China's Road to the Korean War

The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation

Chen Jian

New York

Columbia University Press

1994

3. "Leaning to One Side":The Formation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

On June 30, 1949 Mao issued his famous "lean-to-one-side" statement. In a long article entitled "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," broadcast by the CCP's radio service and reprinted by all major CCP papers, Mao announced the new China's special relationship with the Soviet Union:

Externally, unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equal and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democratic Countries, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, ₁

Mao's statement demonstrated that the CCP and the Soviet Union shared a common political ideology. But ideology alone does not offer a complete answer to the origins of the CCP's lean-to-one-side approach, especially given the CCP's frequently inharmonious relations with Moscow in the past. In order to understand the making of this policy, we need to examine the CCP's historical exchanges with the Soviet Union, to explore the interactions between the party's Soviet policy and its general domestic and international strategies, and to define the relations between Beijing's decision to ally with the Soviet Union and Communist China's increasing confrontation with the United States.

Background

Mao's lean-to-one-side statement, viewed in the context of international politics, can be seen as a logical outgrowth of the CCP's long-time revolutionary policy of attaching itself to the "international progressive forces" led by the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, CCP leaders had clearly perceived the postwar world order as divided into two camps, one headed by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States and viewed their revolution as an inseparable part of the Soviet-led international proletarian movement. Mao's statement is consistent with this view of the postwar world structure. The political implications of Mao's decision are straightforward: in an international confrontation between the Soviet-led progressive camp and the American-led reactionary camp, the CCP had to ally itself with the Soviet Union against the United States.

The lean-to-one-side approach also grew out of the CCP's assessment of the serious nature of America's threats to the security interests of Communist China. As the CCP neared final victory in China's civil war in early 1949, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders became very concerned about the prospect of direct American intervention in China. Although the American military had never intervened, CCP leaders, given their belief in the aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism, continued to view the United States as a dangerous enemy. In the eyes of Mao and the CCP leadership, "it was the possibility of military intervention from imperialist countries that decided the necessity of China allying itself with socialist countries." ₂ By allying China with the Soviet Union, Mao and the CCP leadership hoped to be in a stronger position to face a potentially hostile America.

The CCP's lean-to-one-side decision had also domestic roots. Sources now available indicate that the CCP leadership differed on the direction of the new China's domestic and foreign policies with some pro-Communist "democratic parties." Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai argued that these people "still had illusions about U.S. imperialism" in the sense that they wanted the new China to maintain a less radical stand in international politics. ₃ The opinion of General Zhang Zhizhong, a former close associate of Jiang Jieshi who had just joined the Communist side, was typical in this regard. In a discussion with Mao in May 1949, Zhang suggested that China, while uniting with the Soviet Union, should seek accommodation with the United States and other Western countries. He believed that such a policy would be in the interests of the Chinese nation. Mao disagreed, arguing that the attempt to pursue the "doctrine of the mean" [zhong yong zhi dao] in international politics would be dangerous to the cause of Chinese Communist revolution because it would weaken the revolution's dynamics and blur the distinction between revolution and counterrevolution. ₄ In order to promote the Chinese Communist revolution at home, Mao believed it essential for Chinese foreign policy to lean to one side.

As a practical policy choice, Mao's policy has to be understood within the context of the CCP's efforts to adjust relations with the Soviet Union during the last stage of China's civil war. When Mao issued his statement on June 30, 1949, he apparently had in mind the fact that a high-level CCP delegation, headed by Liu Shaoqi, would travel to the Soviet Union in two days. ₅ Considering the frequently unpleasant history of CCP-Soviet relations, Mao hoped to send a strong signal of his willingness for friendship and cooperation.

The development of the CCP-Soviet relationship had been tortuous during the long course of the Chinese Communist revolution. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the CCP, as a branch of the Soviet-controlled Comintern, had to follow Soviet instructions. Among the party leadership, sharp disagreements existed between the native section headed by Mao and the international section headed by Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu), a Soviet-trained orthodox Communist. Mao had long been stifled by the international section, which was supported by Stalin and the Soviet party. Mao never forgot this experience. After Mao emerged as the top CCP leader in the late 1930s, he continued to face pressures from the Comintern and the Soviet Union on several occasions. Between 1940 and early 1943, when he refused to follow the Soviet order to use the CCP's military forces to attract the main Japanese forces in China "to protect the Soviet Union," the Comintern severely criticized Mao and the CCP leadership. ₆ In the early 1940s, the CCP's rectification campaign, a political movement designed to consolidate Mao's leading position in the party, was viewed suspiciously by the Soviet party and the Comintern, which suspected that the campaign represented an attempt to suppress the pro-Soviet section within the CCP. ₇

Even after the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, the CCP continued to find its policies, especially its management of the united front with the GMD, occasionally the target of Moscow's criticism. ₈ At the Yalta Conference of 1945, Stalin promised Roosevelt that he would not support the CCP in the internal conflict in China in exchange for Roosevelt's agreement on the independence of Outer Mongolia and other concessions in China. This promise was obviously a severe offense to the CCP. ₉ After Japan's surrender at the end of the Second World War, Stalin cabled Mao twice in late August 1945, warning the Chinese Communists not to risk a civil war with the GMD because "it would bring the danger of the complete destruction of the Chinese nation." Mao was very unhappy with these warnings. ₁₀

During the course of the 1946-1949 civil war, CCP-Soviet relations were again inharmonious. While contingently offering the CCP assistance in its confrontation with the GMD, especially in the Northeast, Soviet leaders generally doubted the CCP's ability to win. Even though the GMD insistently took a pro-American stand as the Cold War intensified, the Soviet Union remained neutral. ₁₁ Stalin even pressured the CCP to compromise with the GMD, and Soviet media kept a strange silence as CCP forces won a series of crucial military victories. ₁₂ Several Chinese sources contend that in early 1949, Stalin advised Mao and the CCP leadership not to cross the Yangzi River in order to avert triggering a direct Soviet-American confrontation. Mao firmly rejected this suggestion. ₁₃ Even by late February 1949, after the PLA had forced the GMD government to move from Nanjing to Guangzhou, the Soviet ambassador remained with the GMD government, transferring to Guangzhou. All this must have made it difficult for the CCP to establish a close strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union. ₁₄

All the above, however, gives only one side of the picture. After all, Mao and his followers were Communists. In the long revolutionary process, the CCP leadership kept or tried to keep an intimate relationship with Stalin and the Soviet party. Except for a short period during the Chinese Red Army's "Long March" from southern to northwestern China, the CCP Central Committee maintained daily telegraphic communication with the Comintern and the Soviet Communist party. Mao and the CCP leadership kept Moscow well informed of nearly all their important decisions. ₁₅ Even when the CCP leadership strongly disagreed with Stalin and the Soviet party, they avoided any open disputes with Moscow. Mao and the CCP leadership believed that the divergences between themselves and the Soviets were no more than the ones that would sometimes emerge between brothers. ₁₆

When the tide of China's civil war turned in favor of the CCP, Mao showed a stronger willingness to seek a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. In mid-May 1948, Mao cabled Stalin, stating that the CCP lacked the experience for running China's national economy and asking the Soviet party to send experts to assist the CCP in economic recovery and reconstruction. In response, the Soviet Politburo sent, among others, I. V. Kovalev. ₁₇ After the Soviet-controlled Cominform, successor to the Comintern, announced that Communist Yugoslavia and its leader Josip Tito were "traitors" to the communist world in late June 1948, the CCP immediately decided to stand on the side of the Soviet Union. A series of the party's internal documents emphasized that "if the Chinese people hope to win a complete victory in the revolution, they had to pursue a solid brotherly alliance with the Soviet Union." ₁₈

Believing it necessary to consult with Stalin about the strategic cooperation between the CCP and the Soviet Union, in the spring of 1948 Mao began to plan a visit to Moscow to meet Stalin. In order to concentrate on preparations for this visit, Mao stayed at a small village called Chennanzhuang from mid-April to late May (other members of the CCP Central Committee were then staying at Xibaipo). ₁₉ In a report about the CCP's Politburo meeting to Stalin dated September 28, 1948, Mao mentioned that he had a series of questions to discuss with Stalin and the Soviet party's Central Committee and he planned to visit the Soviet Union in November. Then in another telegram to Stalin on October 16, Mao further clarified that he would be willing to hear Stalin's opinion about "convening the new political consultative conference and establishing the provisional central government (in China)." On December 30, 1948, Mao informed Stalin that the CCP Politburo would convene an enlarged meeting to discuss the party's strategic tasks of 1949, after which Mao planned to visit the Soviet Union. ₂₀

For whatever reason, however, Stalin was not interested in such a meeting at that time. He cabled Mao on January 14, 1949, stressing that since China's civil war was at a crucial juncture, it would be improper for Mao to leave China. Stalin offered to send a Politburo member as the representative of the Soviet party to China to listen to Mao's opinions. Mao agreed. ₂₁ Anastas Mikoyan, a Soviet Politburo member, was chosen to carry out this mission, which proved to be a crucial step toward the formation of the Sino-Soviet strategic alliance.

Mikoyan Comes to Xibaipo

From January 31 to February 7, 1949, Mikoyan secretly visited Xibaipo, the location of the CCP headquarters. Mao, with the other four members of the CCP Central Secretariat, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, and Ren Bishi, held formal meetings with Mikoyan. At the beginning of the first meeting, Mikoyan explained to Mao why Stalin had not earlier agreed to receive Mao at Moscow. Stalin, according to Mikoyan, did not want Mao to leave his position during a critical stage of the war, and he was also concerned about Mao's safety and health. So, rather than invite Mao to the Soviet Union, Stalin sent Mikoyan to China. Mikoyan also stressed that Stalin had asked him merely to listen to the opinions of Mao and the Chinese Communists, but not make any important decision.

Dominating the meeting, Mao tried to neutralize what he thought might be Stalin's worries. He used almost three days to introduce the Soviets to the CCP's thinking on important domestic and international issues. Mao's central topic was the CCP's political design for the new China. He stated that the CCP, together with other anti-GMD democratic parties, would establish a Communist-led coalition government after the Communist victory. The main task of the government would be to lead China to a socialist society. Obviously aimed at easing Stalin's suspicion that Titoism was involved in the CCP's advocacy of such an idea, Mao emphasized that the government would be Marxist-Leninist in nature. While some government positions would be reserved for non-Communist "democratic figures," Mao made it clear that the CCP would firmly control the leadership of the government. Probably responding to Stalin's suggestion that CCP forces should not cross the Yangzi River, Mao pointed out that crossing the Yangzi was absolutely necessary for the CCP to destroy the remnants of the GMD and to "carry the revolution through to the end."

The new China's foreign policy was another focus of Mao's talks. He stressed repeatedly that it was the firm determination of the Chinese Communists to destroy totally the old China's diplomatic legacy. The new China, according to Mao, would adopt the strategy of "cleaning the house before entertaining guests" in its foreign affairs, meaning that the CCP would not pursue diplomatic relations with Western countries until the entire country had been "cleaned up." Mao clarified also that "true friends" of the Chinese people were welcome to stay in China, "helping us in the big cleaning." Mao thus implied that the Soviets would be such true friends.

Mao, touching upon the sensitive problem of the "American threat" to the Chinese revolution, also noted that the United States up to this point had avoided direct involvement in China's civil war. As he saw it, the United States'international obligations were too extensive and Western allies were unwilling to take risks in China. Thus, Mao stated, the Chinese Communists were truly in a favorable situation to win a nationwide victory, and were determined to do so. Mao, however, emphasized that it was yet unforeseeable if the United States would intervene directly when the PLA crossed the Yangzi River. By introducing the problem of "American threat" in such a way, Mao argued skillfully that the CCP needed the support of the Soviet Union without scaring the Russians away. ₂₂

Although Mao was eager to seek the Soviets'support of China's economic reconstruction and military buildup, he made no concrete request for Soviet assistance. This task was left for Zhou Enlai. After the formal meetings, Zhou met with Mikoyan separately. He further explained the plans for the construction of China's political and diplomatic framework and discussed problems such as the recovery of the transportation system and the reconstruction of China's economy after the formation of the new China. He made it clear that the CCP wanted active Soviet participation in China's post-revolution reconstruction. ₂₃

From the CCP's perspective, Mikoyan's trip to Xibaipo was important because it was the first formal contact between the CCP leadership and the Soviet Communist leaders in many years. Mao's systematic introduction of the CCP's domestic and international strategies offered the Soviets an opportunity to understand the CCP's stand and created an atmosphere conducive to discussion between equals. Mikoyan's visit thus served as the first step toward a new mutual understanding and cooperation between the CCP and the Soviet Union, which would finally lead to the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Liu Shaoqi in Moscow

After the PLA crossed the Yangzi River and occupied Nanjing in April 1949, the CCP had final victory firmly in its grasp. While constructing the domestic and international policy framework for the new China, Mao and the CCP leadership wanted to further promote relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union. In early May, CCP leaders decided that the time had come to send a delegation headed by a top CCP leader to Moscow. Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai were placed in charge of preparations for the visit. Wang Jiaxiang, a senior CCP Central Committee member and former CCP representative to the Comintern in the 1930s, was summoned back from his post as party secretary in Manchuria to assist planning the visit. ₂₄

The preparations were ready by late June and the CCP Central Committee decided to assign Liu Shaoqi to lead the mission, authorizing him to discuss with Stalin all important problems concerning the international situation and Sino-Soviet relations. He would introduce to Stalin the considerations underlying the CCP's policy line (especially the CCP's policy of including non-Communist democrats into the CCP-led People's Political Consultative Conference), convince Stalin that the Chinese Communists were not Titoists, and lead the Soviets to a better understanding of China's situation and the nature of the Chinese revolution. He would also pursue practical Soviet support of the Chinese Communist regime, including a guaranteed Soviet recognition of the new China and Soviet military and other assistance. If everything moved smoothly, this mission would open the way for a personal trip by Mao to the Soviet Union in the near future. ₂₅

Mao and the CCP leadership saw Liu's visit as a crucial step in establishing strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Following Wang Jiaxiang's suggestion, the CCP Central Committee prepared a long memo for Liu to present to Stalin, which summarized the new China's domestic and international policies. The memo made it clear that the CCP would win China's civil war, and that the complete liberation of the whole of China was only a matter of time. The CCP leadership believed that it was now almost impossible for imperialist countries to intervene in large scale on the GMD's behalf. The imperialist countries, though, might send troops to disturb China's coastal areas or to carry out an economic embargo against China. This, however, would not change the outcome of China's civil war.

The memo gave a detailed introduction to the CCP's domestic policy, particularly the party's design of the new China's government structure. While emphasizing that the new China would adopt a system of "people's democratic dictatorship," the memo argued that such a system was in nature compatible with Lenin's ideas about "the dictatorship of workers and peasants."

Regarding the new China's foreign policy, the memo made it clear that the CCP would firmly stand on the side of the Soviet Union and other "new democratic countries" while at the same time "fighting against imperialist countries as well as maintaining the complete independence of the Chinese nation" in international affairs. The memo explicitly stated that "the relationship between the Chinese and Soviet parties and the consolidation of the friendship between the Chinese and Soviet nations were extremely significant for the two countries as well as to the whole world." The memo also mentioned that Mao planned to visit the Soviet Union when the new China and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations. ₂₆ To guarantee the success of Liu's trip, Mao knew that he had to do something significant and noticeable. His lean-to-one-side statement was apparently the signal introduced to catch Stalin's attention. When Mao praised the Soviet Union as the undisputed leader of the international progressive forces, he sent an unmistakable message to Stalin: now Stalin had no reason to suspect that the CCP leadership shared the thinking of Titoism.

Liu's delegation left Beijing on July 2. After an eight-day journey, the delegation arrived in Moscow on July 10. Among members of the delegation were Gao Gang, Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Liqun, and Ge Baoquan. Shi Zhe was Liu's interpreter and Xu Jiepan was Gao Gang's. I. V. Kovalev, the Soviet general adviser to China, accompanied the delegation to Moscow. ₂₇ During the CCP delegation's stay in the Soviet Union, they held four formal meetings with Stalin and other top Soviet leaders, in which they touched upon a series of crucial themes.

First, to the surprise and satisfaction of Liu and his comrades, Stalin apologized for having failed to give sufficient assistance to the CCP during the civil war. According to Shi Zhe's recollection, Stalin asked Liu at the second meeting: "Have we disturbed you [in China's civil war]?" Liu replied: "No!" Stalin answered: "Yes, we have been in the way of hindrance to you because our knowledge about China is too limited." ₂₈ Although Stalin's apology came in a private meeting, it deeply impressed Mao and his fellow CCP leaders. Most important, CCP leaders viewed this as a clear sign of Stalin's willingness now to treat his Chinese comrades as equals. ₂₉ Later, many top CCP leaders, including Mao, Liu, and Zhou, mentioned Stalin's apology on different occasions, using it as a strong justification for the CCP's lean-to-one-side approach. ₃₀

Second, the discussion focused on Soviet support of the newly established Chinese Communist regime. Around the time of Liu's visit, CCP leaders were concerned about the problem of international recognition of the Communist regime in China. While convinced that the United States and other Western countries would not offer quick recognition to the new regime, Mao and the CCP leadership were not sure if Moscow and the "new democracies" in Eastern Europe would do so either. Liu spent much time explaining to Stalin the CCP's domestic and international policies. He emphasized that the system of people's political consultative conference, which the CCP would adopt in China, followed China's specific situation, especially the fact that the CCP had a united front with several "democratic parties" in the struggle against the GMD. Under no circumstances would the CCP give up its leadership in post-revolution China. Stalin's response was again very positive and explicitly approved the CCP's domestic policy. ₃₁ When Liu told Stalin that the CCP planned to establish a central government on January 1, 1950, Stalin advised the Chinese to take this step even earlier, stressing that "a long period of anarchy in China should not be allowed." He also promised that as soon as the CCP established a central government the Soviet Union would recognize it. Encouraged by Stalin's attitude, the CCP leadership decided to hasten the formation of the central government, and the CCP's confidence in Soviet support was thus bolstered. ₃₂

Third, Liu's visit produced a CCP-Soviet cooperation on the settlement of the Xinjiang (Sinkiang)problem, which was a substantial achievement for the CCP. As a strategically important region located in northwestern China next to Russian Kazakh, northern part of Xinjiang had long been viewed by the Russians as within their sphere of influence. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several bloody disputes took place between China and Russia in northern Xinjiang. After the triumph of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, Lenin's Soviet Russia acknowledged China's sovereignty over Xinjiang, but the Soviet Union had never fully relinquished its claim of interests there. In November 1944, a pro-Communist rebellion backed by the Soviet Union erupted in Tacheng, Ili, and Ashan (the three northernmost counties in Xinjiang)and the rebels had since controlled that area. When the CCP achieved decisive victory against the GMD in China's civil war in 1949, Xinjiang became one of few regions still controlled by the GMD. During Liu's visit to the Soviet Union, Stalin told Liu that, according to Soviet intelligence reports, the United States planned to use Muslim GMD forces in northwestern China to establish an independent Islamic republic in Xinjiang, which he believed would be extremely harmful to both the CCP and the Soviet Union. He offered to use the Soviet-supported revolutionary forces in northern Xinjiang to check the GMD so that it would be easier for the PLA to enter Xinjiang. ₃₃ Then Moscow helped the CCP Central Committee to establish direct contact with the revolutionary forces in northern Xinjiang by assisting Deng Liqun, the CCP Central Committee's liaison person, to travel from Moscow to northern Xinjiang. Before the PLA finally took over Xinjiang in October 1949, the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia became the main link of communications and transportation between the CCP Central Committee and CCP agents in Xinjiang. ₃₄

Most important of all, Liu's conversations with Stalin produced a crucial consensus: while the Soviet Union would remain the center of international proletarian revolution, the promotion of Eastern revolution would become primarily China's duty. Stalin stressed that the world revolutionary forces were marching forward and much stronger than ever before. He expressed the hope that the CCP would play a more active role in advancing the rising tide of world revolution, especially in East Asia. Stalin stressed that he was not flattering the Chinese. He believed that since the Chinese had greater influence in the colonial and semi-colonial countries in the East, it would be easier for China to help promote Eastern revolution than the Soviet Union. Liu, on the other hand, emphasized to Stalin that the Chinese viewed the Soviet Union as the undisputed leader of the progressive forces of the world. He seemed very cautious in acknowledging before Stalin that China would become the center of the Eastern revolution. Indeed, when Stalin toasted "the center of revolution moving to the East and China," Liu refused to respond. But Liu agreed that ₃₅

Such an agreement on "division of labor" between the CCP and the Soviet leaders was based on their fundamental assessment of the world situation in the late 1940s. According to both Shi Zhe and Kovalev, when Liu asked Stalin's opinion about the possibility of a new world war, Stalin made it clear that the United States was not in a position to start a new world war against the Soviet Union at the moment and that this offered the Communists an opportunity to develop their own strength. ₃₆ Shi Zhe recalls that when the Chinese were in Moscow, Stalin invited them to a documentary film which allegedly had recorded the Soviets testing an atomic bomb. ₃₇ The film recorded the whole process of the test and the Chinese were told that they were the first group of foreigners to be allowed to share the information. By showing the Chinese this film, in Shi Zhe's view, Stalin was relaying to his Chinese comrades not only that the Soviet Union possessed the bomb but also the hope that China "would be protected by the bomb owned by a friend." ₃₈

There is no indication in available Chinese materials that the Korean problem came up in Liu's talks with Stalin. ₃₉ We do know now, however, that in the summer and fall of 1949, right around the time when Liu Shaoqi was in the Soviet Union, the 164th and 166th Divisions of the PLA's Fourth Field Army, the majority of whose soldiers were of Korean nationality, were sent to North Korea. ₄₀ Considering the close relationship existing between the Soviet Union and Kim Il-sung's North Korean regime and that the problem of promoting revolutionary movements in East Asia was one of the central topics of Liu-Stalin conversations, we have no reason to exclude the possibility that members of the Chinese delegation (such as Gao Gang, who had his own interpreter and had a much closer connection with North Korea as the CCP's head in the Northeast)and the Soviets had discussed such matters as sending PLA soldiers back to Korea during their stay in the Soviet Union.

As the conversations between Liu and Stalin were progressing smoothly, the CCP and the Soviet Union quickly entered discussions for establishing military and other cooperation between them. ₄₁ On July 26, 1949, the CCP Central Committee cabled Liu, instructing him to explore with Stalin whether the Soviet Union would be willing to supply the Chinese with 100 to 200 Yak fighters and 40 to 80 heavy bombers, to help the Chinese train 1,200 pilots and 500 technicians in Soviet air schools, and to send air force advisers to China. If the Soviets agreed to the first two requests, the CCP Central Committee stated, Liu Yalou, commander of China's newly established air force, would visit the Soviet Union immediately to work out the details. ₄₂ Following the CCP Central Committee's instructions, Liu Shaoqi met with Stalin, Bulganin, and other Soviet leaders on July 27 to discuss these CCP requests. The Soviet response was positive. Instead of accepting Chinese trainees in the Soviet Union as suggested by the CCP, they offered to assist the Chinese in establishing pilot schools in Manchuria. They also agreed to receive Liu Yalou in Moscow for more detailed discussions. Stalin promised Liu Shaoqi that he would authorize the Soviet Ministry of Armed Forces to give the Chinese requests favorable considerations. Liu Shaoqi telegraphed Stalin's promise to the CCP Central Committee immediately. ₄₃

After receiving Liu Shaoqi's report, the CCP Central Committee decided at once to send Liu Yalou to the Soviet Union. On July 29, Zhou Enlai informed Liu that he and three other Chinese air force officers should prepare to leave Beiping for the Soviet Union in three days. ₄₄ On July 31, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai received Liu, and instructed him to pursue Soviet support in establishing the new China's air force. Both Mao and Zhu emphasized that the main task of the CCP's air force was to help land forces to liberate Taiwan. It should therefore take the United States and the GMD as its primary enemies. ₄₅

The Chinese air force delegation arrived in Moscow on August 11. Liu Shaoqi was originally scheduled to return to China in early August. To await the Chinese air force delegation and personally introduce them to the Soviets, Liu stayed in Moscow until mid-August. On August 13, led by Liu Shaoqi and Wang Jiaxiang, Liu Yalou and his fellow Chinese air officers met with Marshal Aleksander Mikhailovich Vasilevskii, the Soviet minister of armed forces. The Chinese side, introducing to the Soviets the details of their own plans, requested the Soviets to help them establish an air force composed of 300-350 planes within one year. Marshal Vasilevskii made it clear that Stalin had already ordered the Soviet air force to do its best to assist the Chinese. This meeting concluded with an agreement leaving the details to air force officers of the two sides to work out. ₄₆

Liu Shaoqi left Moscow on August 14, accompanied by 96 Russian experts who were to assist China's economic reconstruction and military build-up. Altogether more than 200 Soviet experts would come to China in weeks as the result of Liu's visit. ₄₇ The Chinese and Soviets set up a joint committee, headed by Mikoyan on the Soviet side and Liu Shaoqi and Gao Gang on the Chinese side, to handle Soviet loan and material assistance to China (Stalin agreed to offer China loans of $300 million). ₄₈ Negotiations between the Chinese air force delegation headed by Liu Yalou and the Soviets also developed without difficulty. The two sides reached an agreement on all details of Soviet assistance to China by August 18. The Soviet side agreed to help the CCP to establish six aviation schools, including four for fighter pilots and two for bomber pilots, so that the training of 350 pilots would be completed within a year. The Soviet Union also agreed to sell 434 planes to China, and 878 Soviet air experts would come to work in China. ₄₉ Stalin approved these details in early October. ₅₀ On October 15, the Soviets delivered the first group of Yak-12 planes to China. Nine days later, the first group of 23 Soviet air force experts arrived in Beijing. On December 1, all of the six aviation schools were established with the assistance of the Soviets. By the end of 1949, China had received 185 planes of different types from the Soviet Union. ₅₁

In late September, another Chinese delegation, headed by General Zhang Aiping, came to Moscow to work out the details of establishing China's navy with Soviet assistance. They quickly reached agreement with the Soviets. The Soviet Union would now take responsibility for assisting the new China's naval construction. In October and November of 1949, the first group of 90 Soviet naval advisers arrived in China. ₅₂

As CCP-Soviet relations developed, Sino-American relations deteriorated. Mao responded to the China White Paper by starting a nationwide anti-American propaganda movement to criticize America's China policy while at the same time praising the Soviet Union. After Liu Shaoqi returned from the Soviet Union, he addressed a party conference attended by high-ranking cadres on September 3, 1949. He emphasized that the new China's unity with the Soviet Union represented the "most important interests" of the Chinese people and was thus crucial to China's national security and reconstruction. "While assistance from imperialist countries was an act of aggression," according to him, "the support from the Soviet Union was designed to ₅₃

Liu could easily find evidence to support his statement. Indeed, less than two months after Mao's issuance of the lean-to-one-side statement, substantial Soviet support began to arrive in China. Mao and the CCP leadership, knowing Stalin's attitude, became more confident in dealing with the United States and other "imperialist'countries. To further change the lean-to-one-side approach from rhetoric to reality, the CCP leadership now had every reason to base China's foreign policy and security strategy on a close alliance with the Soviet Union.

The Mao-Stalin Meetings

The next six months were to see further dramatic development of Sino-Soviet relations. On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was formally established. The next day, the Soviet government informed Zh Soviets. The Soviet Union would now tou Enlai of its decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and to break relations with the GMD. ₅₄ A pleased Mao personally composed the Xinhua News Agency release on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union. ₅₅ Accordingly, CCP leaders decided to establish diplomatic relations with all "new democratic countries." ₅₆

To continue the construction of Communist China's lean-to-one-side diplomatic framework, the CCP Central Committee decided in early October that it was time for Mao to travel to Moscow and began laying grounds for this visit immediately. On October 20, Mao informed Stalin of the appointment of Wang Jiaxiang, deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe, as China's first ambassador to the Soviet Union. Mao emphasized to Stalin that Wang, as a member of the CCP Central Committee, would not only be responsible for "general affairs concerning those new democratic countries in East Europe" but also represent the CCP Central Committee "to contact with you and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party for affairs between our two parties." The naming of Wang Jiaxiang as ambassador indicated Mao's determination to promote cooperation with the Soviets. ₅₇

Mao hoped that his visit would result in a new treaty with the Soviet Union, one that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty between the GMD and the Russians. ₅₈ This, as Mao saw it later, "would place the People's Republic in a favorable position by forcing those capitalist countries to fit themselves to our principles; foreign countries would be forced to recognize China unconditionally as well as to abolish those old treaties and sign new treaties with us; and those capitalist countries would dare not to take rash actions against us." ₅₉

While a new alliance with the Russians was Mao's first priority, he was still uncertain about how Stalin would receive him. He considered bringing Zhou Enlai with him to negotiate the treaty with Zhou's counterpart on the Soviet side, so that he himself could remain in the background. Mao decided to let Stalin determine if Zhou should come, probably to sound out Stalin's intentions. On November 9, Mao cabled Wang Jiaxiang, asking him to inform Stalin that he planned to leave Beijing in early December. He stated: "As to whether Comrade [Zhou] Enlai should come with me, or whether his coming should be decided after my arrival in Moscow, please ask Stalin to make a decision." Stalin, perhaps not understanding Mao's request, reaffirmed his invitation only for Mao. On November 12, Mao replied to Stalin that he would leave Beijing for Moscow in early December without mentioning concrete plans for the forthcoming visit. ₆₀

Mao left Beijing by train on December 6, 1949. Among Mao's delegation were Chen Boda, a member of the CCP Central Committee and Mao's political secretary, Shi Zhe, the interpreter, and Luo Ruiqing, minister of internal affairs. I. V. Kovalev, then the Soviet general adviser to China, accompanied the Chinese delegation. ₆₁ After a ten-day journey across the Eurasian continent, Mao arrived at the central train station of Moscow on December 16 to a warm welcome by V. M. Molotov, Nikolai Bulganin, Andrei Gromyko, and other Soviet leaders. ₆₂ The same evening, Stalin and nearly all members of the Politburo received Mao at the Kremlin, a gesture demonstrating high respect for Mao. According to Shi Zhe, immediately after the greetings, Stalin said to Mao: "Great! Great! You have made tremendous contributions to the Chinese people. You are their good son. I wish you good health." Mao replied: "I have been oppressed [within the party] for a long time. I even did not have a place to complain . . ." Before Mao could finish, Stalin said: "Now you are a winner, and a winner should not be criticized. This is a common law." He also observed: "The victory of the Chinese revolution will change the balance of the whole world. More weight will be added to the side of international revolution. We wholeheartedly congratulate your victory and wish you to achieve greater victories." ₆₃ Stalin seemed strongly interested in developing a new relationship with China.

When Mao and Stalin began to touch upon substantive issues, however, communication between them became uneasy. During their first meeting, Stalin cautiously asked Mao about his goals for the trip. Mao evasively replied: "For this trip we hope to bring about something that not only looks nice but also tastes delicious." A cautious Mao wanted a new Sino-Soviet alliance, but he intentionally remained ambiguous to gauge the Soviet response. Shi Zhe further explained in his translation of Mao's remark that "looking nice means something with a good form and tasting good means something substantial." Stalin and other Russian leaders, however, did not seem to understand Mao's meaning. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, a Soviet Politburo member, laughed at Mao's expression. Stalin might have sensed Mao's real purpose, but he would do nothing until Mao clarified himself. So, when Mao asked if he should call Zhou to join him in Moscow, Stalin replied: "If we cannot make certain what we really want to work out, what is the use to call Zhou to come here." Mao, again, made no direct answer. ₆₄

We may never know why Mao did not make his points in a straightforward manner. One possible answer is that Mao adopted a tactic common in ancient Chinese diplomatic practice, "not to release your real intention until your adversary fully expresses his intention." In addition, there is another hypothetical explanation- one concerning Mao's complicated mentality in face-to-face meetings with Stalin. An examination of this mentality helps understand Mao's later complaints about his visit to the Soviet Union and meetings with Stalin, ₆₅ as well as Mao's management of China's relationship with the Soviet Union during the Korean crisis.

There is no doubt that both Mao and Stalin, as fellow Communists, had similar ideological beliefs. It is also apparent that the new China and the Soviet Union, in the face of the escalating Cold War, had many common interests. Mao therefore had strong reasons for pursuing an intimate personal relationship with Stalin, which, as he could clearly see, would greatly strengthen the foundation of the strategic cooperation between his country and Stalin's. Mao, however, was also a revolutionary leader from the "Central Kingdom," who aimed not only to realize a Communist transformation of the Chinese nation but also to reestablish China's central position in international society. Against this background it is understandable that Mao would view Stalin's attitude toward him, especially Stalin's willingness to treat him, his revolution, and his country as equals, with extremely sensitive eyes. ₆₆ In a sense, it became more important to Mao for Stalin to treat him equally than for the Soviet Union to offer substantial material aid to China. In fact, according to Shi Zhe, Mao longed for a personal apology from Stalin for the mistakes the Soviet Union had committed during the Chinese revolution. ₆₇ Psychologically this would certainly put Mao and Stalin on an equal basis and clear the history of unequal exchanges between the CCP and the Soviet Union. In Mao's view, Stalin's praise for Mao himself and the Chinese revolution was important, but not enough, because such praise could also betoken the relationship between a father and a son or an elder brother and a younger one. Mao wanted more. Stalin, however, deeply disappointed Mao as he never demonstrated any willingness to have a profound discussion with Mao about the unpleasant episodes between the CCP and the Soviet Union. ₆₈ This led Mao to suspect that Stalin still viewed China as the inferior "younger brother." ₆₉ Mao therefore would not give Stalin his full trust.

Because neither Mao nor Stalin was willing to take the initiative, Mao's visit achieved little progress in the following two weeks. On December 24, 1949, I. V. Kovalev further complicated the situation by sending Stalin a written report entitled "Several Policies and Problems of the CCP Central Committee." This report pointed out that some CCP Central Committee members, who had been anti-Soviet and pro-America in the past, were now backed by top CCP leaders; that Liu Shaoqi organized groundless criticism of Gao Gang, a pro-Soviet CCP leader in the Northeast; and that non-Communist "democratic figures" possessed many important positions in the Central People's Government of PRC, making the government virtually a united association of different political parties. Influenced by this report, Stalin regarded Mao more dubiously. Mao finally complained to the Soviets that he came to the Soviet Union not just for Stalin's birthday celebration but also to accomplish things more substantial and significant. At this point, Stalin handed this report to Mao. ₇₀ Stalin had unknowingly probed Mao's sore point.

Seeing that no substantial progress had been achieved during Mao's visit, Stalin telephoned Mao twice in late December, urging him to articulate his plans and intentions. Mao remained ambiguous. Finally, Wang Jiaxiang hinted to A. Y. Vyshinsky, the Soviet foreign minister, that Mao intended to abolish the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty and to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet alliance. ₇₁ Stalin understood that a new treaty with China would strengthen the strategic position of the Soviet Union in its deepening confrontation with the United States, and he welcomed Mao's initiative and suggested that the two leaders themselves sign the treaty. Mao, however, believed that the treaty, as a matter between the two governments, should be signed by Zhou Enlai, the Chinese prime minister and foreign minister, and Vyshinsky, the Soviet Union's foreign minister. In the last week of December, Stalin agreed to invite Zhou to Moscow to work out a Sino-Soviet alliance and related agreements. ₇₂

On January 2, 1950, Tass, the official Soviet news agency, published "Mao's interview with a Tass correspondent in Moscow," in which Mao stated: "Among those problems [I have in mind] the foremost are the matters of the current treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the Soviet Union, and of the Soviet Union's loan to the People's Republic of China, and the matter of trade and of a trade agreement between our two countries." ₇₃ That same evening, Molotov and Mikoyan visited Mao and they had an important discussion. The two Soviet leaders made it clear that they were authorized by Stalin to hear Mao's opinions and to decide what the two sides should do to make Mao's visit fruitful. Mao then expressed three considerations:

(1)We may sign a new Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. This will be very favorable to us. [By doing this], Sino-Soviet relations will be consolidated on the basis of the new treaty; China's workers, peasants, intellectuals, and leftist nationalist bourgeois will be greatly encouraged while rightist nationalist bourgeoisie will be isolated; internationally we will have more political strength [zhenzhi ziben] to deal with imperialist countries and to examine all treaties signed by China and imperialist countries in the past. (2)We may ask our news agencies to issue a joint communiqu', only mentioning that our two sides have exchanged views on the old Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty and other problems, and we have reached a consensus on all important problems....(3)We may sign an open statement, but not a treaty, to list the principles underlying our relationship.

Mao made it clear that only if the first choice was implemented would Zhou be called to Moscow. Molotov confirmed immediately that he believed the first choice was the best and Zhou should come. Mao then asked if a new treaty would be signed to replace the old treaty, and Molotov's answer was again affirmative. After the meeting, Mao directed Zhou Enlai to come to Moscow. Not wanting to give the Russians the impression that they were in a hurry to negotiate the treaty, Mao instructed Zhou "to prepare for five days . . . and come here by train not by airplane." Zhou followed Mao's instruction and did not leave for the Soviet Union until nearly two weeks after receiving Mao's telegram. ₇₄

Zhou and a large Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow on January 20, 1950. ₇₅ Two days later, Mao and Zhou had a formal meeting with Stalin and Vyshinsky. This time Mao made it clear that he favored a Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. Mao emphasized that the treaty should guarantee close political, military, economic, cultural and diplomatic relations between China and the Soviet Union, so that the two countries could stop the aggression of imperialist countries. Stalin immediately expressed his willingness to sign a treaty of alliance with China. Mao and Stalin then worked out an agenda for further negotiations for details of the treaty by Zhou and Mikoyan and Vyshinsky. They agreed that besides the treaty, the two sides would also discuss problems related to the Soviet use of the Manchurian railroad and Port Arthur, Sino-Soviet trade, and Soviet financial aid to China. This meeting paved the way for the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. ₇₆

The next day, Zhou, joined by Wang Jiaxiang, Li Fuchun, Ye Jizhuang, and Wu Xiuquan, started negotiations with Vyshinsky, Mikoyan, and other Soviet officials. Zhou focused on making the forthcoming treaty a solid military alliance. According to Wu Xiuquan, one of Zhou's top assistants, Zhou insisted that the treaty should clearly state that if one side was attacked by a third country the other side "must go all out to provide military and other assistance." ₇₇ This persistence paid off, and the treaty included a clause of explicit mutual military commitment.

In exchange for Soviet support to strengthen China's security position, Mao offered to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia and allowed the Russians to maintain their privileges in Manchuria, including control of Port Arthur (LŸshun)for several more years. ₇₈ After a long and uneasy bargaining process, the Sino-Soviet alliance came into being on February 14, 1950. At a ceremony attended by Mao and Stalin, Zhou and Vyshinsky signed the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. According to the treaty, the two sides would "make every effort possible to stop Japan's aggression and the aggression by a third state which is directly or indirectly associated with Japan's act of aggression." And "in the event of one of the High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus involved in a state of war, the other High Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal." ₇₉ Zhou and Vyshinsky also signed an agreement granting China a loan of $300 million at an annual interest of one percent. ₈₀ With an understanding reached by the two sides, the money was largely designated to cover China's purchase of Soviet military equipment. ₈₁ The Soviets agreed also that they would transfer the Southern Manchurian Railway to China by the end of 1952, and withdraw Soviet forces from Port Arthur following the signing of a peace treaty with Japan and no later than the end of 1952.

Both Mao and Stalin were greatly relieved. On the evening of February 14, Stalin, who usually did not attend banquets outside the Kremlin, personally attended Mao's farewell banquet.Three days later Mao and Zhou left Moscow. They returned home with Stalin's promise to support the Chinese revolution and Moscow's military commitment to China's national security. During Mao's visit to the Soviet Union, China ordered 586 planes from the Soviet Union, including 280 fighters, 198 bombers, and 108 trainers and other planes. On February 15, 1950, two days before Mao left for China, he wrote to Stalin to order another 628 planes. From February 16 to March 5, 1950, a mixed Soviet air-defense division, following the request of the PRC government, moved into Shanghai, Nanjing, and Xuzhou, to take responsibility for the air defense of these areas. From March 13 to May 11, this Soviet division shot down five GMD planes in the Shanghai area, greatly strengthening Shanghai's air defense system. ₈₂

These achievements were not easy for Mao to obtain, but he ultimately got them and he was generally satisfied. ₈₃ In his departure speech he called the Sino-Soviet alliance "permanent and inviolable," anticipating that it would "not only influence the prosperity of these two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, but would surely affect the future of humanity and the triumph of peace and justice all over the world." ₈₄ Zhou Enlai also stated in his departure address that "these treaties and agreements made the Chinese people feel that they were no longer isolated"; on the contrary, "they were now much stronger than ever before." ₈₅

Mao and Zhou aimed their statements largely at the enemies of the new China, especially the United States. With the making of the new Sino-Soviet alliance, both Mao and Zhou believed that Communist China now occupied a more powerful position in the face of the long-range American threat. On March 20, Zhou emphasized in an internal address to cadres of the Foreign Ministry that the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty made it less likely that the United States would start a new war of aggression in East Asia. ₈₆ One month later, in a speech to the sixth session of the Chinese People's Government Council, Mao further claimed that the victory of the Chinese revolution had "defeated one enemy, the reactionary forces at home." But, the chairman reminded his comrades, "there are still reactionaries in the world, that is, the imperialists outside China." China therefore needed friends. With the making of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the chairman emphasized, China's external position had been strengthened. "If the imperialists prepare to attack us, we already have help." ₈₇

In fact, even without Mao reminding them, American policymakers understood that the Sino-Soviet alliance represented a big blow to America's strategic interests in the Far East. The alliance symbolized the failure of "driving a wedge" into Chinese-Soviet relations, a primary State Department objective during the 1949-1950 period. As we shall see, the fact that China had now become a close Soviet ally would lead to further escalation of the Sino-American confrontation.

The Chinese-Soviet Green Light for Kim Il-sung

One of the most mysterious aspects of Mao's visit to the Soviet Union has been its connection with the Korean question. Did Mao and Stalin discuss the Korean problem during Mao's visit? Was the coming of the Korean War in any way related to the Sino-Soviet alliance? Scholars have long been unable to answer these questions because of the scarcity of reliable sources. The only clue was from the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, former prime minister of the Soviet Union. ₈₈ According to Khrushchev, Stalin and Mao had a discussion about Kim's plan to unify the Korean peninsula through military means in late 1949 or early 1950:

About the time I was transferred from the Ukraine to Moscow at the end of 1949, Kim Il Sung arrived with his delegation to hold consultation with Stalin. The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet. Kim Il Sung said that the first thrust would touch off an internal explosion in South Korea and that the power of the people would prevail....Stalin persuaded Kim Il Sung to think it over again, make some calculations, and then come back with a concrete plan. Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out. He told Stalin he was absolutely certain of success. I remember Stalin had his doubts. He feared that the Americans would jump in, but we were inclined to think that if the war were fought swiftly- and Kim Il Sung was sure that it could be won swiftly- then intervention by the USA could be avoided. Nevertheless, Stalin decided to ask Mao Zedong's opinion about Kim Il Sung's suggestion....Mao Zedong also answered affirmatively. He approved Kim Il Sung's suggestion and put forward the opinion that the USA would not interfere since the war would be an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves. ₈₉

Khrushchev's testimony was certainly important. However, since the publication of Khrushchev Remembers in the early 1970s, scholars have had little opportunity to prove or disprove his story. The emergence of new Chinese, Korean, and Russian materials in recent years places historians in a position to check the accuracy of Khrushchev's recollections and draw a more comprehensive (though still far from complete)picture of Chinese-Soviet involvement in Kim Il-sung's plan to unify his country by military means.

First of all, recently released Chinese, Russian, and Korean sources demonstrate that Khrushchev's story about the Korean War, though sometimes ambiguous and inaccurate on details, is generally consistent with these new sources. Khrushchev's description of Zhou Enlai's secret visit to the Soviet Union after the UN landing at Inchon, for example, is compatible with new Chinese sources even in small details. ₉₀ Khrushchev's recollections concerning the Korean problem should thus be treated much more seriously than those sections dealing with himself in his memoirs.

Khrushchev's recollections of Kim's discussions with Stalin about his plan to attack the South have also been proved to have their grounds. Now we know, since early 1949, Kim had made constant efforts to get Stalin's support for attack on the South. In March and April 1949, he made a highly publicized visit to the Soviet Union, during which he had extensive meetings with Soviet leaders and signed an economic and cultural agreement with the Soviets. ₉₁ He also brought to Stalin's attention the need to liberate the entire Korean peninsula in the near future. But Stalin, worried about the American reaction, did not agree with him. ₉₂

Kim's desire to liberate the South grew more acute by the end of 1949. The victory of the Chinese Communists strongly encouraged Kim to believe that he could make the same thing happen in Korea. ₉₃ Moreover, in late 1949, Communist guerrilla forces in South Korea had suffered heavy losses to the Rhee regime, possibly convincing Kim that he needed to act swiftly. ₉₄ Consequently, throughout late 1949, Kim tried to achieve Stalin's backing for "his idea of military unification of Korea." Stalin, however, remained uncertain about United States reaction. He therefore asked Kim to reconsider his plan. ₉₅

According to Khrushchev, it was Mao who convinced Stalin that the United States would not interfere militarily if Kim attacked the South because "the war would be an internal matter." ₉₆ Chinese sources now available differ on this problem. Chen Boda, Mao's political secretary who accompanied Mao to visit the Soviet Union in 1949-1950, claimed that Mao was not informed of Kim's plan during his stay in the Soviet Union, nor did he discuss any such plan with Stalin. ₉₇ Two Chinese authors, Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, assert that Mao and Stalin did discuss Kim's plan but differ from Khrushchev's account. "Mao was more cautious than both Kim and Stalin," they suggest, "he raised the possibility of American military intervention during his talk with Stalin in Moscow." ₉₈ Shi Zhe offers a more detailed account of Mao's discussion with Stalin about Kim's plan:

During Chairman Mao's visit to the Soviet Union, Stalin did talk with him about Kim Il-sung's plan to liberate the whole of Korea. Stalin told Chairman Mao that Kim had come to him with the ideas [of the plan] and he asked Kim if there existed any condition unfavorable to his plan, such as whether the Americans would intervene. He found that Kim was in a high mood. "He will only listen to the voice for his ideas, not the voice against his ideas; he was really young and brave," commented Stalin. Then Stalin asked Chairman Mao's opinions about Kim's plan, especially if he thought the Americans would intervene. Chairman Mao did not answer immediately. After a while, he said: "The Americans might not come in because this is Korea's internal affairs, but the Korean comrades need to take America's intervention into account." As a matter of fact, Chairman Mao held reservations about Kim Il-sung's plan. Chairman Mao had anticipated that Kim Il-sung would attack the South no matter what happened. ₉₉

Despite the different opinion offered by Chen Boda, strong grounds exist to conclude that the Korean problem was part of Mao's discussions with Stalin and that Mao at least did not challenge Kim's plan. In addition to Khrushchev's and Shi Zhe's recollections, we have another piece of highly reliable evidence supporting this conclusion: the information concerning a high-ranking North Korean officer's visit to Beijing in early 1950 offered in the memoirs of the late Marshall Nie Rongzhen.

While Mao was still in the Soviet Union, Kim Il-sung sent Kim Kwang-hyop ₁₀₀ to visit China, asking the Chinese to release all remaining Korean-nationality soldiers in the PLA's Fourth Field Army. According to Nie Rongzhen, acting general chief of staff of the PLA, the Chinese agreed to this request after discussions between himself and Kim Kwang-hyop. On January 19, 1950, Kim asked the Chinese to send these sold

During Chairman Mao's visit to the Soviet Unioiers to Korea with their equipment. Nie, sympathetic to the request, had to ask instructions from the CCP Central Committee. He reported this matter to the CCP Central Committee on January 21, and the Committee approved the Korean request the next day. ₁₀₁ Then, according to Nie, 14,000 Korean-nationality PLA soldiers, with their equipment, returned to Korea in the spring of 1950. ₁₀₂

The CCP Central Committee had given an unusually expeditious approval of the second Korean request. Since late 1948 and early 1949, Mao had stressed on several occasions that "in diplomatic affairs nothing was small" and everything should be reported to him and the party's Central Committee. It is thus unlikely that Nie or even Liu Shaoqi, who was in charge of CCP's daily affairs during Mao's absence, would have failed to report to Mao about such a matter which was by no means small. And if Mao could approve this request so quickly or Liu believed that he could authorize the request by himself, this indicates that both within the CCP leadership and between China and the Soviet Union there had existed a well defined consensus on the Korean problem, that is, it was the duty of the Beijing leadership to support the North Koreans'"just struggle" to unify their country.

Another key issue is Mao's assessment of the possibility of American intervention in Korea. Khrushchev emphasized that Mao believed that the Americans would not interfere militarily; Hao and Zhai stressed that Mao called Stalin's attention to the possibility of American military intervention; and Shi Zhe showed us a balanced Mao- while he thought an American intervention in Korea unlikely, he believed it unwise to ignore such a possibility. These accounts are not totally exclusive, as all agree that the possibility of American military intervention was the focus of the Mao-Stalin discussion. Shi Zhe's account seems to be most convincing. This is not only because when Mao and Stalin discussed the issue Shi Zhe personally witnessed it; it is also because Shi's account of Mao's responses to Stalin's inquiry is consistent with the well-known dialectic feature of Mao's way of thinking. Furthermore, Shi's account of Mao's response is also compatible with our knowledge of the CCP's general assessment of American intentions and capacities in East Asia in late 1949 and early 1950.

The CCP leadership, since late 1949, began to downplay the danger of American intervention in East Asian affairs. Mao and the CCP leadership did prepare for direct American military intervention in the mainland in the spring and early summer of 1949. When American intervention did not materialize as the PLA mopped up GMD forces in China's coastal areas, the CCP's perception of the "American threat" changed in late 1949. Convinced now that the prospect of an American invasion of the Chinese mainland no longer existed, CCP leaders concluded that it would take

The CCP leadership, since late 1949, began to downplay the danger of American intervention in East Asian affairs. Mao and the CCP leadership did prepare for direct American military intervention in the mainland in the spring and early summer of 1949. When American intervention did not materialize as the PLA mopped up GMD forces in China's coastal areas, the CCP's perception of the "American threat" changed in late 1949. Convinced now that the prospect of an American invasion of the Chinese mainland no longer existed, CCP leaders concluded that it would take at least five years before the United States would be ready to engage in major military operations in East Asia. U.S. vulnerability in the East seemed more obvious to the CCP in January 1950 when Secretary of State Dean Acheson excluded Taiwan and South Korea from the U.S. western Pacific defensive perimeter. ₁₀₃ What Mao told Stalin, if Shi Zhe's recollections are accurate, is compatible with the general CCP assessment of the American position in East Asia.

In the winter and spring of 1949-1950, however, the Beijing leadership was accelerating the preparations for liberating GMD-controlled Taiwan. As previously discussed, an important purpose of Mao's visit to the Soviet Union was to pursue additional Soviet support for the PLA's Taiwan campaign. Mao may not have wished to see the CCP's Taiwan campaign plan become entangled with Kim's invasion of the South. In other words, although Mao, Kim and Stalin shared common interests in promoting Communist revolutions in East Asia, they had at the same time held their own priorities. It was therefore reasonable that Mao did not give Stalin too affirmative an answer on the possibility of American intervention in Korea.

In short, the Korean problem was a part of Mao-Stalin meetings. Mao did not give active support to Kim's plan, but nor did he oppose it. As Kim had been taking Moscow as the main patron for his attack on the South, such a Chinese attitude would not impede his war preparations. And from Stalin's perspective, Mao's approach would be enough to allow him to back Kim's further war preparations. In fact, on January 30, 1950, for the first time Stalin informed Kim Il-sung in a telegram that he was now ready to discuss with Kim the plan for unifying Korea by force, and "willing to help Kim in this affair." ₁₀₄ Mao-Stalin meetings produced a Chinese-Soviet green light for Kim's plans to attack the South.

The Sino-Soviet alliance served as a cornerstone for the PRC's foreign policy during its early years. In order to pursue a close strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the CCP leadership adopted the lean-to-one-side approach. Since Liu Shaoqi's visit to the Soviet Union in July and August 1949, political, economic, and military cooperations between Beijing and Moscow had developed rapidly. Meanwhile, CCP and Soviet leaders divided spheres of responsibilities between them, leaving the promotion of revolutionary movements in East Asia primarily as China's duty. Mao's visit to the Soviet Union from December 1949 to February 1950 further promoted the Sino-Soviet strategic cooperation, resulting in the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty. It was within this context that Beijing and Moscow offered Pyongyang de facto approval for Kim Il-sung's plans to attack the South.

Shared ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism, as well as to the "world proletarian revolution," certainly played an important role in the alliance's making. The CCP's need to maintain the inner dynamics of the Chinese revolution and Mao's desire to change China's weak-power status by defying the "old world" served as additional causes for the lean-to-one-side decision. A more direct cause, though, could be found in the two leaders'concerns over the threats from the United States. While Stalin needed Beijing's support for strengthening its position in a global confrontation with Washington, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders regarded the alliance with the Soviets an effective means to check America's "ambition of aggression" against China, as well as to challenge the presence of U.S. influence in East Asia. The Sino-Soviet alliance treaty had greatly enhanced the CCP leadership's confidence in confronting the United States.

The high level of unity between Beijing and Moscow in 1949-1950, however, did not mean an absence of problems. In addition to the usual troubles between any partners (such as the differences in each other's strategic emphasis, and the gap between one's need for support and the other's ability to offer aid), an important source of differences between Beijing and Moscow lay in the conflicting personalities of Mao and Stalin. The reality created by the lean-to-one-side policy became particularly uneasy for Mao when he had to play the role as Stalin's junior in direct exchanges with the Soviets, especially in face-to-face discussions with Stalin himself. One finds here the early clues of the divergence between Beijing and Moscow during the Korean crisis and, in the long-run, of the process leading to a Sino-Soviet split.

Notes

Note 1: Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," MXJ, 4: 1477. Back.

Note 2: Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, p. 4. Back.

Note 3: Mao Zedong, "Cast Away Illusion, Prepare for Struggle," MXJ, 4: 1487-94; and Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Recollections of Several Important Decisions and Events, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1991), p. 38. Bo was a member of the Central Committee of the CCP at that time Back.

Note 4: Zhonggong dangshi tongxun (The Newsletter of CCP History), no. 24 (December 25, 1989): 4. Back.

Note 5: The date for Liu's departure for the Soviet Union follows the memoirs of Shi Zhe, who was Liu's interpreter and accompanied Liu to the Soviet Union. See Shi Zhe, "I accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," Renwu (Biographical Journal), no. 5 (1988): 6; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 396. Back.

Note 6: Yang Yunruo and Yang Kuisong, Gongchan guoji yu zhongguo geming (The Comintern and the Chinese Revolution, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1988), chapter 5; Liao Gailong, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution," Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (CCP History Studies), supplementary issue (1991): 2-4; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 213-215. For a discussion representing recent Western scholarship on this issue, see Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, chapter 5. Back.

Note 7: Liao Gailong, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution," p. 4; Yang and Yang, Gongchan guoji yu zhongguo geming, chapter 5. Back.

Note 8: Liao Gailong, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution," pp. 5-6. Back.

Note 9: Ibid., p. 7; Westad, Cold War and Revolution, chapter 1; see also Wang Tingke, "The Impact of the Yalta System upon the Relationship between Stalin and the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution," Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, supplementary issue (1991): 12-21, especially pp. 15-16. Salisbury records that in his interview with Yang Shangkun, secretary general of the CCP's Central Military Commission in the late 1940s, he was told that "Moscow never briefed China on the Yalta agreement." Harrison E. Salibury, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), pp. 491-492, n. 15. Back.

Note 10: Li and Fang et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 616. Shi Zhe recalled that Mao complained after receiving Stalin's message: "How can a nation be completely destroyed simply because its people want to struggle for liberation? I will never believe in this." Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 307-308. Back.

Note 11: For a recent plausible discussion, see Westad, Cold War and Revolution, especially chapter 4. Back.

Note 12: Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 28. Back.

Note 13: It was Mao who first released in a speech on April 11, 1957 that Stalin had advised the CCP before the PLA's crossing of the Yangzi River that the Chinese Communists should not try to cross the Yangzi, "otherwise the Americans would interfere." (See Dangshi ziliao tongxun, no. 22 [1982]: 13.) Zhou Enlai, according to the memoirs of Liu Xiao, Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union (1955-1962), also confirmed that Stalin advised the CCP not to cross the Yangzi (see Liu Xiao, Chushi sulian banian [Eight Years as Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Beijing: The Press of Party Historical Materials, 1986], p. 4). In recent years, whether or not Stalin had advised Mao and the CCP leadership is a question that has been widely debated by Chinese researchers. While Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou, two former Chinese diplomats, allege that they found no reliable evidence to prove that Stalin had ever offered such advice, the opinion of most Chinese researchers, including that of Xiang Qing's, a widely recognized authority in the field of Chinese Communist party history, is that Stalin did advise Mao and the CCP leadership not to cross the Yangzi River. For Yu Zhan and Zhang Guangyou's opinion, see their article "An Exploration of Whether Stalin Advised Our Party Not to Cross the Yangzi River," Dangde wenxian, no. 1 (1989): 56-58. For the opinion of Xiang Qing and others, see Xiang Qing, "My Opinion on the Question Whether Stalin Had Advised Our Party Not to Cross the Yangzi River," Dangde wenxian, no. 6 (1989): 64-66; Liao, "The Relations between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Revolution," p. 7; Chen Guangxiang, "An Exploration of Stalin's Interference with the PLA's Crossing the Yangzi River," Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, supplementary issue (1990): 98-100, 11. For a Russian perspective of this problem, see Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," pp. 49-50. Back.

Note 14: Mao and other CCP leaders were unhappy with the Soviet attitude toward China's civil war. Mao stressed on several occasions that "the Chinese revolution achieved its victory against the will of Stalin." Zhou Enlai also observed: "The Soviet policy [toward China's civil war] was largely the result of their erroneous assessment of the international relations at that time. The Soviets were worried that the civil war in China might overturn the established sphere of influence set up by the Yalta conference, thus leading to an American intervention and making the Soviet Union suffer. Stalin was also scared by the prospect of a Third World War. The point of departure of Stalin's policy was to appease the United States [in China] so that the Soviet Union would be guaranteed time necessary for their peaceful reconstruction. The Soviet Union had a strong reservation upon our ability to liberate the whole China....There existed fundamental divergences between us and the Soviet leaders regarding the international situation as well as our ability to liberate the whole China." Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships," MXJ, 5: 286; Liu Xiao, Chushi sulian banian, pp. 4-5; see also Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang: Wu Xiuquan huiyilu (The Vicissitude of My Life: Wu Xiuquan's Memoirs, Shanghai: Shanghai Literature Press, 1986), p. 181. Back.

Note 15: After the Long March, the CCP Central Committee reestablished telegraphic communication with the Comintern in 1936. In November 1940, the CCP started to use a new set of confidential codes offered by the Comintern to communicate with Moscow, and the telegraphic communication between Yanan and Moscow became very reliable. Mao personally controlled communications with the Comintern and the Soviet Union. He frequently sent long reports to the Comintern and, after the dissolution of the Comintern, to Stalin and the Soviet party, which kept the Soviets well informed of the CCP's strategies and policies. See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 200-217, 307-320, 347-348; Yang and Yang, Gongchan guoji yu zhongguo geming, pp. 367-368. Back.

Note 16: For plausible discussions, see Yang Kuisong, "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy toward the United States," p. 30; and Niu Jun, Cong Yanan zouxiang shijie, pp. 272-274. Back.

Note 17: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 365-366; Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," pp. 46-47. Back.

Note 18: The CCP Central Committee, "Resolution on the Problem Concerning the Yugoslavian Communist Party," July 1, 1949, CCA; The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Circulating the Northeast Bureau's Resolution on Learning Lessons from the Problems Concerning the Yugoslavian Communist Party," August 4, 1948, the United Front Department of the CCP Central Committee, comp., Minzu wenti wenjian ji (A Collection of Documents on National Problems, Beijing: CCP Central Academy Press, 1991), pp. 1155-1157. The quote is from the second document, p. 1155. Back.

Note 19: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 365-367. Back.

Note 20: Cited from Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, p. 36. Back.

Note 21: Stalin to Mao Zedong, January 14, 1949, and Mao Zedong to Stalin, January 17, 1949 cited from MNP, 3: 438-439; see also Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 6; Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 718. Back.

Note 22: This account of Mao's talks with Mikoyan is based on my interviews with Shi Zhe in May 1991 and August 1992, and Shi Zhe, "With Mao and Stalin: the Reminiscences of a Chinese Interpreter," (translated by Chen Jian), Chinese Historians, 5, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 35-44. This part of Shi's memoirs is written with the assistance of Li Haiwen, a senior researcher of the CCP history who has archival access. For a Russian version of Mikoyan's meetings with Mao offered by Kovalev, see Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," pp. 48-49. According to Kovalev, Mao cited the opinion of a "female leader of the revolutionary wing of the Kuomintang" to put forward the question of Soviet Union returning to China the China-Changchun railroad, as well as allowing China to restore sovereignty over Outer Mongolia, and that Mikoyan responded that he was not authorized to discuss such matters (Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," p. 49). Shi Zhe denies that Mao had ever touched upon a topic like this in his conversations with Mikoyan. See Li Haiwen, "A Distortion of History: An Interview with Shi Zhe about Kovalev's Recollections," Chinese Historians, 5, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 61-62. Back.

Note 23: Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 6; Jin Chongji, Zhou Enlai zhuan, pp. 742-43; Yan Changlin, Zai dajuezhan de rizi li (In the Days of Decisive Campaigns, Beijing: Chinese Youth Press), 1986, p. 222; Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949," p. 75. Back.

Note 24: Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 7. Back.

Note 25: Ibid, p. 7; Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949,"p. 76. Back.

Note 26: For a detailed summary of the memo, see Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 398-404; for the complete text of the domestic part of the memo, see Liu Wusheng et al., Gongheguo zouguo de lu, 1949-1952, pp. 56-59. Back.

Note 27: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 396-397; Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949," p. 76; and Ge Baoquan, "In Commemoration of Wang Jiaxiang, China's First Ambassador to the Soviet Union," The Editorial Group of "Selected Works of Wang Jiaxiang," ed., Huiyi Wang Jiaxiang (In Commemoration of Wang Jiaxiang, Beijing: People's Press, 1985), p. 151. Back.

Note 28: Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 8. Back.

Note 29: According to Shi Zhe, when Liu reported to the CCP Politburo that Stalin made the apology for the mistakes he committed to the Chinese revolution, CCP leaders were "greatly moved and encouraged." Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 426. Back.

Note 30: See Wu Xiuquan, Zai waijiaobu banian de jingli (My Eight Years' Experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing: New World Press, 1984), pp. 4-5; Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, pp. 21-22. Back.

Note 31: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 404-405. Back.

Note 32: Ibid., pp. 405, 418-419; Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," pp. 9-10. Back.

Note 33: Zhu Peimin, "The Process of the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang," Kashi shiyuan xuebao (The Journal of Kashi Normal College), no. 4 (1989): 14-15; Deng Liqun, "Before and After Xinjiang's Peaceful Liberation: A Page of Sino-Soviet Relations," Jindaishi yanjiu (Studies of Modern History), no. 5 (1989): 143-144; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 407-408. Kovalev confirms that Stalin promised Liu Shaoqi that the Soviets "were prepared to give direct assistance in the [CCP's] liberation of Xinjiang." See Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," p. 69. Back.

Note 34: Zhu Peimin, "The Process of the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang," pp. 16-17; Deng Liqun, "Before and After Xinjiang's Peaceful Liberation," p. 144. Back.

Note 35: Shi Zhe, "Random Reflections of Comrade Liu Shaoqi," Geming huiyilu (Revolutionary Memoirs), supplementary issue, no. 1 (October 1983): 110-111; Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 10. Back.

Note 36: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 406-407; Kovalev recalls that Liu asked Stalin if the Soviet Union could use air force and submarines to support the PLA's attack on Taiwan. Stalin refused because he feared a direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," pp. 52-53; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 69). Shi Zhe denies that Liu had ever put forward such request (See Li Haiwen, "A Distortion of History," p. 62). No other Chinese sources can confirm this part of Kovalev's recollections. Back.

Note 37: The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, and Liu Shaoqi left the Soviet Union in mid-August, so this film-showing must have depicted something else. But Shi Zhe insisted that they were told that the film recorded a successful bomb test. Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.

Note 38: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 410. According to Kovalev, Stalin told Liu at one meeting: "The Soviet Union is sufficiently strong now not to fear nuclear blackmail by the United States." Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," p. 52. Back.

Note 39: Shi Zhe could not recall if Liu had discussed with Stalin the Korean problem during his stay in the Soviet Union. Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.

Note 40: For a more detailed discussion, see chapter 4. Back.

Note 41: According to Shi Zhe, Liu Shaoqi and his delegation maintained frequent communications with the CCP Center. Liu reported to the CCP Central Committee and Mao himself immediately after each of his meetings with Stalin. Shi Zhe's recollections are supported by documents kept in Beijing's Central Archives. For example, Liu 's long report about his first meeting with Stalin on July 11 was sent to the CCP Center the next day. Interviews with Shi Zhe and Li Haiwen, August 1992. Back.

Note 42: The CCP Central Committee to Liu Shaoqi, July 26, 1949, cited from Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu (The Path to the Sky, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1989), p. 137. Lü was himself a member of the Chinese air force delegation to the Soviet Union in August 1949; see also MNP, 3:529. Back.

Note 43: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, pp. 137, 155-156; Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, p. 37; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 2: 109; and Yang Wanqing, "Liu Yalou: The First Commander of the People's Air Force," Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, no. 42 (June 1992): 220. Back.

Note 44: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, p. 138; Yang Wanqing, "Liu Yalou," p. 220. Back.

Note 45: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, pp. 144-146; Yang Wanqing, "Liu Yalou," pp. 220-224; and MNP, 3:529. Back.

Note 46: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, pp. 155-156. Back.

Note 47: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 2: 11; Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, p. 38; Li Yueran (Zhou Enlai's Russian interpreter), Waijiao wutai shang de xinzhongguo lingxiu (The Leaders of New China on the Diplomatic Scene, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1989), pp. 3-4; Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, p. 730. Zhou Enlai informed the CCP's Northeast Bureau on August 10 that Liu would be back around August 14 and with more than 200 Soviet experts, and that most of these experts would stay in the Northeast to assist the works there. See the CCP Central Committee (drafted by Zhou) to Gao Gang and Li Fuchun, August 10, 1949, telegram, CCA. See also Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," p. 48. Back.

Note 48: Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqui, Gao Gang, and Wang Jiaxing, August 4, 1949, MNP, 3: 541; see also Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949," p. 79; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 406. During Liu Shaoqi's stay in Moscow, Gao Gang, representing the Northeast People's Government, signed a trade agreement with the Soviets. The historian Mineo Nakajima believed that Gao Gang did this "apparently without consulting the Peking leadership." (Nakajima, "Foreign Relations: from the Korean War to the Bandung Line," p. 265). As Gao Gang was a member of Liu's delegation, it is highly unlikely that the CCP leadership did not have knowledge of this trade agreement between the Soviet Union and the Northeast. Back.

Note 49: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, pp. 156-169; Yang Wanqing, "Liu Yalou," p. 224; Lin Fu, et al., Kongjun shi (A History of the PLA's Air Force, Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1989), p. 38; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui , 2: 160-161. Back.

Note 50: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, pp. 168-169. Back.

Note 51: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 2: 161; and Yang Wanqing, "Liu Yalou," p. 228. Back.

Note 52: Lü Liping, Tongtian zhilu, p. 165; Yang Guoyu et al., Dangdai zhongguo haijun (Contemporary Chinese Navy, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1987), p. 48. Back.

Note 53: Liu Shaoqi, "On the Unity between China and the Soviet Union," September 3, 1949, minute, CCA; see also Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949," p. 80. Back.

Note 54: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji, 1949-1950, pp. 5-6. Back.

Note 55: Renmin ribao, October 4, 1949; see also MWG, 1: 17-18. Back.

Note 56: Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, pp. 5-6, 8-9. Back.

Note 57: Mao Zedong to Stalin, October 20, 1949, MWG, 1: 81. Back.

Note 58: In a meeting with Roschin, Soviet ambassador to China, in early November 1949, Zhou Enlai made it clear that the purpose of Mao's visit was to discuss and sign a new Sino-Soviet treaty. See the Institute of Diplomatic History under the PRC's Foreign Ministry, ed., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Activities, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1993), p. 14. Back.

Note 59: Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, January 3, 1950, MWG, 1: 213; Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, pp. 24-25. Back.

Note 60: The CCP Central Committee to Wang Jiaxiang, November 9, 1949, MWG, 1: 131; Mao Zedong to Stalin, November 12, 1949, MWG, 1: 135. Back.

Note 61: Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, p. 40; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 432; see also Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," p. 56. Back.

Note 62: Shi Zhe recalls that the Russians meticulously arranged it so that Mao's train arrived at the station exactly at noon so that Mao was welcomed by the ringing clock of the station. Mao's reception by so many high-ranking Soviet officials revealed that the Russians wanted to please him. See Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 12; and Wang Dongxing's diary entry for December 16, 1949, in Wang Dongxing, Wang Dongxing riji (Wang Dongxing's Diaries, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1993), pp. 156-157. For a Russian version of Mao's visit to Moscow, see Nikola Fedorenko, "The Stalin-Mao Summit in Moscow," Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), no. 2, 1989. Back.

Note 63: Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 13; see also Wang Dongxing, Wang Dongxing riji, pp. 157-158. Back.

Note 64: Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, p. 182; Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," pp. 13-14. Back.

Note 65: After Stalin's death, Mao would often complain about his experience in the Soviet Union. On one occasion Mao summarized Stalin's "erroneous attitude" toward the Chinese Communist revolution in history: "Stalin did a number of wrong things in connection with China....When we won the [civil] war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type. He placed great pressure on us in 1949 and 1950." Mao Zedong, "On the Ten Major Relationships," MXJ, 5: 286. Back.

Note 66: Again, as discussed in chapter 2, we should not forget that Mao defined "equality" basically as a historical-cultural issue. Back.

Note 67: Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.

Note 68: In Shi Zhe's memoirs, he recalls that Mao had been trying to have a profound discussion with Stalin on the history of the relationship between the Chinese and Soviet parties, but he never got such an opportunity. See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 438, 451-452. Back.

Note 69: During his visit to the Soviet Union, Mao expressed such feelings on several occasions. See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 443, 456-457, 463. Back.

Note 70: Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu, p. 41; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 438; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue state that Stalin did not send Kovalev's report to Mao until late January 1950 (Uncertain Partners, p. 97). However, according to Wang Dongxing's diary entry of December 28, 1949, Mao had by this day received a copy of Kovalev's report from Stalin (Wang Dongxing, Wang Dongxing riji, p. 168). Back.

Note 71: Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 437; and Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, p. 182. Back.

Note 72: Shi Zhe, "I Accompanied Chairman Mao to the Soviet Union," p. 17; Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, pp. 182-83; Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, January 2, 1950, MWG, 1: 211. Back.

Note 73: Renmin ribao, January 3, 1950; see also MWG, 1: 206. For Mao's description of the background of this speech, see Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, January 2, 1950, MWG, 1: 211. Back.

Note 74: Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, January 2, 1950, MWG, 1: 211-12; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 439-440; Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, pp. 179-180. Back.

Note 75: Among members of Zhou's delegation were Li Fuchun, vice chairman of the Northeast People's Government, Ye Jizhuang, minister of foreign trade, Wu Xiuquan, director of the Soviet-Eastern Europe Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lai Yali, deputy director of the administrative office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lü Dong, vice minister of the Industry Department of the Northeast, Zhang Huadong, vice minister of the Trade Department of the Northeast, and Ouyang Qing, mayor of the Lüda city (Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, p. 180; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 444). An air force delegation headed, again, by Liu Yalou also followed Zhou to Moscow. Their main tasks this time were to negotiate details about Soviet assistance to establish China's airborne units, ordering more planes from the Soviet Union, and asking the Soviet air force to take on air-defense responsibility in the Shanghai area. See Wang Dinglie, et al., Dangdai zhongguo kongjun (Contemporary Chinese Air Force, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), p. 78. Back.

Note 76: Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, January 25, 1950, MWG, 1: 252; Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, pp. 445-446. Back.

Note 77: Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, January 25, 1950, MWG, 1: 252; Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, pp. 184-85; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 448. Back.

Note 78: Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, January 3, 1950, MWG, 1: 213; see also Wu Xiuquan, Wangshi cangsang, pp. 186-88. According to Shi Zhe's memoirs, during one meeting between Mao, Zhou and Stalin, Zhou mentioned that the Chinese believed it necessary to issue a statement about the status of Outer Mongolia. Stalin immediately became nervous, saying that the status of Mongolia was a settled matter. Zhou then made it clear that he meant that the Chinese government needed to issue a statement to recognize Mongolia's independence. Stalin was greatly relived with Zhou's suggestion. See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jüren shenbian, p. 450. Back.

Note 79: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji, 1949-1950, pp. 75-76. The English translation here is from Grant Rhode and Reid Whitlock, Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1978 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 15b. Back.

Note 80: Simmons has suggested that the Chinese were disappointed with the amount and condition of the Soviet loan (Simmons, The Strained Alliance, pp. 72-73). New Chinese sources, however, point to something different. According to Shi Zhe, for example, the Chinese actually did not ask for a larger loan from the Soviets because Mao believed that it was not good for China to borrow too much money from abroad, even from a friendly country. Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.

Note 81: Wang Dinglie et al., Dangdai zhongguo kongjun, pp. 79-80; Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 2: 155. Back.

Note 82: Han and Tan et al., Dangdai zhongguo jundui, 2: 161; Wang Dinglie, Dangdai zhongguo kongjun, pp. 78-79, 110; Lin Fu et al., Kongjun shi, pp. 53-54; see also Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, Feburary 17, 1950, MJWJ, 6: 76. Back.

Note 83: According to Shi Zhe's recollections, on his way back to Beijing, Mao mentioned several times that he now felt much stronger in the face of the threat from imperialist countries. Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. Back.

Note 84: Renmin ribao, February 20, 1950; see also MWG, 1: 266-67. Back.

Note 85: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji, 1949-1950, p. 81. Back.

Note 86: Zhou Enlai, "International Situation and Diplomatic Tasks after the Signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty," ZWJWX, pp. 11-17. Back.

Note 87: Mao Zedong's address to the Sixth Session of the Central People's Government Council, April 11, 1950, MWG, 1: 291. Back.

Note 88: Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers trans. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Khruschchev, Khrushchev Remembers : The Glasnost Tapes, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990); and Khruschchev, "Truth about the Korean War: Memoirs," Far Eastern Affairs, no. 1 (1991): 63-69. Back.

Note 89: The quotation is from a new version of Khrushchev's recollections of the Korean War, which was first published in Russian and then published in English in Far Eastern Affairs. As Merrill has shown in his Korea: The Peninsula Origins of the War, the part related to the Korean War in Khrushchev Remembers had serious omissions compared with the original Russian tapes. The new version of Khrushchev's recollections of the Korean War contains much more information than Khrushchev Remembers . I will use the transcript of this version in my discussion and will compare it with Merrill's findings. Back.

Note 90: See Khrushchev Remembers pp. 371-772, and the discussion about Zhou's visit to the Soviet Union in October 1950 in chapter 7. See also Chen Jian, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War," working paper no. 1 published by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Cold War History Project, Washington, D.C., 1991, p. 21. Back.

Note 91: For brief discussions of this visit, see Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2 vols.(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990), 2: 344-345; Merrill, Korea: the Peninsular Origins of the War, pp. 143-144, and Goncharov, et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 137. Using South Korean intelligence reports, Merrill points out that the North Koreans and the Soviets signed a secret military agreement during Kim's visit, according to which Moscow made significant commitment to the expansion of the North Korean military machine. Back.

Note 92: The Staff of Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Background Report on the Korean War," trans. by Kathryn Weathersby, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 2, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 441; Sergei Goncharov, "Origins and the Outbreak of the Korean War: New Archival Material on the Still Uncertain Period, Beginning of 1949-June 1950" (a paper presented to a Norwegian Nobel Institute Seminar on "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the War in Korea," March 15-16, 1993), pp. 2-4. Back.

Note 93: In his testimony, Yu Song-chol recalled that when "in China the People's Liberation Army had just finished driving the Kuomintang [Guomindang] from the mainland, unifying the country....there was an envy among the KPA's hierarchy over this fact." This, together with other factors, made the North Korean Communists believe that "the time [was] ripe for war." Yu Song-chol, "My Testimony," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, December 27, 1990, p. 25. See also Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2: 370. Back.

Note 94: For plausible discussions on guerrilla activities in South Korea during this period, see Merrill, Korea: The Peninsula Origins of the War, chapters 5 and 6; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 2, chapters 7, 8, and 12. Back.

Note 95: Goncharov, "Origins and the Outbreak of the Korean War," pp. 3-28. Goncharov's investigation of Russian archival sources shows that Kim Il-sung did not visit Moscow in November or December 1949 as alleged by Khrushchev, but he did constantly try to get Stalin's support for his plans to unify Korea by military means. One Chinese source, though, citing the "Russian archival materials that were handed to China in late 1993," indicates that Kim Il-sung was in Moscow from mid-December 1949 to, probably, late January 1950, and that it was during this visit that he convinced Stalin of the feasibility of his plans to invade the South. Author's correspondence with a Chinese researcher with access to archival sources, November 1993. Back.

Note 96: Khrushchev, "The Truth of Korean War," p. 162. Merrill points out that in the original tape of Khrushchev's memoirs, his description of Mao's response to Stalin's inquiries about the possibility of American intervention was "much more hesitant and tenuous." The transcript of this part of the tape reads: "He (Stalin) asked him (Mao) what he thought about the essence behind such an action. In my opinion, to both issues Mao answered with approval-that is he approved Kim Il-sung's proposal, and also expressed the opinion that the United States wouldn't interfere in an internal matter which the Korean people would decide for themselves." (Merrill, Korea: The Peninsula Origins of the War, pp. 26-27) Back.

Note 97: Chen Boda became China's number four figure during the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. But he lost Mao's trust in 1970 and was then arrested. In 1980 he was sentenced to twenty-year imprisonment but was quickly paroled because of illness. Before his death in 1989, he had several interviews with researchers, and he offered this version of the story. See Zhu Jianrong, Mao Zedong's Korean War: China Crosses the Yalu (in Japanese), (Tokyo: Iwanami Book Store, 1991), pp. 25-26. I wish to thank Ms. Tokiko Sakuragawa for helping translate portions of Zhu's book. Back.

Note 98: Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," p. 100. Back.

Note 99: Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992. This part of Shi Zhe's recollections is not included in his Zai lishi jüren shenbian-it was omitted because of the sensitivity of the problem. A careful reader of Shi's published memoirs will find that in the name glossary following the chapter covering Mao's visit to the Soviet Union there is a listing for "Kim Il-sung," but nowhere in the chapter can the reader find any discussion about Kim. Back.

Note 100: Kim Kwang-hyop was then commander of the KPA's Second Division, who would later play a key role in the KPA's southbound march. For his career, see Robert Scalapino and Lee Chong-sik, Communism in Korea, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 2: 997-998. Back.

Note 101: Nie Rongzhen, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, pp. 743-744. Back.

Note 102: Ibid., p. 744. Interviews with Beijing's military researchers suggest that 23,000 Korean-nationality soldiers returned to Korea in spring 1950, much higher than the figure offered by Nie Rongzhen. These soldiers came from the 156th division and other units of the PLA's Fourth Field Army and were later organized as the Korean People's Army's 7th Division. This number is also much closer to figures given by Cumings in The Origins of the Korean War, 2: 363, which is based on South Korean and American intelligence sources. Back.

Note 103: Su Yu, "Report on the Problem of Liberating Taiwan," January 5, 1950, and "Report on Liberating Taiwan and Establishing Military Forces," January 27, 1950, CCA. see also Zhou Enlai, "International situation and Diplomatic Tasks after the Signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty," ZWJWX, pp. 12-14. Back.

Note 104: Goncharov, "Origins and the Outbreak of the Korean War," p. 33; Weathersby, "The Soviet Role in the Early Phase of the Korean War," p. 432. Back.