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China's Road to the Korean War
The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation
New York
1994
2. The Recognition Controversy: The Origins of Sino-American Confrontation
When Chinese Communist troops entered Shenyang, the largest city in China's Northeast, on November 2, 1948, their commanders discovered with surprise that among foreign diplomats remaining in the city was Angus Ward, the consul general of the United States. While suspecting Americans'motives for staying on in the "liberated zone" (especially given Washington's hostility toward the Chinese revolution), they sensed proudly that even the "U.S. imperialists" now could not avoid direct contact with the Chinese revolutionaries. Ward, however, had only a vague knowledge of his tasks: the State Department ordered him to remain not because of any willingness to reach an accommodation with the new Chinese Communist regime, but only in order to observe the Communist controlled zones without arousing misunderstandings about formal recognition. 1 Lacking an understanding of the profound potential confrontation between the CCP's and Washington's perceptions of each other's stance, Communist cadres and American diplomats in Shenyang failed to anticipate that the contact between them would create a point of serious conflict, finally leading to a direct Sino-American military confrontation in late 1950.
The Ward Case: The Beginning of Confrontation
Local CCP cadres'contacts with American diplomats started shortly after the Communist occupation of Shenyang. After receiving a letter from Western diplomats asking for proper protection, Zhu Qiwen, the new Communist mayor, summoned the American, British, and French consuls general to his office on November 5, promising that the Communist authorities in Shenyang would protect the foreigners remaining there and that he would issue identity cards to consular motor vehicles. Four days later, Zhu visited the three Western consuls and had cordial talks with them. Meanwhile, Ward received "several communications from local (Communist)authorities" addressed either to him "as Consul General or to the office as the American Consulate General." 2 It seemed that Zhu and the Shenyang Communist authorities were willing to deal with these Westerners in their official capacity.
Zhu's actions were not without grounds. On November 1, the CCP Central Committee summarized the party's general stand toward Western diplomats in a cable, drafted by Zhou Enlai, to the party's Northeast Bureau. The cable instructed that given the special situation in the Northeast, foreign banks should not be closed after the liberation of Shenyang. Under the martial law, according to the cable, the U.S., British, and Soviet consulates should be protected by troops; and when the martial law was lifted these consulates should be guarded by police. Under no circumstance should body search be imposed upon foreign diplomats entering and leaving the consulates; neither should the consulates be searched. The cable stressed that as diplomatic practice and international custom were new to the CCP, the party should "consult with Soviet diplomatic personnel," and that while the opinions of the Soviets should be carefully considered, "(their ideas)should be treated as no more than suggestions, and any matter related to policy should be reported to the Central Committee for instructions before action." 3
Several leading members of the CCP Northeast Bureau, including its secretary and deputy secretary, Gao Gang and Chen Yun, who were also CCP Politburo members, as well as Zhu Qiwen, failed to pay enough attention to the last point of these instructions. Without asking for instructions from the central party leadership, Zhu contacted Western diplomats in his official capacity, believing that this was in tune with the CCP's long-time policy of international "united front" as well as helpful for improving the CCP's international image. 4 Ward, taking this as a sign that the Communists were willing to maintain official contacts with the United States, concluded in a report to the State Department: "It was obviously the intention of the Communist authorities at the time to recognize us and permit us to function as an official United States Government establishment." 5
The situation changed suddenly. On November 15, the CCP's Municipal Military Control Commission of the Shenyang City informed all "former" Western consulates in Shenyang, including the Americans, that no foreigners could possess a radio transmitter without special permission of the commission, and that all radio transmitters should be handed over to the commission within 36 hours. 6 In reality, this order affected only the Americans, as the British and French relied instead on regular Chinese communication channels. 7
The changing attitude of the Shenyang authorities was in the first place caused by the CCP leaders'determination to eliminate the old China's diplomatic legacies. Unwilling to treat Western establishments and personnel accredited by the GMD government as formal diplomats, the CCP Central Committee found it necessary to clarify its stand by correcting the "wrongdoings" of the Shenyang authorities. In a November 10 telegram to the Northeast Bureau, the Central Committee directed that because the British, American, and French governments had not recognized the Chinese Communist authorities, the CCP would not recognize their official status either, and that Western diplomats should be treated as common foreigners without diplomatic immunity. Criticizing the Shenyang authorities for their failure to ask instructions beforehand, the telegram emphasized that CCP local authorities should not respond to any diplomatic questions without guidance of the Central Committee. They should request instructions from the party leadership and in the meantime keep open their options. 8 After receiving this telegram, the Northeast Bureau immediately stopped treating Western diplomats according to their official status.
Shenyang's change was also the result of the advice from Soviet representatives in the Northeast, which, as is well known, had long been viewed by the Russians as in their sphere of influence. With the Chinese Communist victory in the Northeast, the Soviets did not want the CCP to allow Western diplomats to remain there in either official or unofficial capacity. I. V. Kovalev, the Soviet representative who was then helping the Chinese Communists restore railroad transportation in the Northeast, advised members of the CCP Northeast Bureau that the CCP should keep a distance from Western countries. He suggested strongly that the CCP should treat American diplomats remaining in Shenyang in the same manner as the GMD treated Soviet commercial representatives in the Northeast in 1946, that is, to cut off their external communications. He particularly mentioned that the CCP should "take control of the radio stations in those places where the Chinese comrades were sure they were operating." Leading members of the Northeast Bureau, especially Gao Gang, who had a particularly intimate relationship with the Soviets, decided to follow the advice of the Soviets to drive Western diplomats out of the Northeast by creating difficulties for them. 9
Security considerations played an additional role in the Northeast Bureau's order to requisition radio transmitters of Western consulates in Shenyang. The PLA's Fourth Field Army was then preparing to move south from Manchuria to enter the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign, a decisive military showdown between the CCP and the GMD, and CCP military planners in the Northeast worried that the remaining American diplomats might use their radio transmitters to send information about the PLA's movement to the GMD. In fact, CCP leaders in the Northeast already believed that American diplomats in Shenyang were "actively engaged in" collecting any available information about the PLA. 10 Later, in a report to the Central Committee on November 24, the Northeast Bureau concluded that U.S. consulate in Shenyang had been involved in espionage activities on behalf of the GMD regime. 11
The combination of these factors caused the Northeast Bureau to order all foreign consulates to hand over their radio stations within 36 hours. After the issuance of the order the Northeast Bureau reported it to the CCP Central Committee for the central leadership's approval. The Bureau also reported that they planned to cut off the three Western consulates from outside communications and to restrict the movement of members of these consulates so that they would be driven out of Shenyang. 12
Mao and the CCP central leadership quickly approved the Northeast Bureau's actions. In a telegram to Gao dated November 17, Mao agreed in principle to the Bureau's ideas of "driving the American, British, and French consulates out of (Shenyang)." At the same time, Mao sternly criticized Zhu Qiwen (but not Gao Gang): "Several of Zhu Qiwen's actions are ridiculously naive, such as notifying foreign consulates for the mayor's inauguration, returning visits of foreign consuls, newspapers in Shenyang publishing the information that the U.S. consulate apologized for the enemy's bombardment, and promising without careful consideration to issue passes for American motor vehicles." Mao ordered that Chen Yun and other leading CCP Northeast Bureau personnel, who were supposed to be responsible for the above mistakes, to make "profound self-criticism." Mao also directed Gao Gang to inform the Soviet Union: "So far as our foreign policy in the Northeast and the whole country is concerned, we will certainly consult with the Soviet Union in order to maintain an identical stand with it." 13
The CCP's order to requisition radio transmitters possessed by Western consulates in Shenyang immediately challenged the status of American diplomats. Following instructions of the State Department, Ward refused to hand over the transmitter, arguing that it was an "integral part of consulate establishment." 14 The Chinese Communists interpreted Ward's noncooperative response as intentionally disregarding Communist authority and violating Chinese sovereignty.
In a telegram to the Northeast Bureau on November 18, Mao further dictated the party's strategy. This time he sternly criticized the Shenyang Military Control Commission for its failure to request instructions from the party leadership before setting the 36 hour deadline. He ridiculed his comrades in Manchuria: you set the deadline and informed the three Western consulates before you reported to the Central Committee, and then you waited for the instructions from the Central Committee, allowing the deadline to be passed. Did you think you might take back the order if the Central Committee disagreed with you? Mao believed that the Northeast Bureau should execute the order immediately in the name of the Shenyang Military Control Commission. Mao also agreed that the Northeast Bureau should follow the suggestion of the Soviets to isolate the three Western consulates "so that the members of the British, American, and French consulates would evacuate in the face of difficulties and our purpose of driving them away could be reached." Criticizing once again Zhu's treatment of Western diplomats in their official capacities, Mao explicitly emphasized that "a certain foreign consul should be called as Mr., not his official title." 15
Following Mao's instructions, the Shenyang Military Control Commission cut the American consulate off from outside contacts during the afternoon of November 18. Two days later, PLA soldiers cordoned off the consulate's offices and residential compound, and Ward and his colleagues were placed under house arrest without advance warning. 16 In a letter to "Mr. Ward," the Shenyang authorities emphasized that because of his "failure (to)surrender (the)radio transmitter constitutes intentional defiance personnel (of)former American Consulate General (would)hereafter (be)forbidden intercourse with (the)outside." In addition to Ward and his wife, twenty Americans and Europeans were confined in the consulate, including two vice consuls, six clerks, one mechanic (with his wife and four children), two staff employees (and the wife of one of them), and one "stateless women." 17 Ward and his staff would not be allowed to leave China until the end of 1949.
"We Should Not Hurriedly Pursue American Recognition"
The CCP's management of the Ward case demonstrated clearly the party's deep hostility toward the United States. It also caused Mao and the party leadership to place the party's external activities under tighter central control, as well as to further clarify the party's policy principles toward the United States.
Mao found it intolerable that the Northeast Bureau had acted on its own without asking instructions from the party center, and the chairman used his criticism of Zhu's mistake as a warning to the entire party. In the following months, he emphasized repeatedly to local and provincial party authorities that they should report to the Central Committee on any matter concerning foreign affairs. In a telegram to the CCP's Tianjin Municipal Committee on January 20, Mao stressed: "Before taking any concrete step in dealing with foreign nationals, you should ask the opinions of the Central Committee, and act with the approval of the Central Committee." After the Communist occupation of Nanjing, the capital of the GMD government, in April 1949, Mao reiterated in two cables to Su Yu, then the director of the Nanjing Municipal Military Control Commission, that "you should request instructions from the Central Committee in advance in all diplomatic matters, large or small alike....Otherwise you might commit huge mistakes." 18
In order to guarantee that all party organs would "request instructions beforehand in diplomatic matters, large or small alike," the CCP Central Committee ordered in January 1949 that in every large city a special group for diplomatic problems should be established within the party's military control commission, which should be commanded by one of the leading members of the party municipal committee. The task of the group was to "study problems concerning foreign residents and diplomatic affairs, collect relevant materials, report periodically to the Central Committee and the party's regional bureau, and put forward questions and ideas for instructions." 19 Not surprising at all, diplomatic affairs had become the field most tightly and directly controlled by Mao and the CCP Central Committee even before the establishment of the People's Republic.
The events in Shenyang also drove Mao and his comrades to further contemplate the principles underlying the CCP's policy toward the United States. The central questions involved here, as Mao perceived them, were that the CCP should never compromise itself with the old China's diplomatic legacies, and that the new China should not hurriedly pursue diplomatic relations with the Western countries in general and the United States in particular. On November 23, 1948, right after Ward's detention, the CCP Central Committee cabled to the Northeast Bureau, emphasizing again that the party's basic policy toward Western countries was that it would not recognize the diplomatic relations between the GMD and those countries. 20 In a Central Committee "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," dated January 19, 1949, Mao further defined the principles the whole party had to follow: "With no exception, we will not recognize any of those embassies, legations, and consulates of capitalist countries, as well as the diplomatic establishments and personnel attached to them, accredited by the GMD government. We will treat them only as common foreigners and give them due protection." As for the party's attitude toward the United States, Mao stressed: "As American military attach's have been involved in direct support to the GMD's civil war efforts, we should dispatch our soldiers to supervise them and give no freedom of movement to them." In contrast, the directive stressed that diplomats from the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries should be treated differently, as "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union . . . had been thoroughly different from that of capitalist countries." 21
At the Central Committee's Second Plenary Session in March 1949, the CCP leadership reached the consensus that the new China should neither hastily seek recognition from, nor pursue diplomatic relations with, the United States and other Western countries. "As for the question of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries," asserted Mao, "we should not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it even for a fairly long period after country-wide victory." 22 Consequently, the decision not to recognize any foreign diplomatic establishment and personnel accredited to the GMD government was firmly established in early 1949 as one of the most important principles of the CCP's foreign policy. During 1949-1950, the CCP leadership stressed on nearly every occasion that the party would put the emphasis on pursuing strategic cooperation with the Soviet Union, and that establishing diplomatic relations with the United States and other Western countries was not a priority. 23
There were profound causes underlying the CCP leadership's negative approach toward establishing relations with the United States. In the context of the escalating Cold War, it is easy to see that this stance correlated with the CCP's perception that the world had been divided between a socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and a capitalist camp headed the United States, and that no middle ground existed between the two camps. These fundamentals left an indelible stamp on the CCP's attitude toward the recognition problem- when CCP leaders decided to lean to the Soviet-led socialist camp it is natural that they would have no illusion of an early Western recognition of the new China or establishing diplomatic relations with Western countries.
Underlying the CCP's suspicion of the United States was also the conviction that the United States had been historically hostile toward all revolutionary movements, including the Chinese revolution. Mao and other CCP theorists particularly noticed that in the twentieth century the United States had demonstrated an extreme hatred for revolutionary changes, especially those related to communism. For example, the United States had sent its troops to interfere with the Russian civil war after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, and the United States was the last major Western country to give diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. In the case of China, the United States was unsympathetic toward both the 1911 Revolution and the Great Revolution from 1924 to 1927, as well as the Chinese Communist movement. 24
Washington's continuous support of the GMD regime in China's civil war further confirmed the CCP's perception that the United States was the enemy of the Chinese revolution. Ever since the outbreak of the Chinese civil war, the CCP had constantly criticized Washington's pro-Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek)approach. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders were further angered by the fact that U.S. Congress had passed appropriations in 1948 and 1949 to buttress the GMD's economic and military position. In the Central Committee's "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs" of January 19, 1949, Mao and Zhou justified their policy of not recognizing diplomatic representatives accredited by the GMD regime by stating that "as many governments of imperialist countries, the U. S. imperialist government in particular, had supported the reactionary GMD government in opposing the liberation cause of the Chinese people, it would be very logical for us not to recognize their representatives in China as formal diplomats." So long as the United States still stood by Jiang's regime, CCP leaders would not agree to a diplomatic relationship with the United States. 25
Mao's concerns over the impact early Western recognition might produce on China's domestic situation was another reason for the CCP's unwillingness to pursue relations with Western countries. To maintain revolutionary momentum after victory, Mao and his comrades believed it necessary to slow down the establishment of diplomatic relations with the West, the United States in particular. Party leaders concluded at the Central Committee's Second Plenary Session that in order to prevent imperialist countries from sabotaging the revolution from within the new China must not establish diplomatic relations with imperialist countries until imperialist privileges, power, and influence in China had been eliminated. 26 Mao's belief that economically China could live on its own further convinced him that Western recognition would not play a crucial role in reconstructing the new China. 27
In a deeper sense, the CCP's attitude toward the recognition problem reflected the CCP leaders'comprehension of the history of China's century-old humiliating relations with the West. What dominated the thinking of Mao and his comrades here was again the revolutionary nationalism deeply rooted in China's history and modern experience.
China's modern exchanges with the West were to Mao and his comrades most humiliating and painful. China had lost its historical glory as the result of Western incursions after the 1840 Opium War. In the eyes of Mao and his fellow CCP leaders, the United States and other Western Powers had never treated China equally in modern history, and they thus had a strong suspicion whether the Western Powers in general and the United States in particular would treat the new China as an equal. Mao explained at the Second Plenary Session: "We are willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we should not grant them legal status in China." 28
The key concept here is the idea of "equality" as defined by Mao. The CCP based their dealings with the United States in 1949-1950 on this concept and emphasized it repeatedly as the prerequisite for accommodation. Mao viewed "equality" basically as a historical problem pointing out that Sino-American relations had been dominated by a series of unequal treaties since China's defeat in the Opium War. He believed that in a moral sense the United States and other Western Powers owed the Chinese a heavy debt. As the first step toward establishing an equal relationship, he argued, the United States had to end as well as apologize for its unequal treatment of China. Only when the historical phenomenon of unequal exchanges between China and the West ended would it be possible for the new China to establish relations with Western countries. 29 So, Mao's definition of "equality" not only meant a total negation of America's roles in China in modern times; it also posed a crucial challenge to the existing principles of international relations followed by the United States and other Western powers. In Mao's opinion, America's willingness to change its attitude toward China represented a pass-or-fail test for American policymakers; and he believed that the United States could not pass the test.
This specific definition of "equality," however, was unacceptable to the Americans. President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other American policymakers of their generation came to the political scene in an age when America had become a world power. Compared with their predecessors, they had much more aggressive and extensive an understanding of the concept "American interests." This fact, combined with a long-existing belief in the superiority of American institutions and values, made this generation of American policymakers often exaggerate the power and influence of the United States, thus confusing their own definition of "principles of international relations" with the universal principles that should be obeyed by everyone in the world. They were therefore neither in a position nor willing to comprehend the real meaning of Mao's concept of "equality." In the final analysis, this reflected the divergences in political interests and ideologies of the two sides, as well as a profound confrontation of a cultural-psychological nature.
Mao and his fellow CCP leaders led their revolution toward victory through practical efforts. They certainly had the sense to fit their policies to reality. Least of all would they want to see China totally isolated in the world. As long-time players of the "united front" strategy, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders were more than willing to weaken the threat of the enemies and potential enemies toward revolutionary China. While facing Western countries on the recognition problem, Mao and the other CCP leaders tried to distinguish between primary and secondary enemies. Strongly influenced by the Chinese diplomatic tradition of "utilizing the barbarians to check the barbarians" (yi yi zhi yi), they hoped to treat with certain Western countries differently to counterbalance the United States, perceived as their most dangerous enemy. Zhou Enlai stressed at the enlarged Politburo meeting in January 1949 that the CCP should not only distinguish between the "international democratic front" and "imperialist front" but should take advantages from contradictions among imperialist countries as well. 30 Mao and Zhou reminded their comrades that the CCP needed to treat "concrete diplomatic cases differently in light of the real nature of the problem and the circumstance" in order to "show flexibility while staying firm on problems concerning principles." 31 In July 1949, when CCP organs in Shanghai reported that there were signs that problems existed between British and Americans remaining in Shanghai, Mao stated in a telegram to the CCP East China Bureau that "as contradictions existed between the United States and Great Britain on the China problem, we should be ready to take advantage of these contradictions." 32 Mao and the other CCP leaders did not want to become ideological diehards.
The question involved here, however, is how to assess the limits arly 1970s, many scholars have argued that the of flexibility of the CCP's external policy in the late 1940s. Since the CCP's hostility toward the United States was basically a response to American hostility toward the CCP, and that if Washington's China policy had been more flexible, the CCP's policy toward the United States could have been less hostile. Consequently, these scholars believed that the CCP's foreign policy was in its essence "situational," and that with a different American policy an accommodation could have emerged between the revolutionary China and the United States in the late 1940s. 33
These scholars have exaggerated the flexibility of the CCP's foreign policy while at the same time neglecting the party leadership's determination to adhere to the party's fundamentals. In fact, almost every time Mao mentioned that the CCP should maintain flexibility in its dealing with Western countries, he always emphasized that under no circumstance should the party sacrifice its basic revolutionary principles. For example, when Zhou talked at the January 1949 Politburo meeting about taking advantage of the contradictions among imperialist countries, he emphasized particularly that while doing so the party should never waver from its own principles. 34 In the telegram to the CCP East China Bureau in July 1949, Mao called on to the possibility of utilizing the contradictions among the imperialists, but he stressed at the same time the need for the party to adhere to diplomatic principles established by the central leadership. 35 Mao and the CCP leadership thus created a situation allowing little space for a flexible foreign policy, let alone an accommodation with the United States.
Washington's Nonrecognition Strategy
For Washington's policymakers, the Ward case posed serious challenges on how to deal with a revolutionary regime. For a period, they were unclear what had occurred in Shenyang. The State Department tried to use diplomatic channels to reestablish contact with the Shenyang consulate, while at the same time limiting publicity in order not to complicate the situation. 36 Starting in early December 1948, George Hopper, U.S. consul general in Hong Kong, repeatedly contacted Qiao Mu (Qiao Guanhua), head of the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua News Agency, to regain communication with the Shenyang consulate. Qiao, refusing to assist the Americans in reestablishing contact with the Shenyang Consulate, responded in January 1949 that the Ward case "was part of a larger question of U.S. attitude toward new government and toward the KMT (GMD)." 37 In the following months, the State Department continued to instruct Hopper and O. Edmund Clubb, U.S. consul general in Beiping, to convey the message that the U.S. government took the CCP's mistreatment of American diplomats in Shenyang as "a violation of international law and custom." As of May 1949, however, the Americans achieved no progress toward the solution of the Ward case. They were told only that the CCP's regulations would not permit official contact with American diplomats in Shenyang "owing to the absence of recognition." 38
Under the shadow of the Ward case, policymakers in Washington found it more difficult than before to discuss the recognition problem with the CCP. Confident in America's values, strength, and influence, they saw recognition (or the threat of nonrecognition)as a possible weapon to put pressure on the CCP. From the beginning, they linked America's recognition of Communist China to the CCP's willingness to fulfill China's obligation in established treaties and agreements with foreign countries. For example, on February 3, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson instructed Clubb to make it clear on an "appropriate occasion" that the CCP's acceptance of Chinese treaty obligations was the basis for American recognition of the Communist regime. 39 On May 13, 1949, three weeks after the Communist occupation of Nanjing, mentioned earlier, Acheson cabled to Stuart three basic conditions for American recognition: "a. de facto control of territory and administrative machinery of state, including maintenance public order; b. ability and willingness of govt to discharge its international obligations; c. general acquiescence of people of country in govt in power." 40 The key here was that the CCP should prove to the United States that it had the ability and willingness to "discharge its international obligation." He implied that the United States would not recognize the Chinese Communist regime until it adjusted its attitudes in line with the diplomatic heritage of the old China and adjusted its foreign policy to the standards set by the Americans.
The Ward case certainly played a role in Washington's adoption of a nonrecognition policy toward the new Chinese Communist regime. Indeed, it is inconceivable that Washington would have given positive consideration to a revolutionary regime at a time when it was detaining American diplomats. In this sense, the CCP's management of the Ward case, as Acheson viewed it, precluded the possibility of any American recognition of Communist China. 41
However, Washington's nonrecognition policy had a background much broader and more complicated than the gloomy impact of the Ward case. First and foremost, this policy was the product of the emerging Cold War and America's global strategy of containment. To understand this problem, we need to review briefly the American economic-political strategy toward China aimed at preventing "China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet power."
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union emerged as the main adversary of the United States in the world. In order to meet the challenge of the perceived Soviet threat on a global scale, policymakers in Washington made the containment of the expansion of Soviet influence in the Far East a primary goal of U.S. policy toward China. In the final analysis, it was the desire to contain Soviet expansion that determined America's generally pro-Jiang policy during China's Civil War. 42
Jiang's impending defeat in China forced policymakers in Washington to reexamine the means and goals of American China policy in late 1948 and early 1949. Preoccupied with a series of crises with the Soviet Union in Europe, especially the one caused by the Berlin blockade, the Truman administration's review of its China policy focused on the possible impact of the rise of a Communist China upon the overall confrontation between the two superpowers. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson and others in Washington wanted to prevent the triumph of the Chinese Communist revolution from causing an irreparable reversal of the strategic balance of power in the world.
After a series of deliberations, the State Department initiated in late 1948 a comprehensive review of America's China policy, prepared by the department's new Policy Planning Staff (PPS)headed by George Kennan. The resulting document, PPS 39, was candid and explicit. Recognizing that the GMD was "on the verge of losing their long struggle with the Chinese Communists," PPS 39 asserted that it would be unwise for the United States to use its military strength to "reverse the course of the civil war" because China was not for anyone to gain or to lose. PPS 39, however, did not recommend accepting the new political realities created by the CCP-GMD struggle in China. Instead, the document set up three immediate aims for America's China policy: "to continue to recognize the National Government as now constituted"; "with the disappearance of the National Government as we now know it, make our decision regarding recognition in the light of circumstances at that time"; and, most important, "to prevent so far as possible China's becoming an adjunct of Soviet politico-military power." 43
A crucial assumption underlying the PPS's proposals was that China was not a military and industrial power and that the rise of a Communist-controlled China did not impose a direct threat to vital American interests in the Asian-Pacific area, let alone on a global scale. The loss of China was undesirable, but not unendurable. PPS 39, for example, emphasized that there was no reason to overestimate China's power potential because "in any war in the foreseeable future China could at best be a weak ally or at worst an inconsequential enemy." 44
This low estimation of China's strategic potential was originally introduced by Kennan and widely shared by many other key figures in the State Department, the Pentagon, and Congress. It served as the basis of the State Department's China policy after Dean Acheson became secretary of state in January 1949. Acheson then oversaw the drafting of a series of policy papers based on the premises of PPS 39. In these papers, which presented a series of comprehensive, yet urgent, political-economic considerations that would guide the Truman administration's China policy throughout 1949 and 1950, Acheson shifted the focus of American strategy from direct support of the GMD to more subtle political and economic methods, including the nonrecognition policy and economic pressures, in order to influence the direction of the Chinese revolution and preserve American interests in China and the Far East. 45
Among these papers regarding China, the two most important are National Security Council (NSC)34 and NSC 41, which further clarified American policy goals. Admitting the virtual defeat of the GMD and longing for a possibility of eventual alienation of the Chinese Communists from Moscow, the drafters of NSC 34 recommended that the United States "continue to recognize the National Government until the situation is further clarified"; meanwhile, Washington should "avoid military and political support of any non-communist regimes in China" and "maintain so far as feasible active official contact with all elements in China." The drafters emphasized that Washington should not anticipate short term gains of this policy: "The Kremlin waited twenty-five years for the fulfillment of its revolution in China. We may have to persevere as long or longer." 46
NSC 41 focused more on available means to implement these goals. Realizing that the United States had limited options, NSC 41 asserted that manipulating trade policy through "moderate restriction" might effectively pressure the CCP. Acheson, who supervised the drafting of the document, believed that full-scale economic warfare, "through intimidation or direct economic pressure," might have only a minimal effect on China's "subsistence economy" and could possibly drive the Chinese into "a position of complete subservience to the USSR." Instead, a policy of encouraging and, at the same time, controlling nonstrategic trade with China through a licensing system would "serve to indicate United States ability and intention to deal drastically with China's foreign trade if necessary." This policy represented, accordingly, "the most effective strategic leverage to create rifts between China and the Soviet Union." 47 Acheson believed that by creating trade difficulties for the Chinese Communists the West could make them understand the deficiencies of the Soviet Union, thus turning China back to the West.
In accordance with the general policy of "making difficulties for the [Chinese] Communists," Acheson decided that the United States should not take positive steps to recognize the Chinese Communist regime. Acheson and others in Washington realized that this stand would not improve American-CCP relations. In the long run, however, they believed that nonrecognition would cause changes in Chinese Communist policy and create conditions for a rapprochement between the United States and China on American terms. American policymakers might be willing to accept reluctantly the failure of the American-supported GMD regime in China but could not accept the rise of a revolutionary China in the East. Unless the CCP clearly distanced itself from the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, the United States would not recognize the new China. 48
To increase leverage on the Chinese Communists, Acheson further instructed American diplomats in Atlantic Treaty countries to discourage any attempt by Europeans to recognize or reach accommodation with China. In the summer and fall of 1949, Western countries were urged to take common ground with the United States on the recognition problem. 49 As a result, the hostility between the United States and the CCP deepened.
The State Department's nonrecognition policy was deeply embroiled in America's domestic politics. In the late 1940s, as Cold War sentiments grew in the United States, the China lobby and the "China bloc" on Capitol Hill, raised a public outcry for the continuation of material assistance to Jiang even as the GMD suffered spectacular setbacks in the civil war. Many influential people, such as publisher Henry Luce of Time-Life, columnists Joseph and Stuart Alsop, former head of the "Flying Tigers" General Claire L. Chennault, China expert George Taylor, and Senators William Knowland (R-California), Kenneth Wherry (R-Nebraska), H. Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey), and Pat McCarran (D-Nevada), vociferously opposed the State Department's attempt to disengage the U.S. from the GMD. Some extreme members of the "China bloc" in Congress even charged that the GMD's defeat was a result of the treason within the State Department. 50
At the same time, Jiang's boosters in Congress and in the State Department also insisted on the notion of a "monolithic communism" and challenged the idea of pursuing Titoism in China. They strongly questioned the wisdom of Acheson's policy to attempt to drive a "wedge" between the CCP and the Soviet Union. 51 Acheson and his advisers became very sensitive to public and congressional opinions on the China problem. They understood that while it was not easy to convince the public and leading legislators of the necessity to reduce support for Jiang, it was even more risky politically to discuss establishing relations with a Chinese Communist regime. 52 Consequently, the inflexible political approach of the "China blocs," backed by the vagaries of public opinion during the emerging Cold War, made accommodation with Communist China an unlikely choice for the Truman administration.
In a deeper sense, American policy toward political relations with a Chinese Communist regime was linked to concerns for maintaining American prestige and credibility in the world in general and in East Asia in particular. Most American policymakers in the early Cold War period had first gained their experiences in foreign affairs in the 1930s and they would never forget how Hitler pushed the world one step after another toward a global catastrophe. Acheson's experience, for example, convinced him that it was meaningless to try to come to terms with an enemy like Hitler, who would be willing to compromise only if his armed forces had been outstripped. 53 From this experience, American policymakers were convinced of the necessity to stand firm in the face of an international aggressor, believing that any concession would eventually lead to increased aggression and undermine the prospect of international peace and order.
When the United States became the leading world power after the Second World War, the traditional American sense of self-superiority was further reinforced by the newly emerged sense of "a world leadership responsibility." Policymakers in Washington were convinced that to preserve American interests in the postwar world the United States had to demonstrate to other actors in the international arena- friends and enemies alike- that it would always honor its international obligations. In the case of China, this perspective encouraged continuation of assistance to the GMD, an old friend of the United States, and discouraged the prospect of reaching accommodation with the Chinese Communists, a perceived threat to America's security interests in East Asia. 54
The above factors caused Washington's nonrecognition policy toward Communist China, and the CCP's management of the Ward case further justified this policy. The American perception of the Chinese Communists combined hostility with contempt, which demonstrated typically the mentality of a dominant Western power in the face of a rising revolutionary country. Mao, angry about America's hostility toward the Chinese revolution, became extremely indignant when he sensed America's contempt of China as an inferior nation. The confrontation between the United States and the CCP would thus become far more than of a purely political nature.
The Failure of the Huang-Stuart Conversations
In May and June 1949, the fundamental differences between the CCP and the United States were further exposed in one of the most important direct contacts between them in 1949-50: the Huang Hua-Stuart conversations. After the Communist occupation of Nanjing in April 1949, Ambassador Stuart received permission from the State Department to stay. 55 Stuart had several goals in mind, believing that he could protect established American interests in China as well as those of American citizens remaining. He was also convinced that he could maintain a channel to communicate with CCP leaders, and, if possible, to influence the CCP leadership. In Stuart's view, the CCP's increasing "anti-American sentiment" was "a substantial residuum of genuine misapprehension." By approaching the Chinese Communists, Stuart believed that he could "remove or to some extent reduce" such misapprehensions. He asked Acheson for permission to meet top CCP leaders on an appropriate occasion to explain American policy and to convince them of the value of cooperating with the United States. Stuart believed that his long-time achievements in China as a devoted educator, as well as his acquaintance with many Chinese Communists, would enable him to have a frank and, possibly, fruitful contact with CCP leaders. 56 On April 6, Acheson authorized Stuart to have discussions with Communist leaders, but reminded him that "every care should be taken to avoid any publicity regarding your approach to the Chinese Communist leaders and the nature of such an approach." 57 After the PLA occupied Nanjing, Stuart quickly expressed his desire to contact representatives of the CCP and even proposed making a trip to Beiping to meet with CCP leaders. 58
CCP leaders were originally puzzled to find Stuart in Nanjing. Almost immediately, however, they realized that this could serve as an opportunity to further explore America's attitude toward the CCP while making clear the CCP's own stand. In a telegram to the CCP's General Front-line Committee on April 28, one week after the Communist occupation of Nanjing, Mao speculated that the United States was now "contacting us through the third person to ask for establishing diplomatic relations with us" and that Great Britain was willing "to do business with us." Mao believed that this was because the old U.S. policy of supporting the GMD had failed, forcing the United States to change its policy. Mao stated that "if the United States (and Great Britain)cut off relations with the GMD, we could consider the problem of establishing diplomatic relations with them." 59 On April 30, Mao, in the name of the spokesman of the General Headquarters of the PLA, publicly suggested that the CCP would be "willing to consider the establishment of diplomatic relations with foreign countries" if such relations could be "based on equality, mutual benefit, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and, first of all, on no help being given to the GMD reactionaries." 60
Had Mao changed his basic attitude toward the recognition problem? Certainly not. What should be particularly noted here is that Mao emphasized once again the CCP's precondition for any possible accommodation with the United States: Washington should first abandon the GMD regime and its old China policy. If the United States did not cut off its connections with the GMD, Mao made it very clear that the CCP would not yield at all on the recognition issue.
Mao, however, did not reject contacts with the United States. One of the main purposes of the April 30 statement was to offer a basis for any possible discussions between the CCP and the United States. Meanwhile, following the established principles of the CCP leadership, the Military Control Commission of the Nanjing City refused to recognize the official status of American diplomats, although it agreed to protect them as common foreigners. After the PLA occupied Nanjing, some soldiers of the PLA's 35th Army entered Stuart's residence. Mao, after learning this, angrily criticized the 35th Army for its failure to ask instructions from the CCP Central leadership and ordered the Nanjing Municipal Military Control Commission to take responsibility for the matter immediately. 61 In addition, the CCP Central leadership ordered Nanjing authorities to allow all Western embassies and legations to maintain cipher communication with their governments. 62
In late April, the CCP leadership appointed Huang Hua to be director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau under the Military Control Commission of Nanjing. 63 Huang was a graduate of Yenching University, where Stuart was once the president. He joined the CCP in the 1930s and later became Zhou's assistant. During Marshall's mediation in China in 1946-1947, he acted as Marshall's interpreter. His appointment to the post in Nanjing was evidently related to CCP's wish to deal with the Americans. Among other things, such as "taking over the Foreign Ministry of the GMD government and transforming foreign affairs," his tasks included "personal contact with Stuart." 64
The CCP's interest in the Huang-Stuart contact was in the first place based on military considerations. As the Chinese civil war was still in progress, CCP leaders believed that they needed to pay special attention to the possibility of American military intervention, especially during the PLA's march toward Shanghai, the largest port city in China and commercial center in East Asia, "because the U.S. imperialists had deep roots in Shanghai." 65 This worry of direct American intervention was further strengthened by Stalin's advice that the CCP should not exclude "the danger of Anglo-American forces landing in the rear of the main forces of the PLA." 66 The Stuart-Huang contact, in the eyes of CCP leaders, would serve as a practical channel for them to convey messages to and get information from the Americans, thus pinning down the military movement of the Americans through diplomatic activities. Mao therefore instructed Huang Hua that the purpose of his meeting with Stuart was "to explore the intentions of the U.S. government." 67 When Stuart informed Huang that the United States would not militarily intervene in China's civil war and that American naval vessels in Shanghai had received orders to leave the combat zone, CCP leaders were greatly relieved and ordered the PLA units attacking Shanghai to act resolutely against GMD ships staying in the Shanghai port. 68
The CCP leadership also believed that contact with Stuart offered an opportunity to press Washington to cut off its connections with the GMD and to stop "interfering with China's internal affairs." In a telegram to the CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee on May 10, 1949, Mao set forth a series of guidelines for Huang. He instructed Huang to "listen more and talk less" while meeting Stuart. Whenever expressing his own ideas, Huang should follow the tones of the PLA spokesman's April 30 statement. Huang needed to make it clear to Stuart that the meeting between them was informal because diplomatic relations did not exist between the CCP and the United States. Mao asked Huang to be "cordial to Stuart while talking to him if Stuart demonstrated also a cordial attitude," but Huang should avoid being "too enthusiastic." If Stuart expressed the desire to remain American ambassador to China, Huang should not rebut him. In response to the CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee's request to ask "the United States to do more things beneficial to the Chinese people" as part of the CCP's conditions to establish relations with the United States, Mao criticized that this "implied that the U.S. government had done something beneficial to the Chinese people in the past" and that it would "leave the Americans an impression as if the CCP were willing to get American aid." Instead, Mao dictated the following principles as Huang's guidelines for discussions with Stuart:
Our request now is that the United States should stop supporting the Guomindang, cut off its connections with the GMD remnants, and never try to interfere with China's internal affairs....No foreign country should be allowed to interfere with China's internal affairs. In the past, the United States interfered with China's internal affairs by supporting the GMD in the civil war. This policy should stop immediately. If the U.S. Government is willing to consider establishing diplomatic relations with us, it should stop all assistance to the GMD and cut off all contacts with the remnants of the reactionary GMD forces. 69
Mao had thus defined the fundamentals for Huang Hua's conversations with Stuart. Huang could be personal, gentle, and even touch upon such sensitive questions as establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. Under no circumstance, however, would he deviate from the determination "to make a fresh start" for the new China's foreign policy. Unless the United States was willing to follow the CCP's conditions, Mao left no doubt on this point, the CCP would not consider recognizing America's "rights" in China.
In early May, Stuart and Huang Hua began a series of secret meetings. Their hoped-for conversations, however, proved quickly to be no more than monologues stating the policy principles of each side. Stuart emphasized the legitimacy of American interests in China and tried to convince the Chinese Communists that they had to change their behavior and accept widely recognized international regulations and principles. Huang, on the other hand, stressed repeatedly that the new China viewed America's cutting off relations with the GMD as the precondition for establishing formal relations. Huang also pointed out that relations between the two countries, including economic exchanges, had to be placed on an equal and mutually beneficial foundation, implying that Sino-American relations in the past had not been equal and thus placing the Americans in the position of a criminal facing trial. 70
CCP leaders showed interest in Stuart's request to visit Beiping. They believed that by entertaining Stuart there, they could further test American policy toward China and, possibly, drive a wedge into the American-led international alliance against Communist China. But they would handle Stuart's visit very carefully, without creating any illusion of a CCP-American accommodation. After careful consideration, Zhou Enlai arranged for Lu Zhiwei, president of the Yenching University, to write to invite Stuart to visit Beiping, informing Stuart at the same time through Huang Hua that he could meet top CCP leaders during his Beiping trip. 71 Zhou, in a telegram to the CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee on June 30, stressed that whether Stuart came to Beiping or not, the CCP "would have no illusion of U.S. imperialism changing its policy"; and that it should be made clear that Stuart had not come to Beiping at the invitation of the CCP, so that the Americans would not use this as "an excuse for propaganda." 72
When the Stuart-Huang contacts were still underway, Mao outlined China's foreign policy at the Preparatory Session of the New Chinese Political Consultative Committee in mid-June. He emphasized that the new China was "willing to discuss with any foreign government the establishment of diplomatic relations on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty." 73 Mao's statement has been taken by many scholars as an indication that the CCP leadership was willing to reach an accommodation with the United States. 74 The key, however, was the two preconditions: to sever relations with the GMD and to treat the new China in an equal and mutually beneficial way. In the same speech, Mao also stressed that if certain foreign governments wanted to establish relations with the new China they must "sever relations with the Chinese reactionaries, stop conspiring with them or helping them and adopt an attitude of genuine, and not hypocritical, friendship toward People's China." What was implicit in these words was the necessity for the Americans to say farewell to the past before they could discuss establishing relations with the new China. Therefore Mao's statement was no more than another expression of the CCP's determination not to trade basic revolutionary principles for the recognition of Western countries. 75
Not surprisingly, at the same time that Mao issued the above statement the CCP escalated their charges against Ward. On June 19, 1949, the CCP alleged through its media that the American consulate general at Shenyang had links with an espionage case directed by an American "Army Liaison Group." The Xinhua News Agency published a lengthy article reporting that "a large American espionage bloc" had been discovered in Shenyang. According to the article, "many pieces of captured evidence show clearly that the so-called Consulate General of the United States at Shenyang and the Army Liaison Groups are in fact American espionage organizations, whose aim was to utilize Japanese special service as well as Chinese and Mongols in a plot against the Chinese people and against the Chinese people's revolutionary cause and world peace." 76 On June 22, Mao instructed the Northeast Bureau not to allow any member of the American consulate to leave Shenyang before the espionage case had been cleared up. 77 Two days later, Mao personally approved an article, entitled "The British and American Diplomacy, an Espionage Diplomacy," prepared by the Xinhua News Agency, calling on the whole party to mobilize to expose the "reactionary nature" of American and British diplomacy, and to maintain a high vigilance against it. 78
Recent studies by Chinese scholars in the PRC indicate that the espionage charge against Ward and the U.S. Consulate in Shenyang was probably an exaggeration of the situation and no convincing Chinese evidence has ever been released to prove the charge. 79 To Mao and CCP leaders, irrespective of the extent to which they believed in this charge, the new accusations against Ward and his colleagues offered the opportunity to further an anti-American mood among Chinese population and also justified their management of the Ward case. 80 Most important of all, Mao and the CCP leadership used this to send the Americans a clear message: if necessary, the Chinese Communists did not fear a confrontation with the United States.
On the American side, the Huang-Stuart conversations failed to mitigate Washington's reluctance to reach an accommodation with the Chinese Communists. On June 3, it was reported to the State Department that Zhou Enlai had expressed an extraordinary d'marche to the U.S. consul general in Beiping that China was "on the brink of complete economic collapse" and desperately needed assistance "from the U.S. and the U.K." Trade relations between China and the United States, according to this message, "would have a definite softening effect on the Communist party's attitude toward the Western countries." 81 Years of investigation have provided no evidence to prove that Zhou authored this message and it is now widely agreed by historians both in China and in the United States that this message may have been fabricated. 82 Nevertheless, the State Department accepted the message as genuine at the time. Although Consul General Clubb, who received the message in Beiping, strongly urged the State Department to give a positive response, policymakers in Washington acted slowly. Not until two weeks after the "Zhou message" reached Washington was Clubb authorized to contact Zhou, and then Zhou's "spokesman" had disappeared. 83
The escalation of the Ward case made it less possible for policymakers in Washington to favor Stuart's plan to visit Beiping. In the judgment of Truman and other top American policymakers, Stuart's proposed trip to Beiping would inevitably cause a massive attack on the administration by pro-GMD factions in Congress and in the press. Furthermore, they were afraid that "the Communists would try to make as much capital as they could out of such a visit," and that the United States would lose a strong means to pressure CCP leaders. Consequently, at the end of June, Truman vetoed Stuart's proposal. 84
Before he heard that Stuart would not come to Beiping, Mao issued his "leaning to one side" statement, announcing that the new China would support the Soviet Union in international affairs. Then a CCP delegation led by Liu Shaoqi secretly visited the Soviet Union, which proved to be an important step toward the formation of a strategic cooperation between Communist China and the Soviet Union. 85 One month later, in response to the China White Paper published by the State Department, Mao initiated a country-wide anti-American propaganda campaign. He wrote five articles criticizing America's China policy from both historical and current perspectives and denounced the United States as the most dangerous enemy of the Chinese people. 86
On the American side, the State Department made further efforts to consolidate a "common front" on the nonrecognition policy. In meeting with Ernest Bevin, the British foreign minister, in September 1949, Acheson insisted that "the Communists recognize international obligations in full as a prerequisite to recognition." He also strongly urged Great Britain and other Atlantic Treaty countries to "consult fully and carefully and concert policies on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government." 87 Meanwhile, the Truman administration supported the GMD's decision to block Chinese coastal areas by naval forces, hoping that this would cause economic problems for the CCP and strengthen America's bargaining power. 88 The gulf between the CCP and the United States widened.
A Diplomatic Impasse
On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was formally established; the same afternoon, Zhou Enlai notified foreign governments of the formation of People's China. A copy of this notification was sent to "Mr. O. Edmund Clubb" to convey to the U.S. government. Zhou stated in the letter of transmittal that "it is necessary that there be established normal diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of China and all countries of the world." 89 Meanwhile, as a practical step toward building the new China's diplomatic framework, the PRC government decided to treat the problem of establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries with the following distinctions: while relationship with communist countries could be established without negotiation, diplomatic relations with "nationalist countries" and "capitalist countries" would be formed only after the other countries clarified their attitude toward the GMD regime through the process of negotiation. 90
The State Department believed that "the announcement of the establishment of the Chinese Communist 'government'would not add any urgency to the question of recognition." 91 On October 3, a State Department spokesman announced that because the Chinese Communist regime did not promise to "recognize international obligations" the United States would not recognize it. 92 Different opinions concerning recognition did exist both inside and outside the State Department. For example, at a State Department-organized round-table conference, which comprised mostly scholars, in early October 1949, many participants stated that the United States should recognize China, and some even believed that recognition should come immediately. 93 The mainstream in Washington, however, believed in nonrecognition. On October 12, Acheson told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the State Department would continue to follow those guidelines he had set up earlier in the year on the recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. The same day, Acheson informed American diplomats around the world that American policy toward recognition remained "unchanged" and he asked "friendly governments" to "maintain common attitude" toward the recognition of Communist China. 94
Mao and his fellow CCP leaders, now certain that prospects for an American recognition of Communist China were remote, again emphasized that Communist China would not pursue early diplomatic relations with Western countries. In an internal instruction to its regional branches on October 19, 1949, the Xinhua News Agency, expressing the ideas of the CCP leadership, stressed that it was the British and Americans, not the CCP, "who were eager to establish diplomatic relations," and that the CCP "should maintain an attitude of waiting and seeing toward the [recognition] problem." The instruction particularly warned that "it is a big mistake to make people believe that we are eager to establish diplomatic relations with Britain and America." 95 In a speech to cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 8, Zhou Enlai made it clear that the CCP's view of the recognition problem had not changed. He stressed that "in order to open the [new China's] diplomatic front, we must first distinguish enemies from friends." Therefore, emphasized Zhou, the new China needed to "establish brotherly friendship with the Soviet Union and other People's Democratic Countries," as well as "to be hostile to the imperialists and to oppose them." 96
As Mao acted to translate the "leaning to one side" policy from rhetoric to reality by visiting the Soviet Union in December 1949, the CCP leadership decided to take further measures to expose the "imperialist nature" of American policy, to strike at the "arrogance" of American attitude toward China, and to cut off any remaining illusion about a Sino-American accommodation among Chinese people, Western-educated intellectuals in particular. On October 24, 1949, Ward and four other consulate employees were arrested by the Shenyang Public Security Bureau under the pretext that Ji Yuheng, a Chinese messenger at the American Consulate, had been mistreated and "seriously injured" by Ward. 97 Dongbei ribao (Northeast Daily), the Shenyang based party newspaper, editorialized on October 25 that "we Chinese people sternly protest against this violent act and will back up People's Government in meting out to the criminals headed by Ward legal sanctions due them." 98 CCP authorities wanted to emphasize that Ward's arrest was within the sovereign authority of Communist China.
The arrest of Ward and his colleagues caused indignant reaction in the United States. The New York Times claimed, "We cannot afford, if we are to retain a shred of prestige anywhere in Asia, to let such men as Angus Ward . . . suffer any further as martyrs to our inability to decide what can and should be done. If the Chinese Communists are illiterate in the language of international diplomacy and decency, we will have to draw them a picture they can understand." The New York World Telegram further suggested that the picture be drawn by America's Pacific fleet. 99
Policymakers in Washington had to respond. The State Department instructed Clubb to meet Zhou Enlai or other high-ranking Chinese officials to present an American protest against the "arbitrary action" of the Chinese Communist authorities. But Clubb was unable to find a way to reach CCP leaders. 100 President Truman expressed the desire to see if the United States could "get a plane in to bring these people out." He also indicated that the United States should consider blockading coal transportation from ports in northern China to Shanghai. 101 The president instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider using force to free the diplomats, but the latter recommended working for Ward's release through negotiations. 102 At the same time, Acheson, Stuart, and others believed that an economic blockade, rather than military forces, could be used as an effective means to force the CCP to release Ward and his colleagues. 103 Facing the new tension in Sino-American relations, Acheson announced at a news conference on November 16 that the United States would not consider diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime until the Americans held at Shenyang were released. 104
The CCP leadership paid little attention to these American threats. One month after Ward's arrest, he and his colleagues were tried by a People's Court at Shenyang. The trial followed the CCP's tight procedures: the Americans were denied any defense, nor were they able to question witnesses or plaintiffs. On November 21, they were convicted and sentenced to a year's probation and expelled from China. At the same time, the Shenyang People's Court announced the expulsion of the remainder of the non-Chinese staff at the former American Consulate at Shenyang because of their involvement in "spy activities." On December 11, 1949, Ward and his staff left China. 105
The CCP was willing to escalate the confrontation with the United States. On January 6, 1950, when Mao Zedong was in the Soviet Union, the Military Control Commission of Beijing City ordered the requisitioning of the former military barracks of the American diplomatic compound in Beijing, which had been transformed into regular offices. 106 The CCP carefully prepared their rationale for action. The Xinhua News Agency argued that the legal basis of these barracks was the "unequal" Chinese-American treaty signed by the GMD and the United States in 1943. The new government had announced its determination to abolish these unequal treaties between the old China and the Western powers, leaving no reason to allow these barracks to be controlled by an "imperialist country." Requisitioning these military barracks was therefore a crucial step in enforcing "complete abolition of all imperialist privileges in China and all unequal treaties imposed on China [by Western powers]." 107 . The CCP leadership used this move to send the message that the party was determined to maintain its principles, even at the risk of provoking a confrontation with the U.S. 108
Beijing's decision further irritated policymakers in Washington. To protest Beijing's "violation of its treaty obligations," Acheson declared in mid-January his intentions to pull out American diplomats from mainland China. 109 This did not bother CCP leaders because they had long prepared for this eventuality. On January 13, 1950, Mao Zedong cabled from Moscow to Liu Shaoqi, in charge of the party's affairs during Mao's absence: "I agree to . . . the requisition of foreign military barracks, and we have to prepare for the United States to retreat all consulates in China." Several days later, Mao stressed in another telegram to Liu: "It is extremely favorable to us that the United States withdraws all diplomats from China." 110 In a statement issued by the Xinhua News Agency on January 18, 1950, the CCP declared that "on problems concerning the maintenance of the interests of the Chinese people as well as the safeguarding of China's sovereignty, the Chinese people will never consider the will of imperialists." The statement reiterated that "all unequal treaties made by imperialists and their privileges of aggression should be abolished," particularly emphasizing that "whether the imperialists will withdraw from China or not, whether they will shout or not, whether they will treat us as equals or not, will have no influence on the just stand of the Chinese people." 111
Policymakers in Washington were now fully convinced that there existed no prospect for an American recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. But Acheson did not want to give up the last opportunity to make clear to Beijing the American view of the causes of the friction between the two countries. In late March, he instructed Clubb to try to meet Zhou Enlai informally before his departure from China. Clubb should tell the Chinese that the American public did not understand the CCP's management of the Ward case and a series of other similar affairs. Clubb should not leave the Chinese with the impression that the discussion would lead to American recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. 112 However, Clubb was unable to meet Zhou. On April 10, an official of Beijing's Alien Affairs Office reiterated to him that the termination of all American support to the GMD was the prerequisite for the discussion of any other issues between the new China and the United States. 113 Deeply disappointed with and, even angered by, his dealing with the CCP leaders, Clubb wrote to George Kennan on April 25, shortly before his departure from China, claiming that the CCP had "oriented its own program to Moscow's and attached China to the Soviet chariot, for better or worse." He concluded that Beijing leaders "do not think like other men," and that they were prepared to risk world destruction in pursuit of their goals. 114 Clubb's words indicated clearly that the gulf between Beijing and Washington had further widened.
The Ward case and the recognition controversy demonstrate the profound gap between the CCP and the United States. On the one hand, CCP leaders took American recognition as a test of America's willingness to accept the great changes brought about by the Communist revolution in China (as the first step the U.S. should cut off its connections with the GMD). The American charge that the CCP's management of the Ward case was "a violation of the basic international concept" had little appeal to the Chinese revolutionaries who were anxious to throw off all vestiges of Western influence. Indeed, CCP leaders believed that the Americans were using the "basic concept of the international law" to control subordinate countries, which had nothing to do with such a revolutionary country as Communist China. On the other hand, American policymakers, driven by the strategy of containment, confined by America's domestic setting, and influenced by considerations about preserving "American prestige," emphasized that the key to recognition lay in the CCP's acceptance of basic principles of international relations as defined by the United States. Policymakers in Washington (especially Acheson)did try to understand the CCP's behavior, but these conditions prevented them from appreciating the CCP's intense revolutionary nationalism, and they seldom considered the possibility of a compromise between the CCP's devotion to its understanding of China's national independence and the American adherence to "widely-accepted international custom and principles."
At this stage, the two sides did not lack channels of communication; they lacked, however, mutually understandable political language and common codes of behavior essential for communication. The Americans stressed the importance of individual liberty, international law and custom, and responsibility to maintain treaty obligations. The CCP claimed that "any struggle on the part of the oppressed people to oppose the oppressors was a just one." Both sides believed that they were correct; neither of them was able to place itself in the other's shoes. Consequently, the more they contacted each other, the greater the conflict became. Such a pattern, as we will see, would dominate the development of Sino-American relations throughout the 1949-1950 period.
Notes
Note 1: The State Department dictated a series of principles to Ward in a telegram on November 2, instructing him to restrict his contacts with local Chinese Communist authorities to an "informal and personal basis." Ward could "choose [the] suitable time to call upon appropriate local officials for [the] purpose [of] informing them he and his staff had remained in city in consular capacity only and for [the] purpose of assisting and protecting American citizens and protecting American property." In no circumstance, the State Department stressed, should the retention of American Consulate be interpreted as a "formal acknowledgement" of the Communist regime. Lovett to Ward, November 2, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 826. Back.
Note 2: Ward to Marshall, November 5, November 9, 1948, ibid.,pp. 829-831; see also Angus Ward, "The Mukden Affair," American Foreign Service Journal (February 1950): 15. Back.
Note 3: The CCP Central Committee to the CCP Northeast Bureau, November 1, 1948, cited from Li and Fang et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 794. Back.
Note 4: Chen Yun later took the responsibility for "the mistake committed in diplomatic affairs" after Shenyang's liberation. See Chen Yun wenxuan, 1926-1949 (Selected Works of Chen Yun, 1926-1949, Beijing: People's Press, 1984), p. 273. See also the CCP Central Committee to Chen Yun and the Northeast Bureau, December 15, 1949, ZYWJXJ, 17: 573-574. Back.
Note 5: Ward, "The Mukden Affair," p. 15. Back.
Note 6: Ward to Marshall, November 15, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 834-35; see also William Stoke, "The Future between America and China," Foreign Service Journal (January 1968): 15. Back.
Note 7: See Bernard Gwertzman, "The Hostage Crisis: Three Decades Ago," The New York Times Magazine (May 4, 1980): 42. Back.
Note 8: The CCP Central Committee to the CCP Northeast Bureau, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan and Chen Yun, November 10, 1948, cited in Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 739. Back.
Note 9: Sergei Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong: I. V. Kovalev, Stalin's Representative, Answers Questions of Sinologist S. N. Goncharov," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 10, no. 4 (Winter 1991-92): 65-66; Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 34. See also Gao Gang to the CCP Central Committee, November 16, 1948, telegram, CCA. It is also interesting to note that Ward noticed that when he and other Western consuls were received by Zhu Qiwen, the Soviet trade representative in Shenyang arrived earlier and left later. Ward to Marshall, November 5, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 829. Back.
Note 10: Li Rui, "An Account on the Takeover of the Shenyang City," Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Materials of the CCP History) no. 40 (February 1992): 58-59. Li Rui was then Chen Yun's political secretary. This account is based on his personal notes from September 1948 to January 1949. Back.
Note 11: See Yang Kuisong, "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy toward the United States in the 1940s," pp. 31-32. After the end of the Second World War, U.S. Office of Strategic Services set up "Operation Cardinal" in Manchuria, which was intended to "establish [an] agent network to secure information on Russian and Chinese actions" there. Throughout Chinese civil war, this network "continued to supply Washington with massive, if not always accurate, information on Soviet and CCP intentions." (See Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 [New York: Columbia University Press, 1992], pp. 204-205.) It is possible that Shenyang Communist authorities had some knowledge of "Operation Cardinal," although I have no hard evidence. Back.
Note 12: Yang Kuisong, "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy toward the United States in the 1940s," p. 31. Why did the Northeast Bureau take action again before requesting approval from the CCP central leadership? One explanation is that Gao Gang, with the support of the Soviets, hoped to create a fait accompli for the CCP leadership so that the party would pursue a harsher policy line toward the Ward case. Back.
Note 13: Mao Zedong to Gao Gang, November 17, 1948, telegram, CCA. Back.
Note 14: Lovett to Stuart, November 15, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 836; and Gwertzman, "The Hostage Crisis," p. 42. Back.
Note 15: Mao Zedong to the CCP Northeast Bureau, November 18, 1948, telegram, CCA. Back.
Note 16: Cabot to Marshall, November 18, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 837; Stuart to Marshall, November 21, 1948, ibid.,pp. 838-39; Clubb to Marshall, November 26, 1948, ibid.,p. 840. Back.
Note 17: See Gwertzman, "The Hostage Crisis," p. 42. Back.
Note 18: Mao Zedong to the CCP Tianjin Municipal Committee, January 20, 1949; Mao Zedong to Su Yu, April 27 and 29, 1949, telegrams, CCA; see also the CCP Central Military Commission's instructions on diplomatic affairs, April 26, 1949, ZYWJXJ, 18: 246-247. Back.
Note 19: The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," January 19, 1949, ZYWJXJ, 18: 49. Back.
Note 20: The CCP Central Committee to the CCP Northeast Bureau, November 23, 1948, cited from Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 740. Back.
Note 21: Mao Zedong's remarks on the CCP Central Committee's "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," Dangde wenxian, no. 1 (1992): 27; see also the CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," ZYWJXJ, 18: 44. Back.
Note 22: Mao, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1436; see also Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, p. 4. Back.
Note 23: Mao Zedong's conclusion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, March 13, 1949, minute, CCA; Zhou Enlai, "Report on Problems Concerning the Peace Talks," ZXJ, 1: 323; "New China's Diplomacy," Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990, hereafter cited as ZWJWX), pp. 4-5. Back.
Note 24: Ke Bainian, "How the Soviet Union Struggled with Imperialism Right after the October Revolution," Xuexi (Study), 1, no. 3 (1949): 12-14; Hu Sheng, Diguo zhuyi yu zhongguo zhengzhi (Imperialism and Chinese Politics, Beijing: People's Press, 1949); and Mao Zedong, "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle," MXJ, 4: 1487-1488. Back.
Note 25: The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," ZYWJXJ, 18: 44-45; see also Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan, p. 742; Li and Fang et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 809. Back.
Note 26: Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, p. 4; Mao Zedong's conclusion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, March 13, 1949, minute, CCA; Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the CCP," MXJ, 4: 1435-36, and MNP, 3: 410-411. Back.
Note 27: Mao Zedong, "Chinese People Stand Up," MWG, 1: 6-7; "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," MXJ, 4: 1477-80. Back.
Note 28: Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1436. Back.
Note 29: Ibid., pp. 1435-1436; the CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," ZYWJXJ, 18: 44. Back.
Note 30: Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan,p. 742. Back.
Note 31: The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," ZYWJXJ, 18: 44; see also Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan,p. 742; Li Ping and Fang Ming et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan,p. 809. Back.
Note 32: Mao Zedong to the CCP East China Bureau, July 17, 1949, telegram, CCA. Back.
Note 33: James Reardon-Anderson, in Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 1, for example, asserts that "circumstances rather ideas have been the principal force shaping Chinese Communist behavior in international affairs." For argument of similar nature, see Donald Zagoria, "Containment and China," in C. Gati, ed., Caging the Bear (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), pp. 109-127. Back.
Note 34: Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan,p. 742; and Li and Fang et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, pp. 805-806. Back.
Note 35: Mao Zedong to the CCP East China Bureau, July 17, 1949, telegram, CCA. Back.
Note 36: Gwertzman, "The Hostage Crisis," p. 44. Back.
Note 37: Hopper to Marshall, December, 6, 15, 21, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 842-43, 845, 847; Stuart to Marshall, January 5, 1949, ibid., (1949), 8: 933-34. Back.
Note 38: Acheson to Clubb, March 2, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 943-944. Clubb to Acheson, February 24, 1949, March 8, 1949, March 9, 1949, March 18, 1949, March 26, 1949, May 9, 1949, ibid., pp. 940, 944-946, 949-50, 956; Acheson to Clubb, April 15, 1949, April 26, 1949, ibid., pp. 952, 955. Back.
Note 39: Acheson to Clubb, February 3, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 11. Back.
Note 40: Acheson to Stuart, May 13, 1949, ibid., p. 22. Back.
Note 41: Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 340. Back.
Note 42: For discussions of U.S. policy toward China during the Chinese civil war and its relations with the emerging Cold War, see Robert L. Messer, "American Perspectives on the Origins of the Cold War in East Asia," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen, eds., American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia, 1931-1949 (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1990), especially pp. 254-261; Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations (3rd edition), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 150-158; John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 75-80; and Westad, Cold War and Revolution. Back.
Note 43: Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff, "The Problems to Review and Define United States Policy toward China," September 7, 1949, FRUS (1948), 8: 146-55; see also PPS 39/1, November 23, 1949, ibid., pp. 208-211. Back.
Note 45: For an excellent discussion of Acheson's intention of using trade and recognition as lever for winning a favorable position for the United States in its dealing with the CCP, see Warren I. Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisors, and China, 1949-1950," in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 13-52, especially pp. 32-33. Back.
Note 46: NSC 34/2, "U.S. Policy toward China," February 28, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 494. Back.
Note 47: NSC 41, "Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Regarding Trade with China," February 28, 1949, ibid., pp. 826-34. Back.
Note 48: Cohen emphasizes that Acheson made substantial efforts to work toward accommodation with the CCP in 1949, with the hope that tensions would develop between Beijing and Moscow (Cohen, "Acheson, His Advisors, and China"). Acheson's strategy, however, was self-contradictory in the first place. As he had limited knowledge of the logic underlying the CCP's policy, his approach toward such crucial issues as the recognition of the CCP regime contributed only to making Beijing and Moscow closer. For a good discussion of the self-contradictory nature of the Truman administration's "wedge-driving" strategy toward China, see Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 19. Back.
Note 49: Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers, May 6, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 17; see also ibid., pp. 18, 25, 26, 28-29, 34, 37, 40-42, 61-62, 76-78, 81-85, 88-91. Back.
Note 50: For the activities and influence of the "China bloc," see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), chapters 5 and 8; Ross Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Harper, 1974); Lewis Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947-1951 (New York, 1976). Back.
Note 51: Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 24-25. Back.
Note 52: See, for example, Acheson memorandum, April 28, 1949, and Acheson memorandum of conversation with Senator H. Alexander Smith, July 14, 1949, RG 59, 893.00/4-2849/ 7-1449, National Archives (hereafter NA). Back.
Note 53: Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson (New York: Cooper Square, 1972), pp. 423-424. Back.
Note 54: For an excellent study emphasizing the role played by concerns for "American prestige" and "American credibility" in the making of Sino-American confrontation, see William W. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981). Back.
Note 55: The decision to stay largely resulted from the initiative of Stuart himself. At the end of 1948, he suggested to the State Department that when the GMD government moved its capital to the South, the principal staff of the American embassy should "remain in Nanking [Nanjing]." In early 1949, when Stuart learned that the GMD government (not Jiang himself) would move to Canton, he further suggested that the "Ambassador and his principal advisors remain Nanking." In late January, Stuart's suggestion was approved, and he remained in Nanjing after the GMD government moved to Guangzhou (Canton) in early February. After the Communists occupied Nanjing, at Stuart's insistence, however, Acheson agreed not to ask Stuart to "make precipitous departure from China following Commie takeover." See Stuart to the Secretary of State, November 7, 1948, November 29, 1948, November 30, 1948, December 3, 1948, FRUS (1948), 7: 851-53, 854, 855, 857-58; Stuart to the Secretary of State, January 26, 1949, February 4, 1949, April 23, 1949; Acheson to Stuart, April 22, 1949, April 23, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 667-68, 673, 682-84. Back.
Note 56: Stuart to the Secretary of State, March 10, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 173-77. Back.
Note 57: Acheson to Stuart, April 9, 1949, ibid., pp. 230-231. Back.
Note 58: Cohen, America's Response to China, p. 164. Back.
Note 59: Mao Zedong to the CCP's General Front-line Committee, April 28, 1949, Dangde wenxian, no. 4 (1989): 43. Back.
Note 60: Mao Zedong, "Statement by the Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People's Liberation Army," April 30, 1949, MXJ, 4: 1464. Back.
Note 61: Mao Zedong to Su Yu, April 27, 1949, telegram, CCA; see also the CCP Central Military Commission to the CCP General Front-line Committee, April 26, 1949, ZYWJXJ, 18: 246-247; Huang Hua, "My Contacts with Stuart after the Liberation of Nanjing," in Pei Jianzhang, et al., Xinzhongguo waijiao fengyun (The Experiences of New China's Diplomacy, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1990), p. 25; and Song Renqiong, "Before and After Nanjing's Liberation," Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, no.38 (1991): 82-83. Back.
Note 62: The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," ZYWJXJ, 18: 234; and FRUS (1949), 8: 104-5, 391, 1062. Back.
Note 63: The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Diplomatic Affairs," ZYWJXJ, 18: 234. Back.
Note 64: Huang Hua, "My Contacts with Stuart," p. 24. Back.
Note 65: Zhang Zhen, "In Reminiscence of the Shanghai Campaign," p. 87; Chen Guangxiang, "Why the PLA Did Not Liberate Shanghai Immediately after Crossing the Yangzi," Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Party History Research Materials), no. 178 (May 1992): 21. Back.
Note 66: Goncharov, "Stalin's Dialogue with Mao Zedong," p. 50; and Goncharov, et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 43. Back.
Note 67: Mao Zedong to the CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee, May 10, 1949, MNP, 3:499; see also Huang Hua, "My Contacts with Stuart," pp. 26-27. Back.
Note 68: The CCP's General Front-line Committee to Su Yu and Zhang Zhen, May 21, 1949, telegram, CCA; see also Chen Xiaolu, "China's Policy toward the United States, 1949-1955," in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations,1945-1955: A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989), p. 186. Back.
Note 69: Mao Zedong to the CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee, May 10, 1949, MNP, 3: 499-500. Back.
Note 70: For details of Stuart-Huang contact and Stuart's plan to visit Beiping, see FRUS (1949), 8: 741-67; for a Chinese version of the story, see Huang Hua, "My Contacts with Stuart," especially pp. 26-28. Back.
Note 71: Huang Hua, "My Contacts with Stuart," p. 30; Stuart to Acheson, June 30, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 766-67. Back.
Note 72: The CCP Central Committee to the CCP Nanjing Municipal Committee (drafted by Zhou), June 30, 1949, telegram, CCA. Back.
Note 73: Mao Zedong, "Address to the Preparatory Meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference," MXJ, 4: 1470. Back.
Note 74: For examples of this argument, see Shi Yinhong, "From Confrontation to War: The Truman Administration's Policy toward the New China" (Ph. D. dissertation, Nanjing University, 1987), p. 49; Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, pp. 124-25; and Mineo Nakajima, "Foreign Relations: from the Korean War to the Bandung Line," in MacFarquhar and Fairbank eds. The Cambridge History of China, 14: 263. Back.
Note 75: MXJ, 4: 1470; see also Zhou Enlai, "Report on Problems Concerning the Peace Talks," ZXJ, 1: 322-23. Back.
Note 76: Renmin ribao, June 19, 1949; Clubb to Acheson, June 19, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 965. Back.
Note 77: Mao Zedong to the CCP Northeast Bureau, June 22, 1949, telegram, CCA. Back.
Note 78: Mao Zedong's instruction to Hu Qiaomu, June 24, 1949, Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji (Selected Correspondences of Mao Zedong, Beijing: People's Press, 1983), pp. 327-328. Back.
Note 79: Shi Yinhong, "From Confrontation to War," pp. 62-63, 72-74. Back.
Note 80: Dongbei ribao (Northeast Daily), June 20, 1949; Clubb to Acheson, June 19, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 965. Back.
Note 81: Clubb to Acheson, June 1, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 357-60. Back.
Note 82: All of Zhou's aides denied that Zhou had sent this "desperate message" to the United States. Huang Hua even called it "total nonsense." (Warren I. Cohen, "Conversations with Chinese Friends: Zhou Enlai's Associates Reflect on Chinese-American Relations in the 1940s and the Korean War," Diplomatic History [Summer 1987], pp. 284-85; Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 304, n. 60) My investigations in Beijing in May 1991, August 1992, and August 1993 confirm that no documentary evidence has ever been found to prove the existence of the alleged Zhou demarche. Back.
Note 83: Clubb to Acheson, June 2, June 24, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 363-64, 397-98. Back.
Note 84: Memorandum by John P. Davis of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff [Kennan], June 30, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 768-69; Acheson to Stuart, July 1, 1949, ibid., p. 769. Back.
Note 85: For a detailed discussion of Liu's visit to the Soviet Union in July and August 1948, see Zhu Yuanshi, "Liu Shaoqi's Secret Visit to the Soviet Union in 1949," Dangde wenxian, no. 3 (1991): 74-80; and Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jŸren shenbian, pp. 396-426; see also discussions in chapter 3. Back.
Note 86: Mao Zedong, "Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle," "Farewell, John Leighton Stuart," "Why It Is Necessary to Discuss the White Paper," "'Friendship' or Aggression?" "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," MXJ, 4: 1486-1520. Back.
Note 87: Memorandum of Conversation with Ernest Bevin by Acheson, September 13, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 81-82. Back.
Note 88: Clark to Acheson, June 23, 1949, ibid., pp. 1103-4; Memorandum of Conversation by Webb, October 1, 1949, ibid., p. 1141. Back.
Note 89: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji, 1949-1950 (Documents of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1950, Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1957), pp. 4-5; see also Clubb to Acheson, October 2, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 93-94. Back.
Note 90: Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, December 19, 1949, MWG, 1: 193; Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, pp. 7-9. Beijing's policy of distinguishing Communist countries from non-Communist countries on recognition problem greatly disappointed such countries like Burma and Great Britain. For a discussion, see Edwin W. Martin, Divided Counsel: the Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1986), pp. 101-102. Back.
Note 91: Memorandum by Freeman [Acting Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs], October 3, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 96-97. Back.
Note 92: New York Times, October 3, 1949, p. 1. Back.
Note 93: FRUS, 1949: 9: 156-58; see also Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, pp. 131-132. Back.
Note 94: U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Reviews of the World Situation, 81st Congress, first and second sessions, May 19, 1949-December 11, 1950, Historical Series, 1974, pp. 94-94; Acheson to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers, October 12, 1949, FRUS (1949), 9: 122-23. Back.
Note 95: The Research Department of the Xinhua News Agency, eds., Xinhuashe wenjian ziliao xuanbian (A Selected Collection of Documents of the Xinhua News Agency, Beijing: date of publication unclear), p. 18. Back.
Note 96: Zhou Enlai, "The New China's Diplomacy," ZWJWX, pp. 1-3. Back.
Note 97: According to Ward, Ji was fired by the Consulate in late September and was found hiding in the Consulate compound by Ward on October 1. Ward tried to escort him out of the area. When "Ji lay down on stairway and refused to move," Ward endeavored to "expel him with intention handing him over as trespasser to armed sentry guarding office building." This prompted a scuffle with Ji's brother, who was also in the compound. Ji was then sent to hospital although Ward believed "neither he nor [his] brother was injured by me or any member of my staff." Ward to Acheson, December 11, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 1047-48. Back.
Note 98: Dongbei ribao, October 25, 1949; for related Chinese reports on the case, see Dongbei ribao, October 28, November 2, 1949. Back.
Note 99: Tucker, Patterns in the Dust, p. 150. Back.
Note 100: Acheson to Clubb, October 28, 1949; and Clubb to Acheson, October 29, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 988-989. Back.
Note 101: "Meeting with the President," memorandum by James E. Webb, November 14, 1949, OCA, Box 14, RG 59, NA; see also FRUS (1949), 8: 1008; FRUS (1949), 9: 1355. Back.
Note 102: Memorandum by Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, November 18, 1949, ibid., (1949): 8: 1011-13. Back.
Note 103: Acheson to Certain Diplomatic Representatives, November 18, 1949, ibid., pp. 1009-10. Back.
Note 104: Department of State Bulletin(November 28, 1949): 799-800. Back.
Note 105: Dongbei ribao, November 27, 1949; Xinhua yuebao, 1, no. 3 (1949): 620-23; Ward to Acheson, December 11, 1949, FRUS (1949), 8: 1049-50. Back.
Note 106: Memorandum by Acting Secretary of State James Webb to the President, January 10, 1950, FRUS (1950), 6: 270-72. Back.
Note 107: Renmin ribao, January 19, 1950; Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, pp. 18-19. Back.
Note 108: What is noticeable here is the CCP's choice of timing to take this action. It had been a well-established principle for the CCP leadership not to recognize the official status of Western diplomats in China; nor would they treat the assets of Western consulates in China as official. Why then did the CCP choose early January 1950, not earlier, to announce the requisition of former American military barracks? One answer might be found in Mao's experiences in the Soviet Union. Mao started his visit to the Soviet Union on December 16, 1949, with the hope of establishing a substantial Chinese-Soviet strategic alliance. Not until early January 1950, however, did Mao receive a positive response from Stalin. On January 3, Mao had a discussion with Molotov in Moscow, which established the principles for the forthcoming Sino-Soviet alliance. As a result, Mao cabled to the CCP Central Committee on January 5, formally informing Zhou Enlai to come to Moscow to complete details of the alliance treaty. (Mao Zedong to the CCP Central Committee, January 2, 3, and 5 1950, MWG, 1: 211-213, 215) The next day, the Beijing Military Control Commission ordered the requisition. We have no "hard evidence" at this stage to prove that the requisition order came directly from Mao in Moscow. However, it should not be too off the mark to say that the dramatic progress of Mao's contacts with Stalin strengthened the CCP's confidence in confronting the United States, thus resulting in the requisition order at this moment. For more details of Mao's visit to the Soviet Union, see discussions in chapter 3. Back.
Note 109: Department of State Bulletin(January 23, 1950): 119. Back.
Note 110: Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, January 13 and 17, 1950, MWG, 1: 235, 241. Back.
Note 111: Renmin ribao, January 19, 1950. Back.
Note 112: Acheson to Clubb, March 22, 1950, FRUS (1950), 6: 321-322. Back.
Note 113: Clubb to Acheson, April 11, 1950, ibid., p. 329. Back.
Note 114: Cited from Michael Schaller, American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 253. Back.
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