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Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bruce Cronin
1998
6. Transnational Community in an Anarchic World
Living in an anarchic world, one hesitates to think in terms of transnational community. Every generation since the birth of the nation-state system has had to cope with various forms of interstate conflict, rivalry, and mutual suspicion. Without external guarantees, trust is not easy to establish even with the best of intentions. As Woody Allen once observed, the lion will lie down with the lamb, but the lamb will not get much sleep that night. Yet, as the previous chapters have demonstrated, under certain conditions political actors can and have chosen to pursue cohesive security arrangements rather than competitive rivalries.
Much of European history has been characterized by dynastic rivalry, hegemonic conflict, shifting balances, and partitions of sovereign states. Yet, as the empirical chapters have demonstrated, there was a fundamental change in European interstate relations in the nineteenth century. Using the standards of measurement and evidence outlined in chapter 1, the cases suggest that states did indeed develop positive transnational identities after 1815 and 1848. Although rivalry and suspicion continued on one level, there was also strong evidence of ideological solidarity, group cohesion, and a sense of a common good, at least among a group of state elites.
Despite the obstacles posed by a competitive international environment, states do build special relationships with other states that go beyond simple expediency. This book has tried to theorize about how and why these relationships develop. It found that the key variable that explains the construction of cohesive security arrangements is transnational identity. Transnational identities can transform egoistic conceptions of sovereignty into perceptions of commonality by facilitating the notion of a common good. To the extent that states are conscious of themselves as constituting a social group, they develop a communality of interests. When such a consciousness is achieved and the idea of a common good accepted, the foundation for a transnational political community is created. The type of identity determines the type of community.
In this concluding chapter I will flesh out the theoretical implications of this study and examine how they can help us to sort out the possibilities for the post–cold war order. In the first section I will revisit the hypotheses outlined in chapter 2 in light of the empirical evidence. I will then discuss how this study contributes to the body of international relations theory and offer possibilities for future research. Finally, I will examine the future of security arrangements after the cold war.
Evaluating the Evidence
Kenneth Waltz argues that structural theories gain plausibility if similarities of behavior are observed across realms that are different in substance but similar in structure. 1 It follows, then, that a structural theory will lose plausibility if differences of behavior are observed across realms that are similar in structure. If this is so, then the security arrangements that emerged in the periods following the Napoleonic wars and the revolutions of 1848 suggest that the distribution of capabilities as an explanatory variable is at best indeterminate. These arrangements were not consistent with multipolar systems during other periods of European history, nor was the behavior of the actors consistent with what structural theories would predict given the conditions at the time.
The cases of the concert and the Holy Alliance support the theses that state actors can indeed share transnational identities with other actors and that this can lead to the creation of cohesive security arrangements. Using the standards of evidence articulated in chapter 1, the empirical chapters found the following: first, there were consistent patterns in the way the political leaders of the great powers and eastern monarchies described themselves and their interaction partners. Specifically, there was a clear sense that they constituted unique communities of great powers and monarchs and that this did not extend to other states. In spite of ongoing tension, they approached the major issues dealing with European reconstruction, revolution, and security from discernible European, great power, and monarchic perspectives. There was also a clear concept of a common good: an aristocratic Europe of monarchies in which security was collectively managed by a small group of mutually acknowledged great powers.
If group cohesion (as opposed to simple cooperation) is evidence of a moderate, positive transnational identity, the Concert of Europe represents the institutionalization of a great power community. Based on a behavioral analysis, I found that the actions of the state leaders were inconsistent with what one should have expected given the structural conditions in the postwar era, absent a common identity. While internal conflict emerged during the concert period, three important indicators of group cohesion are indisputable: the number of potential crises the great powers collectively diffused, the willingness of the powers not to exploit these crises for their own gain, and the steadfast commitment not to go outside the great power circle to solicit allies, even when such action could have been advantageous.
Beginning with the dispute over Poland and Saxony at the Congress of Vienna, the great powers faced many potentially divisive challenges: the reintegration of France into the European community barely three years after the final defeat of Napoleon, conflicts over the eastern question, the independence of Greece and Belgium, rebellion in Spain and within the German and Italian states, the growing ideological division between the conservative monarchies of the east and the parliamentary governments of the west, and, ultimately, the revolutions of 1848. In a balance of power system any one of these crises could have easily escalated into war or at least would likely have led to the emergence of competing power blocs. Instead, all these crises were settled within the club of great powers, specifically within the context of congress diplomacy. Despite ongoing disagreements over how the congress system should operate, none of the great powers pursued unilateral action once an issue was declared to be European in nature.
To gain a perspective on this situation, compare the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna to that of the Yalta conference following World War II. In both cases the major powers attempted to create security systems based on great power management and spheres of responsibility (Roosevelt’s four policemen), yet both also had the potential to break up into two opposing blocs. 2 After the Napoleonic wars Britain and Russia each had the capabilities to dominate the continent, yet instead of competing for European hegemony they pooled their resources to jointly manage security affairs.
The crises faced by the great powers from 1815 through 1822 were potentially just as great as those between the East and the West in the early years following World War II. Yet while the United States and the Soviet Union both exploited the domestic conflicts in Greece and Iran in the late 1940s to further their own agendas, none of the great powers exploited unrest in Spain, Portugal, Piedmont, Sicily, or the German principalities in the early 1820s. Moreover, despite strong domestic pressure within parliament and among the political classes, Britain never sought to counter the Holy Alliance with a liberal common security arrangement, even after the ascendancy of the liberal faction in the 1820s. Consequently, despite the claim by many historians and political scientists that the bifurcation of the system after World War II was structurally inevitable, the case of nineteenth-century Europe suggests that it was not. 3 The theories proposed in this book suggest that one key difference was the great powers’ commitment after the Napoleonic wars to their roles and responsibilities as security managers even in the face of other disagreements.
As a common security system, the Holy Alliance also demonstrated strong evidence of group cohesion. While the members disagreed on a number of issues, they remained committed to their special relationship and their common goals of providing for the collective defense of monarchy in Europe. This enabled historic rivals to place monarchic solidarity over territorial ambitions until the Crimean War in 1854. Neither Austria nor Prussia attempted to exploit the unrest within the German states in 1819 to increase their influence in central Europe at the expense of the other. Similarly, Russia remained loyal to the defense of monarchy even though it could have exploited the Hungarian rebellion against the Austrian empire in 1848 to weaken its potential rival. 4 By sending troops into Hungary to crush the rebellion rather than trying to profit from it, Russia acted within its role as a great power monarchy. This is contrary to what one would expect from a hegemonic competitor. It is not that the leaders of these states felt strong affections for each other. Rather they defined their security more in terms of protecting a transnational value—the survival of monarchy in Europe—than on increasing their power against each other.
Both these cases therefore support the hypothesis that the more states are committed to maintaining a particular set of interstate relationships, the more likely they will act as a member of that social group in international affairs according to group norms.
In analyzing the process through which amalgamated security communities were created in central and southern Europe, we saw a clear shift in how the relevant actors perceived themselves and their relations with the other principalities. More specifically, they began to define themselves as Italians and Germans, rather than simply Tuscans, Piedmontese, Prussians, and Badans. At crucial moments the political leaders approached the important security issues from discernible Italian and German perspectives. This was even true of Bismarck, who has been traditionally portrayed as the quintessential realist politician. While he clearly favored the Prussian state over the German nation for much of his tenure, he ultimately understood that to be a Prussian in the mid-nineteenth century also meant being a German. This limited the degree to which he could promote a purely Prussian interest at the expense of the greater German community.
Thus in the Italian and German cases we saw examples of symbiosis—evidence of a strong positive identity—as the political elites of historically antagonistic states began to view themselves as members of a broader political community that extended beyond their borders. The transformation of central Europe and the Italian peninsula from balance of power systems to amalgamated security communities supports the thesis that under certain conditions states can redefine themselves and their interests in transnational terms.
The cases also support the hypothesis that transnational communities are most likely to form during and immediately following periods of social upheaval when domestic institutions are challenged, international orders undermined, and traditional structures eroded. Moreover, they support the proposition that states are more likely to act in a manner consistent with their transnational identities when their legitimacy is seriously challenged. In all three cases transnational communities were formed in the wake of social revolution and revolutionary challenges from domestic political actors. In chapter 3 the challenge was from the French revolution, which not only threatened absolute monarchy as a justification for rule but also undermined the dynastic system that had helped to provide a framework for interstate relations in Europe. I suggested that the great powers were able to relegitimize the European political system through the adoption of the legitimist principle and the institution of great power security management. This provided a positive standard from which state leaders could justify their rule to their domestic political classes and evaluate the intentions and actions of each other.
Both the Italian and German cases suggest that the challenge to the regimes’ legitimacy following the revolutions of 1848 was the permissive condition that allowed the states to take the extraordinary act of annexing themselves to their traditional rivals. The kings and princes whose authority was based on historic succession lost their political base once constitutionalism emerged as the dominant legitimizing principle. The newly empowered liberal revolutionaries sought legitimacy within the context of a national state. At the same time, Italian and German nationalism was of a particular kind. Unlike parochial forms, which would have highlighted the distinctiveness of Piedmont, Tuscany, Prussia, and Badan, it drew its strength from transnational attachments that emphasized similarities between a diverse group of states. Pan-nationalism was a transnational force that required the elimination of the juridical borders that separated the populations.
Theoretical Implications
The preceding chapters suggest that while the concept of anarchy can be useful for explaining some of the barriers to cooperation and systemic cohesion in international affairs, as a theoretical assumption it is too broad for understanding the features and dynamics of an international or regional order. The dramatic change in political relations between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe cannot be explained by the systemic ordering principle, since politics in both centuries was conducted within an anarchic environment. Moreover, the chapters also suggest that, as a variable, the distribution of capabilities is indeterminate for predicting or explaining the types of security arrangements that are created at a particular time. The structure of the nineteenth-century European system was similar to that of other eras, however the types of security arrangements developed by the great powers differed considerably. Moreover, there was no evidence that any of the security arrangements were derivative of structure. Neither polarity nor hegemony can explain why these arrangements emerged during this particular period.
Until recently, the definition of international relations as the study of egoistic competition in an unregulated environment set the terms of debate in the literature. Thus, the “neorealist-neoliberal debate” has been primarily concerned with the barriers to cooperation, the relative importance of wealth verses security, and the degree to which institutions can ameliorate the harsher aspects of anarchy. 5 As Robert Jervis points out, for neorealism (and, I would add, institutionalism), the actors’ values, preferences, beliefs, and definition of self are all exogenous to the model and must be provided before analysis can begin. 6 The preceding pages suggest that in doing so we miss some crucial elements of international politics.
This book tried to address some of these missing pieces by showing how definitions of self and other can influence and sometimes change the social environment through which states interact. This supports the constructivist claim that there can be different types of anarchies. Once anarchy becomes a variable rather than a constant condition, we are freed from the assumption that rational egoism is necessarily the starting point of analysis. Thus there is a greater range of possible security arrangements, and other factors come into play in determining which is ultimately constructed during a particular period. Power is an important factor in understanding the range of options a given political actor can consider, yet it does not provide grounds for purposive or meaningful action, only the means to take action. Under some circumstances states may use power to forcibly attain specific ends at the expense of other states. In other situations states may use their power to facilitate more cohesive relations with selected states. As a result, power is also indeterminate.
This study contributes to a growing constructivist literature by showing through empirical examination that self-help and its consequences are not universal and unchanging results of anarchy. By focusing on how states can overcome the barriers created by anarchy rather than on the barriers themselves, the book supports the constructivist proposition that the international system is made rather than given. In highlighting the importance of intersubjective variables, in this case transnational identity, this study demonstrates the limits of a strictly materialist analysis. This suggests that much of what occurs in international relations cannot be explained by applying economistic, rational choice models. Rather, the application of sociological insights to the study of international politics can greatly expand the horizon of our field.
By showing how states can create cohesive security arrangements based on the idea of a common good, the book also helps to confirm the constructivist claim that preferences are influenced by social norms, social roles, and historically contingent discourse. Moreover, the empirical chapters showed many clear examples of how the interaction among state actors can change their self-perceptions. This supports the constructivist hypothesis that there is a direct positive correlation between what actors do and what they are. Until recently, most of these claims were based on theoretical argument. It is only in the past few years that attempts have been made to apply these insights to empirical cases. 7 The preceding pages help to strengthen these constructivist claims by examining cases that were hitherto within the sole province of realism, security studies.
In general, constructivist theories do not attempt to refute material and rationalist-based explanations as much as they seek to expand them. The empirical chapters support the wisdom of this approach. While identity was clearly a factor in each case, the study also confirms the role of power and interests in influencing the pattern of relationships and political choices that state officials make. As all three case chapters demonstrate, transnational communities are difficult to construct in part because a system that is based on mutually exclusive territorial units does breed competition. Moreover, the long histories of rivalry, mistrust, and conflict in interstate relations have cumulative and long-term effects.
In the absence of mitigating factors, anarchy can lead to a climate of uncertainty, and in security affairs the stakes are too high to allow for miscalculation. 8 Moreover, the institution of sovereignty reinforces a strong parochialism in domestic politics, which in turn exercises a strong force against transnational cohesion. Thus, even if anarchy does not constitute a single form with relatively fixed features, this does not mean that states can easily overcome their fears and parochialisms. In fact, even forward-looking and idealistic political leaders inevitably have conflicts between their international commitments and their domestic pressures. To the extent that domestic constituents believe that international politics is a zero-sum game, they are disinclined to extend their communities to include other societies. In this sense, the primary barrier to transnational community is not anarchy but sovereignty.
At the same time, ideational and material explanations are not necessarily incompatible. Structural variables can help account for the barriers to transnational community, while intersubjective ones can explain how these barriers can be transcended. 9 Both factors are present in the international environment. Realist and neorealist approaches, however, see structural constraints as a universal condition and cannot conceive of circumstances under which the barriers can be overcome to any significant degree. Constructivists try to articulate such circumstances, and the preceding pages justify this attempt. Both the theoretical and empirical chapters demonstrate how reflection and interaction among political actors can lead to a change in traditional roles.
The preceding chapters also confirm the utility of social identity theory and symbolic interactionist sociology as explanatory frameworks for understanding international politics. Both theories encourage international relations scholars to shift our focus from static structures to dynamic relationships. By using concepts derived from these approaches we are better able to explain the shift in thought and behavior that occurred during the nineteenth century. At the same time, the empirical evidence also disconfirms Jonathan Mercer’s interpretation of social identity theory as supporting the notion that self-help is inherent in an anarchic system. The present study draws from the same body of literature as Mercer, however, far from demonstrating that self-help is a universal and necessary consequence of intergroup relations in anarchy, it shows that states can and do form transnational communities among themselves.
The preceding pages demonstrate that recategorization and redefinitions of self do occur, leading to the formation of new types of social groups. Moreover, the evidence refutes Mercer’s assumption that rivalry and suspicion is based on a state’s need for a “positive social identity.” On the contrary, as the empirical chapters show, states sometimes look outside their own societies in order to develop a positive identity through the creation of reference others. In the Italian and German cases the principalities drew their definitions of the nation to which they aspired to become from each other. Without the others, it would not have been possible to conceive of an Italian or German nation, since their own self-conceptions were firmly rooted in their parochial identities.
Similarly, the great powers, particularly the eastern monarchies, defined their roles and status from their unique relationships with each other. The transformation of Europe from a balance of power system to a concert system and common security arrangement required a form of self redefinition that could only emerge from consistent interaction.
Added Value and Future Research
Adding an additional explanatory factor to existing theories complicates our understanding of international politics. Chapter 1 tried to justify this move by discussing the limits of strictly material and rationalist explanations. Chapter 2 offered a theory for filling in the gaps. This placed a heavy burden on the empirical chapters to demonstrate its utility, since one could argue that the cases could be explained by alliance, cooperation, and institutional theories, without any reference to identity. The results of the study confirm the limitation of these explanations.
The two strongest realist theories for explaining the structure of security arrangements are found in the alliance and hegemony literature. Neither the Concert of Europe nor the Holy Alliance, however, fit the concept of an alliance, an institution whose primary purpose is to enhance state capabilities through combination with others in the face of a defined threat. 10 Nor was either arrangement the result of hegemony. Although some scholars such as Edward Gulick describe the post-Napoleon period as an example of “Europe’s classical balance of power,” neither the concert or the Holy Alliance acted as typical institutions in such a system. Rather than balancing the power of each other, the great powers pooled their power in order to collectively manage security affairs on the continent. The Holy Alliance was focused not on the power of other states but on two transnational movements, liberalism and nationalism, and they placed countervalues (continental monarchy and aristocracy) above self-aggrandizement.
While liberal institutionalists have generally avoided discussion of security institutions, one could still conceptualize both the concert and the Holy Alliance as regimes, without any reference to identity. There is a case to be made for this argument. Certainly states can cooperate to achieve mutual gains without sharing a common identity. Indeed, the appeal of institutionalist theories is their minimalism; they only require an overlapping interest to account for the creation of a regime. At the same time, the evidence presented in the cases suggest that this is insufficient for several reasons.
First, the level of commitment and cohesion required to maintain the concert and the Holy Alliance was far greater than that which can be explained by a simple regime. These institutions went beyond coordinating policies in given issue areas. They were based on the idea that there was some common good that superseded (and was not just consistent with) individual interest. 11 While regimes are reducible to the sum total of individual interest, chapter 3 suggests that the great power and monarchic communities each had an existence independent of its individual members. Both the concert and the alliance constituted social groups as defined in chapter 2, something that goes beyond regimes.
Second, the nature of the discourse suggests that the members also viewed themselves as constituting a unique group. The great powers and monarchs distinguished themselves as a group from the other states of Europe and spoke in terms that went beyond simple mutual interest. The norms and social roles were not only functional mechanisms for regulating behavior, they helped to create new categories of actors (great power monarchs) with expectations that went beyond those of other sovereign states.
Finally, the study suggests possibilities for future research. First, a deeper examination of domestic politics would provide a better understanding of the tension between transnational solidarity and domestic parochialism. This book focused primarily on systemic variables by examining how the interaction between state elites can lead to the development of transnational identities. To accomplish this, I held domestic politics constant by assuming that the elites of the ruling coalition represent the outcome of domestic political struggle. This was useful for examining the link between process and structure. Still, at least part of the variance in identity can be explained by this struggle and thus it would be useful to bring these processes into the picture. While chapter 4 did offer a greater focus on the internal dynamics of the German states, a more sustained study could only increase our knowledge.
Second, our understanding of transnational identities and the construction of cohesive security arrangements would benefit from a comparative study that examines cases where states sought to create transnational communities but failed. The empirical chapters examined three cases in which states successfully constructed cohesive security arrangements. This enabled me to trace the dynamics that led to the transformation of balance of power systems into community-based systems. However, now that the groundwork for studying transnational identity formation has been established, one can use these process variables to examine a wider range of cases. For example, why did the Italian state system successfully amalgamate in the nineteenth century but the Arab state system fail to do so in the twentieth? Why did the five great powers develop a common identity among themselves after the Napoleonic wars but fail to do so after World War I?
Implications for the Post–Cold War Order
If the type of transnational identity that is shared by a given group of states determines the type of security system they construct, we should be able to make broad predictions about future trends, given a specific set of conditions. While it is admittedly difficult to detect a community consciousness as it develops, we can find trends in patterns of thought and deed by using discourse analysis and an interpretation of behavior. All this leads to the proposition that if political leaders are conscious of their political attachments with other states they can make choices that either strengthen or weaken these attachments.
The end of the cold war unleashed widespread speculation by academics and political leaders about what the future of international politics would bring: instability or unprecedented global cooperation, internationalism or isolationism, sovereign equality or great power domination, world democratic revolution or old-fashioned despotism, a “New World order” or a return to pre&-;World War I hypernationalism. In the wake of the political upheavals that had occurred in Eastern Europe, many neorealists, for example, argue that the collapse of Soviet power and the accompanying end of bipolarity will undermine the delicate balance and stability that has prevented war in Europe since 1945. 12 Advocates of this position can point to the outbreak of war in the Balkans and Africa, tensions in the Middle East, and the ethnic conflicts sweeping many regions of the globe as indicative of political relations in the absence of central authority. They would thus predict the emergence of a new balance of power that reflects the structural conditions of the new order.
Taking a contrary position, neoliberals argue that as nations become increasingly locked into a series of complex interdependent relationships the fortunes of each state become tied to those of its neighbors. 13 Institutionalists hold that stability can be maintained through the construction of international institutions that stabilize domestic political structures and facilitate cooperation among states. 14 Robert Keohane and others are cautiously optimistic about this possibility, pointing out that many of the institutions constructed during the cold war are so deeply imbedded within the international system that they are likely to continue even in the face of other structural changes in the system. 15 They can support their arguments by pointing to the consolidation of the European Union and the unprecedented initiatives taken by the United Nations and other regional and international institutions toward stabilizing international politics.
Finally, liberal internationalists argue that with the ascendancy of liberal democracy as the dominant form of state organization in the world more states will resolve differences through international institutions under the rule of law. Arguing that the key variables are to be found at the domestic rather than the systemic level, Anne-Marie Burley holds that liberal states differ fundamentally from nonliberal ones and that these differences translate into different behavior patterns in the international realm. Thus, the different types of international cooperation depend upon the liberal/nonliberal distribution of the states within the system and on the specific contours of different issue agendas. 16
This approach is consistent with the democratic peace thesis, which would predict that as the percentage of democracies in the world increase wars should be less frequent and relations more peaceful. Given this, the democratization of the major powers is the prerequisite for a cohesive collective security system. This position is strengthened by the fact that, despite the turmoil destabilizing many parts of the world, no democratic state has gone to war against another one.
What each of these scenarios have in common is its foundation in some type of structural or material variable: the distribution of capabilities, the presence or absence of institutions, and the distribution of liberal states, respectively. While structural factors will undoubtedly influence and constrain the behavior of states in the coming years, if the preceding analysis is correct, material factors in and of themselves are indeterminate. The nature of the interaction process and intersubjective perceptions of self and other must also be considered. Thus, one of the key variables in determining the direction of the post–cold war order will be the type or lack of transnational identities that form among states.
If peace among democracies is simply a natural outcome of domestic institutional structures, then war should eventually cease to be a feature of international politics as more states become democracies. However, if one views postwar liberal democracies as constituting a type of common security association, then the maintenance and expansion of this peace is dependent upon the development of stronger transnational identities among democratic states. A democratic state that identifies with other democratic states will view the world differently than one that sees the world from the vantage point of its regional identity, for example Europeanism or Asianism. Both are transnational identities, but each involves a different focus of loyalty. One sees the world in terms of democratic versus authoritarian and the other, for example, in terms of Asia versus North America. Democratic states can be nationalistic or regionalistic and may therefore not identify with other democratic states outside their region.
Common security associations form as mutual support systems for states choosing to promote a common value, usually in opposition to a countervalue. The ties between democracies were strongest when they could distinguish themselves as a group from authoritarian societies. Thus the historical fact that democracies have not gone to war against each other may not continue once democracy is no longer viewed as a distinguishing characteristic by political leaders. As more and more states begin to adopt democratic institutions, other differences—economic, social, ethnic—may take precedence. Consequently, there is no guarantee that a world of democracies would remain ideologically tied to one another, so long as other inequalities and differences remain.
The type of security arrangements that evolve over the next few years will likely define the nature of the post–cold war order in the coming period. The first and most obvious possibility is for the system to break down into competing blocs, ushering in a new balance of power. This outcome could be the result of domestic factors (for example, isolationist or nationalist forces within the government or society) or systemic ones (perceived threats from an ascending power such as China, Germany, or Japan). Under these conditions it would make little sense to discuss transnational communities or identities. If, however, political leaders choose to pursue alternatives to a balance of power system, there are at least three possibilities: (1) a concert model, based on the notion of great power management, (2) a collective security model, based on the concept of cosmopolitanism, and (3) regional cohesion based on pluralistic or amalgamated security communities. Each of these alternatives would represent a different type of transnational identity.
A modern-day concert based on an activist and interventionist U.N. Security Council would reinforce a great power identity and most likely lead to an international order in which stability is valued over justice. 17 Such an association would likely strengthen the ties between such identified states. As the Concert of Europe suggests, nations having a great power identity tend to internalize their role as managers and would therefore see their national interests as tied to the maintenance of a workable system of international governance. Thus international stability (although not necessarily peace) would likely be maintained; however, it would often be at the expense of a just settlement of national claims. 18 Kupchan and Kupchan suggest such an association, arguing that this “reflects current power realities” and would be “guided by Europe’s major powers.” 19
As the history of the nineteenth century suggests, however, a modern-day concert could spark the emergence of opposition movements among (or within) the excluded powers by increasing and/or highlighting the distinction between the great powers and the secondary states. The Concert of Europe was able to successfully keep peace between the great powers for four decades, however, while major war did not occur, domestic rebellions were common throughout the period. This opposition culminated in the European-wide revolutions of 1848, which ultimately destroyed the Vienna system. One lesson that can be learned from the nineteenth-century concert is that obligations cannot be imposed on a society of states by a small number of great powers indefinitely.
A modern-day league of nations system (based on collective security rather than great power management) could strengthen ties among all sovereign states and lead to a greater transnational identity based on cosmopolitanism within the community of nations. This type of cosmopolitan identity would view all states that accepted basic values and principles (as defined by the United Nations and other institutions) as constituting a single international community. The self-other distinction would be made on the basis of those who adhered to these principles and those who did not, for example, peaceful versus aggressive states. This is the type of approach that many United Nations enthusiasts have been striving for. 20
If such a system persisted over time, it would strengthen the political and normative bonds between the individual states and the broader international community. This would not mean unanimity or harmony, but rather a commitment toward maintaining a cohesive system based on a common set of goals and a common good. The key factor is whether cooperating states perceive themselves as constituting a community. Practically speaking, this type of arrangement could only work if most states commit themselves to the rules and principles of international society. Such an arrangement would likely value the application of universal principles (justice) along with the maintenance of stability and order.
At the same time, an identification with a “community” based on a particular set of universal principles could also foster exclusion of those who do not share in these principles (the so-called pariah states). For example, those nations that did not adhere to the community’s definition of “human rights” could find themselves excluded from the institutions of international society. As realist theorists point out, universal principles are often defined and imposed by the most powerful states and are often a mask for self-interest. 21 In these cases it could threaten the cohesion of the community. For this reason a collective security system cannot be imposed by hegemonic powers. It could only work in the long term if its underlying principles truly reflected the community of states as a whole, even if the great powers provided the resources for enforcement.
The emergence and/or maintenance of pluralistic or amalgamated security communities could stabilize regional political relations by strengthening ties among states within cognitive regions. As suggested above, PSCs reduce relative gains concerns and foster group cohesion, which can lead to demilitiarization and close cooperation. If such communities were to develop within Latin America and Asia and be maintained within North America and Europe, regional disputes would not likely escalate into international conflicts. The institutional structures already exist for facilitating these types of arrangements, for example, the Organization of American States and the Association of South East Asian Nations. Amalgamated security communities would further consolidate interstate relations by reducing the number of borders that separate societies.
As demonstrated both theoretically and in the empirical cases, community-based security arrangements are difficult to construct, and the formation of transnational identities are challenged by the institution of sovereignty. Cohesive security systems could easily be thwarted by a refusal of key states to fully participate in the kinds of international associations that could strengthen transnational identities. However, if states tend to act on the basis of how they define their situations and the way they view themselves in relations to others, political leaders can also make choices about the type of world in which they wish to live.
For example, whether the United States acts like a Gilpinian hegemon, a Waltzian great power, or a leader in a Wilsonian international community of states depends not only on its resource capabilities but also on how it chooses to define its role in the world. 22 This in turn is affected by the way it acts toward other states. At the same time, even if the political elites of the key states are committed to constructing a cohesive transnational political community, domestic interest groups or opposition political leaders can undermine the foundation for state participation. In this case domestic politics would be a more important variable in determining the outcome than systemic factors.
Rival power blocks could form if states take actions and create associations that are clearly exclusionary in design and form. This is why it is important for political leaders to carefully consider the types of institutions they construct. Western institutions have been highly successful in creating a sense of group cohesion among Western states, and, as a result, it is unlikely that a revival of traditional rivalries and animosities would develop within Western Europe and North America. However, a narrowing as opposed to a broadening of these institutions could create and institutionalize a West-Rest cleavage, with serious security consequences. This could unnecessarily help to bring about Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” 23
For example, if NATO becomes more active as a common security institution but continually acts unilaterally in opposition to more inclusive institutions, it can reinforce unnecessary distinctions between Western and non-Western societies. Russia has already demonstrated strong reactions to NATO’s role in providing security management for Europe at its expense. If this trend continues, NATO can emerge as a negative reference group among powerful domestic actors, prompting calls for more confrontational policies.
To the extent that transnational identities and transnational communities facilitate cohesive relationships and foster greater cooperation between states, they can be viewed as positive. In practice, however, they could produce outcomes that many people would find objectionable. For example, while the Holy Alliance helped the Eastern powers to overcome their historic conflicts by creating a foundation for group solidarity, it also impeded progress by undermining the many reforms initiated by the French revolution. Few people currently view the collective defense of monarchy as a positive historical development. Henry Kissinger’s portrayal of Metternich as a great statesman would look different from the vantage point of a leader in the German reform movement of 1819.
This points to one of the dangers of using identity theories as a foundation for developing practical policies. To the extent that transnational identities help to diminish the conceptual boundaries that divide societies, they can lead to a more cohesive, stable system. However, if they are used to create new boundaries, they can produce fresh animosities and new conflicts. The conceptual division of the world into the civilized and uncivilized during the colonial period was used by political leaders to justify highly exploitative and conflictual practices toward non-European societies. 24 Transnationalism, in this case helped to create new conflicts. Similarly, Samuel Huntington’s search for an external enemy in order to create a new sense of purpose within the West is a modern application of this principle. 25 Yet, as this book has demonstrated, inclusionary associations could deemphasize distinctions based on ethnicity, culture, economic status, or region just as exclusionary ones could make them more pronounced. In this sense, the future is in our hands.
Endnotes
Note 1: Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 123. Back.
Note 2: For an interesting discussion of Roosevelt’s plan to establish a concert-type system, see Warren Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Back.
Note 3: The thesis that the bifurcation of the post–World War II order was an inevitable outcome of bipolarity and structural pressures is argued well in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972). Robert Latham and Benjamin Miller both suggest nonstructural variables that can help account for the bifurcation of the post–World War II system: ideological incompatibility among the great powers and the differing visions of the postwar international order. See Benjamin Miller, “Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts,” Review of International Studies, vol. 20, no. 4 (October 1994), pp. 327–48; and Robert Latham, “Liberalism’s Order/Liberalism’s Other: A Genealogy of Threat,” Alternatives, vol. 20 (1995), pp. 111–46. Back.
Note 4: See A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1923). Back.
Note 5: See David Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neoliberalism, and World Politics,” in David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace, expanded ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). Back.
Note 6: obert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,” World Politics, vol. 40 (April 1988), p. 319. Back.
Note 7: One of the best empirical treatments using a constructivist approach can be found in Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 8: See Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 175. Back.
Note 9: However, “strong” constructivists would argue that structure alone cannot account for these barriers, pointing out that they provide only a permissive condition for a self-help system. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992). Others would add that structure is not strictly material but also includes ideational elements such as system rules and norms. See, for example, David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International Organization, vol. 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989). Back.
Note 10: The literature on alliances is extensive. For a sample, see, Hans Morganthau, “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959); George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962); Glenn Snyder, “Alliance Threats: A Neorealist First Cut,” in Robert Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991); Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). Back.
Note 11: Some may argue that regime theories can incorporate the idea of a common good. However, if the concept of regimes goes beyond Keohane’s minimalist notion to include everything from coordinating fishing rights to collective security management, it loses much of its explanatory power. Back.
Note 12: See, for example, John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5–56. John Lewis Gaddis similarly concludes that bipolarity was the major factor in maintaining stability in the post–World War II era. See his “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” in The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), especially pp. 43–44. Back.
Note 13: The classic articulation of this view can be found in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). Back.
Note 14: See, for example, Jack Snyder, “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,” International Security, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5–41. Back.
Note 15: See Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 16: Anne-Marie Burley, “Toward a Age of Liberal Nations,” Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 33, no. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 397. Back.
Note 17: The assumption that an aristocratic coalition of great powers would be more concerned with the management of international affairs than with the application of universal principles can be derived from such diverse theories as Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 8, and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Back.
Note 18: Following Deutsch and Singer, stability is defined as the probability that the system retains all its essential characteristics, that no single nation becomes dominant, that large scale war does not occur, and that most nations retain their political independence and territorial integrity. See Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, no. 16 (1964), p. 390. Hedley Bull defines justice in world politics as the removal of privilege or discrimination and an equality in the distribution or the application of rights. See The Anarchical Society, p. 79. Back.
Note 19: Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), p. 188. Back.
Note 20: See, for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992 (New York: United Nations). Back.
Note 21: See, for example, E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964 ‘1945’); and Stephen Krasner, “Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights,” in Volker Rittberger, ed., Regime Theory and International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Back.
Note 22: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapter 1; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 9; Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), chapter 4. Back.
Note 23: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22–49. Back.
Note 24: See Gerrit Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). Back.
Note 25: Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of American National Interests,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 76 (September/October 1997). Back.
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