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Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bruce Cronin
1998
4. Constructing a Pan-Italian Community
Both the concert system of great powers and the common security association of monarchs eventually broke down. For some political scientists and historians this was inevitable. Robert Jervis, for example, argues that concert systems decay over time, as memories of the great war fades and old animosities return. 1 A. J. P. Taylor focuses in particular on the rise of Prussian and French power, coupled with the decline in Austrian and Russian power, as the principle explanation for the political changes that occurred in Europe during the middle of the century. 2 Both these explanations suggest that conflict and rivalry are the natural state of affairs in international relations and that therefore the Concert of Europe and Holy Alliance were historical flukes.
Yet the breakdown of these transnational political communities did not produce a new balance of power system throughout the continent. On the contrary, in southern and central Europe two amalgamated security communities were created from a hodgepodge of competing, historically antagonistic states, resulting in the integration of Italy and Germany. Moreover, the Vienna system itself decayed primarily because domestic political actors challenged its underlying principles, not because of aggression by revisionist states. Once again, it was not war but social revolution that precipitated this challenge.
In 1848 revolution swept the continent. Unlike 1789, the revolutions of 1848 were widespread, touching every part of Europe except England and Russia. Beginning with the revolt in Naples, and shortly after in Paris, revolution spread to fifteen European capitals. 3 The uprisings were the culmination of a series of economic, social and political crises that had been developing over the decade. They were diverse and multifaceted and caused by a variety of factors. However as a European phenomenon they were not only domestic revolts against kings, princes, and emperors; they collectively represented a transnational uprising against the political order established by the Vienna treaties of 1815. 4 Above all, they challenged the legitimacy of the monarchic state, which had been the foundation for the Vienna system. This created the permissive condition that allowed for the formation of new transnational identities and the establishment of amalgamated security communities.
Amalgamated security communities are perhaps the greatest anomaly in a system of sovereign states. The voluntary cession of state sovereignty toward a new political center violates our most basic assumptions about international relations, the instincts for political survival and independence. 5 Unlike the creation of an empire, where independent units are conquered and absorbed into the center, political integration is a synthesis of the component units and the creation of an entirely new political community. It thus requires symbiosis among the units, a condition I defined in chapter 1 as a measure of a strong positive identity. Chapters 4 and 5 will examine the conditions under which a diverse set of independent political actors can build symbiotic relationships that transcend juridical boundaries. This chapter will focus on the transformation of the Italian state system.
Italy as a Historical Anomaly
If political integration is a theoretical anomaly, the integration of Italy is also a historical one. Ever since the emergence of independent states and principalities during the fifteenth century, the Italian peninsula was governed by a classic balance of power system. Following the Peace of Lodi in 1454, five states of relatively equal power emerged—Milan, Venice, Florence, Rome, and Naples. A century later Piedmont was created by the House of Savoy. Not only did the principalities regularly fight among themselves, they often allied with European great powers against each other, a classic balancing practice.
The reorganization of the peninsula by Napoleon did not change this situation. While he consolidated some states and absorbed others into his empire, after his defeat the Congress of Vienna recreated the original prewar borders and restored the traditional royal families to their thrones. With the restoration of the old political boundaries came the old rivalries. As Metternich correctly observed at the time, “If disorder broke out in Florence, the inhabitants of Pisa or Pistoria would take sides with the opposition because he hates Florence. And so it happens that Naples is resentful of Rome, Rome of Bolgna, Leghorn of Ancona and Milan of Venice.” 6 The integration of Italy is thus a hard case for theories of cohesive community.
What, then, accounts for the dramatic transformation that occurred several decades later? Much of the literature on nation building in the nineteenth century focuses on modernization and economic development as the driving forces for uniting various segments of society into a modern centralized state. 7 Increases in social communication and the development of a middle class help to break down traditional loyalties such as tribal or regional ties. Specifically, the rising power of the middle classes within the Italian principalities could be said to have created a demand for an integrated economy that would be more efficient for economic expansion. 8 Although these are empirically valid theories for explaining state building within Europe in general, they do not apply to the Italian case.
While many of the Italian principalities participated in Europe’s rapid economic and commercial growth after 1820, their economic development proceeded unevenly and at a slower pace than in most other parts of Europe. 9 The principalities were not particularly good models of modernizing and expanding economies. Moreover, even if economic expansion did produce an increasingly influential middle class, this does not explain why the middle classes would choose to integrate their states with others rather than build their own national economies. There is little evidence that the relevant actors that facilitated political integration responded to economic demands from domestic interests. 10 Most important, political integration preceded economic integration. Whatever economic motivations may have existed among some sectors of the various populations, each step toward integration was preceded by a political crisis.
Another common explanation for Italian integration rests with the “romantic nationalist” argument that unification was the fulfillment of centuries of primordial cultural or ethnic attachments. 11 Italy was a nation in waiting, kept apart by external forces and great power politics. However, Italian history did not leave a legacy that could account for a national or ethnic consciousness to develop in the nineteenth century. The peninsula and islands that we now know as Italy were originally the territories of the Hellenic, Carthaginian, Etruscan, and Roman peoples. For a time they were united—along with much of southern Europe and the Middle East—under the Roman Empire. However, ancient Rome was the capital of a nonethnic Mediterranean empire, not an Italian state; its legacy was not Italy but the Papacy. 12
When “Italy” reappeared during the Renaissance, it was not as a single political unit but rather as a peninsula of city-states. 13 The Teutonic peoples predominated in the north and Greek peoples in the Basilicata and Puglie regions. Arab, Norman, and Spanish stock had left their marks in Sicily, while the old Italic and Etruscan peoples remained in Tuscany. 14 In fact, there was not even a common language to tie them together. Regional dialects were the dominant form of communication; beyond that, Latin was the most common language in Rome, French in Turin, and Spanish in Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. 15 Thus the term risorgimento (literally, rebirth or reawakening) to describe the integration of Italy is somewhat misleading. 16
Finally, some argue that political integration was the result of changes in the balance of power in southern Europe. Among the major changes that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century was in the relative capabilities of the great powers. France became stronger and, with the rise of Louis Napoleon, more aggressive, while Austria was weakened by domestic revolts in Vienna, Prague, Hungary, and Bohemia. This provided the Italian states with an external ally against a distracted hegemon. However, while this could account for the ability of the Italian states to integrate without external interference, it does not explain why the states would wish to do so in the first place. In fact, given the long history of rivalry and conflict on the peninsula, it is counterintuitive.
This is bolstered by the fact that none of the great powers wished to see the creation of an Italian national state. If no one benefited from integration, it is difficult to attribute integration to power politics between the great powers. Therefore, while the creation of the Italian state was facilitated by the weakening of Austria and the breakup of the Holy Alliance following the revolutions of 1848 and the Crimean War in 1856, the creation of the Italian nation required a more fundamental shift in the identities of the Italian principalities.
From another perspective, one may argue that integration was facilitated by an increase in Piedmont’s relative capabilities and the rise of a new breed of modern politicians willing to manipulate both the international situation and nationalist aspirations to their own advantage. 17 In this case, integration can be explained by the ascension of Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, and his attempt to extend Piedmontese hegemony over the peninsular. 18 This is the strongest challenge to the theories offered in this book and the empirical evidence below will help us to determine its explanatory power. The logic of this argument requires that, first, integration was Piedmont’s preferred outcome; second, that it took steps to impose its hegemony on the principalities through the use of military force; and third, that the principalities formed an unsuccessful balancing coalition in an attempt to thwart Piedmont’s power grab.
This chapter offers an alternative explanation. It argues that the political integration of Italy can best be understood by conceptualizing it as a process through which the principle actors created an amalgamated security community. Specifically, I suggest that the Northern Italian Kingdom was a type a cohesive security arrangement organized on the basis of a common good and a shared sense of self, giving its members a positive stake in building and maintaining internal relationships. Based on the theories outlined in chapter 2, I hypothesize that the two conditions required for the construction of an amalgamated security community on the Italian peninsula are a transnational identity that is grounded in a cosmopolitan rather than a parochial nationalism and a “reference other” that embodies this identity and around which the independent units can coalesce. Under these conditions juridical borders are no longer viewed as protections of autonomy but rather as impediments toward unity.
In contrasting these rival explanations, this chapter will examine the alternative possibilities for the organization of the peninsula, explain why one of them won out over the others, trace the process through which political integration occurred, and explore the changing relationships among the principalities.
Competing Identities and the Organization of the Peninsula
Under the Vienna system the Italian peninsula was divided into independent monarchic states, most of whom were tied to the other European powers through dynastic lineage. Lombardy-Venetia was a kingdom within the Austrian empire, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was ruled by Bourbon monarchs with ties to France, and Modena and Tuscany were ruled by archdukes with dynastic ties to the Hapsburgs. Only the Papal States, which were ruled by the pope, and Piedmont, which was ruled by the House of Savoy, were governed by monarchs without ties to a European family. From this hodgepodge of competing political units, there was no obvious model for how the peninsula would be organized, even if the great powers were to renounce their interest in its future.
The organization of Italy would depended upon the kind of state or states the political elites wanted to construct or maintain. On a more basic level, it also depended upon they type of authority that would be the focus of political loyalty among the relevant actors: dynastic, national, religious, or popular. Any one of these could have been accommodated within a balance of power system of independent states, but only pan-nationalism required a radical reorganization of the peninsula.
As a result, even as major social, economic, and political changes swept the continent, the transformation of the peninsula was not only not inevitable; until the 1850s it was extremely unlikely. During the 1830s and 1840s four possible scenarios were proposed, each reflecting a different focus of identification and loyalty: a peninsula of sovereign states, a Catholic federation under the rule of the pope, a republican national state within a continent of national states, and an autonomous pan-Italian state.
The most obvious and widely supported alternative until well into the 1850s was a balance of power system of sovereign states. Each of the principalities had a strong core of political elites with an interest in maintaining the status quo that had been established in Vienna. The “legitimist principle,” which was the foundation of the Vienna system, had justified the restoration of the pre-Napoleonic ruling houses within the principalities. As long as the principalities continued to define themselves in dynastic terms, the Vienna settlement reflected the interests of the political elites. Monarchic solidarity tied the Italian states to the other monarchies of Europe, and the principles of Europeanism and great power management offered them a guarantee of their existing institutions. Under these conditions integration was never a possibility, since the accumulation of power in the hands of rulers over several generations inevitably produced dynastic interests that were at variance with those of the nation.
Austrian control of Lombardy and Venetia was not seen as a problem for the rest of the peninsula, since there was no perceived tie between those regions and the sovereign states of Italy. In fact, during this period many of the elites saw Austria as an ally in helping them to maintain their rule domestically and in balancing the power of the other principalities. Austria’s influence over the Italian states was due not so much to the terms of the peace settlement or to Austrian military power, but rather to the fact that most Italian governments were even more conservative than Austria and thus sought Austria’s help to protect the monarchy on the peninsula. 19 While the public did not welcome Austrian rule in Lombardy, the Austrian archdukes who ruled Modena and Tuscany were given warm welcomes by the people when they returned. 20
Moreover, to the extent that nationalist feeling existed, it was of a provincial rather than a cosmopolitan type. This is captured well by Genovese delegate Pareto, who wrote a letter to Lord Castlereagh during the Congress of Vienna opposing a proposal to merge Piedmont with Genoa: “National spirit... certainly could not exist in the amalgamation of two peoples, Genoese and Piedmontese, divided by their character, their habits, and by an invincible antipathy.... Vain would be the attempt to make them one nation.” 21 Consequently, throughout the Vienna period few Italians wished to form a unified state. 22 In fact, following his return to Piedmont, King Vittorio Emanuele—whose son would later lead a war of independence against Austria—set out to destroy every trace of “Italian” institutions, seeking in essence to de-Italianize his state. 23
Vincenzo Gioberti’s neo-Guelph movement promoted a second alternative: a transnational Catholic community to be centered within the Italian peninsula. To this end, the movement proposed uniting Italy into a federation of Catholic states under the rule of the pope. This reflected a widespread identification with Catholicism among the political elites and general population that cut across state boundaries. Gioberti was not proposing to build an Italian state with Catholicism as the official religion; rather, he advocated the construction of a worldwide center of Catholicism, a political base for the Vatican as a transnational actor. As he argued:
The real principle of Italian unity... the Papacy, is supremely ours and our nation’s because it created the nation and has been rooted here for eighteen centuries. 24
That the Pope is naturally, and should be effectively, the civil head of Italy is a truth forecast in the nature of things, confirmed by many centuries of history, recognized on past occasions by the peoples and princes of our land, and only thrown into doubt by those commentators who drank at foreign springs and diverted their poison to the motherland. 25
In this sense the referent society was the Papal States. The idea of federation rather than integration was based on dual loyalties: one to the Catholic Italian nation and the other to the provincial state. This would have led to a structure somewhat analogous to that of the United States under the Articles of Confederation, which struck a cord with many politically conscious Italians who wanted to reconcile their desire for constitutional government and national unity with their strong Catholic faith. However, it would not only have required the Italian princes and ministers to reconcile their policies with those of the Church but also demanded that the Papal States view themselves as part of a national political entity. In effect, church and state would merge, not merely work in coalition. It was the conflict between these two transnational identities—Catholicism and pan-Italianism—that ultimately eliminated this option as an alternative. The Papal States did not accept the tie between state and religion, and this created a conflict between national and religious loyalties.
A third alternative was to tie pan-nationalism to republicanism. This program was proposed by Giuseppe Mazzini, whose version of nationalism was based on national self-determination rather than cultural or ethnic autonomy. 26 Drawing from the philosophy of the French revolution, Mazzini identified the people with the nation; the people would reflect the will of the nation and vice versa. He argued that “the people have no existence where, owing to a forced union of races or families, there is no unity of belief and moral purpose; these factors alone constitute nations.” 27 This conception of the nation inevitably sees the people—and the nation—as something separate from the state. This was a form of secular (or civic) nationalism in which popular rule would replace monarchic rule.
Unlike Gioberti and the advocates of an Italian kingdom, Mazzini’s vision was also pan-Europeanist in that he saw not only an Italian nation but a Europe comprised of republican national states. In addition to the construction of an Italian state, he envisioned a United States of Europe, toward which his Italian nation might lead the way. 28 To this end, he instigated not only the formation of the pan-nationalist organization Young Italy, but also encouraged the formation of Young France, Young Germany, Young Poland, Young Switzerland, and ultimately Young Europe. Young Europe was conceived as a counterhegemonic coalition to the Holy Alliance, a union of free nations against the alliance of dynastic states. Thus this understanding of “Italy” was tied to the development of a broader European community of national states.
In contrast to the neo-Guelphist concept of a dual transnational community based on church and nation, Mazzini’s idea was a dualism based on a pan-Italian nation and a cosmopolitan Europe. Mazzini believed that just as the French revolution had freed the individual, the Italian revolution would free the nation. 29 In this sense the republican’s reference group was France and the French concept of nationalism. Mazzini’s link between the Italian nation and the European community suggests that the transnational concepts of Europeanism and pan-Italianism were not necessarily in conflict, given the proper conditions. It was at least theoretically possible to simultaneously identify with both the European community and one’s own pan-national community. Had this form of nationalism dominated in Italy and Germany, history may have taken a radically different turn in the twentieth century.
Finally, another form of pan-nationalism emerged, which advocated the construction of a cohesive national state that would eventually develop into a major power. As an autonomous power in its own right, it would owe little to Europe or to the universalistic idea of Europeanism. Rather its legitimation would derive from those special and unique characteristics that would make Italy great. This view was best represented by the National Society, which was formed by Piedmontese intellectuals in 1858. For the leaders of the National Society the nation was closely linked to the state as an institution:
To recover the prosperity and glory she knew in the Middle Ages, Italy must become not only independent but politically united. Everything points irresistibly to political unification.... Science, industry, commerce and the arts all need it.... The spirit of the age is moving toward concentration, and woe betide any nation that holds back!
What use is it to have invented the compass, to have discovered the New World... to have given birth to Caesar and Bonaparte 30 if a foreign ruler can order Neapolitans to fight Romans and can enlist Tuscans, Lombards and Venetians to fight alongside the Croats in his own army? 31
This merger of nationalism with raison d’état saw state-building and nation-building as co-dependent. It was this legacy, not that of Mazzini, Gioberti, or Garibaldi, that provided the ideological basis for Mussolini’s twentieth-century form of Italian nationalism.
This alternative, which eventually was adopted by the leaders of the northern and central states, promoted Piedmont as the referent society that epitomized not only the Italian nation but also the future Italian state. In fact, it was not Piedmont’s military power that made it into a positive reference group for those advocating this form of pan-nationalism. Rather, it was its image as a progressive, modern, and efficient state that could best represent the glory of Italy. Following the revolutions of 1848, Piedmont emerged as a model constitutional state with a strong efficient administration, rapidly expanding economy, progressive education, and liberal social policies. 32
What explains the eventual triumph of this last alternative? In many ways it was the process through which integration occurred, that is, as an amalgamated security community rather than through economic interdependence, a nationalist uprising, a cultural revolution, or a religious crusade. Leading up to the rapid series of events that changed the political map of southern Europe, the transnationalist Italian identity evolved from a common relationship to the rest of Europe, the activities of transnational organizations, and the rise of Piedmont as a referent society. All this was facilitated by a common experience of high intensity and long duration, the wars against Austria. The next sections will examine these in more detail.
A Common Relationship to Europe
One of the factors that helped to facilitate the development of a common transnational Italian consciousness was its external treatment first by Napoleon and then by the great powers of Europe. For almost three quarters of a century the Italian principalities shared a unique common relationship to the rest of Europe. Although neither Napoleon nor the great powers wished to create a unified Italian state, both treated the Italian principalities as a single political entity. This was done primarily for administrative convenience. Rather than approaching each state as an autonomous sovereign unit—as was done with the other secondary states of Europe such as Spain or Belgium—both the French Empire and the Vienna settlement considered the individual states to be part of a broader “Italian question.” 33 These perceptions were ultimately projected onto the Italian states, making the concept of Italy as a political idea not only thinkable, but a focus of discussion by the European community.
Napoleon had divided the peninsula into three parts by abolishing the separate principalities, states, and republics. The northeastern regions were organized into the Kingdom of Italy, the southern areas into the Kingdom of Naples, and the remaining units—Piedmont, Genoa, the Papal States, and Tuscany—were annexed to France. This reorganization, together with the introduction of a uniform code of laws, a common language of administration (Tuscan), and system of government, had a great impact on the political thought of the Italian people. 34 For the first time since the Roman Empire, there was some commonalty among what had been a hodgepodge of political units. Stuart Woolf adds that the rationalization of Italy by Napoleon was the first step toward creating a unified state. 35
After the defeat of Napoleon the great powers reestablished the original juridical borders with a few minor changes. However, the Italian principalities as a group were treated differently than the other European monarchies. Unlike the settlement for the rest of Europe, the peninsula was placed under foreign influence, primarily Austrian. Moreover, while the legitimist principle had enabled the Italian royal families to reclaim their positions within the principalities, they were excluded from the club of European monarchies that had formed among the great powers.
Had Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna established strong independent Italian monarchies, the political basis for a unified Italian nation would have likely been missing. 36 By keeping the Italian states weak and under great power tutelage, the great powers helped to prevent the development of strong state institutions and loyalties among the rulers, elites, and population. 37 Thus, when dynastic legitimacy ultimately collapsed in the 1850s, the new authorities could not simply assume the machinery of the state as had been done in much of Europe. The state was the monarchy and without the latter the former did not have a strong independent existence. This limited the extent to which political elites could develop strong loyalties to the state.
Consequently, in an ironic twist, the Vienna system itself helped contribute toward the eventual development of a transnational identity among the Italian states. In designating Austria as the sole great power responsible for maintaining security and overseeing Italy’s economic development, the Congress of Vienna isolated the peninsula from the rest of Europe. In short, it made the peninsula politically, economically, and militarily impenetrable. Thus, a unique relationship developed among the Italian states, that of object rather than participant in Europe. In other words, while the other secondary powers such as Spain, Holland, and Portugal were treated as important parts of the Vienna system, the Italian states became objects for securing a European equilibrium. The self-other distinction that is often the basis for nationalist identification was in part created by the congress.
Transnational Organizations and Transnational Identities
Another factor influencing the development of a transnational consciousness was the exclusive nature of interaction between domestic political actors within the principalities. These interactions were facilitated by transnational organizations. From 1839 through 1847 scientific congresses were held annually in Pisa, Turin, Florence, Padna, Lucca, Milan, Naples, Genoa, and Venice. These gatherings brought together scientists and naturalists from every principality. While they were largely scientific in nature, in the words of historian Bolton King, it became “impossible for Italians of different states to come together without giving something of a national complexion to their meetings.” 38 That is, since only people from the Italian states attended, the congresses were defined partly by their Italian particularism. Economic questions led to discussions of a customs union, social problems led to discussions of politics, and geographic issues brought out discussions of the future of the peninsula.
Beginning in 1844 the congresses began to elect committees of members representing various Italian states to study such common problems as elementary education, the search for coal deposits, the silk industry, the reintroduction of a uniform metric system, steam power, and deficiency diseases. 39 Besides facilitating cooperative relationships among the principalities on educational, economic, and scientific matters, the congresses forged a new cultural unity in the peninsula, testifying to the economic and intellectual interdependence of its states. 40 It is important to note that the congresses were not initiated by nationalists hoping to nurture an Italian consciousness but by political elites seeking to further their scientific and economic development. Thus the process of cooperation led to more cohesive relationships between traditional rivals.
In another sense the congresses broke down some of the regional barriers that had led most Italians to view themselves from the vantage point of their sovereign states rather than as a conceptual whole. Leopold II of Tuscany, one of the early sponsors of the congresses, brought in scientists and educators from throughout the peninsula, appointing them to important educational and cultural posts in his state. 41 This helped to “Italianize” the scientific and educational institutions.
The principalities also began to cooperate economically. In 1847 Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Papal States signed a treaty forming a customs union, forging a unique form of cooperation (although not economic integration) among the three states from the northern and central regions of Italy. In addition, the government of Piedmont began to build rail lines from Turin to other Italian cities. A short line from Naples to Porticic was opened in 1839 and another was built a year later, which ran from Milan to Monaza. During the 1840s the pace of rail construction across the peninsula increased considerably. For the first time there was some semblance of a geographic, if not political, union. As Piedmontese nobleman Massino D’Azeglio noted, the railways would “stitch the boot” of the Italian peninsula. 42
Obviously, convening interstate congresses and building rail lines across sovereign borders in and of themselves do not create a transnational community. Rather it was the exclusivity of these practices that fostered perceptions of a positive interdependence that was limited to the Italian states.
Perhaps the most important factor in building transnational relationships within the peninsula was the various networks of democratic activists that helped to create a transnational consciousness among the educated and elite classes. These networks played an important role in deemphasizing the juridical divisions among the Italian states in favor of ideological solidarity. As one historian argues, the activists created among themselves a special sense of group solidarity that was built upon a shared intellectual heritage and a common ideology. 43 Democratic movements had existed in every major city within the peninsula since the early 1830s, although until the mid-1940s they tended to remain secretive and isolated from each other. Most of these movements had the dual goal of expelling the Austrians from their respective states and establishing constitutional systems of government within them. Many also sought to curb the spiritual and ideological power of the Church, and some promoted Italian unity.
During the period surrounding the 1848 revolutions, activists within local and regional movements began to make more formal contacts with similar activists in other regions and states. 44 The flow of volunteers from throughout the peninsula to help Piedmont in its war against Austria in 1949 (which I discuss below) further developed this network. All this culminated in widespread participation in the Lombard Campaign (against Austria), the Five Days in Milan (the Venetian revolution), and the proclamation of the Roman republic following an insurrection in the Papal States. While these revolutions were eventually defeated, the experiments helped to strengthen the movements for independence and democracy. This would have lasting effects. Spencer Di Scala estimates that following the defeat of the 1848 revolutions as many as fifty thousand exiles from these movements migrated to Piedmont. 45 Once there, many decided to place independence and unity above republicanism as their immediate goals and helped to influence Pietmontese policy (particularly that of Cavour) concerning Italy. In sum, as the democratic activists began to act together as Italians, their thinking and perceptions became more cosmopolitan. This had an important impact on the future political elites in the northern and central regions.
A Common Experience: War and Unity in 1849
Ultimately it was a common experience that convinced the politically active population that they were Italians as much as they were Piedmontese, Tuscans, and Napalese: the fight against their newly constituted negative reference group, Austria. Until the 1840s there was little resistance to Austrian domination of the northeastern and central peninsula. As argued above, Austria’s presence on the peninsula served the interests of the reigning elites. This changed in 1848. Accompanying the uprisings that began to spread throughout Europe, revolutions occurred in every Italian state except Piedmont. The principle aim of most of the revolutionary movements in Italy was to acquire a constitution for each state and to see that it was respected. 46 Dynastic rulers were driven out of the northern Italian states, the Bourbons were expelled from the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, and the pope and his government was expelled from the Papal States. A Roman republic was declared. While the revolutions were later defeated by Austrian and French troops, the legitimacy of the Italian princes was badly undermined and their dynastic rights were no longer respected.
The 1848 revolutions in Lombardy and Venetia were directed mostly against Austrian rule, and this ultimately brought the Italian nation into conflict with the Hapsburgs for the first time. Tension had been building since 1847 when local political leaders in Milan instigated a boycott of Austrian tobacco. Austrian troops responded by blowing tobacco smoke in the faces of the Venetians and forcing them to smoke Austrian cigars. While the “tobacco riots” that followed failed to dislodge the Austrian administration, the Lombards got their chance a year later. Taking advantage of domestic unrest in Austria, revolutionaries overthrew the local administration and temporarily drove Austrian security forces out of Milan. The provisional government voted for union—rather than alliance—with Piedmont without any prior indication from the latter that they would join the Lombardian opposition against Austria.
In fact, if history was any guide, Piedmont should have been expected to aid Austria in its war against Milan, which would have helped the Piedmontese to maintain their hegemony in the region. However, this time the Venetians appealed to Piedmont for support in the name of Italian solidarity, forcing King Carlo Alberto to choose between his conflicting roles as head of the House of Savoy (whose interest lay with an Austrian alliance) and leader of an Italian state. The rapidly changing political situation forced Alberto to reevaluate his position. The decision of the king to take up the Lombard’s cause was the first indication that Piedmont would shift its loyalty from dynasticism to the defense of a fellow Italian state. This required a reconception of Piedmontese identity in transnational terms.
Before this Carlo Alberto had seen Piedmont as a state of its own, not to be submerged in a union of other Italian states. 47 There is no evidence that Piedmont’s actions were motivated by a desire to expand within the northern peninsula. Nor was Austria a threat to the Piedmontese. Venetia was legally part of the Austrian Empire, an arrangement that had continued for more than three decades. Balance of power and territorial considerations did not appear to be a factor. Thus, while the 1848 revolution in Vienna may have provided the means for Piedmont to challenge Austrian authority, it did not provide the motivation. Moreover, since Piedmont did not face a revolutionary challenge itself, Alberto was not acting to save his throne. Rather, the revolutions throughout Italy had a significant effect on his understanding of Piedmont vis-à-vis the other Italian states. This understanding was reflected in future prime minister Cavour’s statement to Carlo Alberto prior to Piedmont’s entrance into the war, printed in the newly formed Italian newspaper, Il Risorgimento: “The nation is at war with Austria already. The whole nation is rushing to the succor of the Lombards, the volunteers have crossed the frontiers, our fellow citizens are openly making munitions and sending them to the Milanese.” 48 Alberto’s response is also illustrative of his changing understandings:
We, out of love for our common race, understanding as we do what is now happening, and supported by public opinion, hasten to associate ourselves with the unanimous admiration which Italy bestows upon you. Peoples of Lombardy and Venetia... we are now coming to offer you in the latter phases of your fight the help which a brother expects from a brother. 49
This change can be largely explained by the evolution of Piedmont from a dynastic state to a national one. This changed its relationship to the other principalities and created a new role as a referent society for pan-Italianism. As argued in chapter 2, roles are formed within social settings, always in relation to others. 50 This concept of roles is key to explaining Piedmont’s behavior in the integration process. As a dynastic state representing the House of Savoy, Piedmont traditionally viewed its interest as an ally of Austria against other Italian principalities. Since his accession in 1831, Carlo Alberto had seen Austria as an principle ally in the legitimist cause. 51 The Piedmontese army had been trained to fight for the dynasty and the Holy Alliance side by side with Austria. 52 However, as Piedmont’s elites began to view their country as an Italian state, Austria became an enemy dominating a fellow Italian state.
Several points are illustrative in understanding how Piedmont’s identification with pan-Italiansim influenced its perceptions of interest. First, the Piedmontese were woefully unprepared for war, suggesting that the decision to enter was not preplanned. 53 Militarily it was not a wise decision. However, Piedmont’s interests did not appear to be either dynastic expansion or territorial aggrandizement. Rather, in the words of Cavour, “The moral effect of an opening of hostilities and the relief of Milan would be of more use to the Italian cause than the defeat of a body of five hundred men would injure it.” 54
Second, at a crucial point, instead of concentrating on fighting the war, Carlo Alberto insisted on holding plebiscites in both Lombardy and Venetia on whether they wished to merge with Piedmont, even though its leadership had already voted to do so. This move was criticized as a major military blunder by contemporaries and historians alike. 55 While holding plebiscites in the middle of a war made little sense from a military point of view, it was crucial if Piedmont was serious about building a North Italian Kingdom whose authority was based on national sovereignty. This required the legitimation of the population.
Third, even after the Italian alliance was defeated in late 1848 Carlo Alberto resumed the war against Austria in 1849—after the emperor suppressed the Austrian revolution and rebuilt the Austrian army—largely because he was committed to the independence of northern Italy. His resumption of the war was on behalf of Italy, not Piedmont. 56 From a purely Piedmontese perspective resuming the war on behalf of Lombardy made little sense. However, from an Italian perspective it was a war of national liberation. To be an Italian meant he had to act like one.
After the peace agreement was signed, Austria offered to give Piedmont the principality of Parma and a waiver of indemnity if it would modify its constitution and reestablish the Piedmontese-Austrian alliance. King Vittorio Emanuele, Carlo Alberto’s son, who assumed the throne after upon his father’s abdication, refused, saying, “I will hold the tricolor (the symbol of the Italian nation) high and firm.” 57 Although cabinet minister Gioberti proposed that Piedmont send troops into Tuscany to restore order after the republicans took power, both the king and his cabinet refused, arguing that they could not send Italians to fight Italians. This was a radical departure from the diplomatic history of the Italian state system.
The wars of 1848 and 1849 demonstrate several other points about the development of a transnational identity among the sovereign states of Italy. First, before the revolutions and war, Piedmont did not see itself as an Italian state. It was only through its participation in the war of independence on behalf of another state—a common experience—that it developed the notion that the war was an Italian one. This presents a good example of how process and interaction can create new identities. Second, and somewhat related to the first point, the war against Austria was not aimed at building a united Italian nation. It was purely anti-Austrian, focused on achieving independence for the two northern states. However, once the war took on a national character, it changed the perceptions of those participating. Mead’s “community of attitudes” had been formed, providing a framework from which the political leaders could evaluate the appropriate ways of responding to the situation.
Third, the revolutions and the war discredited the Italian princes in the central Italian states and, further, discredited the pope as a national political force. Both the grand duke of Tuscany and the pope had to be restored with the aid of foreign forces. 58 Moreover, the pope’s refusal to support the war against Austria at the crucial moment forever discredited him and the Papacy as a force for national leadership. The pope had argued, logically from a Catholic perspective, that he could not sanction a war of one Catholic country against another. The 1848 events therefore demonstrated that no matter how sympathetic the pope might be to the Italian nation, this would always be subordinated to his role as transnational leader of the Catholic world. He would even conceivably call in foreign powers to intervene on his behalf. 59 His stand forced political leaders to choose between Catholicism and Italianism, and almost all chose the latter.
At the same time, with the defeat of the Roman republic and the Venetian revolution—both showcases for Italian republicanism—Mazzini’s approach to Italian nationalism was no longer tenable. The decision by France to send in troops to forcibly reinstall the pope discredited the idea of a United States of Europe comprised of republican national states. The Romans had assumed that France, the “mother of all republics,” would back the republican cause rather than the papal institutions. 60 They failed to understand the France itself was conflicted between its role as a liberator (under the new revolutionary government) and as a Catholic state. Even as Louis Napoleon’s troops entered the city, the French could not decide whether to act as good Catholics and restore the pope or behave as good republicans and protect the republic. 61 The June elections brought in a majority of pro-clerical deputies, and this decided the issue. Ultimately, the perceived sellout by France and the refusal of Great Britain to lend its support to the national and constitutional cause made any identification with Europeanism unlikely.
Vittorio Emanuele’s strong support for the other principalities in his negotiations with Austria highlighted the special relationship that existed among the Italian states and confirmed the House of Savoy as the acknowledged leader of Italy. The final result of the war was thus to increase the prestige of Piedmont, a phenomenon that would have been unthinkable in almost any previous period in the history of the peninsula. In the years prior to 1848&-;1849 Piedmont had been regarded as a dangerous rival. In fact, previous attempts by other Italian states to involve Austria in a defensive league derived largely from anxiety of Piedmont. 62 The change in the perception of Piedmont can be explained by the fact that the other Italian states had begun to think of themselves as Italians, in which case Piedmont was no longer a dangerous adversary but a leader of a pan-Italian community.
In sociological terms, Piedmont became a positive reference group that embodied the transnational Italian identity. This feeling was articulated by Tucson leader Bettino Ricasoli, who stated, “I want to make Tuscany a province of Piedmont, for that is the only way for her to become a province of Italy. 63 And in Milan, where animosity and suspicion toward Piedmont had traditionally been strong, the members of the government’s peace commission wrote: “Despite our losses, the foundations of free and independent Italy still stand firm in Piedmont, that when conditions of Europe permit us to claim the rights of our common nationality, all Italy may turn to her, as the natural champion of this cause. 64
The identification of Piedmont with Italy was particularly appealing to the liberals and republicans who would later assume power in the central principalities. Piedmont was the only state on the peninsula to emerge from the 1848 revolutions and the Austrian war with its constitution intact. 65 Its steadfast defense of the constitution against the wishes of Austria lifted Piedmont to first claim on liberal Italy’s hope and gratitude. 66 The constitution guaranteed basic political and civil rights and established a parliament, a goal sought by most of the democrats. For the liberals, Piedmont was thus seen as a model state to be emulated.
The Creation of an Italian Security Community
The integration of the peninsula ultimately required all the sovereign states to cede much of their sovereignty to an abstract concept, Italy. In practical terms, this meant merger with Piedmont. The creation of Italy occurred in four stages, beginning with the construction of an amalgamated security community between the northern and central Italian states. This was a direct outgrowth of fighting together as a single unit against Austria in 1859.
During the summer of that year, Piedmont conspired with France to provoke a war with Austria, hoping to expel the latter from the peninsula. According to the secret agreement, France would support the merger of Lombardy and Venetia with Piedmont into a Kingdom of North Italy, as originally proposed during the 1849 war, and, in return, Piedmont would cede Nice and Savoy to France. With the support of France secured, the Piedmontese leaders reached out to their historical rivals in the name of pan-Italianism. Speaking in terms of a transnational Italian community, Vittorio Emanuele made his famous “cry of anguish” speech to parliament calling for all Italians to fight as one against Austria. Thousands of volunteers from each of the northern and central principalities responded by joining Piedmont’s efforts on behalf of Italy.
The war was short and inconclusive, ending with an armistice between France and Austria. Echoing a time-honored tradition, the two great powers sought to settle the “Italian question” between themselves; Piedmont was excluded from the negotiations. This enabled France to sell out Piedmont by agreeing to allow Venetia to remain within the Austrian sphere. This time, however, the situation was different. The participation of volunteers from throughout the peninsula under the command of Piedmont blurred the conceptual boundaries that had previously divided the states and created a new type of security arrangement. The disparate states were not military allies but symbiotic partners. Therefore the agreement would have been impossible to enforce without the force of arms directed against the entire peninsula. 67
This became clear when revolutionaries overthrew the ruling monarchs in Tuscany, Parma, and Modena. The revolutions were not initially nationalist; they were aimed at toppling discredited dynasties kept in power by Austria. 68 However, immediately following the insurrections, the political leaders of these states each announced their interest in joining the Piedmont-Lombardy union, much to the disapproval of France. 69 The French-Austrian agreement had called for restoring the dispossessed princes in the central duchies; however, Parma and Tuscany refused to go along with this agreement and announced their union with Piedmont. Their interest in creating this amalgamated security community was a recognition that they shared a positive interdependence and thus their fortunes would rise and fall together. This recognition was strengthened by their common relationship to the European great powers.
The rulers of these duchies then set out to “Piedmontize” their states by unifying their currencies, customs, and postal arrangements. 70 They pledged their loyalty to Vittorio Emanuele, in effect ceding their sovereignty to a foreign king. As pro-unionist Tabarrini argued after Florence requested annexation, “Either the Florentines do not know what they are doing or if they do, they are giving the greatest possible proof of self-sacrifice for Italy.... The Florentines are committing political suicide.” 71 As a result, Tuscany decided in favor of transnational solidarity over autonomy. Tuscany’s decision was followed by a series of plebiscites in the central Italian duchies in 1860. Elite and popular support for these initiatives was largely the result of the participation of the central Italian rulers in the National Society, which at the time did not foresee a united Italy. 72 Working within the National Society, however, they developed a pan-Italian identity over time. The nature of their association influenced their understanding of self and interest.
Even at this point Piedmont was unsure whether it wanted to merge with the states of central Italy, as this would have meant the end of the House of Savoy as a political entity. For the monarchy, questions of identity were as important than those of territory. Before the war Cavour had not intended to annex Tuscany; rather he preferred an independent Central Italy as an ally against Austria. 73 Thus Piedmont at first hesitated to accept annexation of the central duchies. However, as Cavour continued to modernize Piedmont and identify its interests more closely with Italian aspirations strong domestic pressure grew for the creation of an Italian state. 74 Despite other political considerations to the contrary, Piedmont could not deny an Italian state entry into its newly formed security community. To do so would have undermined its role as a leader of the Italian nation. The new Italian parliament responded by voting to approve annexation by means of plebiscite of any Italian territory that wished to be part of Italy. The link between the House of Savoy and Piedmont had ended.
The creation of an amalgamated security community between the northern and central states formed the core of the new Italian state. The complete integration of the peninsula, however, ultimately required the overthrow of two competing traditional authorities, dynastic and papal, in the southern peninsula. Both actions were the result of revolution and war. The incorporation of Naples and Sicily into the new Italian nation was facilitated by Italian nationalist Giuseppe Garibaldi’s “march of the thousand,” following the overthrow of the Bourbon monarchy in the Kingdom of Two Sicilies. While Cavour preferred to limit the new nation to the northern and central regions for political and administrative reasons, Garibaldi’s success in defeating the Bourbons in Sicily and Naples created a new climate of pan-nationalism in the north. 75 Both king and cabinet ultimately supported the expedition and agreed to sponsor plebiscites in both states. Given that the political elites supported integration, the outcome of the plebiscites was never in doubt, although the fairness of the voting was highly suspect.
Garibaldi’s mission had sparked enthusiasm within the cabinet to complete the direct line between north and south. Cavour thereby sent the Piedmontese army south to challenge the pope’s temporal power, something that would have been a highly dangerous political move even a few years earlier. However, the political elites had already placed their futures with the pan-nationalist security community and therefore their religious loyalties became subordinated to their national ones. Within a few weeks the Papal States were conquered and, following the positive vote in the plebiscites, all but the city of Rome became part of Italy.
By 1860 it was obvious that the Italian states would have to make a final choice between the national and the Catholic ideal. 76 The total unity of the peninsula would require that the Papacy—which still reigned in Rome—be reconceptualized as a foreign power. Thus, while the Italian leaders maintained their spiritual loyalty to the Church, they would have to renounce the temporal power of the Pope. This would in effect end a thousand years of loyalty to Papal power. By 1861, however, identification with Italy had overshadowed loyalty to the Church. This attitude was articulated by Italian minister Baron Bettino Ricasoli, who said, “Europe must recognize that Rome was Italian, not a feud of the Catholic world.” 77 Only the presence of French troops prevented Rome from joining the new Italian state. This obstacle was removed after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 forced the removal of these troops and Rome became a part of Italy.
In 1861 the Italian parliament met in Turin and Vittorio Emanuele was crowned king of Italy “by the grace of God and the will of the nation,” a recognition that his legitimation would now be based on pan-nationalist principles. 78 Thus, although there was some opposition to maintaining the title of Vittorio Emanuele II, sovereign authority was transferred from dynasty to nation. The interests of the king would no longer be defined by his role as head of the House of Savoy and leader of Piedmont but by the requirements of leading the new Italian nation. This was symbolically confirmed once the peninsula was finally fully unified in 1870, as the nation’s capital was moved from Turin—the historic center of Piedmont—to Rome—the mythic center of the Italian nation. This marked the final transfer of power from the House of Savoy to the nation of Italy.
This chapter suggests the interests of the principalities were largely framed by the type of states they wished to form, indicating that the identity of the units are indeed relevant in determining the type of security arrangement that develops within a region. Historic rivalries and distrust were overcome only after the principalities reconceptualized themselves as Italians rather than as simply Tuscans, Parmans, or Piedmontese. Until this occurred, none of the political elites saw integration to be in their interest. Most historians agree that neither Vittorio Emanuele nor Cavour appeared to be motivated by primarily expansionist aims. 79 In fact, on seeing the problems that Naples could potentially cause for an integrated Italy, Cavour lamented the day that Garibaldi compelled him to annex that state. 80
The domination of transnational over parochial identities among the Italian principalities came about through the unique relationship shared by the principalities, the activities by transnational actors, and a change in the types of states that populated the peninsula. It was facilitated by their common experiences during the wars of liberation and the 1848 revolutions. The revolutions of 1848 and 1859 provided the permissive cause by undermining the political foundation of dynastic authority within the principalities. The peninsula’s status as a protectorate of the great powers, in particular Austria, helped to create a consciousness among the states that they shared a unique relationship vis-à-vis Europe. This, coupled with functional cooperation on economic, military, and technical matters, helped to facilitate the development of a common identity. Once Piedmont was seen as the embodiment of Italy’s aspirations, it changed from a dangerous rival to a trusted ally.
Power and interest explanations cannot account for the political integration of the seven independent states into a new political community. While the integration of Italy may have been aided by power politics among the great powers (particularly France and Austria), it was not the cause. At the same time, using the standards of evidence articulated at the beginning of the chapter, we must reject a Piedmontese hegemony explanation. Integration was not Piedmont’s preferred outcome until the other Italian states virtually forced it upon them. Nor did it attempt to impose its hegemony on the principalities through the use of military force. As a result, the principalities never attempted to form a balancing coalition in an attempt to thwart Piedmont’s alleged power grab. Quite the contrary, in the case of the central and northern states the political elites requested annexation, and in the case of the south the general population supported it.
In sum, this chapter demonstrates that the integration of Italy was brought about through the construction of an amalgamated security community in the northern peninsula. This was facilitated by the development of a transnational identity that was grounded in a cosmopolitan rather than a parochial nationalism. It was further facilitated through the creation of a reference other—Piedmont—that embodied this identity and provided a center around which the independent units could coalesce. Under these conditions juridical borders were no longer viewed as a protection of autonomy but rather as impediments toward unity. In a broader sense, it also demonstrates that nationalism is not necessarily a divisive force focused on parochial identities but can be a unifying agent seeking to construct a political community that cuts across juridical borders.
Endnotes
Note 1: Robert Jervis in “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Back.
Note 2: See A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), preface. Back.
Note 3: For a sample of the literature on the 1848 revolutions, see Priscilla Robertson, Revolutions of 1848: A Social History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); Peter Sterns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe (New York: Norton, 1974); Frank Eyck, The Revolutions of 1848–49 (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972); and see David Ward, 1848: The Fall of Metternich and the Year of Revolution (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970). Back.
Note 5: See, for example, Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 105–7. Back.
Note 6: Richard Metternich, ed., Memoirs of Prince Metternich: 1773–1815, 5 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970), p. 188. Back.
Note 7: See, for example, Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Back.
Note 8: Some refer to this as explanation as a “dual revolution” where economic changes lead to political transformation. Back.
Note 9: See Spencer Di Scala, Italy: From Revolution to Republic (Boulder: Westview, 1995), p. 76. Back.
Note 10: The recent thrust of Italian historiography is to reject any substantive link between economic change and political unification. Recent research shows that the objective of creating a large national state was not part of the plans of the major economic groups in Italy at the time and even less among the urban and rural poor. See Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification (New York: Routledge, 1994), chapter 4. Back.
Note 11: Bolton King is a good example of a generation of risorgimento historians who take this position. See his A History of Italian Unity: Being a Political History of Italy From 1814–1871, vol. 1 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1924 ‘1899’). Back.
Note 12: Derek Beales, The Risorgimento and the Unification of Italy (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), p. 30. Back.
Note 13: Edgar Holt, Risorgimento: The Making of Italy, 1815–1870 (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 22. Back.
Note 14: King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. 1, pp. 99–100. Back.
Note 15: Denis Mack Smith, ed., The Making of Italy, 1796–1870 (New York: Walker, 1968). Back.
Note 16: The historical literature on the unification of Italy in the nineteenth century routinely refers to the risorgimento as the process through which unity was achieved, although there is considerable disagreement over when the process began and when it ended. For a good review of the historical debates, see Harry Hearder, Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento, 1790–1870 (New York: Longman, 1983), part 1. Back.
Note 17: See the discussion of these approaches in Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, pp. 63–66. The Piedmont-expansionist thesis is also well argued in Frank J. Coppa, The Italian Wars of Independence (New York: Longman, 1992). Back.
Note 18: See, for example, John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 96–114. Back.
Note 19: Paul Schroeder, “The Nineteenth-Century International System: Changes in the Structure,” World Politics, vol. 39, no. 1 (October 1986), p. 23. Back.
Note 20: Holt, Risorgimento, p. 38; and Stuart Woolf, A History of Modern Italy, 1700–1860: The Social Constraints of Political Change (London and New York: Methuen, 1979), p. 239. Back.
Note 21: T. C. Hansard, The Parliamentary Debates From 1813 to the Present Time, vol. 29 (London, 1815), p. 398. Back.
Note 22: Ward, 1848, p. 84 Back.
Note 23: Hannah Alice Straus, The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna Toward Nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), p. 92. Back.
Note 24: Vincenzo Gioberti, “Del Primato Morale e Civile Degli Italiani,” in Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 81. Back.
Note 26: For a good discussion of the distinction ethnic and civic nationalism, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). Back.
Note 27: Quoted in G. F. H. Berkeley, Italy in the Making: 1815–1846 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968 ‘1932’), p. 12. Back.
Note 28: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 41. Back.
Note 29: Berkeley, Italy in the Making, p. 13. Back.
Note 30: Napoleon was born in Corsica, which was part of Italy. Notation mine. Back.
Note 31: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 224–25. Back.
Note 32: See the discussion of Piedmont’s reform movement in Di Scala, Italy, pp. 95–98. Back.
Note 33: See Paul Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 34: Coppa, The Italian Wars of Independence, chapter 1; Straus, The Attitude of the Congress of Vienna; King, A History of Italian Unity, p. 2. Back.
Note 35: See Woolf, A History of Modern Italy, chapter 1. Back.
Note 36: This is consistent with Theda Skocpol’s thesis that social revolutions are more likely in countries where the state structures are weak. See her States and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Back.
Note 37: Compare this situation to that of the Arab states as discussed by Michael Barnett in “Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab State System,” International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995). Back.
Note 38: King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. 1, p. 150. Back.
Note 39: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 93. Back.
Note 40: Denis Mack Smith, Victor Emmanuel, Cavour and the Risorgimento (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 3. Back.
Note 41: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 58. Back.
Note 42: King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. 1, p. 151. Back.
Note 43: Clara Lovett, The Democratic Movement in Italy: 1830–1876 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 9. Back.
Note 44: Ibid., chapter five. Back.
Note 45: Di Scala, Italy, p. 98. Back.
Note 46: Delio Cantimori, “Italy in 1848,” in Francois Fejto, ed., The Opening of an Era, 1848: An Historical Symposium (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966 ‘1948’), p. 119. Back.
Note 47: J. A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped: 1848–1878 (Sussex: Harvester, 1976), p. 47. Back.
Note 48: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 146; my emphasis. Back.
Note 50: George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), section 18. Back.
Note 51: Smith, The Making of Italy. Back.
Note 52: Cantimori, “Italy in 1848,” p. 119. Back.
Note 53: Holt, Risorgimento, p. 158. Back.
Note 54: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 147. Back.
Note 55: Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 149. Back.
Note 56: Holt, Risorgimento, p. 160. Back.
Note 57: King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. 1, p. 356. Back.
Note 58: Beales, The Risorgimento, p. 66. Back.
Note 59: See Di Scala, Italy, pp. 88–89. Back.
Note 60: Holt, Risorgimento, p. 166. Back.
Note 61: F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System, 1815–1914 (New York: Longman, 1980), p. 73. Back.
Note 62: Woolf, A History of Modern Italy, p. 416. Back.
Note 63: King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. 2, p. 60. Back.
Note 65: See Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, p. 14. Back.
Note 66: Arthur James Whyte, The Evolution of Modern Italy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1944), p. 85; and Holt, Risorgimento, p. 163. Back.
Note 67: See Di Scala, Italy, pp. 106–10. Back.
Note 68: Smith, Victor Emmanuel, pp. 203–4. Back.
Note 69: Di Scala, Italy, pp. 108–10. Back.
Note 70: Beales, The Risorgimento, p. 128. Back.
Note 71: M. Tabarrini, “Dario 1859–1860,” in Smith, The Making of Italy, p. 302. Back.
Note 73: J. M. Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 132. Back.
Note 74: Beales, The Risorgimento, p. 128. Back.
Note 75: Smith, Victor Emmanuel, p. 245. Back.
Note 76: King, A History of Italian Unity, vol. 2, p. 130. Back.
Note 77: Ibid., pp. 328–29. Back.
Note 78: Smith, Victor Emmanuel, p. 245. Back.
Note 79: See, for example, the discussion by Thompson, Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire, p. 267. Back.
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