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Introduction

A large number of scientific disciplines have dealt with the break-up of states. Secession studies include disciplinary approaches such as philosophy, political science, law and history, and particular fields of research, like nationalism and federalism. Generally speaking, research has been conducted at the margins of a more all-encompassing endeavour. Secession has never constituted a central theme in the history of political philosophy or in such disciplines as international relations and constitutional law. Secession is likewise present in, but not central to, political science, where it is situated at the crossroads where domestic policies meet international relations,[1] without deriving much benefit for systematic purposes from this location in a frontier zone. The focal points in discussions on international relations theory have no bearing on the analysis of the origins of secession. Neo-liberal and neo-realist theories differ in their appreciation of the nature of state anarchy, the likelihood of international co-operation and the significance of the increasing number of international institutions.[2] Such debates have no relevance when it comes to providing principles of analysis to explain the emergence of a secessionist movement on the domestic scene, even though they may be very relevant in explaining the success or failure of secessionist movements on the international scene. Ethnic and federal studies, on the other hand, are capable of exploring the roots of secessionist conflict, and possible remedies, but lack the geopolitical perspective necessary for predicting the possible outcomes of such conflicts.

There is thus a lack of integration among the various disciplinary approaches to secession. There is an even deeper divide between the general cognitive frameworks or structures within which social scientists and political philosophers operate. Secession studies are characterized by the traditional opposition between normative and empiricist perspectives, and those working in this field generally subscribe to either one or the other. Each of these two major epistemic communities, which involve scholars from various disciplines, has its own group-specific criteria and its own 'consensual knowledge', accepted as valid

within the parameters of its given perspective. The normative approach is concerned primarily with values and norms. Values for this approach refer to a desired state, a purpose, or a telos. They indicate what is deemed worthy. Norms pertain to blueprints for guiding action. Being deeply preoccupied with what ought to be, the normative approach is also concerned with what should happen, and how to achieve it. This essentially deductive, evaluative and prescriptive approach puts forth claims as to the nature of government, the relation between authority and the individual, political obligation, distributive justice, and the like. The normative perspective is preoccupied with such phenomena as freedom, justice and equity, but especially with rights. It lends itself readily to a moral and intellectual commitment to individual, but also collective, rights. Examples of this perspective in secession studies are the debates on the plausibility of a theory of secession focusing on the right to national self-determination, the value of appeals to minority group rights, or arguments concerning the discriminatory redistribution of economic resources. Depending on their choice of principles and selection of arguments from their chosen perspective, scholars may render a positive verdict on the legitimacy of secession in some cases, but not in others.[3]

In the empiricist approach, knowledge is considered to be scientific if it is primarily empirically based, objective, disinterested and value-free. Observation, the generation of testable hypotheses, verification and, if possible, experimentation are assumed to be indispensable methodological features. This explanatory approach is inductive and analytical. Social scientists should therefore not advocate any political cause – such as separatism, for example. Yet it is not easy for the social scientists who subscribe to this approach to filter out their values, opinions and concerns. This perspective, therefore, is neither as value-free nor as disinterested as it would at first sight appear. Ideological colourings, values, norms and opinions may be discerned beneath the veneer of social scientism. In the realm of politics, for example, scholarship adopting this orientation may assign positive valence to notions of efficiency, equilibrium and order, and the maintenance and stability of existing political systems and state formations. Such a built-in pro-status quo bias tends to interpret secession as a negative phenomenon.[4] Empirical research may, however, also bring a positive verdict on secession when focusing on concrete cases of economic discrimination or political oppression.

A closer look at both traditions reveals that there is little empirical or normative research on secession with the explicit aim of producing an overall conceptual framework whose systematic and encompassing character would be sufficiently developed for it to be generally accepted as constituting a theory, in the strong meaning of this word.[5] A demanding empirical concept of theory encompasses explanatory principles, which are capable of generating a set of verifiable hypotheses. The capacity to predict by constructing specific scenarios is essential

in order for a theory to qualify as such. But it is surely also possible to understand political theory in a weaker sense. Theory – in both the empirical and normative traditions – may also be understood as something which gives a certain structure to a field of research, which systematizes the research questions and includes a coherent set of concepts.[6] In normative discussions, a 'thin theory' offers 'the bare framework for conceptualizing choice and agency but [leaves] the specific content of choices to be filled in by individuals'.[7]

Most empirical and normative literature on secession seems to be based on the presupposition that a more modest ambition is quite adequate to the present state of the art. In the field of empirical research on secession, in a comparative volume on secessionist movements, published in 1990, Ralph R. Premdas pointed out that attempts to explain secession by modernization theory, internal colonialism or political economy have at the very best been only partially successful.[8] The book *Theories of Secession*, edited in 1998 by Percy Lehning, discusses the main positions in the debates taking place in both normative and empirical research on secession.[9] Theory is here understood quite modestly as a way of exploring what is morally at stake when dealing with secession or when analysing the factors explaining secession as a political phenomenon. A similar use of the term 'theory' is also to be found in the various contributions to the book edited by Margaret Moore, *National Self-Determination and Secession*, which was also published in 1998.[10] In his contribution to that volume, Rogers Brubaker argues that the search for 'a' or 'the' theory of nationalism is misguided. In his view, 'the theoretical problems associated with nationhood and nationalism, like the practical political problems, are multiform and varied, and not susceptible of resolution through a single theoretical (or practical) approach'.[11]

The extensively inter-disciplinary nature of secession studies makes it difficult to produce very systematic theories, but it also gives these studies a particular flavour. The wide range of disciplines dealing with secession studies and, in turn, the profusion of issues addressed within this field, make it particularly attractive for scholars who like to work in the frontier zone of their own discipline. This volume aims to add one more theme to this already broad field of research, namely, the interaction between social cognition and political action. More specifically, this is a study of the relationship between the ideas advanced by intellectuals and scholars, especially social scientists, and the politics of secession. In a way, this study deals with the general problem of the role, influence and power of ideas in politics. The chosen approach is empirical. The authors do not have a primary interest in a normative analysis of the various principles to be found in debates on secession. They focus rather on the use made of normative principles by secession movements and on the involvement of intellectuals in political debates with normative content. The primary focus is on the role of intellectuals in these movements and on the relationship between their scientific

and political discourses. The scientific arguments used by movements for and against secession pertain to various disciplines. The contributions to this volume explore the reasons why, in debates on secession, some disciplines are more prominent than others. They also reflect on the question of the truthfulness and objectivity of scientific approaches and on the question of moral responsibility when scholars willingly involve themselves in political disputes.

Contemporary controversies over secessionist claims take place in a context where standards of scientific objectivity have been questioned. Philosophers of science have a tradition of dealing with the socially embedded nature of the knowledge produced by the exact sciences.[12] Post-modern scholarship has likewise focused on the discursive nature of the social knowledge produced by the humanities and the social sciences. It interprets it as a meaning-making activity, based on interpretations of processes of social change. It has highlighted how the production of social knowledge is embedded in value-laden ideological discourses articulating visions of the direction social change should take.[13] This awareness of the discursive and ideological nature of the humanities and the social sciences and of their relative truth-value does not, however, necessarily make it impossible to assess scholarship or to exercise criticism. Moments of crisis or transition (such as secessionist crises) are in fact particularly appropriate for the critical assessment of scholarship, since the political polemics and confrontation they spark off between different schools of interpretation make it easier to uncover the ideological unconscious of these various schools of thought.[14] At the same time, an understanding of the discursive nature of scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences makes it possible to relate it to nation-building narratives.[15]

This post-modern outlook allows an analysis of social knowledge using an approach that acknowledges its relativity but nevertheless ascribes to it an important meaning-giving role within society. It thus follows a tradition previously articulated by sociologists of knowledge such as Karl Mannheim. Mannheim argued that the social sciences are in all circumstances an interpretative form of knowledge, and are hence ideological.[16] His vision of ideologies does not denounce their 'falseness' when set against the standard of an objective truth. His sociology of knowledge is rather concerned with 'the relationship of all partial knowledge and its component elements to the larger body of meaning, and ultimately to the structure of historical reality'.[17] He argues that the intelligentsia, since it is relatively unattached to class interests, not only produces ideologies but is also able to achieve a synthesis of the ideologies present in a specific social context.[18]

Contemporary scholars tend to be more critical than Mannheim of the role of the intelligentsia, its own group interests and its capacity for unmasking the 'ideological unconscious' – the interests behind political and scholarly discourses.

Pierre Bourdieu thus draws attention to how the institutional context in which scholars operate conditions their scholarly production.[19] Zygmunt Bauman depicts the role of intellectuals within a specific social and national context, which implies the 'relativity of knowledge (that is, its "embeddedness" in its own communally supported tradition)'.[20] In this context, the role of intellectuals is to facilitate communication between different traditions of knowledge, since the procedural rules of the intellectual professions enable them to go beyond particular interests and viewpoints and to act as critics of beliefs held in society.[21] Bourdieu likewise highlights how the social sciences may transcend their social conditioning, by arming themselves with 'a scientific knowledge of their social determination'.[22]

The role of intellectuals in secessionist movements and the function of scientific knowledge in nationalist discourses are prominent subjects in literature on nationalism. One of the classics in the analysis of the contribution of intellectuals to the process of nationalist mobilization is Miroslav Hroch's 'Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe'.[23] This book by the Czech historian develops an evolutionary scheme in which scholarly interest in nationalism gradually leads, in a second stage, to patriotic agitation which, if successful, is followed in a third stage by mass support. The contribution of intellectuals to such processes of mobilization is closely linked to their elaboration of national identities. Intellectuals translate their scientific knowledge into a public discourse that proposes a vision of their nation; they evoke and reconstruct its past to root it in historic tradition, but at the same time such 'imagined communities' include a programme for the nation's future.[24]

In his description of the emergence and development of cultural nationalism in Ireland during the nineteenth century, John Hutchinson gives an example of how scientific knowledge and the construction of national identities may interact. He highlights how the political quest for autonomy stimulated scholars to rediscover their nation's past, and particularly its Gaelic roots, which thus became a central feature of Irish identity. Since the scholars involved in this process were also concerned about international scholarly recognition, their reconstruction of the Gaelic past met the then internationally accepted scientific standards.[25] The present contributions concur with this type of research endeavour.

As will be explored in the various contributions, scientific objectivity and moral responsibility acquire a particular meaning in each culture. The contributions to this volume offer a comparison between very different scientific traditions. They analyse the multiple, often country-specific factors that affect the involvement of the social sciences. The presence or absence of 'strong' or 'weak' state traditions, as well as the level of development of civil society, may account for the way in which the social sciences advance. The ubiquity of nation-specific institutional models; the extent of 'acceptable' involvement in academia by the

polity; the degree of 'opportune' closeness between public intellectuals and the political elite, are examples of factors that have an impact on the constitution of the social sciences. Nor should the impact of established national intellectual legacies be forgotten. For instance, intellectual traditions that focus on collective entities such as states and nations rather than individuals have contributed to the emergence of social sciences that differ in focus and emphasis from those that emphasize the individual. Cultural heritages that stress agency leave a different imprint on the social sciences from those that underline structure. Inveterate normative traditions have contributed to different kinds of social science from those coloured by empiricism. The degree and emphasis of the instrumentalist features of the social sciences are conditioned, among other things, by political, cultural and ideological factors.[26]

To sum up, even though some traits are common to all of the social sciences, there are nevertheless country-distinct features. The closeness of the social sciences to the humanities, the ways of acquiring social knowledge and the character of social knowledge itself are rooted in country-specific conditions. These national traditions presuppose what ideas, beliefs, values and norms are to be taken for granted. Cultural cognizance thus acts as the foundation for what, in a given society, constitutes 'uncontested' or 'true' social-scientific insight and understanding. The culture-specific definitions ascribed to the social sciences contribute to the relativity of the concept of objectivity in evaluating social knowledge.

What exactly is the aim of this book? The relationship between social knowledge and secession has been studied for specific cases or in particular disciplines (especially the writing of national histories), but has not been assessed from a comparative, interdisciplinary perspective. Taking such a perspective, the case-studies in the present volume attempt to answer the following questions, which refer to strongly interrelated themes: (1) is there a kind of instrumental relationship between scholars and political leaders in public discussions on secession, and an institutional setting which favours closeness between these two groups? (2) what kinds of scientific disciplines are prominent in debates on secession, and what kinds of normative arguments can they support? (3) what are the particular criteria for scientific objectivity and truthfulness used in discourses for, against and about secession, and how do scholars involved in such debates reflect on these criteria – on both the epistemological and deontological levels? The theme will be examined from a comparative perspective, but the comparison itself will be presented only in the conclusions. This comparative analysis is not meant as a contribution to a future grand theory on secession, which would be rather difficult for the reasons mentioned above. Instead, the book is based on a more modest concept of theory, which aims to systematize the field of reseach through a coherent set of concepts and research questions, and to draw certain conclusions from it.

The book aims to reinterpret – and to a certain extent broaden – the scope of the problems with which research on secession has been confronted.

Some Questions of Terminology

These three questions addressed to the authors of this volume, and the title we have chosen for the book itself, involve a number of terminological problems which require clarification. The use of distinctions such as between the humanities and the social sciences, or the meaning of terms such as 'intellectuals' and 'secession', are linked to specific cultural traditions, which makes their use in a comparative perspective rather problematic. Both the social sciences and the humanities are domains of knowledge that are concerned with humankind and society. The distinction between the two is therefore not obvious. Some claim that the humanities constitute an over-arching discipline, subsuming the social sciences. Others recognize the two domains as separate fields of cognizance, but claim that the boundary between them is unclear. Still others attempt to classify the various branches of knowledge under one category or the other. If the humanities are said to include art, archaeology, education, history, literature, music, philosophy and philology, then anthropology, economics, geography, political science, public administration, psychology, social psychology and sociology are relegated to the social sciences. Branches of knowledge such as, for example, ethnography, ethnology and linguistics are left in limbo. Finally, the field of history may be seen either as overlapping the two domains, or as a component part of each. The broad distinction between diachronic and synchronic fields of study does not fully resolve the problem of what constitutes the humanities and what is social science.

In the final analysis, the classification of the various fields of knowledge is very much country– and culture-specific.[27] The Marxist-Leninist tradition to be found in the Soviet Union, for instance, blurred the distinction between humanities and social sciences, exalting history as the only truly scientific approach for analysing social change, and relegating disciplines such as political science to the dustbin of 'bourgeois' sciences. It would not make much sense to draw a strong dividing-line between the humanities and social sciences in the post-Soviet world, even though sociology and political science have been rehabilitated and historical materialism has been scrapped from the curricula of universities and scientific institutions. For all these reasons, several contributions to this volume and the comparative analysis in the conclusions will be based on a broad concept of the social sciences, which includes history and law.

'Intellectual' is another term whose meaning has to be located in a particular culture and a particular time. Both the boundaries and the internal stratification

of the category are nation-specific. The use of the term 'intellectual' may be quite normal in one cultural context, whereas it would be altogether inappropriate in another, where terms such as 'scholar' or 'academic' would be used. It may have a particular meaning in a specific political context, as when referring to French scholars supporting or opposing the Algerian war of independence in the 1950s, but this meaning would not have been shared outside France, or even outside Paris. The term also has different political associations for the French public of the 1950s and for the same public half a century later. For the purpose of our comparison, we will set aside these specific connotations where the choice of such a term is concerned, and use 'intellectual' interchangeably with 'scholar' or 'social scientist'.

The term 'secession' is, politically, highly problematic. Most debates on secession are actually based on a vocabulary from which the word 'secession' has been expunged. The Soviet experience is illustrative in this respect. The right to secession was codified in the Soviet constitution for all Union republics. In Ukraine, secession has been a constant, but not tolerated, topic of discussion. The signature of the Belovezhskaya Agreement between the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in December 1991 is generally not regarded as an act of secession. It is presented in the media and scientific literature alike as an act of dissolution, even though the act of secession from the Soviet Union and the constitution of independent states are both described in the agreement as constituent parts of this process of dissolution.[28] The terms 'secession' and 'secessionist' are also seldom used in Belgium. Some of those who consider that the right to self-determination of the Flemish people cannot be exercised within the framework of a Belgian federation use the concept of a 'confederation' to point to the positive content of their programme, whereas their adversaries would rather describe these contents in purely negative terms, such as 'separatism'. In Quebec, the term 'sovereignty' is propagated by those who strive for independent statehood, whereas their opponents describe themselves in equally positive terms as 'federalists'. The fact that those who claim the right to secession of a particular people or state are usually reluctant to describe themselves as 'secessionists' can also be explained by the fact that secessionist movements generally reject an unrestricted application of this right. In Quebec, before the 1995 referendum about 50 municipalities – representing one Quebecois citizen in twelve – voted that in the event of secession they would rather stay Canadian than remain part of Quebec.[29] This was unacceptable to the nationalist Parti Québecois. The secessionist leadership of Abkhazia has been refusing to discuss the option of allowing the region of Gali – where more than 90% of the local population is Georgian – to be separated from Abkhazia in exchange for Georgian concessions such as the lifting of the Georgian blockade of the secessionist region: they consider that this

land is historically Abkhazian, and that most of its population were originally ethnic Abkhazians who were forcibly assimilated by Georgian colonization.[30]

'Autonomy' is another term whose meaning is strongly coloured by past experiences. It has a positive meaning for the Flemish and other West European national movements, but no positive connotations whatsoever for those movements in the post-Soviet world that are striving for independence or for greater powers within a federal framework. In the Soviet tradition, where a complex federal system involving various forms of autonomy was combined with a highly centralized leadership under the Communist Party, autonomy has been understood as a method of dissociating the formal from the real exercise of political power. Autonomy had a similar connotation in Yugoslavia. For this reason, it has been replaced by the term 'self-government' in the draft agreement designed to solve the Kosovo problem, prepared in February 1999 at Rambouillet. The draft would otherwise have been unacceptable to the delegation representing the Albanian population of the region. When used in the context of Corsica or Brittany, on the contrary, 'autonomy' has quite a radical programmatic content, coming close to what is described in other countries as 'secession'. For the sake of a comparative analysis, we will have to define the terms 'secessionist movement' and 'secessionist process' in such a way that they may describe even those processes where the concept of secession is absent from political debates or is replaced by terms such as 'autonomy'.

The terms 'secession', 'secessionist movements' and 'secessionist processes' refer in scientific literature to acts of withdrawal from the authority of the central government. The most radical form of withdrawal is the creation of a sovereign and independent state, which is what is generally meant when the term 'secession' is used. The terms 'secessionist movement' and 'secessionist process', however, mean more than movements or processes leading to full independence. It is generally accepted among authors writing on this subject that the forms of withdrawal from the authority of a central government may differ widely. The policies of secessionist movements may result not only in independence, but also in the constitution of an autonomous political unit within a federal state based on the principles of self-rule and shared sovereignty, or in the constitution of a sovereign state within a confederal union of states. Groups may seek either full sovereignty or, simply, greater political autonomy.[31] Seen from this perspective, secessionist movements or secessionist processes may lead to independence, but this is not necessarily the case. It only makes sense to use these two terms, however, in a context where the break-up of the existing state and the creation of a new, independent state may be regarded as a real possibility. Not all federalist movements are secessionist. Nor should all processes of federalization, regionalization or increased autonomy at a sub-national level be regarded as secessionist. The transformation of federated states into independent ones, for instance, is an

option in the Belgian federalization process but not in the Federal Republic of Germany. The political dynamics of these processes have to be taken into account in order to classify them.

This broad conception of secessionist movements and processes, in which they lead to a new (independent) state unit on the international scene or to a new (federated) state unit on the domestic scene, may contrast with the commonly accepted meanings of these terms. Representatives of political movements who intend to withdraw their community from the authority of the state may deny that they are secessionists when, for instance, they are striving for the right to national self-determination within the framework of a federal state. They may regard membership of a federal state as more appropriate than independence for attaining such a right, taking their particular political circumstances into account. It does not make sense, however, to use these movements' own definition of themselves. Not the rhetoric or declared intentions of political movements, based on their own perspectives, but rather the consequences of their actions, or the objective process of which their actions are part, should be assessed. Even in those federations in which the right to secession is not constitutionally enshrined, the choice of secession – understood as a withdrawal from the authority of the central government – remains a possibility which federal structures cannot preclude. This is particularly true for ethno-federal constructions. Ethno-federations, which are based on the principle of self-government for ethnic communities and on the principle of shared sovereignty between them, have to be regarded as open systems. Ever-increasing powers in a constitutional transformation process may culminate in full state sovereignty for the federated states and the dissolution of the federation. In this volume, no fewer than seven contributions on ethno-federal experiments have been included. The cases of Yugoslavia, Quebec, Flanders, Ukraine, Tatarstan, Chechnya and Abkhazia clearly demonstrate that the capacity of federal arrangements to contain secessionist movements may vary significantly.

The Institutional Context and Instrumentality of Scientific Knowledge

The first question formulated above - on the kind of relationship that exists between scholars and political leaders - refers to the institutional context of scholarship on secession. It may be useful, as a way of introducing the different case-studies, to reflect on some more general characteristics of the politicization of modern social sciences. In most countries it is the academic world that has become responsible for determining the boundaries of the social science profession, the nature and identity of the discipline, its principles, and its scope and

methods of enquiry. In some situations, not only social scientists but also publicists, politicians and administrators actively participate in the development of specific areas of scholarship. In such circumstances, academia may not be the exclusive determinant of its fields of knowledge. The form of such external interference differs according to discipline. Archaeologists, for instance, need substantial state support in order to carry out their primary research, which makes them particularly vulnerable to questions about their loyalty to the state or government.[32] Similar examples can be given for other scientific disciplines. This is a problem both of moral integrity and of methodology.

Normally, academia, research institutes and the professional associations of social scientists hold a near-monopoly over definitions of what constitutes scientific knowledge and how it is to be attained. This situation gives the social scientists not only a privileged position of authority, but also power. They regard themselves, and are perceived by others, as experts, possessing a certain 'cultural capital' which is sought out by political and social agents, as well as by the public at large. By assigning meaning to political dynamics, and by formulating beliefs, myths and symbols that are put into action in politics, social scientists also exert an overall influence on political debates. Often, the general public is aware only of the simplified or popularized versions of social knowledge. Such restrained and 'made simple' forms of information may be conveyed by the social scientists, in conjunction with the media. Popular knowledge may influence the public in numerous ways. It may contribute to the process of forming national identity, as well as to the public's political activity. There is always a possibility that this audience will regard this simplified social cognizance, with its components such as myths, as actually constituting received wisdom.[33]

Instrumentalism is a phenomenon intrinsic to the social sciences. After all, modern social sciences came into existence not only to give theoretical accounts of society, but also to provide answers to social problems. Even though, over time, in social science the notions of the 'betterment', 'amelioration' and 'social engineering' of society have become somewhat attenuated, they still persist. It is precisely the notion of instrumentalism that links social science cognitive structures, social knowledge and political action. Requests to the social sciences to exercise their instrumental, problem-solving potential may come from society or from the discipline itself. The public at large may demand that the often government-funded social sciences should be 'concerned' with 'real-life' issues, and should offer knowledge that will be useful for solving social problems. Public authorities may channel funding towards applied types of social scientific research, which they see as being 'concerned' with 'real-life' problems. This may cause fundamental social science research to be under-funded. After all, political players are primarily interested in knowledge that advances their agendas. Finally, the demand for instrumental knowledge may actually come from the social

scientists themselves. They may promote their 'cultural capital' as consisting of a theoretically driven analysis of 'real' social problems, and as public-policy oriented social cognizance deemed indispensable for political decisions and public policy analysis.[34]

Most social scientists do not consider themselves to be neatly quarantined from the 'real world'. This means that they regard themselves as ultimately confronting 'real-life' issues. Thus 'concerned' status is inevitably bestowed on their social scholarship and knowledge. The issue of separatism or secession may serve to illustrate this situation. Some social scientists may put their opinions on the subject and their social scientific endeavours into different mental compartments. Others may avoid explicit references to separatism, while actually allowing their preoccupation with secession to colour their scholarship. There may be social scientists who actually indulge in a straightforward advocacy of autonomy or independence, while maintaining their academic rigour. Real-life political issues, such as the question of secession, may impact in a subconscious way on social scientific scholarship. The tendency to apply the label of 'concerned' scholarship only to works advocating secession may therefore be inappropriate. After all, social science scholarship that stands for the status quo may be equally 'concerned'. The same applies to such identifiers as 'tendentious', 'propagandistic' and 'nationalistic'. Often, these terms are used in a derogatory and dismissive way, to deride pro-secessionist learning, as if pro-status quo scholarship cannot possibly exhibit these traits. 'Concern' with the maintenance of existing polities, or with secession, does not necessarily mean the automatic enlistment of the social scientists in activist partisan causes. 'Concerned' scholarship and cognition do not necessarily have immediate political usefulness.[35]

The political constellation and the academic and intellectual traditions of a country determine how scholarly and political concerns will interact, and to what extent and in what forms the social sciences may be instrumentalized. Western countries generally have a solid and long-standing tradition of academic freedom. The emergence of a public sphere, access to the publishing market and the possibility of moving from universities to public life or other professions gave scholars significantly increased intellectual liberties.[36] Such liberties did not exclude the involvement of intellectuals in the process of constructing a national identity. A well-known example of ideological involvement is the English Whig interpretation of history, with its emphasis on the particularity of England's parliamentary tradition and liberty, which easily became a discourse on national exceptionalism, a complacent account of success, whereby England's providential history could serve as a legitimization for a sense of national mission and a justification for empire-building.[37] In the contemporary context, Hans Morgenthau considers that the choices open to academics in the West – they can serve, confront or ignore government – are all necessary roles. But he also stresses the

necessity for academics to retain a certain immunity from outside pressure through job security, in particular through tenure.[38] He warns of the existence of an 'academic-political complex in which the interests of the government are inextricably intertwined with the interests of large groups of academics. These ties are both formal and informal, and the latter are the more dangerous to intellectual freedom, as they consist in the intellectuals' unconscious adaptation to imperceptible social and political pressures'.[39]

In this volume, two particular forms of interaction between social scientists and policy makers are analysed. In both cases, the state takes a far more active role in shaping scientific production than is generally the case in the Western scientific tradition. The first type of instrumental relationship between power and knowledge is found in communist regimes, and the second in the so-called 'late nations', which are defined by their relatively recent attainment of statehood. Late nations have not necessarily acquired independent statehood. Federated states such as Quebec or Flanders may also be regarded as late nations. Within the Soviet federal framework, a certain form of statehood was granted to Union republics such as Ukraine and to autonomous republics such as Tatarstan, Chechnya and Abkhazia. In the case of Chechnya and Abkhazia, the concept of 'late nation' refers to states that are currently striving for international recognition of their de facto independence. The following distinction between the main characteristics of the type of interaction between scholars and political leadership existing in communist regimes on the one hand, and late nations on the other, is not to imply that these types of interaction are mutually exclusive. Some of the studies on the post-Soviet world presented in this volume clearly demonstrate that, in concrete cases, characteristics of both types may be present simultaneously. These contributions deal with the development of social knowledge in late nations that were governed according to communist principles.

The instrumentality of the social sciences in the Soviet Union demonstrated a particular configuration. The institutional arrangements of this polity were designed to ensure closeness between social scientists and public authorities. In addition, there tended to be a lack of distinction between the public and private spheres, which favoured interventionist involvement by politicians and administrators in the academic realm. Not only did the authorities identify the spokesperson for the discipline, but they also determined the general political and ideological principles that the social sciences were expected to follow. The principles served as the taken-for-granted basis for what were claimed to be social-scientific mental frameworks and social knowledge. The task of social scientists was limited to the 'fine tuning' of uncontested, top-down induced frameworks, and to reproduce social knowledge with a 'within system' bias. The peculiarity of the frameworks used for cognizance and of the social knowledge itself was that both were highly prescriptive, laudatory and apologetic. In addition, the rhetoric of the

social sciences tended to be replete with myths. Finally, the scholarship itself utilized a hegemonic and officialese *langue de bois*. Even though the social sciences tended to be perceived as assisting in the implementation of political agendas, in reality their instrumentality was limited to the legitimization of the regime. Otherwise, this form of social knowledge offered little usefulness to the public authorities for tackling 'real-life' social problems, or for establishing public policies. Yet there tended to be an aura around this highly ideologized, 'bureaucratic scholarship', as if it actually constituted applied research.[40]

The knowledge systems of late nations tend to exhibit a peculiar form of instrumentalism. Their knowledge systems and social cognizance are often produced in situations where there is little distance between public intellectuals in general and those involved in learned enterprises. In addition, there is a blurring of the distinction between the humanities and the social sciences. The public intellectuals concerned with such matters repeatedly find themselves outside official academic structures. Late-nation scholarship becomes institutionalized in civic associations, provided it is allowed by the state. The instrumentality of 'late-nation' scholarship resides in an attempt to grasp 'the national problem' theoretically, and to offer a 'concerned' way of overcoming it. Such social science is assumed to lend support to the process of nation– and possibly state-building endeavours. The myths generated by late-nation scholarship are intended to challenge the myths propagated by the dominant scholarly projects of the country of which a late nation is a component entity. In addition, the myths are instrumental in moulding a late nation's identity. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that this essentially normative, evaluative and prescriptive scholarship is devoted solely to myth-building. Much of this scholarship is just as sound as that of 'established' nations.[41]

The notion of culture tends to receive a good deal of attention in late nations. In such circumstances, culture does not refer simply to ideational aspects of behaviour, such as beliefs, myths, historical ideas and their related values, as well as knowledge. Culture, in fact, acts as a surrogate for politics. Public intellectuals – social scientists included – generate '*discours nationalitaires*' or 'nationalizing discourses'. Although consciously produced, these discourses are also determined by cultural knowledge. 'Nationalizing discourses' are intent on generating social knowledge inspired by insights drawn from the cultural environment, heritage and traditions of 'late nations'. Otherwise, this discourse would be artificial and would not find a receptive audience. Various solidarity myths, such as those pertaining to a common national ancestry, language, history, and so on, constitute important elements of any such discourse. 'Nationalizing discourses' help to forge a collective 'sharedness' and 'togetherness', or an 'imagined' national community.[42]

Clearly, the elaboration by the social sciences of such sensitive issues as nationhood and statehood is not confined to the case of late nations. Govern-

ments or political movements in any context may be preoccupied with such questions and may elicit social science-expertise in these domains. In some instances, 'national' or 'state problems' may focus on how to maintain existing political arrangements, as well as state boundaries. In other instances, 'state' or 'national problems' may refer to desired changes in existing polities, border shifts or secession. Both public authorities and political movements may value and give a high priority to social science scholarship that expounds the notion of communality. Political agents with secessionist agendas may require social scientists to help develop the notion of this communality, with their own future national-statehood in mind. Governments intent on halting separatism may value scholarship that emphasizes the idea of a civic understanding of nationhood or of multiculturalism. Social knowledge that predicts a collective solidarity web is of interest to all political players.[43]

Choosing between Disciplines

The second question addressed in the various case-studies in this volume concerns the kinds of scientific discipline that are prominent in debates on secession and the kinds of normative argument they are able to support. In nation-building discourses, history looms large. History is traditionally close to public discourse. Nicola Gallerano explains this phenomenon by the fact that the 'political function of historiography is to regulate memory and oblivion in order to shape the characteristics and the collective identity of a community and to distinguish it from others; and to construct, thanks to the past, a project and a prophesy for the future'.[44] History is, moreover, 'a scientific activity *sui generis*, whose cognitive dimension touches and mingles with the affective dimension, which is steeped in values, predilections, and non-scientific or pre-scientific discourse',[45] and as such it is easily amenable to transformation into a vulgarized public discourse. History as a scientific discipline is itself closely linked with the development of national identity. The transformation of history into a professional practice based on scientific rules in fact paralleled the construction of national histories. European historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were deeply involved in the writing of histories with a markedly teleological point of view. For them, the construction of a national state was the ultimate goal of national history. They shared a conception of the past as a country which was seen as an adumbration of the present. In this respect, present-day historians who espouse a secessionist cause are often repeating a traditional pattern in writing national histories. This pattern remains highly influential, despite the fact that recent generations of historians have severely criticized the teleological features of such historiography and its projection of present-day values onto the past.

While history offers the narrative of a nation's development and destiny, the social sciences contribute to the formulation of nationalist claims and self-affirmations. Sociology plays a role because of its interest in the social cohesion of a nation: 'Only through a sociological understanding can the fraternity of a nation be grasped; and so, in turn, it is hardly surprising if one of the central preoccupations of sociology has been with social cohesion and types of community, and the ways in which social change, particularly modernization, has undermined or facilitated new kinds of community'.[46] This concern with social cohesion was articulated for example by the French intellectuals who launched a revival of republican nationalism in the late 1980s. Following Durkheim, they emphasized the importance of the national bond for social integration.[47] Such visions can, however, also be deployed by secessionists, contrasting their 'real' national community with the 'artificial' one of the state.

In many contemporary secessionist crises, the economy plays an important role, particularly in political discussions on discriminatory redistribution to certain nationalities. Theories explaining uneven development among regions are a fruitful terrain in the search for legitimation for secession. The theory of internal colonialism, for instance, which highlights the role of governments in reproducing uneven development and discriminating against minorities, has had a strong impact on the political discourses of national minorities in Western Europe, particularly in the 1970s.[48] The popularity of the theory of internal colonialism among intellectuals active in national minority groups was due largely to the universal relevance of its vocabulary of exploitation and colonialism. As international law justifies secession by colonies from the colonizing country, the theory of internal colonialism made it possible to extend this form of legitimacy to some developed countries where the situation of minorities could be described in these terms. A further ground for the wide acceptance of this theory among secessionist groups was its historical dimension, highlighting the continuity of colonialism across the ages. Such a type of narrative could easily be linked to a teleological discourse on nation-building, where national emancipation would appear to be the inevitable outcome of political struggle.

Truthfulness and Moral Responsibility

The third and final topic addressed in the various contributions to this volume has to do with the criteria for scientific objectivity and truthfulness in discourses for, against and about secession, and how scholars involved in such debates reflect on these criteria and on their moral responsibility as scholars. The social sciences have developed heuristic devices for making sense of the social world. The various cognitive structures, frameworks, approaches, and the like, are sup-

posed to render genuine and true accounts of social reality. Acting as frames of reference, they establish the criteria for truthfulness and channel enquiry and meaning in one direction, to the exclusion of others. Even though the frames of reference are the products of conscious and cognizant players, they are contextually conditioned. Their assumptions about reality are based on culturally acknowledged truth criteria. Over time, these reference frameworks, as systems of internalized acquired learning, take on an almost independent existence, and become a *habitus* for those who subscribe to them. Consequently, social scientists may become imprisoned by such a *habitus*, which was essentially of their own making in the first place.[49]

The various case-studies in this book analyse how such systems of acquired learning react and are being transformed during debates on secession crises. It may be assumed not only that the institutional setting in which scientific research takes place is of great importance in establishing the criteria for truthfulness, but also that the crisis which has affected scientific institutions – as it has, for instance, in Eastern Europe since *perestroika* and *glasnost* – may lead to a profound transformation of the guiding principles on which scientific production is based. It may further be assumed that the types of discussion on objectivity and truthfulness will not be the same in all the social science disciplines involved in discussing secession, and that the types of reflection on their involvement also differ widely. A third assumption concerns the specific nature of the social sciences and the humanities, as compared with the natural sciences, when confronted with their moral and political responsibility for the possible use and abuse made of their knowledge. The involvement of natural scientists in the peace movement during the Cold War was related to the moral dimension of their scientific activities. It had nothing to do with the methodological rules to be followed by scientific research. Social science dealing with research on nationalities after the Cold War has been affected in a different way by deontological considerations. Contrary to the reaction of natural scientists during the Cold War – who founded associations or scientific journals such as *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* to discuss the application of scientific knowledge by the military-industrial complex – historians and other social scientists have directed their criticism of the abuse of knowledge directly against their peers. The self-critique of the social sciences has taken the form of traditional scientific polemics on methods and ideas.

Historiography is a good example of this type of critical reflection. In the 1990s, historiography became the focus of moral reprimand when it was perceived as being responsible for the strengthening of nationalist currents in Eastern and Central Europe. This critique primarily took the form of a self-critique. Eric Hobsbawm, for example, reflected on the disruptive power of knowledge in the following terms: 'For historians are to nationalism what poppygrowers in

Pakistan are to heroin addicts; we supply the essential raw material for the market'.[50] Many similar statements are to be found in the literature on recent ethnic conflicts. The use and abuse of history in the Yugoslav wars, for instance, is a widely publicized topic, which confronts us with the fact that knowledge means power and that power may be used to various ends. By editing (together with Terence Ranger) the volume *Invented Traditions*, Eric Hobsbawm has himself made a prominent contribution to this critique of nationalist instrumentalization, by highlighting how many venerable and allegedly age-old 'national' traditions are in fact quite recent inventions (e.g. the Scottish kilt), often the conscious creations of governments and/or nationalist militants.[51] Another prominent scholar of nationalism, Ernest Gellner, has argued that nationalist historical narratives suffer from a pervasive false consciousness. Of nationalism, he wrote: 'Its myths invert reality: it claims to defend folk culture while in fact it is forging a high culture; it claims to protect an old folk society while in fact helping to build up an anonymous mass society.'[52] For Gellner, nationalism – the tendency whereby 'societies worship themselves brazenly and openly'[53] – is an ideology of self-interest.

While agreeing that national identities are cultural constructs, other scholars of nationalism such as Benedict Anderson and Anthony Smith have critiqued this merely instrumentalist vision of nationalism. Rather than interpreting 'invention' as 'fabrication' and 'falsity', they propose to understand it as 'imagining' and 'creation'.[54] Anthony Smith thus focuses on how national imaginings sustain national cohesion by presenting 'a vision of ethnic fraternity of elites and masses through a historical drama' which evokes 'deeper meanings of collective destiny and community in the face of the dangerous fragmentation and alienation that modern industrialism and science unfold'.[55] This process actively involves intellectuals, since they act both as producers of scientific knowledge and as myth-transmitters.[56] Scientific disciplines 'translate the idealised images of the ethnic past into tactile realities, according to modern canons of knowledge'.[57] Nations and their traditions may be inventions, but they are seldom mere fabrications,[58] since myths are themselves constrained by the language of science. At the same time, the disciplines in the social sciences are themselves involved in constructing a vision of a national community (sociology) and in rooting national identities in the past (history and archaeology).[59]

At the methodological level, historians have reacted by criticizing primordialist assumptions in defining ethnic and national identities (which locate the birth of an ethnic group at the beginning of recorded history), and by refuting claims about the immutability of national groups and their identification with a particular territory. Similar reflections on methodological fallacies resulting from an attempt to define timeless and unchanging boundaries in national identities can be found in other disciplines. Archaeologists have highlighted the importance of

cultural diffusion and the concomitant porosity of ethnic boundaries. Anthropologists have documented the emergence of ethnic identities in Third World countries as a (not always intended) consequence of colonial policies. By affirming that 'a language is a dialect which has an army and a navy', linguists have likewise debunked claims about the primordial status of language.[60] Scholars who, with such criticism, highlight the shifting and often contingent nature of ethnic and national identities, are nevertheless aware of their continued political relevance.

Mythological Knowledge

One of the key terms to be found in scholarship on nationalism and its political impact is 'myth'. The term itself, as explained by Joanna Overing, goes back to the distinction made in Greek philosophy, in the fifth century BC, between 'logos' and 'muthos', which became a constituent of the Western conception of scientific thought. In the tradition of the Enlightenment, myth was understood as a still uncivilized mode of thought, opposed to logos or reason itself. In the twentieth century, it gradually lost its exclusively negative connotation. Even if mythological knowledge does not necessarily have anything to say about the 'real world' (knowledge of which remained reserved for scientific discourse), and is therefore irrational and false, it still gives an outsider access to the worldview of a particular culture.[61] Myths are a favourite subject of anthropological research. In 1997, Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin edited the collective volume *Myths and Nationhood* in which, together with scholars such as Anthony Smith and Andrew Wilson, they applied this concept to particular traditions in historiography.[62] Myths are analysed on the basis of their contribution to the social cohesion of a community by, for instance, legitimizing the social order, upholding particular identities or enabling identity transfers.[63]

With the creation of myths, identities can shift more easily, or a new identity can be superimposed on an older one, during radical transformation processes. In the creation of the post-Soviet states, for instance, there was a need to create new identities which had to replace or be superimposed on the old Soviet identity. The simplification of reality as a precondition for facilitating communication within a political community, and for enabling the community to respond in a coherent way to radical challenges, is central to such an analysis. Myths are not seen as being congruent with reality in the sense of a scientific truth, but as expressing a community's postulates about reality. These postulates are of both a moral and a cognitive nature.[64] Myths are not freely invented or imagined. In order to be adopted by those who control and direct public communication, they have to be acceptable to public opinion at large. They have to have a certain

relationship with the memory of the community, in order to elicit its consent, and for this purpose falsified or invented materials are quite inappropriate.[65]

This conception of myths is particularly important for the analysis of scientific production in late nations. Myths are constructed, but at the same time they are grounded in common cultural experiences and socially shared beliefs. Myths capture national cultural values, organize a multitude of social beliefs, and blur the line dividing past from present. Clusters of myths offer nation-specific schemata, and contribute towards nationally peculiar structures of cultural knowledge. Myths assure nations of a 'worthwhile distinctiveness', hence their particular importance for 'late nations', as these communities may be lacking in indubitable collective memory. Myths extend them instant gratification, by offering a respectable national past, which is recalibrated if necessary. Myths that attribute antique origins to national identities root them in sentiments of eternity and destiny that parallel the religious imagining.[66] Ancestry, founding and other myths sustaining 'late nations' dispute the long-standing myths of established nations. This being so, the public intellectuals and social scientists of a 'late nation' and those belonging to the states of which a 'late nation' is a part may deride each other's scholarship as being untrue, unrealistic, artificial, and riddled with myths, in the negative sense of the word. Conversely, the social-scientific formulations of one's own national community are depicted as being true, authentic, realistic, and devoid of myths.[67]

Myths appeal to the legitimate moral claims of particular communities and have to be congruent with their perception of reality. But what, then, is the difference between the truth of mythical knowledge and the truth of scientific knowledge? What is the difference between the normative meaning of a myth and the normative discourse of political theory? The difficulty in answering this question indicates that the traditional distinction between logos and muthos has only limited value for analysing the characteristics of secessionist discourses and their use of scientific disciplines. Several arguments can be given to support this thesis. First, mythical and scientific discourses share the characteristic of being ineffective when they are manipulated, created or imagined at will. They each have to rely on collective memories or historical facts, which remain external to their discourses. In this respect, the 'true' content of mythical knowledge and its moral message cannot be dismissed as being in opposition to an enlightened logos.

Second, neither can it be stated that the transformation of existing scientific approaches on the basis of ideological needs (the creation of new 'myths') necessarily has negative consequences for what is traditionally described as one of the main features of scientific progress, namely, methodological precision in assessing reality. Ethnically inspired archaeology may, as stated by Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett, help to 'build justifiable pride in a specific cultural tradition' and

simultaneously stimulate 'research into the past development of that tradition'.[68] Nationalism, for instance, had a decisive influence on archaeology, causing the original focus on evolution to be shifted over to the record of particular peoples. This had a positive effect on methodology, as it stressed the importance of a systematic description of spatial variations.[69]

Third, what is even more important in this context is the fact that too strong a focus on the dichotomy between mythological and scientific discourses may distract attention from the problem of objectivity in scientific research itself. Myths are described as being reductive in creating a particular coherent apprehension of reality, and as being inward-oriented in creating legitimacy for the moral claims of a particular community. The ascription of such characteristics to the world of myths does not solve the problem of their presence in standard scientific research. Normative and cognitive elements are intermingled in 'myths of territory' and 'myths of oppression'. They are likewise intermingled in any scientific analysis of migration processes in history and in the economic analysis of discriminatory redistribution. When we ascribe everything we consider irrational or illegitimate in scientific discourse to the world of myths, the question of objectivity in social science and the problem of formulating rules for scientific research remain unresolved.

The relativization of the distinction between scientific and mythological knowledge should not necessarily lead to the abandonment of this distinction or to epistemological relativism and moral scepticism. On the contrary, the presence of opposing national narratives – characteristic of secessionist crises – confronts scholars with the question of how to evaluate such narratives, and thus requires reflection on the scientific standards for choosing between alternative narratives and explanations of events. Almost inevitably, however, such reflection also includes a normative dimension – a judgement on the impact of such narratives on political events, and thus on the moral responsibility of historians and social scientists. The cases put forward in this book offer material for such reflection. They discuss a wide variety of political situations, and of political involvement by historians and social scientists, but they all concur in observing a particular relation between scholarly and political concerns. By comparing the problems raised by such a relation, we aim to give structure to this field of research, to systematize the research questions involved, and thus to make a contribution towards a better understanding of secession.

Notes

[1] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1985, p. 230.

2   See the overview of the main issues in the debate on international relations theory: Charles W. Kegley Jr, 'The Foundations of International Relations Theory and the Resurrection of the Realist-Liberal Debate', in Charles W. Kegley Jr (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory. Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge,* New York, St Martin's Press, 1995, p. 32.

3   Giovanni Sartori, 'Philosophy, Theory and the Science of Politics', *Political Theory*, Vol. 2, May 1974, pp. 133-162. Allen Buchanan, *Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1991.

4   Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1981, pp. 62-67, 156, 179-180. Barry Clark, *Political Economy*, Westport, Praeger, 1991, pp. x-xii. Oskar Lange, 'Note sur l'idéologie et les tendances dans la recherche en sciences économiques', *Revue internationale des sciences sociales*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1964, pp. 567-573.

5   A good overview of the different empirical approaches to secession is to be found in Ralph R. Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson (eds), *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, London, Pinter, 1990, pp. 12-29.

6   According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, in international relations theory the first meaning is generally to be found in Europe, whereas Americans would use a more demanding concept of theory. Cf. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, 'Security Complexes: A Theory of Regional Security', paper presented to the conference 'Central Asia in a New Security Context', organized by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm on 2-3 September 1999.

7   Jeremy Waldron, 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative', in Will Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 98.

8   Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', *op. cit.*, pp. 17-24.

9   Percy B. Lehning (ed.), *Theories of Secession*, London/New York, Routledge, 1998. See also Michel Huysseune, *An Analysis of the Relation Between Research in the Social Sciences and Nation-Building Discourses: the Case of the Lega Nord in Italy*, doctoral dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2001, p. 22.

10 Margaret Moore (ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.

11 Rogers Brubaker, 'Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism', in *ibid.*, p. 260.

12 Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970; Bruno Latour, *Science in Action. How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1987.

13 See e.g. Jeffrey Alexander, who argues that there is 'always an eschatology, not merely an epistemology, in theorizing about social change'. Cf. Jeffrey A. Alexander, 'Modern, Anti, Post, and Neo: How Social Theories Have Tried to Understand the "New World" of "Our Time"', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994, pp. 165-197. Quotation p. 167.

14 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949 (originally published as *Ideologie und Utopie*, Bonn, F. Cohen, 1929), p. 75.

15 See e.g. Hayden White, *The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourses and Historical Representations*, Baltimore/London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

16 Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 77.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 136-146.

19 Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo academicus*, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1984, pp. 11-52.

20 Zygmunt Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters. On Modernity, Post-modernity and Intellectuals*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, p. 4.

21 *Ibid.*

22 Bourdieu, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

23 It was first published in German in 1968 but became popular in its English translation in 1985. On Hroch see Louis Vos, 'Nationalisme: Reflecties van een Historicus', *Cahiers d'histoire du temps présent*, No. 3, 1997, pp. 291-320.

24 Quoted in John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 130.

25 John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism. The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation-State*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1987.

26 Bruno Jobert and Pierre Muller, *L'Etat en action*, Paris, PUF, 1987, pp. 67-70; Luk Van Langenhove, 'Rethinking the Social Sciences? A Point of View', in *The Social Sciences at a Turning Point,* Paris, OECD, 1999, pp. 45-47.

27 Burton R. Clark and Guy R. Neave (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Higher Education*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Vol. 4, 1992, pp. 1981-1989 and 2071-2080.

28 On 8 December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus signed a Joint Declaration, establishing a Commonwealth of Independent States and stating that 'the objective process of secession by republics from the USSR and the formation of independent states have become a reality' (Abram Chayes *et al.*, 'The Development of US Policy Toward the Former Soviet Union', in Alexei Arbatov *et al.*, *Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1997, p. 493). The term *vykhod* (literally meaning 'exit'), used in the original Russian text, may indeed be loosely translated as secession. The exact Russian term for secession, however, would be *otdelenie*. The term *vykhod* was also used in the paragraph of the various Soviet constitutions giving the right of secession to the Union republics.

29 *The Economist*, 19 December 1998.

30 See the interview with the Abkhaz president Vladislav Ardzinba in *Moscow News*, No. 39, 8-14 October 1998, p. 5.

31 Cf. Allen Buchanan, 'Secession and Nationalism', in Robert E. Goodin and Philip Petit (eds*)*, *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Oxford/Cambridge, Mass., Basil Blackwell, 1993, p. 587; see also Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232. S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe makes a distinction between separatism, defined as 'an attempt that seeks some degree of self-government short of total independence for a minority in conflict with the existing state' and secession, conceived as 'an attempt to establish a separate sovereign state', Introduction to Premdas, de A. Samarasinghe and Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 2. In our opinion, it makes more sense to view secession as a gradual process which may be used as a synonym for separatism, rather than to make a clear-cut distinction between separatism, conceived as a search for autonomy, and secession, defined as a search for sovereignty.

32 Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett, 'Archaeology in the Service of the State: Theoretical Considerations', in Philip L. Kohl and Clare Fawcett (eds), *Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 8.

33 Bjorn Wittrock and Peter Wagner, 'Social Science and the Building of the Early Welfare State: Towards a Comparison of Statist and Non-Statist Western Societies', in Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *States, Social Knowledge, and the Origin of Modern Social Policies*, Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 90-113.

34 J. Michael Brittain, 'Les frontières culturelles des sciences sociales dans les années 1990', *Revue internationale des sciences sociales*, Vol. 39, No. 119, 1989, pp. 111-122.

35 Richard P. Nathan, *Social Sciences in Government,* New York, Basic Books, 1988, pp. 31-56; *Sciences sociales et décisions*, Paris, OECD, 1979, pp. 30-35.

[36] Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore, 'Apologias for the Nation-state in Western Europe since 1800', in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (eds), *Writing National Histories. Western Europe Since 1800*, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 3-14.

[37] Benedict Stuchtey, 'Literature, Liberty and Life of the Nation. British Historiography from Macaulay to Trevelyan', in Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan and Kevin Passmore (eds), *Writing National Histories. Western Europe Since 1800*, London, Routledge, 1999, pp. 30-46.

[38] See the Preface to Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (eds), *Two Worlds of International Relations*, London/New York, Routledge, 1994, pp. vi-vii.

[39] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade. 1960-70*, London, Pall Mall Press, 1970. See also the Preface to Hill and Beshoff, *op. cit.*, p. vii.

[40] Kenneth Dyson, *The State Tradition in Western Europe*, Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1980, pp. 81-110. Rainer Lepsius, 'Sociology in Germany and Austria 1919-1954', *EUI Working Papers*, No. 104, 1984, pp. 60-71. Françoise Thom, *La Langue de bois*, Paris, Julliard, 1987, pp. 63-107.

[41] Bernard Giesen, *Intellectuals and the Nation*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 22-40. Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos, 'Nation and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe', in Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos (eds), *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 9-37.

[42] Anouar Abdel Malek, *L'Egypte: société militaire*, Paris, Seuil, 1962. The author probably originated the concept '*discours nationalitaire*'. Rogers Brubaker, 'National Minorities, Nationalising States, and External Homelands in the New Europe', *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 2, 1995, pp. 107-132. Brubaker's more recent usage rests on a slightly different conceptualization.

[43] Françoise Lorcerie, 'Les sciences sociales au service de l'identité nationale', in Denis-Constant Martin (ed.), *Cartes d'identité: Comment dit-on 'nous' en politique?,* Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1994, pp. 245-281.

[44] Nicola Gallerano, 'History and the Public Use of History', in François Bédarida (ed.), *The Social Responsibility of the Historian*, Providence/Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1994, p. 90.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[46] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1986, p. 172.

[47] Lorcerie, *op.cit.*, especially p. 252.

[48] The main theoretician of internal colonialism was Michael Hechter. In his historical overview of uneven development in Great Britain, he argued that the Celtic fringe of the United Kingdom had systematically been discriminated against and kept in a state of dependence by British governments, to the advantage of the English part of the country. See Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.

[49] Johann Mouton, 'The Structuration of Social Knowledge', in Jana Gosporikova *et al.* (eds), *Methodological Challenges of Interdisciplinary Research in the Social Sciences*, Pretoria, HSRC Publishers, 1996, pp. 31-50. Bruno Maggi, 'Les conceptions de la formation', *Economies et sociétés*, Vol. 30, Nos 11-12, 1996, pp. 151-177. Yves Surel, 'The Role of Cognitive and Normative Frames in Policy-Making', *EUI Working Paper*, RSC 98/45, 1998.

[50] Quoted in Kohl and Fawcett, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[51] Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983 (especially Eric J. Hobsbawm, 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914', pp. 263-307).

[52] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1983, p. 124.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[54] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1983, p. 15.

[55] Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 173.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 172.

[60] Anna Laura Lepschy, Giulio Lepschy and Miriam Voghera, 'Linguistic Variety in Italy', in Carl Levy (ed.), *Italian Regionalism, History, Identity and Politics*, Oxford/Washington, D.C., Berg, 1996, p. 70.

[61] Joanna Overing, 'The Role of Myth: An Anthropological Perspective, Or: The Reality of the Really Made-Up', in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (eds), *Myths and Nationhood*, London, Hurst & Company, 1997, pp. 1-18.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] George Schöpflin, 'The Functions of Myths and a Taxonomy of Myths', in *ibid.*, pp. 19-35.

[64] Overing, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[65] Schöpflin, *op. cit.*, p. 26, Andrew Wilson, 'Myths of National Identity in Belarus and Ukraine', in Kohl and Fawcett (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[66] Anderson, *Imagined Communities, op.cit.*, pp. 17-20.

[67] Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, London, Penguin Books, 1999, pp. 22-23 and pp. 65-68.

[68] Kohl and Fawcett, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[69] See Bruce G. Trigger, 'Romanticism, Nationalism, and Archaeology', in Kohl and Fawcett (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 269.