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LIBERALISM AFTER THE SIXTIES: A RECONNAISSANCE

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"One of the rudest things you can call an American politician nowadays is a liberal," editorialized *The Economist* in 1996, recalling (among other examples) how George Bush had drawn blood by associating opponent Michael Dukakis with the "L-word" in the 1988 presidential race.[1] "Liberals—usually the good guys of my visceral political calculus—are losing the battle of ideas," wrote columnist William Raspberry a year later. "They haven't had a bright new idea in ages."[2]

It was not always so—in particular, the year I entered graduate school in 1960, which was by chance an election year. Liberalism was a proud and politically dominating tradition of ideas and social reforms with roots in the progressive era, given mature form under Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, and in 1960 gathering moral force and political energy for a third phase of what Harvard historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. would teach us to call the Schlesinger Cycle of corrective liberal reform. When William E. Leuchtenburg ended an early November graduate history class with the admonition "Now vote, and vote right!" we all knew what had been said. Everyone at Columbia, it seemed, was a liberal. Many had stood three hours in the rain days earlier to glimpse the nominee from Massachusetts on a motorcade through New York. We sensed that great events, restorative and corrective, once again lay ahead in American politics, and we were right—though that was not all that lay ahead.

Sometime in the second half of the sixties, historian Arthur Mann later wrote, "Suddenly, things turned upside down." Assassinations wrenched the

constitutional order, campuses and cities were engulfed in violence, and the American people became "unhappy, confused, adrift, distrustful, and divided. . . . What went wrong?"[3] In politics, things certainly went substantially wrong for liberals—Richard Nixon elected twice, one term and out for a moderate Democrat from Georgia, then a Reagan-led and Bush-extended conservative reign. Democrats returned to the White House in 1993, only behind a candidate who received 43 percent of the vote and would not use the word *liberal*. Then two terms of erratic searching for a governing center, ending in impeachment-spiced confusion and the election of a Republican in 2000.[4]

How and why did liberalism lose its political and intellectual dominance?

"IT ALL STARTED IN THE SIXTIES"

When Barry Goldwater conceded defeat to Lyndon Johnson in November 1964, having carried six states, not only the political but also the intellectual and moral supremacy of liberalism in American politics seemed to have reached a crest, with a long season of dominance ahead. The central feature of the liberal program, hesitantly begun by Kennedy and boldly pursued by Lyndon Johnson, was their sponsorship of the drive for black equality and an end to Jim Crow. The central fact of liberal political life from the sixties forward was a deeply felt moral (and intellectual) superiority. The political opposition had fought the civil rights crusade, spoke the evasive banalities of "states' rights" and of communist plots to divide Americans. No wonder that the bright and the young were drawn to the neighborhoods left of center.

Yet as the Great Society rolled forward, one astute observer of American politics sensed that the liberals were headed for political trouble. Lyndon Johnson told Bill Moyers, after signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ending Jim Crow, that he believed he had "delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come."[5] This reads like a shrewd guess about the future, but it was both premature and flawed. LBJ, who quoted Martin Luther King Jr.'s phrase "We shall overcome," still received a majority of southern votes in the 1964 election, Goldwater carrying only the five Deep South states.[6] Positions taken on civil rights in 1963–64 had some political cost, but had not yet "delivered the South" to the opposition. The white South (and many voters elsewhere) would eventually turn more decisively toward the Republicans (or away from politics), but because of events ahead of LBJ's comment to Moyers in 1964—things Johnson and his allies had yet to do,

along with social turbulence and cultural trends that became associated, fairly or unfairly, with liberalism.

LBJ in his memoirs conceded that political defeat in 1968 owed to more than the signing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (though he thought he would have won if nominated). "The Democratic Party had pressed too far out in front of the American people . . . too far too fast in social reform," he concluded. And "the disruptive methods of the radicals of the "new left," at the Chicago convention and on university campuses" had frightened voters. But "I would not have abandoned a single major program" or "postponed a single law."[7] The people had faltered, their government a bit too good for them, too soon.

Johnson's error here was to see the Great Society as a single whole. Only a portion of Democratic Party–sponsored reform measures accounted—along with social turbulence—for the political upheavals that sent Johnson and then Humphrey into retirement. Within the Great Society were sectors of special vulnerability where the potential for political trouble was high. On the legislative side, one could say that roughly half of the Great Society had been widely discussed, reasonably well understood by the public, and popular. The banishment of Jim Crow in schools and public facilities, as well as an end to voting discrimination by race, were well understood, thoroughly aired, and backed by a national consensus that the white South would join much more quickly than anyone anticipated. A strong base of public support also existed for Medicare, federal aid to education, the Wilderness Act, the beginnings of federal action on cleaner water and air, workplace safety and consumer protection, even control of highway billboards. But another large basket could be filled with measures only briefly debated before Congress and poorly understood by the public or, often, their liberal architects: certain augmentations of the welfare state, notably the war on poverty's "community action" component and the parallel expansion of AFDC as well as Medicaid, which was tacked onto the Medicare legislation by Wilbur Mills with little congressional scrutiny; the expanded public housing program of 1968, rushed through in six months; the Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965, which increased immigration and ended the advantage given to nationalities that had settled and built the nation before 1920; bilingual education.[8]

In addition to Great Society laws and programs there was the postlegislative cutting edge of liberal reform—the program building and rule-making activities of federal bureaucrats and judges, offstage, carrying on reform by taking initiatives liberals knew to be right even if not exactly demanded by huge lobbying coalitions or large majorities in the polls. These included the deinstitu-

tionalization of the mentally ill, the "black empowerment" strategy of the war on poverty, school busing to engineer the proper racial mix of students, "affirmative action" preferences in hiring, college admissions, and contracting for blacks that were soon extended to a broad range of certified "minorities."

As it turned out, certain of Great Society liberalism's politically costly associations—with the war in Vietnam, the hippie and protester riots outside the Chicago convention hall, flag- and draft-card burning, Black Panthers with fists raised and automatic weapons brandished—would slowly wane, while liberal social engineering was a growing presence.[9]

LIBERAL RACE POLICY AFTER THE END OF JIM CROW

"Is the civil rights movement over, now that we have outlawed Jim Crow and voting discrimination?" To this question, liberals emphatically answered that they had just begun to fight. Legal equality achieved, social equality must come quickly or the urban crisis of the 1960s would be only a foretaste. In retrospect, it was easily the most ambitious government project in modern history. Daunting handicaps had become attached to black America, entrenched during slavery and extended by discrimination and bigotry for decades thereafter. Then came the great black migration out of the rural South, a trickle beginning in the late nineteenth century, accelerating in the 1920s with restrictions on immigration, and then cresting in a wave of 4.5 million people from the 1940s to the 1960s. The new urbanites brought with them mixed cultural resources—a blend of assets such as strong church and family affiliations and some middle-class work and saving habits, but also a sharecropper culture of illiteracy, loose family ties, and dependence on white landowners.[10] The timing of their migration was unfortunate. Most of these refugees with agricultural skills arrived just as the American economy was shifting away from heavy industry toward a postindustrial mix in which education and technical and social skills were at an increasing premium.

Thus black populations gathering at the center of urban America after mid-century were a mix of a small, tenacious black middle class with a growing underclass–urban residents with what William Julius Wilson called "a weak attachment to the labor force," characterized by out-of-wedlock births, single-parent families, crime, and welfare dependency. Most black Americans were not in the underclass. But the underclass was mainly black, and growing, as the sixties arrived.[11] Their presence was marked by the statistics of so-

cial pathology. The urban crime rate rose 60 percent from 1960 to 1966, then jumped another 83 percent in the five years between 1966 and 1971; the National Academy of Sciences found that a disproportionate share of crimes of violence were by blacks (and against blacks). Births to unmarried women rose from 2.3 to 5.7 percent among whites across the sixties, but from 21.6 to 34.9 percent among blacks.[12]

Liberals, now not just sympathetic to the cause of black advancement but politically committed to it, struggled to find policy leverage. One of their first ideas ran into fierce trouble and got its author fired, shutting down a whole sector for discussion. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a sociologist who was assistant secretary in the Labor Department, in March 1965 produced a seventy-eight-page paper entitled "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action." Moynihan pointed to the increase of single black mothers and concluded, "the Negro family structure is crumbling." Male joblessness and desertion was producing an illegitimacy rate of one-quarter among blacks, leading to welfare dependency and "a tangle of pathology." Moynihan attributed all this to historic racism and economic pressures and spoke vaguely and briefly of solutions through family-strengthening federal programs, not even hinting at black moral regeneration.[13] Black leaders, at first welcoming a government official's exploration of the black situation, by October were accusing Moynihan of saying in effect that blacks tolerated or were unusually inclined toward promiscuity, illegitimacy, and welfare dependency. "Blaming the victim," charged Boston civil rights activist and psychiatrist William Ryan; "fuel for a new racism," pronounced James Farmer of CORE.[14] The uproar from the liberal and civil rights community ostracized Moynihan and led to his resignation. "All public discussions in mainstream liberal circles of issues like the state of the black family . . . simply ceased," reported Nicholas Lemann.[15]

What, then, could government do? Urban riots after 1965 lent urgency to the question. Nondiscrimination and universality of human rights were the philosophical core of the 1964 and 1965 civil rights statutes, and these measures were spectacularly successful in desegregating public accommodations and promoting the black franchise. But nondiscrimination did not turn public schools into engines of black upward mobility, and black economic advancement was slow. Was there a faster way to continue the civil rights movement?

A central new idea was to move beyond proving discrimination, which was difficult and expensive, to proving unequal social outcomes, which statistics could quickly confirm. Once discrimination in the form of unequal outcomes was established—"institutional discrimination" was the term invented for it,

since no actual discriminator could be found—the remedy was black preferences in jobs, contracts, and university admissions until equal results were obtained. This was soon the operative meaning of "affirmative action."

When the term first appeared in President Kennedy's 1963 Executive Order 10925, it was understood to mean "keep your eyes open for a qualified black." That it might evolve into something more ambitious and polarizing—black preference, special treatment, quotas—had been suspected by some of the legislators moving toward the law that killed Jim Crow, and strenuously and categorically denied by the chief sponsors of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Asked in 1964 hearings on the civil rights bill if the legislation would "require employers to establish quotas for non-whites," Senator Hubert Humphrey assured the body that "proponents of the bill have carefully stated on numerous occasions that Title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual or group," and pledged to eat the bill page by page if it ever did so.[16] Just three years later, officials in the Labor Department's Office of Contract Compliance (OFCC), in a hurry for results, saw federal contract dollars as a lever for rapid black job growth. Their Philadelphia Plan of 1967–68 would have required bids for federal construction contracts to hire "minority employees" in proportion to their presence in the work force. Astonishingly, this plan for race-based quotas was adopted by Nixon in 1970 and was rapidly expanded to cover four categories of minorities—Asians and Pacific Islanders, African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans and Alaska natives—and applied to more than 300,000 firms doing business with the federal government, eventually affecting one-quarter of the American workforce. Affirmative action would be expanded by the entrenched liberal activists in the civil rights bureaucracies in the Justice Department, in a new independent regulatory commission (the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC), and in the line agencies (twenty-seven rights-enforcement offices were at work in line agencies by 1969). The "original, Kennedy-Johnson meaning of affirmative action, which meant nondiscrimination enhanced by outreach programs," or "soft affirmative action," writes Hugh Davis Graham, had given way to "hard affirmative action," which insisted on equality of results and did not need to find discrimination in order to intervene to order race-based corrrection.[17] The transition "occurred quickly and quietly" between 1965 and 1968.[18] "The public had no idea," added Stephen and Abigail Thernstrom.[19]

Equally fraught with political danger to liberals was another, faster path chosen first by HEW bureaucrats in 1966 and strongly followed by judges. This was busing public-school students as a remedy for segregated schools.

When southern school authorities resisted integration and the 1965 law extending federal aid to secondary education gave HEW leverage, guidelines were written making compliance with the Brown decision dependent not on the absence of discrimination, but on actual mixed student populations. Impatient with the snail's pace of school integration, the Supreme Court insisted in 1968 on unspecified "affirmative steps" by school officials to achieve integration, and in 1971 it confirmed a District Court order that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Board of Education bus students between white suburbs and the black inner city to achieve a strict racial quota for all schools in the huge district. Race-based busing soon spread across the country, an "immense social experiment" of liberal parentage, two scholars wrote, and one that was "wildly unpopular everywhere."[20]

THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION

But something larger was in motion than the redefinition of civil rights as requiring "affirmative action" in the form of racial preferences and busing for correct racial proportions in public school populations. The civil rights movement was with good reason called a "revolution," a profound moral awakening and political drama falling only a little short of the national experience with civil war. The moral certainty, fervent and innovative style, language, and tactics of "the movement" swept away what had seemed an impregnable structure of southern law and custom and wrote a new chapter in the American narrative. The energy and success of this crusade lent irresistible momentum to a larger "rights revolution" that began much earlier.

Michael Sandel locates a turning point in FDR's 1944 State of the Union speech on a new "Economic Bill of Rights," in which Roosevelt proposed making the government responsible for providing the "right" to a job, food and clothing, education and much else.[21] This was aspiration only, but it led toward what was to be liberalism's central project in the second half of the century. The Warren Court took the lead in the rights revolution beginning in the 1950s, declaring new rights in the areas of race in the schools and procedures affecting the criminally accused. In the 1960s, the "rights revolution" spread outward through the agency of thousands of liberal-left lawyers, law professors, activists for minorities and women, judges, federal officials, and legislators, all responding to what Mary Ann Glendon has called "the romance of rights."[22]

One result, beginning in the 1960s and continuing through subsequent decades, was the construction by Congress of an enormous second tier of

regulatory agencies upon the base established during the New Deal. But unlike the economic focus of 1930s regulation this new wave of "social regulation" created statutory language conferring rights "to clean air and water; safe consumer products and workplaces; a social safety net including adequate food, medical care, and shelter; and freedom from public and private discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, and age," in the words of Cass Sunstein, whose *After the Rights Revolution* (1990) lists six civil-rights laws, five occupational-safety laws, and six environmental laws enacted in the 1960s, with many more to come in the succeeding two decades.[23]

This broadening movement to enlarge individual and group rights built on the logic of the civil rights crusade and gained impetus from a growing family of well-organized lobbies with few vocal or organized opponents (with the large exception of the ERA rights drive). In the two sectors of rights expansion devised as faster paths to black equality, however—affirmative action and welfare entitlements—some divisions appeared between moderate liberals and those to their left.

Nathan Glazer, reviewing the Civil Rights Commission's 1970 report *The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort,* objected to what he saw as a move from "equal opportunity . . . to an attempt to ensure a *full equality* of achievement." The CRC made "scarcely a reference to any single case of discrimination by anybody in this enormous report," and a small army of federal officials"—570 in the CRC, 166 in the Department of Defense, and six thousand more being trained for agency deployment—was pursuing the "full equality of groups." This was "reverse discrimination," and "we have become involved in something entirely new," Glazer wrote.[24]

Uneasiness over the hardening of affirmative action was also expressed in the deliberations of the McGovern Reform Commission of the Democratic Party in November 1969 as it considered, in the words of member Austin Ranney, the idea of "our fellow black Democrats" that "something more is needed than a non-discrimination rule." They debated establishing quotas for blacks in state delegations, voted 10–9 for language requiring delegations to have the same racial proportions as the local population, and then added women and "young people" without much discussion. Writer Theodore White was dismayed when he read the transcript of the meeting, for it meant that the Democratic convention in 1972 would be shaped by quotas. The "liberating idea" that blacks should not be excluded had "changed to become an intellectual prison . . . [in which] certain groups must be included." This was for White "to plunge over a political cliff to disaster."[25]

THE WELFARE DILEMMA

Another policy arena where 1960s liberals sensed opportunity and reaped political trouble was indigent relief. The New Deal moved the "welfare" issue from local relief to a system dominated by federal payments to the unemployed, but Franklin Roosevelt more than once denounced "welfare" as a long-term policy. He persuaded Congress to replace these emergency measures with a permanent system of social security anchored in contributory old age pensions, with direct federal relief only for the blind and the uncovered, currently destitute elderly and with federal public works for the able-bodied. Aid to fatherless children—through their mothers, who could hardly be in the workforce—was attached as the AFDC program and was expected to be minor. Caseloads were insignificant for two decades, then unaccountably boomed upward to 3.1 million recipients in 1960, then to 4.3 million by 1965, and rising.[26] "Welfare" began to be condemned as a support system for female-headed families in which the mother and children were slum-dwelling dependents of the state, shielded from any work experience, while the fathers escaped responsibility.

The engagement of liberals with the welfare issue was briefly the story of a failure, the war on poverty. After it was dismantled, their legacy became more an attitude than any particular program structure. Liberal opinion in the 1960s and after shifted away from the New Deal's commitment to work and its wariness of the dependency effects of direct relief, toward the "guaranteed annual income" idea that Richard Nixon and Democratic 1972 presidential candidate George McGovern would espouse. LBJ resisted this leftward shift of liberal opinion on welfare but could not contain it. It was driven by the climate created by black urban riots in 1967–68 and a growing liberal sense, expressed most scoldingly in the 1968 Kerner Commission Report on urban riots, that nothing less than universal entitlement to welfare would quiet the black community and constitute "social justice" at last for the descendants of slaves.[27]

This shift in elite opinion was paralleled, it appears, by a sharp change in attitudes among the poor, who moved away from earlier feelings of shame. Caught up in what historian James Patterson calls "the enhanced sense of entitlement that pervaded those turbulent times," the black poor especially were becoming aggressive and litigious about their "welfare rights" and bottom jobs with their insulting wages.[28] "Reports of resistance on the job circulated orally in the black community, among employers, and in white work-

ing class neighborhoods" in the late 1960s, Michael Piore wrote, a phenomenon reported earlier in an urban ghetto by Elliot Liebow in *Tally's Corner*.[29]

Liberals and advocates of the poor by 1968 had failed in two attempts to enact their guaranteed annual income. But along the way they had presided over and to some degree caused an expansion of the AFDC clientele from 4.3 percent of American families in 1965 to 6.1% in 1969 to 10.8 percent in 1974, and in the population on public assistance from 7.1 million in 1960 to 14.4 million in 1974. This income transfer drove down the proportion of Americans in poverty in a dramatic, unprecedented way, and was seen by many liberals as second only to ending Jim Crow as liberalism's crowning achievement.[30] Liberals "clapped their hands with pride," writes Patterson, at this "phenomenal reduction of absolute poverty" from 22 percent of the population in 1959 to 11 percent in 1973. The Great Society, along with economic growth, had moved 60 percent of the pre-transfer poor out of poverty in 1970 and raised America's welfare expenditures toward—though hardly matching—the levels of the social democracies in Western Europe.[31]

What of FDR's fear that these dollars (and food stamps and public housing and free legal services) would prove "a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit"?[32] Patterson observes that "few people paid much attention to the Cassandras," as welfare at the end of the sixties became one of the rights of citizenship.[33] The zeitgeist did not lend itself to talk of obligation or to concern over what happened to "the human spirit" in its absence.

THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE SIXTIES AS A REPUBLICAN OPPORTUNITY

Whatever one thought then of the Great Society and the rights revolution it had fostered, it had coincided with and was to some extent seen as associated with an ambience of mass media-transmitted images of antiwar protests, countercultural weirdness, drugs, the Manson killings, Black Panther fist salutes, feminist rebellion, free love, and urban riots. "In the public perception," wrote James Sundquist of the Brookings Institution, looking back from the 1980s, "all these things merged. Ghetto riots, campus riots, street crime, anti-Vietnam marches, poor people's marches, drugs, pornography, welfarism, rising taxes, all had a common thread: the breakdown of family and social discipline, of concepts of duty, of respect for law, of public and private morality."[34] Liberals would have said that they had made an unmatched record in attacking the causes of such social unrest and rebellion.

But it was not long before they were depicted as the most important source of this social unraveling.

One Democrat had already sensed the possibilities opened by the party's recent record and image. This was Governor George Corley Wallace of Alabama, the public figure who first framed the language to exploit liberal vulnerabilities. In the presidential primaries of 1964, before urban riots broke out, Wallace, despite his unmistakably southern drawl and unimpressive physical appearance, won 34 percent of the vote in Wisconsin, 30 percent in Indiana, and 45 percent in Maryland. The numbers make him just another loser in the history of runs for the presidency, but both his biographers, who agree on little else, call him the most influential loser in American politics.[35] The years between 1964 and 1968 opened an opportunity to capitalize on the invisible discontent of Democratic voters. Republicans picked up forty-four House seats in 1966, and one heard a hinge of political history turn when the GOP that year ended the career of liberal icon Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois and popular liberal Governor Pat Brown lost to a second-rate movie actor, Ronald Reagan.[36]

Two years later Wallace, now candidate of his own American Independent Party, moved northward with a language of populist protest far removed from the old racial appeals of southern politics, but portable anywhere in America. He did not attack blacks, but rather the elite Democratic establishment in Washington—politicians, journalists, judges, intellectuals—who were reaching down into local schools and workplaces all over America, practicing "reverse discrimination" and imposing heavy costs on ordinary working people. His use of the "wedge" or "social issues"—court-imposed busing, affirmative action, leniency on crime, welfare abuse creating a dependent class, rising illegal drug use, urban disorder, and elite domination from Washington and the eastern seaboard—moved a significant number of Democrats, in their view abandoned by their own party, to vote some other way.

Wallace polled ten million votes, putting Richard Nixon, with 43 percent of the total, in the White House. Liberals read the 43 percent as the true strength of their enemy, but 57 percent of the voters had voted against the liberals' beribboned warrior, Hubert Humphrey. And Nixon, surely listening to Wallace's language, had shown impressive skill in endorsing an end to segregation and discrimination while bristling with objections to using federal power to "force a local community to carry out what a federal administrator or bureaucrat may think is best."[37] Wallace had been blunter: "They say, 'We've gotta write a guideline. We gotta tell you when to get up in the morning."[38]

Two books pointed out the opportunity in all this for antiliberals, especially Republicans. A writer and activist in the Nixon campaign, Kevin Phillips, described a seismic political shift toward *The Emerging Republican Majority* (1969), "the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in America politics." The Democrats had been repudiated by the voters, Phillips argued, for their "ambitious social programming . . . [and] inability to handle the urban and Negro revolutions," and because the "Democratic and liberal record was one of failure—in global diplomacy, Asian warfare, domestic economics, social and welfare policy, and law enforcement." The 1968 election was not a momentary setback for the party of FDR, but the first sign of a substantial realignment. The liberal party's northeastern stronghold was on the losing end of a vast demographic shift of power to the Sunbelt, the South and West. Especially in the South, "obsolescent Democratic loyalties" opened up the colonization of a new Republican heartland that Wallace had only momentarily pulled into a fleeting third-party effort.[39]

A year later came Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg's *The Real Majority* (1970). They saw the electorate turning from the older economic issues toward "the Social Issue," a combination of concerns over what they fuzzily characterized as "law and order, [racial] backlash, antiyouth, malaise, change, or alienation." "The law-and-order issue can be finessed" by Democrats, but occasional remarks against crime will not be enough. They have to "*believe* that the Social Issue is important, is distressing to their constituents. . . . Rhetoric alone is never enough." Otherwise, "it could get worse for Democrats," who simply must "listen to the center."[40]

IT ALL CONTINUED IN THE SEVENTIES

Liberals did not derive the same lessons from the 1968 election as Phillips and Scammon and Wattenberg—quite the opposite. To them Wallace was a demagogue, playing upon the racism of a portion of the white working class in a bad year for clear thinking. And Nixon's election was an aberration in a country destabilized by the Vietnam War, the electorate denied by assassination the chance to choose that tough, antiwar liberal Bobby Kennedy.[41] The next time around the American public could be led to do the right thing.

And liberal thinking on the meaning of recent events was especially important, because the Democratic Party, perhaps for the first time, was coming under the control of one of its components, the liberals. Party reforms

launched in 1968 by the left wing of the party shifted selection of nominating convention delegates from party regulars to activists in antiwar or women's or other "rights movements," and under the new rules 83 percent of the delegates to the 1972 Democratic Party Convention were from the ranks of reform activists, the rest from state-based party organizations, with a shrinking congressional component. "We aren't going to let these Harvard-Berkeley Camelots take over our party," said an AFL-CIO official—but they did.[42] An ideological upheaval had produced structural changes within the Democratic Party, moving its image and policies leftward.

The convention in 1972 bypassed moderates such as Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson of Washington and nominated Senator George McGovern, whose views expanded the political problem. He urged withdrawal from Vietnam and called for a $30 billion cut in defense spending, amnesty for Vietnam war deserters, and a grant of $1,000 to every American to eliminate poverty and redistribute income. Historian Ronald Radosh spoke for Democratic centrists when he charged that the party's left by the end of 1972 had firmly "identified the party with the rise of crime, the influence of drugs, the decline in moral standards, and the breakup of the traditional family structure."[43] When voting time came, the New Deal coalition had badly splintered. The Republicans took a majority of Catholic voters for the first time in any presidential election; Nixon was favored by Italian Americans and by voters in union families and made huge inroads on other components of the old Democratic assemblage, such as Jews. McGovern carried Massachusetts and the District of Columbia.

WHY ARE WE LOSING?

There were stirrings of an intraparty debate on that question after the 1972 disaster.[44] But the prevailing interpretation survived McGovern's defeat and seems to have been this: we Democrats lost in 1968 and 1972 because political demagogues (George Wallace first, Nixon and Agnew second) exploited the Vietnam War turmoil but also the deep-seated racism, fear of economic changes brought on by an onrushing globalization of capitalism, fear of feminist and gay self-assertion, and generally reactionary impulses of the average American. These voters and citizens failed the cause, misled into "white backlash" by wicked demagogues playing the race card through the use of code words such as "welfare queen," "forced busing," and "crime." But, surely, time was on our side. Liberals must make the case for the better an-

gels of our nature, and after an interlude the public will once again turn to affirmative government. Keep the faith.

In the meantime, all that was lost was the presidency. Democrats held their lead in governorships (31), and by a narrowed margin controlled both houses of Congress in every year of Nixon-Ford rule. And they translated this into policy results, pushing through an extraordinary number of environmental and consumer-protection laws—including the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), Clean Air Amendments in 1970, pesticide and pollution controls laws in 1972, and the Occupational and Safety and Health Act of 1970.[45]

A dissenting view was mobilizing, finding voice in the pages of a new journal, *The Public Interest*, in those of *Commentary* and elsewhere, and in those of authors such as Irving Kristol, Moynihan, Norman Podhoretz, James Q. Wilson, Ben Wattenberg, Seymour Martin Lipset, Aaron Wildavsky, and Nathan Glazer. In this perspective, the Democratic Party had moved steadily leftward after 1964 along a broad front of unpopular and little debated rights-revolution initiatives led by hard affirmative action and the expansion of welfare. All of this was for the most noble of goals: racial reconciliation and social equality. But choosing these paths and means meant that Democrats lost not just the white South but also the party's New Deal nonsouthern white urban base and transformed themselves into the minority party, at least for presidential elections. The implication, for those who see the central task of politics as gaining and holding power through durable, broad-based coalitions so that good deeds can then follow, would be to move back toward the center until a winning base is reclaimed. And good deeds can then follow, perhaps at a slower pace.[46]

A pivotal issue was one's understanding of the career of George Wallace. Astonished by his warm reception in northern primaries in 1968, Wallace declared, "They all hate black people, all of them. They're all afraid, all of them. Great God! That's it! They're all Southern! The whole United States is Southern!"[47] If Wallace said it, and it is a judgment about prejudice, then it must be so. But Nathan Glazer registered an early dissent in an essay on "The White Ethnic Political Reaction." White "ethnic" voters were not, in his view, more racially prejudiced than Anglo-Saxon Protestants, but according to some polls, less so. They were, however, in the path of the black surge into northern urban neighborhoods and experienced firsthand what college-based and suburban liberals (and Republicans) have not—housing and job competition with blacks. White working-class families found their orderly neighborhoods and schools increasingly populated by blacks, who, in the

older residents' view, brought female-headed and welfare-dependent families, crime, and an unreliable male workforce. Glazer cited a handful of sociological studies documenting these class and cultural conflicts, suggesting that the "real source of prejudice is not race at all" but "realities" that "cannot be wished away."[48]

This brief treatment suggested a more complex understanding of the message sent by Wallace's voters than the governor himself, and the liberals who disagreed with him on everything else, appeared to hold. It was all very easy for white liberals to condemn and label as racists the angry housewives shouting into TV cameras from South Boston or Chicago busing protests, but "real grievances of the lower-middle-class ethnic groups were overlooked," Michael Novak had argued in his 1971 book *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics.* Blacks move into their neighborhoods, "everything begins to decline" from crime rates to garbage collection to the quality of neighborhood schools, "white flight" (and black middle class flight) begins and property values slide, the realtor offers only $14,000 for a home worth more, the man sells, an incoming black family pays $17,000, and "everyone feels bitter." "Ethnic workers," Novak went on, "have legitimate reasons for economic, social, and cultural anxiety about the black revolution." But faraway "intellectuals," Novak's term for liberal elites, "lose nothing at all. It is for them a moral gravy train."[49] By the 1990s a small library of neighborhood studies had richly described the concrete resentments of the Jews and Italians of Canarsie, the white ethnics of South Boston and New York, and others whose cherished neighborhoods and local schools lay in the path of a spreading black ghetto culture.[50] The political result of all this was vividly captured in Samuel Freedman's *The Inheritance* (1996), whose subtitle, *How Three Families and America Moved from Roosevelt to Reagan,* announces the book's story of the political journey to the right of key elements of FDR's Catholic, ethnic base, whose party had "left" them.

LIBERALISM: STILL LEFTWARD

Such perspectives were heresy within liberal thought. Many decided that people like Moynihan and Glazer were not liberals any longer, but "neoconservatives," thus no longer a part of the conversation. The liberal project had not reached the time for extended soul-searching; there was too much to be done. Liberal reform ideas and energies in the 1970s ran strongly and found many outlets. The planning idea had lacked a champion after FDR,

but it revived in the late 1960s. Senator Humphrey and others sponsored a national planning bill, the idea of a national growth policy, and promoted metropolitan regionalism. A liberal-labor coalition was only blocked by the threat of a Ford veto from enacting the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment legislation in 1975–76.[51]

But with equal or more energy and creativity, and considerably more success, liberals pushed ahead with the work that had begun during "The Movement." A main thrust was to expand the system of race, ethnicity, and gender preferences that embodied hard affirmative action. Unchecked by Republicans in the White House, the liberal impulse worked through executive branch agencies, and increasingly the courts. Federal regulators in the EEOC and the departments of Labor and Education were bent on equality in the workplace and rapid minority progress up the mobility ladder of higher education.[52] Labor's regulators (in the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) expanded the Philadelphia plan, issuing Order #4 in 1971 to push the requirement of racial preferences for black Americans in the jobs and subcontracts attached to federal contracts outward to all major cities and the 20 percent of the nation's firms contracting with the government. Federal aid to education was a lever to thrust racial preferences into university admissions, and pressure from ethnic and women's lobbies soon produced an expansion of those qualifying for compensatory advantage because of past discrimination. Women and most racial minorities, even very recent immigrants with no history of exposure to discrimination in the United States, were included.

Congress was passive during this expansion of hard affirmative action until 1977, when, without hearings in either house, a voice vote in the Democrat-controlled House authorized a new "minority contract set-aside" program (MSA), in which 10 percent of public-works funds would be set aside from competitive bidding and reserved for businesses owned by "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts."[53] The Supreme Court somewhat uneasily upheld the contract set-aside concept in 1980 in *Fullilove v. Klutznick,* and such programs spread to more than 230 state and city governments (where black mayors were increasingly in power) by 1989. Inside the federal government, minority "set-sides" that began in the Small Business Administration (SBA) spread to the immense contracting budgets of departments such as Defense and Transportation. Without formal hearings and under ethnic lobbying pressure, the SBA's MSA program was extended to include persons with ancestry from Brunei, Cambodia, Guam, Laos, and other countries in an apparently arbitrary process that excluded, for some

reason, Iranians and Afghans. By the mid-1990s the federal government was running 159 preference programs for businesses whose owners were certified as "disadvantaged." Illegal aliens were eligible for these as well as other entitlements.[54]

Thus hard affirmative action—racial-ethnic-nationality-sex preferences aimed (loosely) at filling quotas in jobs, contracts and admissions—had become a main track on which liberals carried on the civil rights struggle. They were commendably determined to hasten social equality, dangerously moving ahead as social engineers of a new spoils system, without broad public discussion and consent.

Although hard affirmative action originated outside Congress and was little discussed, the conferring of new rights on a broadening range of citizens became a main theme of Congress, which in the 1970s created legal entitlements, in Cass Sunstein's words, to "freedom from risks in the workplace and from defective consumer products, from poverty, from long hours and low wages, from fraud and deception, from domination by employers, from one-sided or purely commercial broadcasting, and from dirty air, dirty water, and toxic substances." The 1970s brought a major expansion of government's protective regulatory reach. The federal budget for the major regulatory agencies grew from $886 million in 1970 to over $5.5 billion in 1979, the pages of the Federal Register devoted to proposed or actual administrative regulations multiplied from 9,562 to 74,120 pages.[55]

The courts were active partners in this post-1960s expansion of the reach of government into the daily economic and social life of Americans. The rights revolution, called "the longest-lasting legacy of the sixties" by Samuel Walker, a historian of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), was pressed ahead in the 1970s by cadres of activist lawyers working in public-interest lobbying groups often funded by the Ford Foundation after its 1970 decision to sponsor the growth of new advocacy organizations. The drive for women's equal rights appeared blocked during the long, state-by-state battle that eventually prevented ratification of the ERA, but a string of successes profoundly altered the legal status of women. These began with the 1963 Equal Pay Act, included a major political mobilizer in the form of the Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision establishing a legal regime for abortion, and added up to a series of laws and court decisions prohibiting sex discrimination in areas ranging from education, maternity leave, access to credit, and the sex-labeling of jobs. The rights of prisoners, gays, the mentally ill, illegal aliens, and farmworkers were expanded by lawsuits brought by groups such as the ACLU, La Raza, and the

National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. "Millions of ordinary people—students, prisoners, women, the poor, gays and lesbians, the handicapped, the mentally retarded and others—discovered their own voices and demanded fair treatment and personal dignity," wrote Walker, in understandably triumphant tones, since there had been in his view no losers and no costs.[56] A different tone came in the assessment of Thomas and Mary Edsall, seeking in the early 1990s to understand a series of Democratic presidential defeats. They described "a revolution that sought new civil and citizenship rights for a range of previously stigmatized groups—criminal defendants, atheists, prisoners, homosexuals, the mentally ill, illegal aliens, publishers of pornography, and others."[57] Liberal academic and activist Lawrence Fuchs, an early supporter of hard affirmative action who developed strong misgivings, heard U.S. Commission on Civil Rights vice-chair Mary Francis Berry insist in 1980 that the civil rights agenda included admission of Cuban and Haitian boat people, and was stunned by "just how loose the meaning of civil rights had become."[58]

However one saw the social and political impacts of the rights revolution, it was clear that Nixon's two electoral victories had not ended or even slowed that part of the liberal reform cycle broadening out from the civil rights movement. Roll on, liberal-left, with or without presidential leadership.

LIBERALISM FRUSTRATED

Nixon disgraced, a weak successor Republican, but liberals did not cycle back into power, with an opportunity for another national renovation. The Democrat's moderate Georgian president floundered in economic troubles and poor luck, and in 1980 a divided and history-encumbered Democratic Party lost the White House and the leadership role again, this time to the former B-movie actor radiating California's sunny expectations. Carter carried only six states, and the Democrats lost the Senate.

Carter's defeat after one term spurred what looked like a broad rethinking—establishment of a Democratic Party Council, Congressional retreats and seminars, a new Center for National Policy, and a flurry of books by presidential hopefuls. One historian of all this reformist soul-searching found it "highly random" and "not productive or constructive."[59] Two more failed runs at the White House seemed required, and along they came—1984 candidate Walter Mondale, Hubert Humphrey's heir, carrying one state and the District of Columbia; 1988 candidate Michael Dukakis losing forty-two

states to George Bush, who liberally called him a liberal. The "L-word" now seemed the third rail of American politics, synonymous, in Reagan and Bush rhetoric, with ACLU softness on crime, suspicion of the military, "tax and spend" economics, indifference to the values of family and flag. "Liberalism," observed historian Fred Siegal, is a creed now "defined in the public mind in cultural rather than economic terms."[60] The Democratic base had eroded, analyst Gerald Pomper points out, by shrinkage (of the labor union component), and disaffection (chiefly of southerners and Catholics). Getting nonvoters to the polls, the left's favorite theme, would not have helped, for in 1988 polls showed them leaning toward the Republicans.[61]

EXPERIMENTING WITH THE MESSAGE AND THE LABEL: THE 1990S

The story of Clinton-era efforts to reposition the Democratic Party is too close at hand and too erratic with cross-currents to permit a guess as to whether it will be seen only as part of the declensionist past, or in some sense an anteroom to a "New Democrat" future. Working from a base of ideas and phrases generated by the "communitarian" movement emphasizing the need to rebalance rights with responsibilities, and by the Democratic Leadership Council formed by southern elected Democrats in 1985 to find ways to "recapture the middle," Bill Clinton won the White House twice without using the L-word—with 43 percent of the vote in 1992 and 49 percent in 1996.[62] But he and Hillary were liberals, hoping to lead the next cycle of reform in the line of FDR-Eleanor and JFK-Jacquie. Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. thought their timing excellent: "The tide is plainly turning," he wrote in 1992, "Governor Clinton and Senator Gore are indeed JFK's children."[63] It was not to be. Only by "triangulating" away from early liberal positions was Clinton able to squeeze into a second term. He spoke of having found a "Third Way," language used by center-tending former left parties in Europe, especially Labor in the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Tony Blair. The term developed no identity, the Clinton years no momentum. Vice President Gore, running a bit left of "the Third Way" though inexplicably making no use of the most unifying of the sixties' crusades, environmentalism, in 2000 lost the closest election in American history to Republican George W. Bush. At the close of the twentieth century the Democratic Party bore much resemblance to its nineteenth-century self, a minority party harbor for ethnic tribes with no compelling ideas or national business to transact.

THE LIBERALS' PAST AND FUTURE: ASSESSMENTS AND SPECULATIONS

How had liberalism come to this place?[64]

Here, as in so much else, most of the scholarship on the issue is drawn back to seminal developments in and expanding beyond the sixties. Even if one concedes the case made by some historians that modern liberalism wandered from its core (and winning) economic reform mission as early as the 1940s, the sixties seem in retrospect the watershed of liberal political misjudgments. Beginning in that era and gaining momentum into the 1970s and after, liberal policies on and communicated attitudes about welfare, crime, preferential treatment of blacks and other minorities and women, school busing, and national defense and patriotism, drove a wedge between liberal elites and the party's base as well as the broader electorate. A persistent theme is policy decisions made without full and candid public discussion, often outside the relatively open processes of Congress. These include the move from soft to hard affirmative action and the vast expansion of bilingual education that were launched within new and little-scrutinized federal bureaucracies; the relentless incremental expansion of welfare; the long busing experiment in federal management of local education through judges. Even when Congress deliberated openly, liberal programs later to be deeply unpopular were sometimes adopted with explicit expert assurances that the policies would not do certain unwelcome things that they subsequently did—as, for example, the Immigration Act of 1965 both vastly expanded incoming numbers and radically altered countries of origin after solemn assurances to the contrary.

A cluster of unpopular programs was only a part of the problem for post–Great Society liberals. If politics were a set of policy scales with weights marked "law" or "program," unpopular policies might have been balanced or even outweighed by measures with the LBJ signature that had broad support—Medicare, aid to education such as student loans, subsidies to agriculture and medical research and municipal sewage plants, wilderness protection. But Great Society liberalism had other negatives beyond a large part of its policy portfolio. Journalist Kevin Phillips in 1982 perceived a "second social-issue wave" that had built up during the 1970s, "pivoting on religious, moral and sexual controversies." There was underway, as he saw it, a "morals revolution" with which liberals had become identified, even if only partisans on the right thought them solely responsible. By "championing permissiveness, homosexuality and abortion while implicit-

ly derogating the family, prayer and biblical teachings," Phillips wrote, they not only lost Democratic voters but also energized the Christian right and brought some conservative nonvoters into active political life.[65] What Phillips called the "morals revolution" James David Hunter (and then everybody else) called, with more subtlety, *The Culture Wars* (1991). America seemed increasingly dividing into traditional-religious-nationalist versus cosmopolitan-secular-globalist camps. Republicans liked to oversimplify and exploit these alignments, since liberals, and the rest of the left, were entirely in the latter camp (along with staunch Republicans from the top echelons of business whose outlook was cosmopolitan and international). Looking back from the end of the century, Francis Fukuyama pointed out that the United States and every other economically advanced society experienced what he called "the Great Disruption" as they passed from industrial to information-based economies. Beginning in the mid-sixties and continuing through the century, "seriously deteriorating social conditions" unexpectedly built in behind economic change. Crime, social disorder, and divorce and illegitimacy rates shot upward, while trust and confidence in core institutions and even in fellow citizens went into a "forty-year decline."[66] In Fukuyama's view, liberalism was not responsible for this values disruption. Liberals merely ignored or underestimated it, all the while parenting a welfare system that seemed an accomplice. This judgment seems indulgent. As the belief system attuned to expanding group and individual rights, embracing an almost universal cultural tolerance and seeing all worries about crime and illegitimacy as essentially racist, liberalism seemed to many observers—and apparently to much of the voting public—one of the Great Disruption's sponsors.

Another cultural dimension of late-twentieth century liberal policymaking was "identity politics," a recently minted term for a new version of something old. Both—more correctly, all—American political parties have long made appeals to ethnic and racial groups. But liberals in the 1960s began a politically sustained, policy-expressed emphasis on locating the victims of discrimination or disadvantage (the second would often suffice, as proxy for the first) on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation, and providing governmental advantage to these client groups.

The impetus, of course, came from the civil rights movement. Its exhilarating example led to minority-group multiplication and mobilization—by feminists, Hispanics of various group names, American Indians, gays and lesbians, and the mentally and physically handicapped. A growing number of organizations and "leaders" speaking in their names emphasized their

groups' victimhood and claimed entitlement to the benefits of affirmative action, reparations, and apologies. The debate over such policies is robust and growing. The political implications are clear—the image of the Democratic Party caught up in a corrupting relationship with client tribes expecting governmental largesse, an arrangement justified by the "moral high ground" slogan of historic former wrongs redressed by rights. Equally worrisome to some observers was the power of identity politics to reorient public discourse and therefore civic culture. Mary Ann Glendon complained of a "rapidly expanding catalogue of rights" accompanied by a "new version of rights discourse . . . set apart from rights discourse in other liberal democracies by its starkness and simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the rights label . . . and its silence with respect to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."[67] For Todd Gitlin, veteran of New Left activism in the Bay Area during the sixties, "today it is the conservatives who claim common culture and color blindness as their special causes." When Ronald Reagan spoke of national revitalization, "the Democrats offered no commonality . . . no political culture—only a heap of demands piled on demands." Even as George Bush in 1992 admitted that he lacked "the vision thing," Democrats "stared uncomprehending into America's post–Cold War identity crisis, barely aware that they lacked even the terms of unification. . . . They needed a whole that was more than a heap. . . . The Democrats [by the 1990s] were a loose, baggy party, the Left an aggregation of movements, grouplets, and ideological tendencies. . . . Since the McGovern convention of 1972, raggedly and selectively, the Democrats had taken much of their poetry from a Left that had no conviction that commonality was possible. . . . They trapped themselves in zero-sum programs—busing, affirmative action—that split their base . . . [and] could not agree on a common commonality."[68] And in the words of Alan Wolfe: "Speaking the language of a cultural elite committed to tolerance, relativism, and personal and group identity, liberals separated themselves off from the traditional moral views of hardworking middle-class Americans, becoming, in the process, a 'new class' committed to an 'adversary culture' of collectivist values, therapeutic remedies, hostility to corporations, and even anti-Americanism."[69]

Theodore White had sensed the buildup of centrifugal forces as early as 1978, wondering in his autobiography whether "America would be transformed, in the name of opportunity, simply into a Place, a gathering of discretely defined and entitled groups, interests, and heritages; or whether it could continue to be a nation. . . ."[70] Liberalism had bonded with "Diversity," a sometimes good thing that was increasingly being asked to serve as the cen-

tral goal of national policy. Would America, worried Richard Morgan, become "simply a collection of ethnics huddled around a standard of living?"[71]

THE MOMENTUM OF GOOD INTENTIONS

Of course, occasionally going a bit out in front of public consensus, even in a democracy, has a lot to be said for it. Liberal elites in the 1960s were pushing hard for an end to the legal regime of racial discrimination. Steps in this direction had for decades been meeting massive resistance from the southern white electorate, and in the 1960s it appeared that the white resistance had taken root across the nation. A disconnect between elite and working-middle class attitudes on race policy was a new and deeply felt reality. To liberals who were finding themselves as the elite, the situation implied a moral warrant for imaginative, innovative government willing to be on occasion "countermajoritarian." It was one of those hopefully rare times in which it was necessary to coerce the bigoted or uncompassionate majority, using the courts, administrative rulemaking, and other pathways around wrongheaded arrangements. This is sometimes called political leadership, the high plateau of political life.

But if innovative countermajoritarian policy leads to a long ordeal of party weakness and defeat—another way to say, to the coming to power of hated enemies such as Richard Nixon—then, in politics, as distinct from seeking the kingdom of God, there must be rethinking and course corrections. Especially if the policies themselves bring disappointing social as well as political results. Yet serious rethinking by liberals came only in the 1990s, and then haltingly, after two decades of political hemorrhaging, the presidencies of Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, and other Republican enjoyments. Why was recognition of political vulnerability and misjudgment so long delayed?

To disgruntled leftist Michael Tomasky, for example, there was always much to be taken seriously in the criticism of hard affirmative action, welfare, bilingual education, and mass immigration under (and illegally around) the 1965 act. But liberals tended to dismiss all criticism as racism and would not rethink policies that seemed the only available means of continuing the civil rights crusade. Rejecting "any attempt at self-examination," Tomasky concludes, the left "has taken itself out of the conversation."[72] "In sum, liberals," physically and socially remote from the urban churning, "were arrogant," writes Gordon MacInnes, "and showed no respect for middle class and working Americans."[73] Reaching deeper, Thomas and Mary Edsall drew up a

list of reasons why liberals could not bear to open a discussion of their errors: "Fear of information damaging to liberal goals . . . a reluctance to further stigmatize blacks who were just emerging from centuries of legal oppression . . . an unwillingness to raise issues straining the fragile liberal coalition . . . [and] the confusion growing out of the upheaval in moral values among the white middle and upper-middle class."[74]

LOOKING AHEAD

There is still some optimism in liberal—now "progressive"—precincts. Demographic trends promise victory, goes one view, because immigration brings a surging Hispanic vote that will "flip . . . the lower, 'Latinized' Sunbelt back to the Democrats."[75]

Perhaps so, though President George W. Bush clearly thinks all Americans of Mexican descent are potential Republicans. Even if he is wrong and the Democrats inherit most of the Hispanic vote, winning by this arithmetic does not promise the challenge of nation-saving, brings no history-making moment. Liberalism had once aimed at more. How again to be more than a 43 percent or 50.1 percent winner but a *cause,* rallying majorities for social transformation? That dream has a firm grip.[76]

Billionaire financier George Soros, remembering the 1890s and 1930s, imagines a meltdown of the global economy offering an opening for capitalism-fixers—which means liberals under whatever name, with a mission of building a "global New Deal."[77] But the strains of globalization remain below crisis level, and nowhere could one see the intellectual building blocks of a coherent international and national reform program to deal with a collapse or sustained malfunction of the global economy. The tea leaves are in a dark, deep cup.

On September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists seized four civilian aircraft and drove two of them into the World Trade Center in New York and one into the Pentagon in Washington, killing more than three thousand people. A fourth hijacked plane, apparently headed for another target in Washington, crashed in Pennsylvania when the passengers, realizing the nature of the hijacker's mission, attacked the terrorist at the controls. America was at war, President George W. Bush declared, and others called it the beginning of World War III.

These events supplied a decided sense of national crisis with no likelihood of early resolution, a lengthy struggle against global terrorism that was not at

all what crisis speculators had envisioned. Where was any opportunity for liberal-progressives? Criticism of and disagreement with President George W. Bush had at first to be muted, even on domestic matters, but the opposition would eventually oppose. But with what message and effect? Big Government was back, but it was President Bush and his administration asking for increased spending for defense, strengthened intelligence capacities and border/immigration controls, and assistance to war-damaged facilities as well as crippled airlines. A distinctive progressive response to the deadly global terrorist impulse and apparatus was going to be very difficult to fashion, especially because a part of the left initially seemed to be taking pacifist and "America is the problem" positions.[78] Liberal writer George Packer nonetheless saw a silver lining, commenting that September 11 "made it safe for liberals to be patriots."[79] Perhaps so, but that pathway to leadership had been clogged by Republicans since the Democrats buried PT-boat skipper John F. Kennedy. The public had for two decades expressed more confidence in Republicans than Democrats in foreign affairs and national security issues, and by a large margin.

A few intellectuals, even before the 2001 attacks, had been reminding their readers that liberalism had in the first half of the century been wedded with nationalism, and labored to work their way back from a splintered multiculturalism toward a workable accommodation with national solidarity, the risky emotions of patriotism, even that discredited old idea, national identity.[80] For those who followed the discourse of the public intellectuals, it was a mark of how widespread were these end-of-century reconsiderations in liberal territory when the dean of the multicultural left, Richard Rorty, urged the cultural left to drop its "semi-conscious anti-Americanism" and "start trying to construct inspiring images of the country" so that it can "begin to form alliances with people outside the academy."[81]

Whatever is ahead, at the start of the twenty-first century the liberal narrative is fragmented into confusion, the connections to the mainstream public lost, along with a convincing vision of what the historic moment requires. Liberals had lost their story. Republicans, sensing an opportunity, had substituted a new narrative, the liberal as tax-and-spend moral idiot. But this language, too, will age. Returning to the word *Progressive* may have more significance than is realized. It suggests a recognition that recent misjudgments are not the whole of a political heritage, and reminds that, a century ago, the nonsocialist left built a winning story around nation-building, along with the conviction that capitalism, alone, should not be given the only role in planning, or steering, a country.

Wearier than most, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, thinking of the social pathologies that the welfare state had made worse, but perhaps also of four decades of public policy's muddles and unintended consequences, concluded that "it is time for small platoons" of family, church, and neighborhood.[82] That sounded like the end of a political era, without a hint of the shape of the future.

NOTES

1. "Liberalism Defined," *The Economist* (December 21, 1996), p. 17. The focus of this essay is on political liberalism, the liberal persuasion engaged in political effort associated with the Democratic Party since Franklin Roosevelt. It does not review other forms such as legal liberalism or liberal political theory, on which there is an immense literature.

2. William Raspberry, "Liberals: Out of Ideas," *Washington Post,* September 26, 1997, p. A25. See also Tom Hamburger, "How Did Liberal Get to Be Such a Dirty Word?" *Minneapolis Star Tribune,* September 30, 1996, p. A7.

3. Arthur Mann, *The One and the Many* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 9.

4. "What went wrong?" is also an absorbing question for the opposition. "What is a conservative?" asked the *Los Angeles Times* at the end of 1998, with GOP House Speaker Newt Gingrich's leadership repudiated and its majority feeble. No party, in 2000 and after, could assemble a working majority or decisively win the White House. But this opens a larger question.

5. Robert Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–1973* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 120.

6. Numan Bartley and Hugh Davis Graham, *Southern Politics in the Second Reconstruction* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 106–110.

7. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspective of the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 549.

8. For influential overviews of the Great Society, see Allen J. Matusow, *The Unraveling of America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), and James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

9. For two contrasting views of LBJ and his legacy, see Robert Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), and Dallek, *Flawed Giant*. Lewis L. Gould, "The Revised LBJ," *Wilson Quarterly* (Spring 2000): 80–96, is a useful review of the biographical literature.

10. See the vivid migrant biographies collected in Nicholas Lemann, *The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991).

11. On the "underclass," see William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Ken Auletta, *The Underclass* (New York: Random House, 1982); Lemann, *The Promised Land,* and the notes to chap. 7, "Welfare and the Underclass Threat," in Mickey Kaus, *The End of Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

12. Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall, *Chain Reaction* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 52; *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988); Gerald David Jaynes and Robin M. Williams Jr., eds., *A Common Destiny: Blacks and American Society* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1989).

13. The report is reprinted in Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), 41–124.

14. Gordon MacInnes, *Wrong for All the Right Reasons: How White Liberals Have Been Undone by Race* (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 46.

15. Lemann, *Promised Land,* 177. It almost ceased. Economist Andrew Brimmer, a governor of the Federal Reserve Board, made a speech at Tuskegee Institute in 1970 entitled "The Deepening Schism," in which he noted that "able . . . and well-prepared" Negroes were making economic progress, but "those with few skills" were not, the latter entangled in "the dramatic deterioration in the position of Negro families headed by females." There was no uproar, since Brimmer was black. See Godfrey Hodgson, *America In Our Time* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 445.

16. Hugh Davis Graham, *The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy, 1960–1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 106–109; Nathan Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 44–45; Stephan Thernstrom and Abigail Thernstrom, *America in Black and White: One Nation, Indivisible* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 425.

17. Thernstrom and Thernstrom, *America in Black and White,* 424–429; Hugh Davis Graham, "Race, History and Policy: African Americans and Civil Rights since 1964," in Hugh Davis Graham, ed., *Civil Rights in the United States* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 17–20. See also John David Skrentny, *The Ironies of Affirmative Action* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

18. Hugh Davis Graham, "Unintended Consequences: The Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy," *American Behavioral Scientist* 41 (April 1998): 903–904; and Graham, *Collision Course: The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action and Immigration Policy in America* (New York: Oxford University Press,

2002). The terms "soft" and "hard" affirmative action were, to my knowledge, first suggested by Nathan Glazer when he spoke of "hard affirmative action." See Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination,* 207.

19. Thernstrom and Thernstrom, *America in Black and White,* 173.

20. Thernstrom and Thernstrom, *America in Black and White,* 330. See also J. Harvey Wilkinson III, *From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration, 1954–1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), Ronald P. Formisano, *Boston against Busing: Race, Class and Ethnicity in the 1960s and 1970s* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), and James T. Patterson, *Brown v. Board of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

21. Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 281.

22. Mary Ann Glendon, *Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse* (New York: Free Press, 1991), xx–xxi.

23. Cass R. Sunstein, *After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 12–30.

24. Nathan Glazer, "A Breakdown in Civil Rights Enforcement?" *The Public Interest* (Winter 1971): 107. See also Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination,* and Graham, *Civil Rights Era*, 456–458.

25. Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 24–33.

26. James T. Patterson, *America's Struggle against Poverty, 1900–1980* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1980), 171.

27. Gareth Davies, *From Opportunity to Entitlement: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996).

28. Patterson, *America's Struggle*, 171, 179. See also Patterson, "Race Relations and the 'Underclass' in Modern America: Some Historical Observations," *Qualitative Sociology* 18 (1995): 237–260.

29. Michael J. Piore, *Birds of Passage: Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 161–162. See Elliot Liebow, *Tally's Corner: A Study of Streetcorner Men* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), and the discussion in William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 104–109.

30. John Morton Blum, *Years of Discord: American Politics and Society, 1961–1974* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 170–177; Patterson, *America's Struggle,* chap. 10.

31. Patterson, *America's Struggle,* 160, 165–170, and see chap. 10 generally.

32. FDR quoted in Samuel Rosenman, ed., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 4:19–20.

33. Rosenman, ed., *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt,* 4:183.

34. James Sundquist, *The Dynamics of the Party System* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1983), 382.

35. A point of agreement pointed out by Hugh Davis Graham in his review of Stephan Lesher, *George Wallace: American Populist* (1994) and Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism and the Transformation of American Politics* (1995), *Reviews in American History* 24 (1996): 332–336.

36. Matthew Dallek, "Liberalism Overthrown," *American Heritage* (October 1996), pp. 39–60; Dallek, *The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan's First Victory and the Decisive Turning Point in American Politics* (New York: Free Press, 2000).

37. Stephen A. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972,* vol. 2 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 187.

38. Jody Carlson, *George C. Wallace and the Politics of Powerlessness* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981), 6.

39. Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), 1–33.

40. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), 20, 284–289.

41. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., "What If RFK Had Survived?" *Newsweek,* June 8, 1998, p. 55. For a skeptical view of RFK's electoral prospects, see Nelson Polsby, ed., *What If?* (Lexington, Mass.: Lewis, 1982). For doubts that RFK was an ardent liberal, see Ronald Steel, *In Love with Night: The American Romance with Robert Kennedy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), and Evan Thomas, *Robert Kennedy: His Life* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

42. Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 38. For the McGovern-Fraser Commission reforms of Democratic Party rules, see Byron Shafer, *Quiet Revolution: The Struggle for the Democratic Party and the Shaping of Post-Reform Politics* (New York: Russell Sage, 1983), and William Mayer (*The Divided Democrats: Ideological Unity, Party Reform, and Presidential Elections* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996).

43. Ronald Radosh, *Divided They Fell: The Demise of the Democratic Party, 1964–1996* (New York: Free Press, 1996), xi.

44. Ben Wattenberg reports that he "helped start" and was chairman of "a Democratic anti-McGovernite factional group called the Coalition for a Democratic Majority," but says no more about it in his *Values Matter Most* (New York: Free Press, 1995). For a brief account of the group and two other small forerunners of the DLC, see James M. Burns and Georgia J. Sorenson, *Dead Center: Clinton-Gore Leadership and the Perils of Moderation* (New York: Scribner, 1999), 151–153; see also Norman Podhoretz, "Life of His Party," *National Review* (September 13, 1999), p. 50. On Sen-

ator Jackson, see Robert G. Kaufman, *Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).

45. See David Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), especially chap. 4, "Business on the Defensive, 1969–1972."

46. This perspective on things found early expression in Scammon and Wattenberg's *The Real Majority* and in the 1990s was vigorously expressed in Edsall and Edsall, *Chain Reaction*. For a review of the Democrats' internal feuds and self-assessments, see Jacob Weisberg, *In Defense of Government: The Fall and Rise of Public Trust* (New York: Scribners, 1996).

47. Carter, *The Politics of Rage,* 344.

48. Glazer, *Affirmative Discrimination,* 177–195.

49. Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 7, 12–13, 250.

50. Jonathan Rieder, *Canarsie: The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn against Liberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Formisano, *Boston against Busing*; Jim Sleeper, *The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of Race in New York* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); Lemann, *The Promised Land*; Fred Siegel, *The Future Once Happened Here: New York, D.C., L.A., and the Fate of America's Big Cities* (New York: Free Press, 1997); Samuel Freedman, *The Inheritance: How Three Families and America Moved from Roosevelt to Reagan and Beyond* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Alan Brinkley lists several studies of the urban "populist right" with "rational grievances" in *Liberalism and Its Discontents* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 361.

51. See Otis L. Graham Jr., *Toward a Planned Society: From Roosevelt to Nixon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), and *Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), chap. 1.

52. On the rights-based effort to force schools and universities toward equal results, see Stephen C. Halpern, *On The Limits of the Law: The Ironic Legacy of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

53. Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Section 103(f)(2).

54. Hugh Davis Graham, "Since 1964: The Paradox of American Civil Rights Regulation," in Morton Keller and H. Shep Melnich, eds., *Taking Stock: American Government in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), 187–218; "Unintended Consequences," 898–912; and "Race, History, and Policy: African Americans and Civil Rights since 1964," *Journal of Policy History* 6 (1994): 24–27. See also George La Noue and John Sullivan, " ''Presumptions for Preferences: The Small Business Administration's Decisions on Groups Entitled to Affirmative Action," *Journal of Policy History* 6 (1994): 439–467; and La Noue, "Split Visions: Mi-

nority Business Set-Asides," *The Annals* 523 (September 1992): 104–116. At Senator Robert Dole's request, in February 1995 the Congressional Research Service compiled a thirty-three-page list of every "federal statute, regulation, program, and executive order that grants a preference to individuals on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or ethnic background." (Congressional Research Service to Honorable Robert Dole, February 17, 1995.)

55. Sunstein, *After the Rights Revolution,* 12–30; David Vogel, *Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), chaps. 3–4.

56. Samuel Walker, *In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 300.

57. Edsall and Edsall, *Chain Reaction,* 45. See also James T. Patterson, "The Rise of Rights and Rights Consciousness in American Politics, 1930s–1970s," in Bryon E. Shafer and Anthony J. Badger, eds., *Contesting Democracy: Substance and Structure in American Political History, 1775–2000* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 237–263.

58. Lawrence H. Fuchs, "The Changing Meaning of Civil Rights, 1954–1994," in John Higham, ed., *Civil Rights and Social Wrongs* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 71.

59. Caroline Arden, *Getting the Donkey out of the Ditch: The Democratic Party in Search of Itself* (New York: Greenwood, 1988), 1. Journalists talked of a new centrist impulse they labeled "neo-liberalism," defined by *The New Republic* editor Morton Kondracke as "an attempt to combine the traditional Democratic compassion for the downtrodden . . . with different vehicles than . . . quota systems or new federal bureaucracies." He named a rising cluster of younger Democrats—Gary Hart, Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts, Bill Bradley of New Jersey, Jerry Brown of California. Morton Kondracke, "A Doubtful New Order," *The New Republic* (November 15, 1980). See also Randall Rothenberg, *The Neo-Liberals* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

60. Fred Siegel, "What Liberals Haven't Learned and Why," *Commonweal* (January 13, 1989), pp. 17–18. Cultural and *racial* terms, argues Peter Brown in *Minority Party: Why Democrats Face Defeat in 1992 and Beyond* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1991).

61. Gerald M. Pomper, ed., *The Election of 1988: Reports and Interpretations* (New York: Chatham House, 1989), 110–137.

62. The DLC story is well told in Kenneth S. Baer, *Reinventing Democrats: The Politics of Liberalism from Reagan to Clinton* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

63. Schlesinger, in Peter B. Kovler, ed., *Democrats and the American Idea: A Bicentennial Appraisal* (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Policy Press, 1992), 363–364.

64. Some scholars object to the form of the question. Define liberalism in terms of the values of individualism, political equality, and the consent of the governed, they ar-

gue, and it has steadily expanded its moral authority. See Robert Booth Fowler, *Enduring Liberalism: American Political Thought since the 1960s* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999). The same sense of robust liberalism comes if one defines it as citizens lobbying networks supporting a "postmaterialist" agenda of environmental protection, consumerism, and minority group advancement: see Jeffrey M. Berry, *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

65. Kevin P. Phillips, *Post-Conservative America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 23.

66. Francis Fukuyama, *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of the Social Order* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 4. See also Daniel Yankelovich, *New Rules: Searching for Self-Fulfillment in a World Turned Upside Down* (New York: Random House, 1981); Bruce J. Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture* (New York: Free Press, 2001).

67. Mary Ann Glendon, *Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse* (New York: Free Press, 1991), xx–xxi, 5.

68. Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture Wars* (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), 33, 79, 82–83, 100. See also Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda* (New York: Crown, 1993).

69. Alan Wolfe, *One Nation, After All* (New York: Viking, 1998), 304.

70. Theodore H. White, *In Search of History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 538.

71. Richard E. Morgan, *Disabling America* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 269.

72. Michael Tomasky, *Left for Dead* (New York: Free Press, 1996), 9, 13. George McGovern, always more thoughtful than the image created for him in 1972, regretted sixteen years later that the antiwar movement called the war "immoral" rather than imprudent or otherwise mistaken, since the word "immoral" shut off dialogue with the other side. "If you disagree with us, you are immoral." Recalled by George F. Will in *Suddenly* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Post Press, 1990), 266.

73. MacInnes, *Wrong for All the Right Reasons,* 7. This would be no news to historians Christopher Lasch and Robert Wiebe, who argued in different ways that a "national class" of self-appointed experts emerged in the reform movements at the start of the twentieth century and thereafter the political participation of the public was steadily reduced. See Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), and Robert Wiebe, *Self-Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

74. Edsall and Edsall, *Chain Reaction,* 53. See also Brown, *Minority Party*.

75. Paul Starr, "An Emerging Democratic Majority," *The American Prospect* (November–December 1997), p. 21. This was a remarkable calculation. Oklahoma Sena-

tor Fred Harris based his 1972 and 1976 presidential runs on the 25 million young people newly eligible to vote in 1972. See Richard Lowitt, *Fred Harris: His Journey from Liberalism to Populism* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 183. Unfortunately, says William Mayer, this is an "empirically inaccurate premise." Nonvoters are not closet Democrats or liberals, but mostly independents whose turnout would not much alter the results (*Divided Democrats,* 164–165). On how the "Joe Sixpack" white middle class could be won back with government measures to deal with economic insecurities, see Ruy Teixeira and Joel Rogers, *America's Forgotten Majority* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

76. See, for example, E. J. Dionne, *They Only Look Dead: Why Progressives Will Dominate the Next Political Era* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), and Weisberg, *In Defense,* 158–192.

77. George Soros, *The Crisis of Global Capitalism* (Boston: Perseus Books, 1998), and *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). See also Paul Krugman, "The Return of Depression Economics," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 1 (January/February 1999): 56–74. The phrase "Global New Deal" appears, among other places, in W. Bowman Cutter, Joan Spero, and Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "New World, New Deal," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 80–98.

78. See Michael Kazin, "After the Attacks, Which Side Is the Left On?" *New York Times,* October 7, 2001, p. A4.

79. George Packer, "Recapturing the Flag," *New York Times Magazine* (September 30, 2001), p. 15.

80. John B. Judis and Michael Lind, "For A New Nationalism," *The New Republic* (March 27, 1995), pp. 19–27. See also Jeff Faux, *The Party's Not Over: A New Vision for the Democrats* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); and David A. Hollinger, "National Solidarity at the End of the Twentieth Century," *Journal of American History* (September 1997): 559–569, along with the exchange with Gary Gerstle and others. See also David Miller, *On Nationality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Martin Marty, *The One and the Many* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997); Yael Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Russell Hardin, *One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).

81. Richard Rorty, "The Dark Side of the Academic Left," *Chronicle of Higher Education* (April 3, 1998), pp. B4–B6. See also Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998).

82. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 230.