

9. Intellectual Discourses in the Taiwan Independence Movement¹

Attempts have been made to establish theories of secession for both analytical and normative purposes. Comparative studies of present-day secessionist movements have been conducted in the search for a comprehensive analytical framework. Looking critically at several political theories, Ralph R. Premdas has designed a framework that strives to be both simple and comprehensive at the same time.² Summarized briefly, he proposes five dimensions to be examined in an empirical case-study of a secessionist movement: 1) the causes of secession, including the primordial variables (language, religion, race, values or culture and territory), and the secondary factors (neglect, exploitation, domination and internal colonialism, repression and discrimination, and forced annexation); 2) the organization, ideology and leadership of the movement; 3) the governing regime and its institutional framework; 4) modes of conflict management; 5) the international dimension, such as external allies, support or intervention.³ When discussing these five dimensions, Premdas points to the importance of the role of intellectuals in the movement. In his view, 'the right to secede and determine a group's destiny is asserted in diametrical opposition to another sacred right, that of a state to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity: the latter is also a right sanctioned by the UN. Secession, then, is not an uncontested moral claim made in a vacuum and yielded to without argument and challenge'.⁴ In the secessionist and anti-secessionist movements, therefore, what counts is not only the physical power but also the moral discourse of the parties involved.

It is my endeavour in this chapter to analyse the secessionist movement in Taiwan with the focus on the role of pro-secession intellectuals and their discourses. Along with the historical evolution of the movement, several points need to be looked at closely. These include the role of intellectuals in the movement, the major disciplines employed in the pro-independence discourse, the content of the discourse and the implications of this case-study for the discussion on secessionist movements in general. Owing to the limited scope of this

chapter, it will not be possible to analyse the anti-secessionist intellectual discourses in the People's Republic of China and in Taiwan, and the debates between pro- and anti-secessionists.

Background

Territory

Today our understanding of Taiwan includes the island of Taiwan itself, the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands (numbering 64 in all), the Offshore Islands (the Jinmen and Mazu groups, also known as the Quemoy and Matsu groups in English) and a handful of islands in the South China Sea. The island of Taiwan is geographically separated from Mainland China by 100 miles of water. There are also several other names for Taiwan: Formosa (a name given by the Portuguese, the first Westerners to set foot on the island – a word meaning 'beautiful' in their language), Nationalist China, the Republic of China (ROC), and more recently 'Island China'. To avoid confusion, throughout the text the terms "Taiwan Island" and "Taiwan" will be used when referring to different geographical territories, the former meaning the main island and the latter including all of the islands.

Population and Ethnic Composition

Taiwan has a population of 22 million people, which is divided into three (sub-) ethnic groups: Taiwanese, Mainlanders, and Aborigines. According to the 1990 census, approximately 85 per cent are Taiwanese, 14 per cent Mainlanders, and slightly more than 1 per cent are Aborigines. One important criterion for differentiating between the ethnic groups is the date of their settlement in Taiwan. The Aborigines and their descendants, who are of Malay-Polynesian origin, are the original inhabitants of Taiwan.⁵ The Taiwanese and their offspring are those who emigrated from Mainland China before the second world war. This category is further subdivided into two groups, mainly according to linguistic differences: the Hoklos, a people originally from the Fujian and Guangdong provinces who started immigrating to Taiwan from the seventeenth century onwards and who speak a Fujian dialect known as Hoklo; and the Hakkas, who also originated mainly from the same two provinces, from the eighteenth century onwards, and speak another dialect – Hakka.⁶ The Mandarin-speaking Mainlanders comprise the troops and followers of the Kuo-ming-tang Party (the Nationalist Party, KMT) who retreated to Taiwan between 1945 and 1949 following the KMT's defeat in the civil war, and their descendants – Mandarin being the official language in China.

Brief History of Taiwan in Relation to the Mainland

From historical records, we know that between 1264 and 1294, during the Yuan dynasty, the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands were incorporated into Fujian province. In 1372, the succeeding Ming dynasty also continued to exercise judicial powers of inspection over these islands. Taiwan Island, however, was not on the map of the Chinese Empire at the time. In 1622, the Dutch occupied the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands, using the place as a base for the transit trade of its East India Company. Following the war between the Chinese Empire and the Netherlands, the Dutch were forced to retreat to Taiwan Island, and for the next 30 years they turned it into a base for Dutch colonial expansion. When the Ming dynasty was destroyed by the Manchus from the North and replaced by the Qing dynasty, Zheng Chenggong (also known as Koxinga) of the Ming Dynasty and his troops defeated the Dutch and, in 1662, drove them from Taiwan Island. Zheng and his followers then used it as their base, in order to fight against the Manchus and to restore the Ming dynasty. The rule of Zheng's family over Taiwan Island was ended in 1683 by the Qing dynasty. From then on, the whole of Taiwan was officially included on the map of the Chinese Empire, as part of Fujian province.

In 1894, the Sino-Japanese (jiawu) war broke out, resulting in the total defeat of China. Taiwan Island and the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands were consequently ceded to Japan under the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (also named as the Shimonoseki Treaty), signed the following year. Thus began 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, brought to an end only with the surrender of Japan in World War Two. Under the San Francisco Treaty of September 1951, Japan gave up its claim to Taiwan and the nationalist ROC took over.

As its defeat in the civil war was clearly imminent, between 1945 and 1949 the KMT gradually retreated from the mainland to Taiwan. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the confrontation between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) of the PRC and the KMT of the ROC across the Taiwan Strait has gone through different phases. Between 1949 and the late 1970s, the two sides were openly hostile. The slogan of the Communist PRC was 'liberate Taiwan', while the nationalist ROC swore to 'take over the mainland'. After the Korean War, the confrontation between the two sides had actually become part of the Cold War, with one in the communist bloc and the other siding with the West. The military presence of the US navy, the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait since 1953 contributed to the stalemate of the confrontation. Although the US had lent Taiwan its protection and made it one of its strategic bases in the Pacific, it did not support the KMT government's plan to take over the mainland by force. That the KMT government failed to get full support from its American 'big brother' was best illustrated by the loss of its seat in both

the UN General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC in 1971, and the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979.

The hostile confrontation across the Strait began to thaw in the late 1970s. On the mainland side, the PRC proceeded to reform. The Chinese government designed a new strategy for reunifying the mainland and Taiwan, this being the famous 'one country, two systems' policy later applied to the former British colony, Hong Kong. On the other side of the Strait, modernization and democratization have characterized the development of Taiwan over the last two decades. The KMT government dropped its hostile 'three Nos' policy towards the mainland (i.e., no compromise, no contact and no negotiation), and renounced its claims to Mainland China in May 1991. Furthermore, informal exchanges, such as trade, investment and tourism, have taken place across the Strait since the mid 1980s. No official talks on unification have yet been held, as the two sides cannot agree the basis on which such talks should be conducted. There is still no agreement as to the precise objectives, conditions or formal status of these negotiations – they are still at the stage of 'negotiations about negotiations'. The Beijing government would like to negotiate with Taipei in a central-local framework, while Taipei insists this should be a negotiation between two equal governments or political entities. Meanwhile, the development of the Taiwan Independence Movement has further complicated the picture.

The Taiwan Independence Movement

The secessionist movement in Taiwan did not emerge as an organized movement until 1947-48. By Taiwanese academics it is often labelled the 'modern Taiwan Independence Movement' (TIM). A diachronic examination of its evolution would not, however, take 1947-48 as its starting point, since the political development of Taiwan society in two earlier periods is just as important for an understanding of the emergence of the TIM. The first period was from 1895 to 1945, when Taiwan was under Japanese occupation. The anti-Japanese movement and the experience of colonization helped shape a distinct Taiwanese consciousness. The second period, from 1945 to 1947, witnessed the beginning of the KMT's rule over Taiwan and several clashes between the KMT and the local population, which later gave rise to the modern independence movement. A brief review of these two periods will be helpful before we turn to the movement itself.

1895 – 1945

The cession of Taiwan to Japan following the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 initiated the anti-Japanese movement in Taiwan. Feeling betrayed by the Qing court

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and facing the repressive Japanese colonization, the Taiwanese took up anti-Japanese struggles in various forms. The proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Taiwan in the same year was part of a major mobilization against the occupation. The former governor of Taiwan, T'ang Ching-sung, was elected president by the local nobles. Following the short-lived republic, the Taiwanese engaged intermittently in armed uprisings and guerrilla warfare against the Japanese until 1916.⁷

After 1916, the Japanese changed their ruling policies from the previous military repression to full-scale assimilation coupled with 'bread-and-butter' policies. As the Japanese regarded Taiwan as their 'unsinkable warship' and used it as a base for their military expansion in the Pacific area, the economic development of Taiwan did not follow the general pattern of the colonial economy, namely, that the colony should be deprived of its raw materials and become merely a market for manufactured goods from the colonizing country. Instead, from the 1930s the Japanese helped to develop infrastructure in Taiwan, such as the irrigation system for agriculture. The industrialization of Taiwan, which was subsequently to become the basis for the economic miracle, also began at that time. To assimilate the Taiwanese culturally, the language policy – namely, that all Taiwanese had to learn and speak Japanese – was also enforced. Despite the unjust and forceful nature of this policy, it provided the different ethnic and linguistic groups in Taiwan, for the first time, with a common language for communication. By the 1940s, the standard of living in Taiwan was far higher than that of the mainland.

After the first world war, with the introduction of the Western notion of self-determination, and inspired by the Home Rule movement in other parts of the world, the anti-Japanese activists changed their strategies. From the earlier form of uprisings and guerrilla warfare, the struggle evolved into a non-violent movement. In this period, intellectuals (especially those who had received their education abroad, mostly in Japan) played a leading role. Two strategies were employed at the time. On the one hand, there was the 'Licensed Reform' group whose aim was to extend the autonomy of the Taiwanese people through reforms within the colonial system. The Movement of Petition for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament in 1920 was one such effort to gain self-governance for Taiwan without overthrowing Japanese rule. On the other hand, the more radical type of movement, led by the Taiwanese Communist Party (founded in 1928), promoted the idea of independence for the Taiwanese nation and carried on the anti-colonial revolution. The two forms of the anti-Japanese struggle were reflected not only at the social and political levels but also at the cultural level. The formation of the Taiwan Cultural Association (*Taiwan wen-hua hsieh-hui*) in 1921 aimed to lay a broad cultural foundation for the political movement. It accounted largely for the emergence of Taiwanese New Literature, New Drama

and New Art in the 1930s. Today, it is generally agreed among Taiwanese scholars that a certain Taiwanese consciousness began to take shape during this period. However, with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese repressed all these movements in order to stabilize Taiwan as one of its bases for its so-called Holy War. Although most leaders of the movements continued their fight after fleeing to Japan, Hong Kong and the mainland, the movement in Taiwan itself was crippled.

1945 – 47

When the KMT's troops first arrived in Taiwan in 1945, the local population welcomed them warmly. As most of them retained strong links with the mainland and still identified with Chinese culture, the prospect of ending Japanese colonial rule and returning to the motherland raised high social expectations and enthusiasm. However, disappointment and disillusion soon replaced the initial optimism. The expectation that Taiwanese could now share power with their 'mainland brothers' was crushed by the KMT. Assuming the role of victor and occupier, the KMT exercised its rule with repression and corruption. Politically and culturally, Taiwanese were discriminated against. Ch'en-i, the Governor of Taiwan appointed by Chiang Kai-shek, pursued more authoritarian policies than the Japanese colonial governor had. The language policy banned the use of Japanese and enforced Mandarin in all educational and cultural activities. The majority of government posts were allocated to Mainlanders, regardless of their professional capacities. Economically, large quantities of raw materials were transported to the mainland where the KMT and the CCP were still at war. Within a year of the KMT's taking over, inflation disrupted the economy, and famine occurred in Taiwan, which had been previously unheard of. The disillusionment felt by the Taiwanese was best illustrated by a popular saying at the time: 'the dogs (the Japanese) go but the pigs (the KMT) come'. Many Taiwanese considered the KMT's rule to be much worse than that of the Japanese.⁸

Consequently, antagonism grew along an ethnic line separating the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese. The terms '*pen-sheng-jen*', meaning 'local people of this province', and '*wai-sheng-jen*', 'peoples from the outside provinces', were used to label the Taiwanese and the Mainlanders respectively. This ethnic cleavage, reinforced by political, economic and linguistic injustice, cut so deep that it led to the confrontation between the KMT government and various sectors of the population just one-and-a-half years after the KMT took control of Taiwan.

On 28 February 1947, a small incident triggered off the island-wide anti-KMT and pro-home rule movement. As a result, the whole of Taiwan Island was organized into two camps: the right-wing camp, comprising many local-oriented organizations, sought a high degree autonomy for the Taiwanese through

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institutional reforms, whereas the left-wingers, the 'People's Alliance', led by the Taiwanese Communist Party, favoured an armed uprising and joined the voluntarily organized armed force, the so-called 'February 28 Troops'. Both camps set autonomy, not independence, as their goal, and this is illustrated by the 'Forty-two Demands of the Taiwanese' put forward in March 1947 by the Committee to Resolve the February 28 Incident. The Demands were announced to Taiwan, the KMT's Nanjing government and the international communities in Mandarin, Hoklo, Hakka, English and Japanese. The Committee hoped to negotiate with the KMT's Nanjing government on terms of reform that would grant Taiwan the status of an autonomous region within the ROC. The KMT government, however, had no intention of negotiating. Instead, they opted for military repression. After the crackdown on the February 28th Movement, the KMT imposed martial law, which was to last for 38 years. The élite in the Movement who fled from Taiwan gave up the idea of autonomy and resorted to a struggle for independence for Taiwan.

From 1948 to the Present

In 1949, after the total retreat to Taiwan by the ROC government and the remaining KMT troops, Chiang Kai-shek turned Taiwan into a military base with a view to taking over the mainland. Taipei became the temporary capital of the ROC while the whole of Taiwan remained a province, with Tai-chung city as its provincial capital. The KMT's adherence to the 'one China' policy and its claim to be the only legitimate government of China contradicted the reality that the ROC presided only over Taiwan. Several measures were taken to legitimize the KMT's version of Chinese nationalism and its claim to both the mainland and Taiwan. First, the Mainlanders arriving in Taiwan during and after the second world war were obliged to maintain their original provincial classification when registering officially. Such a measure helped to create the illusion that there were still different constituencies from all parts of China under the KMT government. Second, the constitutional constraints on presidential power were suspended, with the addition of a number of emergency measures, which were justified on the basis of the Chinese nationalist revolution. This allowed Chiang to impose martial law on Taiwan by emergency decree. Under the office of the president, Taiwan was transformed into a police state where the military penetrated civilian life at all levels. The organization of opposition parties was prohibited and there was no freedom of press or speech. Third, as only elections in mainland constituencies could express the will of the Chinese nation, the representatives elected on the other side of the Taiwan Strait in 1947 and 1948 would remain in office until unification could take place.⁹ Fourth, the use of Mandarin (the official language in China) was imposed as the language of education and

instruction. Mandarin was identified with love for one's country, while the use of dialects within school grounds was prohibited. Fifth, education and academic research were geared towards strengthening the KMT's version of Chinese nationalism. Under such circumstances, the practice of Communism and the propagation of the ideas of Taiwan independence were classified among the most serious crimes. Owing to the tight control in Taiwan, the TIM began as an underground movement and was, most importantly, carried on overseas.

The Alliance for the Re-liberation of Taiwan under the leadership of Thomas Liao was formed in Hong Kong in September 1947.¹⁰ On 1 September 1948, Liao sent a petition to the UN appealing for Taiwan to be put under the temporary trusteeship of the UN, and for the natives of Taiwan to be allowed to decide by referendum either to revert to China or to become independent. In February 1956, a 'provisional government of the Republic of Taiwan' was established in Tokyo, with Liao as provisional president of Taiwan. At the same time, large numbers of Taiwanese students studying abroad engaged actively in the independence movement. The Young Formosan Association, founded in Japan on 28 February 1960, and the Committee for Formosans' Free Formosa, established in the US in January 1956, were examples of such student organizations. They sought to promote the idea of independence for Taiwan on an international platform through various means, such as journals, demonstrations and seminars. In 1970, the majority of these organizations united under the banner of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), with their headquarters in New York.¹¹ The WUFI had a worldwide range with an underground Taiwan branch in Taipei, an American branch in Los Angeles, a Japanese branch in Tokyo, a European branch in Paris, and a South American branch in São Paulo.

Meanwhile, in Taiwan, although an organized independence movement became impossible thanks to the strict controls, a number of intellectuals continued an individual struggle for independence despite the threat of imprisonment and the death penalty. The strong moral revolt expressed by their resistance was very much in line with what was being done at the same time by dissidents under other authoritarian regimes, for instance, in Eastern Europe. A case in point was in 1964 when, together with two students, Dr P'eng Ming-min, director of the political science department of the National Taiwan University, drafted the 'Declaration of Formosan Self-Salvation'. Before they could distribute the print-outs of the declaration, they were arrested.¹²

In the 1970s, with the loss of the UN seat to the PRC in 1971 and the normalization of Sino-American relations, the ROC became increasingly isolated on the international scene. Moreover, the economic boom in Taiwan, together with the impact of the third, worldwide wave of democratization during this period, awakened the democratic consciousness of the Taiwanese people. The activists for democracy formed an alliance with the secessionists against the

KMT and its authoritarian regime. Setting aside ethnic differences, prominent activists and scholars combined their efforts in the organization *Tang-wai* (meaning 'outside the party'), to promote democratization in Taiwan.

In response to the changing external and internal factors, under Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT shifted the focus of its policy from a military take-over of the mainland to domestic economic development. In the government, the process of Taiwanization was initiated.¹³ In the increasingly pluralistic Taiwan society, discussion touching on the core of the Taiwan problem – namely, Taiwanese identity and the independence of Taiwan – became increasingly publicized. The KMT progressively evolved into a more tolerant party. In 1986, in defiance of the KMT's ban on opposition parties, members of *Tang-wai* formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). A few months later the KMT government responded to this transformation of public consciousness by lifting the 38-year-old martial law and the ban on opposition parties and a free press. Thus began the transformation of Taiwan from authoritarian rule to a democratic society.

Moving from the underground out into the open, from overseas to Taiwan, from the illegal to the legal, the TIM entered a new phase. In the ensuing decade, independence organizations spread throughout Taiwan.¹⁴ The means used by political parties and populist organizations to promote the idea of independence included all forms of media, such as radio, television, newspapers, journals and the internet, and other legal activities such as mass rallies, demonstrations and election campaigns. In the closing years of the twentieth century, the DPP gained increasing popular support and developed into a genuine opposition party.¹⁵ In March 2000, its candidate Ch'en Shui-pian won the presidential elections. The DPP did not, however, manage to gather majority support in the parliament at that time. Only a minority of the electorate has been convinced by its national programme.

The Role of Intellectuals in the TIM

Throughout the history of the TIM, the intellectuals of Taiwan have always played the key role. They have been the initiators and advocates of the ideas on independence, the explorers of the theories, and organizers, leaders and participants in the actual movement throughout the whole life of the TIM. As we mentioned earlier, the TIM is a political movement that developed alongside the construction of Taiwan nationalism. Nationalism as a political movement has been noted by many students of political science as emerging first in the minds of the intellectual and political élite, and then spread by them to the population at large. It is the élite's drive to create a nation that gives rise to a broader, popular

sense of nationhood. A few concrete cases can be cited here to illustrate the important role played by intellectuals throughout the development of the TIM.

One clear example of the active involvement of intellectuals in the TIM is the Association of Taiwan University Professors, founded in 1990 with the promotion of independence for Taiwan as its primary mission, alongside other aims, such as the promotion of Taiwanese culture. Members of the association, i.e., university professors, were ardent supporters of the DPP. And later, when some of them considered that the DPP was putting political gains above the commitment to independence, they withdrew their support and helped to found another political party, the Taiwan Independence Party (*chien-kuo-tang*), in 1996.¹⁶ The intellectuals participating in the TIM are not necessarily of Taiwanese origin, and many have undergone a transformation from having a Chinese identity to a Taiwanese one, as revealed in a case-study conducted by Lee Hsiao-feng.¹⁷ The experience of the historian, Ch'en Fang-ming, is a case in point: he shifted from being a 'Chinese on Taiwan' with a strong Chinese identity to a 'Taiwanese on Taiwan' promoting the idea of independence. In 1999, he was the Minister for Culture and Propaganda in the shadow government of the DPP, and he pursued the study of Taiwan's history in order to strengthen the ideological basis of the TIM.

For a better understanding of the role of intellectuals in the TIM, an examination of their ideas and theories would be illuminating. Hence, in the following section, an analytical synthesis of the pro-independence discourse will be made.

The Pro-Independence Discourse

One feature of the TIM's pro-independence discourse is its extensiveness – it covers a wide range of disciplines and topics. Apart from history, which is a discipline commonly employed in almost all secessionist movements, political science, ethnic studies, anthropology and international law are of special importance in the discourse of the TIM. To a lesser extent, economics is also used to support the idea of independence. A state in the contemporary world comprises several elements: a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The choice of the above-mentioned disciplines is an effort to demonstrate that Taiwan has in effect met almost all the criteria for being a state except one, namely, international recognition. In the following section we shall try to group the pro-independence arguments given by the TIM scholars under several disciplines, while bearing in mind that in reality these arguments usually overlap. We will not analyse the truthfulness of these arguments or describe the discussions with scholars who defend the positions of the KMT or the Chinese Communist Party. The aim of

the following section is to see how TIM scholars make use of various academic disciplines to advance their political goals.

From the Perspective of History

Both the KMT and the CCP base themselves extensively on historical research when making their claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. Their enquiries into the historical links between the two sides across the Strait – links such as cultural, trade and administrative ones – presuppose ‘the truth of the claim that these links somehow become political and binding down the generations’.¹⁸ Hence the argument that ‘Taiwan is part of China’. The TIM intellectuals reject the validity of turning historical links into some kind of political principle. As the Taiwanese writer Lee Ao puts it, why should claims to Taiwan based on the historical record be any more valid than the claim of, say, modern Turkey to the lands that once formed the Ottoman Empire?¹⁹

TIM scholars state that, although historically Taiwan was a part of China during the Qing dynasty, the Qing court was of a different political order, and so at that time China was not a modern nation-state. The Chinese state in the modern sense was not in place until the foundation of the ROC in 1911. In their view, it would consequently not make sense to draw the borderline for the new state on the basis of the historical boundaries of the Chinese Empire. While acknowledging the fact that there are tenuous links between Taiwan and the mainland, TIM scholars are stating that Taiwan has not been ‘an inalienable part of China since ancient times’. Citing from historical records, they point to the fact that, before 1684, Taiwan Island had always been regarded by the Qing court as a land of barbarians, and it was only after 1684 that Taiwan was annexed to the Chinese Empire.²⁰ More importantly, they argue that the Shimonoseki Treaty signed in 1895, according to which Taiwan was to be ceded to Japan in perpetuity, was a legally binding document.

As the TIM scholars see it, the importance of Taiwan in the construction of the KMT’s Chinese nationalism changed over time with the changing international environment. Although the cession of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 had served as one of the many sparks that triggered off the quest for Chinese nationalism, Taiwan was not an issue for Chinese nation-building at the time. Between 1911 and 1941, the KMT was virtually silent on the subject of claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. TIM activists have stated that in the draft constitutions of the ROC in 1925, 1934 and 1936, Taiwan did not appear as a province in the new republic. Instead, among the lost territories listed in the Three Principles of the People, it is indicated that, although Taiwan initially played a symbolic role as a ‘lost territory’ of the Qing order, this did not necessarily imply that the sovereignty of the Chinese nation should be asserted over it.²¹

The claim to Taiwan by the KMT, according to TIM scholars, was only made after the American entry into World War Two when Chiang used his position within the Allied camp to make demands concerning Taiwan. After the war, with the CCP and the KMT each joining different camps in the Cold War, the CCP likewise claimed sovereignty over Taiwan in order to justify its anti-imperialist nationalism. In writing the biography of Hsieh Hsüeh-hung, the leader of the Taiwanese Communist Party, historian Ch'en Fang-ming opposes the claim made by the CCP that the anti-Japanese movement led by the Taiwanese Communist Party in the late 1920s was a movement of its sub-branch. The subordination of the Taiwanese communist movement to the CCP is, in his view, a distortion of historical fact. As he sees it, the advocacy of 'Taiwanese Independence' and the 'principle of self-determination' by the Taiwanese Communist Party had drawn a clear line separating the anti-Japanese movement in Taiwan from that on the mainland.²² The TIM scholars generally agree that the incorporation of Taiwan into either the nationalist or the communist version of Chinese nationalism is the result of the Cold War. Taiwan, they argue, has been a victim of the interplay of the super-powers in the Cold War.

Apart from the above-mentioned arguments, historians and educators supporting the TIM have, since the 1980s, called for a reorientation in both research and education on history. They strongly criticize the ignorance of Taiwan's history in both scientific research and the educational system arising from the KMT's assimilation policy. With the democratization of Taiwan, historical research institutes, organized on a popular basis, have mushroomed in the last two decades.²³ The educational curriculum is also undergoing adjustments. These changes, in the view of educators and historians who support the TIM, are indispensable for the formation of a Taiwanese nation.

From the Perspective of International Law

Both the PRC and the ROC argue that they legally recovered their rightful territory from Japan at the end of the second world war. Several documents are put forward as evidence to support these claims. First, the Cairo Declaration of 1 December 1943 demanded that Japan should return Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands to the ROC. Second, the Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945 reiterated the demand set forth in the Cairo Declaration. Third, on 2 September 1945 Japan signed the document of surrender, stating its acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. Fourth, according to the highest command from the Allied headquarters on 15 October 1945, the Japanese army was to surrender and to relinquish sovereignty over Taiwan and return it to China.²⁴ In response to these above-mentioned arguments from the other parties, TIM scholars have questioned their validity by making extensive use

of the discipline of international law. Their arguments have three focal points.²⁵

First, it is argued that neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Proclamation is an international treaty. According to some TIM scholars, they are nothing more than a non-self-executing statement of intention. As the 'third party', Japan was not present at the signing of either. Since Taiwan was then legally Japanese territory, no legal document concerning a change of sovereignty over Taiwan could be legally valid without the consent of Japan. Hence, neither declaration had – in the view of those international lawyers who support the TIM – any legally binding force as far as the settlement of the dispute over Taiwan was concerned. They could not serve as a justification for the claim to sovereignty by the ROC or the PRC. In their view, the only legally valid document concerning the status of Taiwan is the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed later, in September 1951, between 48 Allied countries and Japan. The second article of this treaty states that Japan gave up all its sovereignty and territorial claims with regard to Taiwan – it does not specifically provide that sovereignty over Taiwan should be restored to China. This article, they say, therefore cannot be interpreted as lending support to either the PRC or the ROC's claim over Taiwan. When signing the Sino-Japan peace treaties with the ROC and the PRC, in 1952 and 1978 respectively, Japan merely reiterated its disclaimer of sovereignty over Taiwan. Regarding the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, the Japanese official position is that it 'understands and respects' such a claim.²⁶ The word 'recognize' is not used. TIM scholars interpret this as meaning that the Japanese government does not recognize the PRC's sovereignty claim over Taiwan.

According to TIM scholars, it therefore follows that no international treaty has ever granted either the ROC or the PRC sovereignty over Taiwan. Taiwan at the end of the second world war, consequently, should be regarded as 'undetermined territory', and the dispute over sovereignty should be left to be settled by the local population, in accordance with the principle of self-determination. It was very much thanks to this understanding that, in the 1950s, the idea of placing Taiwan under the UN's temporary trusteeship was quite popular in the TIM.

Secondly, at the same time as these authors oppose the legal claim to sovereignty of Taiwan by the KMT, they nevertheless acknowledge that the ROC government has in fact been exercising its jurisdiction over Taiwan for more than 50 years. According to the principle of *uti possidetis* (as you possess, you shall continue to possess) in international law, the ROC government has in their view acquired de facto sovereignty over Taiwan. But these pro-TIM scholars go on to argue that, despite this, the KMT government has been exercising oppressive authoritarian rule in Taiwan, which de-legitimizes its rule. Furthermore, the KMT's adherence to the 'one China' policy up to the early 1990s, and to the name 'Republic of China', have resulted in the isolation of Taiwan on the interna-

tional scene. As the PRC has been internationally recognized as the only China, the ROC has lost its entitlement to claim sovereignty over the whole of China.

Thirdly, some Taiwanese scholars from the discipline of international law use the distinction between 'government succession' and 'state succession' in international law in an attempt to refute the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan.²⁷ By 'government succession' is meant that, when a new government replaces the old one by means of constitutional change or through revolution, the integrity and continuity of the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state remain unchanged. In principle, the new government succeeds to all the rights and responsibilities of the previous government. State succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of one state by another over a given territory. It is important to note that the phrase 'state succession' does not connote any principle of presumption that after the change of sovereignty, a transmission or succession of legal rights and duties occurs. The rights and responsibilities of the new state should coincide with its present jurisdiction. Having made such a distinction, the authors observe that, as it withdrew to Taiwan, the KMT government has never been fully overthrown by the new Beijing government. In their view, the Beijing government has emphasized time and again that the PRC is a new state with regard to its international relations and has taken on the international obligations and engagement of the KMT government on a selective basis. Consequently, the TIM scholars argue that the Beijing government – as a new government of a new state, the PRC, and not a new government of the ROC – cannot claim to be the successor of the KMT government. Thus, the exercise of its sovereignty should coincide with its present-day jurisdiction. TIM scholars have argued that – since the Beijing government of the new state, the PRC, has never ruled Taiwan – the claim of the PRC to exercise sovereignty over Taiwan is not in accordance with international law (even though the world community of states defends the PRC's 'one China' position on this matter).²⁸

From the Perspective of Anthropological and Ethnic Studies

The pro-independence discourse focuses a good deal on the notion of Taiwan nationalism. The use of 'Taiwan nationalism' in place of 'Taiwanese nationalism' in this text is deliberate. As in the (sub-) ethnic differentiation in Taiwan, 'Taiwanese' is used as a label for the first group of immigrants from the mainland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in contrast to the 'Mainlanders', which refers to the second group, who arrived between 1945 and 1949. The discussion on Taiwan nationalism has gone through a radical transformation concerning the understanding by Taiwan nationalists of what constitutes a Taiwan nation. Prior to the 1960s, the discussion of Taiwan nationalism ran mainly along the lines of ethnic/racial division. Thus, only the Taiwanese (those who immigrated to Taiwan before the second world war) constituted the Taiwan nation, whereas

the Mainlanders (those who immigrated to Taiwan from 1945 to 1949) were excluded. Since the 1960s, there has been a major breakthrough in the discussion of Taiwan nationalism within academic circles. By discarding nationalism on an ethnic/racial basis, the Taiwan nation as a political and civic community became the bearer of Taiwan nationalism. In the process of transforming the content of Taiwan nationalism, political theory played a decisive role. The renewed version of Taiwan nationalism will be discussed in the next section. In this section, we shall try to look at the earlier notion.

One possible explanation as to why the earlier TIM scholars defined Taiwan nationalism on an ethnic/racial basis lies in the semantic confusion caused by terms such as 'ethnic group', 'nation', 'nationalism' and 'minority group' in Chinese.²⁹ Nation and nationalism were both relatively new notions from the West. When introduced into China at the beginning of this century, 'nation' was translated as '*minzu*', exactly the same word as for 'ethnic group', and 'nationalism' was '*minzu zhuyi*'.³⁰

Using some of the findings of anthropological and archaeological studies on Taiwan, TIM scholars state that, before the arrival of the Dutch in 1624, Taiwan was an aboriginal society. The original inhabitants of Taiwan were of Malay-Polynesian origin. From the angle of ethnolinguistics and physical anthropology, TIM scholars argue that the original inhabitants of Taiwan could not have originated from South China, as stated by the PRC.³¹ However, simply trying to prove the non-Chineseness of the original inhabitants of Taiwan is not enough, since the majority of the Taiwan population have been immigrants arriving from Mainland China over the centuries. To demonstrate that the modern Taiwanese are different from the Han Chinese, some TIM scholars have gone one step further, arguing from an evolutionary perspective. As the earlier pioneering immigrants from the mainland were largely male, they argued that the multiplication of the population in Taiwan was largely due to intermarriage between the male pioneers and the female aborigines. Thus emerged a new ethnic group of mixed blood. Given their frontier origin and their common experience, the members of this ethnic group – so the theory goes – developed their own social consciousness as Taiwanese. In his work *Taiwan Nationalism (Taiwan minben zhuyi)*, Liao, the early leader of post-war TIM, maintained that 'today's Taiwanese have their inheritance from the Indonesian, Portuguese, Spaniards, Dutch, Fujianese, Cantonese and Japanese; in other words, Taiwanese blood is a mixture of the Aboriginal, Han Chinese, Japanese, Latin and Teutonic races'.³²

Another prominent TIM scholar and political leader, Shih Ming, also insisted on the mixed ethnic origin of the Taiwan nation. In his early publication in 1968, *Taiwan Nation – Its Formation and Evolution*, he stated: 'The main members of our Taiwanese society are the descendants of the Han pioneers who first coexisted with the aborigines and later assimilated them. Throughout the four-

hundred-year historical experience (...) a single and inherent community, the Taiwan nation, has come into being on the basis of its distinct natural environment and common destiny (...) a nation completely different from the Chinese.³³ However, neither Liao's 'mixed-blood Taiwan nation' nor Shih Ming's ethnic theory found much popular support in Taiwan society. Other TIM scholars further challenged their views. Then the discussion of Taiwan nationalism took a new turn with the involvement of political scientists.

From the Perspective of Political Science

Not convinced by the attempts to base Taiwan nationalism on race or ethnic differentiation, some TIM scholars started to clarify the concept of nationalism in the 1960s. Among them, P'eng Ming-min's contribution is significant. Much influenced by Ernest Renan's *Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation*, he enquires what elements constitute the foundations of the modern nation-state. He comes to the conclusion that its most vital component is not an objective element such as biological origin, culture, religion, or language, but 'a sense of common destiny and belief in shared interests'. 'These subjective feelings', he argues, 'which rise out of a common history, are not necessarily related to the objective criteria of biology, religion, and language'.³⁴ The modern nation-state is first and foremost a political community. Thus national identity, or nationalism, is a political identity based on freedom of political association, rather than on the objective criteria of an ethnic community.

The implications of P'eng's idea about nationhood are far-reaching. In essence, the discussion of Taiwan nationalism changes from its previous focus on ethnicity to a more civic version. That is to say, a nation in the modern sense is a free political association based not merely on objective criteria such as ethnic distinctiveness, language and cultural heritage, but more on the subjective affiliation of a certain group or groups of people. TIM scholars argue that it is because a nation is a political association, not an ethnic group, that some modern states have been able to come into being, despite their ethnic heterogeneity, or that several states can grow out of one homogeneous ethnic group.³⁵ This argument rejects the use of historical links by the KMT and the CCP as a justification for their claims on Taiwan. It further affirms the right to self-determination and to free political association as the justification for Taiwan independence. Some TIM activists draw a parallel between the TIM and American independence. They argue that the fight for Taiwan independence is for the pursuit of liberty, which, they say, is inherently democratic in nature. Moreover, criticizing the authoritarian nature of the KMT and CCP regimes, they perceive the TIM as making a major contribution to the promotion of democracy and humanitarian values in the world.

The academic discussion and reflection on the Taiwan nation helped lead to a shift in the perception of their nation by the Taiwan political movement. In the mid 1970s, the TIM began to promote a new notion of the Taiwan nation according to which 'no matter where you were born, or when you arrived in Taiwan, as long as you identify yourself with Taiwan, you are a member of the Taiwan nation'.³⁶ This understanding is labelled 'non-differential identity' (*wucabie rentonglun*). The importance of 'non-differential identity' is that it is no longer exclusive, that it aims to overcome the sub-ethnic divisions in Taiwan society by rallying both Taiwanese and Mainlanders.

Conclusions and Avenues for Further Research

Reconsidering the history of Taiwan, one cannot help but be struck by the complexity of the historical, social and political environment in which the TIM has evolved. In striving for an independent State of Taiwan, the independence-seekers have to justify their position against the claims to sovereignty over Taiwan made by both the ROC and the PRC. Like other nationalist movements in the world, intellectuals with nationalist aspirations are involved in the process of nation-building and state-building. The pro-independence intellectuals, as shown in this chapter, are involved in the TIM not only through their actual political participation but, more importantly, through their reflection on notions such as 'the Taiwan nation' and 'Taiwan nationalism'. Various disciplines in social science have been present in the nationalist discourse, namely, history, ethnic studies, international law and political science. The present chapter has shown the arguments put forward from different academic perspectives in support of the course of independence. It should be pointed out here that this analysis aims merely to present the arguments in the nationalist discourse – in order to facilitate their comparison with other secessionist movements in the conclusions to this volume – rather than to discuss their truthfulness. No normative assessment has been made, nor have the scientific counter-arguments from the PRC side been examined.

One particularity in the evolving nationalist discourse is the changing concept of the Taiwan nation. Among intellectuals, a shift in their understanding of their nation has occurred. The Taiwan nation, which was previously defined as primarily an ethnically (racially) based community, is now increasingly perceived by most TIM intellectuals to be first and foremost a political community based on voluntary self-identification by the individual. Recent studies on Taiwan nationalism also point to such a shift in the national identity and suggest the emergence of a civic nationalism in Taiwan.³⁷ Notwithstanding the more inclusive understanding of nationalism, TIM intellectuals and activists largely disagree about whether or not the Taiwan nation is already in place. As shown by

opinion polls on national identity, the percentage of the population identifying themselves as Chinese still exceeds that of those who identify themselves as Taiwanese.³⁸ Political developments in Taiwan in recent years have demonstrated that the KMT has also been receptive to the changing content of the idea of a Taiwan nation as promoted by the TIM. Notions such as 'living community on Taiwan' and 'new Taiwanese' appear frequently in its discourse and were even part of the political thinking of the previous President, Lee Teng-hui.

The redefined Taiwan nationalism in the minds of intellectuals and politicians does not necessarily mean, however, that a similar shift has taken place in the national identity of the population at large. As Eric Hobsbawm states in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 'national identification and what it is believed to imply, can change and shift in time, even in the course of quite short periods. In my judgement this is the area of national studies in which thinking and research are most urgently needed today'.³⁹ The case of Taiwan, where such a shift in national identity is currently taking place, thus offers scholars an opportunity to study such a transition. Further studies of this new national identity in Taiwan should address a number of issues. On the one hand, for political development on Taiwan itself, one should ask whether the newly forged civic national identity will help consolidate democratization on Taiwan, and whether it will reduce the ongoing friction between the sub-ethnic groups. On the other hand, for cross-strait relations, one should ask what the implications of this development in Taiwan nationalism are likely to be.

Notes

- ¹ Note on romanization: Throughout the text, pinyin is used for names, places and organizations in the PRC, and the titles in all Chinese references. However, Wade-Giles romanization is used for the names of individuals and organizations in Taiwan, for example with Chiang Kai-shek, Kuo-ming-tang, which should be Jiang Jieshi and Guomindang in pinyin.
- ² Ralph R. Premdas, 'Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective', in Ralph R. Premdas, S. W. R. de Samarasinghe and Alan B. Anderson (eds), *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective*, London, Pinter Publishers Ltd, 1990, pp. 12-29.
- ³ *Ibid.* pp. 21-25.
- ⁴ *Ibid.* p. 13.
- ⁵ A vast amount of research has been carried out in recent years to discover the origin of the Aborigines of Taiwan. From the linguistic point of view, the Aboriginal language in Taiwan is closely related to Malay and Bahasa. From an anthropological viewpoint, the Aborigines of Taiwan have many affinities with the islanders in the South Pacific Ocean in terms of culture, physical make-up and the organizational form of society. In the latest contribution to research on the origin of the Aborigines of Taiwan, the results of DNA tests suggest that Maoris (natives of New Zealand) may have come from Taiwan or may be related to the Aborigines of Taiwan in some way (Source: *South China Morning Post*, August 11, 1998). I am grateful to John F. Cooper for providing this information.

Intellectual Discourses in the Taiwan Independence Movement

- ⁶ The common use of 'dialect' is adopted here. However, as in the minds of many people the term tends to denote a subordinate form of a dominant language with only some variations in pronunciation and vocabulary, we would like to point out that here 'dialect' can be used as an equivalent of 'language'. In fact, the question whether a dialect is a limited deviation of a dominant language or should be considered a language in itself is the subject of heated debate even among linguists. Furthermore, in Taiwan some socio-linguists argue that Hoklo, Hakka and Mandarin are 'three branches off the main trunk of the Chinese language'. (For a more detailed study on the relationship between the ethnic groups and their dialects in Taiwan, see Shih Cheng-feng, 'Ethnic Differentiation in Taiwan', *Journal of Law and Political Science (Taiwan)*, No. 3, 1995, pp. 141-166).
- ⁷ The republic actually existed for only 10 days, while the resistance movement which attempted to revive it lasted for more than four months. The proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Taiwan – which was a very important event in democratization in Asia, as this was the first republic to be established there – basically sought to fend off Japanese occupation. The desire to remain Chinese – Qing – is clearly discernible from the title of the reign – *yongqing*, meaning Qing forever.
- ⁸ See Ch'en Yung-hsing (ed.), *228 xueshu yiantaohui lunwenji, 1991 (Proceedings of the 1991 Conference on the February 28 Incident)*, Taipei, Tsu-li Evening Post Press, 1992.
- ⁹ In accordance with this measure, those representatives elected to the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan (Congress) in 1947 and 1948 who had retreated to Taiwan with the KMT government were given life-long service. Strict rules were later introduced on filling the vacant seats when some of the representatives died. In 1949, the overall representation of the Taiwanese population in the National Assembly was a mere three per cent. The National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan were called ironically by the Taiwanese the 'Thousand-year-long Parliament'. It was not until 1992 that some representatives were forced into retirement and new elections to the Legislative Yuan became possible.
- ¹⁰ Liao was a doctor of engineering, obtaining his PhD from Ohio University in the US.
- ¹¹ These organizations include the Young Formosans' Free Formosa (Japan, 1950s), the United Formosans in America for Independence (the US, 1966), the United Free Formosa (Taiwan, 1964), the United Formosans for Independence in Europe (Europe, 1967) and the Canadian Committee Supporting Formosan Human Rights (Canada, 1964).
- ¹² In Canada, P'eng obtained his PhD in international aviation law. Because he was internationally known in his field, the KMT sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment, which was quite light under the circumstances. Later, in response to mounting international pressure, his sentence was changed to house arrest. P'eng managed to flee abroad and sought political asylum in the US, continuing his opposition activities as the senior supervisor of the WUFI.
- ¹³ Taiwanization means the appointment to government of people from sub-ethnic groups other than the Mainlanders. As a result, by the late 1980s, 70% of the KMT membership of 2.4 million was Taiwanese, and by 1993 the very highest posts in the government were filled by Taiwanese, including that of president (Lee Teng-hui), premier (Lien Tsan), and president of the Judicial Yuan (Congress) (Lin Yang-kung).
- ¹⁴ Besides the DPP, another political party, the Taiwan Independence Party (Chien-kuo-tang), which made the establishment of an independent Taiwan State its political priority, came into being in 1996. Civil-society groups promoting independence abound. Apart from the WUFI, the more recent influential pro-independence organizations include the Taiwan Association of University Professors (founded in December 1990) and the Mainlanders' Association for Taiwan Independence (founded in August 1995).

- ¹⁵ In early 1993, the DPP claimed more than 35,000 members. In the 1992 election to the national Legislative Yuan, the DPP won one-third of the seats. In the 1994 election for the mayoralty of Taipei, the DPP candidate, Ch'en Shui-pian, defeated his KMT rival and became mayor. The landslide victory of the DPP in the 1997 elections for mayor and magistrates (with DPP candidates winning 12 seats out of the total of 20) was a landmark confirming its popularity.
- ¹⁶ The DPP was divided between those in the *Hsin-ch'ao-liu* (New Trend), who were eager to promote Taiwan's independence, and those in the *Mei-li-tao* (Formosa) faction, for whom democratization was a more urgent objective. And in the 1996 presidential election campaign the Formosa faction gained the upper hand in the party, leading to the DPP's 'grand reconciliation' strategy in the campaign. The pro-independence faction consequently broke apart to form the Taiwan Independence Party (*chien-kuo-tang*). Since then, the DPP's relationship with the KMT has gradually evolved from the stage of 'loyal opposition' into a phase of 'both competition and co-operation'.
- ¹⁷ Lee Hsiao-feng (1994), 'guojia rentong de zhuanxiang – yi zanhao Taiwan fanduirenshi de shige gean wei li' (the Change in National Identity – Case-Studies on Ten Opposition Persons in Post-war Taiwan), in *Retong yu guojia: jindai zhongxi lishi bijiao (Identities and National Formation: Chinese and Western Experiences in the Modern World)*, Institute of Modern History (ed.), Sinica, Taipei, Jiuyu Printing Ltd, 1994, pp. 323-362.
- ¹⁸ Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society*, New York/London, Routledge, 1997, p. 1.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 1-2.
- ²⁰ For example, in one of the many on-line publications by TIM supporters, Yung-Cheng, Emperor of the Qing dynasty, was quoted as saying 'Taiwan, from time immemorial, was not a part of China. My mighty father reached beyond, conquered and annexed it to Ding's territory.' <http://www.wufi.org/forum>.
- ²¹ The other lost territories listed in the Three Principles of the People include Korea, Vietnam, Burma, the Ili basin, Bhutan and Nepal (Hughes, *op. cit.*, p. 5).
- ²² Ch'en Fang-ming, *Tansuo Taiwan shiguan (Exploring the History of Taiwan)*, Taipei, Tsu-li Evening Post Press, 1992, pp. 26-43 and pp. 241-260.
- ²³ One example is the non-governmental Research Group on the 2-28 Event (2-28 minjian yanjiu xiaozhu). Together with other civil societies, this research group has effectively organized different social and academic activities to uncover the causes, effects and future implications of the event.
- ²⁴ State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, *Zhongguo Taiwan wenti (The Taiwan Problem in China)*, Beijing, Jiuzou Publishing House, 1998, pp. 52-57.
- ²⁵ Hsü Ch'ing-hsiung, *Taiwan de guojia dingwei (Defining the Status of Taiwan)*, Taipei, Ts-ying Culture Publishing House, 1995; Chiu Hung-dah, 'The International Legal Status of Taiwan' in Jean-Marie Henckaerts (ed.), *The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order*, London, Kluwer Law International Ltd, 1996; and Chiu Hung-dah, 'Comments on the White Paper on "The Principle of One China" (pingshu yige zhongguo baipishu)', *Journal Europe* (Paris), 24 February 2000.
- ²⁶ Hsü Ch'ing-hsiung, *Taiwan de guojia dingwei (Defining the Status of Taiwan)*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- ²⁷ Hsü Ch'ing-hsiung, 'Taiwan guojifa diwei zi tantao' (Exploring Taiwan's International legal Status), paper presented to the conference *New Prospects for the Legal System in Taiwan (Taiwan fazhi xinzanwang)*, Taipei, 1996, <http://www.wufi.org.tw>.
- ²⁸ For a discussion on the international status of Taiwan, see also Henckaerts (ed.), *op. cit.*

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- ²⁹ The equivalent Chinese words for these terms are ethnic group – *minzu*, or *zuqun*, nation – *minzu*, nationalism – *minzu zhuyi*; minority group or national minority – *shaoshu minzu*. The term '*minzu*' in Chinese has a connotation of 'pertaining to race'.
- ³⁰ To resolve this confusion, some TIM scholars have suggested using a phonetic translation for both 'nation' and 'nationalism', as is being done in Japanese.
- ³¹ On the basis of two anthropological discoveries in Tso-nan County, Taiwan, in 1971 and 1974, the mainland anthropological society generally holds the opinion that the origin of the Taiwanese Aborigines is closely associated with that of pre-historic humans on the mainland (State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5).
- ³² Huang Shao-t'ang, 'Zanhou Taiwan duiyundong yu Taiwan minzuzhuyi de fazan' (The Post-war TIM and the Evolution of Taiwan Nationalism) in Shih Cheng-feng (ed.), *Taiwan minzuzhuyi (Taiwan Nationalism)*, Taipei, Avant-garde Publishing House, 1995, pp. 195-227. Quotation, p. 200. Author's translation.
- ³³ *Ibid.* p. 209.
- ³⁴ P'eng Ming-min, *A Taste Of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston Ltd, 1972, pp. 93-94.
- ³⁵ P'eng Ming-min cited Belgium and Switzerland as examples of where peoples of different origin and background constitute a single state based on feelings of common interest. And the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are instances where they mainly share the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common blood, language and religion and, in large part, of laws, yet each exhibits a separate political constitution and forms a separate nation. (P'eng, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94)
- ³⁶ See the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) home page: <http://www.wufi.org> and Huang Shao-t'ang, *op. cit.*, pp. 214 -217.
- ³⁷ See Gunter Schubert, 'A New Rising Nation? The Discourse on National Identity in Contemporary Taiwan', paper presented at the international conference on the 'Development of Contemporary Taiwan and its Implications for Cross-Strait Relations, the Asia-Pacific Region and Europe', Taipei, 1998 and Lin Chia-lung, 'Taiwan's Emerging Civic Nationalism: Origin and Implications', paper presented at the Fifth North America Taiwan Studies Conference, University of Wisconsin – Madison, June 1999.
- ³⁸ According to an opinion poll in 1995, 35% of the population identify themselves as Chinese, 29% as Taiwanese and 27% as both Chinese and Taiwanese, while 6% are undecided (Dai Bao-chun, 5 June 1995, *Independence Morning Post*).
- ³⁹ Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 11.

