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China's Road to the Korean War
The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
New York
1994
6. After Inchon: The Making of the Decision on Intervention
Beijing's waiting period did not last long. On September 15 the American X Corps succeeded in landing at Inchon. The North Korean forces, forced to turn from the offensive to the defensive, in a few days began to disintegrate. The UN forces started marching northward. Even though Mao and his military planners had anticipated that a reversal in Korea might occur, the Inchon landing still shocked them. Mao had lost much sleep and consumed many cigarettes in the days after Inchon. 1 From the NEBDA's headquarters in Shenyang to Zhongnanhai, the CCP Central Committee's compound in Beijing, people talked about almost nothing but Inchon and Korea: What was happening at Inchon? How would the Americans do the next? Could the Korean People's Army hold in face of American counteroffensive? 2 In Zhongnanhai, Mao and his Politburo colleagues had to answer these questions and thereby make a decision.
Impacts of the Inchon Landing
Beijing viewed Inchon with gravity. First of all, in a military sense, the landing had invalidated one of the basic assumptions under which the Beijing leadership had been acting since early July: that Chinese troops would be used to accelerate a KPA victory or, at least, to prevent a possible reversal. With the dramatic shift of the offensive and defensive positions of the two sides after the Inchon landing, the North Koreans were no longer in a position to play a major role in war operations. If the Chinese entered the war, they would be facing an enemy who held the initiative on the battlefield. Therefore, Chinese troops first needed to try to restore the strategic balance and then to pursue a victory over the enemy. All of this meant that the main burden of waging the war would fall on the shoulders of the Chinese, and that the duration of, and risks involved in, China's military intervention would be substantially increased.
In Beijing's view, the deteriorating situation in Korea after Inchon further endangered China's security interests. Before the Inchon landing, the main battlefield of the war was in South Korea. Even with the U.S. military intervention in Korea and the Seventh Fleet moving into the Taiwan Strait, the safety of the Chinese mainland was not directly threatened. The Inchon landing led to the rapid shift of the primary combat zone from the South to the North, and war flames moved continuously closer to the Chinese-Korean border, threatening the Northeast and China's main source of coal, steel, and water power. 3
The reversal of the Korean situation, Beijing leaders feared, also darkened the prospect of revolutionary development in the East and the world. Viewing the disintegration of the North Korean Communist forces, they realized that a total victory on the part of the UN forces meant also a fatal strike against the development of the Eastern revolution, in which Beijing wished to play a crucial role. As a result, the worldwide balance of power between the "revolutionary camp" and the "reactionary camp" would take a turn in favor of the latter. On one occasion, Zhou Enlai even expressed a thesis which might be called the Chinese version of the "domino theory": "The Korean question is an international one and it cannot be separated from other international issues....Only if [North] Korea could win the victory, the enemy would not open a breach in the peace camp. If Korea fell down, breaches in other places would also be opened one by one. If the enemy were allowed to break down the gate of the Eastern Front and make his way into our house, how could we devote ourselves to construction?" 4 This prospect was intolerable for Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders, especially because they had been so eager to advance China's international prestige through the promotion of an Eastern revolution following the model of the Chinese revolution.
More important, Beijing leaders could not ignore the profound negative impact that the reversal of the Korean War would have on China's domestic situation. In the minds of Beijing leaders, this would appear at least in two ways. First, the remnants of the GMD forces, together with those who opposed or were dissatisfied with the Communist regime (such as the former landowners and rich peasants who had lost their land and their social status as local elites during the land reform), would echo the UN counteroffensive by rebelling against the Communist government. 4 Second, the GMD government in Taiwan, eager to join the UN forces in the Korean conflict, would either participate directly in the UN march toward the Yalu or try to attack coastal areas in East China if the situation became favorable for them. After the Inchon landing, Mao cabled to commanders of the PLA's East China Military Region, stressing that defense in East China should be put on alert on the assumption that the United States and Jiang Jieshi would try to make landings there. 6 The CCP leadership had to consider either of these contingencies very seriously.
The combination of these factors made China's military intervention in Korea a more urgent yet more complicated matter. In a letter to Gao Gang immediately after the Inchon landing, Mao stated that the Chinese now had no choice but to enter the conflict and that war preparations needed to be further accelerated. 7 The practical course of the Beijing leadership's decision-making process, however, was still constrained by attitudes in Moscow and Pyongyang. Meanwhile, decisions in Washington, especially on the question of whether or not UN forces should cross the 38th parallel, was another factor that Mao and the CCP leadership had to take into account.
Like the policymakers in Beijing, Stalin understood the crucial impact of the Inchon landing on the Korean War as well as on the balance of power in East Asia. Stalin had been shocked by the quick and unyielding American response to North Korea's invasion of the South, and worried that too bold an approach on the part of Moscow and Beijing could result in a direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. After the Inchon landing, he saw another possibility: if the United States succeeded in occupying the Korean peninsula, the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States in Northeast Asia would totally change in Washington's favor. The appearance of U.S. forces on the Korean-Soviet border would create a hot-spot for direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Either for the purpose of enhancing the reputation of the Soviet Union as a great power in the Far East or for maintaining the strategic structure established after the Second World War in Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union could not allow the United States to become the master of the entire Korean peninsula. Stalin, however, was neither ready nor willing to bring on a direct military confrontation with the United States to save Kim Il-sung's North Korean regime. The fate of Korea, while related to the security concerns of the Soviet Union, did not affect the most vital Soviet interests. If Soviet troops appeared in Korea, the conflict would most probably be expanded, and, in the worst possible situation, the world order established after the Second World War would be overturned. Stalin did not want to take the risk. Furthermore, according to the agreement reached between the Chinese and Soviet Communists during Liu Shaoqi's and Mao Zedong's visits to Moscow, the promotion of revolutionary movements in Asia was primarily Beijing's duty. Under these circumstances, having the Chinese send in their troops became the most reasonable choice for Stalin. 8 On September 16 or 17, Stalin cabled Mao, inquiring about China's military deployment in the Northeast and asking if the Chinese were in a position to send troops to help the North Koreans. 9 It is also reported that Stalin inquired if Beijing leaders would allow Kim to establish an exile government in the Northeast. 10
Chinese sources now available indicate that Mao did not give a comprehensive response to Stalin until October 2, when the UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel. The Beijing leadership, though, did give positive consideration to the Soviet suggestion. During the second half of September, the Chinese and Soviets discussed, probably through Chinese embassy in Moscow and Soviet embassy in Beijing, possible Chinese-Soviet cooperation in Korea. Following the spirit of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, the Soviets agreed in late September that if the Chinese troops entered the Korean War, the Soviet Union would provide the Chinese with an air umbrella. The Soviets also agreed to supply the Chinese with military equipment and war materials. 11
Facing a dramatic military reversal, the North Koreans had to invite the support of Chinese troops. After the Inchon landing, two high-ranking Korean Communists, Pak Il-yu and Pak Hon-yong came to China to ask the Chinese to send troops to Korea. 12 Hong Xuezhi, then vice commander of the 13th Army Corps and later vice commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers to Korea, recalled that Pak Il-yu came to Andong to explain to the commanders of the NEBDA the deteriorating situation in Korea after the Inchon landing. According to Hong, Pak "could only introduce the situation in the most general sense, and he had no way to go into the detailed development of the war situation, as communications between Pyongyang and the front-line troops were no longer effective." Pak, as Hong recalled, "on the behalf of the Korean Party and Government, sincerely asked China to send troops to Korea." Hong and other NEBDA leaders agreed to convey Pak's request to Beijing and promised that "as soon as we have received the order, we would immediately come to Korea's rescue." 13
It is important to note that Kim Il-sung did not come to China, and that both Pak Il-yu and Pak Hon-yong belonged respectively to the Chinese section and the southern section within the Korean Workers' Party. Both were later purged by Kim Il-sung. 14 Why did Kim not come to China personally? While it is possible that he was too busy in the disastrous days after Inchon to do so, his absence may also indicate tensions between himself and the Beijing leadership, as well as escalating internal struggles among the Korean Communists. In Hong Xuezhi's and Chai Chengwen's memoirs, they mentioned that Pak Il-yu and Pak Hon-yong came to China under "Kim's instructions"; other Chinese sources, however, suggest something different. Interviews with Beijing's researchers suggest that after the Inchon landing the opposition factions within the Korean Communist Party sent their representatives to China, asking the Chinese to send troops to Korea while at the same time requesting help in getting rid of Kim Il-sung, whom they held responsible for the catastrophic situation after Inchon. After careful deliberations, Mao made it clear that it would be improper for China to interfere with the internal affairs of the Korean leadership, that Kim Il-sung was the "banner" of the Korean Communist revolution, and that if Kim were removed at the time of great difficulties North Korea would fall into disorder and turmoil. Mao concluded that the Chinese would continue to deal with Kim on the matter of sending Chinese troops to Korea. 15 No printed Chinese sources available can prove or disprove this information. If it is correct, the activities of the "opposition factions" must have been related to the visits of Pak Il-yu and/or Pak Hon-yong. This also explains why the Chinese waited until early October, when Kim personally requested China's assistance, before finally making the decision to enter the war.
To prepare for China's entry into the war, the Beijing leadership sent five additional military attach's to Korea immediately after the Inchon landing, all of whom were PLA officers. 16 Their dispatch was first proposed by NEBDA commanders in a report to the CMC on August 31, which suggested that an advance team, composed of four officers, be sent to Korea to "get familiar with the general situation, make surveys of Korean topography, and prepare for future battles." Zhou Enlai did not respond to this suggestion. 17 Right after the Inchon landing the CMC decided that it was now necessary to send this group of officers to Korea, and the North Koreans also approved this dispatch. 18 Instead of acting as an "advance team," the group went to Korea as Chinese military attach's. On September 17 Zhou received Chai Chengwen and four of the five-member group, instructing them to leave for Pyongyang immediately to prepare for the coming of Chinese troops. The group arrived in Pyongyang around September 20, and all five members received letters of introduction personally signed by Kim Il-sung. They started off immediately for different parts of North Korea to investigate the military situation. 19
Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai was working on the operational outlines for the Chinese troops to be sent to Korea. On September 20, he laid down the following principles for Communist military actions in Korea: "The war to resist America and assist Korea should be conducted as a protracted war on the basis of self-reliance. In every campaign and battle, we have to gain superiority by concentrating our manpower and firepower in order to break up and destroy the enemy. By weakening the enemy gradually, we will be able to carry out a protracted war." These suggestions were conveyed to Kim Il-sung through Ni Zhiliang, the Chinese ambassador to Korea. 20 Mao approved these principles.
As Mao and the Beijing leadership approached the final decision to send troops to Korea, they issued a series of protests and warnings against the American intention of "expanding the war to the Chinese-Korean border and China itself." On September 24, Zhou Enlai cabled UN headquarters to protest against alleged U.S. air bombardment of Andong. He argued that the United States intended to "extend the war of aggression against Korea, to carry out armed aggression on Taiwan, and to extend further its aggression against China." 21 The next day, General Nie Rongzhen, in a meeting with K. M. Panikkar, Indian ambassador to China, sent another signal which could be understood as a warning against the UN forces' marching northward: China would not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the [Sino-Korean] border." 22 Zhou's and Nie's statements indicate again the intentions of the Beijing leadership to further mobilize China's public opinion, as well as to appeal to the international media to support China's entry into a "just war."
Mao and other Beijing leaders still needed to answer another crucial question: Would the UN forces cross the 38th parallel and continue to march toward the Yalu? The answer to this question was important for the timing as well as the nature of China's intervention. As Mao and his fellow Beijing leaders had been following the "worst case assumption" since the start of the Korean War, they tended to believe that the UN advance would not stop at the 38th parallel. However, from a military perspective, stopping, or even delaying, UN forces at the parallel would allow the Chinese more time to make the final decision to enter the war. The answer to this question, however, lay in Washington.
The American "Rollback"
The Inchon landing and the UN troops' successful advance to the 38th parallel posed serious challenges to the wisdom of policymakers in Washington: Should the UN forces cross the 38th parallel and continue to march toward the Korean-Chinese border? How would the Soviet Union and China respond to such a move? What should be the limits of U.S. goals in the Korean War? These questions were crucial to Washington's strategy for resolving the Korean crisis.
As early as July, when North Korean forces held the battlefield initiative, the problem of whether UN forces would cross the 38th parallel became one of Washington's central concerns. This question was first raised by Rhee. He emphasized in a statement on July 13 that "the action of the North Korean forces had obliterated the 38th parallel and that no peace and order could be maintained in Korea as long as the division at the 38th parallel remained." 23 Policymakers in Washington were willing to consider this argument. On July 17, President Truman instructed the NSC to offer recommendations "covering the policy which should be pursued by the United States after the North Korean forces have been driven back to the 38th parallel." 24
Disagreements existed among policymakers in Washington as to what to do. Opposition to crossing the 38th parallel came mainly from George Kennan. The Korean War had erupted just when Kennan was preparing to leave the State Department, and he stayed on to offer advice to Acheson and other policymakers in Washington. While favoring the idea that the United States should firmly counter the North Korean invasion for the sake of American prestige as well as the balance of power in East Asia, he opposed viewing events in Korea as the prelude to a well-coordinated Soviet plot to expand in other parts of the world, and he predicted that a shift of the tide in the Korean War to America's favor could lead to a Soviet and/or Chinese intervention. Kennan thus believed the attempt to cross the 38th parallel risky. 25
Kennan's view was shared, though to a lesser extent, by some members of the Policy Planning Staff, who were still under the strong influence of Kennan's strategic thinking. A PPS memorandum of July 25 argued that crossing the parallel might bring the Soviet Union and/or China into the conflict, as well as lead to the loss of support in the UN. The memorandum suggested that "decisions regarding our course of action when the UN forces approach the 38th parallel should be deferred until military and political development provide the additional information necessary to enable us: (a) to base our decisions on the situation in Korea and in other parts of the world at that time; (b) to consult with other UN members who are supporting the Security Council resolutions in regard to measures which might be necessary or desirable once the aggression had been brought to an end; and (c) to keep our military capabilities and commitments in safe balance." 26
The voices advocating advancing into North Korea, however, were much louder and more explicit. The Pentagon believed that it did not make military sense to stop at the 38th parallel, which was "a geographical artificiality violating the natural integrity of a singularly homogeneous nation." If the UN forces failed to cross the parallel, the pentagon argued, a renewal of military instability on the Korean Peninsula would follow. In contrast, the Pentagon believed that a decision to cross the parallel and unify Korea would offer "the United States and the free world the first opportunity to displace part of the Soviet orbit," and therefore became "a step in reversing the dangerous strategic trend in the Far East in the past twelve months." Responding to the PPS's emphasis on the necessity of splitting Beijing and Moscow, the Pentagon argued that as a result of the unification of Korea under UN auspices, "elements in the Chinese Communist regime, and particularly important segments of the Chinese population, might be inclined to question their exclusive dependence on the Kremlin. Skillfully manipulated, the Chinese Communists might prefer different arrangements and a new orientation." 27
The majority of the State Department also favored crossing the 38th parallel for political, strategic, and psychological reasons. John Foster Dulles, for example, argued that "the 38th parallel was never intended to be, and never ought to be, a political line." The failure to march across the parallel, Dulles warned, would provide an "asylum to the aggressor" and cause great danger to both South Korea and the United States. 28 The opinion of John M. Allison, director of the Office of Northeastern Asian Affairs in the State Department, was more vehement and influential, as he was placed in charge of studies on future Korean policy on July 22. 29 While acknowledging the existence of a "grave danger of conflict with the USSR and the Chinese Communists" if Washington adopted a "rollback" strategy, he still strongly favored actions aimed at unifying the entire Korean peninsula under UN auspices. He stressed that it was the duty of the United States to make it clear "that he who violates the decent opinions of mankind must take the consequences and that he who takes the sword will perish by the sword." Allison asked his colleagues in Washington: "When all the legal and moral right is on our side why should we hesitate?" 30
General MacArthur was another influential advocate for crossing the 38th parallel. Longing for a total victory over the North Korean Communists, MacArthur made it clear that it was his intention to destroy North Korean forces rather than merely drive them back to the 38th parallel. In a talk on July 13 with Generals J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg, the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, MacArthur stated that it might be necessary to occupy all of Korea. He stressed that a victory over the Communists on the Korean peninsula "would check Communist expansion everywhere and thus obviate the necessity of our being fully prepared to meet aggression elsewhere." He opposed vigorously "any delay or half-way measures." 31
The influence of these arguments for marching north of the parallel was further strengthened by America's domestic setting after the outbreak of the Korean War. The intensifying Cold War atmosphere, together with Senator McCarthy's renewed attack on the State Department for giving communism "a green light to grab whatever it could in China, Korea, and Formosa," placed tremendous pressure upon the Truman administration. Outcries for more resolute American action in the face of Communist aggression prevailed among members of both parties and on major newspapers. Overwhelmingly, the view was that now was the time to break the "purely fictitious line" of the 38th parallel and to pursue a unified Korea. 32
Under these circumstances, Truman and Acheson leaned toward marching across the 38th parallel. What worried Truman most, however, was the possible reaction of the Soviet Union and China. Would Moscow and Beijing interfere directly if the UN forces counterattacked? This was the question policymakers in Washington had to answer if they decided to take the war into North Korea.
Strongly influenced by the general perception that Beijing leaders, at least at the present stage, were following orders from Moscow, Washington's attempt to seek a reliable assessment of Moscow's and Beijing's reactions to an expanded conflict into North Korea focused on the former. In the first several weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, many in Washington did believe, as Rosemary Foot points out, "that the Korean operation was a feint to lure U.S. forces away from some more vital area where a Soviet attack was planned." 33 Gradually, however, they found that this was not the case. Moscow appeared reluctant to play a significant role in the Korean conflict. The Soviet Union's return to the UN Security Council in early August, as well as the introduction of a Soviet proposal to end the conflict through negotiation, was taken by members of the State Department as evidence of the Soviet unwillingness to act boldly in Korea. The Defense Department found also the Soviet leaders' attitude toward the Korean conflict to be extremely cautious. The USSR did not put forward any harsh protest when in August UN air forces bombed the oil supply depot at Rajin in North Korea, only 17 miles from the Soviet border. 34 Yet both the State and Defense Departments continued to view Soviet interference as likely in August and September, especially if Soviet leaders felt that it "would not involve a substantial risk of global war." 35
While making its recommendations for U.S. strategy for a counteroffensive in Korea, the NSC postulated that the possibility of Soviet and Chinese intervention could be diminished by allowing only South Korean troops to march into North Korea while American ground forces avoided this step. On September 11, President Truman approved the NSC's report, known as NSC 81/1, authorizing the invasion and occupation of North Korea provided Soviet or Chinese intervention did not occur. The UN command was directed to use only South Korean forces to conduct the final march toward the Korean-Chinese border with operations restricted to Korean territory. In the event of open or covert Soviet or Chinese intervention, UN forces would assume the defensive and avoid escalating the conflict into a general war. Nevertheless, since the NSC, with the approval of the President, now defined American war aims in Korea as pursuing Korea's "complete independence and unity," the UN movements north of the parallel became almost certain. 36
The success of the Inchon landing turned the question of whether the UN forces would cross the 38th parallel into an issue of imminent importance. Policymakers in Washington continued to act according to the contingency plans set up by NSC 81, and their basic assumption was that if Moscow failed to take action of some kind before UN forces crossed the parallel, it could well mean that the Soviets, and also the Chinese, had adopted a hands-off policy. On September 27, the JCS instructed General MacArthur that UN forces could now conduct military, air, and naval operations across the 38th parallel to destroy North Korean forces. The general was also told to make certain that there was no major Soviet and Chinese military involvement in Korea, that UN forces should restrict their operations in Korean territory, and that only South Korean troops were to be used in Korea's northeastern provinces. 37 Two days later, Secretary of Defense George Marshall informed MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of [the] 38th parallel." 38
General MacArthur had thus been put in a position to act on his own judgment. As a military leader with a strong personality and eager to see a complete military victory, MacArthur was determined to march forward; and he had long believed that the 38th parallel was a meaningless line that had lost any significance after the North Korean attack. The strategy he tried to carry out was aimed at establishing "privileged sanctuaries" along the Manchurian border, thus preventing Communist expansion in the future. With the approval of top policymakers in Washington, he declared "all of Korea open for our military operations unless and until the enemy capitulates." 39
At this juncture, Beijing issued a series of explicit warnings about its intentions if the UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. Policymakers in Washington, however, regarded them as no more than "bluffing." When Zhou Enlai, through the Indian ambassador to Beijing, K. M. Panikkar, warned Washington on October 3 that if UN troops crossed the 38th parallel, China would intervene, Acheson viewed it as "bluff, pending more information." Although he recognized that there was a risk involved in UN forces marching toward the Yalu, he emphasized that "a greater risk would be incurred by showing hesitation and timidity." 40 Policymakers in Washington simply did not believe Beijing's warnings.
Several assumptions supported this approach. First, American policymakers were inclined to believe that after Inchon the best time for China's intervention in Korea had passed. A CIA report of September 28 alleged that the Chinese had missed the opportunity to turn the tide of the war at an early point, and "like the USSR, [China] will not openly intervene in North Korea." Alan Kirk, U.S. ambassador to Moscow, predicted that the threat of Chinese intervention had receded because the most favorable time for China's intervention "was logically when UN forces were desperately defending the small area of Taegu-Pusan, when the influx of overwhelming numbers of Chinese ground forces would have proved the decisive factor." The CIA concluded on October 12 that "from a military standpoint the most favorable time for [Chinese] intervention in Korea has passed." 41
Second, policymakers in Washington believed that Beijing leaders had to focus on domestic problems, and it would be unlikely for them to send troops to Korea. The CIA observed in its October 12 memo that the Chinese Communists faced tremendous domestic problems. If the CCP led China into a military conflict with the United States, "the regime's entire domestic program and economy would be jeopardized," and "anti-Communist forces would be encouraged and the regime's very existence would be endangered." Acheson was more than ready to accept such a view. He stated that "it would be sheer madness" for Beijing leaders to enter the Korean conflict when they themselves had numerous problems. 42 Third, Washington believed that China's entry into the Korean War would make Beijing regime even more dependent on Soviet support while at the same time minimizing Beijing's opportunity to take China's seat in the United Nations. 43 Indeed, American policymakers simply could not imagine that Beijing could gain anything by involving itself in a major confrontation with the United States.
Underlying these assumptions was a deep-rooted sense of American superiority in face of a backward China, as well as a stubborn contempt of Chinese Communist leaders because they were Chinese. There existed virtually no divergence between hard-liners like Dulles, Allison, and, of course, General MacArthur and moderates like Kennan on the problem of judging China's power potential. In fact, a consistent belief among policymakers in Washington was that even if the Chinese Communists did engage themselves in the Korean War, America's military and technological superiority would guarantee an easy victory over them. 44 Thus, while assessing Moscow's and Beijing's possible reaction to America's "rollback" policy, Washington's eyes fixed on Moscow. Once American policymakers became convinced that direct Soviet intervention in Korean was unlikely, they believed that a Chinese intervention was even less possible. Influenced by this mentality, intelligence analysts and policymakers in Washington easily ignored clues about Beijing's military redeployment and political mobilization for entering the war. And, not surprising at all, the CIA concluded as late as October 12, four days after Mao issued the formal orders to send Chinese troops to Korea: "Despite statements by Chou [Zhou] Enlai, troops movements to Manchuria, and propaganda charges of atrocities and border violations, there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea." 45 It is apparent that what was involved here was more than a simple intelligence failure.
Under these circumstances, we see an interesting yet ironic phenomenon: although Acheson and many others in Washington had been endeavoring to encourage Titoism in China, thus splitting Beijing and Moscow, they persistently emphasized the CCP leaders' subordination to Moscow after the outbreak of the Korean War. Truman believed that the "so-called Communist Chinese Government was nothing but a tool of Moscow." Acheson claimed that Beijing played a major role in serving Kremlin's plot of expansion in East Asia. 46
These allegations would reach their height when policymakers in Washington were shocked by Beijing's military intervention in Korea. In a heated debate with Clement Attlee, the British prime minister visiting Washington in early December 1950, both Truman and Acheson insisted that Beijing was not an independent actor in the international arena. Acheson would argue that Beijing's behavior was "based on the Moscow pattern" and that CCP leaders were "better pupils even than the Eastern European satellites," and Truman would stress that the CCP leaders "are satellites of Russia and will be satellites as long as the present Peiping [Beijing] regime is in power." 47 Is this a reflection of Washington's hostility toward revolutionary China? Yes. But mixed with these hostile feelings was also an unwillingness to appreciate the way Beijing leaders defined and defended the new China's security interests. It is clear that policymakers in Washington misperceived Beijing's intentions. This misperception, in the final analysis, was deeply rooted in the mentality that Mao called "American arrogance."
The First Decision: October 1- 2
In late September, Beijing leaders could see that the situation in Korea was deteriorating with every passing minute, and that North Korean resistance was collapsing under enormous pressure from superior UN forces. On September 30, the South Korean Third Division crossed the 38th parallel. The next day, General MacArthur issued an ultimatum to Kim Il-sung demanding an unconditional surrender. 48
Facing the imminent downfall of their regime, the North Korean leaders had no other choice but to seek direct Soviet and Chinese military assistance. On September 29, Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong sent a letter to Stalin, which stated that "at the moment when enemy troops cross the 38th parallel it is very necessary for us to have direct military aid from the Soviet Union." If the Soviet Union was not in a position to provide such aid, Kim and Park asked Stalin to "assist us in the creation of international volunteer units in China and in other people's democracies to render military assistance to our struggle." 49 As Stalin was unwilling to risk a confrontation with the United States, he considered a "more acceptable form of assistance [to North Korea] to be assistance by people's volunteers," which, in his view, was a "question we must consult first of all with the Chinese comrades." 50
Now Kim Il-sung had to make a personal appeal to Bejing for China's direct support. On the evening of September 30, the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang held in the embassy's basement a reception for the PRC's first anniversary. Kim showed up and met with Ni Zhiliang and Chai Chengwen, requesting that the Chinese send the 13th Army Corps into Korea. Ni and Chai agreed to convey Kim's request to Beijing in the shortest possible time. 51
As the situation deteriorated, on October 1, Kim, together with Pak Hon-yong, sent off an emergency letter to Mao, formally asking the Chinese to send troops to Korea. To make sure that the message would reach Mao in time, Pak Hon-yong flew to Beijing on the evening of October 1 to deliver the letter by hand. 52 The letter started with an overall summary of the course of the Korean War from late June to late September. Kim and Pak emphasized that before the American landing at Inchon, the KPA had possessed a highly advantageous position. While the enemies were constricted in a small area in the southernmost part of the Korean peninsula, the KPA had every opportunity to "win the decisive final victory." Then, Kim and Pak stated, the U.S. imperialists, "for the purpose of changing Korea into their colony and military base," gathered almost all of their forces in the Asian-Pacific area to make the landing at Inchon. The KPA had since been forced to change from the offensive to the defensive. Describing the current situation in Korea as "most grave," Kim and Pak confessed that "it is difficult for us to cope with the crisis with our own strength." They ended the letter "urgently soliciting that the Chinese People's Liberation Army directly enter the war to support us." 53
The North Koreans' request came at the time when the Beijing leadership had reached the final stage of their deliberations over whether or not to send troops to Korea. On September 30, Zhou Enlai declared at a mass conference that "the Chinese people will absolutely not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists." 54
Zhou sent off this open warning at the same time when top leaders in Beijing acted to make the decision to intervene in Korea. The first day of October was a long one for Mao and his fellow Beijing leaders. During the day, urgent reports from the Chinese embassy in Korea poured into Zhongnanhai. In the late evening, the emergency message by Kim and Pak reached Mao. Then Mao summoned an urgent meeting attended by members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. 55 The message from Kim Il-sung and the Korean situation was the main topic of the meeting. Top CCP leaders decided that an enlarged Politburo Standing Committee would meet the next day, attended also by Beijing's top military planners. After this decision was made, Mao did not go to bed. Instead, at 2 a.m., the morning of October 2, he telegraphed to Gao Gang and Deng Hua in Shenyang, ordering Gao to "come to Beijing for a meeting immediately." He also ordered the NEBDA to "complete its preparations ahead of the original schedule and to await the order to carry out operations against new enemies on the basis of the original plan." He instructed Deng to make the party leadership abreast of the NEBDA's status of preparation. 56
In the early afternoon, Gao Gang flew from Shenyang to Beijing. Around 3 p.m., the enlarged meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee began at Zhongnanhai. Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai (all members of the Standing Committee) attended the meeting; Gao Gang, who had been in charge of the NEBDA since August, and Nie Rongzhen, the PLA's acting chief of staff, also attended. 57
Mao's opening statement revealed his inclination to enter the war at this moment. Emphasizing the dangerous situation in Korea, Mao made it clear that "the question now is not whether or not but how fast we should send troops to Korea. One day's difference will be crucial to the whole situation. Today we will discuss two urgent questions- when should our troops enter Korea and who should be the commander." 58 Mao's statement is crucial. It virtually dictated the outcome of the meeting. Moreover, as further developments would prove, the ideas Mao expressed also established the basic tone of the Beijing leadership's discussion over China's role in Korea in the days to come. Mao demonstrated that he was the person in control. If at several other meetings CCP leaders would debate the pros and cons of entering the Korean War, they did so for his consideration. When the Beijing leadership wavered on several occasions concerning the problem of when and how Chinese troops should enter Korea, the wavering was largely the reflection of the internal struggle in Mao's own mind.
Following Mao's agenda, the discussion at the meeting first focused on selecting a commander for Chinese troops in Korea. This task would have been easy if Lin Biao, who had long enjoyed the reputation as one of the most talented military commanders of the PLA, had been willing to take the position. Lin had been the commander of the Fourth Field Army, which had fought mostly in the Northeast during the civil war, and was familiar with the situation in Manchuria and in nearby Korea. Furthermore, the four armies (the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies) concentrated in the Chinese-Korean border area were all units of the former Fourth Field Army, which Lin would more naturally command than other top PLA commanders. Lin, however, refused to lead Chinese troops to Korea. In the three months from early July to late September, Mao and other members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee had inquired several times about Lin's intentions concerning commanding Chinese troops in Korea. Lin stressed consistently that he was unable to accept this duty because of his poor health. During the CCP leadership's previous discussions about the necessity of sending Chinese troops to Korea, Lin expressed strong reservations. He believed that as the PRC faced tremendous challenges at home and abroad and as the United States was technologically superior to China, China should not put itself into a direct military confrontation with the United States. In early October, Lin was preparing to travel to the Soviet Union for medical treatment. The combination of all these factors made Lin an impossible choice. 59
Mao and top CCP leaders briefly considered Su Yu, vice commander of the Third Field Army, who had been responsible for organizing the Taiwan campaign since mid-1949. In early July, at the two conferences chaired by Zhou Enlai, the CMC even made the decision to appoint Su as the commander of the NEBDA. But Su was later hospitalized for medical treatment, eliminating him from consideration. 60
Mao's mind now turned to Peng Dehuai. As one of the creators of the Chinese Red Army, Peng had fought alongside Mao from the late 1920s and established a prominent reputation as a military leader with great talent and broad vision. Peng had commanded the First Field Army, fighting in northwestern China, during the civil war. He had also served simultaneously as vice commander-in-chief of the PLA and vice chairman of the CMC, so that his influence extended far beyond the First Field Army. If selected as the commander for Chinese troops to Korea, he would certainly have had no difficulty in dealing with commanders from the Fourth Field Army. 61 Mao, who knew Peng very well, had considered asking him to lead the troops in Korea even before the Inchon landing. In a telegram to Peng on August 27 Mao informed him that "in order to accommodate the current situation," the CCP leadership believed that "it was necessary to concentrate twelve armies for emergencies," and that Peng would "be invited to Beijing for a direct consultation at the end of September." 62 2 At the October 2 meeting, Mao proposed Peng as the commander of the Chinese army in Korea. The proposal was immediately seconded by Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the PLA and Peng's close personal friend. The decision was made, contingent on the agreement of Peng himself. 63
When should China enter the war? This was another problem the meeting addressed. The answer depended basically on two factors: how soon might the NEBDA complete final preparations and how much time would be allowed by the development of the Korean situation?The meeting decided that Chinese troops would enter Korea around October 15. In other words, the NEBDA should be ready to begin war operations in less than two weeks. 64
The meeting also discussed how to establish effective Chinese-Soviet cooperation over China's entry into the Korean War. Mao obviously felt that this was the right time to make a comprehensive response to Stalin's request, which he had received two weeks earlier. Before the end of the meeting, Mao suggested that he should personally cable Stalin to inform him of the decision so that Beijing and Moscow could work out details for wartime Chinese-Soviet military cooperation. The meeting approved this suggestion. 65
Right after the meeting, Mao sent a lengthy telegram to Stalin, summarizing the Chinese leaders' basic assessment of the risks involved in China's entry into the Korean War, the goals they hoped to achieve by sending troops to Korea, and the means through which these goals could be realized:
(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [the Chinese] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary. If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary force were fundamentally destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East. (2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, we are prepared to wipe out the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and [thus] drive them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name of the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an American declaration of war on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas. (3) Of the two questions, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able to wipe out American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question (that the United States declares war on China) would still remain as a serious question. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of Korea for a long period). If so, even though the Untied States declared war on China, the confrontation would not be a large-scale one, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war). (4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will maintain a defensive warfare, while fighting with small groups of enemies and learning about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of Soviet weapons and to be equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the invading American forces. (5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and one mechanized division) is armed with 1500 pieces of artillery of various calibers ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of such artillery. The enemy would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we are not assured that our troops are able to wipe out an entire U. S. army once and for all. But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be prepared so that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us in one campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times larger than the enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to use a firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use 2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy's 1500 pieces of artillery of the same calibers), so that we can guarantee a complete and thorough destruction of one enemy army. (6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from the south of the Yangzi River and the Shannxi-Ganshu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually apply these divisions next spring and summer in accordance with the situation of the time. 66
Interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing's military researchers with access to Mao's manuscripts suggest that the original text of Mao's telegram to Stalin is longer than the published version. Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the Chinese large amounts of military equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well as to confirm that the Soviet Union would provide the Chinese with air support when Chinese troops entered operations in Korea. 67 This telegram, and other available materials, places us in a position to answer several crucial questions:
First, what sort of a war did Chinese leaders anticipate they would be fighting in Korea? As Mao indicated, he understood that once Chinese troops entered a direct military confrontation with the United States the possibility existed that the United States might formally declare war on China and that American naval and air forces might attack China's coastal areas. Mao did not fear this prospect. He believed that even if the United States were to declare war on China, the focus of the war would still be in the Korean peninsula. If Chinese forces were able to eliminate American troops on the Korean battlefield, it would be unlikely that the confrontation between China and the United States would change into a total war. As far as the duration of China's intervention was concerned, Mao stressed that after focusing on the defensive in the initial stage of the confrontation, Chinese troops, if properly equipped by the Soviets, would begin an offensive to "annihilate the enemy." In other words, Mao did not anticipate that China would be involved in a long war. 68 It is also noticeable that Mao's analysis of America's military power focused on the conventional strength of the traditional three services. Nowhere did Mao mention America's nuclear power. This indicates again that Mao did not believe that the atomic bomb would be used on the Korean battlefield. All this demonstrates that when Mao and top CCP leaders made the decision to send Chinese troops to Korea, they were looking forward to a regional war, a conventional war, a short war, and a limited war. They did not anticipate that China's intervention would either lead to a world war involving the two superpowers or evolve into a nuclear slaughter.
Second, what goals did Chinese leaders hope to achieve by sending troops to Korea? In this telegram Mao assigned the Chinese troops the task of "solving the Korean problem." According to Mao's own explanation, this meant that the Chinese troops should be able to "eliminate the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and drive them out [of Korea]." Mao mentioned in the telegram that if the Chinese failed to "eliminate American troops in large numbers in Korea," a stalemate could emerge on the battlefield, putting China under serious domestic and international pressure. However, he treated this as no more than the worst possibility. The emphasis of his perceived war aims was clearly on a total victory over the United States and its "lackeys." 69 Against this background, when Mao talked about "the settlement of the Korean problem," his vision went far beyond the Korean peninsula and China. He linked the "settlement of the Korean problem" with its influence on the "whole East." When Mao considered the negative impact if Beijing failed to send troops to Korea, he emphasized that this could result in an unfavorable situation in the overall confrontation between the "reactionary forces" and the "revolutionary forces" in the East. And when he stressed the necessity of China's entry into the war, he made it clear that this would serve to promote the Eastern revolution.
Third, what were the basic conditions underlying Mao's pursuit of a victorious war in Korea? Mao acknowledged in this telegram that the United States possessed technological superiority as well as the domination of the air. But Mao believed that this could be handled by Chinese troops if properly equipped by the Soviets and supported by the Soviet air force. Furthermore, Mao relied on China's superior manpower and his belief in the higher morale of Chinese soldiers. He was confident that the Chinese Communists would be able to adopt the strategy that they had so successfully used in China's civil war, that is, "to concentrate our own forces four times larger than the enemy" to separate and annihilate the enemy. Mao even perceived that by using this strategy the Chinese would be able to annihilate an entire American army on the Korean battlefield. It is apparent that Mao's confidence in a Chinese victory over the United States was largely based on the reliability of the Chinese-Soviet strategic alliance, as well as on the CCP's own military experience.
In retrospect, Mao's perceptions proved to be only partially correct. As Mao predicted here, the direct Chinese-American military confrontation in Korea remained a regional, conventional, and limited war, although it lasted longer than Mao expected. During the practical course of China's military intervention in Korea, however, Mao and other Chinese leaders discovered that the United States was a resourceful enemy and the Soviet Union an uncertain ally. The CCP's long-established military and political strategies, including "separating and annihilating the enemy by concentrating our own forces," "fighting at close quarters and fighting in the dark," and "strengthening the military quality of the troops through widespread and profound political mobilization," would not be enough to bring about a Chinese victory in Korea. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders would gradually realize that they had underestimated both the determination of the Americans to fight in Korea and the effects of modern technology and military equipment in modern warfare. The Chinese-North Korean forces, although outnumbering the UN forces, could not overcome inadequate military equipment, vulnerable supply lines, and lack of air support. This made Mao's plan of "driving Americans out of the Korean peninsula" unfeasible. Moreover, Mao and his fellow Chinese leaders would find Stalin to be much less trustworthy than they initially believed. Mao would get far less support from Moscow than he had hoped to receive. As a result, Mao would be forced to redefine China's aims during the course of the Korean War and, in the long run, to redefine China's security strategy and foreign policy. 70
Mao, of course, could not have foreseen these problems on October 2, 1950. Although under huge psychological pressure, Mao did not lack self-confidence. For him, the problem now was how to get the olitburo's backing for the decision, and how to implement it. He was a soldier willing to face one of the most difficult challenges in his life.
Several hours after Mao sent off this crucial telegram to Stalin, Beijing issued another warning to the United States. Early on the next morning, Zhou Enlai arranged an emergency meeting with the Indian ambassador Panikkar. Zhou asked Panikkar to convey a message to the Americans: "The American forces are trying to cross the 38th parallel and to expand the war. If they really want to do this, we will not sit still without doing anything. We will be forced to intervene [women yao guan]." 71
Why did Zhou send off this message after top CCP leaders had made the primary decision to enter the Korean War? In the past, without an understanding of the relationship between Beijing's decision to enter the war and Zhou's issuance of this warning, many scholars of the Korean War took this as evidence that Beijing did not want a direct military confrontation with the United States. This warning served as the last chance to avoid direct Chinese-American confrontation, scholars argue, and if Washington had responded seriously to this warning and ordered the UN forces not to cross the 38th parallel, China's military intervention could have been averted. Zhou's warning has thus been taken by many scholars both in the West and in China as the single most important piece of evidence supporting the argument that the Beijing leadership sent Chinese troops to Korea only to protect the safety of the Sino-Korean border. 72
We now know that top Chinese leaders had made the primary decision to enter the war before Zhou's warning, not after it. A question thus emerges: What was the real meaning of Zhou's warning? To answer this question is obviously not an easy task, especially because we have no way to creep into the minds of Mao, Zhou, and other CCP leaders. While one cannot exclude the possibility that Chinese leaders sent off the warning for the purpose of avoiding China's military involvement at the final moment, 73 one should not merely rely on the apparent meaning of Zhou's statement. Combining the clues available now, two hypothetical alternative interpretations are offered here. First, Zhou's statement could have been designed to serve China's last-minute military preparations. In a military sense, as the Chinese were then still not fully ready to enter the war and as UN forces were advancing northward rapidly, top Beijing leaders must have realized that the UN forces could reach the Chinese-Korean borders before they could act. If so, they would lose the grounds on which to send in Chinese troops. By giving the Americans a clear warning, they may have hoped to delay the advance of UN forces, winning valuable time to complete final preparations.
Second, Zhou's statement could have been made for political considerations. Eager to use "The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea" as a means to mobilize the Chinese nation as well to promote China's prestige and influence in the world, Mao and Beijing leaders may have concluded that a warning would further justify China's interference in the Korean War at home and abroad. If the United States failed to heed the warning (Beijing leaders obviously believed that the United States would continue the march), Mao and the CCP leadership would be in a stronger position to tell their own people and peoples in other parts of the world that they had tried everything before resorting to force. The Beijing leaders' considerations behind Zhou's warning could well offer another strong case for the political scientist Richard Ned Lebow's argument that "justifications of hostility crises serve to mobilize domestic and foreign support for an impending war and deprive an adversary of such support." 74
The Politburo Backs Mao
At 10 a.m., October 4, a Russian-made Iliushin-14 plane landed on the airport of Xian, the largest city in Northwestern China. Within an hour, Peng Dehuai, then chairman of the Military and Administrative Committee of the Northwest and commander of the PLA's Northwest Military Region, boarded the plane. Mao and Zhou had ordered Peng to come to Beijing without any delay, so Peng did not have time to say goodbye to his colleagues before boarding the plane, which took off immediately, heading for Beijing via Taiyuan. 75
While Peng was on his way to Beijing, an emergency meeting of the CCP Central Committee Politburo began around 3 p.m. in Zhongnanhai. The central topic of the meeting was the Politburo Standing Committee's decision to send Chinese troops to Korea. Those at the meeting included almost all members of the CCP Politburo and other key leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Gao Gang, Peng Zhen, Dong Biwu, Lin BoqŸ, Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Wentian and Li Fuchun. Peng Dehuai arrived at the meeting at about 5 p.m. Yang Shangkun, director of the Office of the CCP Central Committee, and Hu Qiaomu, director of the Central Information Agency, also attended. 76
Mao announced at the beginning of the meeting that the Politburo Standing Committee had made the decision to send troops to Korea. Because of the importance of the decision, Mao asked "those attending the meeting to list the possible disadvantages involved in dispatching [Chinese] troops to Korea." 77 Following Mao's call, most people attending the meeting expressed their reservations about the decision to enter the war; and, surprisingly, their views prevailed during the first day's meeting. 78 Their opinions can be summarized as three main arguments. First, having experienced decades of wars, China faced tremendous economic and financial problems. To achieve economic recovery and reconstruction, China needed a period of peaceful recuperation. To send troops into Korea might cause discontent at home. Second, China faced difficult political problems. The country had not been finally unified, and Taiwan and some offshore islands were still controlled by remnants of the GMD. Furthermore, land reform was just beginning in many "recently liberated areas." To participate in the Korean War would weaken the efforts to solve these problems. Third, the Chinese army would meet in Korea a geographic situation completely different from that of China, and would have to conduct warfare without control of the air or guarantees of logistic supply. They could therefore suffer in face of superior American weapons and equipment. 79 Mao did not directly rebut these opinions, but before the adjournment of the October 4 meeting he revealed his disagreement to them: "All you have said is not without ground. But when other people are in a crisis, how can we stand aside with our arms folded. This will make me feel sad." 80 The meeting was to resume the next day.
Mao's determination to enter the war, obviously, had not been weakened by the reservations of his comrades. Indeed, these arguments proved only that the difficulties involved in sending Chinese troops to Korea did not go beyond what he had contemplated. And he may also have felt that some of the problems listed by his comrades, such as the necessity of further consolidation of the new Communist regime, would be better solved if China could win a major confrontation with the United States. As the paramount leader of the party who had established his leading authority during the long Shcourse of the Chinese Communist revolution, Mao remained confident of his own judgment and of his ability to convince his comrades of the correctness of his determination.
The key person, in Mao's view, was Peng Dehuai. Peng came to the meeting with no preparation for discussions about sending Chinese troops to Korea. He arrived late and did not speak at the meeting. 81 But as the Politburo Standing Committee meeting of October 2 had already decided to ask Peng to command Chinese troops to Korea, his attitude toward intervention would have decisive influence on other people.
On the morning of October 5 Mao asked Deng Xiaoping to meet Peng at his hotel room and then accompany him to Mao's quarters for an exchange of opinions. As soon as Peng arrived at Mao's office, Mao told him that the situation in Korea was extremely urgent, that the UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel, and that China had an obligation to send troops to Korea. The difficulties involved in sending troops to Korea were obvious, Mao asserted, but there were advantages that favored the decision to enter the war. Mao asked Peng to state his opinions frankly. Peng, who had spent most of the night carefully considering Mao's decision to dispatch troops to Korea, had concluded that the decision was correct because it "not only combined the ideal of internationalism with considerations of patriotism, but was also crucial to the safety of China's Northeastern borders." The chairman, excited by Peng's response, asked him if he was willing to command Chinese troops in Korea. He explained that Lin Biao had been the first choice but had refused the appointment, claiming that he was physically unfit. The chairman stressed again that the situation in Korea was extremely urgent, that the UN forces were marching toward Pyongyang, and that it would be too late to send troops to Korea if the enemy forces reached the Yalu River. He argued that "we have to move forward immediately." After a brief moment, Peng agreed to take command of Chinese troops in Korea. A relieved Mao asked Peng to express his opinions when the Politburo meeting resumed the same afternoon. Peng's acceptance of the duty to command Chinese troops played a key role in enhancing Mao's control of the decision-making process. 82
The Politburo meeting resumed in the afternoon. Peng, following Mao's instructions, spoke firmly in support of sending troops to Korea. He stressed that if U.S. forces reached the Yalu River, they could easily find an excuse to invade China; if China failed to enter the war until after the U.S. had occupied the entire Korean Peninsula, the situation would become more complicated. Disagreeing that sending troops to Korea would slow political consolidation at home, Peng emphasized that by entering the Korean War, the CCP would have an opportunity to beat both the arrogance of the United States and the bluster of reactionaries at home. Peng concluded that it was absolutely necessary to send troops to Korea. 83
Peng's speech transformed the mood of the meeting, and the discussion now centered on the advantages of sending troops to Korea. The participants finally reached a series of consensuses: First, the Korean problem was not an isolated one. It had become the focus of the confrontation between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp in the East, perhaps even in the world. The purpose of sending troops to Korea was not only to rescue Korea, but also, and more important, to defend and promote an Asian and world revolution. Second, the safety of Korea was closely linked to the security of China. If the Americans reached the Yalu River, China would lose an important strategic buffer zone and face a heavy burden in defending its Northeast border. Third, comparing China's situation with that of the United States, China was superior in terms of manpower, moral strength, and support from the people, which would balance China's inferiority in terms of weapons and equipment. 84 The meeting formally confirmed Peng Dehuai's appointment. Mao concluded the meeting, stressing the necessity to enter the Korean War: "We have now only one choice, that is, no matter how many difficulties or dangers we may encounter, we have to send troops to Korea immediately, before Pyongyang is occupied by the enemy." 85
The Politburo's meeting on October 4 and 5 was not a decision-making one in a strict sense, because the key decision had been made by the Politburo Standing Committee on October 2. Mao's purpose was to secure acceptance of his decision to enter the Korean War. To achieve this objective, Mao adopted the tactics that he had used with such sophistication since having become the paramount leader of the CCP: he first encouraged all members of the Politburo to express their opinions, especially the opinions that were different from his own, and then he used his wisdom and authority to persuade his comrades to yield to his ideas. Mao himself called this process "democratic centralism," a reflection of the combination of Leninist principles with an enlightened emperor's "way of dealing with different opinions" in traditional Chinese political culture (na jian zhi dao). Mao proved himself a master at dominating the party's decision-making apparatus.
After the meeting, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to dine with him. They further discussed the concrete problems involved in implementing the decision to send troops to Korea. Mao stressed again that Chinese troops needed to enter Korea quickly, and he worried that any delay could result in fatal consequences. He directed Peng and Gao to travel to Shenyang as soon as possible to convey the decision to commanders above the division level of the NEBDA. The troops of the Border Defense Army, Mao emphasized, should enter Korea by October 15. At the same time, Zhou Enlai would fly to the Soviet Union to finalize details of Soviet air support for Chinese land forces and supply of military equipment. 86
The next morning, Zhou Enlai chaired an enlarged meeting of the CMC, the focus of which was supposedly on how to guarantee logistical support for Chinese troops in Korea and how Peng would form his headquarters. Lin Biao, however, again expressed his reservations. He stressed that fighting the Americans was a very different matter from the CCP's previous experience of fighting the GMD. As the United States possessed modernized military forces and the atomic bomb, argued Lin, Chinese troops engaged in direct confrontation with the Americans would suffer severe losses. Zhou immediately criticized Lin in stern terms, emphasizing that the decision to send troops to Korea had been made by Mao and the Central Committee and that the remaining problem was how to carry out the decision. The meeting decided that Nie Rongzhen would take charge of general logistical matters and that Peng's headquarters would be established on the basis of that of the 13th Army Corps. This meeting also confirmed that Zhou Enlai would visit the Soviet Union to expedite the delivery of Soviet military supplies to China. 87
Mao met again with Peng and Gao on October 7 to discuss a few details concerning the command and logistical systems for Chinese troops going to Korea. Mao suggested to Peng that he establish his headquarters in a hidden location north of the Yalu River to guarantee his safety. Peng believed it better for him to be with Kim Il-sung to coordinate the operations of Chinese troops with those of the North Korean forces. Peng also stressed the need to maintain secrecy before Chinese troops entered operations. He recommended that even after the fighting started, the Xinhua New Agency should be restricted in reporting the activities of Chinese troops. Mao agreed. 88
The Issuance of the Order
The time for action had arrived. The Americans further justified Mao's decision to enter the Korean War at this moment. On October 7, the UN General Assembly, at the urging of the United States, approved the establishment of a UN Commission of the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. The same day, the American First Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel. Zhou's warning made through Ambassador Pannikar had been totally ignored. Mao now had every reason to tell his comrades that to enter the war was the only choice. On October 8, in the name of the chairman of the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Commission, Mao issued the order to send Chinese troops to Korea:
(1) In order to assist the Korean people's war of liberation, repel the invasion launched by the American imperialists and their running dogs, and to defend the interests of the Korean people, the Chinese people and the people of all Eastern countries, it has been ordered that the Northeast Border Defense Army be turned into the Chinese People's Volunteers and that the Chinese People's Volunteers move immediately into the territory of Korea to assist the Korean comrades in their struggle against the invaders and to strive for a glorious victory. (2) The Chinese People's Volunteers comprises the 13th Army Corps and its constituents including the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies, and the Border Defense Artillery Headquarters and its First, Second, and Eighth Artillery Divisions. All the above-mentioned units are required to complete preparations immediately and get ready for the order to begin operations. (3) Comrade Peng Dehuai is appointed as the Commander and Political Commissar of the Chinese People's Volunteers. (4) The Chinese People's Volunteers will take the Northeast Administrative Region as its general logistical base. Comrade Gao Gang, commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region, will take full charge of coordinating and guaranteeing all requisitions for supplies from the rear base, as well as for the assistance provided to Korean comrades. (5) When moving into Korean territory, the Chinese People's Volunteers must demonstrate friendship and respect for the Korean people, for the Korean People's Army, for the Democratic Government of Korea, for the Workers' Party of Korea (the Korean Communist Party) and other democratic parties, and for Kim Il-sung, the leader of the Korean people. They must strictly comply with military and political discipline. This is a very important political precondition through which the fulfillment of the military operations is ensured. (6) [The Chinese People's Volunteers] must fully anticipate all kinds of difficult situations that they may, and will, encounter and must be prepared to exercise a high degree of enthusiasm, courage, caution, and a spirit of perseverance in overcoming these difficulties. At the present moment, the general international and domestic situations are favorable to us, but unfavorable to the aggressors; if only our comrades are resolute, brave, good at working with the local people and good at fighting against the aggressors, the final victory will be ours. 89
Why did Mao call the Chinese troops going to Korea "Chinese People's Volunteers"? Before the Inchon landing, as Mao and the CCP leadership contemplated sending troops to Korea, they discussed what to call these troops. To minimize risk of a formal war with the United States and to follow the original assumption that Chinese troops would play only a supplementary role in the fighting, Mao and the CCP leadership were inclined to call Chinese troops in Korea "Chinese People's Supporters." After Inchon, the implications of China's intervention changed dramatically. In further discussions on how to describe Chinese troops in Korea, Huang Yanpei, a pro-Communist "democratic figure," then China's vice premier, suggested that it would be better to call Chinese troops in Korea "volunteers." Mao and other CCP leaders immediately saw the merits of this suggestion. By calling Chinese troops in Korea volunteers, they would be able to better convince the Chinese people of the moral justification of the intervention, while at the same time alleging that Chinese troops were organized on an unofficial basis, thus reducing the risk of a formal war with the United States and other Western countries. 90
Mao's emphasis that the CPV should demonstrate "friendship and respect" to Kim Il-sung, the Korean party, and the Korean people was not just propaganda. For the chairman, Kim's cooperation concerned both the effectiveness and significance of China's intervention in Korea: While the wholehearted cooperation of Kim and his comrades would better guarantee the success of China's war effort, the new China's influence and prestige would be significantly enhanced if the Chinese could prove that their intervention in the war did not aim to extend China's political control over Korea but to fulfill true "internationalist obligations."
Mao was now ready to give Kim's and Pak's formal request an affirmative response. He sent a telegram to Kim Il-sung via the Chinese embassy in Korea on the evening of October 8, formally informing him that China had decided to "dispatch the Volunteers to Korea to assist you in fighting against the aggressors." Mao asked Kim to send Pak Il-yu immediately to Shenyang to meet Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang to "discuss a series of concrete problems concerning the CPV's entering fighting in Korea." 91 Late that evening Ni Zhiliang and Chai Chengwen arrived at Kim's underground headquarters in Pyongyang and delivered Mao's telegram. 92 The Chinese war machine was now in motion.
The process leading to the decision to intervene was not straightforward. Under the shadow of the grave impacts of the Inchon landing, Beijing leaders had to consider the implications of the northward movement of UN forces, to coordinate with both Moscow and Pyongyang, and, most important of all, to unify party leaders. Mao played a crucial role in leading the CCP leadership toward intervention. His opening statement at the October 2 Political Bureau Standing Committee meeting, which was apparently the result of his extensive considerations during those sleepless days and nights after Inchon, set up the basic tones for the decision-making process. The following debates among top Beijing leaders about the necessity of sending troops to Korea were substantial, but had never got out of Mao's control. In fact, the opposition opinions from other Beijing leaders strengthened, rather than weakened, Mao's determination. Consequently, twenty-three days after the Inchon landing, eight days after the South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, and one day after American forces entered North Korean territory, Mao ordered "Chinese People's Volunteers" to enter the war. To turn the order into action, though, Mao and the Beijing leadership still had things to do: to further mobilize the country, to consolidate the consensus of the party leadership, to push the troops to complete the final preparations, and, not least of all, to make sure that when Chinese troops were engaged in operations Soviet air forces would be with them. The issuance of the October 8 order, therefore, did not conclude Beijing's path to intervention.
Notes
Note 1: See Li Yingqiao, Zai Maozhuxi shenbian shiwunian (With Chairman Mao for Fifteen Years, Shijiazhuang: Hebei People's Press, 1991), p. 159. Back.
Note 2: For personal recollections of the mood in Shenyang and Beijing after the Inchon landing, see Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, p. 22; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, pp. 8-9; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 492-493. Back.
Note 3: Although the Beijing leadership had alleged frequently that the real American intention behind invading Korea was to threaten China's Northeast, they did not treat this seriously until after the Inchon landing. In Zhou Enlai's speech to the Chinese People's Consultative Conference on October 24, 1950, he stressed that U.S. subjugation of North Korea would create real problems for the security of Northeast China. "Half of our heavy industry is in the Northeast, and half of the heavy industry in the Northeast is in the southern part, within range of enemy bombers. . . . If the U.S. imperialists get close to the Yalu River, how can we have the peace of mind to go about production?" Zhou Enlai, "Resisting U.S. Aggression, Assisting Korea and Defending Peace," ZWJWX, pp. 28-29. Back.
Note 5: See Zhang Min, "A Survey of the Struggle to Suppress Reactionaries in the Early Years of the PRC," p. 254; Lin Yunhui et al., Kaige xingjing de shiqi, pp. 139-140; and Yang Dezhi, Weile heping, p. 4. Back.
Note 6: Hu Shiyan et al., Chen Yi zhuan (A Biography of Chen Yi, Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1991), p. 487. Back.
Note 7: Cited from Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 79. Back.
Note 8: This paragraph about Stalin's attitude change after Inchon is largely based on my discussions with Russian historian Goncharov in November 1991 and March 1993. The following Chinese sources offer a similar general account of Stalin's attitude after Inchon: Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 24; and Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,p. 22. Back.
Note 9: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 492-493. In my interviews with Shi Zhe in August 1992, he recalled that this telegram reached Beijing "one or two days" after the Inchon landing. Back.
Note 10: This was released by Chen Yi, China's foreign minister, in a speech on April 16, 1964, see Yao Xu, Cong yalujiang dao banmendian, p. 22; see also Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,p. 22. Back.
Note 11: Several Chinese sources mention that before China made the final decision to enter the Korean War, the Soviets agreed to provide air cover if China sent troops to Korea. Few of these sources, however, reveal when and how the agreement was made. Nor do these sources reveal the contents of this agreement. This paragraph follows Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, pp. 24-25, and Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," pp. 142, 147. Back.
Note 12: Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, 8-9; Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 77. Back.
Note 13: Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 9. Back.
Note 14: For a recent study of Kim Il-sung's suppression of his opponents within the Korean Labor Party, including Pak Il-yu and Pak Hon-yong, see Sin Sam-Soon, "The Repressions of Kim Il-sung: A Historical Memoir," Korea and World Affairs, 15 (1991): 279-301; for Kim's purge of Pak Hon-yong, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, 1: 436-452. Back.
Note 15: Interviews with Chinese party history researchers in May 1991. Shi Zhe confirmed in my interviews with him in August 1992 that after Inchon Kim's opponents within the Korean Labor Party asked Mao to support their efforts to get rid of Kim, but Mao did not agree. According to one Chinese source, the CCP Central Committee cabled Kim Il-sung on September 20, advising him to prepare for a protracted war, to carefully maintain the main formation of North Korean forces, and to avoid staking everything on a single effort in fighting the Americans. See Zhou Jun, "The Strategic Change from the War of Liberation to the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," p. 16. The cable is a clear indication that Mao and the CCP leadership continued to accept Kim Il-sung as the leader of North Korean Communists. Back.
Note 16: These five people were: Zhang Mingyuan, deputy head of the Logistics Department of the PLA's Northeast Headquarters; Cui Xingnong, head of the intelligence Department of the Headquarters of the 13th Army Corps; He Lingdeng, staff officer at the Headquarters of the 39th Army; Tang Jingzhong, chief of staff of the 118th Division under the 41st Army; and Li Fei, deputy head of the Intelligence Department of the Headquarters of the Artillery Force under the CMC. Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 79; see also Xie Fang, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng houqin jingyan zongjie, p. 12. Back.
Note 17: Zhou worried that sending Chinese military observers could give the Koreans a wrong signal that Beijing was about to send troops to Korea, as well as reveal prematurely China's intentions to the Americans. See "Minutes of the Conference to Examine and Discuss the Preparations of the Northeast Border Defense Army, 5:00 PM, August 26, 1950," CCA. Back.
Note 18: Xie Fang, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng houqin jingyan zongjie, p. 12. Back.
Note 19: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 79. Back.
Note 21: Renmin ribao, September 25, 1950. Back.
Note 22: K. M. Panikkar, In Two Chinas (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 108; Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 74; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, p. 41. Back.
Note 23: Memorandum by Allison, July 13, 1950, FRUS, 1950: 7, p. 373. Back.
Note 24: Memorandum by Lay, July 17, 1950, ibid., p. 410. Back.
Note 25: Kennan, "Possible Further Danger Points in Light of the Korean Situation," June 30, 1950, Box 24, Kennan Papers; Kennan to Acheson, August 8, 1950, PPS papers, Box 8, RG 59, NA; see also Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 488. Back.
Note 26: Draft Memorandum Prepared by the PPS, July 25, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 469-473. Back.
Note 27: Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Department of Defense, "U.S. Course of Action in Korea," July 31, 1950, ibid., pp. 502-10. Back.
Note 28: Memorandum by Dulles, July 14, 1950, ibid., pp. 386-87. Back.
Note 29: Foot, The Wrong War, p. 72. Back.
Note 30: Memorandum by Allison to Nitze, July 24, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 460-61. Back.
Note 31: J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (Boston: Houghton Mittin, 1969), pp. 81- 83. Back.
Note 32: Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 69-70. Back.
Note 34: Ibid., pp. 75-76. Back.
Note 35: Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State, August 31, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 672. Back.
Note 36: NSC 81/1, Report by the National Security Council to the President, September 9, 1950, ibid., pp. 712-721; see also Barton J. Bernstein, "The Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel and Marching to the Yalu," Foreign Service Journal (March 1977): 18-19. Back.
Note 37: Webb to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations, September 26, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 781. Back.
Note 38: Marshall to MacArthur, September 29, 1950, ibid., p. 826. Back.
Note 39: Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, p. 201. Back.
Note 40: Memorandum of conversation by Allison, October 4, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 868-869. Back.
Note 41: Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2: 734-735; Foot, The Wrong War, p. 80; and Memorandum by the CIA, October 12, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 934. Back.
Note 42: Memorandum by the CIA, October 12, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 934; Smith, Dean Acheson, p. 201. Back.
Note 43: Memorandum by the CIA, October 12, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 934. Back.
Note 44: Foot, The Wrong War, pp. 82-84; Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, pp. 230-231. Back.
Note 45: Memorandum by the CIA, October 12, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 933-934 Back.
Note 46: Bernstein, "The Policy of Risk," p. 17; Acheson to Bevin, July 10, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 348-350. Back.
Note 47: Minutes of Truman-Attlee Discussions, December 4, 1950, FRUS (1950), 3: 1706-1709. Back.
Note 48: According to Nie Rongzhen's memoir, the Chinese general staff received the information that the UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel on the early morning of October 2. See Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 736. Back.
Note 49: Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong to Stalin, September 29, 1950, cited from Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War: New Documentary Evidence," pp. 452-456. Back.
Note 50: Stalin to Matveev, September 30, 1950, and Stalin to Shtykov and Matveev, October 1, 1950, ibid., pp. 455-456. A. I. Matveev was then Stalin's personal military representative in Korea, and Shtykov was then Soviet ambassador to North Korea. Back.
Note 51: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 80; Zhang Xi, "Peng's Appointment," p. 123. Back.
Note 52: Zhang Xi, "Peng Dehuai and China's Entry into the Korean War" (trans. by Chen Jian), Chinese Historians, 6, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 5-6. Back.
Note 53: Cited from Ye Yumeng, Chubing chaoxian: kangmei yuanchao lishi jishi (Entering the Korean War: The True Story of the History of Resisting America and Assisting Korea, Beijing: The Press of October Literature, 1990), pp. 39-40; see also Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 123-124; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, pp. 46-47. The fact that the letter uses a long paragraph summarizing the situation of the Korean War from late June to late September indicates that it could be the first direct request for China's military intervention by Kim himself. It is also noticeable that this letter was sent off under the name of Kim and Pak Hon-yon, despite the serious problems that had long existed and that had recently got worse between them. Back.
Note 54: Zhou Enlai's speech at the convention celebrating the first anniversary of the establishment of the PRC, September 30, 1950, Renmin ribao, October 1, 1950. Back.
Note 55: The Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo was then composed of Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Ren Bishi. But as Ren was very sick at that time, he probably did not attend the meeting. Back.
Note 56: Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Deng Hua, October 2, 1950, MWG, 1: 538. Back.
Note 57: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 125; Xu Yan, "The Final Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 10. Back.
Note 58: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 125-126. Back.
Note 59: Ibid., pp. 125-126. Back.
Note 60: See Mao Zedong to Su Yu, August 8, 1950, MWG, 1: 464. Back.
Note 61: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 126-127; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, p. 54. Back.
Note 62: Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, August 27, 1950, MWG, 1: 485. Back.
Note 63: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 127. In interviews with Zhang Xi on August 22 and 26, 1992, I learned that his description was based on his July 1984 interview with Yang Shangkun, director of the CCP Central Committee's administrative office in 1950, and from 1988 to 1993 the PRC's president. Back.
Note 66: Mao Zedong to Stalin, October 2, 1950, MWG, 1: 539-540. Back.
Note 67: Interviews with Beijing's military researchers and Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.
Note 68: According to several of Mao's other telegrams after China's entry into the war, Mao believed that Chinese intervention would last no longer than one year. Not until February and March of 1951, when the Chinese offensive had been halted by the UN forces, did Mao begin to mention that the war would probably last for more than two years. For a more detailed discussion of Mao's changing assessment of the duration of China's intervention in Korea, see Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War." Back.
Note 69: Mao's optimistic mood in defining China's war aims lasted until mid-1951. Only after Chinese troops suffered a major setback in their long-planned offensive aimed at "giving the Americans a decisive strike" in April and May of 1951 did Mao and the CCP leadership begin to give up the unrealistic goal of pursuing a total victory over the United States in Korea. For a discussion, see Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims," pp. 38-39. Back.
Note 70: For a more detailed discussion on how Mao's perceptions of the power potential of the Americans' and their own had been challenged during the process of the Korean War, see Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims." Back.
Note 71: Zhou Enlai's talks with Pannikkar, ZWJWX, pp. 25-27; Weida de kangmei yuanchao yundong, p. 27; Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 81; Pannikar, In Two Chinas, pp. 108-110. According to the recollections of Pu Shouchang, Zhou's English language interpreter, Zhou carefully discussed with him about how to find an accurate English term for "yao guan," which in other contexts could be translated as "to be concerned" or "to take care of." Zhou, however, believed that "intervene" was a more proper term to express what he meant. See Pei Jianzhang et al., Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun, p. 97. Back.
Note 72: The literature related to this argument is too vast to be all listed here. For a recent example of this approach, see Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War." Back.
Note 73: In fact, both Mao and Zhou later stated that if the United States had listened to Zhou's warning and stopped at the 38th parallel, China would not have sent troops to Korea. These statements, though, are open to question. Back.
Note 74: Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 29. Back.
Note 75: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 128-129; Hu Guangzheng and Bao Mingrong, "Several Factual Corrections of Yao Xu's 'The Brilliant Decision to Resist America and Assist Korea,' " Dangshi yanjiu, no. 3 (1981): 60; Wang Yan et al., Peng Dehuai zhuan (A Biography of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1993), pp. 400-401. Back.
Note 76: The list of the participants follows Qi Dexue's Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, p. 49. It is noticeable that Lin Biao's name is not on the list. Nie Rongzhen, in his discussion of Lin Biao's opposition to sending troops to Korea, leaves the impression that Lin attended the meeting, see Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 736. Back.
Note 77: Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu (The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: People's Press, 1981), p. 257. Back.
Note 78: We may never be able to identify those who opposed or expressed doubts about the decision to enter the war and those who favored it. The Politburo meetings of October 4-5, according to my interviews with experts on CCP history in May 1991 and August 1992, left no written records behind them. The memoirs of those who participated in the meeting, understandably, are often self-serving. In a generally plausible study of China's participation in the Korean War, Zhu Jianrong offers a concise summary of the division within the Politburo on the problem of sending troops to Korea. According to him, at the October 4 meeting, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were the only two who wanted to send troops to Korea. Among the potential supporters of Mao and Zhou were Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Dehuai. Gao Gang and Lin Biao firmly opposed Mao and Zhou. And Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, Zhang Wentian, and Li Fuchun demonstrated a "negative" attitude toward sending troops. The division changed the next day. Mao and Zhou were supported by Zhu, Peng, Deng, and Liu, while the attitude of Chen and Li was still "negative," and Gao and Lin continued to oppose sending troops to Korea-they probably did not attend this day's meeting. (Zhu Jianrong, Mao's Korean War, pp. 201-201). Zhu does not document his account. In my interviews with Beijing's experts in August 1992, I discussed Zhu's account with them, and they all believed that Zhu's summary was too absolute to be convincing. For example, it is doubtful that Zhou had been such a firm supporter of Mao's ideas. According to Shi Zhe, Zhou had real reservations about sending troops to Korea. In fact, my interviews suggest that it would be safe to say that almost all members of the Politburo, except for Mao, expressed reservations in different degrees about sending troops to Korea. Back.
Note 79: Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 737; Xu Yan, "How Did the CCP Central Committee Make the Decision to Dispatch Troops to Resist America and Assist Korea", p. 6. Back.
Note 80: Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu, pp. 257-258. Back.
Note 81: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 131-132; Peng Dehuai, Peng Dehuai zishu, p. 257. Back.
Note 82: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," pp. 133-134. In my interviews with Zhang Xi, he confirmed that his account of Mao's talks with Peng was based on Peng's own recollections later given to his staff. Back.
Note 83: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 136; Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 736. Back.
Note 84: Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 737; Yao Xu, Cong yalujiang dao banmendian, pp. 23- 24; Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, pp. 13-14. See also CCP Central Committee, "The Guideline for Interpretations of the Current Situation," October 26, 1950, Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao, 19: 211-213. Back.
Note 85: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 136. According to Zhang, his descriptions of the meeting of October 4 and 5 were based on his interview with Yang Shangkun in July 1984, the diaries of Zhang Yangwu, Peng Dehuai's secretary, and the recollections of Cheng Pu, Peng's military associate, about Peng's own depiction of the meetings. Back.
Note 86: Ibid., pp. 137-138. Back.
Note 87: Ibid., p. 139; Xu Yan, "China's Decision on the Military Intervention," p. 11; Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,p. 24; in my interviews with Zhang Xi in August 1992, he stressed that both his and Xu's accounts of the conference were based on available documentary sources. Back.
Note 88: Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 39. Back.
Note 89: Mao Zedong's order to form the Chinese People's Volunteers, October 8, 1950, MWG, 1: 543-544. Back.
Note 90: Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,pp. 26-28; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 27; see also Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan (Selected Military Works of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1988), p. 322 Back.
Note 91: Mao Zedong to Kim Il-sung, October 8, 1950, MWG, 1: 545. It is interesting to note that Mao did not inform Kim of China's decision to dispatch troops to Korea until the last minute, although Kim must have been anxiously waiting for a Chinese response. Back.
Note 92: The North Korean leadership had severe internal divisions in the wake of North Korea's military defeats. Chai Chengwen recorded in his memoirs that when he and Ambassador Ni arrived at Kim's headquarters, Kim was involved in an emotional quarrel with Pak Hon-yong. After Pak left, Kim explained to the Chinese: " He [Pak] has no determination to start a guerrilla struggle in the mountainous area." North Korean leaders had begun to prepare for the worst. See Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 84. Back.
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