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The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review
1997
Section VII: Transforming U.S. Forces For The Future
The fundamental challenge for the Department of Defense is to ensure that we can effectively shape and respond throughout the 1997-2015 period. This means that even as we maintain the ready, versatile forces necessary to meet the challenges of shaping and responding in the near term, we must at the same time be transforming our forces, capabilities, and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the future.
Joint Vision 2010 and the Future Of Warfare
In an effort to guide this transformation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed Joint Vision 2010, a conceptual template for how America’s armed forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint military operations. Joint Vision 2010 embraces information superiority and the technological advances that will transform traditional warfighting via new operational concepts, organizational arrangements, and weapons systems. It guides the Department’s preparations for the future through its focus on four new operational concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics—that together aim at achieving full-spectrum dominance.
Information Superiority: Backbone of Military Innovation. The ongoing transformation of our military capabilities—the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)—centers on developing the improved information and command and control capabilities needed to significantly enhance joint operations. With the support of an advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) common backbone, the United States will be able to respond rapidly to any conflict; warfighters will be able to dominate any situation; and day-to-day operations will be optimized with accurate, timely, and secure information. Just as much of the non-defense world has become increasingly interconnected through the growth of internetted communications, the Department of Defense is working to provide a complementary, secure, open C4ISR network architecture.
The five principal components of our evolving C4ISR architecture for 2010 and beyond are:
Advanced battle-management capabilities that allow employment of our globally deployed forces faster and more flexibly than those of potential adversaries;
An information operations capability able to penetrate, manipulate, or deny an adversary’s battlespace awareness or unimpeded use of his own forces;
A joint communications grid with adequate capacity, resilience, and network-management capabilities to support the above capabilities as well as the range of communications requirements among commanders and forces;
An information defense system to protect our globally distributed communications and processing network from interference or exploitation by an adversary.
In warfare, the information superiority that these capabilities provide will significantly increase the speed of command, enabling forward deployed and early-entry forces to take the initiative away from numerically superior enemy forces and set the conditions for early, favorable termination of the conflict.
Dominant Maneuver. Enabling control of the battlespace through the multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities, dominant maneuver allows U.S. forces to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces. Dominant maneuver will provide U.S. forces with overwhelming and asymmetric advantages to accomplish assigned operational tasks.
The dominant maneuver concept requires several enhanced capabilities. First, U.S. forces need to be lighter and more versatile. Basing logistics at sea and centralizing combat service support functions at higher tactical levels enable units to maneuver more quickly. Increasing the jointness of operations at lower tactical levels increases the forces’ versatility in achieving their objectives. Second, mobility and lethality must be increased through greater reliance on netted firepower. Third, dominant maneuver requires more flexible strategic and tactical sea and air lift. Procurements of the Air Force’s C-17 Globemaster, the Navy’s Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship, and the Marine Corps’ MV-22 and Special Operations Force’s CV-22 tiltrotor aircraft are examples of the Department’s efforts to improve long- and medium-range lift.
New maneuver concepts are under development to take advantage of dominant maneuver capabilities. The Army’s Strategic Meeting Engagement concept, for instance, would require projection of a force capable of achieving operational objectives over strategic distances, so called “ CONUS to combat.” The Marine Corps’ Operational Maneuver from the Sea replaces the traditional notion of assaulting the shore from a series of close-in ships and then securing a beachhead prior to moving inland with the concept of an assault launched from ships far out at sea in which the invading force moves immediately to the identified objective located far inland. The MV-22 and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle are key to achieving this capability for the Marine Corps.
Precision Engagement. Precision engagement enables joint forces to shape the battlespace through near real-time information on the objective or target; a common awareness of the battlespace for responsive command and control; a greater assurance of generating the desired effect against the objective or target due to more precise delivery with increased survivability for all forces, weapons, and attack platforms; and the flexibility to rapidly assess the results of the engagement and to reengage with precision when required.
Precision engagement requires more capable attack platforms and advanced weapons and munitions in addition to the enabling support of a C4ISR common backbone. The Department will be adding to its arsenal several more capable attack platforms for engaging targets on the ground and in the air, including the F/A-18E/F, F-22, and Joint Strike Fighter tactical aircraft; the Comanche and Apache Longbow helicopters; the Crusader artillery system; and the SC-21 family of new surface combatants and possibly the Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator. The Department is also developing and fielding numerous advanced weapons and munitions including improved stand-off weapons such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Attack Missile and the Joint Standoff Attack Weapon; bombs that can be accurately delivered from medium altitude, such as the Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser and the GPS-aided Joint Direct Attack Munition; and a new generation of anti-armor weapons such as the Brilliant Anti-Tank and Skeet submunitions.
Precision engagement is based on intelligence about enemy forces and expert judgment as to the correct force or weapon needed to generate the desired effects. The Services are working to increase the precision of infantry weapons and improve field equipment to ensure the individual soldier or Marine is fully integrated into the advanced systems that create precision engagement. Precision engagement also extends to the full spectrum of operations in which U.S. forces are likely to participate. Precise, nonlethal weapons are also currently under development for use in smaller-scale contingencies such as noncombatant evacuations and peace operations.
Full-Dimensional Protection. Protection for U.S. forces and facilities must be provided across the spectrum, from peacetime through crisis and war and at all levels of conflict. To achieve this goal, full-dimensional protection requires a joint architecture that is built upon information superiority and employs a full array of active and passive measures at multiple echelons. Full-dimensional protection will enable U.S. forces to maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver, and engagement.
U.S. efforts to develop and deploy a multi-tiered theater air and missile defense architecture are a prime example of full-dimensional protection. Missile defenses must range from small area protection for joint and coalition troops, such as that provided by the lower-tier PAC 3 upgrade to the Patriot system and the Navy’s Area Defense System, to wide-area defense of civilian populations and larger troop concentrations that will be provided by the upper-tier Aegis-based Navy Theater-Wide System and the Army’s Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The Airborne Laser, currently under development by the Air Force, will greatly improve missile defense layering by providing a boost-phase interception capability.
U.S. forces also need improved protection against chemical and biological weapons threats. New chemical and biological weapons detectors, improved individual protective gear, and a greater emphasis on collective protection are all critical to the Department’s efforts to protect its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines from these asymmetric threats. Full-dimensional protection also includes defense against asymmetric attacks on information systems, infrastructure, and other critical areas potentially vulnerable to non-traditional means of interdiction or disruption.
Focused Logistics. Focused logistics integrates information superiority and technological innovations to develop state-of-the-art logistics practices and doctrine. This will permit us to accurately track and shift assets, even while en route, thus facilitating the delivery of tailored logistics packages and more timely force sustainment at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of operations. Focused logistics will reduce the overall size of logistics support while helping to provide more agile, leaner combat forces that can be rapidly deployed and sustained around the globe.
Initiatives such as Joint Total Asset Visibility and the Global Combat Support System will provide deployable, automated supply and maintenance information systems for leaner, more responsive logistics. These programs, as well as a host of Service initiatives—such as the Marine Corps’ Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System—will be capable of supporting rapid unit deployment and employment and will better support the battlefield commander by eliminating redundant requisitions and reducing delays in the shipment of essential supplies. In addition, the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force package is being used to test and refine new logistics support concepts. This move toward focused logistics should continue to result in more responsive logistics support at lower cost.
Conceptual Approaches to Exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs
The goals set forth in Joint Vision 2010 are the foundation for a broader effort to exploit the Revolution in Military Affairs. Indeed, the U.S. military is committed to realizing joint and Service visions of modern warfare and is taking a number of steps to do so, including studies, wargames, R&D, advanced concept technology demonstrations, and simulated warfighting experiments. Through these efforts, which are being pursued vigorously in each Service, the armed forces are identifying, developing, and testing concepts and capabilities that will ensure their ability to transform for the future.
Army. The Force XXI and The Army After Next processes are identifying new concepts of land warfare that have radical implications for the Army’s organization, structure, operations, and support. Lighter, more durable equipment will enhance deployability and sustainability, and advanced information technologies will help the Army conduct decisive operations. The force will be protected by advanced but easy-to-use sensors, processors, and warfighting systems to ensure freedom of strategic and operational maneuver. Overall, the Army will require flexible, highly tailorable organizations—from individuals to small units to echelons above corps—to meet the diverse needs of future operations and to reduce the lift requirements for deployment to a theater.
The Army sustains separate, but complementary, efforts in a continuous process to implement the visions identified in Force XXI and The Army After Next. Current efforts are aimed at enabling today’s soldiers and combat systems with information technology and other enhancements while beginning long-term research and development efforts. The Army’s Experimental Force (EXFOR) is the vehicle for testing these innovations. EXFOR is a digitized heavy force used to identify and evaluate new operational concepts, organizational designs, advanced technologies, doctrine, and tactics through the Army’s Advanced Warfighting Experiments. The Army After Next program is a comprehensive initiative designed to better understand the probable nature of warfare 30 years into the future and provide focus to today’s development efforts. Through an annual cycle of wargames, workshops, and conferences, Army After Next strives to lay the research foundation necessary for assessing the effects of increased mobility, lethality, and maneuver—leveraging radical advances in information technology, weapons, and platform speeds at both the tactical and operational levels—to ensure land power remains a strategically decisive element of warfighting well into the 21st century.
Air Force. Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, the Air Force’s vision of air and space warfare through 2010, calls for maintaining and improving six core competencies built on a foundation of quality personnel and integrated by global battlespace awareness and advanced command and control. Air and space superiority will allow all U.S. forces freedom from attack and freedom to attack, while the Air Force’s ability to attack rapidly anywhere on the globe will continue to be critical. Rapid global mobility will help ensure the United States can respond quickly and decisively to unexpected challenges to its interests. The Air Force’s precision engagement core competency will enable it to reliably apply selective force against specific targets simultaneously to achieve desired effects with minimal risk and collateral damage. Air- and space-based assets will contribute to U.S. forces’ information superiority, and agile combat support will allow combat commanders to improve the responsiveness, deployability, and sustainability of their forces.
The Air Force has established six new battle laboratories to implement this vision. The mission of these battle labs is to rapidly identify and validate innovative ideas that improve the ability of the Air Force to execute both its core competencies and joint warfighting. The concepts validated in the labs will be assimilated into Air Force organizational, doctrinal, training, and acquisition efforts. The six labs are concentrating on the following areas: unmanned aerial vehicles; information warfare; air expeditionary forces; space capabilities; battle management command and control; and force protection.
Navy. The Navy’s future vision of warfare, delineated in From the Sea and Forward . . . From the Sea, and further developed in the Navy Operational Concept, identifies five fundamental and enduring roles: sea control and maritime supremacy, power projection from sea to land, strategic deterrence, strategic sealift, and forward naval presence. However, in the future the Navy will fulfill these roles with vastly enhanced capabilities. The Navy has embraced an RMA concept called Network-centric Warfare: the ability of widely dispersed but robustly networked sensors, command centers, and forces to have significantly enhanced massed effects. Combining forward presence with network-centric combat power, the Navy will close timelines, decisively alter initial conditions, and seek to head off undesired events before they start. The naval contribution to dominant maneuver will use the sea to gain advantage over the enemy, while naval precision engagements will use sensors, information systems, precisely targeted weapons, and agile, lethal forces to attack key targets. Naval full-dimensional protection will address the full spectrum of threats, providing information superiority, air and maritime superiority, theater air and missile defense, and delivery of naval fires. Finally, naval forces will be increasingly called upon to provide sea-based focused logistics for joint operations in the littorals.
The Navy also uses warfighting experiments to integrate technological advances and innovative operational concepts with real-world training. The At-Sea Fleet Battle Experiments overseen by the Maritime Battle Center are designed to explore new concepts and emerging systems like the Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and theater ballistic missile defense to evaluate their effects on fleet capabilities and determine future requirements. These intensive experiments are limited in number to maintain their quality and are combined with other fleet exercises to maximize participation. Completed earlier this year, the first of these experiments, Fleet Battle Experiment Alpha (conducted off southern California in March 1997), evaluated C4ISR capabilities, requirements for a Sea-Based Combined Joint Task Force, and other emerging concepts.
Marine Corps. Marine Corps Operational Maneuver from the Sea foresees warfare that requires tactically adaptive, technologically agile, opportunistic, and exploitative forces. Individuals and forces must be able to rapidly reorganize and reorient across a broad range of new tasks and missions in fluid operational environments. The Marines will still need to project power ashore for a variety of potential tasks ranging from disaster relief to high-intensity combat.
The focus of Marine Corps RMA efforts is on the enhancement of the individual Marine and his or her ability to win in combat. The Marine Corps Combat Development System focuses on generating the most effective combination of innovative operational concepts, new organizational structures, and emerging technologies. The Commandant’s Warfighting Laboratory at Quantico, Virginia, institutionalizes the Marine commitment to innovation. Through the five-year “Sea Dragon” program, the Marines have developed an extensive experimentation plan divided into three phases, each culminating in an Advanced Warfighting Experiment:
Urban Warrior—a two-year effort, begun this year, to explore operations in urban, near urban, and close terrain.
Capable Warrior—combining virtual and live forces comprising operational level deception and maneuver in response to crisis, with the objective of containing or obviating an incipient major theater war.
In the joint world, simulation centers such as the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint C4ISR Battle Center are developing future Joint Vision 2010 operational capabilities by evolving and blending innovative concepts and emerging technologies.
Exploration of the Rma in the Long Term
By conducting several research efforts that look out to 2020 and beyond, the Department seeks to ensure it will be prepared for a range of plausible futures. The Army’s Dominating Maneuver wargames and workshops explore operational concepts and RMA force characteristics that might be relevant in the 30-year time frame. The Air Force is now planning its transition from an air and space force to a space and air force through the Chief of Staff’s institutionalized long-range planning process, which has identified new operational concepts and the paths to implement those concepts. The Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group likewise has concept generation teams that are investigating future naval warfare concepts, from rotational base issues to asymmetric capabilities and responses. In addition, the Marine Corps’ Operational Concepts wargames and New Science projects are examining nonlethal and other innovative technologies, as well as the application of algorithms from other disciplines, such as the natural sciences, to military art and science.
OSD’s Office of Net Assessment has also developed an Operational Concepts Wargaming Program with support from the Services. This program will explore concepts such as dominant maneuver, Air Force modernization concept alternatives, “future Navy,” space war, and information warfare. The Department’s science and technology (S&T) efforts are directly linked to Joint Vision 2010 concepts and are guided by concept-related Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs). Each DTO identifies a specific future technology advancement that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated date of technology availability, and the benefits likely to result from the technology advance. For example, the Future Combat System (FCS) offers the potential of executing future dominant maneuver concepts with smaller, lighter, and more mobile ground forces. FCS technology innovation efforts focus on achieving leap-ahead capabilities for a ground-combat vehicle in the areas of mobility, lethality, survivability, deployability, and sustainability. Similarly, the Advanced Ground Vehicle Mobility Systems DTO aims to increase the speed, mobility, employment flexibility, and durability of future ground vehicles.
Additionally, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is investigating a satellite constellation, know as “Starlite,” that can provide on-demand radar imagery anywhere and in near real-time to the theater commander, and a “Situational Awareness System” that will link the Internet to the warfighter via an arm-mounted terminal.
These are just a sampling of the long-range planning and experimentation activities ongoing in the Department.
QDR Modernization Decisions: Supporting the Transformation of U.S. Forces
The Department’s extensive modernization effort, which will reach the aggregate procurement spending objective of $60 billion per year shortly after the turn of the century, directly supports efforts to realize the modern, joint capabilities called for by Joint Vision 2010 and to exploit the RMA in accordance with the “prepare now” tenet of our defense strategy. The QDR modernization review focused on a number of programs for evaluation and decision, in order to ensure that future U.S. forces have modern, technologically superior equipment, that systems are effectively integrated across platforms and Services, and that programmatic and operational risks were weighed in the context of force requirements. Several of these decisions resulted in programmatic changes, highlighted below.
C4ISR. Because modernization of our forces depends on a strong C4ISR common backbone and because these systems require significant resources, the Department undertook a hard and sweeping look at our entire C4ISR effort. While a number of programmatic adjustments were evaluated, we did not change the general focus and amount of resources devoted to C4ISR in the QDR. The net effect of the programmed investments will be to substantially improve our awareness of various types of enemy forces in the areas adjacent to our forces and at longer ranges as well. We will continue to evolve toward more interoperable battle management systems with the initial deployment of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) below the joint command level and into operational Service units. The Department is committed to achieving information superiority and to the resolution of remaining challenges over the next several years. A significant C4ISR challenge is to overcome deficiencies in our ability to move information in a timely manner to the lowest tactical levels. We will fund efforts to meet such challenges by correcting certain imbalances in the overall C4ISR program and by more aggressively using advanced technologies to reduce ongoing program costs. Decisions on C4ISR will be made in the context of other decisions on force structure, force design, weapons platforms, munitions, and information-enabled operational concepts.
JSTARS. The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) provides radar data on fixed and moving targets from an airborne battle management platform that enhances our combat forces’ ability to operate throughout the battlespace in responding to crises. In conflict, the JSTARS tracking data can be used by on-board and ground-based controllers to help direct timely attacks on a wide range of targets. Our approach to system development provides important enhancements to the U.S. JSTARS fleet and reflects our commitment to support NATO’s consideration of the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability.
The Department has decided to reduce the overall U.S. JSTARS fleet from 19 to 13 aircraft. A fleet of this size will provide round-the-clock coverage needed in a major theater war. Some portion of these aircraft would have to be redeployed in the event of a second major theater war. In addition, this fleet could be augmented by NATO JSTARS aircraft, if the allies collectively agree to fund the NATO AGS capability. The decision to limit the JSTARS buy also allows for funding to support the U.S. share of a four or six aircraft NATO AGS program. The six plane buy would allow for broader NATO participation, supporting our 30 April 1997 “fast-track” offer to our NATO allies.
We will also explore the potential for supplementing radar coverage of enemy force movements from long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In addition, our approach provides funds for key upgrades to U.S. JSTARS, including radar upgrades and improved connectivity to weapon platforms and broadcast intelligence.
Tactical Aircraft. Our review of tactical aircraft programs focused on the F-22 Raptor, the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). We assessed alternatives to these programs from the standpoint of both warfighting risk and acquisition cost. Termination of any of the three fighter programs was not considered prudent given the warfighting risk of such a decision and the significant adverse impact it would have on technology development and the defense industrial base. However, the Department also needed to balance such warfighting risk against the need to use scarce modernization funds prudently and to support acquisition program stability by planning for that which we can truly afford. The interrelationships among these programs were a significant factor, including the direct transfer of derivative avionics and propulsion technology from the F-22 to the JSF.
F-22 . The F-22 is the Air Force’s replacement for the F-15C/D in the air superiority role; it will also incorporate substantial air-to-ground capability. The F-22 will have a much-reduced radar signature, an ability to cruise at supersonic speed, and a new generation of avionics. It can also carry precision munitions that enable it to conduct air-to-ground attacks anywhere on the battlefield.
We have decided to decrease total procurement of the F-22 from 438 to 339 aircraft, consistent with its much greater capability compared to the F-15, as well as our overall affordability concerns and force structure decisions. This decision will provide three wings of this stealthy air supremacy platform. Consistent with this decision, we are slowing our ramp-up to full production of the aircraft. We will buy 12 fewer F-22s during Low-Rate Initial Production, thereby decreasing concurrency in the program. The F-22 program will build to a maximum production rate of 36 aircraft per year, down from the original planned rate of 48 per year, ensuring overall affordability beyond the program period. In the future, the Department will consider replacements for the F-15E and the F-117 long-range interdiction aircraft when they reach the end of their service lives beyond 2015. To make that decision, the Department will consider a range of alternatives, including the possible acquisition of variants of the F-22 for these roles.
F/A-18E/F . The Navy’s principal fighter/attack acquisition program, the F/A-18E/F is an enlarged, much-improved follow-on to the proven F/A-18C/D, currently the backbone of carrier aviation. The E/F model has significantly greater range, carrier payload recovery capability, and survivability. It also will be able to function as a tanker for in-flight refueling. The F/A-18E/F affords valuable growth capability and more payload flexibility to effectively employ the next generation of stand-off weapons.
The Navy will plan on procuring a minimum of 548 F/A-18E/Fs, building up to a maximum rate of 48 aircraft per year in contrast to the previously projected peak rate of 60 aircraft per year. The ramp up to the full production rate of 48 per year will be delayed two years, from FY 2000 to FY 2002, in order to ensure funding balance during the program period. This will result in a reduction of 24 aircraft in the program period. The Navy will transition to the JSF as soon as the costs and effectiveness for the JSF are well understood and the aircraft is demonstrated to be superior to the F/A-18E/F. Depending upon the pace of JSF progress, this transition may begin as early as FY 2008, when initial production of the JSF is planned for the Navy. Should JSF development be delayed, additional F/A-18E/F aircraft beyond 548, to a total as high as 785 aircraft, may be added later as appropriate to sustain planned force structure. In the future, the Department will also consider variants of the F/A-18E/F as possible candidates for the eventual replacement of the EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft.
Joint Strike Fighter . The JSF will be the Department’s largest acquisition program and the first to develop a family of common aircraft for use by land- and sea-based aviation forces. The JSF will be employed by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps in variants configured for each Service’s specific needs. This tri-Service program reflects the judgment that developing three major new combat aircraft simultaneously would have been prohibitively expensive. The JSF is anticipated to have a substantial mission radius, high survivability, and will use advanced-technology design, materials, and manufacturing techniques.
Total procurement of the JSF was reduced to 2,852 aircraft, down from 2,978 in our previous long-range plans. A Joint Staff-led review of Service plans showed the prospect for inventory management efficiencies through such a reduction.
In addition to decreasing the total buy of JSF, the maximum planned production rate of 194 aircraft will be reached in 2012 rather than 2010, easing overall modernization affordability. Uncertainties in prospective JSF production cost warrant careful Departmental oversight of the cost-benefit tradeoffs in design to ensure that modernization and force structure remain in balance over the long term.
Marine Corps V-22 (MV-22) Osprey. The MV-22’s unique tiltrotor design represents leap-ahead technology in supporting combat forces. Two changes in the MV-22 program are now planned. First, recognizing the urgent need to replace the Marine Corps’ aging fleet of Vietnam-era medium lift helicopters, the Department will accelerate MV-22 procurement to a long-term rate of 30 aircraft per year in 2004. Based on the MV-22’s superior capability relative to the CH-46 helicopter it will replace, the Department will reduce the MV-22 program objective from 425 aircraft to 360. By combining accelerated procurement with a reduced total buy, we will exploit the Osprey’s demonstrated performance, dramatically improving our midterm operational capabilities while saving over $3 billion in total program costs. The new program of 360 MV-22s reflects streamlined logistics requirements for the Corps’ infantry battalions and divisions which are anticipated from the ongoing Marine initiatives such as the Combat Service Support Element Enterprise and the Sea Dragon advanced warfighting experiments. The new objective of 360 Ospreys also reflects the benefits of this modern aircraft’s greatly increased reliability and maintainability. The accelerated procurement of the MV-22 reflects our commitment to modernization of Marine Corps combat capabilities, incorporating revolutionary 21st century technology.
B-2 Bombers. The Department has decided not to propose procurement of any additional B-2 bombers beyond the currently planned force of 21 aircraft. The assessment that led to this decision examined numerous trade-offs of other capabilities for more B-2 bombers in the broader context of the requirements identified during the QDR. It was aided by analysis conducted as part of the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study that examined the advantages and disadvantages of reducing elements of our current force structure—other bombers, sea-based aviation, and land-based aviation -in order to procure additional B-2 bombers. The analysis showed that in a majority of the cases examined, additional B-2s deployed quickly to a conflict could improve our ability to halt an adversary’s advance during the opening days of a major theater war. This was especially true in cases where there would be little or no warning of the conflict or where our tactical aircraft would be restricted in their access to the theater. In addition, the B-2 could use less expensive munitions in more missions than existing aircraft. This advantage, however, diminishes as other low observable aircraft, particularly the Joint Strike Fighter, enter the force.
Against these advantages of the B-2, the analysis weighed several disadvantages. First, the B-2 would not provide the full range of warfighting and shaping capabilities offered by the forces it would replace. For example, missions such as air superiority, reconnaissance, and forward presence would suffer. Second, the additional B-2s did not provide the same weapons delivery capacity per day as the forces that would have to be retired to pay for B-2s. Although this difference is less important in the halt phase because of the B-2’s superior survivability, it has greater impact throughout the remainder of the conflict after the adversary’s air defenses have been substantially suppressed. Third, existing forces would have to be retired immediately to pay for the additional B-2s. Even then, the savings from retiring the forces are not enough to offset the large up-front investment for the B-2s in the FYDP. And, there would be a loss in warfighting capability during the decade or more between when the outgoing forces were retired and all the B-2s were delivered.
Deep Strike/Anti-Armor Weapons and Munitions. In the wake of the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, the Department determined that the current munitions programs, with modest adjustments, will provide the capability to defeat potential aggressors in the years ahead. The next generation of munitions will give our forces superior precision engagement capability against projected threats. The fielding of unitary and cluster bombs that can be delivered accurately from altitudes above the effective range of enemy anti-aircraft artillery and manportable surface-to-air missiles, standoff weapons that avoid dense concentrations of air defenses, and highly effective precision munitions will increase the survivability and lethality of our forces in future conflicts as called for in Joint Vision 2010.
For the “deep battle,” the following systems will be procured in accordance with existing plans: the Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser carrying Combined Effects Bomblets or the “brilliant” Skeet anti-armor submunition; the Army Tactical Missile System with Brilliant Anti-Armor Submunitions (ATACMS BAT/BAT Pre-Planned Product Improvement); the product improved version of the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, and the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) with a unitary warhead. In addition, we will consider decreasing our buy of JSOW variants carrying Combined Effects Bomblets and Skeet; increasing our buy of Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile and laser-guided bombs; and changing the mix of Joint Direct Attack Munition variants. We will also continue Hellfire II production while analyzing the appropriate mix of Hellfire II and Hellfire Longbow missiles.
To maintain a balanced approach for the “close battle,” the Department is continuing to evaluate a number of candidate anti-armor systems. Our evaluations to date support our commitment to the ongoing Javelin program as planned and demonstrate the potential importance of the “Follow-On to TOW (Tube-Launched Optically Tracked Wire Command-Link Guided Missile)” and M829E3 armor-piercing tank round. Working with the Services, the Department will reach decisions on the mix of these close-battle anti-tank weapons during the development of the next defense program.
Ship Modernization. The Navy’s ship modernization program will ensure the United States retains the ability to control the seas and project power ashore in peacetime and across the broad spectrum of contingencies. Procurement of the CVN-77, the tenth Nimitz-class carrier, continues the modernization of the nation’s carrier fleet at a force structure level of 11 active carriers and one Reserve/training carrier. A total force structure of 12 carriers will allow the United States to sustain carrier battlegroup deployments at a level that helps shape the international security environment in support of our security strategy and commitments. Additionally, contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime overseas presence requirements, submarines will be procured at a long-term rate of one-and-one-half to two per year, consistent with a target force level of 50 attack submarines.
Army Ground Combat. The Army faces both near- and long-term challenges in executing its currently planned modernization program. Reductions in operations and support costs will help us achieve needed modernization funding increases and will provide some additional resources above those previously planned. These additional resources will address a number of the Army’s most pressing modernization needs. For example, the Army will accelerate the fielding of a digitized (Force XXI) corps and complete Army National Guard Division Redesign more quickly.
“Digitization” involves the use of modern communications capabilities and computers to enable commanders, planners, and shooters to rapidly acquire and share information. This improved awareness will revolutionize the conduct and tempo of all phases of combat operations. The results of recent Army Warfighting Experiments at Fort Irwin and follow-on experiments will be used to determine the force structure, materiel requirements, and doctrine for digitized units. The Army had planned to field the first digitized corps in 2006. This corps now can be fielded one to two years sooner.
The Army National Guard Division Redesign program will relieve an important warfighting shortfall by converting lower priority combat brigades into higher priority CS/CSS forces. This program (described in detail in the Reserve Component Forces section) was established last summer but funding shortfalls have restricted the pace of conversion. The Department will now accelerate the pace by increasing both near-term and midterm funding and completing the program on a more realistic time line.
Although these actions will improve the Army’s longer-term investment program, additional measures will be required to achieve a balanced modernization program. In the middle of the next decade, the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter and the Crusader self-propelled howitzer will enter production. Our review affirms that both systems are necessary to the Force XXI concept. Savings from planned Army personnel reductions alone will be insufficient to support both programs. Additional funds from sources such as base realignments and closures are critical to procuring these systems on the projected schedule. Programmatic changes, including reducing currently projected peak procurements and rephasing other major programs, may also be necessary.
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. The QDR thoroughly reviewed all theater ballistic missile defense programs and identified programmatic issues in the THAAD system and Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). Technical failures in the THAAD test program have required its restructure and brought into serious question the program’s ability to meet the 2004 target date. This restructure will improve the stability of the program, lower its risk, and allow us to explore increased commonality between the interceptor missiles and kill vehicles used in THAAD and the Navy Theater-Wide system. The MEADS program, a cooperative theater missile defense development effort with Germany and Italy, is currently unfunded beyond FY 1998. In the QDR, the Department decided to fund the program through FY 1999. The QDR reaffirmed our approach to the high priority Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and Navy Area Defense lower tier systems, Navy Theater-Wide upper tier system, and the Airborne Laser program. In addition, the Department is committed to continue pursuing increases in capability in attack operations to address the theater ballistic missile and cruise missile threats prior to launch, thereby reducing the stress and reliance on intercept systems.
National Missile Defense (NMD). Developing U.S. capabilities to deploy a National Missile Defense that will provide protection against a limited ballistic missile attack is a high national priority. The Administration established a development program aimed at creating the option to make a decision on deployment as early as FY 2000, if the threat warrants. The goal of the program is to be able to deploy an Initial Operational Capability within three years after such a decision is made. We determined in the QDR, however, that the existing NMD program could not meet these objectives within the programmed budget. The analysis further concluded that substantial additional funds should be directed to NMD over the next three years, but noted that even with additional funds, NMD will remain a program with very high schedule and technical risk. The Department has decided to add the needed funds totaling about $2 billion. However, the precise amount and allocation over the coming years is still under review.
Cruise Missile Defense (CMD). In light of intelligence estimates that a cruise missile threat to U.S. forces may emerge after 2000, DoD has a substantial theater Cruise Missile Defense program. This effort could provide significant assistance to a national cruise missile defense effort. Over the next several years, the Department has decided to increase emphasis on national cruise missile defense.
Navigation. Upgrades to the space-based Global Positioning System (GPS) and compliance with Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) rules that will be coming into force over the next several years will require significant future expenditures which are yet to be determined. The navigation challenge is to efficiently implement upgrades to the GPS satellite constellation and user navigation equipment that allows us to respond effectively in time of crisis and to facilitate our participation in the GATM system and other navigation and safety efforts. The March 1996 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) on GPS directs the Department to pursue the protection of our access to GPS positional information in the face of potential enemy electronic jamming and the ability to deny enemy use of GPS. A program decision in support of this directive is scheduled for late 1998. DoD efforts to ensure compliance with the new GATM regime are being coordinated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and will involve significant investment to properly equip the Department’s very large fleet of aircraft. The Department must introduce the needed navigation equipment to comply with the new FAA/ICAO procedures in order to preserve the worldwide deployment capability of our forces, avoid delays, and enhance air-space management capability.
Transforming Our Response to Asymmetric Challenges
Integral to our efforts to transform the Department for the future are our efforts to address a range of asymmetric challenges. Measures to prepare our forces to face these challenges, from fielding new capabilities to adapting how U.S. forces will operate in future contingencies, are already underway. To ensure that U.S. forces will be able to respond effectively to such challenges through the year 2010 and beyond, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the CINCs are working together in several areas. Chief among these are threats of NBC weapons use, terrorism, and information warfare.
Counterproliferation. In recent years, the Department has made substantial progress toward fully integrating the risks associated with an adversary’s NBC weapons use into our military planning, acquisition, intelligence, and international cooperation activities. This need was underscored in the major theater war assessment done in the QDR. Accordingly, the Secretary of Defense has increased planned spending on counterproliferation by approximately $1 billion over the program period, particularly for protective measures against chemical weapons. With this additional investment, the Department will continue to strengthen existing U.S. capabilities. These efforts will be critical to ensuring that U.S. forces have the counterproliferation capabilities they need as we move into the 21st century.
The QDR underscored two key challenges that the Department must meet as part of its strategy to ensure future counterproliferation preparedness: the Department must institutionalize counterproliferation as an organizing principle in every facet of military activity, from logistics to maneuver and strike warfare, and internationalize those same efforts to encourage our allies and potential coalition partners to train, equip, and prepare their forces to operate with us under NBC conditions.
To advance the institutionalization of counterproliferation concepts, the Joint Staff and CINCs will develop an integrated counter-NBC weapons strategy that includes both offensive and defensive measures. The U.S. military will continue to develop regular individual, unit, joint, and combined training and exercises that incorporate realistic NBC threats. Such training and exercises are the best means for testing operational concepts and doctrine and for fostering innovation and adaptation. Early deployment or pre-positioning of NBC defense and theater missile-defense capabilities and personnel into theaters of operations will also be explored.
Ongoing DoD programs focused on future counterproliferation capabilities include:
Development of a capability to defeat hard and/or deeply buried targets;
Biological weapon detection and emergency response programs;
Chemical detection, protection, and decontamination;
Increased funding for special operations forces counterproliferation activities.
Complementing these efforts to institutionalize counterproliferation concepts and enhance our ability to operate in NBC environments are U.S. efforts to internationalize counterproliferation by encouraging allies and friends to adapt similarly. Given the likelihood that U.S. forces will fight in coalition with others in the future, combined readiness is a key concern. Unless they are properly prepared to deal with NBC threats or attacks, allies and friends may present vulnerabilities for a U.S.-led coalition. In particular, potential coalition partners cannot depend on U.S. forces to provide passive and active defense capabilities to counter NBC threats. U.S. counterproliferation cooperation with its NATO allies through the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation provides a template for improving the preparedness of long-standing allies and potential coalition partners. In particular, efforts to strengthen international counterproliferation partnerships are currently underway with allies and friends in Asia.
Force Protection and Combating Terrorism. Over the past few years, and particularly following the attack on Khobar Towers, the Department has moved swiftly to reduce American vulnerability to terrorist attacks and to make U.S. forces as preeminent in combating terrorism as they are in other forces of warfare. The Department will ensure that U.S. forces operate under mandated standards for combating terrorism, improve intelligence collection, distribution, and information-sharing with allies, and strengthen our capability to protect citizens and military personnel from chemical or biological attacks with special emphasis on high threat regions. Future efforts will focus on enhancing both antiterrorism and counterterrorism capabilities and will range from policy initiatives to planning and training improvements, and the development of new operational systems to combat terrorism.
To ensure that the U.S. military has highly effective antiterrorism capabilities in the future, the Department will undertake several initiatives. The Department will enhance force protection training using a mobile “train the trainers” approach to reach senior leaders and their key staff. The Department also will continue to improve the newly created Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force, a Marine unit that performs consequence management in chemically and biologically contaminated environments. Finally, the Department will continually reassess the vulnerability of its facilities at home and abroad and make necessary improvements to safeguard their physical security.
The Department is also committed to improving sensitive counterterrorism training and technologies—those used to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to terrorist attacks over the next decade. Counterterrorism forces will continue to receive the most advanced training available, exercise frequently to maintain proficiency, and develop new skills, and work with foreign peers to hone combined skills as well as develop mutual trust and confidence.
Although U.S. forces currently possess sophisticated systems for combating terrorism, the Department is increasing its research and development investment in this area. This funding will support several state-of-the-art development programs including: systems to detect, assess and disable large vehicle bombs; stand-off explosive detection capabilities; pre- and post-construction blast mitigation techniques for physical structures; capabilities to maintain surveillance of and tag and track harmful materials that can be used in terrorist attacks; and improvements to robotic vehicles used in counterterrorism operations.
Information Operations. Efforts to exploit information technology to adapt and transform the U.S. military are well underway. To date, the Department has directed most of its efforts in this area toward protecting critical U.S. infrastructure against hostile information operations and developing U.S. information operation capabilities for use in peacetime engagement activities, smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater wars.
Although our current capabilities are adequate to defend against existing information operations threats, the increasing availability and decreasing costs of sophisticated technology to potential adversaries demand a robust commitment to improve our ability to operate in the face of information threats as we approach the 21st century. Critical to ensuring that ability will be the institutionalization of information operations—that is, the integration of information operations concepts into military planning, programming, budgeting, and operations. In the context of Joint Vision 2010, we will continue to develop additional guidance to strengthen information assurance—the protection, integrity, and availability of critical information systems and networks. Further, we will allocate adequate resources for these efforts within our information technology investment programs and improve the Defense-wide planning and implementation process, regularly assessing funding adequacies for all information assurance program components.
Defense against hostile information operations will require unprecedented cooperation between the Department of Defense, other federal agencies, the armed forces, commercial enterprises, our allies, and the public. The Department is working closely with the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure to develop this cooperative relationship. Technical measures to protect military information systems, both hardware and software, are being greatly expanded, and all Services now provide capabilities to test and assess their information networks and systems. Capabilities to protect information systems must also extend beyond traditional military structures into areas of civilian infrastructure that support national security requirements, such as the telecommunication and air traffic control systems.
Offensive actions to disrupt our adversary’s access to information are also part of U.S. military capabilities. Such capabilities will be increased in the future to ensure that the United States maintains information superiority during a conflict.
Conclusion
Preparing now for future challenges is critical to the success of our defense strategy throughout the 1997-2015 time frame. The Department is committed to implementing and underwriting Joint Vision 2010 and complementary Service visions. Efforts to modernize our current force are integral to that implementation; even more important are efforts to leverage new technologies to harness the Revolution in Military Affairs through new operational concepts, new doctrine, and, ultimately, organizational changes. In addition, the Department must institutionalize innovative investigations, such as the battle laboratories and warfighting experiments, to ensure future concepts and capabilities are successfully integrated into the force in a timely manner. Finally, we must remain ever vigilant against asymmetric strategies that threaten our forces and citizens by strengthening efforts to reduce their likely use and potential impact and by developing a range of response options. Through all of these efforts and activities, DoD is transforming itself at a substantial pace.
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