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China's Road to the Korean War
The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
New York
1994
7 . The Decision Stands the Test: China Crosses the Yalu
Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang flew from Beijing to Shenyang early in the morning of October 8. They had about one week's time to solve any remaining problems before Chinese troops had to cross the Yalu. A few hours later, another plane flew Zhou Enlai to the Soviet Union. His task was to meet Stalin to finalize the Chinese-Soviet cooperation in Korea. In the meantime, Mao and his colleagues in Beijing wasted no time in considering how to accelerate military preparations, to further mobilize the country, as well as to make certain that when China was in a war its domestic situation would remain stable. The road leading to China's intervention in Korea had now reached the final stage, but the test for the Beijing leadership's war decision, as we shall see, was not yet over.
Domestic Mobilization Expanded
Mao had always been a believer that military actions should serve the party's political needs, and that intensive mass mobilization would best guarantee successful military operations. When he ordered Chinese troops to enter the Korean War, he endeavored to push the "Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea" to a new high peak. Following Mao's instructions, cadres of the CCP Central Committee's Propaganda Department began in early October to work on a document offering guidelines for the movement. Mao supervised the drafting of the document, personally revising its contents and polishing its wording. A draft of this inner-party document was ready around the time when Mao issued the order to enter the war. After several revisions, including the revision by Mao himself, the document was finally issued to all party organs on October 26, entitled "The CCP Central Committee's Directives on the Current Situation." On November 5, the Xinhua News Agency, on the basis of this document, issued another more detailed, openly circulated document, entitled "How to Regard the United States (Outlines for Propaganda)."These important documents not only reveal the series of considerations underlying the CCP leadership's decision to enter the Korean War but also offer clues crucial for an understanding of why Mao was willing to risk a major confrontation with the United States. 1
A central task of the "Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea," according to these documents, was "how to regard the United States correctly." Historically, they argued, many Chinese had been either deceived by the "outward appearance of American democracy" or psychologically overwhelmed by the strength of the United States. These Chinese thus believed that China should "learn from the United States," that China's modernization needed America's support, and that China could not afford to offend Americans. The Beijing leadership emphasized that "it was reactionary to be pro-America" and that "it was wrong to either adore or to be afraid of the Untied States."
Beijing leaders therefore established the goals for a nation-wide propaganda movement aimed at "exposing the real nature of U.S. imperialism," placing emphasis on three points. First, both from historical and current perspectives the United States was China's enemy: historically the United States had persistently pursued extraterritoriality and privileges through unequal treaties with China; currently the United States had invaded Korea and Taiwan, threatening China's security. Second, it was a myth that the United States was a "democratic and peace-loving" country. In reality, the "reactionary ruling classes" in the United States were exploiting and oppressing the working masses at home and making the United States "the bastion of international wars of aggression" abroad. Third, the United States was by nature a "paper tiger." It was politically isolated in the world as the result of its reactionary policies and militarily weak because of the contradictions between America's limited resources and Washington's unlimited aims of expansion. As a result, China's confrontation with the United States was both necessary and reasonable- because the United States was China's enemy and because China could defeat the United States.
Beijing leaders offered four arguments to bolster their claim that the United States was militarily vulnerable. First of all, since Washington had committed itself to Europe, Asia, and almost everywhere in the world, it could not possibly hold all fronts. Second, the United States, as a country located in the western hemisphere, was almost halfway across the earth from East Asia. American troops and war materials needed to travel across the Pacific Ocean for operations in Korea. This would greatly restrict "the American capacity for logistical supply and military reinforcement." Third, the United States had limited human resources to spend in the Korean War and American soldiers did not like to fight in a remote foreign land. The Beijing leadership estimated that the United States had around 1.45 million men serving in the armed forces, two thirds of whom were either inexperienced or non-combat personnel. In comparison, the Chinese and Korean forces easily outnumbered the Americans and their allies. Moreover, Chinese and Korean soldiers, fighting to defend their own homeland, would have a much higher morale than the Americans. Finally, the United States could not rely on the support of strong allies, since West Germany and Japan had not been rearmed, and Britain, France, and Italy were no longer great military powers.
Beijing leaders gave three reasons to persuade the Chinese people not to fear the prospect of atomic warfare. First, while it was true that the atomic bomb was a weapon of massive destruction, its power should not be exaggerated. In fact, they argued, "the atomic bomb would produce only the effect equal to the accumulation of thousands of regular bombs," which might "influence the process of a war but could not decide the fate of a war." Second, considering the nature of the atomic bomb, it could not be used everywhere. "As the bomb had such capacity for destruction, it could not be used in a battle engaging the troops of the two sides; otherwise, the users' troops would also be destroyed." Furthermore, as the bomb had such a concentrated, massive power of destruction, it would be less threatening to a vast country like China than to the United States and other Western industrial countries which were heavily dependent on a few big industrial centers. Third, the United Stated had to consider the fact that it was no longer in a position to monopolize the bomb. "If the United States dared to use it, it would naturally face retaliation, and this would be most horrible for the United States, which had a concentrated industry."
In order to "combine patriotism and nationalism with internationalism," Beijing leaders adopted "resist America and assist Korea, and defend our home and our country" as the central slogan for the "Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea." They stressed the importance of establishing a close relationship between "the deep-rooted patriotic and nationalist feeling" of every common Chinese and the great task of "beating American imperialists in Korea." They called on the Chinese people to "hate the U.S. imperialists," to "disdain the U.S. imperialists," and to "look down on the U.S. imperialists." In short, the Chinese people, as Mao repeatedly emphasized, had to "beat American arrogance."
These instructions illustrated again the Beijing leadership's intention to change the external pressure caused by the Korean crisis into a driving force for promoting the continuation of the great Chinese revolution. Mao believed that nothing could be more appealing to the Chinese people's profound nationalist feelings than the prospect of defeating a powerful enemy like the United States in a major military confrontation. The new China's successful confrontation with the United States, even at a heavy price, would inculcate into the Chinese people a new mentality combining the inner acceptance of Communist ideals with the regenerating sense of China as a great nation in the world. As a result, the CCP would be in a much stronger position to carry out its plans to transform totally Chinese society, as well as to expand China's international influence through the promotion of the Eastern revolution. Even if China could not defeat the Americans in the Korean War, it would not represent an intolerable blow to the Beijing leadership. One of Peng Dehuai's statements, with which Mao fully agreed, made clear the Beijing leadership's view of this problem: "It is necessary to send troops to assist Korea. Even if we were to be defeated in Korea, this would be no worse than that our victory in the War of Liberation would come several years later." 2
Mao and the CCP leadership understood what they needed to do and what they were in a position to do at that moment. On October 10, two days after Mao formally issued the order to send Chinese troops to Korea, the CCP Central Committee issued "The Directive for Correcting the Rightist Tendency in Suppressing Reactionary Activities." Criticizing "the failure on the part of many party members and cadres" to take "resolute measures to suppress reactionary activities" in the past several months, the directive stressed that the entire party should be determined to destroy "all reactionaries and reactionary activities." The directive emphasized that the ruthless suppression of reactionary activities was crucial "for guaranteeing the smooth progress of land reform and economic reconstruction, as well as for the consolidation and further development of the Chinese people's revolution." The directive called for "striking the imperialist plot of sabotage and thoroughly destroying the remnants of Jiang Jieshi bandits." 3
This directive was certainly an indication of the Beijing leadership's concern about creating a stable rear while Chinese troops were engaged in a major military confrontation with the United States. 4 It reflected also the CCP's need to achieve an absolute control over Chinese society. The CCP leaders understood that "the most ruthless suppression of the counter-revolutionaries, spies, saboteurs, and landlord-tyrants who were the most reactionary under the premise of resisting and assisting Korea would not only be fully supported by the labouring people but would also be favored by members of the upper bourgeoisie class and upper intellectuals." 5 As a matter of fact, although most violent, anti-Communist activities existed in outlying provinces and regions, the emphasis of the "suppression of reactionary activities" lay in urban areas. 6 With the introduction of the October 10 directive, a nationwide mass movement aimed at "suppressing reactionary activities" quickly emerged together with the "Great Movement of Resisting America and Assisting Korea." By May 1951, more than 2.5 million "reactionaries" had been arrested and 710,000 were executed. 7 CCP leaders justified such widespread terror on the grounds that otherwise the newly established Republic would be in danger. 8 The movement thus became one of the most important domestic campaigns in the first years of the PRC. 9
Military Preparations further Accelerated
The issuance of the order to enter the Korean War made military preparations a more urgent task than ever before. On the morning of October 8, immediately after their arrival in Shenyang, Peng and Gao met with leading commanders of the 13th Army Corps, including Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, Xie Fang, and Du Ping. Peng conveyed to them the party leadership's decision to send troops to Korea and asked them to try their best to fulfill the tasks assigned by the party. 10 That afternoon, Peng and Gao had a meeting with the leading figures of the CCP Northeast Bureau and the PLA's Northeast Military Region, informing them of the Politburo's decision to enter the Korean War. Peng stressed that it was crucial to "send troops to Korea as soon as possible to fight against the enemy; otherwise, the consequences could be disastrous." Following the decision of the Politburo, Peng also asked the Northeast Region to guarantee logistical support for Chinese troops fighting in Korea. 11 In the evening, Peng met with Pak Il-yu, who had just rushed from Korea to Shenyang. Pak explained battlefield situation to Peng, asking Chinese troops to enter Korea in the shortest possible time and, as the first step, to guarantee the control of Sinuiju and Hamhung. 12
On October 9, Peng Dehuai summoned a conference in Shenyang, attended by all army-level commanders in the CPV. The purpose of the conference was "to introduce the current situation and the intentions of the Central Committee, as well as to learn about the real moral status of the troops." 13 Peng emphasized at the conference that because enemy forces were moving rapidly toward the Yalu, "we have to compete with the enemy." Following the instructions of the CCP leadership, he also made it clear that China "sent troops to Korea for winning the war while at the same time being prepared to be defeated." He asked his subordinates to "strengthen political mobilization of the troops, helping the cadres and soldiers to establish the determination to win the war." He ordered all armies to complete preparations for battle within ten days, and some units to enter Korea even earlier. 14 Considering that UN forces still controlled the air, Xie Fang, now the CPV's chief of staff, suggested that Chinese troops should cross the river under darkness to maintain secrecy. Peng agreed. 15
The same evening, Peng took a train to Andong, so that he could be in a more direct position to monitor the movement of UN troops and to discover any problem still existing in Chinese military preparations. Informed that UN forces had about 400,000 soldiers, including around 10 divisions or 130,00 front-line troops, Peng concluded that he needed reinforcements to enable his troops to overwhelm UN forces in the initial confrontation. He cabled to Mao on the evening of October 9: "Originally we planned to send out two armies and two artillery divisions....Now we have decided to change our original plan and to assemble all of our forces [four armies, three artillery divisions, and three antiaircraft artillery regiments] at the south bank of the Yalu River." Mao approved this change immediately. 16 Peng also reported to Mao that the largest problem facing the CPV was the lack of means of transportation. He estimated that the CPV needed at least 700 more trucks and 600 more drivers. 17 At 8 p.m. on October 10, Peng cabled to Mao again, informing him that he would meet Kim Il-sung in Korea the next day to discuss coordination between Chinese and North Korean troops. 18 At this stage, the Chinese troops were like an arrow on a bowstring- they could enter Korea at any time.
Moscow's Renege
The situation, however, changed suddenly at this juncture. At 8:00 p.m. on October 12, Mao sent an urgent telegram to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang and other leading figures in the Northeast, ordering them to stop implementing the war order immediately. Mao directed that all units of the 13th Army Corps should "stay where they were to undertake more training, not to begin operations," and that Peng and Gao should come back to Beijing for further discussion about the war decision. 19 On the same day, Mao sent another telegram to Rao Shushi and Chen Yi, respectively political commissar and commander of the PLA's East China Military Region, ordering the units under their command that had served as the NEBDA's reserve forces to stop all actions and "stay in their current positions for rectification." Mao stressed also that they should "not give any new explanations to our cadres and the democratic figures [from other parties]" for such a dramatic change. 20 Worrying that Mao's telegram would not reach Peng in time (it would take a few hours to translate the telegram from confidential codes to texts), Nie Rongzhen hurried to the General Staff's operation department to make a long-distance call to Peng, informing him that he was to return to Beijing immediately to attend a Politburo meeting which would "reconsider the decision to dispatch troops to Korea." 21
Mao and the CCP leadership had stopped the movement of Chinese troops at this late stage because of Stalin. Since late September, the CCP Politburo had based its decision to enter the war on the understanding that China would provide the land forces and the Soviet Union the air cover. Mao in his October 2 telegram to Stalin therefore requested that the Soviet air force enter Korea to cover Chinese troops. On October 8, at the same time Mao issued the orders to send Chinese troops into Korea, Zhou Enlai, together with Shi Zhe, the interpreter, and Kang Yimin, the confidential secretary, flew to the Soviet Union to finalize details of Chinese-Soviet military cooperation in Korea, arriving in Moscow on October 10. 22 Accompanied by Bulganin and joined by Lin Biao, now in Russia to receive his medical treatment, 23 and Wang Jiaxiang, Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Zhou flew to southern Russia to meet Stalin at his villa on the Black Sea on the same afternoon. 24
The meeting was a long one- lasting from 7 p.m. until 5:00 the next morning. Chinese participants at the meeting were Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Wang Jiaxiang and Shi Zhe, and the Soviet participants included Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Molotov, and N. T. Fedorenko (the Russian interpreter). 25
Shi Zhe offers a detailed account of the meeting. The atmosphere was tense at first because neither side knew the exact stand of the other. Stalin initiated the conversation by discussing the general situation in Korea, emphasizing that the North Koreans faced serious difficulties and that the situation was most urgent. He wanted to know the view of his Chinese comrades on the situation. Zhou responded, stressing that China also faced serious difficulties resulting from years of warfare, and he made it clear that China's stand was that "it would be better for us not to enter the Korean War." Stalin seemed disappointed. He stated that without outside assistance, the North Koreans could survive for no more than one week. Instead of pressing the Chinese too hard, however, Stalin asked Zhou to consider the tremendous American menace to China's security, to the Northeast in particular, if UN forces reached the Yalu. He commented that American occupation of the entire Korean peninsula would cause a very difficult situation for both the Soviet Union and China in East Asia. Stalin also warned the Chinese that even the task of absorbing Korean refugees could place a heavy burden on the Chinese and they should plan for this immediately.
Then Stalin made it clear that the Soviet Union was not in a position to send troops to Korea because the Russian border with Korea was too small and the Soviet Union had already announced a complete withdrawal from Korea. If the Soviet Union sent troops there, Stalin emphasized, a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States could follow. He then suggested that China send troops to Korea. In order to encourage the Chinese to enter the war on Kim Il-sung's behalf, Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would provide sufficient military equipment and war material for the Chinese. He mentioned that the Soviet Union had large amounts of weapons and ammunition left over from the Second World War to supply the Chinese, and stated that the Soviet air force would defend China's Northeast and coastal areas and also cover the Chinese troops along the Korean side of the Yalu. The discussion then focused on if and when Soviet air forces would enter Korea. Stalin insisted that Soviet air force needed more preparations and was therefore unable to cover Chinese troops in Korea, at least not at first. Zhou told Stalin that he was not in a position to make the decision on when to enter the war and that he needed to contact the CCP leadership in Beijing. Therefore, the meeting was unable to reach any conclusion on whether or under what conditions China would enter the war. 26
Shi Zhe's account, which outlines the Zhou-Stalin meeting, also raises a series of questions. The Beijing leadership had made the decision to enter the Korean War and conveyed the decision to the North Koreans, and the Chinese troops gathering on the Chinese-Korean border were ready to cross the Yalu. Why then did Zhou inform Stalin that the Beijing leadership preferred not to enter the war? Is Shi Zhe's account reliable? If not, what really occurred during the Stalin-Zhou meeting? If yes, why did Zhou fail to inform Stalin of the true intention of the Beijing leadership? In fact, Shi Zhe's account is not the only version of the story offered by Chinese sources, and Shi himself has been challenged for telling such a seemingly dubious and contradictory story. 27 Kang Yimin, the confidential secretary who also accompanied Zhou to Moscow, for example, claimed that "Shi Zhe could have been misled by his memory" and offered another version of the story. He emphasized that the purpose of Zhou's visit was "to inform Soviet leaders that China had decided to send troops to resist America and assist Korea, as well as to ask the Soviet Union to provide China with military support and send [Soviet] air forces to the Northeast and such coastal cities as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai." 28
A brief discussion about the purpose(s) and contents of Zhou's visit is therefore in order. Shi Zhe insists that Zhou was to inform the Soviets that China would not enter the Korean War. After discussing the matter with Shi Zhe and other researchers in Beijing and checking all available documentary sources, I believe that Shi Zhe may have confused the contents of Zhou's statement to Stalin and the purpose of his visit. In both Shi's published memoirs and my extensive interviews with him in August 1992, he also recalled consistently that the central topic of the Zhou-Stalin meeting was to determine whether the Soviet Union would offer the Chinese troops an air umbrella over Korean territory and, to a lesser degree, if the Soviets could satisfy the military needs of Chinese troops fighting in Korea. Several other Chinese sources have confirmed that Zhou's visit to the Soviet Union was to work out the details of Soviet military support to China, especially securing the Soviet air umbrella. 29 One of Mao's own recollections helps to clarify the question. In a conversation with Kim Il-sung in 1970, Mao recalled the situation in October 1950:
Although we have placed five armies along the Yalu River, it was difficult for our Politburo to make the final decision....Stalin was tired and disappointed and said: "Let it go at that. [suan le ba ]." Then did you [pointing to Zhou Enlai] visit the Soviet Union? Did you tell him [Stalin] that we would not send troops to Korea? (Zhou replies: No. I gave him two options and asked him to make the decision). Oh, yes. When we were to send troops to Korea, we desperately needed to make sure that they [the Soviets] would send their air forces to cover us. At first Molotov agreed, but then Stalin telephoned us saying that their air forces could not go beyond the Yalu River. Finally we made the decision and telephoned him that whether the Soviets would dispatch its [air] forces to Korea or not, we would go ahead. 30
Mao's statement confirms the main purpose of Zhou's visit- Zhou went to the Soviet Union not to call off Beijing's involvement in the Korean War but to pursue the best possible deal from Stalin. It also offers important clues to clarify why Zhou informed Stalin that Beijing preferred not to send troops to Korea- this was possibly a trick designed by Mao to place more pressure on Stalin. Shi Zhe agrees with this view, and in our discussions about the Zhou-Stalin meeting he repeatedly emphasized that by Zhou's informing Stalin that China would not enter the Korean War "Mao was intentionally playing with [wan] Stalin." 31 Considering that during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union he chose not to reveal his true intentions to Stalin, it is fully reasonable to believe that Mao would repeat the same pattern in other dealings with him.
Stalin, however, was certainly familiar with this kind of game. He would not be easily pressed by the Chinese, especially because he must have learned from the North Koreans that the Chinese had made the decision to enter the war. He was thus able to carefully design and stick to his basic stand. He strongly encouraged the Chinese to enter the war, but he would not allow the Soviet air force to cross the Yalu River at too early a time. Zhou had no way to further "play with" Stalin. From a Chinese point of view, however, Stalin's attitude violated the Soviet promise in the treaty signed with China eight months earlier which stated that the Soviets would offer "all-out" support for the Chinese if the latter entered a military confrontation with the imperialist countries. It is easy to understand why Stalin's decision was viewed by Chinese leaders as nothing less than a betrayal at a time of real crisis.
Now let us return to the Zhou-Stalin meeting. Probably because the meeting could not overcome the barrier of air support and, finally, failed to reach a deal acceptable to both sides, Stalin and Zhou decided to send a telegram jointly to the CCP Central Committee. The telegram made it clear to Mao and other Beijing leaders that "the Soviet Union will fully satisfy China's need for the supply of artillery, tanks, airplanes, and other military equipment," but "it will take at least two or two-and-half months for the Soviet air force to be ready to support the CPVs' operations in Korea." 32 Zhou then flew back to Moscow to wait for Beijing's response. 33
The Second Decision: October 13, 1950
Stalin's sudden change angered Mao and CCP leaders while at the same time it created tremendous pressures for them. After receiving the telegram from Zhou and Stalin, Mao put the CPV's movement on hold. 34 He and other CCP leaders in Beijing now had to decide if they would intervene without direct Soviet air support- a very difficult question. Since early October, after the decision to enter the Korean War, the chairman and his colleagues had been acting on the assumption that Chinese troops would have sufficient support from their Soviet comrades. According to the understanding of Mao and the CCP leadership, the Soviet Union would supply the Chinese with military equipment and war materials, take the responsibility of protecting important industrial centers in China's coastal area, and provide air cover for Chinese ground troops in Korea. When Chinese troops were about to enter the Korean War, the last issue drew increasing attention from Chinese military planners. For example, at the October 9 conference attended by army-level commanders in Shenyang, the officers questioned Peng Dehuai about whether their troops would be well protected from the air after entering operations in Korea. Unable to answer this question, Peng and Gao jointly cabled Mao at 11 a.m., when the meeting was still underway, asking: "How many bombers and fighters can the CMC send to Korea after our troops are engaged in operations there? When will [the air force] be dispatched and who will be in charge?" 35
Lack of air cover was also a widespread concern among the low-level officers and soldiers who were preparing to enter operations in Korea. According to the memoirs of Jiang Yonghui, then associate commander of the 38th Army, one of the CPV's best units, while responding to soldiers' inquiries about air support, many platoon and company commanders responded that with the backing of the powerful motherland as well as the support from the brotherly Soviet Union, they would get "as many cannons and planes as they wanted." 36 The Soviet air umbrella in Korea thus became an issue that influenced the morale of the Chinese troops.
Gao and Peng quickly returned to Beijing. The CCP politburo held an emergency meeting on the afternoon of October 13 to discuss whether China should intervene without Soviet air support. 37 Peng Dehuai reported on his talks with Pak Il-yu, the movements of UN forces, and the status of CPV preparations, making it clear to the participants that the CPV troops were ready to cross the Yalu. The discussion then focused on whether China should send troops to Korea without direct Soviet air support. Reportedly, Peng became angry when he learned that the Soviet Union would not send its air force to Korea to cover the Chinese troops, and threatened to resign as the CPV's commander. 38 Mao again dominated the discussion. He emphasized to Peng and other participants that although Soviet air force would not enter Korea in the initial stage of the war, Stalin had promised air defense over Chinese territory as well as the supply of large amounts of military equipment to Chinese troops. He asked Peng not to resign from his position. 39 After weighing the pros and cons, especially having evaluated the serious consequences of China's failure to send troops to Korea, participants reached a consensus that even without direct Soviet air support in Korea, the Chinese were still in a position to fight the Americans there. They would now depend more on Mao's principles of self-reliance, emphasizing that an army with higher morale could beat an enemy with superior equipment. They also believed that if the United States occupied the entire Korean peninsula, China's immediate security as well as the fate of the revolution in the East would be in severe danger. As a result, the meeting reaffirmed that, as Mao recalled to Kim Il-sung, "whether or not the Soviets would dispatch its air forces to Korea, we would go ahead." 40 Peng immediately called his secretary, instructing him to send a most-urgent telegram to Deng Hua, Xie Fang, and other CPV commanders, ordering CPV units to "accelerate preparations for entering operations in Korea." 41
After the meeting, Mao telegraphed to Zhou to respond to Zhou's and Stalin's October 11 telegram by summarizing the reasoning and conclusions of the Politburo meeting: 42
(1) As a result of my discussion with the comrades of the Politburo, we are still convinced that dispatching our troops to Korea would be beneficial to us. In the first phase of the war, we may concentrate on fighting the [South Korean] puppet army, which our troops are quite capable of coping with. We may open up some bases in the mountainous areas north of Wonsan and Pyongyang. This will surely raise the spirits of the Korean people. If we can eliminate several divisions of the [South Korean] puppet army in the first phase, the Korean situation would take a turn in our favor. (2) The adoption of the above-mentioned active policy will be very important to the interests of China, Korea, the East, and the whole world. If on the other hand we sent none of our troops and allowed the enemy to reach the banks of the Yalu River, the international and domestic reactionary bluster would surely become louder; such a situation would be very unfavorable to us and it would be even worse for the Northeast. The whole Northeast Border Defense Army would be tied down there, and the electric power in south Manchuria would be subject to the control [of the enemy]. In short, we believe that we should enter the war and that we must enter the war. Entering the war can be most rewarding; failing to do so may cause great harm. 43
While making it clear that China would enter the Korean War, Mao continued to bargain with Stalin. He instructed Zhou Enlai in the same telegram to clarify whether the Soviets would ask China to lease or to purchase the military equipment that Stalin agreed to provide. "If the equipment could be provided through leasing, and we would therefore be able to devote 200 million dollars of our budget to economic and cultural reconstructions, as well as to other general military and administrative expenses, our troops would then enter Korea without much worry. And we would be able to wage a prolonged war while at the same time maintaining the unity of the majority of our people at home." Furthermore, the chairman wanted to make sure that the Soviet air force would enter operations in Korea later. He stressed in the telegram: "If the Soviet air force could, in addition to sending volunteer pilots to support our military operations in Korea in two to two-and-a-half months, dispatch units to Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Qingdao, we then would not need to fear the [American] air attack, although we still have to endure some losses if the American air attack occurred during the coming two to two-and-a-half months." Mao Zedong instructed Zhou Enlai to "stay in Moscow for a few more days, further consult with the Soviet comrades, and solve the above-mentioned questions." 44
At first glimpse, it is surprising that the CCP leadership reaffirmed its decision to intervene after Stalin reneged on air protection in Korea. Considering Mao's understanding of the relationship between the Korean crisis and the CCP's revolutionary commitment and the new China's security needs, however, the decision was a natural, or even inevitable, development. Mao believed that Korea's fate concerned both the vital security interests of China and the destiny of an Eastern and world revolution, of which the Chinese Communist revolution was an important part. Moreover, the CCP leadership's management of the Korean crisis had been strongly influenced by Mao's desire to use the crisis to mobilize the party and the entire Chinese nation. Given Mao's frame of reference, he had to enter the Korean War. This is why even a dramatic shift (such as Stalin's breaking his promise to provide air support) did not alter Mao's resolve. His decision to send Chinese troops into Korea was not an easy one; however, it was a decision consistent with the CCP's specific revolutionary commitments and security concerns.
New Problems and Challenges to the War Decision
After receiving Mao's telegram, Zhou telephoned Molotov to inform him of the CCP Politburo's decision. 45 The next day Zhou cabled Stalin from Moscow. Following Mao's instructions, Zhou continued to try to persuade Stalin to send the Soviet air force to Korea. He put a series of questions before Stalin: "In addition to the dispatch of the 16 Soviet volunteer air regiments [to China], can [the Soviet Union] continue to send bombers to Korea to support the operations of the Chinese troops? . . . Besides sending volunteers to join operations in Korea, can the Soviet government send more air units to station in big cities in China's coastal area?" 46
Stalin continued to refuse to use Soviet air units in operations in Korea when Chinese ground forces began operations, no matter how much this might disappoint his comrades in Beijing. He did confirm, though, that the Soviets would take the responsibility of safeguarding China's territory, that the Soviet air force might enter Korea later (but no deadline was given), and that the Soviet Union would guarantee China's military supply. 47 This ambiguous approach left a stamp on the long-range development of Sino-Soviet relations. Stalin's incomplete commitment made clear to Mao and the CCP leadership the limitations of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Yet the Chinese desperately needed Soviet support in any form at this moment, and Mao had no other choice but to swallow the fruit of the Soviet "betrayal." Mao, however, would never forgive it. A seed of the future Sino-Soviet split had thus been sowed in the process of China's intervention in the Korean War.
After the CCP Politburo reaffirmed that Chinese troops would go to Korea without direct Soviet air protection, Gao Gang left Beijing during the early morning of October 14 for Shenyang to convey the decision to top CPV commanders, leading members of the CCP Northeast Bureau, and the PLA's Northeast Military Region. 48 Meanwhile, Mao and Peng spent the day formulating new strategy and redeploying the CPV in light of the changing situation on the Korean battlefield as well as the changing attitude of the Soviet Union. In two telegrams to Zhou Enlai, still in Moscow, Mao informed him of a series of adjustments in the CPV's operation plans and war aims, based on his discussions with Peng. Intelligence reports on recent developments in Korea suggested to Mao that after occupying Pyongyang and Wonsan, the UN forces would either stay where they were or continue to march northward. While "it would take some time" for the American units, most of which at the moment "remained at the 38th parallel," to reach and capture Pyongyang, "they would need more time to take Tokchon from Pyongyang." Meanwhile, Mao judged that "if the Americans did not attack Tokchon, it would be quite difficult for the puppet forces at Wonsan to attack [Tokchon] alone." Mao believed that "our troops would gain time to advance [into planned positions], prepare defense and complete deployment." 49
Following these judgments and facing the cruel fact that Chinese troops in Korea would not be protected from air attack, Mao decided to restrict the CPV's operational goals in the initial stage of the war. Mao summarized the CPV's new strategy for the initial fighting: The CPV troops were to take a defensive position after entering Korea; they would establish a defensive perimeter, composed of two or three defense lines, north of Pyongyang and Wonsan in order to hold bases as the starting point for future offensive operations. If UN troops attacked the perimeter in six months, they planned to wipe out the enemy before the perimeter; if UN troops did not initiate an offensive, the Chinese would not either. Only after all preparations were completed would a counteroffensive be launched toward Pyongyang and Wonsan. 50
However, Mao did not give up the hope that Chinese troops could gain the initiative on the battlefield through a few victories over the UN forces, especially over the South Korean "puppet" units, in the initial contacts. Mao mentioned in his telegram to Zhou that both Peng and he believed that "once we destroyed one to two, or two to three, entire divisions of the puppet army, the situation would become more flexible for us." 51 To regain the initiative, Mao decided that all four armies and three artillery divisions of the CPV would start entering Korea on October 19. He also ordered the Ninth Army Corps to continue to move into areas with easy railway access to the Northeast. 52
The rapidly changing situation in Korea placed new pressures on Mao and the CCP leadership in the next twelve hours. Early in the morning of October 15, Mao learned that UN forces, including the Americans, were preparing to seize Pyongyang. Confronted with the accelerating northward march of UN forces, Mao cabled Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, who had just left Beijing for the Northeast by plane, instructing them to "have our advanced troops start off on the 17th so that they would reach Tokchon on the 23rd, rest for a day and then start the construction of defensive works on the 25th to achieve a superior position against the enemy." 53
Peng arrived in Shenyang shortly after the arrival of this telegram. He found that besides Gao Gang and top CPV commanders, Pak Hon-yong was there. Pak told Peng that the enemy troops had approached Pyongyang, that the North Korean Communists needed their Chinese comrades to assist them at the earliest time, and that Kim Il-sung wished to meet Peng as soon as possible. Peng told Pak that top CCP leaders had decided to send troops across the Yalu on the 18th or the 19th. He invited Pak to join Gao Gang and himself to travel to Andong the next day. 54
On October 16, Peng chaired a conference attended by division-level commanders from the CPV at Andong. He first conveyed the final decision of the Politburo to send troops to Korea. Obviously having sensed that reservations existed among the participants, Peng particularly explained the reasons for the decision to enter the Korean War. He emphasized that if China "failed to support positively the revolutionary government and people in Korea by sending its troops there, the reactionaries at home and abroad would be increasingly rampant, and those pro-Americans would become much more active." He warned his future subordinates that the American occupation of the entire Korean peninsula "would present a direct threat to our country, causing an extremely unfavorable situation for our national defense and border defense." As a result, Peng anticipated, the Chinese troops would have to fight the Americans in Chinese territory. So, Peng concluded, "to support Korea is also to consolidate our own national defense." 55
Peng stressed also that all units needed to prepare for a difficult and protracted war. He ordered that all CPV units should enter Korea in the shortest possible time. 56 When recalling this meeting, Du Ping commented that "if the August 13 conference was one designed for mobilization, the October 16 conference was one to pledge resolution before going into operations." 57 After the meeting, a regiment of the 42nd Army entered Korea in the night of October 16. 58 The next morning, Peng instructed Xie Fang to cross the Yalu to Sinnuiju to prepare for the coming of the CPV's main forces. 59
The influence of the Soviet withdrawal of direct air support, however, was demonstrated again at this final moment. When Peng traveled back from Andong to Shenyang to solve the remaining logistical problems for the CPV on October 17, he and Gao Gang received a surprising telegram from Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, and other top CPV commanders, which expressed strong reservation for entering the Korean War at that moment:
After yesterday's conference for the deployment of crossing the [Yalu] River, many comrades have expressed the opinion through discussions that our troops have only a few anti-aircraft artillery pieces and have no air support at this moment, and that the enemy could concentrate large numbers of planes, artillery, and tanks to wage heavy attacks against us without any worries. And as the Korean terrain is mostly composed of mountainous areas and water rice fields, it will be difficult to construct defensive works in the chilly weather and out of frozen soil. If the enemy started an all-out offensive, it would be less than possible for us to hold our ground. The opinion of the majority is that as we have not been fully prepared and as political mobilization is far from complete, it would be better if we send off our troops not this winter but next spring. 60
Peng and Gao understood the seriousness involved in the suggestion of the telegram: some leading CPV commanders had not yet been convinced of the necessity for China to send troops to Korea. They reported these generals' opinions immediately to Mao.
The continuous existence of reservations to entering the Korean War, together with the fact that Zhou Enlai would return to Beijing on the 18th, made Mao reluctant to issue the final order. He decided to postpone again the CPV's entry into Korea until he and the Politburo could meet with Zhou and receive a first-hand report on Stalin's stand. In a telegram to Peng and Gao on October 17, he ordered the advanced units of the CPV to continue "preparing to" enter Korea and wait for a "formal order" which would be issued the next day. He also asked Peng and Gao to return to Beijing again for discussions. 61
The Final Decision: October 18
Peng and Gao flew to Beijing on the early morning of October 18 and top CCP leaders met again that day. Peng reported on the reservations expressed by CPV commanders, especially their worries about the consequences of the lack of proper Soviet air support in Korea. Zhou made it clear that although Stalin would not send Soviet air forces directly into Korea, he did promise to supply the Chinese with as much military equipment and ammunition as they needed in the Korean conflict, and that Soviet air forces would provide the Chinese with an umbrella over China's territory, especially important industrial centers in coastal areas. It was also possible that the Soviet air force would enter operations in Korea later. Listening to Peng's and Zhou's reports, Mao's mind was dominated by the worries that "the enemy troops were now attacking Pyongyang and in a few days they could reach the Yalu River." He told his comrades that "no matter how many difficulties were there, we should not change the decision to send our Volunteers to cross the [Yalu] River to assist Korea, and we should not delay the time of action." Following Mao's suggestions, the meeting finally established the evening of October 19 as the deadline for the CPV to cross the Yalu. 62
At 9 p.m. on October 18, Mao personally cabled Deng Hua and other CPV commanders (Peng and Gao were then still in Beijing) to order CPV troops to cross the Yalu:
It has been decided that the four armies and three artillery divisions will follow our original plan to enter northern Korea for war operations. These troops will start to cross the [Yalu] River from the Andong-Ji'an section tomorrow (the 19th) evening. In order to maintain strict secrecy, the troops should start to cross the river after dusk every day and stop [crossing] at four o'clock the next morning; by five all troops should be completely under cover, which should be carefully checked. In order to gain experience, only two to three divisions will cross the river on the first night (the night of the 19th), and the number can be increased or decreased on the second night according to the situation. Details will be conveyed to you in person by Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai. 63
In the early morning of October 19, Peng and Gao flew back to Andong. They immediately convened a meeting of top CPV commanders to guarantee that Mao's decision would be implemented. Peng stressed that he would not tolerate any further opposition and reservation to the war decision. Peng met also with Pak Il-yu, who learned with excitement that the main forces of Chinese troops would enter Korea "today, after dark." 64
In order not to reveal prematurely the CPV's movement into Korea, Mao ordered the entire country, especially the public media, to adopt a policy of "only act and not talk." He made it clear that "no open propaganda about what we are doing should appear in our newspapers" and that "only high-ranking cadres of the party will be notified of the actions undertaken." 65 Mao also ordered CPV soldiers to dress in the uniforms of the Korean People's Army in the initial stage of their operations, so that they would be in a position to take the UN forces by surprise when the first encounter occurred. In accordance with Mao's instructions, CPV solders were not allowed to send personal letters to families or friends before their departure for Korea. 66 Chinese troops were now ready to cross the Yalu.
The week between October 12 and 19 witnessed the final stage of Beijing's path to the Korean War. The decision to enter it was challenged from both within (especially by the doubt cast by several CPV commanders) and, more seriously, without (Stalin refused to give operations in Korea an air umbrella); and the challenges continued until the moment the Chinese troops were to cross the Yalu. Mao's determination to enter the war, however, proved to be much firmer and deeper than these challenges. He again played a central role in convincing his fellow CCP leaders in Beijing that for the sake of China's security interests as well as the promotion of the Eastern revolution, China had no choice but to enter the war. Consequently, the war decision stood the test.
After dark on the evening of October 19, massive numbers of CPV troops began to cross the Yalu River. 67 Around midnight, General Nie Rongzhen reported to Mao that Chinese troops were smoothly entering Korea. For the first time in many days, Mao had a sound sleep. 68
Notes
Note 1: Mao and the CCP leadership did not want to prematurely reveal their decision to send troops to Korea, so the first document was not issued until late October, and the second not until early November. For the text of the first document, which was an inner-party one, see Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao, 19: 211-213; for Mao's revision of the document, see MWG, 1: 616; and for the text of the second document, see Weida de Kangmei yuanchao yundong, pp. 674-684. The citations of the Beijing leadership's argument in the following paragraphs are all from these sources. Back.
Note 2: Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu, p. 258. Back.
Note 3: The CCP Central Committee, "The Directive of Correcting the Rightist Tendency in Suppressing Reactionary Activities," October 10, 1950, Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao, 19: 205-206. Back.
Note 4: Zhang Xi, "The Sudden Cancellation of the CPV's Movement on the Eve of Its Entry into Korea," Dangshi yanjiu ziliao, no. 186 (January 1993): 254; Li Jianwei et al., Zhongguo gongchandang lishi (A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 3 vols., Beijing: People's Press, 1990), 3: 75-76; Hu Sheng et al., Zhongguo gongchandang qishinian, p. 329. Back.
Note 5: Zhou Enlai's speech at a meeting of the CCP United Front Department, January 20, 1951, Zhou Enlai tongyi zhanxian wenxuan (Selected United Front Works of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: People's Press, 1984), p. 200. Back.
Note 6: See the CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Suppressing Reactionary Activities in Big Cities" (drafted by Mao), MWG, 2: 139. Back.
Note 7: Liu Shaoqi, "The Politburo's Report to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," February 6, 1954, Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao, 20: 253; see also Li Jianwei et al., Zhongguo gongchandang lishi, 3: 77-78. Back.
Note 8: The CCP Central Committee to CCP Regional Bureaus and PLA Regional Headquarters, February 28, 1951 (drafted by Mao), MWG, 2: 147; see also "Why Should We Ruthlessly Suppress Reactionary Activities," editorial, Renmin ribao, February 22, 1951. Back.
Note 9: Zhang Min, "A Survey of the Struggle to Suppress Reactionaries in the Early Years of the PRC," p. 250. Back.
Note 10: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 143; and Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, p. 10. Back.
Note 11: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 143. Back.
Note 12: Ibid., pp. 143-144; Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan, p. 404; Hu and Bao, "Several Factual Corrections of Yao Xu's 'The Brilliant Decision to Resist America and Assist Korea,' " p. 60. Back.
Note 13: Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, October 9, 1950, cited from Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 144. Back.
Note 14: Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 15; Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 144; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, pp. 17-21. Back.
Note 15: Sun and Cui, "Winning Victory Not Just on Battlefields," p. 8. Back.
Note 16: Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 737; Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 142-145; Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, pp. 84-85; Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, October 11, 1950, MWG, 1: 548. Back.
Note 17: See Huang Yi, "Peng Dehuai's Great Contribution to the Logistic Affairs during the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," Junshi shilin, no.1 (1989): 34. Back.
Note 18: Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan, p. 405; Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 147. Back.
Note 19: Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang and others, October 12, 1950, MWG, 1: 552. Back.
Note 20: Mao Zedong to Rao Shushi and Chen Yi, October 12, 1950, Ibid., p. 553. Back.
Note 21: Zhang Xi, "The Sudden Cancellation of the CPV's Movement on the Eve of Its Entry into Korea," p. 5. Back.
Note 22: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 83; Zhang Xi, "The Sudden Cancellation of the CPV's Movement on the Eve of Its Entry into Korea," p. 3. In my interviews with Shi Zhe in May 1991, he was still uncertain about the date of Zhou's departure, and he believed that it could be either October 6 or 7. Li Haiwen, the CCP history researcher who assisted the writing of Shi Zhe's memoirs, later found that Zhou signed a document in Beijing on the early morning of October 8, so Zhou could not have left Beijing until sometime on October 8. Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 495; interviews with Shi Zhe and Li Haiwen, August 1992. Back.
Note 23: According to Kang Yimin's recollections, Lin Biao flew to the Soviet Union together with Zhou Enlai, but Shi Zhe recalled that Lin Biao went to the Soviet Union separately. See Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, pp. 62-63; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 495, n.3. Back.
Note 24: The date of the meeting has been controversial in Chinese sources. Zhang Xi originally dated Zhou's meeting with Stalin for October 9 in his influential article, "Peng's Appointment," p. 147. Shi Zhe asserted that Zhou arrived in Moscow on October 9, flew to southern Russia and met Stalin on the 10th, and came back to Moscow on the 11th or 12th. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 495, 498) Kang Yimin did not offer an exact date of the meeting, but he mentioned in his recollections that Zhou left Beijing on October 8, and it took Zhou four days to get to Stalin's villa on the Black sea. So Zhou could not meet Stalin until late on October 12. ("Kang Yimin's Recollections on Zhou Enlai's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in October 1950," minutes, CCA) Shi Zhe, Zhang Xi, and I concluded on August 22, 1992 after comparing carefully materials available to us that Zhou could not have reached Stalin's villa before the afternoon of October 10. Because Zhou and Stalin sent a telegram to Mao on October 11 to report on the meeting between them, the meeting must have occurred from the evening of 10th to the morning of the next day. Back.
Note 25: The list of the participants of the meeting was offered by Shi Zhe. Zhang Xi in "Peng 's appointment," p. 147, offers a list very close to this one (only Wang Jiaxiang was not included). In my interview with Zhang in August 1992, he confirmed that his information was based on interviews with Shi Zhe. In "Kang Yimin's Recollections on Zhou Enlai's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in October 1950," p. 2, Kang stated that he stayed in Moscow and Zhou and Shi flew to the Black Sea to meet Stalin. Back.
Note 26: This paragraph is based on Shi Zhe's memoirs, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 495-499, and interviews with Shi Zhe in May 1991 and August 1992. In the next several paragraphs I will discuss those points of the meeting that are unclear in the published version of his memoirs and that I have clarified during my interviews with him in August 1992. Back.
Note 27: I myself, for example, was not convinced by Shi Zhe's account and expressed my doubts in my article, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," p. 29. Michael Hunt also questions the reliability of Shi Zhe's recollections. See Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-June 1951," p. 460, n. 26. Back.
Note 28: Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, pp. 62-63; Kang Yimin, "Kang Yimin's Recollections on Zhou Enlai's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in October 1950," especially pp. 2-3. Back.
Note 29: See, for examples, Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 83; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, pp. 25-26. Back.
Note 30: "Mao Zedong's Conversations with Kim Il-sung," October 10, 1970, minute, CCA. The two sentences, "At first Molotov agreed and then Stalin telephoned us that their air force could not go beyond the Yalu River," are ambiguous. No documentary evidence would confirm this concrete process as described by Mao. Back.
Note 31: Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.
Note 32: The original text of this key telegram has not been located in the archives of the CCP Central Secretariat or the CCP's Central Archives. The citation here is from Shi Zhe's Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 498, n.1, and Zhang Xi's "The Sudden Cancellation of the CPV's Movement on the Eve of Its Entry to Korea," p. 3. In my interviews with Shi Zhe and Zhang Xi in August 1992, they confirmed that this citation was not based on the original of the telegram but on Mao's summary of this telegram in the starting paragraph of Mao's telegram to Zhou Enlai on October 13, 1950 (part of it has been published in MWG, but this part has been omitted). Back.
Note 33: Kang Yimin claims that at the Zhou-Stalin meeting (although he did not attend the meeting), Stalin agreed to offer equipment for ten Chinese divisions and to send Soviet air forces to the Northeast and coastal cities. Shortly after Zhou flew back to Moscow, however, Molotov informed him that the Soviets had changed their mind and would not provide the Chinese with military equipment. Zhou angrily argued with Molotov. Finally "the Soviet side agreed to support China's decision to send troops to Korea and to provide China with military assistance." See "Kang Yimin's Recollections on Zhou Enlai's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in October 1950," p. 4; and Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, pp. 62-63. Back.
Note 34: According to Zhang Xi, the text of the telegram was translated from Russian into confidential codes, and then sent from Moscow to the Soviet embassy in Beijing. It was then translated into Chinese, which did not reach Mao's hand until late afternoon, October 12. See Zhang Xi, "The Sudden Cancellation of the CPV's Movement on the Eve of Its Entry to Korea," p. 4. Back.
Note 35: Cited from Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 144-145. Back.
Note 36: Jiang Yonghui, 38 jun zai chaoxian, pp. 28-29. Back.
Note 37: The time of this meeting follows the account of Zhang Xi (Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 150). Zhu Jianrong, based on information offered by Lei Yingfu, claims that the meeting was possibly held from the late evening of October 12 to the early morning of October 13 (Zhu Jianrong, Mao's Korean War, pp. 288-289). In my discussions with Zhang Xi in August 1992, he pointed out that if the meeting were held earlier than the morning of October 13, it would have been impossible for Peng to attend the meeting. But there is strong documentary evidence to prove that Peng not only attended the meeting but also presented important opinions about Soviet air coverage to it. So the meeting could not have been held earlier than the afternoon of October 13. The description of the meeting in this paragraph, unless otherwise cited, is based on Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 150, and Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan, p. 405-406. Back.
Note 38: Zhu Jianrong, Mao's Korean War, pp. 288-289; see also Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 26. Back.
Note 39: Zhu Jianrong, Mao's Korean War, p. 289. In my interviews with Zhang Xi and Xu Yan in August 1992, they confirmed that the information offered by Zhu here is reliable. Back.
Note 40: "Mao Zedong's Conversations with Kim Il-sung," October 10, 1970, minute, CCA. Back.
Note 41: Zhang Xi, "The Sudden Cancellation of the CPV's Movement on the Eve of Its Entry to Korea," p. 6; and interviews with Zhang Xi, August 1992. Back.
Note 42: The very first sentence of Mao's telegram stated that "the October 11 telegram by Stalin and you received." Then, as discussed before, Mao stated that he had learned that "the Soviet Union was by all means in a position to satisfy China's need for artillery, tanks, airplanes, and other ammunition," and that "it will take at least two or two-and-half months for the Soviet air force to be ready to support Chinese Volunteers' operations in Korea." This, however, is not included in the published text of the telegram in MWG. Back.
Note 43: Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 13, 1950, MWG, 1: 556. Back.
Note 44: This part is not included in the published text of Mao's telegram. The summary of this part of the telegram here is based on the original text of the telegram kept in CCA. Back.
Note 45: See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 499-500. According to Shi Zhe, even Zhou was surprised when he received Mao's telegram. Back.
Note 46: Zhou Enlai to Stalin, October 14, 1950. Part of the telegram is cited by Shi Zhe in his Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 502. The original of the telegram is kept in CCA. Back.
Note 47: Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.
Note 48: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 151. Back.
Note 49: Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 3:00 p.m. and 9 p.m., October 14, 1950 MWG, 1: 558-559, 560. MWG does not give the hour time for the second telegram. The hour cited here is based on Chai and Zhao, Kangmei yuanchao jishi, p. 60, and Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 151-152. Back.
Note 50: Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 9:00 p.m., October 14, 1950, MWG: 558-559. Back.
Note 51: Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 3:00 p.m., October 14, 1950, ibid., p. 559. Back.
Note 52: Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 3:00 p.m., October 14, 1950; Mao Zedong to Chen Yi, October 14, 1950, ibid., pp. 559, 557. Back.
Note 53: Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, 5 a.m. October 15, 1950, ibid., p. 564. Back.
Note 54: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 152-153; Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan, p. 406; see also Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 27. Back.
Note 55: Peng Dehuai, "Address at the CPV's Division Level Cadres Conference," October 14(?), 1950, Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai), (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1988), pp. 320-327. (According to other sources, Peng's address should be given on October 16, but Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan mistakenly dates it for October 14.) Back.
Note 56: Zhang Xi, "Peng 's appointment," pp. 153-154; Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 15; Hu Guangzheng, "Brilliant Decisions and Great Achievements: On the Decision to Dispatch Troops to Korea," Dangshi yanjiu, no. 1 (1983): 37. Back.
Note 57: Du Ping, Zai Zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 35-36. Back.
Note 58: Xu Yan, "The Final Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 11. Back.
Note 59: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 157. Back.
Note 60: Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,p. 25; Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," p. 157. Back.
Note 61: Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, October 17, 1950, MWG, 1: 567. According to Zhang Xi, Mao also informed Peng and Gao that "it would be better to decide the time for sending off our troops after Zhou comes back to Beijing to report to the Central Committee on the 18th." Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," p. 157; see also Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan, p. 407. Back.
Note 62: Xu Yan, "The Final Decision to Enter the Korean War," pp. 11-12; Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan, p. 407; Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," p. 158. The quote of Mao's statement is from Zhang's article, which, according to my interviews with him in August 1992, is based on the minute of the meeting. Back.
Note 63: Mao Zedong to Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, Han Xianchu, and Xie Fang, October 18, 1950, MWG, 1: 568. Back.
Note 64: Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 31; Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," p. 159. Back.
Note 65: Mao Zedong to Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng and others, October 19, 1950, MWG, 1: 571; see also Mao Zedong to Hu Qiaomu, October 21, 1950, ibid., p. 580. Back.
Note 66: Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," p. 155; Jiang Yonghui, 38 jun zai chaoxian, pp. 33-34. Back.
Note 67: Starting on the evening of October 19, four Chinese armies (the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd) and three artillery divisions crossed the Yalu River from three directions. By October 22, all these troops, with a total number of 260,000, had entered Korean territory. see Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,pp. 39-40; Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 20; and Chai and Zhao, Kangmei yuanchao jishi, pp. 61-62. Back.
Note 68: Li Yinqiao (Li was the head of Mao's bodyguards at that time), Zouxia shentan de Mao Zedong (The Mao Zedong Who Was No Longer a God, Beijing: Chinese and Foreign Culture Press, 1989), pp. 122-123; and Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,p. 25. Back.
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