|
|
|
|
China's Road to the Korean War
The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
New York
1994
5. Beijing's Response to the Outbreak of the Korean war
Sunday, June 25, 1950, should have been a relatively quiet day for Chinese leaders. During the first three weeks of June, Beijing had been the scene of an array of important meetings, especially the party Central Committee's third plenary session. After extensive discussions devoted to China's economic reconstruction, defense projects, and issues related to the long-range confrontation with the United States, Beijing leaders must have felt the need of a break. They had scheduled nothing important for that day. 1
But June 25, 1950 was destined to be unusual. At four in the morning , intensive gunfire shattered a tranquil pre-dawn along the thirty-eighth parallel, which had separated North and South Korea since 1945. The well-trained North Korean troops, fitted out with Soviet weapons and spearheaded by Soviet-made T-34 tanks, rapidly advanced into the territory of the South. After learning of the North Korean invasion, policymakers in Washington responded swiftly and firmly. Within thirty-six hours, they had decided to dispatch military forces to assist South Korea. On June 27, at the request of the United States, the UN Security Council, in the absence of the Soviet Union, 2 passed two emergency resolutions condemning the North Korean invasion and requesting sanctions against it. Meanwhile, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to enter the Taiwan Strait to neutralize this area. 3 The Korean War quickly changed into an international crisis.
The Implications of the Crisis for Beijing
Mao Zedong and others in Beijing should not have been surprised by the North Korean invasion, but they were certainly shocked by the quick and unyielding American reaction. The Korean crisis immediately posed several serious challenges to Mao and the CCP leadership.
Washington's decision to intervene in Korea and Taiwan challenged in the first place a crucial perception that CCP leaders had held since 1946-47: that East Asia represented "the weak point of the international front of imperialism." The CCP leadership, influenced by their own experience during the Chinese civil war, believed correctly that American strategic emphasis at that time lay in Europe. They also perceived, less correctly, that American military strength in the Asian-Pacific area was inadequate, making major American intervention in the internal conflicts or revolutionary changes in an Asian country unlikely.
However, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders overlooked three crucial factors relating to U.S. East Asian policy. First, the United States had intimate ties with the Syngman Rhee government (although many in Washington disliked Rhee as they disliked Jiang). U.S. forces had occupied Korea since the end of World War II and had established the Rhee government. Thus, while the importance of the GMD declined in Washington's policy considerations, South Korea gained weight. A North Korean victory over the Rhee government, in the view of American policymakers, would damage the credibility of American policy in East Asia. South Korea's close connections with Japan made it even less likely that the United States would tolerate its destruction. 4 Second, the failure to maintain a non-Communist China had caused severe criticism of the Truman administration at home. Truman and other policymakers in Washington realized that hesitation or timidity in the face of the North Korean invasion would play into the hands of domestic political enemies who accused the Truman administration of being soft on Communism. To President Truman, an appeasement policy toward the North Korean invasion could mean political suicide. 5 Third, U.S. East Asian strategy had quietly changed in early 1950. The CCP's victory in China, together with Soviet possession of the atomic bomb, changed the world balance of power and forced American policymakers to reassess American strategy in East Asia. Consequently, they believed that the United States should not allow further expansion of Soviet influence in any part of the world, including the Asian-Pacific area. While the American decision to aid South Korea was not a foregone conclusion, it was consistent with the new direction of American foreign policy. 6 With the outbreak of the Korean War, the CCP leadership had to reevaluate American intentions and military capacities. The result of this assessment, together with Beijing leaders'understanding of other immediate and long-range domestic and international needs facing the newly established PRC, would determine Beijing's response to the Korean conflict.
U.S. response to the Korean War also changed the scenario of the CCP-GMD confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. Although President Truman maintained that the task of the Seventh Fleet was a neutral one, the United States had virtually reentered China's civil war on the GMD's behalf. GMD leaders welcomed this U.S. protection against the pending Communist attack. 7 Viewing the military prospect for a Taiwan campaign dramatically changed with the appearance of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, CCP leaders had to reconsider the implications of America's hostility toward the new China and, accordingly, had to readjust their strategy toward Taiwan.
The central challenge, as CCP leaders viewed it, came from U.S. military involvement in Korea. They clearly sensed that as the result of the U.S. military intervention in Korea, the balance of strength between the North and South Koreans had changed enormously. Did the North Korean Communist forces have the ability to crush the resistance of South Korean troops and to defeat reinforcements from the United States? Chinese leaders were uncertain. 8 If the conflict in Korea were prolonged or even reversed because of the involvement of the United States, among other things, the safety of China's northeastern region would be threatened. Beijing leaders could not forget that Japanese imperialists had first annexed Korea, then penetrated and occupied China's Northeast, and then began a war of aggression on China. In this sense, it was not simply for propaganda purposes that Beijing leaders would emphasize that the safety of Korea was closely related to China's security. 9 Furthermore, the American decision to intervene in Korea and to dispatch the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait convinced CCP leaders that the result of the conflict in Korea was linked with the fate of the entire East. In a conversation on June 30 with Chai Chengwen, recently appointed as China's political counsellor to Korea, Zhou Enlai stressed that the Truman administration's actions in Korea and Taiwan reflected an overall American plan of aggression in Asia. 10 Chai recalled that after the outbreak of the Korean War policymakers in Beijing widely believed that the U.S. intervention in Korea and Taiwan represented a general plot to surround and attack China from three directions- Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina. 11 This perception of American policy caused Mao and his fellow CCP leaders to keep a vigilant eye on the development of the Korean conflict.
America's military intervention in Korea and Taiwan also created tremendous internal pressures on Mao and the CCP leadership. In June 1950, the Chinese Communist regime was only eight months old. The CCP had been busy restoring order and consolidating the rule of the Communist regime. For Mao and the CCP leadership, the most difficult task was neither how to smash the final resistance of GMD remnants on the mainland, nor how to establish the CCP's control over China's political and economic life, but rather to establish the authority and credibility of the CCP as China's ruler by creating a true, extensive, and internalized support on the part of the Chinese people to the Communist regime. 12 The completion of this task was particularly important for Mao in terms of carrying out his great plans of continuing the revolution after the Communist victory in China. Consequently, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders feared that the crisis situation created by the Korean War would stimulate "reactionaries" remaining on the mainland, social classes who were hostile to the Communist revolution, and the GMD regime in Taiwan would try to make trouble. 13 More important, the common people in China, who had experienced domestic turmoil and foreign invasion for almost a century and who had still only limited knowledge of the CCP's internal and external policies, would take the CCP's management of the Korean crisis as a test case of the CCP's ability to rule China and to safeguard China's prestige and national interests.
While the eruption of the Korean crisis imposed serious challenges to CCP leaders, at the same time it offered them a series of potential opportunities. Deeply influenced by the dialectic Chinese strategic culture defining crisis (weiji) as a combination of danger (wei) and opportunity (ji), Mao treated the Korean crisis as an opportunity as well as a challenge from the very beginning.
What needs to be stressed is that in assessing the impact of the Korean War's outbreak on the Beijing leadership one should not overemphasize the degree to which CCP leaders had been shocked by America's intervention in Korea and Taiwan. CCP leaders had long been aware of Washington's hostility toward the Chinese revolutionaries, and they believed that a direct confrontation between Communist China and the United States would come sooner or later. Since late 1949, they had concluded that such a confrontation would occur in any of the three locations: Taiwan, Indochina, or Korea. In this sense, U.S. intervention in Korea and Taiwan confirmed at the grand strategic level the CCP leaders'fundamental perception of the aggressive nature of U.S. policy in East Asia.
In this context it is not surprising to see that Mao and the CCP leadership believed that by firmly confronting "U.S. imperialist aggression" in Korea and Taiwan, they could turn the tremendous outside pressure to new dynamics for creating the revolutionary momentum of the Chinese people: if they could properly manage the Korean crisis, they would greatly strengthen the CCP's authority and reputation as China's rulers, thus laying the basis for Mao's long-range plans of transforming the old Chinese society into a new socialist country. As Chai Chengwen points out in his memoir, CCP leaders, who had shown a talent for changing "the disfavors to the favors" in their previous experiences, realized immediately that the new American intervention in East Asia was an opportunity to "mobilize the masses as well as to inspire the comrade-in-arms." 14 On June 29, 1950, China's General Information Bureau issued an internal directive to all official propaganda agencies, which reflected the CCP leadership's train of thought in face of the Korean crisis:
The U.S. president Truman announced on June 27 to intervene in the Korean civil war and to use naval forces to control the Taiwan Strait with the attempt to stop our liberation of Taiwan. Foreign Minister Zhou has issued a statement to solemnly condemn these actions. This is an important event at the present time. The United States has thus exposed its imperialist face, which is not scary at all but is favorable for the further awakening of the Chinese people and the people of the world. All over China, we have to hold this opportunity to echo Foreign Minister Zhou's statement and to start a widespread campaign of propaganda, so that we will be able to educate our people at home and to strike firmly the arrogance of the U.S. imperialist aggressors. 15
In terms of its international impact, the crisis situation caused by the Korean War had shaken the balance of power in the Asian-Pacific region. For Mao and the CCP leadership, this represented again a threat as well as an opportunity. The new China had never been afraid of challenging the established international order, which, from the CCP's viewpoint, was created and dominated by Western imperialist powers. This approach did not necessarily mean that the CCP, for the purpose of creating a "new world," would intentionally attack the established order in East Asia through violent means. Such an approach, nevertheless, certainly influenced the CCP's response to the Korean War. At least, under the circumstance that the Korean War had already changed into an international crisis, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders realized that by adding their strength to the North Koreans they could contribute to the creation of a new international order in East Asia more favorable to revolutionary China. 16
From Beijing's perspective, even an expansion of warfare in the Korean peninsula, though not desirable, might not necessarily be intolerable. The relationship between the CCP and the North Korean Communists had been intricate. Kim Il-sung, while endeavoring to maintain cooperation with his Chinese comrades, maintained vigilance against Chinese influence, especially during the time that his leading position was still threatened by the "Chinese section" within the Communist party. 17 To Mao and the CCP leadership, expanding warfare in Korea would inevitably menace China's security interests. At the same time the Korean War could offer the Chinese Communists a possible opportunity to expand the influence of the Chinese revolution into an area at the top of the CCP's Asian revolutionary agenda. From the beginning, Mao and the CCP leadership viewed the Korean War with mixed feelings: failure to eject the Americans from Korea could mean insecurity for China; success would advance China's prestige and influence in the East.
Korea Becomes the Focus
Viewing the Korean crisis both as danger and opportunity, the CCP leadership responded to the new American involvement in Asia with major adjustment in the Chinese strategy vis-à-vis the Untied States. As Beijing leaders perceived from the beginning of the crisis that "the focus of contradictions in the East, or even in the whole world, lay in Korea" 18 and that the American action influenced both Beijing's internal and external policies, their management of the Korean crisis both focused on Korea and went beyond it.
Beijing's first strategic adjustment was to criticize U.S. intervention in Taiwan while at the same time putting on hold its Taiwan campaign plan. Beijing leaders indignantly criticized Truman's new Taiwan policy, and they explicitly linked Truman's policy to a broader American plot of aggression in the East. On June 28, 1950, Mao addressed the eighth session of the Chinese central government council. The chairman pointed out angrily that America's military intervention in Taiwan had proved that Truman's January 5 statement was nothing but "a pack of lies," and that the United States "had torn to shreds all international agreements regarding the nonintervention in China's internal affairs." He stressed that the Chinese people and peoples all over the world "should unite and be fully prepared to crush any provocation by the American imperialists." The same day, Zhou Enlai issued an even stronger statement. He called Truman's June 27 decision "a violent invasion of Chinese territory as well as a thorough violation of the UN charter," which was "an open exposure and putting into practice the long-prepared [American] plan to invade China and to dominate Asia." The premier declared that all of this could only arouse the Chinese people's indignity against the American imperialists. 19
In reaction to the Seventh Fleet's appearance in the Taiwan Strait, the CCP leadership quickly decided to put preparations for invasion on hold. On June 30, Zhou Enlai met with Xiao Jinguang, commander of the navy, to inform him of the Central Committee's decision to postpone preparations for the Taiwan campaign. While Zhou pointed out that American intervention in the Taiwan Strait had increased difficulties for the CCP to attack Taiwan, he nevertheless believed that the delay was not necessarily a bad thing, especially because the PLA had not completed its preparations for the Taiwan campaign. Beijing's plans to cope with the situation, according to Zhou, would be "to continue the demobilization of our land forces while at the same time strengthening the construction of our naval and air forces. And the Taiwan campaign will be postponed." 20
The CCP's military forces acted accordingly. In mid-July, Su Yu formally explained to the Third Field Army that "in order to focus on resisting America and assisting Korea" the Taiwan campaign plan would be postponed. 21 Following this new policy, the CCP leadership and the PLA's East China Headquarters redeployed military forces vis-à-vis Taiwan. In the Fujian area, opposite Taiwan, PLA troops had been preparing since late 1949 to launch amphibious assaults against GMD-controlled offshore islands. By early June six armies (the 24th, 25th, 28th, 29th, 31st, and 32nd) had concentrated in the Fujian area preparing for a second attack on Jinmen, the first step toward a final invasion of Taiwan. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the main task of the troops in Fujian changed from military operations against GMD-controlled offshore islands to "suppressing local bandits and stabilizing the rear area." 22 On August 8, Chen Yi , commander of the East China Military Region , suggested that the CCP leadership drop the Taiwan campaign until after 1951. 23 On August 11, the CMC approved Chen's proposal and formally delayed the Taiwan campaign until 1952, and an assault against Jinmen would not be attempted before April 1951. 24 Following this order, the Third Field Army began to consider the "liberation" of Taiwan as a long-range task; and three of its armies would be later transferred from Fujian to the Korean border. The Ninth Army Corps, the reserve force for the Taiwan campaign, would also be transferred to the Northeast. Meanwhile, the strategic emphasis of Chinese naval forces shifted from the Taiwan area to areas closer to the Korean peninsula. 25
Beijing's policy toward Indochina also changed. Treating the Indochina war as a part of the overall confrontation between the revolutionary forces and reactionary forces in the East, Mao and the CCP leadership accelerated their support for the Viet Minh. On June 27, three days after the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and other top CCP leaders met with Chinese military advisers preparing to work in Vietnam. Mao told the advisers to help the Vietnamese organize and establish a formal army and to assist them in planning and conducting major operations to defeat French forces. Liu Shaoqi explained that if the Chinese failed to support the Vietnamese revolutionaries and allowed the enemy to remain the Chinese would meet more difficulty and trouble on their southern borders. 26 The Chinese Military Advisory Group, composed of 79 experienced PLA officers, was formally established in late July, with General Wei Guoqing as the head, assisted by General Mei Jiasheng and General Deng Yifan, both army-level commanders from the Third Field Army. To maintain secrecy, they were known publicly as the "Working Group in Southern China." They arrived in Vietnam in early August, and started to serve with the Vietnamese Communist forces. 27
Meanwhile, the CCP leadership had decided to send General Chen Geng, one of the most talented, high-ranking PLA commanders and a member of the CCP Central Committee, to Vietnam. His task was to help organize a major military campaign along the Chinese-Vietnamese border, so that the Viet Minh would be directly backed by the PRC. This idea was first put forward by Ho Chi Minh during his secret visit to China in early 1950 and was received with much interest by the CCP leadership. Ho himself had suggested Chen Geng, whom he had known since the 1920s. 28 On June 30, the CCP Central Committee formally appointed Chen Geng as the party's representative to Vietnam. 29 General Chen traveled to the Viet Minh's bases in northern Vietnam in mid-July. After a series of meetings with Ho, General Vo Nguyen Giap, and other Viet Minh leaders, Chen worked out the campaign plan in late July. 30 In order to guarantee success, Beijing provided military equipment and other war materials. By September 1950, the Chinese had delivered more than 14,000 guns, 1,700 machine guns, about 150 pieces of artillery, 2,800 tons of grain, and large amounts of ammunition, medicine, uniforms, and communication equipment. 31 With the joint effort of the Viet Minh and Chinese Communists, the Border Campaign turned out to be a great success for the Viet Minh, and changed the balance of power on the Indochina battlefield. With the vast territory of the PRC becoming the Viet Minh's strategic rear, Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists were now in an unbeatable position. 32 General Chen believed this battle important for the pressure it added to the "imperialist camp" already engaged in Korea. 33
The Korean battlefield held the main attention of the CCP leadership. Mao and other Beijing leaders were concerned not only with how to "hold ground" in the face of the new American threat but also with how further to strengthen the CCP's leading position at home and influence abroad through successfully managing the Korean crisis. Beijing's strategy toward the Korean crisis was thus belligerent in nature from the outset.
A crucial question for Beijing leaders was how to judge correctly the prospect of the Korean War, especially after American ground forces began landing in South Korea. In accordance with Mao's long-time philosophy of "striving for the best while preparing for the worst," Beijing leaders believed that the Korea War could have three different outcomes. First, North Korean troops might succeed in sweeping cross the Korean Peninsula and forcing American troops to retreat from Korea. If so, the Korean crisis would be solved in a way favorable to the revolutionaries, making the power and influence of the United States in East Asia suffer. Second, with the continuous arrival of American reinforcements on battlefield, a strategic stalemate could emerge with neither side gaining an upper hand, causing a prolonged crisis and making both the military and political implications of the war more complicated. Third, America's military involvement might succeed and the situation in Korea could be reversed. If so, the reversal would presumably be followed by a UN forces' counteroffensive toward the Yalu, and the reactionary forces at home and abroad, including the GMD government in Taiwan, would take this opportunity to recover "lost ground" in China. If the worst possibilities occurred, China's security interests would be seriously threatened. 34 CCP leaders hoped that North Korea would succeed, but they could not ignore the danger involved in a possible setback.
The sensitive relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang made the situation even trickier for CCP leaders. In preparing his invasion of the South, Kim Il-sung had not informed Mao and the CCP of his specific plan and timing of invasion, and even after the war began, he did not formally inform Beijing leaders until June 27, when his troops had already occupied Seoul. 35 In the initial stage of the war, the well-prepared and equipped North Korean military forces had the upper hand on the battlefield. Kim Il-sung appears to have believed that direct help from Beijing was neither necessary nor desirable, especially if such help would strengthen the position of opposition factions within the North Korean Communist Party. Under these circumstances, Kim acted on his own, and Beijing seemed to have had little influence on Kim's handling of the war. In the first two weeks of conflict, Beijing leaders even lacked first-hand information on the war's development. 36 This perhaps explains why the Beijing leadership did not convene decision-making meetings on new military deployments aimed at Korea until two weeks after the outbreak of the War.
Beijing leaders, however, tried their best to follow the changing situation on the battlefield from the very beginning. After learning that President Truman had announced that the United States would come to the rescue of South Korea, the Chinese General Staff suggested immediately that Beijing send a group of military observers to Pyongyang to "investigate the military situation" as well as to "strengthen the connection with the [North] Koreans." 37 After reviewing this report, Zhou Enlai, obviously with Beijing's intricate relationship with Kim Il-sung in mind, decided to send a group of Chinese military-intelligence officers to Pyongyang, not as "military observers" but as members of the Chinese embassy. 38 On the late evening of June 30, Zhou, together with Zhang Hanfu, vice foreign minister, and Liu Zhijian, first deputy director of the CMC's Intelligence Department, received Chai Chengwen, former director of the Intelligence Department of the PLA's Southwestern Military Region. Zhou named Chai political counsellor of the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang in order to "establish connections with Comrade Kim Il-sung" as well as to collect first-hand information on the fighting. Zhou wanted Chinese diplomats sent to Pyongyang within one week. 39 Less than one week after the outbreak of the war, Korea was becoming the focus of Beijing's strategy vis-á-vis the United States.
The Establishment of the NEBDA
With their attention increasingly centering on Korea, Beijing leaders became more worried about the effect of American intervention. On July 6, an editorial of Renmin ribao openly warned that the presence of U.S. military forces in Korea meant that "the Korean people's victory could be a bit slower" and that "the Korean people had to prepare for a prolonged and more arduous warfare." 40 On July 7, the UN Security Council, again in the absence of the Soviet Union, authorized the creation of a unified UN command, which would be directed by an American commander. On the same day, the American 24th Division began to land in Korea. All of this immediately captured the attention of the Beijing leadership. The next day, in a talk with the Chinese diplomats who were leaving for Korea, Zhou pointed out that as American troops had already entered the Korean War and the UN Security Council had authorized the United States to command the UN troops, the conflict in Korea would likely be prolonged. 41 The deep-rooted worries that Pyongyang could lose the initiative in the war precipitated Beijing's new military deployment to cope with the Korean conflict.
On July 7 and 10, Zhou, under Mao's instructions, chaired two conferences focusing on military preparations and other issues related to the Korean conflict. The participants in these conferences were leading members of the CMC, directors of the CMC's different departments, commanders of the PLA's services and arms, as well as the PLA's regional headquarters. 42 At the beginning of the July 7 conference, Zhou conveyed to the participants Mao's analysis of the situation which emphasized that it was necessary to establish a "Northeast Border Defense Army," so that "in case we needed to enter the war we would be prepared." 43 The central decision made at these conferences was that the 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies of the 13th Army Corps under the Fourth Field Army (these were the best units of the PLA which had been used as a general reserve force since late 1949) would be moved into the Northeast immediately. These forces, added to the 42nd Army and the First, Second, and Eighth Artillery Divisions, which had been stationed in the Northeast, would be transformed into the Northeast Border Defense Army (NEBDA). The redeployed troops were to be in position on the Chinese-Korean border by the end of July. 44 The two conferences also decided that Su Yu, then vice commander of the East China Military Region, who had been responsible for planning the Taiwan campaign since the summer of 1949, would be appointed commander and political commissar of the NEBDA. Xiao Jinguang, commander of the navy, would become the NEBDA's vice commander, and Xiao Hua, vice director of the PLA's General Political Department, would take the position as the NEBDA's vice political commissar. In order to guarantee the logistical support for the troops that were moving into the Chinese-Korean border areas, the two conferences decided to appoint Li JŸkui, then deputy chief of staff of the PLA's Central-southern Military Region, as the logistics commander of the NEBDA. Considering that the PLA had undergone a demobilization following the principle of cutting off the numbers while improving the quality of the troops since early 1950, the two conferences decided to ask the PLA's General Logistics Department to formulate and implement new plans for recruiting soldiers. The two conferences also decided to start immediately a movement of political mobilization following the slogan of "defending the safety of our country" among PLA soldiers, and they assigned the PLA's General Political Department the responsibility for organizing this political mobilization. 45
Mao and other members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee immediately approved the decisions of the two conferences. 46 On July 13 the CMC formally issued the "Orders to Defend the Northeast Borders." The main contents of the orders were: First, four armies (the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd) and three artillery divisions (the First, Second, and Eighth) would be concentrated on the Chinese-Korean border to establish the NEBDA. Their main tasks were "to defend the borders of the Northeast, and to prepare to support the war operations of the Korean People's Army if necessary." Second, Su Yu was appointed as commander and political commissar of the NEBDA; Xiao Jinguang the vice commander; Xiao Hua the vice political commissar; and Li JŸkui the commander of logistic affairs. 47 Third, the headquarters of the 15th Army Corps was to be transformed into the new headquarters of the 13th Army Corps to command the 38th, 39th, and 40th Armies. Deng Hua, the commander of the 15th Army Corps and a talented high-ranking officer of the PLA, was appointed commander of the 13th Army Corps, Xie Fang the chief of staff, and Du Ping the director of the Political Department. 48 In less than three weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Beijing leadership took a crucial step to make China's intervention in Korea possible.
Initial Military and Political Mobilization
Immediately after the issuance of the CMC's July 13 order, large-scale military redeployment started. The 38th Army arrived in the Fengcheng area of Liaoning province on July 24; the 39th Army entered the Liaoyang-Haicheng areas in Liaoning the next day; the 40th Army, which had to travel from Guangdong province in the south to the Northeast, arrived by train at Andong, a border city on the Yalu River, on July 27. Meanwhile, the 42nd Army, which had been previously stationed in the Qiqihaer area of Heilongjiang province in northern Manchuria, moved into the Tonghua-Ji'an area of Jilin province. By the end of July, four armies, three artillery divisions, four air-defense artillery regiments, three truck transport regiments, one tank regiment, one engineer regiment, and one cavalry regiment, with a total of more than 255,000 troops, had taken positions on the Chinese-Korean border. 49 In order to guarantee the transportation lines between China and North Korea, Nie Rongzhen proposed to Mao and Zhou on August 2 that the Northeast Military Region send anti-aircraft artillery units to defend bridges over the Yalu River. Mao approved this proposal immediately. 50
While military redeployment was under way, military planners in Beijing labored to stockpile war materials, establish rear bases for war operations, and organize a logistical supply network. On July 14, Zhou Enlai telegraphed the Northeast People's Government, the Headquarters of the Northeast Military Region, and the Headquarters of the Central-southern Military Region (the 13th Army Corps belonged to this region before moving into the Northeast), setting up rules to ensure logistical support and military expenditures for the NEBDA. After the 13th Army Corps entered the Northeast, according to Zhou's instructions, the CMC would be in charge of supplying the NEBDA with weapons, ammunition, clothing, medicine and medical equipment, communication equipment, and automobile parts, while the Northeast Region should be responsible for offering the NEBDA food, fuel, daily operating costs, and operation expenditures. 51 When all units of the NEBDA had almost completed their redeployment in the Northeast, the CMC decided on July 26 to reestablish the Logistics Department under the Headquarters of the Northeast Military Region and formally appointed Li JŸkui its director, to coordinate logistical preparations for the NEBDA. Then logistics departments were established at both army and division levels for all units of the NEBDA. The Logistics Department of the PLA's Northeast Military Region Headquarters was formally established on August 7, 1950. 52
Meanwhile, the PLA high command made extensive efforts to establish war material stockpile for troops moving into the Northeast. In mid-July, the General Logistics Department assigned the Northeastern, Northern, Eastern, and Central-southern Military Regions to prepare for the NEBDA 340,000 sets of cotton-padded uniforms, 360,000 pairs of cotton-padded leather shoes, 400,000 cotton-padded hats, cotton-padded waistcoats, and cotton-padded overcoats, 400,000 pairs of sweat pants, 700,000 pairs of cotton-padded gloves and socks, and 5,000 field cauldrons. In late July, the CMC gathered for the NEBDA from different military regions 54 types of ammunition, totalling 1,600 tons. The CMC also tried to establish for the NEBDA field hospitals with a capacity of 100,000 beds and assigned to them 20 surgical operation teams. Assisted by the Northeast Military Region, the CMC allocated more than 1,000 transport trucks, together with drivers and driver assistants, for troops in the Northeast, so that the NEBDA would be able to establish food storage for three months and fuel storage for six months. 53
The Beijing leadership made these logistical preparations not only for battles on the Chinese-Korean border areas but also for possible military operations in Korea. In early August, on his way to his new post in Shenyang, Li JŸkui stopped by Beijing to have a discussion with Nie Rongzhen. Nie told Li that the CCP leadership had decided to assist North Korea in fighting the United States and was prepared to send troops into Korea. To ensure well-coordinated logistics, Mao had approved the establishing of a Logistics Department at the Headquarters of the PLA Northeast Military Region. If Chinese troops entered military operations in Korea, the department would be responsible for all logistical needs of troops in both the Northeast and in Korea. 54 Nie's talks demonstrated clearly that the purpose of China's military preparations had gone beyond the simple defense of the Chinese-Korean border.
While military preparations were under way, the CCP leadership paid special attention to the political mobilization of the entire Chinese nation. At the decision-making conference of July 7 as well as in a series of other discussions by the CCP leadership, an issue of central importance was how to utilize the Korean crisis to precipitate a widespread political mobilization. Mao and the CCP leadership decided to start a political indoctrination movement combining "internationalism and patriotism," following the slogan of "defending the homeland and safeguarding the country" (baojia weiguo). 55 All of this turned out to be the prelude of the "Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea," one of the "three great movements" (the other two were the land reform movement and the movement to suppress reactionaries) in the early years of the PRC.
In accordance with the considerations of changing outside pressures into the dynamics of internal mobilization, a semi-official organization, "The Chinese People's Committee of the Movement to Fight against U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea," was established on July 10. Directly controlled by the CCP, the committee consisted of all non-Communist "democratic parties" and "people's organizations" (such as the General Chinese Workers' Union, the General Chinese Youth Association, and the General Chinese Women's Association). The main task of the committee was to coordinate and promote a nationwide anti-American imperialism propaganda movement. On July 14, the committee announced that the week from July 17 to 23 would be a "Special Week for the Movement of Opposing the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea." The purpose of this particular movement, according to the announcement of the committee, was "to wage a profound propaganda campaign and to educate the people all over the country, so that they would be able to understand thoroughly that U.S. imperialists had committed crimes in their aggression towards Asian countries and destruction of the world peace, and that U.S. imperialists were totally defeatable." The committee called on the entire country to use newspapers, radio broadcasts, magazines, wall posters, movies, dramas, songs, speeches, store windows, and exhibitions to stir the "hatred of the U.S. imperialists" and the "sympathy and support of the Korean people" among the great masses in China. 56
What should be noted here is the CCP's eagerness to inculcate a new image of the United States into the minds of the Chinese people through political indoctrination and propaganda. They emphasized that the United States had long engaged in both political and economic aggressions against China, that the United States had been hostile to the Chinese revolution, that the United States, as a declining capitalist country, was in reality not as powerful as it seemed to be, and that a confrontation between China and the United States was inevitable. "Beating American arrogance" became a central propaganda theme. 57
In the meantime, the Beijing leadership decided to further promote a nationwide campaign aimed at suppressing "reactionaries and reactionary activities." CCP leaders regarded this as a long overdue task. In the last stage of China's civil war, while Communist forces marched forward rapidly and the GMD regime and its military forces disintegrated, the Communists would often occupy a region, especially in outlying areas, without properly cleaning up GMD remnants. Furthermore, in order to maintain social order during the initial days of Communist takeover, the CCP adopted a relatively lenient policy toward members of GMD government and military forces who had stopped resisting the Communists. This policy, however, created elements of instability within Communist-controlled territories. After the PLA had conquered the mainland (except for Tibet) by early 1950, the CCP leadership felt the necessity to consolidate its rule through "suppressing reactionary activities." In mid-March 1950, the CCP Central Committee issued a formal directive on "suppressing reactionaries," which symbolized the start of this "great movement" of the early days of the PRC. 58
Until the outbreak of the Korean War, the movement to suppress reactionary activities had achieved only marginal progress. In addition to such factors as Communist cadres lacking experience and CCP local authorities being busy with other affairs (such as fighting with the runaway inflation left by the GMD regime), another key reason for the slow progress of the movement was the CCP's need for a stronger rationale to convince the great masses in China that the terror created by such a movement was necessary. The crisis situation caused by the Korean War offered the opportunity. On July 23, when the "Special Week for the Movement of Opposing the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea" had reached its peak, the Beijing leadership, in the name of the State Council and the Supreme People's Court, issued the "Instructions on Suppressing Reactionary Activities." The instructions emphasized that the reactionary activities at home were "directed by imperialists abroad." The Beijing leadership ordered all party organs and government agencies to take it as "one of their utmost tasks" to "lead the people to mop up ruthlessly all open and hidden reactionaries, thus establishing and consolidating the revolutionary order, safeguarding the democratic rights of the people, and guaranteeing that the reconstruction and all necessary social transformations would be carried out smoothly." 59 Following the instructions, a new wave of "suppressing reactionaries" swept across China, reaching its peak after China's entry into the Korean War. 60
In short, the Beijing leadership's management of the Korean crisis was a comprehensive effort. While Beijing leaders paid special attention to military preparations, they also emphasized the importance of political mobilization in a variety of forms. In the eyes of Mao and the CCP leadership, the new China's security interests would be best served by guaranteeing the safety of the Chinese-Korean border, promoting the CCP's authority and credibility at home, and enhancing the new China's prestige on the international scene. Mao and the CCP leadership were determined to achieve all of these goals. 61
War Preparations Intensified
In view of the gradual emergence of a stalemate on the Korean battlefield, Beijing leaders' fear about a reversal in the Korean War was justified. After the UN Security Council's call for assisting South Korea, Truman instructed MacArthur on June 29 to use the naval and air resources of the Far East Command to support South Korean forces. The next day Truman approved the use of ground forces stationed in Japan for battles in South Korea. American reinforcements reached Korea in early July, five days before the creation of the UN command. Troops from fifteen other member nations of the UN gradually joined the United States to participate in operations in Korea. The North Korean forces were still able to advance relentlessly during July and early August until they were stopped in the southeastern part of the Korean Peninsula, the last toehold of the UN forces. Then the currents of war began to change. By August 5, the UN command had established a defensive perimeter behind the Naktong River, around the southernmost port of Pusan, through which UN forces were reinforced and supplied. Although Kim Il-sung announced on August 15 that the month of August would become the month of "national liberation," repeated North Korean attacks on the "Pusan perimeter" made no substantial progress, primarily because the North Koreans had too long a supply line and their offensive power had been exhausted. The war had entered a stalemate and the prospect for a North Korean victory was slipping away.
In the meantime, warning signals emerged in Taiwan when General MacArthur made a dramatic, unauthorized trip there for two days at the end of July. During his stay there, MacArthur claimed that "arrangements have been completed for effective coordination between American forces under my command and those of the Chinese Government" to meet any attack. 62 Beijing quickly pointed to MacArthur's activities in Taiwan as strong evidence of "American aggression and invasion of Taiwan," which was part of the overall U.S. imperialist plot to surround and strangle the new China. 63
Under these circumstances Mao and his fellow Beijing leaders believed that it was necessary to accelerate preparations for sending Chinese troops to Korea. On August 4, 1950, the Politburo met to discuss the Korean situation. Top CCP leaders speculated that the Korean War could either be a short one or a long one, that the war could be further expanded, and even that the atomic bomb might be used. They understood that if the United States were to use the atomic bomb in Korea China had no way to stop it. But they would not be scared by such a prospect and would try to use conventional weapons to fight the Americans. In any case, they believed that China had to prepare for the worst possible scenario. Mao mentioned the necessity of intervention at the meeting: "If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us. We should not fail to assist the Koreans. We must lend them our hands in the form of sending our military volunteers there. The timing could be further decided, but we have to prepare for this." Zhou Enlai echoed Mao's ideas by stressing that "if the U.S. imperialists defeated North Korea, the cause of peace would suffer and the Americans would become more aggressive." In Zhou's opinion, "in order to win the war, China's strength must be added to the struggle." He believed that "if China's strength were added, the whole international situation could be changed." He asked his comrades to "establish such a broad perspective." 64
In a move obviously related to the Politburo's August 4 discussion, Mao, in the name of the CCP Central Committee, cabled Gao Gang the following day, ordering him to "take the main responsibility to call a meeting of all the army and division cadres [of the NEBDA] in mid-August and to outline the goals, significance, and general directions of the war operations." The chairman emphasized that "it is required that all the troops must complete their preparations within this month and be ready for orders to carry out war operations. The troops must maintain high morale and be well-prepared. Questions raised by officers and soldiers regarding the war must be answered." 65 The Politburo discussion and Mao's telegram demonstrate unmistakably that the CCP leadership had seriously considered sending troops to assist North Korea in fighting the UN forces in early August, more than one month before the Inchon landing.
Following Mao's August 5 instruction, the 13th Army Corps held a conference attended by army- and division-level commanders on August 13. Gao Gang chaired the meeting. Xiao Hua and Xiao Jinguang traveled to Shenyang to attend it. Gao conveyed the Politburo's instructions, emphasizing that the main task of the Border Defense Army was to prepare to assist the North Korean forces to defeat the Americans if necessary. 66 According to the memoirs of Du Ping, director of the 13th Army Corps' Political Department, the major theme of the meeting was: "Should we allow the Americans to occupy Korea and attack China and then destroy them? Or should it be better if we take the initiative, assisting the Korean People's Army to wipe out the enemy and defend ourselves?" The answer of the majority attending the conference was: "We should take the initiative, cooperate with the Korean People's Army, march forward without reluctance, and break up the enemy's dream of aggression." 67
Participants at the conference also believed that China possessed several advantages that would guarantee its victory in a military confrontation with the United States. Chinese troops outnumbered the Americans by three to one. While U.S. military commitments in West Europe and North America were preventing Washington from sending any more than half million troops to Korea, China had an army of more than four million to draw on. Moreover, the quality of Chinese soldiers, their morale in particular, was superior to American soldiers. As they were fighting for a just cause, the Chinese would be able to prevail. Third, China, much closer to the battlefield than the United States, held an upper hand in logistics. Finally, the sympathy of the world's people was on the side of China, while the United States was in a morally unfavorable position. 68 These points would be emphasized repeatedly as China further mobilized toward an intervention in Korea.
Obviously influenced by the CCP Politburo's attitudes regarding the possibility that the United States might use nuclear weapons, the conference participants discussed the limits of the atomic bomb as a weapon to be used in Korea. They emphasized that human forces, not one or two atomic bombs, would determine the result of a war. Participants in the conference also believed that in a tactical sense, if the Americans used the bomb in Korea, it would not only hurt the Chinese but also harm the Americans themselves, and that in a strategic sense, policymakers in Washington had to consider the shocking influence on world opinion if they used the bomb. 69 In short, the dominant voice of the conference favored the CCP Politburo's opinion that China should not be scared by the bomb.
The conference also touched upon possible Chinese military strategies and tactics to be used in operations against the Americans on the Korean battlefield. Deng Hua, commander of the 13th Army Corps, reported to the meeting the result of the studies by himself and his staff in this regard. According to him, the strong point of the Americans was that they possessed superior fire power and greater mobility. It would thus be extremely difficult for the Chinese to defeat the Americans by adopting a strategy of waging a frontal offensive. Deng introduced an alternative strategy. He proposed that Chinese troops should seek out weak links in American lines, bravely penetrate into the rear of the enemy, destroy the enemy's transportation and communication networks, and then annihilate enemy forces by separating and surrounding them. These advantages, according to Deng, would make a Chinese victory over the Americans possible. 70
The conference, however, also concluded that preparations for entering the Korean War were "too onerous to be completed in August." The most conspicuous difficulties existed in equipment supply, medical support, and in establishing a secure communication network. Most participants believed that it would take additional time to carry out the task of political mobilization among the troops that would enter operations in Korea. 71 Gao Gang reported these conclusions to Mao by telegraph on August 15 and suggested that the date for sending Chinese troops to Korea be postponed. Gao's report was further reinforced by Xiao Jinguang, who conveyed the NEBDA's difficulties to Mao in person after returning to Beijing. 72 Mao, having second thoughts, cabled Gao Gang on August 18, again in the name of the CCP Central Committee, approving that "the deadline for the Border Defense Army to complete its training and other preparations can be postponed to the end of September." In the meantime, he ordered Gao to "step up supervision, and make sure that all preparations will be completed by September 30 ." 73
Following Mao's instructions, the NEBDA made every effort to push forward military preparations and political mobilization to meet the new deadline for completing war preparations. In mid-August, the 13th Army Corps convened a meeting focusing on the political indoctrination and mobilization of its troops. Participants in the meeting reported that the soldiers of the 13th Army Corps differed on the problem of entering the Korean War. About 50 percent of the soldiers, most of whom were Communist Party or Communist Youth League members, were positive about fighting in Korea. Many of them had even submitted petitions for participating in "resisting Americans and assisting the Korean people." About 40 percent of the soldiers appeared indifferent, neither enthusiastic nor unwilling to fight in Korea. They would obey orders. Around 10 percent of the soldiers, the majority of whom were former GMD soldiers or new recruits from the "newly liberated areas," did not want to be sent to Korea. They were particularly worried about having to fight the Americans, who had the atomic bomb. Some even openly opposed China's entry into the war because this could "draw the fire to China itself." 74
The 13th Army Corps responded with a political indoctrination and mobilization campaign in late August, focusing on three themes- "if we must fight the war" (bi'da), "if we dare to fight the war" (gan'da), and if we can win the war" (neng'da). In answer to the first question, political cadres of the 13th Army Corps stressed that U.S. imperialists historically had been aggressive toward China and that just as the Japanese imperialists, America's intervention in the Korean War aimed to threaten the security of China. They emphasized that the United States had proved itself to be the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese people, that China's confrontation with the United States was inevitable, and that to aid the North Koreans was also to safeguard China itself. In answering the second and the third questions, CCP cadres made every effort to convince the soldiers that American troops, though equipped with modern weapons, were fighting an unjust war, and thus lacked a high morale, that the Americans were too far away from their own country, making them logistically vulnerable, and that the UN forces would be easily outnumbered by the Chinese and North Koreans. In order to make these points more persuasive, they arranged for some "liberated soldiers" (GMD captives who joined the PLA) who had fought together with American troops in Burma during the Second World War to discuss the weaknesses of American soldiers, to demonstrate that the Americans were beatable. 75
Meanwhile, the troops in the Chinese-Korean border areas conducted a series of training programs specifically designed for fighting the Americans in Korea. For example, all military and political officers over battalion level were required to study carefully Korea's geographic features and topography, as well as the character of American troops. Many of them were also trained in special anti-aircraft and anti-tank programs. In order to prepare for military operations in Korea, the PLA's Northeast Military Region recruited more than 2,000 Korean nationals in the Northeast to serve as interpreters and liaison personnel for Chinese troops. 76 Du Ping later recalled that he and his colleagues all felt that "the order for operations could soon come, and we have to hurry up." 77
Concerns for a Reversal
With military preparations for entering the war under way, the PLA's General Staff, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held a series of meetings in the second half of August to analyze possible changes on the Korean battlefield. PLA military planners noticed that the Americans had concentrated two divisions of troops and many naval vessels in Japan. They worried that General MacArthur might use these forces in a major landing operation behind the North Korean lines. 78
Members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also alarmed by two statements by Warren Austin, U.S. delegate to the UN, on August 10 and 17, which emphasized that the goal of UN military action in Korea was to unify the entire peninsula. 79 Responding to Austin's statement, Zhou cabled Trygve Lie, UN secretary general, and Jacob Malik (the Soviet delegate who returned to the UN on August 1 to chair the Security Council for the month), on August 20, emphasizing that as Korea was China's neighbor, Beijing was very concerned with the solution of the Korean question. 80
Following Zhou's instructions, on August 23 the staff of the Operation Bureau of the PLA's General Staff convened a meeting to discuss the situation on the Korean battlefield, chaired by Zhou's military secretary Lei Yingfu (who had then also been appointed as the Bureau's vice director ). After debating different options and conducting a simulated scenario on maps, the participants unanimously concluded that the enemy's next step would be a landing operation at one of five possible Korean ports, Wonsan, Nampo, Inchon, Kunsan, and Hungnam. Among these ports, the most likely and threatening one would be Inchon.
According to Lei Yingfu's recollections, which are supported by his personal notes, the meeting summarized six reasons for this conclusion. First, the enemy had concentrated more than ten divisions in a narrow and small area behind the Naktong River and adopted a strategy of neither retreating nor attacking. It was obvious that the purpose of such a strategy was to trap as many KPA troops as possible, thus creating opportunities to strike the KPA's rear. Second, the Americans had held two divisions in Japan, and recently more mobile units had arrived there. These troops, however, were not used to reinforce the Pusan perimeter; nor were they deployed along the coast of Japan for strengthening its defense. Instead, they were conducting intensive training, especially for landing operations. Third, General MacArthur and many other American commanders had fought in the Pacific area during the Second World War and were experienced in amphibious operations. Fourth, many British and American naval vessels, including numerous landing craft, had been moving from other parts of the world to East Asia. This indicated American intentions to land in the North Koreans' rear. Fifth, under the heavy pressure of the KPA's continuous offensives, the enemy troops had been pushed into the small areas behind the Naktong River. They had constructed strong defensive works, making it difficult for the KPA to annihilate them in a short period. The longer the KPA's main forces were bogged down before the Naktong River, the deeper the crisis could be. Sixth, Korea was a narrow and long peninsula and Seoul served as the key linkage for almost all north-south transportation lines. Inchon, located close to Seoul, became the most practical place for the Americans to land. If the enemy landed at Inchon while at the same time starting a counteroffensive from the Naktong area, the KPA would be forced to engage in a two-front war with its main forces being cut off in the South. The entire situation of the Korean War could thus change immediately in the enemy's favor. 81
Lei personally reported the conclusions of the meeting to Zhou Enlai on the evening of August 23. Zhou took them very seriously and immediately relayed to Mao the conclusions Lei and his staff had reached. Alarmed, Mao instructed Zhou and Lei to come to his office to give a more detailed report. Mao, obviously convinced by the ideas of Lei and his colleagues, then began to ask Lei questions, particularly about General MacArthur's personality. Lei replied that as a military commander MacArthur was famous for his arrogance and stubbornness. Mao, greatly interested in this, commented: "Fine! Fine! The more arrogant and more stubborn he is, the better. An arrogant enemy is easy to defeat." 82
Mao then had a brief discussion with Zhou and decided to take three measures immediately. First, they decided to reiterate to the NEBDA that no matter what the difficulties, all preparations for operations should be completed by the end of September. Second, they decided to inform the North Koreans and the Soviets immediately that Chinese military planners believed that the Americans might land at Inchon, and to suggest the KPA move some units from the Naktong area to Inchon to strengthen its defense. Third, they decided to order both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PLA's General Staff to pay close attention to the enemy's movement and report any change promptly. 83
Mao was truly concerned with the danger of the possible reversal of the Korean War. Several days after the meeting with Zhou and Lei, Lee Sang-jo, a representative of the Korean People's Army, came to Beijing to inform the Chinese of the situation on the Korean battlefield. While meeting Lee, Mao stressed that the North Koreans needed to pay sufficient attention to the possibility that UN forces could land at some place on the East or West coasts of the Korean peninsula, thus attacking the North Korean forces from the rear. Mao pointed to a map and mentioned specifically that Inchon was one of the most likely spots for such a landing. Mao suggested that the North Koreans prepare for the contingency. 84 Kim Il-sung, however, ignored Mao's warnings. 85
In the eyes of the Chinese leaders, the situation was urgent. To speed up the NEBDA's war preparations, Zhou chaired a long-scheduled coordinating meeting late on the evening of August 23 to solve the NEBDA's supply problems. At the meeting it was decided that the Northeastern People's Government would be responsible for the NEBDA's food, forage, and coal supplies and the Fourth Field Army would pay for the NEBDA's budget. All of the NEBDA's operational expenditures beyond budget would be covered by the central government, which would use cotton, yarn, and cloth to support the currency in circulation in the Northeast. 86
On August, 26 the CMC convened a crucial meeting, chaired by Zhou, to further discuss the nature of the Korean crisis and to define the NEBDA's tasks and strategies. 87 Zhou offered a central report, which reflected clearly top CCP leaders' perception of the Korean situation. Zhou first summarized the international nature of the Korean crisis:
The U.S. imperialist [intervention in Korea] aims to open a breach in Korea, to change Korea into the base for their actions in the East, and to prepare for starting a new world war....Therefore, Korea is indeed the focus of the struggles in the world. Taking advantage of the Korean War, the U.S. imperialists have succeeded in seizing the banner of the United Nations in their confrontation with the peace front. They have also used the Korean problem to wage domestic mobilization. As the American strategic emphasis lies in Europe, they are also doing everything possible to use the Korean problem to mobilize capitalist countries in Europe, so that these countries will obey the domination of the United States. [The Americans] want also to take this pportunity to remilitarize Japan and West Germany, with the consent of other capitalist countries. After conquering Korea, the United States will certainly turn to Vietnam and other colonial countries. Therefore the Korean problem is at least the key to the East.
Viewing the Korean crisis from this international perspective, Zhou believed it necessary for Beijing "to use the Korean problem to explore the plots of the U.S. imperialists." He emphasized that the Chinese should "not treat the Korean problem merely as one concerning a brother country [North Korea] or as one related to the interests of the Northeast"; rather, Zhou stressed, the Korean problem "should be regarded as an important international issue."
Zhou continued to analyze possible prospects of the development of the Korean crisis. He stated that with the eruption of the Korean War, Mao, himself, and other top Beijing leaders had expected that the North Koreans would either liberate the entire Korean peninsula in a short time or face a long and difficult confrontation with the Americans and Rhee's troops. "After observing the fighting for two months," Zhou stated, "it is now apparent that the pursuit of the first possibility is almost impossible." Zhou believed that China should get ready to cope with a reversal of the Korean conflict. "Our duty is now much heavier," stressed Zhou, "and we should prepare for the worst and prepare quickly." Zhou emphasized particularly that in no circumstance should the plan to enter the Korean War be released, even to the North Koreans, so that "we could enter the war and give the enemy a sudden blow." 88
Zhou then entered into a detailed discussion of how the three services of the Chinese military should prepare for a direct confrontation with the United States. He instructed all of the arms of the PLA to make long-range plans for "the coming war [with the United States]." Regarding the tasks and strategies of the NEBDA, Zhou conveyed Mao's instructions that the NEBDA should speed up training and establish a unified command structure, and when the troops began operations in Korea, a commander-in-chief would be appointed to lead them. Zhou mentioned that in order to rotate combat troops in Korea, the Central Committee was considering asking each of the PLA's military region to offer ten armies as reserve forces.
The meeting examined the current status of air force, airborne troops, and tank units, and found that the offensive air force, with a size of only seven regiments, could not begin operations in Korea earlier than December, and that neither the airborne forces nor the tank units were in a position to enter the war. The meeting concluded that it was necessary to purchase more weapons from the Soviet Union, so that ten armies would get proper artillery supply, and by the end of 1950 four air regiments, nine tank regiments, and eighteen anti-aircraft artillery regiments could be used in operations in Korea. 89
Following the lines of the August 26 meeting, Zhou chaired another meeting on August 31 to further discuss the structure and strategy of the NEBDA. 90 The meeting decided that the NEBDA would be composed of eleven armies (36 divisions) or about 700,000 troops, deployed in three lines: the 13th Army Corps, plus the 42nd Army would become the first line, the Ninth Army Corps the second line, and the 19th Army Corps the third line. The meeting also decided to further strengthen the NEBDA's artillery units by adding seven artillery divisions and twenty-six anti-aircraft artillery regiments. The meeting estimated that casualties of around 200,000 (60,000 deaths and 140,000 wounds) would occur in the first year of the war, and proper medical support should be prepared. 91 Accordingly, the CMC decided on August 31 to establish three branches under the Logistics Department of the Northeast Military Region, so that supplies to combat troops in different areas would be securely guaranteed. 92
For the purpose of strengthening reinforcements for the NEBDA, in early September, the CMC, following General Nie Rongzhen's suggestion, decided to move the Ninth Army Corps and the 19th Army Corps from the Shanghai area and northwestern China to areas close to Shanhaiguan, which lay close to northeastern China. 93 The Chinese military forces involved in coping with contingencies in Korea had thus reached twelve armies. On August 27, Mao informed Peng Dehuai, military and administrative head of the Northwest Region and later commander of Chinese troops in Korea, that the CCP central leadership would decide how to use the concentrated Chinese troops by the end of September. 94
These preparations and redeployments were made with the assumption that Chinese troops would begin military operations in Korea sooner or later, which was demonstrated clearly in a report by NEBDA commanders in late August. Viewing that a stalemate had emerged on the Korean battlefield, Xie Fang, Deng Hua, and Hong Xuezhi increasingly worried about a UN counterattack. They believed that it would be foolish for China to wait until an American counteroffensive had placed the Northeast under direct threat; it would be better to enter the war earlier to assist the North Koreans to maintain the initiative on the battlefield. 95 On August 31, 1950, they sent a report, drafted by Xie, to the CMC. The situation in Korea, in their view, was not optimistic:
The U.S. imperialists are endeavoring to hold the Taegu-Pusan area and to use partial counter-offensive to consolidate their position, so that they could gain time and start a counter-offensive after the arrival of reinforcements. On the other hand, opportunities for the Korean People's Army to break up and destroy the enemy are no longer there....The intentions of the enemy's counter-attack are assumed to be as follows: first, to land part of its troops on some coastal areas in north Korea for harassing and holding operations and advance its main forces northward along main highways and railways gradually; second, to make a large-scale landing of its main forces on our flank rear areas (Pyongyang or Seoul) and at the same time employ a small force to pin down the [North Korean] People's Army in its present position, enabling it to attack from the front and rear simultaneously. In that case the People's Army would be in a very difficult situation.
In order to avoid this scenario, they believed that the North Koreans had to win the war quickly and needed China's help. To assure the success of Chinese intervention, they made three suggestions. First, China should make every effort to secure strong Soviet air support and more Soviet equipment when Chinese troops entered operations in Korea. 96 Second, in addition to the 13th Army Corps, China needed to commit two additional army corps to Korea, with proper artillery and tank support. They also needed more anti-aircraft artillery and anti-tank weapons. Third, logistical support for Chinese troops entering the Korean War needed strengthening. In addition to preparing food and ammunition and establishing field hospitals, Chinese reconnaissance groups should be sent to Korea in advance to get familiar with the war situation as well as the topography. The report suggested that the best timing for entering the war might be when the UN forces had counterattacked back across the 38th parallel, because this would put China in a politically and militarily more favorable position to defeat the enemy. 97
This report received careful attention in Beijing. On September 7 Chai Chengwen, now the Chinese political counsellor in Pyongyang, was summoned back to Beijing by the Foreign Affairs Ministry. Zhou Enlai received him the same evening. Chai had prepared an outline for this meeting, which stressed: "Since the American and Rhee troops retreated from Taejon, the Korean People's Army has entered an impasse in its confrontation with the enemy, and can hardly move forward. Without mastery of the sea and control of the air, it will be detrimental [to the North Koreans] if [they] run into a protracted warfare with the enemy in such a long and narrow peninsula surrounded by sea in three directions." Zhou read the report carefully and asked Chai: "If the situation changes suddenly and we decide to send our troops to enter the Korean War, what difficulties do you think we will meet?" Chai believed that the most difficult problems would be transportation and logistics. Zhou circulated Chai's report to all members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. It was Chai's impression that top CCP leaders had made up their minds and "China would surely send troops to Korea; what remained a problem was when to issue the final order." 98
As preparations for entering the Korean War continued, concerns about, or even opposition to, involving China in a direct military confrontation with the United States emerged among top CCP leaders. The most conspicuous representative of this position was Lin Biao. 99 According to Chai, two days after his meeting with Zhou he was directed by the CMC to see Lin. To Chai's confusion, he found Lin had strong reservations about sending Chinese troops to Korea. At one point, Lin even asked Chai if the North Koreans had the determination to fight a guerrilla war if the situation reversed. 100 There are strong reasons to believe that others among the CCP leadership shared Lin Biao's view. 101
Mao, however, seemed confident of the necessity for a Chinese intervention and tried to convince his comrades. On September 5 Mao spoke to the Ninth Session of the Central People's Government Council, stressing that China was superior to the United States in several aspects. The United States, according to Mao, though strong economically, was waging an unjust war of aggression and lacking people's support. In a political sense, the United States, suffering from political divisions at home and divergences with allies, was isolated and vulnerable. In the military field, Mao believed that the United States "had only one advantage, namely having a lot of steel, but three weak points." Mao listed these weak points as: "(1) Their front line is too long, stretching from Berlin to Korea; (2) their supply line is too extensive, separated by two oceans (the Atlantic and the Pacific); and (3) their combat ability is very low . . . not so strong as the troops of Germany and Japan [during World War II)." 102 In discussing possible American responses to Chinese intervention in Korea, the CCP leadership also considered the United States might use nuclear weapons. Mao believed this was unlikely and the Chinese should not fear this prospect. Mao emphasized confidently: "We will not allow you [the Americans] to use the atomic bomb. But if you insist on using it, you may use it. You can follow the way you choose to go, and we will go our own way. You can use the atomic bomb. I will respond with my hand grenade. I will catch the weak point on your part, hold you, and finally defeat you." 103
These opinions indicate that Mao had considered the potential pros and cons involved in China's entry into the Korean War, and that he favored sending troops to Korea. Mao's arguments had set the basic tone for the CCP leadership's decision-making process on the Korean problem, and Mao would repeat this analysis again and again in the CCP leadership's discussion of sending Chinese troops to Korea. Although the situation would change dramatically between early September and mid-October, when Chinese troops finally crossed the Yalu, Mao would stick to these basic arguments. Mao's problem was how to convince his comrades (and, sometimes, even himself) of the correctness of his judgment.
Intervention Delayed
With the evidence presented above, it is clear that Mao Zedong and the CCP leadership had been inclined to send Chinese troops to Korea in late August and early September. The problem remaining for them was when and under what circumstances. Why then did Beijing fail to act at once, waiting instead until after the Inchon landing? To answer this question, one has to understand that Mao's final decision was constrained by complicating internal and external factors, some of which were beyond his control.
First of all, the Northeast Border Defense Army had been unable to complete preparations to enter the war before the Inchon landing, although it had been pushed continuously by Mao. This gave Mao little choice but to postpone the deadline for the Chinese troops' completion of preparations from the end of August to the end of September. Furthermore, although Mao and the Chinese high command had anticipated that UN forces would attempt to land in the rear of the North Korean forces, there is no evidence that either the Chinese or the North Koreans had any idea that the landing would come in mid-September. If Beijing leaders had known General MacArthur's schedule, it is likely that Mao would have further pushed Chinese military preparations so that the troops could have been operations ready earlier.
Mao's status as the party leader as well as his desire to win China a glorious victory in the Korean conflict may also have prevented him from acting prematurely. Although in 1950 Mao dominated the CCP's decision-making process both on domestic and foreign affairs, he could not dictate everything as he would during the Cultural Revolution. Mao might not need to yield to the different opinions held by his colleagues, but it would have been foolish for him not to take them into consideration. In fact, unless China's territorial safety were directly threatened by the Americans, Mao would have had difficulty in convincing the party and the Chinese people of the necessity to intervene in Korea. Meanwhile, Mao's underlying calculus for entering the Korean War- to mobilize the party and the nation under the banner of patriotism and nationalism- must be kept in mind. Mao could easily understand that a premature entry into the Korean War could have weakened the appeal of the CCP's stress on nationalism and patriotism, something Mao wanted to use to mobilize the Chinese nation.
Crucial diplomatic factors also hindered China's entrance into the war. In retrospect Beijing's war decision was restricted by its relationships with Moscow and Pyongyang. Before Mao could send his troops to Korea, he needed to get the cooperation of the Soviet Union and, equally important, the consent of Kim Il-sung. Neither, unfortunately for Mao, was easy.
Direct American military intervention in Korea sent a strong warning to Stalin, making him aware that he had underestimated America's intentions and capacity to engage in major military actions in East Asia. Because the promotion of revolutionary movements in the East had been Beijing's domain and because the main strategic interests and attention of the Soviet Union were in Europe, Korea was not Stalin's primary concern. A Communist victory in Korea might still be important to Stalin, but was not crucial for the strategic interests of the Soviet Union. Stalin had strong reasons to avoid a major confrontation with the United States over Korea. Several Chinese sources point out that Stalin did not want to involve the Soviet Union in a showdown with the United States. 104 Although Chinese sources currently available reveal no concrete discussions between top leaders of Beijing and Moscow from late June to mid-September 1950, it is plausible that the CCP leadership would have maintained close contacts with the Soviets. In actuality, we do know, through at least two Chinese sources, that a Soviet air force division, with 122 Mig-15 fighters, "following the agreement of the Chinese and Soviet governments," arrived in the Northeast in August 1950, "to take the responsibility of defending this area." 105 Considering that the Sino-Soviet alliance was now a cornerstone of Beijing's foreign policy, Mao had reason to take Stalin's cautious attitude seriously.
Kim Il-sung's attitude was even more troublesome for Mao. As a Korean nationalist, Kim hoped to win the war with his own forces. Facing the complicated factional divisions within the Korean Communist Party, Kim wanted to avoid strengthening the influence of the "Chinese section," a result that was more than possible if Chinese troops directly entered the war. 106 Kim thus seemed unwilling to request Chinese help as long as he believed the situation was under control. 107 When Beijing inquired if China could send high-ranking military observers to Korea, Kim did not cooperate. For example, in early August, the CCP Central Committee decided to dispatch to Korea Deng Hua, who had just taken the position as the commander of the 13th Army Corps, to learn about the war situation. When he arrived in the border city of Andong on the Chinese side of the Yalu, however, "the situation suddenly changed." The North Koreans made it clear at the last minute that Deng was unwelcome and he had to give up his mission. 108 Indeed, except for a group of Chinese military-intelligence officers sent to Pyongyang in mid-July as Chinese diplomats, Beijing was unable to dispatch high-ranking military observers to Korea. 109 In the days before Inchon, Mao could easily sense that Kim's attitude would influence the moral justification as well as effectiveness of Chinese intervention in Korea. Without Kim's invitation, Chinese leaders preferred not to go ahead. And China's entry into the Korean War had to be delayed.
Two-and-half months after the outbreak of the Korean War, China became an intensively mobilized country. Beijing leaders established the NEBDA by transferring over 300,000 of China's best troops to the Chinese-Korean border area (with another 400,000 serving as reserve forces), took preliminary steps to ensure the troops' logistical supplies, and initiated the domestic political mobilization that would be essential for the country to enter a major military intervention on a foreign land. These accomplishments would prove to be crucial when intervention became urgent in late September and early October. However, even with Mao's repeated pushing, Chinese troops in the Northeast were still some distance away from combat readiness. Moreover, Beijing had difficulties in establishing an effective strategic coordination with Pyongyang and, to a lesser extent, Moscow. Although Mao and many other Chinese leaders and military planners became increasingly worried that a reversal might occur in Korea, they could do little to influence the process of the war. They had to wait.
Notes
Note 1: The account about Beijing leaders' schedule for June 25, 1950 is based on interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. It is also supported by other Chinese sources, such as Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, pp. 25-26. Back.
Note 2: The Soviet Union walked out the UN Security Council in mid-January 1950, allegedly to protest the UN's refusal to seat Communist China. Numerous Western studies, especially Simmons in Strained Alliance, have long argued that the real purpose of the Soviet boycott of the Security Council meetings was to prevent Beijing from taking its place in the UN. Recently released Chinese sources revealed that the Soviets discussed the decision to walk out the Security Council with Mao during his stay in Moscow. See Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and the CCP Central Committee, January 7, 1950, MWG, 1: 219-220. Back.
Note 3: For details of the Truman administration's response to the outbreak of the Korean conflict, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950 (New York: The Free Press, 1968); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 58-59; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 248-249. For considerations underlying the decision to interfere in Korea and Taiwan, see Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, "Korea," June 25, 1950, FRUS (1950), 7: 148-154. For Truman's statement, see ibid., p. 203. For UN resolutions, see ibid., pp. 155-156, 211. For a different interpretation arguing that the Truman administration reluctantly adopted a policy of direct military intervention in Korea, see James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950 ,(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). Back.
Note 4: For a plausible discussion about U.S. policy toward Korea in the late 1940s and its position in U.S. Far Eastern strategy, see Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, chapters 1, 3, and 5; and Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp. 94-101; see also discussions in chapter 4. Back.
Note 5: Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, pp. 196-98; and Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, pp. 76, 273-274. Back.
Note 6: For plausible discussions of the subtle change in U.S. Far Eastern strategy from late 1949 to early 1950, see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, chapter 4; and Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 69-76. Back.
Note 7: For the GMD's response to Truman's decision to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, see Gu Weijun (Wellington Koo), Gu Weijun huiyilu, 13 vols. (Wellington Koo's Memoirs, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Store, 1989) 8: 3-12; Liang Jintun (Chin-tang Liang), "Chinese-American Relations during the Korean War," Zhongmei guanxi lunwenji (Essays on Chinese-American Relations, Taipei: The United Publishing House, 1982), pp. 210-216. Back.
Note 8: According to Shi Zhe, in late June Mao was very much worried about if the North Koreans would be able to handle the situation in the face of direct American military intervention. Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.
Note 9: For typical Beijing "propaganda" about the connection between the U.S. invasion of Korea and the threat to China's security based on the analysis of Japan's aggression against China's Northeast in history, see Hu Sheng, "How Did the United States Invade China in History," Shishi shouce (Current Affairs Handbook), no. 3 (1950). See also Zhou Enlai, "Resisting U. S. Aggression, Assisting Korea and Defending Peace," ZWJWX, p. 31. Back.
Note 10: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, pp. 35-36. Zhou's view expressed here was widely shared by CCP cadres and PLA commanders, who believed that the United States had a broad plan of aggression against China. See Jiang Yonghui, 38jun zai chaoxian, pp. 8-9; Yang Dezhi, Weile heping, pp. 7-8; Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 12-13. Zhou himself would repeat the same argument on many other occasions, see, for example, Zhou Enlai, "Resisting U. S. Aggression, Assisting Korea and Defending Peace," ZWJWX, p. 29. Back.
Note 11: See Zhu Jianrong, Mao Zedong's Korean War, pp. 64-65. Back.
Note 12: Hu Sheng et al., Zhongguo gongchandang de qishinian, pp. 313-314. Back.
Note 14: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 31. Back.
Note 15: The General Information Agency, "Instructions on the Propaganda of the U. S. Imperialists' Open Interference with the Internal Affairs of China, Korea, Vietnam and other Countries," June 29, 1950, the Research Department of the Xinhua News Agency, eds., Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao huibian, 2: 50. Back.
Note 16: In fact, Zhou Enlai clearly expressed this idea at a CCP Politburo meeting in early August 1950. See Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece, p. 43. Back.
Note 17: For a discussion of the intricate cooperation between Kim Il-sung's North Korean Communists and the CCP, see Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol.2, chapter 11; see also discussions in chapter 4. Back.
Note 18: Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 7. Back.
Note 19: For Mao Zedong's address, see Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji, 1949-1950, p. 130; for Zhou Enlai's, see ZWJWX, pp. 18-19. Back.
Note 20: Xiao Jinguang, Xiao Jinguang huiyilu, 2: 8, 26. What is noticeable is that Zhou Enlai mentioned here that the demobilization plan would continue. This was probably because top Beijing leaders, impressed by the rapid progress of the North Koreans during the first days of the conflict, were uncertain to what extent the United States would be militarily involved in Korea and thus did not consider at this moment sending Chinese troops to Korea. As we will see, however, this approach will quickly change along with the gradual American military involvement in Korea. Back.
Note 21: Yang Guoyu et al., Dangdai zhongguo haijun, p. 41. Back.
Note 22: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 384-385; Ye Fei, Ye Fei huiyilu, pp. 613-614; Back.
Note 23: Zhou Jun, "The Party Central Committee's Decision on the Strategic Transition from the War of Liberation to the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," Dangshi yanjiu ziliao, no.4, (1992): 15; and He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China," p. 15. Back.
Note 24: The CMC to Chen Yi, August 11, 1950, cited from He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China," p. 15; see also Zhou Jun, "The Strategic Change from the War of Liberation to the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," p. 15. Back.
Note 25: Zhou Jun, "The Strategic Change from the War of Liberation to the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," p. 15; He Di, "The Last Campaign to Unify China," p. 15; Ye Fei, Ye Fei huiyilu, p. 614; Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 8; and Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 123. Back.
Note 26: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 519-520; The Editorial Group, Zhongguo guwentuan yuanyue kangmei douzheng shishi, pp. 5-6; Qian Jiang, Zai shenmi de zhanzheng zhong, pp. 50-61. Back.
Note 27: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 520; the Editorial Group, Zhongguo guwentuan yuanyue kangmei douzheng shishi, p. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the CMAG's activities in Vietnam, see Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War," The China Quarterly, no.133 (March 1993): 85-110. Back.
Note 28: Xu Peilan and Zheng Pengfei, Chen Geng jiangjun zhuan (A Biography of General Chen Geng, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1988), pp. 580-581; Mu Xin, Chen Geng dajiang (General Chen Geng, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1988), pp. 581-599. Back.
Note 29: Qian Jiang, Zai shenmi de zhanzheng zhong, p. 63. Back.
Note 30: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 522-523; the Editorial Group, Zhongguo guwentuan yuanyue kangmei douzheng shishi, pp. 15-16; Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, pp. 115-116. Back.
Note 31: The Editorial Group, Zhongguo guwentuan yuanyue kangmei douzheng shishi, pp. 44-46; Mu Xin, Chen Geng dajiang, pp. 590-93. Back.
Note 32: For a more detailed discussion of China's connection with the Border Campaign, see Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War," pp. 93-95; see also Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 521-527; the Editorial Gruop, Zhongguo guwentuan yuanyue kangmei douzheng shishi, pp. 13-25. Back.
Note 33: Chen Geng, Chen Geng riji, 2: 6-7. Back.
Note 34: Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 7; Chen Yun, "Policies toward Financial Affairs with the Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea," Chen Yun wengao xuanbian, p. 99. See also "Minutes of the Conference to Examine and Discuss the Preparations of the Northeast Border Defense Army, 5:00 PM, August 26, 1950," CCA. Back.
Note 35: In my interviews with Shi Zhe in August 1992, he recalled that not until three days after the outbreak of the Korean War did Kim Il-Sung send a field grade officer to Beijing to inform Mao and other Beijing leaders that the North Koreans were taking military actions "to fulfill the tasks of the Korean revolution and to unify the entire country." According to Shi, Mao was told that it was the South Koreans who first started the attack and that only then did the North Koreans decide to make an overall counterattack. Mao, however, was not convinced by such a story. Shi recalled that in one talk between himself and Mao in late June or early July, Mao commented that Kim was really "too smart a person," and that the North Koreans might meet big trouble in the future. Back.
Note 36: The Chinese did not establish their embassy in Pyongyang until mid-July 1950, although the PRC and the North Korean Communist regime had established diplomatic relations as early as October 1949. Back.
Note 37: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 36. Back.
Note 39: Ibid., pp. 35-36. According to Chai's account, seven former Chinese military intelligence officers completed preparations for going to Pyongyang as Chinese diplomats by July 7. They arrived in Pyongyang on July 10, and Chinese embassy was then formally opened. Back.
Note 40: "The Victorious Future of the Korean People's War of Liberation, "Renmin ribao, July 6, 1950. Back.
Note 41: Cited in Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 39. Back.
Note 42: Participants in the two conferences included Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the PLA; Nie Rongzhen, acting general chief of staff; Li Tao, director of the Department of Military Operations under the General Staff; Luo Ronghuan, director of the PLA General Political Bureau; Yang Lisan, director of the PLA's General Logistics Department; Xiao Jinguang, commander of the navy; Liu Yalou, commander of the air force; Xu Guangda, commander of the armored force; Su Jin, vice commander of the artillery force; Teng Daiyuan, commander of the PLA railway engineering corps; Lin Biao, commander of the PLA's Central-South Military Region; He Jinnian, vice commander of the PLA's Northeast Military Region; and Wan Yi, commander of the artillery force under the Fourth Field Army. See Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 449-50. According to the recollections of Lei Yingfu, Zhou Enlai's secretary for military affairs at that time, among the participants of the July 7 conference were also Xiao Hua, deputy director of the PLA's General Political Department, Li Kenong, director of the CMC's Military Intelligence Department and vice minister of foreign affairs, Lai Chuanzhu, political commissar of the 15th Army Corps, Li Jükui, vice chief of staff of the Forth Field Army, Xiao Ke, director of the CMC's Military Training Department, Zhang Jingwu, director of the CMC's People's Armed Forces Department, Fu Qiutao, secretary general of the Central Demobilization Committee, Zhang Chinghua, vice director of the Cartography Bureau under the PLA's General Staff, and Lei himself. Lei Yingfu, "Random Recollections of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea" (unpublished manuscript); see also Xu Yan, "China's Decision on the Military Intervention in the Korean War" (unpublished paper), p. 3. Back.
Note 43: Zhu Jianrong, Mao Zedong's Korean War, p. 81. Zhu's account cited here is based on the testimony by Lei Yingfu. Back.
Note 44: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 449-450; Yao Xu, Cong yalujiang dao banmendian, p. 14. Back.
Note 45: Ma Qibing and Chen Wenping et al., Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian ,(The Chinese Communist Party as the Ruling Party for Forty Years, Beijing: CCP Historical Materials Press, 1989), p. 19; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 450; Yao Xu, Cong yalujiang dao banmendian, p. 14; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, pp. 29-30. Back.
Note 46: Mao Zedong to Nie Rongzhen, July 7, 1950, MWG, 1: 428; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 450. Back.
Note 47: Later only Li Jükui assumed the position. Su Yu was on sick leave and then hospitalized. Xiao Jinguang needed to focus on the busy affairs of China's newly established navy. Xiao Hua was then in charge of the PLA's General Political Department (as Luo Ronghuan, the director of the department, was in bad health), and he could not assume his position in the NEBDA either. The headquarters of the NEBDA had never been formerly established. On July 22, Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen reported to Mao that "it seemed difficult at the present stage" to form the headquarters for the NEBDA. They suggested that all units of the NEBDA be commanded by Gao Gang, commander and political commissar of the Northeast Military Region. They also suggested that a single logistics department should be established under the headquarters of the Northeast Military Region to make logistical preparations well coordinated and that Li Jükui be appointed as the director of the department. Mao approved these proposals the next day. See Du Ping, Du Ping huiyilu, pp. 14-15; Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 113; Huang Yi, "Zhou Enlai: the Leader and Organizer of Strategic Logistic Affairs during the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," Junshi shiling (Military History Circles), no. 5 (1989): 10. Back.
Note 48: Du Ping, Du Ping huiyilu, p. 14; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, p. 18; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 449-50; Yao Xu, Cong yalujiang dao banmendian, p. 14; Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 33. Later, Hong Xuezhi and Han Xianchu were both appointed as vice commanders of the Thirteenth Army Corps. Back.
Note 49: Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, pp. 7-8; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 1: 450; Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 33; Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 113; Huang Yi, "Zhou Enlai: The Leader and Organizer of the Strategic Affairs during the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," p. 9. Back.
Note 50: Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 120. Back.
Note 51: With large numbers of troops moving from southern and central China into the Northeast, the PLA's logistic support system immediately faced a serious challenge. In the early days of the PRC, the PLA organized its military regions basically on the basis of former field armies, which had their own budgets. The CMC distributed funds and material supply to them at the beginning of the calendar year. In the case of the 13th Army Corps, the Southern-central Military Region had been responsible for its supplies before it moved into the Northeast. Which military region, the Southern-central or the Northeastern, should supply the 13th Army Corps after the Corps entered the Northeast became a practical problem. Furthermore, in 1950, the Northeast Region had its own currency, which was independent from Renminbi, the money used in other parts of China. Zhou Enlai therefore set up rules before troops moved into the Northeast. See Huang Yi, "Zhou Enlai: The Leader and Organizer of the Strategic Affairs during the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," pp. 10-11. Back.
Note 52: Xu Guangyi et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui de houqin gongzuo (The Logistical Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1990), p. 137; Xie Fang et al., Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng houqin jingyan zongjie (Summaries of the Logistical Experience during the War to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: The Golden Shield Press, 1987), pp. 10-11; Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 115; Li Jükui, Li Jükui huiyilu (Li Jükui's Memoirs, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1986), p. 264. Back.
Note 53: Xie Fang et al., Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng houqin jingyan zongjie, pp. 11-12; Huang Yi, "Zhou Enlai: The Leader and Organizer of the Strategic Affairs during the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," p. 12. Back.
Note 54: Li Jükui, Li Jükui huiyilu, pp. 263-264. Back.
Note 55: See MWG, 1: 428, n. 2. Back.
Note 56: Weida de kangmei yuanchao yundong (The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: People's Press, 1954), pp. 7-8; and "The Great Political Significance of the 'Special Week of Opposing the U.S. Invasion of Taiwan and Korea," Shijie zhishi, 22, no. 3 (July 21, 1950): 2. Back.
Note 57: In Mao's telegrams dealing with the Korean crisis, Mao paid special attention to "American arrogance" (xiaozhang qiyan or aoman), and he often referred to "beating American arrogance" as an important reason for China to enter the Korean War. See MWG, 1: 539, 556; see also discussions in chapters 6 and 7. Back.
Note 58: For the background of the movement to suppress reactionary activities, see Hu Sheng et al., Zhongguo gongchandang de qishinian, pp. 328-329; Zhang Min, "A Survey of the Struggle to Suppress Reactionaries in the Early Years of the PRC," Dangde wenxian, no. 2, (1988): 38-41; Lin Yunhui et al., Kaige xingjing de shiqi (China from 1949 to 1989: The Period of Triumphant March, Zhengzhou: Henan People's Press, 1989), pp. 137-141. For the CCP Central Committee's directive on suppressing reactionary activities issued on March 18, 1950, see Liu Wusheng et al., Gongheguo zouguo de lu, pp. 233-235. Back.
Note 59: The State Council and Supreme People's Court, "Instructions on Suppressing Reactionary Activities," July 23, 1950, in Central Institute of Historical Documents, ed., Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, 1949-1950, (Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the PRC, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1991), pp. 358-360. Back.
Note 60: Lin Yunhui et al., Kaige xingjing de shiqi, pp. 137-144; see also discussions in chapter 7. Back.
Note 61: Allen Whiting presented a plausible analysis of Beijing's "Resist American Invasion of Taiwan and Korea" campaign in July and August, pointing out that the real purposes of this campaign were to break down pro-American feeling, to suppress anti-Communist opposition within China, to spur reconstruction and land reform, and, in the final analysis, to mobilize the mass hostility toward the Americans. Whiting, however, argued that the campaign should not be cited "as evidence of preparation for military intervention in the war" (Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 82-84). With the insight gained from new Chinese source materials, it is evident that the anti-American campaign served both the need for long-range mobilization and the short-run possibility that China would enter the Korean War. And, as I will further discuss in the next chapter, the two aims were virtually interwoven in Mao's management of the Korean crisis. Back.
Note 62: Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 194. Back.
Note 63: Renmin ribao, August 5, 1950; see also Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 81-82. Back.
Note 64: Cited in Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, p. 43; see also Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu, p. 30. Back.
Note 65: Mao Zedong and the CCP Central Committee to Gao Gang, August 5, 1950, MWG, 1: 454. According to the reminiscence of Nie Rongzhen, following the decision of the CMC on the same day, he ordered the NEBDA to "finish every preparation by the end of this month and wait for the directive to enter the war." Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 734. Back.
Note 66: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, p. 18; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, p. 7. Back.
Note 67: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, p. 18. Back.
Note 68: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 18-20; Xu Yan,Diyici jiaoliang,p. 18. Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 119. Zhang, an army-level officer himself, served on the PLA's General Staff for more than forty years, and was once on Zhu De's military staff. Since 1983, he has been a member of the editorial group of Peng Dehuai's official biography and was granted special access to Party history and military archives as well as the opportunities to interview a wide range of people from top leaders to secretaries and associates of policymakers. His article provides the most detailed coverage of Beijing's decision-making process in October 1950. Back.
Note 69: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 19-20. Back.
Note 70: Ibid., p. 53. It should be noted that the PLA's experiences in China's civil war strongly influenced Deng's strategic design, and that Chinese experiences in the Korean War would prove that Deng and his fellow CCP military planners had underestimated the role played by modern technology and equipment in a modern warfare. See Deng Hua, Lun Kangmei yuanchao de zuozhan zhidao (On the Operation Direction of the War to Resist America and Assist Korea, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1989); see also Chen Jian, "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950-1951." Back.
Note 71: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 20-21; Zhou Jun, "The Strategic Change from the War of Liberation to the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," p. 15; Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p. 119. Back.
Note 72: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 20-21; Zhang Xi, "Peng's appointment," p.119. Back.
Note 73: Mao Zedong to Gao Gang, August 18, 1950, MWG, 1: 469. Nie Rongzhen recalled in his memoirs that he send the same order to the NEBDA, see Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, pp. 734-735. Back.
Note 74: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 23-24. Interviews with Beijing's military researchers in May 1991 and August 1992 suggest that while the percentages described by Du could be an exaggeration of the "positive factors," Du's descriptions are generally reliable. Back.
Note 75: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 24-25. Back.
Note 76: Ibid., p. 29; Sun Yaoshen and Cui Jingshan, "Winning Victory Not Just on the Battlefield: General Xie Fang in Korea," Renwu (Biographical Journal), no. 1, 1991, p. 8. Back.
Note 77: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, p. 21. Back.
Note 78: Lei Yingfu, "Remember Him and His Teachings for Ever," in Cheng Hua, et al., Zhou Enlai he ta de mishumen, (Zhou Enlai and His Secretaries, Beijing: Chinese Broadcasting and Television Press, 1991), p. 114. Back.
Note 79: For a discussion of Austin's address, see Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 78-79. Back.
Note 80: Renmin ribao, August 21, 1950. Back.
Note 81: Lei Yingfu, "Remember Him and His Teachings for Ever," pp. 114-116; and Xu Yan,"How Did the CCP Central Committee Decide to Send Troops to Korea," p. 5. Back.
Note 82: Lei Yingfu, "Remember Him and His Teachings for Ever," pp. 115-116; see also Xu Yan,"China's Decision on the Military Intervention in the Korean War," p. 7; Zhu Jianrong, Mao Zedong's Korean War, pp. 132-134. Back.
Note 83: Lei Yingfu, "Remember Him and His Teachings for Ever," p. 116; Zhu Jianrong, Mao Zedong's Korean War, p. 134. Back.
Note 84: Lyoko Sakuyi, "The First Exposure of the Truth of the Korean War: Interview with Lee Sang-jo," Spring and Autumn of Literature and Arts (in Japanese), (April 1990): 171; see also Sun Baoshen, "Mao Zedong Had Predicted that the Americans Could Land at Inchon," Junshi shiling, no.10 (1990): 13; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 492; Lim Un, The Founding of a Dynasty in Korea, pp. 187-188. I wish to thank Mr. Zhang Chiping and Ms. Yao Ping for translating portions of Sakuyi's article. Back.
Note 85: According to Lim Un, a well-informed Korean dissident living in Moscow, "Kim Il-sung, with our troops advancing toward what Kim thought was decisive victory, disregarded [Mao's] warnings as matters unworthy of consideration, and ordered his men to keep it secret." Lim Un, The Founding of a Dynasty in Korea, p. 188. Back.
Note 86: Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, August 24, 1950, Zhou Enlai shuxin xuanji (Selected Correspondences of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1988), p. 433. Back.
Note 87: Participants at this meeting included Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Lin Biao, Nie Rongzhen, Ruo Ronghuan, Xiao Jinguang, Xiao Hua, Yang Lisan, Zhang Libing, He Cheng, Wang Bingzhang, Xu Guangda, Zhang Jingwu, Li Kenong, Xiao Ke, Wang Jing, Teng Daiyuan, Li Jükui, Fu Qiutao, Li Tao, Lai Chuanzhu, and Su Jing. Zhang Chinghua and Lei Yingfu were assigned to take notes at the meeting. See "Minutes of the Conference to Examine and Discuss the Preparations of the Northeast Border Defense Army, 5:00 PM, August 26, 1950," CCA. Back.
Note 88: Zhou mentioned here that the French had learned of and broadcast China's support to Ho Chi Minh because the Viet Minh had failed to maintain secrecy. Zhou stressed that everyone should keep this lesson in mind. Back.
Note 89: "Minutes of the Conference to Examine and Discuss the Preparations of the Northeast Border Defense Army, 5:00 PM, August 26, 1950," CCA; see also Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 122. Back.
Note 90: Besides Zhou, participants at this meeting included Nie Rongzhen, Li Tao, Yang Lishan, Xu Guangda, Su Jing, Xiao Ke, and Wang Bingzhang. Lei Yingfu was again assigned to take notes at the meeting. "Minute of the Meeting on Planning the Construction of the NEBDA," August 31, 1950, CMA. Back.
Note 91: Ibid.; see also Xu Yan, Diyici jiaoliang,p. 19. Back.
Note 92: Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 123; Back.
Note 93: Shen and Meng et al., zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 8; Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 123. Back.
Note 94: Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, August 27, 1950, MWG, 1: 485. Back.
Note 95: Sun and Cui, "Winning Victory Not Just on the Battlefield," p. 7. Back.
Note 96: The report also suggested that if air support by the Soviets could not be guaranteed, China should delay sending land forces into Korea. See Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, p. 22. Back.
Note 97: Du Ping, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, pp. 21-22; Luo Yinwen, "Realistically Bringing Forth New Ideas: Stories about General Deng Hua," Renwu, no. 5 (1985): 63; Sun and Cui, "Winning Victory Not Just on the Battlefield," pp. 7-8; Xu Yan,Diyici jiaoliang,p. 20; Yao Xu, "Comrade Deng Hua in the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," Part I, Hunan dangshi tongxun Newsletter of Party History Studies in Hunan), no. 3 (1985); and "Deng Hua," in the Editorial Department of Xinghuo liaoyuan, et al., Jiefangjun jiangling zhuan, 12 vols. (Biographies of PLA Commanders, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1988), 7: 30-31. Back.
Note 98: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 78. Back.
Note 99: Although Lin was not the only one who felt reluctant to send Chinese troops to Korea, he is the most prominent person mentioned by Chinese sources whenever the opposition opinion is discussed. This is surely because Lin's downfall in the early 1970s made him an easy target of criticism. Back.
Note 100: Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, pp. 78-79. Back.
Note 101: See, for example, Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 735. Back.
Note 102: Cited from Meng Zhaohui, "The Application and Development of Mao Zedong's Military Thought in the War to Resist America and Assist Korea," Junshi lishi, no. 1 (1991): 3. Back.
Note 103: Cited from Shen and Meng et al., Zhongguo renmin zhiyuanjun kangmei yuanchao zhanshi, p. 7. Back.
Note 104: For a good discussion of Stalin's attitude after the outbreak of the Korean War, especially his unwillingness to involve the Soviet Union in a direct confrontation with the United States, see Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Stage of the Korean War," pp. 433-434. Back.
Note 105: Wang Dinglie et al., Dangdai zhongguo kongjun, p. 78; Deng Lifeng, Xin zhongguo junshi huodong jishi, p. 121. Back.
Note 106: Kim Il-sung had also been skeptical of the combat power of the Chinese troops. See, for example, Lim Un, The Founding of a Dynasty in North Korea, p. 182. Back.
Note 107: In Lee Sang-jo's recollections, he particularly stresses that his visit to Beijing before the Inchon landing was "not for the purpose of asking China's military assistance," Lyoko Sakuyi, "The First Exposure of the Truth of the Korean War," p. 171; in my interviews with Shi Zhe in August 1992, he confirmed that Kim did not ask for Chinese assistance until after the Inchon landing. Back.
Note 108: Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, pp. 4, 8. Hong did not clearly point out that it was because of North Korean opposition that Deng gave up his mission. In my interviews with Chinese researchers in May 1991 and August 1992, they all agreed that a last-minute negative signal from the North Koreans is the most reasonable explanation for Deng's giving up the mission at the bank of the Yalu. Back.
Note 109: See Chai and Zhao, Banmendian tanpan, p. 77; Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng huiyi, pp. 8-9. See also discussions in chapter 7. Back.
Email this citation