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Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bruce Cronin
1998
2. Transnational Identities and International Politics
Why should we study identity in international relations? Because identities provide a frame of reference from which political leaders can initiate, maintain, and structure their relationships with other states. These relationships can range from symbiosis to hostility, but embedded within them are a set of expectations concerning the nature of the actors. Structures, rules, and norms can motivate, constrain, and generate behavior, but ultimately political leaders interpret and evaluate the intentions and behaviors of other states, not abstract structures. 1 All relationships involve interaction between oneself and an other or among groups of selves and others. Thus, the way in which one defines self and other can influence the nature of the relationship. Material capabilities may provide the means for action, but identities help to define the social situation.
At the same time, while identities can be important variables in explaining behavior and interest, sometimes the nature of the actors is less important for structuring relationships than other factors such as domestic politics or the distribution of capabilities. My only claim at this point is that these are not universal factors that we can determine a priori, rather they depend upon the contexts of what symbolic interactionist sociologists call the particular social situations. 2 In some situations states act autonomously, driven by an egoistic definition of interest that is better explained by structural variables than by identity. In these cases other states are considered objects for achieving egoistic goals and relative gains concerns may be paramount. In other situations, however, states act as part of a conceptual social group and thus view the others as partners. Under these circumstances identities can help the actors define the situation by providing them with a standard for judgment and evaluation. If, as I suggested in the introduction, security arrangements can range from an international state of nature to a fully integrated amalgamated security community, then we need a theory that can explain how states can overcome the polarizing effects of anarchy and create transnational political communities.
This chapter offers such a contextual analysis by examining the relationship between identity, interest, and behavior in international relations. More specifically, it discusses the conditions under which transnational identities can transform an egoistic definition of self to one based on membership in a conceptual social group. This forms the foundation of a transnational community. It draws from social identity theory and strategic interaction models to show how the “self-other” distinctions that underlie identity helps political leaders to frame their interests and develop relationships with other states. It also shows how these definitions can change. It does so in three stages.
First, I examine the social construction of a state’s parochial (or egoistic) identity and its effect on definitions of interest and subsequent behavior. Second, I discuss how specific forms of interaction among states can lead to the development of transnational or social identities; further, I state the conditions under which such a development is likely. Third, I demonstrate the way transnational identities can transform a state’s conception of interest and its relationships with other states, arguing that in situations where transnational identities are considered more salient than parochial ones, states are likely to act as a group member rather than as an autonomous unit. This forms the basis for a transnational political community. Finally, I suggest the conditions under which this is likely to occur.
The Question of Identity in International Relations
Two literatures upon which one can draw to build a theory of identity in international relations are social identity theory (SIT), which has its roots in social psychology, and symbolic interactionist sociology (SIS), which is rooted in social theory. While these models come from different intellectual traditions, both address the social nature of the self as constituted by society. 3 Specifically, they both view human actors as differentiated into multiple identities that reside in circumscribed practices such as roles and norms. Their research is thus centered on the idea of a multifaceted and dynamic self that mediates the relationship between social structure and individual behavior. While SIT emphasizes the social group and the identification of members within the group, SIS focuses on interaction processes and the symbolic meanings that individuals assign to particular situations.
Social identity theory argues, in part, that individuals are socially constructed by the conceptual groups to which they belong. 4 It holds that actors develop conceptual ties to one another through the creation of social identities. These identities can lead to group solidarity and collective action. SIT models place the social group in the center of their investigation by emphasizing the social forces and psychological pressures that help members of social groups to differentiate themselves from other groups, for example, genders, classes, ethnicities, and political communities. This occurs through three processes: categorization, where individuals mentally partition the world into comprehensive units, identification, where actors define themselves and are viewed by others as members of certain social categories, and social comparison between groups, which helps actors distinguish between their conceptual “in-group” and other out-groups. SIT research seeks to explain intragroup solidarity and intergroup conflict by showing the ways in which individuals identify themselves and their interests with the group.
The application of SIT in this book runs directly counter to political scientist Jonathan Mercer’s interpretation of SIT for international relations. Mercer sees SIT as supporting the neorealist assumption that states are a priori self-regarding, the opposite conclusion from the one offered in this chapter. 5 The primary difference can be found in how we each define the group and the prospects for redefinition. Mercer takes the autonomous state as his starting point and limits his definition of group to those living within the state’s juridical borders. Thus, he uses SIT to make an argument for why states (defined as in-groups) are predisposed toward suspicion and fear in their relations with other states (out-groups). Arguing that groups are inherently competitive, he holds that “once we assume that we have two states, we can assume each will compete against the other regardless of the other’s behavior.” 6
The main problem in Mercer’s interpretation is that he does not allow either for group redefinitions or multiple group identities. This is illustrated by his preference for the term other-help rather than Alexander Wendt’s prosocial in describing situations in which interstate relations are cohesive. 7 Other-help implies that states will naturally view all states but their own as others, and thus any cooperative gestures will either be self-interested or altruistic. However, individuals and corporate actors usually belong to many in-groups, some of which overlap and some of which conflict. One can simultaneously be French, European, and Catholic. It is theoretically unjustified to automatically assume that all group memberships will conflict, apart from the particular situation and the particular groups involved. Indeed, SIT views the group as developing within society, in this case international society, and clearly rebuffs the notion that the self (the sovereign state) is either independent from or existing prior to society.
Moreover, the logic of his argument implies that state boundaries are static and unchanging. Yet one of his own examples, ethnocentrism, demonstrates the limits of focusing only on ingroup behavior. Ethnocentrism is indeed a powerful barrier to the formation of transnational identities, yet throughout modern history societies and cultures have often redefined their nationality by moving either to higher levels of aggregation (political integration) or to lower ones (secession). This suggests that identities are dynamic and that sovereignty is not an impenetrable barrier to transnational community building.
SIT’s emphasis on group behavior and group processes can thus help us to understand how individuals can act within the context of a conceptual social group, for example as Arabs as well as Egyptians. Symbolic interactionist sociology can augment this through its emphasis on the dynamics of social interaction and how this can influence the construction and reconstruction of roles.
Symbolic interaction theories hold that the “self” is always in the process of being (reproducing) and becoming (changing). The main premise of SIS is that human beings do not typically respond directly to stimuli but rather assign meanings to the stimuli and act on the basis of these meanings. SIS thus focuses primarily on the way actors create, interpret, and define (or redefine) social situations through the use of symbols, framing, and role making. 8 These situations are defined and interpreted by the participants, who act toward each other on the basis of their intersubjective definitions. Thus, actors assign meaning to acts, objects, and individuals in terms of their joint relationship to the situation. 9 Identities and the social roles that are derived from them influence the way meaning is assigned and therefore influence behavior. Action, then, is influenced by social interaction and definitions of the present situation. 10
In the following pages I will integrate these two approaches into a model that explains how transnational identities can shift the conceptual boundaries that divide states. The application of these models to international relations theory requires a conceptual move from the individual/societal level to that of the state/interstate environment. This requires two conditions: first, a theory of agency that allows us to treat states as coherent social actors with definable identities and second, a theory that shows how states collectively comprise a society through which sociological factors can operate.
Most neorealists would deny that the international environment can be considered a society, and thus social theories would not be applicable to international relations. Following Hobbes, neorealism tends to view society in terms of a legal social order that can only function with the construction of a central authority that will “keep everyone in awe.” Lacking a Leviathan with the power and authority to make laws, adjudicate disputes, and enforce rules, a functional international society cannot develop. 11
Neither the SIS nor SIT models, however, require the existence of either a central authority or a single value system that is accepted by all members of society. Sociologists study relationships among individuals and groups that occur in a social context regardless of how or even whether they are formally governed. Symbolic interactionist Sheldon Stryker, for example, simply defines society as “patterned, organized interaction,” while SIT proponents Hogg and Abrams see society as comprising large-scale social categories that stand in power and status relations to one another. 12 In both models society is conceptualized not as a static external force influencing or determining behavior but as an interaction process.
While these models would not be applicable in an international state of nature where communication and interaction are minimal or even nonexistent, they are clearly consistent with Hedley Bull’s “Anarchical Society.” 13 Thus, we can build a model of transnational identity without assuming that the international environment itself would need to transform from a self-help system (as defined by Waltz) to a prosocial one. 14
The next condition for applying these sociological models to the international system requires a reasonable assumption that states can behave as social actors with definable identities in their relations with one other. This is not to deny differences between individual and corporate actors, rather it simply means that the processes that facilitate identity formation and human social behavior are similar at different levels of aggregation. We need to assume that states (through their agents) can interact, categorize, form relationships, interpret behavior, and exchange signals with other states. There are in general three approaches to suggest that enduring environmental forces produce a constancy of state action that justifies attributing identities, interests, and roles to states: first, to equate the state with its top officials or government, second, to treat the state as an institutional actor, where state officials express the continuity of its institutions, and third, to portray the state as a corporate entity with stable identities, thus attributing to the state a national personality or collective consciousness. 15
For the purposes of this study I favor a combination of the first and second approaches. States can be understood as integrated sets of political institutions that hold supreme authority within internationally recognized territories. 16 They reflect the histories, geographies, cultures, social institutions, and class structures of the societies over which they rule, but they also have an independent existence. In this sense states act more like “trustees” than “servants” of their societies. While we can assume that they reflect the dominant domestic political actors, they also act with a fair amount of autonomy in promoting the goals of society. 17 Under normal circumstances the institutional structure of the state remains relatively constant regardless of who controls the mechanisms of government. 18 This tends to change only after a social revolution or radical regime transformation. As a result, the institutions of the state possess a high level of continuity, coherence, and stability that allows for state agency.
The balance of domestic political forces is reflected in the composition of the ruling coalition, which represents the dominant social groups in society. 19 As long as the ruling coalition remains in control of the state, there should be relative stability in its institutional structure. Thus, while state leaders are the agents of action, they are embedded in an institutional structure that provides for a form of socialization and coherence across time and domain so long as the regime type (or form of state) remains constant. 20 This allows for the emergence and maintenance of relatively stable identities.
Moreover, states themselves can attain the status of political actor in international affairs by virtue of their relationship with other states. Theda Skocpol argues: “The linkage of states into transnational structures and into international flows of communication may encourage leading state officials to pursue transformative strategies even in the face of indifference or resistance from politically weighty social forces.” 21 Consequently, when I use the term state in this book I am referring to a stable institutional structure that is represented by its political leadership. For this reason the empirical chapters will focus on the interaction among state elites. For the purpose of evaluating the evidence, a common identity among the sovereigns, ministers, and revolutionary leaders from different states will be viewed as synonymous with a transnational identity.
State Identities and the Definition of Self
The study of identity in international relations involves at least two components: conceptions of self and other held uniquely by each state (state identity) and self-other conceptions that encompass broader social categories that are shared by at least two states (transnational identity). Intuitively, we may be tempted to simply divide them by assuming that state identities are determined by domestic politics and that transnational identities are created through interaction among state officials on the international stage. Indeed, identity theories suggest such a dichotomy by arguing that all actors have both personal identities—a conception of oneself as unique and distinct from others—and social identities—that part of the self-concept that is derived from the social category to which one is associated. 22 However, the most interesting sociological and social-psychological work on understanding the self and its relationship to the other suggests a more complex model.
Parochial identities are rooted in a consciousness of difference; they emerge from an individual’s understanding of oneself as being in many ways unique. However, on one level even parochial identities can be considered to be social/interactive in character because for one to consider oneself to be distinct, she must have some conception of what she is distinct from. This is an inherently social process in which “I and thou” are mutually constituted. This dialectic is the basis of what George Herbert Mead refers to as the “self.” 23 Similarly, while domestic politics and national culture clearly play an important role in facilitating a national identity, they are mediated by the participation of the state in international society.
Mead argues that the self arises through social experience. Once it has arisen, it continues to be defined and redefined through the process of interaction. 24 This point is key, because the concept of a self is the basic ingredient for an identity, whether we are talking about an individual or a corporate actor. Unlike biological models, which classify organisms according to their essential characteristics such as physiological attributes, human identities are not inborn, nor can they exist apart from one’s relations with others. If individuals were socially autonomous from society, there would be no need to consider one’s identity. A Robinson Crusoe, for example, has no basis from which to develop a concept of self, since he has no standard of comparison. One can make a Hegelian claim that he is conscious, but not self-conscious, because this requires the presence of an other. 25 As soon as he comes into contact with another, however, his egoistic understanding of himself would inevitably be challenged, and he would be forced to locate his individuality within a social context.
Sociologists speak of identities in terms of “social locations” relative to the various individuals and social categories with whom actors come into contact. 26 They are defined in terms of self and other that arise in the process of social experience and activity. 27 This is because it is only through our interaction with others that we become conscious of our similarities and differences. As Hegel points out, to be conscious of oneself as a unit implies distinguishing between one’s self and those determinate characteristics that differentiate one from other people. To be conscious of what one is, is to be conscious of what one is not. 28 One’s ethnicity, for example, only becomes apparent when one comes in contact with other ethnic groups; ethnicity is not a defining characteristic in a uni-ethnic society. This contact could either render one’s ethnic characteristics important or irrelevant, depending upon the nature of the interaction. 29 Race is an important characteristic only in a race-conscious society. Brown-eyed people, for example, do not generally view their eye color as socially significant, nor do they attribute any particular set of expectations or assumptions about other brown-eyed people.
Symbolic interactionist theories hold that actors have many selves, with each related to the interactions with which he or she is involved. 30 Thus, each person is a unique combination of various characteristics and social locations. As we interact with others, we become aware of ourselves as objects (as well as subjects) and come to see, assess, judge, and create identities. This combination of our various selves constitutes our parochial identity. The significance of one’s identity for understanding behavior often depends upon the particular social situation. People often know what to expect of each other in particular situations because they know that various types of people behave in typical ways under particular circumstances. 31 For example, as a daughter, one may behave in a certain manner vis-à-vis one’s parents, while the daughter may see herself (and act) entirely differently in a situation where she is defined as an employer. Thus, identities are “situated” within specific contexts. For this reason, Mead argues that the self is complex and differentiated. Once the self arises, it continues to be defined and redefined through interaction.
As we move from one situated identity to another we develop a cumulative sense of the others who are important to us, either positively or negatively. Sociologists refer to these as “reference others” or, if they comprise conceptual categories, “reference groups.” 32 Reference others help individuals to form judgments about themselves by serving as points of comparison or standards of judgment, thus facilitating the process of self-definition and ultimately identity formation. Both individual and institutional actors continually compare themselves to others, positively and negatively, in part to better define who they are and, equally important, who they are not. Thus even parochial identities are socially constructed, owing much to the nature of one’s relations and interactions with (or against) others. While all individuals are motivated by certain innate drives and needs—for example, hunger, sleep, and personal security—it is impossible to understand one’s interests in a social environment apart from knowing their situated identity. For rational choice to operate one must be able to deduce a set of ordered goals from the actors. This means either to assume a fixed set of interests such as power maximization (as Morganthau does) or to try to determine what kinds of actors pursue what kinds of goals in what kinds of situations.
While states are obviously more complex than individuals, they too have definable personalities and identities that serve to distinguish them from other states. Like the case of individuals in society, state identities are also formed in large part through a process of social interaction and social comparison, and this in turn affects conceptions of self. A state that has had no contact with other states cannot have an identity, since there would be no standard of comparison or location of self. Because all states have a particular history and represent a unique combination of domestic institutions and cultural practices, no two states can have the same parochial identity. The institution of sovereignty enables a state to develop its own unique personality, which provides the material basis for the construction of a “self.” Yet sovereignty is itself dependent upon a process of differentiation and self-categorization that can only exist within a broader social environment. In fact a political community cannot even be considered a state unless it participates in the nation-state system; states exist as “sovereign” entities by virtue of their independence from other states.
As Anthony Giddens suggests, the sovereignty of the nation-state does not precede the development of the state system. That is, state authorities were not originally empowered with an absolute sovereignty, destined to become confined by a growing network of international connections. Rather, the development of state sovereignty depended—and still depends—upon a monitored set of relations between states. “ ‘International relations’ are not connections set up between pre-established states,” Giddens argues, “which could maintain their sovereignty without them: they are the basis upon which nation-states exist at all.” 33
Thus, even on its most basic level, the sovereign state develops its identity as a state through its associations within the nation-state system, and its unique consciousness is formed by differentiation from other states. France exists as an independent sovereign entity with its own national personality and identity through its distinction from Spain, Germany, and so on. The identity of being French provides a rationale for developing a particularly “French interest,” rather than a European or Catholic one for example, but only because of the existence of non-French states. Through its interaction and communication with other states, its agents categorize, compare themselves to, and occasionally try to emulate them. Its agents became self-conscious, and this affects both the meaning and future development of its institutions. If the French are perceived as quirky and fiercely independent in their relations with other states (including their allies), it is only because we have developed a standard for state behavior by comparing them to other states.
In an international society of states, then, state identities are largely constituted through their relationships with other states. States achieve an understanding of “self” through the process of social comparison and categorization. One cannot deduce identities apart from the historical context through which this interaction occurs. As with the case of individuals, a particular characteristic of a society can either be rendered significant or irrelevant depending upon the context. For example, religious and dynastic identities were the most salient characteristics in defining self and interest within the European state system for much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 34 One did not speak of the “Austrians” as much as one did of the “Hapsburgs.” Austrian interests were synonymous with dynastic interests and, in some contexts, Catholic interests. With the rise of nationalism, however, both religious and dynastic identities were downplayed in favor of cultural or ethnic attributes. Similarly, when independent states amalgamate into a single entity—such as Italy or Germany in the nineteenth century—or break apart into smaller entities—such as the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia—there is a clear change in the characteristics that are considered most salient in defining the self as a corporate entity.
“National” identity—and following from this, national loyalty—are thus products of differentiation among societies. The construction of a national identity is achieved through the creation of conceptual boundaries that separate the domestic (the self) from the foreign (the other). These boundaries are not natural formations, and they often change over time. However, the way in which political actors draw them greatly influences the way in which the state and its population distinguishes itself and its interests in international society. A narrowly conceived nationalism, for example, places a clear boundary between one’s ethnic or civic community and all others. 35 Broader attachments are considered less important or even detrimental, and interests tend to be defined in highly parochial terms. Yet a more broadly conceived transnationalism can extend the definition of one’s community to include populations from other societies, for example, pan-Slavism or pan-Arabism. It depends upon how one defines “the nation,” and this has important consequences for definitions of interest and for the legitimation of, for example, a separate Arab state apart from the broader Arab nation. At the same time, a broadly conceived cosmopolitanism, for example, Europeanism, extends the definition of self to include a far broader conceptual category of people and societies than does ethnic nationalism. While political actors and populations having such an identity retain attachments to their own political communities, they also identify themselves and their interests with those of a broader group that crosses political borders.
The concept of patriotism as loyalty to one’s own country presupposes a conceptual tie between the population, or at least the political elites, and the state. This tie is presumed to be greater than other bonds, such as religion, ethnicity, and regionalism. The institution of sovereignty provides the material foundation for this bond; however, this is by no mean static or unalterable. Since national identities, like other types of group consciousness, are constructed, they are capable of being reconstructed or transformed. T. A. Elliot demonstrates, for example, how racial identities in Africa became reclassified as national when they became attached to a particular territory after decolonization. 36 This was also the prerequisite for the creation of the Italian and German nations in the mid-nineteenth century.
Historical factors can have an important impact on a political unit’s conception of “self” and the degree to which this definition of self is based on political, ethnic, social, or geographic characteristics. The modern state formed long before nationalism provided it with an identity based on the composition of the population. 37 The formation of most territorial states in Europe preceded the development of the modern conception of the nation, which did not arise in most of Europe until after the French revolution. 38 The state in the early modern period had no particular identity apart from the king’s lineage until it became differentiated from other states. The fusion of crown and state created political units based on personal loyalty to the king or prince, but it would be stretching the meaning of the terms to say that there was a “national identity” or “national interest” beyond the perceived preferences of the monarchy. Identity and interest were not necessarily tied to a specific territory; political boundaries were fluid, and many territories changed hands frequently. Thus even geography was not a stable foundation for identity or interest.
In contemporary international society the creation and re-creation of conceptual boundaries continues to play a vital role in the development and transformation of identities and interests. Some of the variance in a state’s identity can be explained by domestic politics. For example, the change in Iran’s identity in 1979 from a Persian to a Shiite Muslim state was the result of social revolution and a change in regime. The emergence of a radically different ruling coalition laid the foundation for this change. However, to the extent that identities are built and maintained through evaluative comparisons between in-groups (the self) and relevant out-groups (the other), domestic politics is intricately tied to the international environment. Iran’s “Islamic revolution” (to the extent that it was such) was defined in part by its opposition to the West (the other) and its solidarity with Islam (a transnational political force). 39 The reference group or society that provided the standard for social comparison was the United States and other “Western” nations, which many Iranians blamed for contributing toward their oppression. In this case new identities were created from a negative comparative process. Later Iran itself became a reference group, albeit a positive one, for other political actors within other countries seeking to create Islamic states, for example Afghanistan.
Like the complex and differentiated self that comprises the individual, states represent a variety of societal institutions and practices that gain social meaning when they are contrasted with other types of institutions and practices. Thus states have many identities, each of which is situated within a specific context. These situated identities enable states to occupy different social positions or roles in different situations. For example, in the late nineteenth century, Great Britain could act (and be generally viewed by others) as the “mother of all parliaments” in its relations with emerging democracies in Europe and North America while at the same time imposing itself as a colonial bully in its relations with India.
In fact, Britain was both a democracy and an empire, which made for a complex and differentiated national personality. One might argue that its identity as the first modern European democracy contradicted its role as a colonial empire, however, the creation of different social situations enabled Britain to act differently in various contexts without undermining its legitimacy or identity. The self-serving conceptual distinction between civilized and uncivilized—a transnational distinction—enabled Britain to justify this seemingly contradictory behavior to its population and European neighbors. 40
Identities can affect interest not only by providing a standard of comparison and expectation but also by influencing one’s choice of reference groups and the degree to which these groups are viewed positively or negatively. Returning to a previous example, prior to 1979 Iran considered itself to be a modern westernizing state within a region of hostile cultures (its population is Persian, not Arab). As such, its ruling coalition saw the United States as its key superpower ally. Following its revolution in 1979, Iran identified itself as an Islamic state, which formed the basis of its relations with other states. Its traditional ally became the “Great Satan” and its main competitor for regional hegemony, Syria, became an ally. Moreover, Iran so strongly identified with its role as leader of the Islamic world that it deliberately alienated both superpowers simultaneously, a move that cannot be explained by classical balance of power theory.
Transnational Identities and the Construction of a Social Group
Up to this point I have focused primarily on the way states distinguish themselves from other states and how this can affect their relationships with and behavior toward each other. I argued that a state’s parochial identity is formed through a process of conceptual differentiation between domestic and foreign, or self and other. These identities are reinforced by the institution of sovereignty, which legitimizes political distinctions based on geography and nationality. Thus, states are predisposed to favor their parochial identities. However, states do not exist in isolation from each other but are rather connected in a complex network of relationships—both positive and negative—that provide opportunities for creating, strengthening, or weakening their identifications with each other.
If state identities are formed and reinforced through social comparison and categorization, it follows that they can also be transformed and expanded through this same process. While communication, comparison, and interaction among political actors can uncover difference and distinctiveness, they can also lead to a consciousness of commonality that moves or even erases the conceptual boundaries between states.
Hogg and Abrams argue that there is a continuum of self-conception ranging from exclusively social to exclusively personal identity and that when social identities become more salient than personal identities the resulting behavior is qualitatively different. 41 The determination of which identity will inform a state’s interest—and thereby influence its subsequent behavior—depends upon identity salience, that is, the relative importance of one particular identity in relation to others in a particular situation. 42 If one has several conflicting identities, the relative location of one particular identity on the “salience hierarchy” becomes an important predictor of behavior. When the salience of one’s social identity is high, group interests become synonymous with state interests, because the actors perceive that their fortunes are tied to those of the group.
It is difficult to determine what the identity salience of a state will be at a particular time, apart from the domestic and international circumstances that exist. Stryker, however, argues that identity salience can be determined by the degree to which an actor is committed to a particular set of relationships. Thus, a state may act against its parochial instincts if its leadership believes that such behavior is necessary to maintain good relations with those whom they value. For example, the United States may act against its own domestic constituents in economic affairs in cases where the cohesiveness of the Group of Seven is at stake. In this instance it would be acting to enhance its role as an economic leader of advanced capitalist states at the expense of domestic politics.
States, like individuals, belong to a variety of social as well as parochial categories. Individuals are not only defined by their personal characteristics but by their group qualities, such as ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and profession. And, like individuals, states not only represent societies defined by their internal qualities—culture, history, geography, political institutions—but also by their association with broader conceptual social groups that transcend juridical borders. 43 These groups together furnish states with a repertoire of discrete category memberships (social identities) that help to define them in their relations with other states. The mutual recognition by particular states that these social categories are part of their self-concepts, as well as their knowledge that they belong to certain social groups, forms the basis for transnational identities.
Like transnational communities, transnational identities—social identities that transcend juridical borders—can form either among societal groups or among states. Like all types of collective identities, they express a change in the level of abstraction of self-categorization, that is, a shift from a definition of self as unique and distinct to one that perceives the self as an part of a conceptual social category or group that transcends state boundaries. Put another way, they express a change in the way states make self-other distinctions. Social identity theory holds that a transformation of identities can occur when actors develop conceptual attachments to selective others through the processes of recategorization, recomparison, and reidentification. When a group of states recognize that they share a common set of social characteristics and experiences that define them as a unique group in distinction from other conceptual groups, they have created a transnational identity. I argue that transnational identity formation requires both material and intersubjective conditions. At a minimum, the necessary material conditions include the following:
First, there must be a shared characteristic that can form the material basis for a transnational social group, such as a common ethnicity, region, form of state, political or economic system, or relative level of development. The more salient this characteristic is to a society’s self-understanding, the more likely it is to value its transnational attachments with those sharing the attribute. For example, both England and Germany are European states, however, it has been apparent over the past few decades that Germany values its ties to Europe and the European ideal more than England does.
Second, there must be a shared exclusive relationship to the other states in the system or region. Exclusivity is key to group cohesion and helps to highlight the distinctions between those sharing a common social characteristic and those who do not. In short, exclusive relationships highlight a self-other distinction by creating positive and negative reference groups.
For example, for many years, the relations among democratic states were conducted on a different basis (reflecting different expectations) than those between democracies and nondemocracies. 44 The exclusiveness of their relationships was facilitated in part by their minority status in a world dominated by autocratic regimes. Over time this created a unique set of norms that guided their behavior toward each other, which was not generally extended to autocracies. The division of Europe between liberal democracies and communist bureaucracies after World War II both reflected and solidified this relationship.
Third, there must be a high level of positive interdependence between the states. Interdependence lowers the conceptual boundaries that are created by juridical borders, and this can help to lead to a broader definition of “self” that moves beyond territorial distinctions. The interdependence must be positive—that is, mutually rewarding—otherwise it could lead to resentment and conflict. 45 When a group of actors depend upon each other to satisfy at least one of their primary needs and achieve satisfaction from their association, they tend to develop feelings of mutual attraction that strengthens the group. 46 Interdependence can vary in duration, reward level, and intensity, and these three variables determine the degree to which an interdependent relationship will contribute toward a transnational identity. I argue that the greater the degree of interdependence and the higher the reward level, the stronger the social attachments and the greater the potential for transnational identity formation.
While these three material conditions can provide a foundation for the development of a common identity, they cannot in and of themselves create this identity. Social identities are intersubjective phenomena and thus have no practical expression apart from their recognition by the actors involved. Lacking a political consciousness, objective conditions will not necessarily translate into intersubjective understandings. For example, although European states have long shared a common geographic and cultural characteristic, a common relationship to non-Europeans (particularly during the colonial era) and a clear economic and social interdependence, European identities have waxed and waned over the past several hundred years. This is because European leaders have often not thought of themselves as Europeans but rather as Austrians, Hapsburgs, or Catholics. A political consciousness allows the actors to interpret the already existing material conditions in ways that make them salient to their definition of self and other.
If, as constructivists argue, there is a causal relationship between what actors do and what they are, transnational identities develop in the course of sustained interaction. 47 Since interactions can be either positive or negative, we are looking for a set of practices that demonstrate commonality. For this reason, I would argue that group identities develop out of common experiences; political actors must act together as a group before they can recognize the existence of that group. Common experiences highlight the uniqueness of a group, particularly when they are of high intensity and long duration. This is why, for example, concert systems tend to form in the aftermath of a major war. 48 The great powers recognize their special role in defeating the revisionist power and this can extend to peacetime systems management. Similarly, the development of a transnational “Third World” identity among former colonies is a good example of how a shared experience that was both highly intense and long in duration—colonialism—could facilitate the creation of a social group.
I hypothesize that the greater the intensity and the longer the duration of the experience, the stronger the social attachments and the more likely that transnational identity will form. Under these conditions sustained interactions can become institutionalized over time. By this I mean that the actors develop a set of practices and norms to facilitate their continued interaction. To the extent that the participants view their relationship as distinct and exclusive, these practices become attached to their group identities. In this sense, the actors socialize each other.
Transnational Identities and Behavioral Effects
Transnational identities can alter the social environment through which a group of states relate to each other by creating what Mead would call a community of attitudes or “generalized other.” These communities develop particular frameworks that inform the members of the appropriate ways of responding to a situation. 49 Thus, the generalized other provides the criteria for self-assessment, reflection, signaling, and interpreting the signals of others. In Meadian terms, states sharing a transnational identity often assume the organized social attitudes of their group (or community) toward the social problems that confront them at any given time. This can generate certain types of behavior in several ways:
First, transnational identities provide the members of a social group with a set of norms, boundaries, goals, and a social context for interaction. Social identities carry with them a certain range of prerogatives and obligations an actor who is accorded that identity may carry out. 50 These prerogatives and obligations constitute the role-prescriptions associated with that identity. In any particular situation actors participate in a network of roles that define it. 51 Roles link transnational identities with action by defining the types of behaviors that are characteristic of a category of actors within a specific context. In other words, while a transnational identity defines states’ social location relative to other states, the roles that are derived from these identities create expectations and assumptions about what this particular category of actors typically does in a particular situation. State elites then often exhibit a national role conception, which signals the actions that are appropriate to their state and the actions it should undertake with the international system. 52
States sharing a transnational identity act in the context of organized patterns by recognizing each other as occupants of these roles. Actors tend to adhere to their roles when a positive relationship to its reference others depends on its being a particular type of actor. Under these circumstances its ability to maintain a positive transnational identity, as well as its “membership” in the transnational social group, is tied to willingness to act in a certain manner. For example, democratic states are expected to conduct their foreign relations according to the “rule of law,” at least in their dealings with each other, and the community of democratic states often pressures its members to do so. 53
This is, of course, subject to interpretation and manipulation by the states inhabiting these roles. Roles proscribe a range of behaviors that are consistent with a particular identity. Thus, there is often conflict and/or disagreement as to what a particular identity entails, for example, what it means to “act like a great power” or “act like a European.” However there are limits to how far a state can deviate from accepted group norms and still be considered part of the group.
At the same time, because states belong to many conceptual social groups, they have many identities, often pulling them in conflicting directions. As a result, social actors often exhibit role conflict when there are contrary expectations attached to some position in a social relationship. Such expectations could call for incompatible performances. Giddens describes this as “role strain,” which manifests itself in at least two points of tension: first, between the needs and wants of the actors and the role-prescriptions that are associated with their various identities (egoistic impulses verses group norms) and second, between the role-prescriptions of different social identities that an individual is ascribed with, adopts, or is forced to assume. 54 Under these conditions a state’s situated identity (that is, the identity that most appropriately fits the particular situation) becomes the important variable in predicting behavior. This type of contextual analysis can explain why a state may act differently in otherwise similar conditions, for example, why security dilemmas arise among some states and not others.
Second, common identities can facilitate cooperation among members of a transnational social group. Social groups exhibit a high degree of closure in the sense that the participants recognize a common membership in an organized unit and a sense of interdependency with respect to common goals. 55 States sharing a common transnational identity tend to value their associations with each other. Stryker refers to this as “commitment,” which can vary in intensity from minimal to high. States that are highly committed to maintaining their relationships with certain types of states are more likely to be risk acceptant and accommodating to them, and as a group they are more likely to practice diffuse reciprocity. Thus, the higher the commitment, the greater the degree of cooperation. Moreover, states that hold a particular attribute to be highly important, for example, democracy, often find it beneficial to support others having the same attribute. Under these conditions states are less likely to worry about relative gains within the group than they are between their in-groups and other out-groups. This can promote trust and help to overcome collective action problems.
I therefore suggest that the more a state is committed to maintaining a particular set of interstate relationships, the higher the salience of its transnational identity relative to other identities, and the more likely it will act as a member of that social group in international affairs according to group norms. In practical terms, this means that higher levels of commitment should lead to stronger transnational identities and greater group cohesion.
Third, transnational identities can help to legitimize a particular form of state or governance structure, and, therefore, under conditions of domestic uncertainty states are more likely to act in a manner consistent with these identities. In every society there are a variety of domestic forces promoting alternative ideologies. The ruling coalition simply represents the dominant one. Transnational identities help to validate particular forms of governance or state over others by creating positive reference groups from which political actors can draw legitimacy. Reference groups help a regime or ruling coalition to justify its form of governance to its society by providing a positive standard from which domestic actors can evaluate its worthiness to rule. To the degree that the regimes can positively identify themselves with a transnational social group, they empower those domestic forces sharing that transnational identity.
This is particularly important during rapid periods of change, when social forces are in potential or actual conflict. 56 Under conditions such as these—that is, when the legitimacy of the form of state or governance is seriously challenged either domestically or internationally—states are more likely to act in a manner consistent with their transnational identity. To fail to do so could undermine their position vis-à-vis competing groups. Moreover, domestic political actors are often more concerned with protecting transnational values than those associated with the doctrine of raison d’état, for example, pan-nationalism, monarchy, or republicanism. A state that fails to reflect these values loses support and legitimacy.
Michael Barnett demonstrates, for example, that Arab governments were often highly constrained in their ability to promote a purely parochial state interest at the expense of the greater Arab nation. 57 Such behavior would undermine their legitimacy as an Arab state, thereby threatening their domestic support among the population. Internationally, a gap between a transnational identity and a state’s expected behavior could undermine its legitimacy vis-à-vis the other members of the transnational social group sharing that same identity. This could result in the exclusion of that state from the very community in which it hoped to participate. This places limits on the degree to which a state can promote a policy of raison d’état if this policy appears to violate the norms of the transnational social group.
Fourth, transnational identities are often institutionalized within international associations that help to socialize their members according to group norms. To be a member of any group is to accept the norms associated with membership. To the degree that the association is taken as a positive reference group, the participants take on the roles associated with them. The exclusive nature of these associations helps to highlight the self-other distinction that forms the basis of an identity. Conceptions of self are often linked to ideal conceptions of what one ought to be, which are linked both to group membership and an us-them distinction between social groups.
These exclusive associations help to highlight and strengthen the transnational identities they embody. Thus states become more “European” by participating in the European Union, more “Third World” by their membership in the Group of Seventy-Seven, and more “Arab” by their participation in the Arab League. To the extent that this is viewed as beneficial for the states involved, the social group grows stronger. Thus, the greater the perceived benefits of group membership, the stronger the identity, and the more likely each state will act as a member of the group.
Transnational Identities and Transnational Communities
In chapter 1 I defined a transnational political community as a collectivity of political actors organized on the basis of common values and a common good that transcends juridical borders. Such communities act with at least some degree of internal consensus in their relations with outside states. The development of transnational identities enables states to construct such communities by diminishing the conceptual and political boundaries that separate them. Under the conditions cited above transnational identities can transform egoistic conceptions of self to perceptions of commonality by creating a community of attitudes or generalized other. This does not mean that conflicts cease among members of the community. Indeed, disagreements over the proper roles and norms members are expected to assume or follow can be intense.
Moreover, other factors, principally sovereignty and anarchy, continue to exert pressures against group cohesion. What distinguishes the dynamics of transnational community from other relationships or forms of cooperation, however, is that the members generally hold a concept of a common good, not simply common interests. Transnational communities are sustained through a commitment by their members to maintaining a particular set of social relationships with each other. The type of community is determined by the type of transnational identity.
Transnational identities do not develop easily and transnational security communities are hard to construct. The polarizing effects of sovereignty and anarchy are formidable obstacles. Thus, transnational communities are most likely to form during and following periods of social upheaval, when domestic institutions are challenged, international orders are undermined, and traditional structures are eroded. During these periods contending political actors often seek new forms of legitimation, allowing, for a brief period, a redefinition of political boundaries. Sometimes state actors respond by looking inward and increase their parochialism, as was done in Germany and Italy during the interwar period. At other times political actors reevaluate their parochialism and discover new foundations for commonality, as the cases in the next three chapters demonstrate. These periods of reflection and reidentification offer the greatest possibilities for overcoming the barriers of anarchy.
The next section will closely examine three cases in which state leaders constructed cohesive security arrangements on the basis of a transnational identity. To the extent that the cases illustrate the points argued above, they offer evidence of the power of transnational identity in international relations.
Endnotes
Note 1: For a good discussion of how rules can motivate and generate behavior, see David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International Organization, vol. 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 441&-;73. Back.
Note 2: John Hewitt, Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1976), p. 109. Back.
Note 3: For an excellent comparison of the similarities and differences in these theories, see Michael Hogg, Deborah Terry, and Katherine White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology Quarterly, vol. 58., no. 4 (1995), pp. 255–69. Back.
Note 4: Social identity theory developed from an attempt to provide an alternative to the assertion that intergroup conflict is by definition characterized by some real competition for scarce resources. For a sample of this literature, see Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); John Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group (New York: Blackwell, 1987); Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams, Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Process (New York: Routledge, 1988); and Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990). Back.
Note 5: Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity,” International Organization, vol. 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 251. Back.
Note 8: Symbolic internationalism grew from the work of George Herbert Mead, although it also has roots in German idealism, Scottish moralism, and American pragmatism. It was further developed by Herbert Blumer, particularly in his Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969). See also Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday Anchor, 1959); Tamotsu Shibutani, “Reference Groups as Perspectives,” American Journal of Sociology, vol. 60, pp. 562–69; Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (Menlo Park, Cal.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1980); and Joel M. Charon, Symbolic Interactionism: An Introduction, an Interpretation, an Integration Method (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979). Back.
Note 9: Hewitt, Self and Society, p. 115. Back.
Note 10: Charon, Symbolic Interactionism, p. 24. Back.
Note 11: Stephen Krasner, for example, argues that the kinds of institutionalizing mechanisms that can work so powerfully to socialize individuals in domestic polities are not available on the international level. See his “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security, vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995), p. 149. This assumption can also be found in Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979); and Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). Back.
Note 12: Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism, p. 79; Hogg and Abrams, Social Identifications, p. 26. Back.
Note 13: Hedley Bull argues that a society of states exists in the sense that the participants are conscious of certain common interests and common values and conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and institutions in their relations with one another. See The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), especially chapters 1 and 2. Back.
Note 14: Alex Wendt makes a case for the possibility of this deeper transformation, although this would require a more fundamental change than that which will be addressed in this book. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992). Back.
Note 15: See Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37 (1993), pp. 274. Back.
Note 16: This is similar to the definition proposed by Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Nation-State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), p. 1. Back.
Note 17: There is a large literature from a variety of perspectives on the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis society. See, for example, Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” in John Hall, ed., States in History (New York: Blackwell), pp. 109–36; and Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). In international relations this position is held by, among others, Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). Back.
Note 18: See Stepan, State and Society, p. xii. Back.
Note 19: “Ruling coalition” refers not to the government but to the combination of social forces (for example, labor, business, church) that dominate the state apparatus. Back.
Note 20: Robert Gilpin conceives of the state as a coalition of coalitions whose objectives and interests result from the bargaining among the several coalitions composing the larger society and political elite. See his War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 19. Back.
Note 21: Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, p. 9. Back.
Note 22: See Michael Hogg, The Social Psychology of Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction to Social Identity (New York: New York University Press, 1992), p. 90. Back.
Note 23: Mead’s primary work dealing with issues of self and society was published from a series of lectures in George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). Back.
Note 24: Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 138–140. Back.
Note 25: As Hegel argues, “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 110, par. 175. Back.
Note 26: Hewitt, Self and Society, p. 101. Back.
Note 27: Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 135. Back.
Note 28: G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 38, section 40. Also see translator’s note, p. 320. Back.
Note 29: Alex Wendt argues, for example, that the signals exchanged during “first contacts” are crucial in helping actors to define a situation as threatening or benign. See “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” p. 405. Back.
Note 30: Mead, Mind, Self, and Society; Hewitt, Self and Society, pp. 77–82. Back.
Note 31: John Hewitt refers to this as “typification.” See his Self and Society, pp. 122–24. See also Alfred Schultz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 11–122. Back.
Note 32: Shibutani, “Reference Groups as Perspectives, pp. 562–69. Back.
Note 33: Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 263. Back.
Note 34: See, for example, Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1990), pp. 150–54. Back.
Note 35: There is a large literature examining how these boundaries are constructed. For a sample of the various approaches, see Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); and John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Back.
Note 36: T. A. Elliot, Us and Them: A Study in Group Consciousness (Aberdean: Aberdean University Press, 1986). Back.
Note 37: See Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (London: Methuen, 1977). Back.
Note 38: See E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chapter 1. Back.
Note 39: See David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), chapter 4. Back.
Note 40: Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins’s study on colonialism clearly demonstrates the importance of the civilized-uncivilized distinction in legitimizing imperial practices. See “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 70. Back.
Note 41: Hogg and Abrams, Social Identifications, p. 25. Back.
Note 42: Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism, p. 61. Back.
Note 43: A social group is defined as two or more actors who share a common identification and perceive themselves to be members of the same social category. See John Turner, “Toward a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group,” in Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 15. Back.
Note 44: This is the basic theme of the “democratic peace” literature. See chapter 1, note 31. Back.
Note 45: For an excellent analysis of negative interdependence, see Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945). Back.
Note 46: Jonathan Turner, Michael Hogg, P. Oakes, S. Reichter, and M. Wetherell, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (New York: Blackwell, 1987. Back.
Note 47: For an extended discussion of the link between process and identity, see Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.” Back.
Note 48: As Robert Jervis points out, the shared experience of fighting a winning war produces significant ties between allies. These allies form the core of the concert system. See his “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 60–61. Back.
Note 49: Mead, Mind, Self and Society, pp. 155–58. Back.
Note 50: See Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 117. Back.
Note 51: Hewitt, Self and Society, p. 101. Back.
Note 52: Kal Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 14 (1970), pp. 245–46. Back.
Note 53: Anne-Marie Burley argues, for example, that liberal states tend to hold each other to a different standard than that for nonliberal regimes. Thus, for states to enter the club of liberal nations, they are expected to follow certain norms in choosing their governments and in their foreign relations. See her “Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine,” in Columbia Law Review, vol. 92, no. 8 (December 1992), p. 1913. Back.
Note 54: See Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, pp. 118–19; and Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism, p. 73. Back.
Note 55: Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism, p. 68. Back.
Note 56: Jack Snyder argues, for example, that European institutions help to facilitate democratization in Eastern Europe by providing such a standard. See his “Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,” International Security, vol. 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5–41. Back.
Note 57: Michael Barnett, “Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System,” International Organization, vol. 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 479–510. Back.
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