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Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War
Campbell Craig
1998
8.Berlin Looms Again, January–July 1961
John F. Kennedy took over the White House from Eisenhower on January 20, 1961. Traditional studies of his administration’s ensuing military policy have tended to focus on the urgent efforts of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and several defense intellectuals on his staff to reinvigorate an American national security policy left stagnant and dangerous by their predecessors. Agreed that their task was to move away from Eisenhower’s static policy of massive retaliation, these leaders devised and implemented a dynamic new policy, flexible response, which brought the concept of limited war back to White House decisionmaking and U.S. military operational planning. 1
To their dismay, Kennedy and his advisers were unable to implement the new policy until 1962. 2 This was because the likelihood of an imminent crisis over Berlin forced them to focus on immediate planning, and on the prospect of a war in Europe to be fought with the weapons and strategies left to them by Dwight D. Eisenhower. From January to June Kennedy and his advisers engaged in a messy struggle to develop a policy on Berlin. Khrushchev’s ultimatum in June, and then his decision to build a wall around West Berlin in August, however, forced them to make decisions before they were ready. From August through October, especially, Kennedy’s civilian and military advisers struggled over the question of limited war with an intensity that made the battles between Dulles and Eisenhower seem mild. But the latter’s strategy would prevail.
Disorganization for the Inevitable Crisis
Due to circumstances largely beyond his control, Kennedy walked into an exceedingly difficult situation on Berlin. Eisenhower’s decisions to avoid military confrontation over Berlin but then to eschew further negotiations with Khrushchev had left everything up in the air. The city remained in limbo, divided into World War II occupation sectors that even Eisenhower had admitted were "abnormal." 3 Moreover, Berlin lay in the middle of a nation, East Germany, which the West had refused to recognize formally, even as informal contacts increased. And the glamour of working-class progress had begun to wear thin among many educated East Germans, many of whom were so shaken by the conflict in 1959 that they crossed into West Berlin and asked for asylum. Seeing the cream of his country flee to the West, and resenting also the demeaning task of providing Western access across East German territory into West Berlin, the East German leader Walter Ulbricht was insisting in 1961 that Khrushchev put an end to the capitalist enclave. 4
Because Eisenhower had managed the 1959 crisis by executing war-avoiding maneuvers rather than articulating and adhering to a common Western diplomatic position, Kennedy inherited no solid consensus among the United States and its major allies. As we have seen, the British opposed taking a rigid position on Western "rights" in Berlin and were willing to risk war only in the event of a communist attack on the outpost; indeed, it is doubtful whether they would have been willing to launch major war to prevent an East German absorption of West Berlin. Adenauer’s government regarded Berlin as a symbol of Western, and particularly American commitment, but by 1961 he was more concerned with the question of whether NATO would defend West Germany with nuclear weapons. 5 Naturally, Willy Brandt, the mayor of West Berlin and Adenauer’s opponent in the fall elections, put forth a harder line on Berlin. The French President, Charles de Gaulle, wanted to see the Americans stick to a tough position. De Gaulle was not overly concerned with the fate of West Berliners or the propagandistic value of the capitalist island; rather, Berlin was for him a test to see if the United States was really ready to initiate world war to save Western Europe. An aggressive American position on Berlin, and especially a clear willingness to defend it with nuclear war, could allay his fears. A weak stance, on the other hand, could make de Gaulle more determined to develop an independent nuclear force for France. 6
Eisenhower’s stubborn diplomacy during the last year of his presidency had alienated Nikita Khrushchev, and this was another problem Kennedy had to face. The Soviet leader had been heartened by Eisenhower’s forbearance during the Berlin crisis and the friendly summit in September 1959, which was why Khrushchev decided in early 1960 to press for further accords with the West. 7 Détente could free up resources for nonmilitary production and aid to third-world leftists, and it would lessen the possibility of nuclear war. Tolerating a Western outpost in Berlin was reasonable payment for these objectives, and that was the deal Khrushchev thought he arranged and was ready to formalize at the Paris Summit in May, 1960.
Khrushchev regarded the U&-;2 flight on the eve of the Summit to be an abrogation of this deal, not so much because he was outraged by the flight per se but because it made him appear—as Eisenhower must have known it would—a fool in the eyes of Soviet militarists opposed to détente with the Americans. 8 His retribution would be to destroy the Paris Summit and revive the Berlin Crisis after Eisenhower had left office. This was no shock to the new administration: Llewellyn Thompson, whom Kennedy chose to keep on as ambassador to Moscow, was one of several advisers to note that a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin was nigh; Georgi Bolshakov, a KGB agent and representative of Khrushchev in Washington, had been warning the administration consistently that his boss considered the Berlin situation unacceptable. 9
Further, Kennedy had little time to gain control over his policymaking bureaucracy. By the time of the first Berlin crisis in 1958, all efforts to change Eisenhower’s mind about limited war had failed, and there was no longer any question, especially after Dulles’s illness, that any American decision about war in Berlin would reflect the president’s will only. Thus the story of American decisionmaking during that crisis can be told by concentrating primarily on Eisenhower. The circumstances could not have differed more for Kennedy. Between his inauguration and the outset of the second crisis in June, several people vied for control over American policy on Berlin, creating a disorganized decisionmaking process that Kennedy was wholly unable to master. Advisers, consultants and Cabinet officials deluged Kennedy with position papers, contingency plans, and formal recommendations, often written in an admonitory tone unimaginable in the previous administration. 10 A single U.S. stance on Berlin did not really exist before June, though some key advisers had begun to stake out their own positions. It would take Khrushchev’s ultimatum and then the Wall to force a clarification in Kennedy administration policy.
But the most difficult problem Eisenhower had bequeathed to Kennedy was a rigid military policy, a nuclear strategy, and a force structure that conformed to the dictates of NSC–5707/8. As a consequence of Eisenhower’s decision to reduce U.S. non-nuclear forces in Europe, the Western armies around Berlin were completely outnumbered by those of the Warsaw Pact. NATO’s military posture, moreover, consisted not only of forces on the ground but also strategies in the minds of its commanders. After eight years of Eisenhower, military planners in Europe, above all General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Commander of American forces in Europe and NATO commander as well, were determined to carry out the official policy of nuclear retaliation following any significant military setback in Europe. Norstad believed that without the nuclear option his NATO forces were doomed to defeat; he therefore opposed any suggestion that the West refrain from using such weapons in a war over Berlin. Articulating a policy of flexible response in campaign speeches and position papers was one thing; implementing it on the ground in the space of months was quite another.
In January and February Kennedy relied on Ambassador Thompson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for advice on Berlin. Both were sure that Khrushchev would revive the Berlin Crisis, and both recommended that Kennedy remain publicly quiet about the issue, avoid provoking Khrushchev, and plan for the inevitable Soviet ultimatum. 11 In late February, Rusk sent a memorandum to McNamara urging him to reduce American and NATO reliance upon the threat of nuclear war. Rusk went as far to argue that the West should refrain from nuclear retaliation even if the Soviet Union launched a massive conventional attack against Western Europe. To make this tenable, the United States and NATO would have to increase their conventional capabilities dramatically. 12
Despite Rusk’s initial involvement, Kennedy decided in March to ask Dean Acheson to advise him on Berlin and Germany. 13 With the help of Assistant Secretary of State Foy Kohler and Paul Nitze, whom Kennedy appointed to head the Defense Department’s Office of International Security Affairs, Acheson set out to dominate Kennedy’s national security policy. On March 29 he sent Kennedy a lengthy memorandum on NATO, urging him to establish better civilian control over the military command structure, and making this remarkable recommendation:
. . . it seems essential that an outstanding American civilian figure (1)= assume a NATO office with an explicit charter to take a primary role in developing military policy and (2) receive a large delegation of power from the U.S. and, in particular, a delegation from the Secretary of Defense.. . . he would be in the direct chain of command from the President through the Secretary of Defense for the release of nuclear weapons to NATO during central war or during more limited action. 14
Whether Acheson envisioned himself in this new position was not clear: what this recommendation did show was that Acheson so distrusted the current nuclear hierarchy that he was willing to suggest to Kennedy that he appoint a nuclear czar with unprecedented (and perhaps unconstitutional) power and authority. Given that Acheson considered Kennedy to be weak and indecisive, 15 this was quite a suggestion indeed.
In early April Prime Minister Macmillan and his major advisers came to Washington to visit the new president and gauge his views on Europe. On the 5th the two sides met to discuss Berlin. Acheson dominated the conversation, reiterating the argument he had made in his 1959 article, and had recently repeated in an April 3 memorandum to Kennedy. 16 The Soviets were likely to move against Berlin soon. Abandoning that city, Acheson went on, would lead to the loss of all Germany and then perhaps the rest of Western Europe. The West must therefore respond to any Soviet or East German provocation in West Berlin with sustained, conventional military action. A threat to launch nuclear war over Berlin, he declared, was "reckless and would not be believed." Not surprisingly, Macmillan described Acheson’s plan as "a tremendous advance in the U.S. position." 17
Acheson’s was not, yet, the "U.S. position." Perhaps a bit distressed by Acheson’s March 29 letter, and by his imperious domination of the talks with the British, Kennedy issued National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 18 number 41, an early official Berlin directive. According to NSAM 41, Acheson would continue to work on Berlin, but McNamara would be= in charge of military contingency planning. 19
Seizing this opportunity, McNamara responded on May 5 to Kennedy’s "action memorandum" with his own "Military Planning for a Possible Berlin Crisis." The "national policy guidance" on this subject was not satisfactory, McNamara reported: the existing plan was still NSC-5803, a three-year-old strategy that "does not reflect new developments in U.S. strategic thinking. Specifically," McNamara went on,
NSC 5803 implies the U.S. "will be prepared to go immediately to general war after using only limited military force to attempt to reopen access to Berlin." This is inconsistent with current thinking which proposes the use of substantial conventional force before considering resort to nuclear weapons and other general war measures. An early restatement of our national policy with regard to Berlin Contingency Planning is desirable. 20
For the time being, McNamara stated, the United States and NATO could reopen ground access to Berlin without resorting to nuclear weapons, but to reopen air access would require "an expansion of the conflict." It was "mandatory" for the West to improve its conventional capabilities so that, at least, Soviet forces would be obliged to join the East German army in an effort to keep NATO forces from retaking West Berlin. This would force Khrushchev to think twice about the risks of expanding the war. 21
On May 20 the Joint Chiefs conveyed McNamara’s intentions to Norstad. At present, the Chiefs noted, U.S. and NATO forces around Berlin could be defeated by East German forces alone. The Secretary of Defense, they instructed Norstad, "considers it mandatory that, in any operation larger than a probe, we have force level required to defeat any solely satellite force, without employing our nuclear weapons." Norstad was to report back with the force levels he needed to achieve such a capability. 22
By the end of May, then, the Kennedy administration’s preparation for Berlin remained embryonic. Acheson was declaring that NATO must stand pat on Western rights there, and be ready to fight a conventional war the moment the Soviets tried to abrogate those rights. Even though Acheson was only an adviser to Kennedy, no one else in the administration, least of all Kennedy himself, was ready to offer an alternative to his approach. McNamara had expressed his interest in working to develop American military forces capable of fulfilling Acheson’s demand, but actual deployment of such forces was a long way off. The Secretary of State, Rusk, was out of the loop. With no imminent crisis at hand, the new administration avoided making a final policy on Berlin.
The Vienna Summit and the Berlin Ultimatum
Back in February Kennedy had suggested that he and Khrushchev meet for an informal summit. After a long wait—more specifically, after the American embarrassment at the Bay of Pigs 23 —Khrushchev assented, and the two sides agreed to meet in Vienna in early June.
En route to Vienna, the American entourage arrived in Paris on May 31. Of course Kennedy and his wife Jacqueline were warmly welcomed by the Parisians, one of whom, President de Gaulle, was also eager to instruct the young president in the ways of French national interest. De Gaulle, like Macmillan, had maintained a consistent position on Berlin. 24 No nation, he told Kennedy, would run any serious risk of nuclear war to achieve some territorial gain. Therefore Kennedy’s proposal to augment conventional forces in Europe and remove the strategy of massive retaliation was wrong, for, in reducing the possibility of general nuclear war, it increased, not diminished, the likelihood that Khrushchev would move against the old German capital. Kennedy responded by suggesting that conventional forces could protect Berlin as well as nuclear weapons. De Gaulle corrected the mistaken American. ". . . there is no possibility of a military victory for us in the area of Berlin," he replied. "What we must make clear is that if there is any fighting around Berlin, this means general war." 25
The French president was thus refuting the nascent positions of Acheson and McNamara: not only were NATO’s conventional forces far too weak to fight for Berlin, but it was futile to believe that this situation could be changed in the future. Better to state that a Soviet move against West Berlin would trigger all-out nuclear war and be done with it. Kennedy seemed to be persuaded by his French counterpart, asserting in an afternoon session that "Khrushchev be made to understand that we are decided, if necessary, to wage nuclear warfare." 26
De Gaulle’s suasions may have actually changed Kennedy’s mind, or perhaps he was voicing agreement to avoid a pre-summit skirmish, or perhaps Kennedy did not really know what his own views were regarding the defense of West Berlin. But the legendary Frenchman had informed him that limited military action around Berlin was pointless. If nothing else this must have deflated in Kennedy’s eyes the confident strategy Acheson had been advocating. It was all well to stand tough on Berlin, but backing that toughness up—then, in the spring of 1961, not in the abstract—was a token military contingent that could be wiped out by the East Germans themselves and then a NATO strategy based on the early use of nuclear weapons. De Gaulle had suggested to the American president, as his entourage left for Vienna on June 2, this troublesome alternative: if the Russians revived their Berlin ultimatum, Kennedy either had to convince himself that Berlin’s defense warranted nuclear war, or he had to be ready to out-bluff Nikita Khrushchev.
The summit in Vienna focused mostly on Berlin. On the first day, June 3, the two heads-of-state discussed a test-ban treaty, the situation in Laos, the debacle in Cuba, and met for a formal dinner that evening. Khrushchev brought up the main issue, Berlin, the next morning during meetings at the Soviet embassy. Repeating the argument he made in 1958, the Soviet leader declared, in the course of a lengthy tirade, that he was going to sign a peace treaty with the East Germans. It was time to recognize the existence of two separate German states; Berlin could be turned into a "free city," he suggested, with the Soviets providing guarantees to ensure special status for the Western sector. 27
Kennedy responded to Khrushchev’s demands by stressing that American prestige hinged upon the maintenance of occupation rights in West Berlin. "If we were to leave West Berlin," Kennedy stated, "Europe would be abandoned as well." Khrushchev replied to this reasoning by stating that the Soviet Union was going to sign the peace treaty, there was nothing the United States could do about that, but it would be possible to work out an "interim arrangement" in Berlin that would preserve American prestige. The two Germanies could try to work out a plan for reunification: if after, say, six months no agreement was reached, then the Soviet Union would feel free to sign the peace treaty with, and turn over control of Berlin to, the East German regime. 28
At the end of the morning discussion Khrushchev informed Kennedy that his aides had already prepared an aide-memoire explaining its intentions regarding Berlin—his morning tirade, apparently, had been premeditated. 29 The two leaders met again in the afternoon—this time only with interpreters—and Kennedy more forcefully accused Khrushchev of risking major war. Khrushchev answered that his "decision to sign a peace treaty is firm and irrevocable" and that it would happen in December. Kennedy replied by predicting a "cold winter," and that was the end of the Vienna Summit. 30
Khrushchev crushed Kennedy at Vienna. The American president had gone there hoping to get Khrushchev to agree to a compromise in Laos, establish an arms-control agenda, and, most important, accept the American position on Berlin, which was to leave it the way it was. Instead Kennedy left Vienna with a formal Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in his pocket.
Many factors may have contributed to the rout, including the Soviet leader’s rhetorical skills, his need to reassure the anxious East Germans, Kennedy’s inexperience, and even the heavy medication Kennedy took to ease his chronic back pain. 31 But the real source of Kennedy’s problems in Vienna was his lack of resolve over Berlin. He was not sure why the West insisted on retaining occupation rights in West Berlin; this was why he concentrated on the matter of American "prestige" in his talks with Khrushchev, rather than on the merits of the Western case itself. Kennedy continually warned Khrushchev that Soviet action against West Berlin would discredit the United States and drive it off the European continent, as if he expected the Soviet premier to regard such an outcome with dread. Without coupling his talk about American prestige with persuasive, gritty threats of nuclear war—something he did not do in Vienna—Kennedy was only entreating his Soviet counterpart, appealing to Khrushchev’s goodwill, and at the height of the Cold War that was a curious stance indeed. Of course, the veteran Soviet leader easily discerned Kennedy’s irresolution, and bluffed him off the table. "Politics is a merciless business," Khrushchev wrote of that day in his memoirs. 32
Kennedy returned home from Vienna by way of London, where he had the pleasure of hearing the British describe the Soviet aide-memoire as "fairly reasonable." Back in Washington, on June 6, he met with congressional leaders and informed them of the Soviet ultimatum, but in an address to the public that evening Kennedy said that there had been "no threats or ultimatums by either side." 33
By issuing the deadline at Vienna Khrushchev rekindled a direct superpower confrontation that had been smoldering for two years. The Kennedy administration now had to face directly the questions it had danced around for the first half of the year. What, exactly, was the U.S. interest in Berlin? What, exactly, would the United States do should that interest be threatened by force?
The Minimal Approach
Kennedy may have hoped that by avoiding, and even publicly denying the existence of, the Soviet ultimatum, Berlin might go away. 34 On June 10, that wish was destroyed. Perhaps sensing Kennedy’s inertia, his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, sent him a stern memorandum urging him—almost ordering him—to decide what to do about Berlin. The State Department, Bundy wrote, was working on a formal reply to the Soviet aide-memoire; Acheson was developing his own Berlin recommendation; McNamara was responsible for military contingency planning. But Kennedy, Bundy insisted, needed to take "immediate, personal, and continuous command." On that day as well Pravda reprinted the Soviet aide-memoire, thus exposing the American President’s lie to the world. 35
Over the next week things did not much improve. On June 12 Bundy asked McNamara whether the U.S. could deploy "more substantial non-nuclear force" by October; on June 14 McNamara replied that existing conventional forces in Europe were inadequate for any sustained defense of West Berlin. 36 The next day Senator Mike Mansfield, the majority leader, called for the West to accept a "free city" solution to the crisis, 37 while in Moscow Khrushchev reiterated his determination to sign the peace treaty at the end of the year. Certainly Kennedy did not distinguish himself by opening an NSC meeting on the 13th by asking "who was responsible for planning and coordination on Berlin contingencies." (Rusk answered that he was.) 38
Despite Rusk’s embarrassed reply, Kennedy’s question seemed to be more clearly answered three days later at the first meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning (ICG). ICG chairman Kohler introduced Acheson as having been "requested by the President to study contingency planning," and Acheson went on to present a detailed, hard-line proposal. Dominating the meeting, Acheson argued for
training exercises in Europe and redeployment of troops to battle stations as if in preparation for an action toward Berlin. The crash programs for Polaris and other missiles and submarines should continue. There should be a resumption of nuclear testing. There should be proclamations of limited and unlimited national emergencies, supporting resolutions in the Congress, and substantial increases in the military budget. There should be a movement of troops to Europe and a general alert of SAC. 39
If these steps failed to dissuade the Soviets from carrying out their plan, the United States should commence an airlift, to be followed if necessary by the use of tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. By allowing for this final step Acheson was conceding that for the near future, at least, conventional forces would not be sufficient in a European war. This was a departure from his previous judgment that it would be better to fight with conventional weapons and lose than not to fight at all or to defend Berlin with nuclear weapons. But for Acheson the problem was really more one of commitment and perception than of detailed contingency planning. Echoing Dulles, he declared that "if the US were genuinely ready to fight for Berlin the Soviets would relent and war would be unnecessary." The issue was "essentially one of US will." 40
As there seemed to be no other proposal, Acheson’s confrontational approach served to define the policy toward Berlin in the immediate wake of Vienna. What would happen if this hard-line stance led to conflict? On June 26 the Joint Chiefs, responding to McNamara’s May 5 demand, issued a grim answer to that question. The position of the Chiefs was clear: it would be impossible to win a conventional war over Berlin. Yes, the chiefs argued, after a mobilization period of four months the United States could maintain access to Berlin with conventional arms if it were opposed only by East Germany. If the Soviets joined the battle, this new force would survive for five days, fifteen if other NATO forces took part. But what were the chances that the United States could commence full mobilization, like the kind that went on during World War II, over its rights in West Berlin? Would the French, contemptuous of conventional war, or the British, hardly dedicated to West Berlin, really contribute substantial forces to such a war? The Chiefs concluded that "it would not be feasible for the European Allies or the United States to engage in non-nuclear war for any extended period with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be brought into the area by 31 October 1961." 41
The Chiefs’ reply staggered Kennedy and his advisers, because it made Acheson’s belligerence seem like a recipe for nuclear war. Initially, Kennedy seemed to stick with the Acheson line: on June 29 he issued NSAM 58, which ordered McNamara to prepare military plans for a possible airlift, regional naval blockade, and nonnuclear ground action with Berlin. 42
In early July, however, Bundy, together with White House aides Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Abram Chayes, and an outside consultant named Henry Kissinger, began to develop an alternative position. On the 6th Bundy reminded Kennedy that a new steering group, headed by Rusk, was now in charge of Berlin planning. 43 The next day, just before Kennedy left for Hyannis Port for the weekend, Schlesinger got to the president a lengthy and detailed attack on the Acheson plan, which went as far as to list Acheson’s allies and antagonists and urge the president to recommence Berlin planning with the participation of "non-Achesonians." Schlesinger warned Kennedy in a cover letter that current policy had created a "dangerously rigid" situation that "may leave you very little choice as to how you face the moment of thermonuclear truth." 44
Kennedy brought McNamara, Rusk, and his newly appointed "military representative" General Maxwell Taylor with him to Massachusetts to discuss the Acheson plan. Accounts of this weekend vary 45 but it is clear that Kennedy decided to follow the recommendation of Schlesinger, Chayes and Kissinger, that he set up alternative planning, and push Acheson aside. On July 13 Bundy delivered a lengthy memorandum to the president that reflected this change. The United States, he said, should
Avoid any significant military build-up at this time, on the ground that the crisis is one of political unity and firmness of will, and on the further ground that substantial military preparations at this stage would divide the alliance, stiffen the Russians, frighten our own people, and operate against an effective stand in Berlin under the fundamental shield of nuclear deterrence. 46
This was a curious set of recommendations. It was not self-evident that a military build-up around Berlin would "divide the alliance, stiffen the Russians, and frighten our own people"; Acheson had been arguing exactly the opposite for months. Nor was it obvious that a conventional build-up might serve to undermine, not strengthen, the U.S. position in Berlin, since Kennedy and his colleagues had been saying otherwise for years.
The purpose of Bundy’s memorandum was to rationalize a change in American policy regarding Berlin. On the same day that Bundy completed it, Kennedy announced a new U.S. policy. "There are two things that matter," he declared during a NSC discussion: "our presence in Berlin, and our access to Berlin." 47 This statement departed from the longstanding American position that Berlin was a defeated city in which the four victorious powers enjoyed the legal rights of occupier. Once-major issues like East German border regulation, the importance of American lip-service toward German reunification, and particularly the maintenance of World War Two rights of occupation were to be de-emphasized in favor of the more general demands that Western forces have open passage to Berlin and security once they were there.
A first order of business in implementing this new policy was to inform Dean Acheson of his new status. On July 17 Kennedy met with key Cabinet members to discuss Berlin. Not invited were Vice President Johnson and the three main figures in the ICG: Nitze, Kohler, and Acheson. At the meeting Rusk went over allied opinion, while McNamara described his plan to achieve a moderate conventional buildup by the beginning of 1962. Kennedy announced that organization on Berlin planning was going to change: from now on, he reiterated, the ICG would conduct day-to-day planning at the "lower level," while a new Berlin Steering Group would have "fundamental responsibility" for official United States policy. This steering group would be chaired by Rusk and composed of other Cabinet members, Bundy, and Chairman of the JCS Lyman Lemnitzer. Acheson was not on the list. 48
The next day Kennedy and McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs. Kennedy informed the chiefs that he planned to supplement the Pentagon budget immediately. Chairman Lemnitzer confirmed that with this budget supplement, the United States would be ready to wage conventional war in Europe by January 1962. He said that the new force, while not capable of actually defeating its serious Warsaw Pact counterpart, would indeed "provide some additional time for negotiation before resorting to nuclear warfare." 49 This was a clear acknowledgement on the part of the Chairman that it would indeed be impossible to wage a serious conventional campaign to defend West Berlin before 1962. That meant that Acheson’s plan was dead.
To get Kennedy to accept and confirm this reality, Bundy sent him a memorandum on the morning of the 19th, hours before the weekly NSC meeting. He warned the president that the "hard wing" of the ICG, "led by Acheson and Nitze," would press for an American declaration of national emergency. The national security adviser recommended that Kennedy instead state that neither an East German–Soviet peace treaty nor Berlin border-regulation by East German soldiers was a "fighting matter," and suggest that the United States "extend serious feelers" to the Soviets about negotiating on Berlin. 50
At three that afternoon the Berlin Steering Group met. All agreed with McNamara’s plan to build up conventional forces by the end of 1961, raise taxes to pay for that build-up, and shelve the idea of declaring a national emergency. At four the rest of the NSC, including Acheson, was let into the Cabinet room. Quickly the meeting centered upon "a very important exchange" between Acheson and McNamara. Their argument existed on two levels. Literally, they disagreed about the national emergency declaration and the question of calling up major reserve forces. McNamara, of course, supported Kennedy’s decision to put these actions off until a later date, to avoid exacerbating the crisis. But their debate was also a struggle for power in front of the entire National Security Council, to see whose military policy on Berlin would prevail. Bundy concluded his account of this exchange by reporting "general agreement that the plans as presented by Secretary McNamara were satisfactory. Mr. Acheson," Bundy added, "specifically indicated his own approval." 51
A second step in the implementation of the new policy was to get the United States position in writing, pass it on to European allies, and declare it officially. This job fell to Rusk, whose patient tolerance of Acheson’s usurpations was now paying off. Working from a paper he had prepared on July 17, 52 Rusk developed an official American position on Berlin, and delivered it to the British, French, and West German ambassadors on July 21. The nub of the new strategy, Rusk explained, was to make access to and the security of West Berlin "vital interests" worthy of military action. Less important were the issues of reunification and East German recognition. The United States would go on record as supporting self-determination for all Germans but would not go to war for it. 53
Kennedy himself sent versions of this new policy to Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Macmillan on July 20, and on the 25th outlined it in a public address to the nation, and, by extension, to the Soviet leadership. 54 Much of the president’s speech reiterated in familiar terms the American commitment to the West Berliners; he also announced the increase in conventional forces and defense spending, while stressing his desire to resume talks with Khrushchev. But the most significant aspect of Kennedy’s speech was his conspicuous use of the term West Berlin. 55 He was telling his audience that the United States no longer considered the division of the city to be a temporary remnant of World War II, but rather a fact of the Cold War. West Berlin mattered; East Berlin was beyond American purview.
With the general American position now public, it was time to hammer out a more specific policy with the Europeans—particularly the French, who were not likely to be pleased with the new turn of events. This was the kind of thing Dean Rusk was good at. On July 27 the Secretary of State sent a "groundwork" team, led by Kohler, Nitze, and Chayes to Paris to work on an accord with the French, British, and West Germans. 56 On August 5 Rusk arrived, to engage in formal ministerial consultations.
The Secretary of State presented the new American policy in detail to his colleagues. On the diplomatic front, the United States would support commencing negotiations with the Soviet Union sometime well before the December deadline. In the event of diplomatic failure—i.e., if the communists forcibly moved against West Berlin—Rusk suggested that the West first react with various nonmilitary initiatives, including an economic embargo, another airlift into the Western sector, and a "roaring debate" in the United Nations. Only after these measures failed should NATO respond with military action, and the United States would insist that "significant Allied conventional forces" be used to make Khrushchev aware of allied determination and give him time to back off before nuclear war began. The United States would not support a rapid and public mobilization of Western forces, nor would it advocate taking a hard line on the general question of recognizing East German authority. 57
The British of course supported the American plan wholeheartedly, although Foreign Secretary Alec Home wondered why, if the West were going to offer negotiations, it could not be done sooner rather than later. 58 The French, and to a lesser extent the West Germans, opposed offering the Soviets negotiations under the threat of ultimatum; the French also rejected the new American timidity on nuclear war—Rusk was invited to meet with de Gaulle personally on the 8th to be informed of this 59 —and the talks concluded on August 9 without concrete agreement. But Rusk had made it clear that the United States would look for ways to avoid war, and particularly nuclear war, during a confrontation in Berlin and would emphasize the security and accessibility of West Berlin, not the lesser issue of whether East Germans or Russians patrolled its borders. Assuming Soviet infiltration of these talks, this news would have gotten back to Khrushchev by August 10 or so.
The June ultimatum, then, had forced the Kennedy administration to come up with a solid diplomatic position on Berlin. Afraid that Acheson’s confrontational stance might provoke a war that could not remain conventional, Kennedy signed on to a more conciliatory policy, a plain declaration that the West was determined to preserve its position in West Berlin, but West Berlin only. This indicated clearly to Khrushchev that the United States would not oppose a termination of its occupation status in East Berlin, whatever its sixteen-year old rights were.
The Kennedy administration had not, yet, resolved at all the question of how it would respond to a challenge to its position in Berlin. McNamara had begun to rewrite American military policy, but in early August the chances of actually keeping a war over Berlin non-nuclear were remote. Bundy reminded Kennedy of this on the 21st: the Joint Chiefs, he stated, "say that they can’t study a substantial non-nuclear ground action in Europe until Basic National Security Policy has been revised, since present (Eisenhower) NSC policy prevents such action." 60
But the revision of American policy had made war over Berlin seem much less imminent. And if Khrushchev maintained his ultimatum, it was not to expire until the end of the year, so McNamara would have several months to deploy the new forces and persuade the Chiefs and Norstad to sign on to the new program. He and Nitze left for Europe in late July to meet with Norstad and begin that difficult task.
Endnotes
Note 1: Indeed, many traditional interpretations have the Kennedy administration basically inventing American nuclear policy out of nothing. For an example of this approach, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946–1976 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1979), chapter 4. Back.
Note 2: Though, as I will discuss in the epilogue, McNamara did attempt this in 1962. Back.
Note 3: As Khrushchev himself pointed out to Kennedy, at the fateful Vienna Summit; see memorandum of June 4, 1961 conversation between American and Soviet delegations, FRUS 14 (1961–63) "Berlin Crisis, 1961–62" p. 89. Back.
Note 4: On Ulbricht’s role in the 1961 crisis, see Hope M. Harrison, "Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961," Cold War International History Project working paper no. 5 (Princeton, 1993), pp. 37–51. Back.
Note 5: Adenauer was particularly afraid that NATO would choose in the end to let West Germany fall rather than build up sufficient forces to match the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe. Serious NATO nuclear forces would prevent NATO members from arguing that it was militarily impossible to defend West Germany. In a four-power meeting in March Adenauer thus spoke of "the necessity of its [NATO] having nuclear capability." See March 8, 1961 memorandum from Averill Harriman to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in FRUS 1961–63 volumes 13, 14, and 15, microfiche supplement [hereafter FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement]. On this point also see Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 180–91. Back.
Note 6: On de Gaulle’s attitudes about Berlin see Richard Challener, "Dulles and De Gaulle," in Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal (Providence, 1994), pp. 163–66. Back.
Note 7: On Soviet internal politics leading up to the 1961 crisis, see Robert M. Slusser, The Berlin Crisis of 1961: Soviet–American Relations and the Struggle for Power in the Kremlin, June–November 1961 (Baltimore, 1973), esp. chapter 1; and Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev’s Motives and Soviet Diplomacy in the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962," a June 1994 "Soviet Union, Germany, and the Cold War, 1945–1962" conference paper, pp. 12–27. Back.
Note 8: See William J. Tompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 224; and Tusa, The Last Division, p. 203. Back.
Note 9: March 10, 1961 telegram from Thompson to State Department, FRUS 14 (1961–63): 19; March 16, 1961 telegram from Thompson to State Department, ibid., pp. 30–31. Back.
Note 10: The most egregious example of disrespect toward Kennedy I have found comes from a memorandum written by McGeorge Bundy. In late August, as preparations for a possible confrontation over Berlin mounted, Bundy wrote a preparatory note for the president outlining an upcoming meeting on political strategy. "This is a complex subject," Bundy began, "and the most important one you have. So be patient with a complex memorandum." Imagine Gordon Gray or even Dulles saying this to Eisenhower. See August 28, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement, p. 1. Back.
Note 11: See Tompson, Khrushchev, and January 28, 1961 letter from Rusk to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), p. 4. Back.
Note 12: Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, p. 45. Rusk’s proposal may have originated in a memorandum sent to him in January by Walt Rostow, the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. See ibid., p. 47. Back.
Note 13: On February 8 Kennedy asked Acheson to chair his advisory committee on NATO; sometime in March (I have been unable to find the precise date) Acheson was named "Special Consultant" on Berlin and Germany. See Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: the Cold War Years 1953–71 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 117. Back.
Note 14: March 29, 1961 memorandum for the President, DDC 1993, number 2372, p. 5. Back.
Note 15: Acheson did not disguise his disdain for the President. In July, for example, he told colleagues that this "nation is without leadership." Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis p. 182n. Also see Tusa, The Last Division, pp. 234–35 Back.
Note 16: April 3, 1958 memorandum from Acheson to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement, pp. 1–2. On Acheson’s 1959 article, see chapter 6, above. Back.
Note 17: Memorandum of April 5, 1961 Kennedy–Macmillan meeting, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 37–38. Catudal (pp. 54–56) argues that the British viewed Acheson’s plans with "horror," but this is not really correct. Though Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Alec Home opposed Acheson’s general belligerence over Berlin, insofar as Acheson emphasized conventional over nuclear force in defending that city, the British supported him. Back.
Note 18: Though the Kennedy administration continued to compose BNSP in 1961 and 1962, the president expressed his policy wishes more conspicuously in "action memoranda." Back.
Note 19: Reference to NSAM 41 is made in Bundy’s April 17, 1961 memorandum to McNamara, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement. Back.
Note 20: May 5 memorandum from McNamara, FRUS 14 (1961–63): 62. Back.
Note 21: Ibid., pp. 62–63. Back.
Note 22: May 20, 1961 telegram from the JCS to Norstad, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement, pp. 1–2. Back.
Note 23: This was the U.S.-supported invasion of Cuba, by Cuban expatriates and CIA operatives, which was easily repelled on the beaches by Castro’s army. Kennedy’s decision not to provide the invaders with American air support led to the ignominious defeat. The president’s apparent indecisiveness led Khrushchev to believe that Kennedy was a weak figure who would be easy to manipulate at a summit. See Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960–1963 (New York: Burlingame Books, 1991), p. 149. Back.
Note 24: Though with the successful French atomic test in 1960 de Gaulle was beginning to think differently. Back.
Note 25: Memorandum of May 31, 1961 early afternoon conversation between Kennedy and de Gaulle, FRUS 14 (1961–63), p. 83. Back.
Note 26: Memorandum of late afternoon conversation between Kennedy and de Gaulle, ibid., p. 85. Also see Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, with Joe McCarthy, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye": Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 291. Back.
Note 27: Memorandum of June 4, 1961 conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 87–88; Beschloss provides a lively account of the Summit in The Crisis Years, chapters 8 and 9. Back.
Note 28: FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 94–96. Back.
Note 29: Indeed, Khrushchev’s ultimatum came as no surprise to Kennedy: on May 23 the Soviet leader had told Thompson he would issue one. See Tusa, The Last Division, pp. 237–38. Back.
Note 30: Memorandum of June 4, 1961 afternoon conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, ibid., pp. 96–98. Back.
Note 31: On Kennedy’s dependence upon various pain-killing drugs, see Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pp. 186–93. Back.
Note 32: Quoted in Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Strobe Talbott, trans. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 500–501. Back.
Note 33: Record of June 5, 1961 conversation between Macmillan and Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), p. 99; Kennedy speech reprinted in Public Papers of the President of the United States, 1961 (Washington: GPO, 1962), pp. 441–46. Back.
Note 34: On Kennedy’s wishful thinking, also see Beschloss, The Crisis Years, p. 176. Back.
Note 35: June 10, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 107–9. Back.
Note 36: June 12, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to McNamara, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement; Editorial Note, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 135–36. Back.
Note 37: Many Europeans suspected that Mansfield was speaking for the administration. I have found no evidence to substantiate, or refute, this claim; all that can be said is that in mid-June Kennedy had not made up his mind about Berlin. He did tell the Italian Prime Minister, Amintore Fanfani on the 12th that the free city idea "might have a great deal of appeal to the unsophisticated." See memorandum of June 12, 1961 conversation between Kennedy and Fanfani, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement. Mansfield’s speech is reprinted in the Congressional Record, 87th Congress, 1st session, volume 107, pp. 10328–34. Back.
Note 38: Notes on June 13, 1961 NSC meeting, DDC 1993, number 3447, p. 1. Back.
Note 39: Record of June 16, 1961 meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, FRUS 14 (1961–63), p. 121. Back.
Note 40: Ibid., pp. 119–20. Also see Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pp. 258–59n. Back.
Note 41: Report from the JCS to McNamara, attached to a June 26, 1961 memorandum from Nitze to Bundy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement, pp. 4–5. Back.
Note 42: Memorandum for the Record of June 29, 1961 NSC meeting, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 160–162; NSAM 58, ibid., 162–65. Back.
Note 43: July 6, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement. Two weeks earlier Bundy said that he, Bundy, was "the President’s principal adviser on Berlin." June 22, 1961 State Department memorandum, ibid. Back.
Note 44: July 7, 1961 memorandum from Schlesinger to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 173–76; July 7, 1961 covering note on Henry Kissinger’s memo on Berlin, NSA number 2144; July 7, 1961 memorandum from Kissinger to Bundy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement. Also see Schlesinger’s own account in A Thousand Days (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 386–88. Back.
Note 45: See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 387–88; Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pp. 246–47; Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 160–63. Back.
Note 46: July 13, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, FRUS 14 (1961–63), supplement, p. 4. Back.
Note 47: Memorandum of July 13, 1961 NSC discussion, FRUS 14 (1961–63), p. 194. Back.
Note 48: Memorandum of July 17, 1961 meeting on Berlin, ibid., pp. 209–12. Back.
Note 49: Memorandum of July 18, 1961 meeting on Berlin, ibid., p. 215. This memorandum was written by McNamara. Back.
Note 50: July 19, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, ibid., pp. 216–18. Bundy’s memorandum also suggests that Kennedy was not particularly aware of the issue at hand. Back.
Note 51: Memorandum of July 19, 1961 NSC meeting, ibid., pp. 219–20. On this meeting also see Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis, pp. 180–83. Back.
Note 52: Rusk’s paper is reprinted in FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 207–9. Back.
Note 53: See Editorial Note, ibid., p. 224. Back.
Note 54: Kennedy’s speech is reprinted in Public Papers 1961, pp. 533–40. Another way the United States had conveyed the new approach to the Soviet Union was simply to ensure that certain agencies in Britain and France were made aware of it, as they were known to be infiltrated with Soviet spies. See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 224, 282. Back.
Note 55: On this point also see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 368–69. Back.
Note 56: The proceedings of these meetings are not available, although it would seem that Kohler and Nitze were able to dominate the U.S. delegation; Bundy complained to Kennedy on August 2 that the delegation was "less ready to think of new positions" than even Acheson. Back.
Note 57: Memorandum of August 6, 1961 Quadripartite Ministerial Conversations on Berlin, FRUS 14 (1961–63), pp. 301–2. The entire record of the ministerial meetings, as relayed by Rusk, covers ibid. pp. 269–323. Back.
Note 59: August 8, 1961 conversation between Rusk and de Gaulle, ibid., 312–16. Back.
Note 60: July 21, 1961 memorandum from Bundy to Kennedy, DDC 1995, number 3087, p. 2. Parentheses in original. Back.
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