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Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bruce Cronin
1998
1. The Concept of Transnational Communities
In a world of independent sovereign states it is often difficult to conceive of a community beyond the protective walls of national borders. Indeed, in the field of international relations the term community rarely appears either as a theoretical concept or descriptive phrase. 1 For most of the literature, the lack of a central authority and common world culture precludes the formation of transnational communities. As a result, the only alternative to the extremes of perpetual war and world government is cooperation, defined in terms of mutual adjustment of policies in the pursuit of well-defined but limited goals. 2 Realists tend to focus on alliances as the primary form of cooperation, while institutionalists examine regimes and other types of institutions. Neither, however, sees a foundation for cohesive communities among sovereign states. States can have shared interests, but not shared identities.
This book seeks to build such a foundation. It explains how political elites construct transnational communities by developing common social identities. These identities are the fundamental building blocks of the community. My primary focus in this regard are the types of security arrangements states create that are based on principles of group cohesion. These include concert systems, pluralistic security communities, amalgamated security communities, common security associations, and collective security systems. In developing this theme the book illustrates how states distinguish friends from enemies, partners from competitors, and communities from outsiders, beyond political expediency.
My claim is the following: transnational political communities form when a set of political actors sharing a common social characteristic, a common relationship, a common experience, and a positive interdependence develop a political consciousness that defines them as a unique group. This is facilitated by the creation of conceptual distinctions between a notion of self and other, for example, East-West, democratic-autocratic, great power—secondary power, Old World—New World. The type of transnational identity (the independent variable) determines the type of cohesive security arrangement (the dependent variable). Thus, for example, a common identity among great powers will lead to a concert system. None of this requires the formation of a world government or a transformation of the anarchic environment. In making this argument I do not deny the powerful polarizing effects of anarchy and sovereignty, but rather I examine the conditions under which these effects can be overcome. In doing so I draw on recent advances in social theory, particularly constructivist approaches in international relations, symbolic interactionist sociology, and social identity theory.
I begin with the premise that communities require some degree of group cohesion and a shared sense of self. However, they do not require a formal centralized political authority to maintain them. They can be tightly knit (for example, tribal societies) or loosely constructed (for example, professional associations). They can consist of individuals or corporate entities. I define community as a collectivity of political actors organized on the basis of a common good and a shared sense of self, giving its members a positive stake in building and maintaining internal relationships. 3 The notion of a common good and shared sense of self distinguishes community from other forms of association. Political communities are those that are concerned with the allocation of values or resources. The types of communities with which I am concerned are those that are voluntarily constructed by state elites based on a recognition that they share a special relationship to the other members. This constructivist notion stands in contrast to the communitarian concept, which views community as something organic, which one is born into and grows within. 4 My use of community, on the other hand, requires a political consciousness. Therefore, my definition is somewhat analogous to Rousseau’s general will, which is volunteerist but presupposes a group awareness of a common good. 5
A transnational community is one that transcends juridical borders. It can be formed between societal actors (such as a workers’ international or international Catholicism) or between states (represented by their respective ruling coalitions). In this book I am primarily interested in the latter. I prefer the term transnational to international because this shifts the emphasis away from individually based bilateral relationships between states toward group dynamics. 6 The concept of international suggests a relationship between two or more distinct independent entities, while the idea of transnational implies transcending traditional boundaries. In this sense a transnational community has an existence that is independent of the states that comprise it.
This book examines the social foundations of transnational communities by focusing on the key element in their formation: the development of common identities shared by the member states. Such transnational identities transcend the barriers that separate sovereign states. According to a standard dictionary definition, identities are sets of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a member of a group. 7 In chapter 2 I will expand this definition to incorporate sociological concepts. Social identities are those parts of the self-concept that are derived from the social categories with which one is associated (for example, American or professor). Transnational identities are social identities that transcend juridical borders (for example, great power or European state).
Structural theories tend to minimize the importance of identity as an explanatory variable because the anarchic environment does not permit any major variation in state behavior. The system conditions the form of interaction that occurs between states, but interaction cannot change the structure of the system. Thus, for analytical purposes, a state is a state and only the strategic environment varies. 8 As a result, neorealism’s emphasis on security and survival reduces all states to their primal characteristics. Yet as E. H. Carr observes, consistent realism excludes four elements that are essential to all political thinking: a finite goal (beyond self-preservation), an emotional appeal, a right of moral judgment, and a ground for action. 9 By offering an understanding of self in relation to others, identities can address these basic existential issues and, further, provide grounds for purposive or meaningful action.
To the extent that identities are viewed as exclusive, they are unit-level attributes and can explain state parochialism better than they can transnational community. However, while the principle of sovereignty creates political and psychological boundaries that separate one society from another, sovereignty does not mean social autonomy. States continually interact with, influence, and occasionally emulate each other. Often this process serves to highlight and strengthen the boundaries that divide them, however, it can also diminish them. In developing a theory of transnational identity in chapter 2, I will examine the conditions under which transnational identities can transform a parochial definition of self and interest to one based on membership in a conceptual social group. These groups form the basis of transnational communities and provide the theoretical foundation for variation in security arrangements under anarchy.
Anarchy and the Barriers to Community
Traditionally, the menu for choice of international security arrangements has been limited. Most of the security literature proceeds from the assumption that the lack of a central authority in the international environment breeds insecurity, mistrust, and fear. For both realists and neorealists, in particular, states are predisposed toward self-help and parochialism and resist efforts to become entangled in any relationship that significantly limits their freedom of action. From this perspective there can be only three possible security arrangements: a perpetual war of all against all (an international state of nature), a balance of power system, and a world government or empire. Since the latter would require a transformation of the anarchical environment, this possibility can be eliminated so long as independent sovereign states exist.
This leaves us with perpetual war and a balance of power. For neorealism, the former can also be eliminated because the logic of the latter (as well as the frequent introduction of hegemony into the system) provides a measure of stability and order. Rational states wishing to survive form alliances to enhance their capabilities through combination with others. This reduces incentives to initiate war since the prospects for victory are uncertain. As a result, we are left only with a balance of power system, which Waltz argues exists in any anarchic order whether it be comprised of nation-states, city-states, or even street gangs. 10 In such a system the distribution of material capabilities is the key variable for understanding and explaining diplomatic history. It tells us whether the system will be bipolar or multipolar, which states will dominate, and whose interests will be served in the international order.
In such an environment there is no basis upon which to build communities among states, since strategic calculation makes all other states both potential allies and potential adversaries. The segmentation of the world into independent nation-states creates a situation whereby each unit not only determines its own interests autonomously but also must provide its own means to pursue them. 11 Sovereignty places a wall between one’s society and all others. For these reasons, neorealist theories argue that deep structure (anarchy) generates observable patterns of behavior in the system that are limited to balancing, competition, and egoism. Thus neorealists posit an ongoing struggle for power and wealth as a “law” of international politics in an environment of unregulated competition. 12
How, then, can one speak of community in international politics? The simple answer is, we cannot so long as we accept this model of the international environment. The crucial task is to demonstrate that deep structure is a powerful but not determining factor in influencing state behavior. Institutionalists do so by arguing that anarchy places strong but not insurmountable restrictions on cooperation. For institutionalists, states can create functional institutions to achieve mutual gains without a prior transformation of the anarchic environment. In particular, regime theories show how a convergence of self-interest between states can facilitate cooperation in defined issue areas, when independent action would result in pareto-inferior outcomes. 13 Moreover, they demonstrate how institutions can help to overcome collective action problems, uncertainty, and mistrust, all key barriers to cooperation posited by realists. Most important, institutionalists argue that an anarchic environment is not necessarily zero-sum and there are therefore opportunities for mutual gain. This can lead to a variety of patterns of interactions between states. 14
While this can explain cooperation in international politics, it cannot in and of itself account for the formation of transnational communities, primarily because these theories do not posit any circumstances under which its regimes and institutions can transform the social environment through which states interact. Interaction is generally presented as a dichotomous variable, cooperation or conflict, rather than as a continuum that could enable us to differentiate between forms of cooperation. Building an alliance and engaging in multilateral security management are both forms of cooperation. However, they produce very different types of security arrangements. Shared interests are necessary but not sufficient elements for building transnational communities. Without a corresponding shared sense of being, that is, a social identity, relationships remain ad hoc and opportunistic. While regimes can facilitate trust and encourage reciprocity, they do not create a sense of group cohesion, another necessary element in any type of community. Thus regime theory cannot tell us the conditions under which a balance of power system could be transformed into a more cohesive security arrangement, such as a collective security system or a concert of great powers.
To understand the various forms of cooperation that can develop within the anarchic environment, we need to shift our focus away from structural variables toward an examination of interstate relationships. The structure of relationships provides a social arrangement of the units that is based not on material capabilities but on conceptions of self. For this line of argument, the constructivist critique is most helpful. Constructivists argue that Waltz’s definition of structure cannot predict the content or dynamics of anarchy; different forms of unit interaction can produce different types of systems. This is based on the premise that the dynamics of international politics is neither natural nor given by deep structure, but rather is socially constructed by political actors through their interactions and relationships. 15 Thus, the condition of anarchy allows for a wide variety of behaviors that are determined not by the imperatives of structure but by the way in which political actors perceive their situations and their social environment. Constructivism, then, offers an intersubjective element as well as a redefinition of structure. 16
In an influential critique of Waltz Alexander Wendt argues that one cannot derive self-help or balancing behavior from the principle of anarchy alone. He holds that without prior assumptions about the structure of identities in the system Waltz’s materialist definition of structure is indeterminate of behavior. 17 He brings the interaction of the units back into the systems model by demonstrating that state actors and systemic structures are mutually constitutive. If self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy, he argues that it must emerge causally from processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role. 18 Therefore, international anarchy does not constitute a single form with relatively fixed features but rather is a condition within which many variations can be arranged. 19 This allows for the formation of transnational communities without a prior transformation of the anarchical environment.
Constructing Security Arrangements
Building from these premises, I posit at least seven possible types of security arrangements that can develop within an anarchic system of states: an international state of nature, a balance of power system, a pluralistic security community, a collective security system, a concert system, a common security association, and an amalgamated security community. The latter five constitute types of transnational political communities. These different types of arrangements can be identified by three primary characteristics, which serve to distinguish one from the others: their constitutive rules, patterns of behavior, and types of institutions governing them.
Constitutive rules are the grammar of action that creates or defines new forms of behavior by providing a “vocabulary” (a stock of meaningful actions or symbols) for international communication. 20 As such they make action meaningful and intelligible to the political actors. While material resources such as military power, tradable goods, and technology provide the capability for political and social action, rules and norms provide the framework of meaning through which use of that capability becomes recognizable as purposive policy. This enables political actors to build social relationships with each other and, moreover, to determine which ones will be adversarial and which will be cooperative.
From the rules that constitute and define the system, states create regulative rules that provide a standard from which they can generate expectations, evaluate the behavior of others, and determine the legitimate range of actions that may be undertaken. The patterns of behavior associated with these processes are derived from these rules. To the extent that we can associate certain types of behavior with certain kinds of security arrangements, behavior is a variable. The regularity of behavior and the constitutive rules that underlie the system leads to the development of specific types of institutions. 21 The types of institutions that help to maintain and reproduce the system can also be associated with specific arrangements.
I argue that the type or lack of identities that states develop within a system determines the type of security arrangements they construct. Chapter 2 will build a model that supports this argument. For the moment, this is offered as a hypothesis.
A total lack of any common identity (even as states) will produce an international state of nature. This form by definition has no constitutive rules and as such lacks any social or political institutions. The distribution of territory among competing authorities is arbitrary and unstable, a function of power and opportunity, and there is no mutual recognition of borders. Thus, it does not even meet the minimal conditions that would allow for the development of a balance of power system. This is a pure self-help environment. This condition has never existed in the modern world despite the lack of a central authority at the global level, although the environment in Europe during the early Middle Ages loosely approximated this. 22
A common statist identity in the absence of any other commonalities will produce a balance of power system. Such a system is premised on the notion that the survival of state independence requires that no single state predominate. The constitutive rule of the system is the principle of sovereignty, defined in terms of constitutional independence. 23 This provides for a set of stable expectations concerning the distribution of territory and institutional authorities. While Waltz and other realists require only a survival instinct among a plurality of states to maintain a balance of power, without the constitutive principle of sovereignty there can be no concept of statehood, since internationally recognized borders would be absent. Thus it would be difficult to know when a violation has occurred that would spark a balancing alliance.
Balancing and bandwagoning are the primary forms of behavior, and alliances are the main institution for maintaining the system. While a balance of power is in many ways a self-help system, the need to rely on allies for survival also creates a level of security interdependence among the states. Although it is not based on any principle of group cohesion, this system does require an intersubjective agreement concerning the nature of the units (states, as opposed to other types of political actors). Without these prior assumptions, it would be difficult if not impossible to know against whom one is to balance and with whom one is to ally. Moreover, since it is in the interest of all states to support the institution of sovereign statehood against competing authorities, there is a common “statist” identity based on mutual recognition of the units. The survival of one’s state requires the survival of the state system and the principle of sovereignty.
A balance of power system and an international state of nature are both examples of competitive self-help security arrangements. As such, they are individualist in both foundation and practice. While there is a vast literature on balance of power systems, far less has been written about what I term community-based security arrangements. This book will deal with three of them: concert systems, common security associations, and amalgamated security communities.
Concerts are multilateral institutions for high-level diplomatic collaboration between the great powers. 24 In a concert system the mutually recognized great powers combine to collectively manage security affairs within a given region. Issues of systemic importance, even those of vital interest to a particular member, are expected to be collectively discussed. Any action taken must be either approved or initiated by the group. 25 Because this requires such a high level of commitment, sacrifice, and trust, the great powers need to develop a relationship that goes beyond cooperation on the basis of mutual self-interest. There must be some concept of a common (that is, group) good. I therefore argue that concert systems require a transnational great power identity based on a mutual recognition that the members constitute a unique and exclusive group with special rights and responsibilities for systems management.
Another type of community-based security arrangement is what I call a common security association. 26 Unlike alliances, they are not formed to enhance state capabilities through combination with others in opposition to a specific adversary. Rather, their purpose is to express solidarity among states seeking to promote and legitimize a specific form of political organization or ideology. Within a common security association security is defined in terms of protecting a particular institution such as monarchy, communism, or democracy. Such an arrangement is premised on the idea that national security requires the survival not only of one’s own state but of domestic institutions in other states that help to support and legitimize one’s own regime. This means banding together against those who would challenge it, particularly transnational revolutionary movements.
The transnational identity that underlies this bond is based on a shared regime type or ideology. This type of arrangement differs from a collective security system in two important ways. First, it is by definition exclusive; only those states promoting the same domestic political institutions or regime are part of the system. Second, its purpose is not to prevent all forms of aggression but only threats to particular institutions. There are many examples of these types of associations: the Nonaligned Movement, the Arab League, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Holy Alliance, and the Communist International.
A third type of arrangement is an amalgamated security community (ASC), characterized by the formal merger of at least two states’ administrative, security, and political institutions. In such an arrangement states voluntarily cede their sovereignty to create a new political entity, usually centered around a state that acts as the core. For states to achieve this unusual level of cohesion, there must be a type of shared pan-nationalist identity (either civic or ethnically based). The constitutive rule of such an arrangement is “collectivity as singularity.” That is, the collectivity of units acts as a coherent single unit. The pattern of behavior is political integration and the primary institution is a federal government.
This idea of an ASC was first suggested by Karl Deutsch and his associates as a way of understanding the integration of distinct political communities into a single state. 27 However, while their study was informative, they failed to specify a coherent set of variables that would led to the formation of such a community. For example, they concluded that there were twelve conditions (nine “essential” and three that “may be essential”) to account for integration. These conditions varied from “a distinctive way of life” to “unbroken links of social communication.” 28 What their study lacked was a theory that informed their work and that could connect these random variables. By conceptualizing ASCs as cohesive security arrangements based on a common transnational identity, we can place them in a broader context that would allow for a more coherent set of variables.
ASCs differ somewhat from our conventional notion of security arrangements. Unlike concerts or alliances, for example, amalgamated security communities are not designed to deal with threats as they have been traditionally understood (that is, threats to a country’s territorial integrity or sovereignty). However, to the extent that states are the primary institutions that provide security for their societies, the integration of autonomous units under a common political authority represents a distinct form of security arrangement. They are conceptually similar to other types of security mechanisms in the sense that states construct them to protect their populations, institutions, and values. Moreover, they represent a clear choice on the part of the major political actors to promote their security as a single unit rather than through alliance or cooperation with others.
In addition to these three arrangements, there are two other possible community-based systems:
A pluralistic security community (PSC) forms when states within an integrated geographic or cognitive area develop a regional identity in which they view their security as linked with that of the region as a whole. Within a PSC states hold stable expectations of peaceful change, facilitated by shared norms, values, and political institutions as well as a high degree of interdependence. 29 Within the region political actors identify and expect their security and welfare to be intimately intertwined with those on the same side of the spatial and cognitive borders. The constitutive rule of PSCs is the peaceful settlement of disputes and peaceful change when required. The patterns of behavior include demilitarization of state armed forces and cooperation in all security matters. The primary institutions facilitating cooperation are regional organizations. The two best examples of this type of arrangement can be found in the North American and European regions after World War II.
A collective security system forms when all states within a given system share a cosmopolitan identity that identifies them as members of a single community of nations. Within such a system states not only renounce their right to initiate unilateral military action but also accept obligations to participate in collective action against an aggressor regardless of who it may be. 30 The system is based on the following principles: no grievance warrants resort to force to overturn the status quo, military force is legitimate only to resist attack, and all states have a legal and moral obligation to consider an attack on any nation as an attack upon themselves. The primary constitutive rule is the indivisibility of peace. The defining form of behavior is collective action, and international law and organizations are the primary institutional forms. Unlike a concert system (which only includes great powers) or a pluralistic security community (which is limited to those within a specified region), collective security is nonexclusionary. It requires a very high level of commitment that goes beyond any type of parochial, ethnic, regional, or ideological affinities one may have with others.
The seven models of security arrangements can be compared as follows:
| Security System | Common Identity | Constitutive Rules | Patterns of Behavior | Primary Institutions |
| International State of Nature | None | None | War of all against all | None |
| Balance of Power System | Statism | Sovereignty and Independence | Balancing and Bandwagoning |
Alliances |
| Concert System | Great Power | Multilateral Security Management | Consultation/Joint Action | Congresses/Summits |
| Pluralistic Security Community | Cognitive Regionalism | Peaceful settlements of disputes | Demilitarization and cooperation | Regional organizations and regimes |
| Common Security System | Institutional or ideological | Solidarity | Mutual Support | Transnational Association |
| Amalgamated Security Community | Pan-Nationalism | Collectivity as Singularity |
Political Integration | Federal Government |
| Federal Government Collective Security System | Cosmopolitan | Peace is indivisible | Collective action | International law and organizations |
Organization of the Book
This model places community-based security arrangements within a broader context of possible security systems. How and why cohesive security arrangements evolve during a particular period of history is the focus of this book. Since states can usually promote their strictly parochial interests through self-help policies and alliance-building practices, accounting for other security mechanisms requires a concept of utility that transcends the boundaries of individual units. Chapter 2 develops such a concept based on theories of social identity. The chapter discusses how, why, and under what conditions social identities can form and how this helps to facilitate transnational relations among political actors. It argues that preferences are shaped by identities, that political actors can become very attached to these identities, and that the development of group (transnational) identities can produce much deeper security cooperation than one would expect from either a neorealist or neoliberal perspective.
At the same time, if identity is going to be a meaningful explanatory variable, it must truly be allowed to vary. Thus, chapter 2 also examines how different types of identities can lead to different types of relationships. In doing so, it lays the foundation for the theme of the book, that the types of transnational identities determine the types of security systems that develop.
In a practical sense none of this matters if cohesive security arrangements only form among states that are already predisposed toward close collaboration. One does not need a theory of identity to explain why historic allies sharing common interests deepen their security ties in the face of a perceived threat. For this reason, the case studies in part 2 involve states with no previous history of group cohesion. Chapter 3 examines the rise of a great power concert (the Concert of Europe) and a common security association (the Holy Alliance) after 1815 under conditions that strongly favored the development of a balance of power system. Two powerful states, Britain and Russia, emerged from the Napoleonic wars as potential adversaries and competitors for European hegemony. The other great powers—Austria, France, and Prussia—were also traditional rivals with conflicting territorial ambitions.
None of the states in Europe were democracies in any substantive sense, therefore we can eliminate the “democratic peace” thesis as an explanation for group cohesion. 31 Moreover, since the long peace that existed among the great powers during this period lacked the two conditions commonly cited to explain this phenomenon during the cold war, bipolarity and nuclear weapons, we can eliminate these variables as well.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the rise of two amalgamated security communities among traditionally hostile and competitive states. Chapter 4 analyzes the integration of the Italian peninsula, a region that was historically governed by a classic balance of power system comprised of states lacking a common language or common culture. Chapter 5 investigates the integration of central Europe under a German federation. Like the Italian peninsula, this region had no history of close collaboration or affinity. Quite the contrary, for centuries the principalities jealously guarded their sovereignty and resisted attempts to create a German Reich.
In all three cases the development of new identities was facilitated by changes in the social structure of Europe, brought about by the French revolution and the revolutions of 1848. The cases will show that it was changing conceptions of legitimate statehood rather than a changing distribution of capabilities that most influenced the course of European history in the nineteenth century.
Methodology, Definitions, and Potential Pitfalls
Making empirical arguments about identity is, in the words of one of my reviewers, always difficult and methodologically treacherous. Social identity is an intersubjective concept that is manifested in group consciousness, rather than a material entity that can be measured by quantitative standards. It is therefore not easy to “prove” that a particular actor shares a common social identity with others. Moreover, unlike material-based variables, intersubjective ones are essentially constitutive rather than causal. 32 That is, they do not cause behavior but rather influence action by helping to define social situations and the quality of the actors with whom individuals come into contact. 33 This makes it difficult to draw a direct link between the identity of the actors and their political preferences. It is doubly difficult when dealing with historical cases, since we cannot conduct interviews or make outcome-blind predictions that would later confirm or refute the existence of a particular identity. Finally, there is the problem of measurement: how strong does an identity have to be to produce a change in attitude and behavior?
Recognizing these potential problems, we must rely on systematic observation and interpretation. Generally there are at least two ways to determine in a given case whether a group identity exists and whether this identity affects subsequent political choices. First, one can examine the nature of discourse that characterizes the interactions among specified political actors. The surest sign that a society or group has adopted a new concept or understanding is the development of a new vocabulary in terms of which the concept can then be publicly articulated. 34 Specifically, do the actors speak of themselves in terms of being part of a social group? How do they characterize others with whom they interact, both positively and negatively? Do they appear to make conceptual distinctions between groups, that is, do they speak of a special bond among specified actors? In short, the researcher looks for consistent patterns in the way the given actors define themselves, their situations, and their interaction partners.
Using the scale described below, we ask whether the content of the discourse is consistent with symbiosis, hostility, or any of the identities in between. This requires an analysis of internal memoranda, published historical accounts, diplomatic exchanges, public statements, treaties, and memoirs in order to reconstruct how the relevant actors perceived themselves, their situations, and their relationships vis-à-vis other actors.
Some writers argue that discourses and ideas are a mask covering up deeper material interests. 35 While this may be true in some or even many cases, it does not refute the use of discourse analysis as an indication of attitude and belief. Discourses that are conducted in terms of a social group identity are an explicit acknowledgment of that group’s existence and, more important, constitute a recognition that the actor wishes to be identified with the group. That the actor is doing so to gain some material benefit presupposes that he or she sees a connection between group interest and individual interest. At an rate, assuming that an actor’s words reflect her or his true intentions is no more presumptuous than divining what her true “deeper interests” really are. 36
A second method for determining the existence and constitutive power of a given social identity is through an analysis and interpretation of individual and group behavior. Specifically, the researcher seeks to determine if the specified actors behave in a manner consistent with their identities in circumstances where they would otherwise not be expected to do so. This approach raises the problem of causation mentioned above. How can we know that a particular action or behavior is the result of one’s identity rather than some other variable? This is a difficult issue, even in the sociological literature.
One way of attacking this problem is to stipulate in advance what actions one should expect an actor to take absent a group identity, given a set of material conditions (for example, the distribution of power, economic status, or strategic environment). If they depart from this expected behavior, the researcher tries to determine if their observed action is consistent with what one should expect a member of that social group to take. In this context the following four elements will count as evidence for a group identity and a group consciousness: first, if the specified actors from different states act as partners rather than adversaries or competitors in their deliberations and interactions; second, if there is a clear concept of a group interest or common good among the participants; third, if the state officials approach the question of European reconstruction at least partially from a discernible European and great power perspective (in the case of chapter 3) and if they approach the strategic questions from discernible Italian and German perspectives (in chapters 4 and 5, respectively). Finally, if this influenced the process and outcome of the deliberations, it will count as evidence for the constitutive power of transnational identity.
The measurement question can be dealt with by treating identity as a continuum from negative to positive (see figure 1.1), ranging from conceiving the other as the social or cultural opposite of the self to viewing the other as an extension of self. 37 Building from this premise, a pure-positive social identity can be defined as symbiosis, a relationship in which the actors view each other as extensions of themselves. A highly positive but less intense identification can be defined as altruism, where the actors retain their individuality but are so closely identified with another that they are willing to make sacrifices on their behalf. The next level on the continuum is cohesion, a situation in which actors recognize a common good among themselves and view themselves as part of a conceptual group. The middle level is indifference; the actors are not important enough to each other to have any positive or negative evaluations.
Figure 1.1: Measurement of Identity
A moderate form of negativity is rivalry; others are seen as competitors and objects for the fulfillment of self-interest. The most intense negative identification is hostility, a situation where the actors hold a mutual antagonism to the point of seeing each other as the “antiself” or enemy.
The following pages will examine how different forms of identification help to determine the level of cooperation. To better understand this process, we turn to social identity theory and symbolic interaction sociology.
Endnotes
Note 1: An important exception is Emanual Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Back.
Note 2: See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially pp. 51&-;57. Back.
Note 3: See Robert MacIver, On Community, Society, and Power: Selected Writings, ed. Leon Bramson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). Back.
Note 4: Ferdinand Tönnies, for example, holds that communities are tied to a form of kinship and cannot be self-consciously built or instituted. See his Community and Society (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), trans. and ed. Charles P. Loomis (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). Back.
Note 5: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950). Back.
Note 6: The common use of the concept transnational in the literature has been to describe relations among political actors other than states, for example nongovernmental organizations, social movements, and bureaucratic agencies from different governments. There is no reason, however, why state officials cannot also conceive of themselves and their societies as belonging to a broader community beyond their juridical borders. For a sample of recent literature on transnationalism as nongovernmentalism, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Kathryn Sikkink, “Human Rights, Principled Issue Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization, vol. 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 411–42). See also Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and James Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs (London: Frances Pinter, 1980). Back.
Note 7: See The American Heritage Dictionary, 2d. college ed. (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1985), p. 639. Back.
Note 8: Waltz argues that “to the extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behavior and the outcomes of their behavior become predictable... (therefore) systems theories explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges.” Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 72. Back.
Note 9: E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964 ‘1939’), p. 89. Back.
Note 10: See Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 21–37. Back.
Note 11: Robert Art and Robert Jervis, “The Meaning of Anarchy,” in Robert Art and Robert Jervis, eds., International Politics: Anarchy, Force, Political Economy and Decision Making (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), p. 3. Back.
Note 12: See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 7. Back.
Note 13: Keohane, After Hegemony. Stephen Krasner defines an international regime as a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 1. Back.
Note 14: Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, no. 38 (October 1985), pp. 226–54. Back.
Note 15: This line of argument was refined and popularized in international relations by Alexander Wendt in “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992). For an excellent analysis of the origins and development of constructist research programs, see John Ruggie, “Introduction: What Makes the World Hang Together?” in his Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 1998). For a sample of other constructivist literature, see Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, vol. 88 (June 1994); Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); and Martha Finnemore, The National Interest in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 16: Intersubjectivity refers to the shared symbolic meanings that actors assign to particular situations. Unlike objective definitions—which are exogenously given—or subjective ones—which are endogenously developed by individual actors—intersubjective meanings are perceptions that are shared by at least two actors. They are developed in the process of communication and interaction. I discuss this process in greater detail in chapter 2. Back.
Note 17: Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It.” Back.
Note 19: Barry Buzan makes a similar point in Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), section 1. Back.
Note 20: David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” International Organization, vol. 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 455–56. Back.
Note 21: Robert Keohane defines institutions as both a general pattern or categorization of activity and a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized. He also argues that specific institutions can be defined in terms of their rules, although he is referring to regulative, rather than constitutive, rules. Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in his International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 162–63. Back.
Note 22: See Joseph R. Strayer and Dana C. Munro, The Middle Ages, 395–1500 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970). Back.
Note 23: The definition of sovereignty as constitutional independence is from Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986). Back.
Note 24: See Benjamin Miller, “Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts,” Review of International Studies, vol. 20, no. 4 (October 1994), p. 329. Back.
Note 25: Two of the best works on the concert as a system are Richard Elrod, “The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System,” World Politics, vol. 28 (January 1976); and Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study in International Security Cooperation,” in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). Back.
Note 26: I use the term common to distinguish them from collective security systems. Back.
Note 27: See Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Back.
Note 29: This definition is loosely adapted from Deutsch et al., who coined the term and conceptualized this type of security arrangement. See their Political Community in the North Atlantic Area. For recent work on this topic, see Adler and Barnett, Security Communities. Back.
Note 30: There is a vast literature on collective security and its institutions. The classic works include Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), chapters 11 and 12; Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), chapter 19; Kenneth Thompson, “Collective Security Reexamined, American Political Science Review, vol. 47, no. 3 (September 1953); Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares (New York: Random House, 1971), chapter 12; and Roland Stromberg, “The Idea of Collective Security,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1956). For more recent treatments, see Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,” International Security, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), p. 155; and Richard K. Betts, “Systems of Peace or Causes of War?” International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992). Other recent articles include John Mueller, “A New Concert of Europe?” Foreign Policy, vol. 77 (Winter 1988–1990); James E. Goodby, “A New European Concert,” Arms Control Today vol. 21, no. 1 (January/February 1991); and Gregory Flynn and David Scheffer, “Limited Collective Security,” Foreign Policy, vol. 80 (Fall 1990). Back.
Note 31: There is a vast literature on the relationship between democracy and peace, dating back to the work of Immanual Kant. Some of the recent work takes this a step further by arguing that democratic states share a unique relationship among themselves that can be loosely viewed as a community. See, for example, Anne Marie Slaughter, “Toward an Age of Liberal Nations,” Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 33, no. 2 (Spring 1992), and “Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine,” Columbia Law Review, vol. 92, no. 8 (December 1992). For a good articulation of the democratic peace thesis, see the articles by Doyle, Russett, and Owen in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993). Back.
Note 32: Constitutive variables create and revise the actors or interests which agent-oriented approaches take for granted. See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). Back.
Note 33: For a similar argument on the constitutive nature of norms, see Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art or an Art of the State?” International Organization, vol. 40 (August 1986), pp. 753–75. Back.
Note 34: See Quentin Skinner, The Foundation of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 352. Back.
Note 35: See, for example, Stephen Krasner, “Westphalia and All That,” in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institution, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Marcus Fischer, “Feudal Europe, 800–1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 427–66. Back.
Note 36: For an excellent challenge to the assumption-of-interests approach, see Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 37: Alexander Wendt makes a similar suggestion in “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics,” in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder: Rienner, 1996), p. 52. Back.
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