role as constitutional court was the Israeli High Court of Justice’s own doing, its own interpretation of how it should function. Israeli law assigns the court more limited responsibility for hearing appeals from district courts and calls on it to serve as a high court of justice with jurisdiction over disputes between the state and its different agencies and individual petitioners. Moreover, this basic law gives the court the power to review only statuses that were enacted after Basic Law: Human Dignity came into effect. By doing so, the law perpetuates all of the previously existing discriminatory laws.


30. See Meir Shamgar, “Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli Military Conquest—The Initial Stage,” in M. Shamgar, ed., *Military Government in the Territories Administrated by Israel 1967–1980* (Jerusalem: Sacher Institute, The Hebrew University, 1980) (in Hebrew). In fact, Israel never considered the West Bank and Gaza Strip as holding the legal status of occupied territories, preferring instead the term “administered area.” The argument was as follows: the UN decision (192) that called to partition Palestine was never implemented because the Palestinians rejected it, the annexation of the West Bank by Transjordan was illegal, and the Gaza Strip was under Egyptian military rule. The result of these circumstances was a “sovereignty vacuum.” The Israeli claim was that international law’s definition of occupation only applies when one state occupies the sovereign territory of another state. See Yehuda Zvi Blum, *For Zion’s Sake* (New York: Cornwall, 1987).
31. So far, no separate branch of sociology devoted to military occupation exists, probably because most contemporary occupations—that is, conquests without annexation—were of short duration. However, this no doubt may be considered a kind of temporary social order. In our case, the entrance of the HCJ into the game was probably instrumental, used as a safety valve and together with the settlement process assisted in making the temporary a nearly permanent-temporary social order.


33. The traditional Palestinian village clerk.


37. For example, establishing a Palestinian state with complete and stable peace existing between Israel and Palestine.

38. The state settled Jewish immigrants in old and new areas of settlement in place of the local Arab residents. In 1945, there were 293 Jewish settlements in Palestine/Eretz Israel, among them 27 cities and urban neighborhoods. Following the 1961 census, there were 771 Jewish settlements, among them 63 urban settlements. In contrast, 356 Arab villages, cities, and parts of cities had been uprooted, such as Jaffa, Lydda, and Ramleh. About 3,250,000 dunums of land, which had been under Arab ownership, were transferred to the Custodian of Absentee Property. See Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory, 122–123. Some Arab villages were systematically and completely destroyed to prevent their inhabitants from returning. Jews resettled settlements and neighborhoods that were not destroyed. These were not always new immigrants, but often established members of society and army veterans. This was the beginning of an immigration that would change the entire demographic and, later, the cultural and political character of the state.

39. These findings are from among roughly seventy-five villages, of which sixty-five were completely destroyed, such as Iqrit and Bir‘m. About twenty-seven villages were abandoned due to expulsions during the war, while the residents of about fifteen villages were expelled after the war, e.g., Majdel. A number of other villages were evacuated fully or partly at the initiative of their residents, who were resettled in other villages.

40. See, e.g., Ismail v. Chief of Police, HCJ 197/52, in which it was ruled that “the order that was made by the respondent (the Military Governor) was designed to guarantee the public peace and to establish the public order. It is not for us (the High Court justices) to express an opinion as to whether the goal will indeed be achieved by this. This is given to the final verdict of the respondent ‘ . . . we do not
see any justification to intervene in the matter.” So too, 46/50 Tal Ayube v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 126/69 gives the military commander a free hand in handing out expulsion orders, and determines that the court has no say in the matter. In a number of cases (46/50 or 111/53) the judges ruled that secret information that could endanger state security should not be brought before the court.


43. According to local tradition, which was recognized by both Ottoman and British colonial law, the lands belonged to God or to the sultan (the representative of God). Individuals, families, and villages had the right only to maintain the land. Private ownership of the land was an unrecognized concept, though starting in 1858, the Ottoman authorities, and later the British, tried without much success to parcel out and register lands, as well as order them in state holdings books. With the end of the British rule in 1948, only about 20 percent of the lands of Palestine–Eretz Israel were ordered, these largely under Jewish ownership or of disputed status.


46. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory*.


48. For information related to this controversy, see Meir Shamgar, “Legal Concepts and Problems.” In comparison, see Allan Gerson, *Israel, the West Bank and International Law* (London: Frank Cass, 1978), and Allan Gerson, “Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of Israeli Presence in the West Bank,” *Harvard International Law Journal* 14, no. 1 (Winter 1979): 1–49. It must be remembered that Meir Shamgar was the chief military counsel when the rules of military justice in the territories were established, and was then later made a Supreme Court justice who was supposed to critique these rules.

49. This is particularly evident according to clause 78 of the Ottoman Lands Law, which allowed for the acquisition of property rights to land for anyone who could successfully prove that he or she had worked and maintained the land for ten years. British rule adopted these principles, but the Israeli regime made the evidentiary demands to prove maintenance more and more strict, that is, until *State of Israel v. Abdallah Asad Shibli* (HCJ 520/89) in 1992 revoked all maintenance rights that the village of Shibli had to its lands since 1944, which had been awarded according to the principle that “the land shall not be sold forever,” making all the unregistered and nonordered lands the property of the Israel Lands Authority.

51. It is unclear from study of international law to which state this refers: the occupying power, Jordan, the British Mandatory government, or the potential state of the local residents.

52. When faced with an activist High Court, which functioned as a quasi-alternative legislature, the legislature enacted a series of laws termed in, political jargon, High Court bypass laws. In addition to the political attacks to which the High Court exposed itself by adopting judicial activism, it also exposed itself to academic criticism and to attacks from the Bar Association. Lately, the High Court has retreat recognizably from this activist position.


55. Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness.

56. According to recent developments in Israeli political culture, the concept of a Jewish state is equated with that of a Zionist state, but not with an Israeli state because the latter also includes Arabs. See Ariel Rosen-Zvi, “Jewish and Democratic State: Spiritual Fatherhood, Alienation and Symbiosis—Is It Possible to Square a Circle?” in Daphne Barak-Erez, ed., A Jewish and Democratic State (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1996), 11–54 (in Hebrew).

57. The leading Israeli jurist Avigdor Feldman stated that democracy and Judaism are two separate bodies of knowledge, orientations with nothing in common. To describe the incommensurability of these two entities, Feldman used the term “differend,” coined by Jean F. Lyotard. See Avigdor Feldman, “Jewish and Democratic State: Space without Place, Time Without Duration,” in Daphne Barak-Erez, ed., A Jewish and Democratic State (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1996), 261–274 (in Hebrew). See also the symposium on “A Jewish and Democratic State,” Iyunet Mishpat [Legal Studies] 19, 1995 (in Hebrew).

58. Justice Menachem Elon claims that it was not accidental that the wording of the law places the Jewishness of the state before its democratic character, as any threat of conflict or contradiction would be resolved by preferring Jewishness, though Justice Elon does not elaborate precisely, probably intentionally, to what this Jewishness specifically refers to.


60. Its essence is that Israel is a state of Jews or has a quasi-constitutionally protected Jewish majority. However, no consideration has been made for a situation
in which, by way of natural population growth, non-Jews become the majority and wish to democratically change the name, symbols, and laws of the state.

61. That is, granting Arab citizens equal rights to the common goods of the state.


63. The rich or the property owner might also be included. See Menachem Mautner’s sharp and ironic critique of these two basic laws, which are “clear laws of the 18th century liberalism sort, defending civil rights rather than political or social rights.” Mautner lists a series of rights missing from these laws, such as the right to receive health services, the right to housing, the right to support for the disabled, the right to education, the right to a pension, the right to work, the right to unionize, and the right to strike. Menachem Mautner, “The Hidden Law,” *Alpayim* 16 (1998): 45–72 (in Hebrew).

**Chapter 9. Exchanging Territories for Peace**


2. In 1948, the Israeli armed forces conquered parts of Northern Sinai, but pressure from the Western powers compelled them to withdraw. In 1956, several hours after Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the Third Jewish Commonwealth—a kind of declaration of the annexation of conquered territories—American pressure compelled him to admit that he was prepared to withdraw from all conquered areas. In the negotiations following the 1973 war, Israel was forced, primarily by international pressure, to lift its siege of the Egyptian Third Army on the western bank of the Suez Canal and to agree to partially withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, all within the framework of partial arrangements. In general, compensation for these withdrawals came from the United States in the form of intensified economic and military aid. The Arabs, however, also received payment in the form of a temporary de-escalation of the conflict. For the sociological impact of the ward and conflict in generating anomie, see Baruch Kimmerling, “Anomie and Integration in Israeli Society and the Salience of the Arab-Jewish Conflict,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 9, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 64–89.


5. Even the nationalistic Herut Party generally tended to play down its aspirations to reopen the issue of Israel’s boundaries, at least up to the time of the Six-Day War, especially because it established a parliamentary bloc with the Liberal Party, which maintains a moderate stand in this matter. For a further treatment of Israeli literary content, see Ehud Ben-Ezer, “War and Siege in Israeli Literature after 1967,” *Jerusalem Quarterly* 9 (Winter 1978): 20–37.


10. Indeed, the reverse was true: Egypt and Syria concluded that they had to reinitiate warfare, even under conditions of strategic inferiority, and not simply change the political status quo. Egypt did, however, enter into negotiations precisely when it considered Israel’s military superiority to have been broken following the 1973 war.


12. Indeed, the reverse was true: Egypt and Syria concluded that they had to reinitiate warfare, even under conditions of strategic inferiority, and not only to change the political status quo. Egypt did, however, enter into negotiations precisely when it considered Israel’s military superiority to have been broken following the 1973 war. See Michael I. Handel, *The Diplomacy of Surprise: Hitler, Nixon, Sadat* (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981).

13. The concept of the state is emphasized. Palestinian refugees are thus excluded from the overall Israeli political consciousness and ascribed to the countries in which they reside as refugees or, in the case of Jordan, citizens.


20. Like Meir Kahane’s small but salient Kach Party, which publicly declared that the Arabs of the occupied territories must be evicted. In the 1984 general election, Kahane won one of the 120 seats in the Knesset.

21. Within the bounds of two extreme assumptions—considerable Jewish immigration into Israel, a high Jewish birth rate, and Arab emigration from Israel, versus meager Jewish immigration, little Jewish population increase, and Arab immigration—Jews will constitute 45 to 60 percent of Israel’s population in 2010. Certainly, actual developments and processes will likely not be so extreme. Hence, one may assume that by 2010 the Jewish population will constitute 54 percent of all of Israel. See Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, The Population of Israel, 193–198.


34. Russell A. Stone, *Social Change in Israel*.

35. Eitan Haber, Zeev Schiff, and Ehud Yaari, *The Year of the Dove*.


37. Levy Morab, “Price of the Occupation.”

38. Stephen P. Cohen and Edward E. Azar, “From War to Peace.”


**Chapter 10. Nationalism, Identity, and Citizenship**

1. Published in 1986 by the mainstream Hebrew-Zionist publishing house Am Oved. Shammas is also well known for his Hebrew translations of Emil Habibi’s powerful novels and stories that depict, through satire and irony, the lives of Arabs under Israeli control and the destruction and uprooting of the Arab community during the 1948 war.


3. The Arabs are in a continuous dilemma between demanding equal and full (not separate) participation in the common material and cultural goods of Israeli state and society and demanding autonomous spaces within the state. Recently, some Arab intellectuals have suggested a binational state within the entire land of colonial Palestine instead of the two-state solution propagated before. For a historical analysis of the Arab Palestinian identity, its crystallization, and development, see Chapter Three.


5. As a matter of fact, Shammas did it: About ten years ago, he left the country
and settled in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where he occupied a permanent post as professor of Arabic and Hebrew cultural studies.


9. This took place in a private meeting in 1992, when Shammas, who had since moved to the United States, returned to Israel for a visit. He and the writer David Grossman met with Yehoshua at the latter’s home in Haifa. D. Grossman reports the debate in Sleeping on a Wire: Conversations with Palestinians in Israel (London: Picador, 1994), 250–277. The book was first published in Hebrew in 1992; it edited and adapted the conversation for print.

10. Here Yehoshua adopted the conventional Israeli Zionist belief that Judaism in exile, or Diaspora, can only be a partial identity; the complete fulfillment of Jewishness, whatever it may mean, can be expressed only within the framework of a territorial nation-state, or Zion. Thus, the Israeli is the Jew who has returned to Palestine (Eretz Israel, or the Land of Israel) to constitute the sovereign Jewish nation-state.

11. The armistice border with the Arab states from 1949 to the 1967 wars.

12. A. Shammas, “We? Who is We?” Politika 17 (1987): 25–30 (in Hebrew). One can read the debate between Shammas and Yehoshua as one of conflicting interpretations of culture and cultural identity. In contrast to Yehoshua’s ethnocentric definition of Israeli identity, Shammas’s anti-essentialistic position resembles the recent strongly contested conceptions of identity that have been espoused by thinkers such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, and the feminist critic Judith Butler. In their writings, cultural identity is perceived as a dynamic process that can best be understood in relation to cultural others, against which a group defines itself. See J.F. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990).


27. Or as was stated by Anton Shammas: “My nationality, according to the Israeli Ministry of the Interior, is ‘Arab;’ and my Israeli passport, doesn’t specify my nationality at all. Instead, it states on the front page that I’m an Israeli citizen. . . . If I wrote ‘Arab’ under nationalité, in the French form, I would be telling the truth according to the state that had issued my identity card and my passport, but then it may complicate things with the French authorities. On the other hand, writing ‘Israeli’ under nationalité is worse still, because in that case I would be telling a lie; my passport doesn’t say that at all, and neither does my I.D.” Shammas continued: “I do not know many people in the Middle East who can differentiate between
‘citizenship,’ ‘nation’ (leom), ‘nationalism’ (leumiut), ‘nationalism’ (leumanut), ‘people’ (am), and ‘nation’ (umah). In Arabic, as in Hebrew, there is no equivalent for the English word ‘nationality.” A. Shammas, “Palestinians in Israel: You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet,” *Journal of the International Institute* 3, no. 1 (Fall 1995): 25.

28. See Chapter Four of this volume.


31. Reines (1839–1915) was an orthodox rabbi of the community of Lida who called for some adaptation of the religious codex (*halakhah*) to the modernizing world to prevent the secularization of the Jews. He first joined the Lovers of Zion movement and later Herzl’s political Zionism. His major view was that Zionism should be a genuine religious movement.


33. See Basic Law: Knesset, Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1992), and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992). The additional regular law is the Parties’ Law. A basic law is one passed by a special majority of the Knesset, intended to be incorporated into any future written constitution (Israel lacks a complete written constitution at present).


35. Since 1948, the Israeli government has recognized certain established religious groups and granted their leaders special status, even when they are tiny minorities. These communities are entitled to state financial support and tax exemptions. According to Israeli legislation, all residents must belong to religious denominations the rules of which they are obliged to follow regarding marriage, divorce, and burial. British colonial rule recognized ten millets, (i.e., Jews and nine Christian denominations). The Israeli state added to these the Druze in 1957, the Evangelical Episcopal Church in 1970, and the Bahai in 1971. Muslims have not been officially recognized, but their religious courts, de facto, have similar authority to a millet institution. All other groups from Conservative and Reform Jews to “new religious” groups (i.e., cults) are not recognized.

36. Islamic religious law.

37. One born to a Jewish mother or “converted according to halakha”—however, the law does not include this crucial last phrase, thus allowing non-Orthodox converts abroad and even family members who are not converts to enter
and enjoy the privileges granted according to the immigration law known as Law of Return.

38. This proposed law asks that the state recognize only Orthodox conversions to Judaism.


Chapter 11. The Power-Oriented Settlement


2. Jews and Arabs drew diametrically opposite political conclusions from this basic approach. The Arabs considered all of the territory of Palestine to be Arab land—in its Islamic version, belonging to God and legally endowed (waqf). On this land, Jews have rights as individuals, but have no basis for any collective, political, or nationalistic claims. The Zionists argued that there was no legitimate room for Arab claims on their ancient homeland; rather, the Palestinian Arabs, as a part of the Arab nation, should fulfill and exercise their collective political rights in the framework of the Arab nation and other surrounding Arab states. Those Arabs that remained under sovereign Jewish control would enjoy human and civic rights as individuals. This is one facet of the so-called Arab-Jewish conflict. For a full analysis, see Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington, IL: Indiana University Press, 1994).


6. Fatah is the reversed acronym for Harakat al- Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, or Palestine Liberation Movement. Among the initial founders were Yasir Arafat (under his nom de guerre, Abu Ammar), Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), Salah Khalaf (Abu

7. The PLO was established following an inter-Arab rivalry between Abd al-Karim Qasim, the Iraqi president, and Gamal Abd al-Nasir in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they competed in declaring support for a Palestinian entity (not a state). The PLO was established May 1964, following the first Arab summit in February of the same year. The Arab summit meetings later approved creating the Palestine Liberation Army, ostensibly to recover the rest of Palestine (over and above the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) from the Jews.


9. Meron Benvenisti (1986) calls this the return of the “communal warfare” situation, in “Israel’s Decolonization Crisis,” *New Outlook* (December 1989): 16–19; Emanuel Sivan labeled it a “colonial situation.”


13. For many years, the official Israeli position was not to accept the revival of an independent and authentic Palestinian political and military entity; it considered the PLO to be another Arab tool to delegitimize Israel, referring to the population of the West Bank as “Jordanians” and to the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip as “refugees.” However, it seems that the Israeli leadership did understand the real meaning of the post-Shuqairi PLO.


16. Operations such as the attack on a school in Ma’alot (May 15, 1974), Kiryat Shmona (November 1974), attacks on movie theaters, coffeehouses, and hotels (the Hotel Savoy in March 1975) in downtown Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and a bus on the central coastal highway (March 1978) occupy a salient place in Israeli collective memory. The usual Palestinian response to the accusations that their armed struggle was indiscriminate terror, mostly aimed at civilian targets, was that the entire Israeli Jewish society participates in the military effort, and thus any distinction between civilian and military targets is not valid. This argument is sometimes expanded to include the Diaspora Jewish community as well as the capitalist world.
order, due to its support of Israel, or because Israel is seen as its agent in the region. Only since the late 1980s has an effort been made to hit primarily military targets within Israel, or settler targets in the occupied territories.


22. The first planned guerrilla operation was thwarted by the Egyptians, who arrested the entire fida’i group in Gaza. In the second operation—apparently against the Israeli national water-carrier project—one guerrilla, Ahmad Musa, was killed by Jordanians and another, Mahmoud Hijazi, was captured by Israelis. During this period, Fatah received some military training and support from Syria. This was probably the reason for attacking the water carrier, which was one of the major sources of conflict between Syria and Israel. However, when in 1966 the Syrians intended to replace Arafat with a pro-Syrian officer, jailing Arafat and Abu Iyad, the cooperation temporarily ceased and Fatah learned how to manipulate inter-Arab rivalries to keep its relative autonomy. See Barry Rubin, Revolution until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 11.


24. Helena Cobban, “Syria,” 30–31. Claims for Jordan as a part of a Palestinian state were considered shortly afterward by the Palestinians as bad politics. First, such claims would turn into a premature total war with the Hashemite Kingdom. Second, establishing a Palestinian state in Jordan could be interpreted as giving up the core lands of Western Palestine. Indeed, the ultranationalist Israeli leader, Major General Ariel Sharon, long asserted that Jordan is Palestine.

25. Israeli experts rushed to explain the meaning of this code to politicians and the public. Between 624 (the battle of Bader) and 630, there were a series of raids between the Meccan Quraysh tribe (Muhammad’s original tribe) and the army of Medina (or Madinat al-nab—Yathrib, the place where Muhammad received asylum from persecutions, or performed the hijra, which included a Jewish community). In 627 the Qurayshs defeated Muhammad and his followers, but in a counterattack, Muhammad assaulted Mecca. The Treaty of Hudaybiyya between the Meccans and

26. Ironically some Israelis titled him the Mayor of Gaza. This poor image was strengthened by a comparison with the portrait of Hussein, the king of Jordan, who was depicted as a smart and strong gentleman and a man of the world, especially after the October 1994 peace accord with Jordan.


29. The Allon Plan was never adopted officially, but until 1977, it was a basic guide for the Israeli government. Its basic presumption was that the densely populated territories should be returned to Arab (Jordanian) control, the Jordan River must be regarded as a security border, the Jordan valley should be settled by Jews, and the unified Jerusalem metropolitan area must be considerably enlarged by including the Etzion bloc.


34. Bassam al-Shak’a was elected in Nablus, Fahd Qwasmi in Hebron, Karim Khalaf in Ramallah, and Ibrahim al-Tawil in al-Bireh.

35. It seems that the outside leadership also felt threatened by the new—and in some cases, elected—leadership.


42. The data are based on Majid Al-Haj, Elihu Katz, and Samuel Shye, “Arab and Jewish Attitudes: Toward a Palestinian State,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 4 (December 1993): 619–632 and data provided to the author of this chapter by the Louis Guttmann Institute of Applied Social Research. Questions about supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state were not asked before May 1989. Generally, the outcomes of surveys that were done by other institutes showed the same trends. In May 1989, 20 percent of the Israeli Jewish population favored establishing a Palestinian state beyond the present autonomy; in July 1990, 22 percent; in November 1990, the period of the Gulf crisis, 17 percent; in May 1991, 22 percent. A dramatic change occurred following the agreement: in September 1993, 40 percent favored a state; in October 1993, 33 percent; in July 1994, 33 percent. Israeli Arab citizens’ support remained very stable at approximately 95 percent. The majority of the Jewish population supported the Oslo agreement, varying between 62 percent and 54 percent (in August 1994, before the major Islamic terrorist activities). Following the agreement, 57 percent of the Jewish population supported stopping the settlement-building process in the occupied territory, but opposed dismantling already existing settlements (only 35 percent supported evacuation). Twenty-five percent of the Jewish population believed that Arafat really wanted peace—a 15 percent increase compared to May 1989. The public’s readiness to make further concessions to the Palestinians increased from 54 percent in June 1994 to 60 percent in August, and approval of the government’s handling of current affairs increased sharply, from 38 percent in June 1994 to 54 percent following the accord with Jordan. See Eliahu Katz and Hanna Levinson, press releases, Guttmann Institute of Applied Social Research, June 14, 1994, and August 7–8, 1994.

43. Yitzhak Rabin was the minister of defense in the National Unity government, under Likud’s leadership, when the Palestinian popular uprising erupted in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in December 1987.

44. The first attempt to use this idea was the establishment of the Village Leagues, quasi-military armed groups paid by the Israeli occupation authority and its secret branches and led by Mustapha Doudin. This was the initiative of
Menachem Milson, a professor of Arab literature at Hebrew University, appointed as civilian administrator of the West Bank in early 1982. Milson, equipped with the knowledge of the traditional cleavages between the fellahin and the city dwellers, made an attempt at “applied Orientalism,” hoping to co-opt a part of the less nationalistic peasantry and use them to oppress the more “Palestinized” urban middle classes and intellectuals. See Mark A. Tessler, *Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 549–552. A far more successful move was to establish the Southern Lebanese Army, which operates as a soldier-of-fortune army in the Israeli buffer zone in Southern Lebanon.

45. Some argue that the Palestinian Authority leaders did not establish the requested institutions to receive financial resources free of donor control. According to this approach, the Palestinian Authority was also playing the chaos and weakness game, in order to save financially without having limits or control imposed on them. This was also done to recruit Israeli influence and maximize received resources.

46. Jordan, with its estimated 60 to 70 percent Palestinian population, is the best-tailored target for expected Palestinian expansion. This knowledge made the Bedouin dynasty rush toward a peace agreement with Israel in 1994 as a kind of alliance and insurance cementing the traditional tacit agreements among the two. Israel is also too powerful at this stage, and in the foreseeable future, to be threatened strategically by a Palestinian state. Paradoxically, the existence of Israel may be the best insurance policy for the continuous existence and sovereignty of the Palestinian state vis-à-vis the power of its Arab neighbors.


49. The Israeli interpretation of this historical turn of events was to underplay it as a tactical move, the adoption of a new doctrine with the aim of dismantling Israel in stages; in such a framework, the Palestinians would get their mini-state and be in a better position to conquer the whole of Palestine. See, e.g., Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies*. When accepting the partition plan in 1937, David Ben-Gurion used the same reasoning.

50. It became clear that the major victims of the settlement from the Jewish side were all or most of the settlers in the occupied territories, including their families. On the other side, millions of Palestinians are called on to give up their hope and right to return to their previous properties, lands, homes, and localities. Peace is an abstract notion that is very difficult to exchange for tangible assets.

51. This is precisely what raised concern among the educated middle class in the West Bank regarding the formation of a totalitarian and police-state entity.

52. See Chapter Four.

Valley, the Syrian Heights, and formerly Sinai was a completely different case, as the government initiated and subsidized most of the first settlements.

54. Prima facie, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are a part of the new worldwide wave of so-called Islamic fundamentalism inspired by its Iranian version, or perhaps a part of a new cosmic clash of civilizations. See Samuel P. Huntington, “A Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49. However, both movements, and particularly Hamas, have a very local character, and despite connections with global developments, are a “pure Sunni Palestinian” venture.


Chapter 12. Politicide


Epilogue

1. Even the most individualistic identities have political meanings, conclusions, and results. The social profile of Jews who ranked their profession highest seems somewhat alienated. They believe that they can influence national processes, but are not attached to their communities or to the country and consider emigrating from Israel more often than do other groups. Also, they do not trust the ability of the government and the armed forces to keep them safe, and their obedience is conditional, if they believe in obedience at all. Politically, they are mostly left-wingers. Their demographic profile is also different: they tend to be highly educated, upper-income males who are either Israeli-born or of Western origin. They are also the least religious group, with many more holding active anti-religious orientations. It seems that these are the carriers of individualistic orientations, much more so than the other types of agencies (see Chapter Two).


4. Brubaker and Cooper mention, among others who had worked with collective identity, Zygmunt Bauman, Pierre Bourdieu, Fernand Braudel, Craig Calhoun, S.N. Eisenstadt, Anthony Giddens, Bernhard Giesen, Jurgen Habermas, David


9. For individual salvation, most Jews preferred the United States. Among the sixty-five million Europeans who migrated to the Americas between 1800 and 1850, more than four million were Jews, constituting 6 percent of all immigrants, compared with their 1.5 percent representation in the total population of Europe. During the first quarter of the twentieth century, about 20 percent of European Jews migrated to the Americas. Most of the religious Jews strongly opposed the Zionist idea, arguing that only the Messiah, acting on God’s command, could lead the gathering of the Jewish people in Zion; Zionism was viewed as a rebellion against God. Yet the majority of Jews during this period were religious and traditional, still believing in a miraculous messianic return to the Holy Land at the apocalyptic end of days. The strength of messianic belief was evidenced three hundred years earlier, on May 31, 1665, when a self-appointed messiah, named Shabbtai Zvi, made his appearance. Shabbtai Zvi managed to provoke mass hysteria amongst hundreds of thousands of Jews, from the territories of the Ottoman Empire to Poland and Eastern Europe and even in many parts of Western Europe, by proclaiming the Day of Redemption to be June 18, 1666. The Jews, despite the opposition of most prominent rabbis, were ready to march as a mighty army and restore the godly kingdom of David on earth. Eventually, the Ottomans interpreted the millenarian movement as a rebellion and put the so-called messiah in jail, where he converted to Islam. The affair has remained an enormous disaster and a traumatic event in Jewish collective memory. Nonetheless, the hope for the coming of the messiah has never ceased. More recently, a similar phenomenon broke out among the followers of the late Brooklyn Hassidic Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson. The supposed redemption was linked with the miraculous inclusion of Greater Israel—the territories occupied in the 1967 war—into the Israeli state, and the transformation of Jewish Israeli society into a holy, moral community.


12. Menachem Friedman, “The State of Israel as a Theological Dilemma,” in Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989) From the beginning, most streams of Orthodoxy and the religious parties tended to recognize the state at least de facto, and a so-called United Religious Front participated in the first governmental coalition. Coercive secularization of new immigrants, however, provoked a great deal of anxiety and anger that lead to a deeper split between Orthodoxy and the Zionist state.


15. On November 2, 1917, the British government issued the well-known Balfour Declaration, which stated that “His Majesty’s Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this objective.” Later, the Council of the League of Nations put Palestine under British colonial rule in July 1922. The Mandate entitled the British to be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and political conditions “as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home and the development of self-governing institutions, and also to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion” (article 2 of the charter). The Mandatory charter also granted official representational status of the Jewish community in Palestine to the Zionist organizations and their local branch—the Jewish Agency.

16. The Jewish community was fully aware of the implications of the colonial state-building effort, and made controlling this process their highest priority. The Jews feared the prospect that the natural development of the decolonization process and continuing Jewish demographic inferiority would transfer control of the country to the majority Arab population of Palestine. This forced the Zionists to withdraw from the Mandatory state and establish their own parallel autonomous institutions, including a quasi-underground, paramilitary organization—the Haganah (“defense” in Hebrew). In its first stage, the Haganah was a partisan army, affiliated
with and under the command of the Labor Movement and its highly centralized labor union, the Histadrut. Only following the Arab revolt in 1936 was control over the Haganah passed to the Jewish Agency in response to its need for funding from the entire community. Zionist historiography considers the present Israeli military force a direct continuation of the Haganah militia.

17. Such as the massacre of about 125 villagers at Deir Yassin on April 9, 1948.


19. Self-evidently, there is no symmetry between the two catastrophes. The similarity lies only in the collective trauma experienced by the Jews and Palestinians.


23. In this case, a process of immigration occurs into any designated territory already populated to differing degrees by a local population—or by a population that had previously settled there—with the aim of establishing a permanent community, as in all of the cases of the founding of nations by new immigrants. See, e.g., Louis Hartz, ed., *The Founding of New Societies. Studies in the History of the United States. Latin America, South Africa, Canada and Australia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace amp; World, 1964).


26. The researchers explained this by the political weakness of the Arab citizens of Israel, the closure of most public and governmental positions to them, and their inability to convert material resources into cultural capital. See Moshe Semyonov

27. And from there to other Arab countries, such as Jordan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, which officially boycotted Israeli products. The short distances made this movement of goods and lack of customs profitable for both sides.

28. Except the Arabic language, which was declared as one of the state’s official languages. In a draft of the constitution issued by the Israeli Institute of Democracy, even this status was erased.


33. Interestingly, one salient activity of the JNF was planting forests that became a major symbol of Zionist nation-building activity. By locating the JNF in this context, its crucial role in the Zionist-Palestinian conflict as a major actor in land acquisition and control was blurred.


36. Some 46 percent of Israel’s Jewish citizens favor transferring (expelling) Palestinians out of the territories, while 31 percent favor transferring Israeli Arabs out of the country, according to the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies’ annual national security public opinion poll, conducted in September 2005. In 1991, 38 percent of Israel’s Jewish population favored transferring the Palestinians out of the territories,
and 24 percent supported transferring Israeli Arabs. “Transfer” (ethnic cleansing) is in fact another face of the recent unilateral disengagement or convergence plan.

37. This despite Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deals with protecting civilians in times of war. It particularly emphasizes protecting civilians, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring “parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Most international legal experts interpret this as forbidding the establishment of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, but Israel has insisted that it does not because the territories were not conquered from a sovereign state and did not constitute such a state prior to their occupation; therefore, they are “disputed territories.” Israel also wrongly disagrees that its settlement activities violate Article 55 of the 1907 Hague Regulations regarding the use of occupied state lands.


39. For a detailed description of the background, content, and positive and negative results of the Oslo accord, see Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian People, Part 4. In the Oslo accords, the Palestinians had recognized Israel’s right to exist in 78 percent of historical Palestine in the hope that, following the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, and on the basis of the Arab interpretation of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, which call for withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, they might recover the remaining 22 percent, with possible minor border adjustments. The first Israeli negotiators in Oslo were several junior academics, Yair Hirshfield and Ron Pundik, who were later joined by some officials and junior politicians, such as Uri Savir and Vice Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin, who continued the negotiations. See Yair Hirshfield, A Formula for Peace: Negotiations on the Oslo Agreements, the Strategy, and its Implementation (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2000) (in Hebrew). See also Ron Pundik, From Oslo to Taba: The Disrupted Process (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute, 2001) (in Hebrew). Each of the participants in the talks has attempted to make his place in history. A slightly different version is that of Uri Savir. See Uri Savir, The Process (New York: Random House, 1998).

40. Talia Sasson, Unauthorized Outposts: Report Submitted to the Prime Minister, available at http://www.fmep.org/documents/sassonreport.html (accessed May 31, 2007), 21 identifies 105 settlements but acknowledges that there may be more that she was not able to locate.

41. The intentional ignoring of unauthorized settlements is rooted in sympathy toward them and in the tactical decision to obscure the phenomenon both externally (from the United States) and internally to avoid unnecessary conflicts. Since the start of the colonization project, most of the settlements have been authorized after the fact.
42. In the Wye River Memorandum (October 23, 1998), in which Israel agreed to withdraw in stages from about 13 percent of the territory it occupied in return for the Palestinian Authority’s success in suppressing terror and disbanding private militias. A part of the agreement was implemented, including an Israeli withdrawal from some of the territories, a Palestinian crackdown on militants, and the opening of the Palestinian Airport in Gaza. However, the Palestinians did not, or could not, implement the arms reduction clause and other parts of the agreement, and the Israelis did not continue with subsequent stages of withdrawal. Netanyahu’s government lost the support of both the Israeli right wing and elements within the coalition, who were dissatisfied either because the government had conceded too much or too little, or because of personal scandals rooted in Netanyahu’s personality.

43. Before he was elected, Barak once said that he understood the Palestinians; that if he were one of them, he would join a terrorist organization. This, of course, immediately caused an uproar, and Barak was forced to insist that he had been misconstrued, that his remarks had been taken out of context, and so on. One can believe him: He does not have and has never had any ability to empathize either with his adversaries or with his friends. This is without doubt one of the reasons that his negotiations with both Assad and Arafat failed, and that relations with fellow Israeli politicians, including members of his own party, are poor.

44. In 2006, Hamas tried to regain these bargaining chips by pathetically refusing to recognize Israel’s right to exist and the Green Line as a border.

45. Indeed, it was the lowest point of Arafat’s political and economic position. He supported Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, mistakenly hoping to improve the position of the 350,000 Palestinians living there under Iraqi rule; he also cheered Iraqi missiles attack on Israel. This political miscalculation made him a pariah among the Arab states and the West. No doubt, this together with pressure from Palestinians inside the territories forced Arafat to offer far-reaching concessions to the Israelis.


47. On another occasion, when the delegations got swept up into an argument over whether the remains of the First Temple were indeed buried beneath the Al-Aqsa Mosque, it was the Protestant Clinton who gave a sermon on Solomon’s Holy
Temple according to the Bible. One of the president’s Jewish aides intervened to save the embarrassing situation, commenting that this was the President’s personal opinion and did not reflect the official position of the United States. Menachem Klein, The Jerusalem Problem: The Struggle for Permanent Status (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2003).


52. His rival group, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad Movement, is a militant group, far smaller than Hamas, and lacks the wide social network that Hamas has. The Islamic Jihad was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1979 by Fathi Shaqaqi, with the aim of liberating historic Palestine, destroying Israel, and replacing it with an Islamic state. The movement’s armed wing, al-Quds (Jerusalem) Brigades, has claimed responsibility for many attacks in Israel, including suicide bombings and Qassam rocket strikes, and is considered more militant than Hamas. Shaqaqi was killed in October 1995 by an unknown assassin. Some people believe the responsible party to be the Israeli government, while others say other Palestinian groups killed him.

53. Sari Hanafi, Here and There: Towards an Analysis of the Relationship between the Palestinian Diaspora and the Center (Jerusalem and Ramallah: Muwatin and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2001) (in Arabic).

