China's Road to the Korean War

The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation

Chen Jian

New York

Columbia University Press

1994

1. Revolutionary Commitments and Security Concerns: New China Faces the World

By the end of 1948, Mao Zedong and his comrades realized that China's three-year civil war would soon end with a Communist victory. The Guomindang (the Nationalist Party or GMD) regime, suffering from political corruption, economic collapse, and a series of military failures, had little chance to save itself from a final defeat. ₁ Mao proclaimed with full confidence in his new year message of 1949 that "the Chinese people will win final victory in the great War of Liberation, even our enemies no longer doubt this outcome." In his report to the enlarged Politburo meeting on January 6, he further alleged that "the Chinese revolution will achieve final victory in the whole country in 1949 and 1950." ₂ Mao and his party would now have to govern China and devise a foreign policy for the new Chinese Communist state.

In September 1948, the CCP Politburo held a five-day meeting at Xibaipo (CCP headquarters at that time), to analyze the international situation as well as other tasks facing the CCP in the last stage of China's civil war. ₃ In January 1949, Mao chaired another enlarged Politburo meeting of top leaders at Xibaipo; and two months later, the CCP held its Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee. The main purpose of these two meetings was to thrash out basic strategy and policy after securing nationwide victory. ₄ Out of these meetings was to emerge a security strategy and foreign policy geared to consolidating the achievements of the Communist revolution, preparing for a thorough transformation of the old Chinese society, serving China's security interests as defined by the CCP, and changing completely China's humiliating relationship with the outside world. Mao and his comrades decided that "making a fresh start," "cleaning the house first before entertaining guests," and "leaning to one side (the Soviet Union)" would become the principles guiding Communist China's external relations. ₅ Consequently, the "new China," as Mao and the CCP called it, was to emerge as a revolutionary power in a world that had been rigidly polarized by the Cold War.

The Domestic Agenda

The CCP's foreign policy-making was in the first place influenced by the party's domestic agenda, especially by the tasks of achieving political consolidation, rebuilding a war-shattered economy, and, in a deeper sense, maintaining the inner dynamics of the Chinese Communist revolution after nationwide victory. These problems conditioned CCP leaders'consideration of the new China's foreign policy, driving them to adopt a radical approach toward the outside world.

The first aspect of the CCP's domestic agenda involved the need to establish a new revolutionary regime. To Mao and his associates, this was first of all a question concerning the elimination of the GMD regime and its remaining influence in China. Mao always believed that "the fundamental problem of a revolution is that concerning political power." ₆ A primary goal of the Chinese Communist revolution, as often expressed by Mao and other CCP leaders in overt ways, was to destroy completely China's old political structure and at the same time, with the support of the new state power, to build in China a "New People's Democratic Dictatorship," which, according to Mao, was the Chinese form of "proletarian dictatorship." ₇

In Mao's view, this political transformation was extremely important because it would serve as the basis for the CCP's plans to conduct a thorough transformation of Chinese society. In terms of the contents of this political transformation, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders believed that they had to "eliminate all reactionary forces in China through revolutionary means" so that the GMD and the Chinese "reactionaries" would have no hope of returning. As the first step, they needed to dismantle the old constitutional system and state apparatus of the GMD regime and replace them with the CCP's own revolutionary government. Considering the importance of these tasks, Mao argued that, with the disintegration of the GMD's military forces, political struggle would replace military engagement as the main form of the CCP-GMD confrontation, and that it was crucial for the CCP to demonstrate no mercy for the GMD, now on the verge of collapse. ₈ Understandably, these revolutionary commitments would push the CCP leadership to take a harsh attitude toward those countries that still maintained active relations with the GMD regime.

In 1949, the CCP also faced the problem of economic reconstruction. After wars and chaos lasting for nearly half a century, China's economy was in a shambles. Compared with the standard of 1936, the year before Japan's invasion of China, the country's general industrial production had decreased 50 percent, with heavy industry dropping almost 70 percent. All main railroads were severely damaged. Agriculture also suffered from grave problems; compared with the pre-World War II period, grain production had fallen by 22.1 percent and cotton production by 48 percent. Runaway inflation caused additional economic and financial problems that were difficult to cure. ₉ Mao and his fellow CCP leaders realized that the challenge of economic recovery and reconstruction would be daunting. During both the January enlarged Politburo meeting and the March Central Committee meeting, Mao spent considerable time discussing strategies, policies, and tactics the CCP would need to revitalize the economy. Mao understood that a failure in China's economic recovery and reconstruction would jeopardize the prospect of the continuous success of the Chinese Communist revolution. ₁₀

However much China might need foreign support for economic reconstruction, Mao was unwilling to compromise the CCP's revolutionary principles to get that assistance. He believed that the economic challenge China had to face was in its essence a political problem. While Mao realized that the CCP should not refuse to pursue or accept economic assistance from abroad, especially if the assistance was from the Soviet Union and other people's democratic countries, ₁₁ he also emphasized that the party should never forget its final goal-the construction of a socialist society in China-and should always combine its policy for economic recovery and reconstruction with its strategy for the realization of socialist transformation of the old economic structures. At the Central Committee's Second Plenary Session, Mao stressed that the CCP should restrict the existence and development of private capitalism in China through limiting its sphere of activity, defining and restricting its working conditions, regulating its price system, and imposing taxes on it. Mao also made it clear that the process of economic reconstruction would be put under the absolute control of the CCP in order to "consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in the state power" and to promote China's development "from the new democratic society to the future socialist society." ₁₂ In short, Mao viewed China's economic reconstruction as a pivotal aspect of the Communist revolution.

Mao, who also believed that China's economic reconstruction had to be carried out mainly by the Chinese themselves, did not feel that large-scale economic assistance from Western capitalist countries was either possible or necessary. Mao assumed that Western countries would be unwilling to maintain positive economic ties with Communist China as the latter posed a profound challenge to the Western-dominated "old world." Chen Yun, the CCP leader in charge of economic affairs, followed Mao's ideas to anticipate that Western capitalist countries, the United States in particular, would impose an economic blockade by "refusing to buy from China while not selling to China" after the CCP's nationwide victory. ₁₃ Mao, unfrightened by such a prospect, believed that China-with its huge land area, abundant resources, vast domestic markets, and a large population, could be self-reliant in economic matters. As early as 1938, he had argued that China could survive a protracted war with Japan because of the self-sufficient nature of the Chinese economy. The CCP's experience during the Yanan period further strengthened Mao's belief in self-reliance. ₁₄ In late 1948 and early 1949, Mao and the other CCP leaders stressed on a series of occasions that the CCP should strive for economic self-reliance so that the new China would stand the challenges of Western imperialist countries.

This profound confidence in China's ability to live independently strengthened the CCP's unyielding attitude toward Western capitalist countries. In a document about the new China's foreign trade policy dated February 16, 1949, the CCP Central Committee stressed that "The basic guideline of our foreign trade is that we should export to and import from the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries so long as they need what we can offer or they can offer what we need. Only in the situation that the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries are not in a position to buy from us or sell to us will we do some business with capitalist countries." ₁₅ Mao summarized the CCP's economic strategy: "The two basic policies of the state in the economic struggle will be regulation of capital at home and control of foreign trade." ₁₆

Zhou Enlai later summarized the CCP's calculus of the relationship between the party's revolutionary doctrine and its attitude toward trade with the West. He stated that as "the old China had been dependent on the imperialists not only in the economic sphere but also in the sphere of culture and education, "China was therefore "exploited economically and polluted politically." In order to "expose and eradicate the evil influence of imperialism," Zhou emphasized, "we should neither rely on the imperialists nor be afraid of them." Zhou concluded that the CCP's foreign trade policy should be based on the assumption that "most of those materials we need could be supplied by ourselves and some by our friends" and that "we should never count on our enemies." ₁₇

Mao and the CCP leadership attached even greater importance to the problem of maintaining the inner dynamics of the Chinese Communist revolution after victory than they did to political consolidation and economic reconstruction. This emphasis was to play a decisive role in shaping Communist China's foreign policy. Mao titled his 1949 New Year's message "Carry the Revolution through to the End." According to him and other CCP leaders, the "end" of the revolution must be understood at two different levels. First, the CCP was determined to eliminate the GMD military forces and to overthrow the GMD regime so that "the Chinese reactionaries would not be able to come back, by taking advantage of the compromise of the revolutionaries, as had happened during the 1911 revolution and the North Expedition (of 1927)." ₁₈ Second, Mao was contemplating how to push the revolution forward after its victory. In his report to the Central Committee's Second Plenary Session, Mao pointed out that the CCP's seizure of power was only the completion of the first step in the long march of the Chinese Communist revolution, and that "the road after the victory would be longer, the work greater and more arduous." Mao warned the members of the party:

It will not require much time and effort to win the nationwide victory, but to consolidate it will. The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to construct. The imperialists reckon that eventually we will beg alms from them in order to live. With victory, such moods as arrogance, self-styled heroism, inertia and unwillingness to advance, preoccupation with pleasure-seeking, and distaste for continued hard struggle may grow within the party. With victory, the people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms. The flattery of the bourgeoisie, however, may conquer the weak-willed in our ranks. There may be some Communists who were not conquered by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation. ₁₉

This emphasis on "carrying the revolution through to the end" was a long-standing preoccupation in Mao's thinking. As early as 1939 and 1940, Mao stated in The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party and On New Democracy, two of his most important works, that the Chinese Communist revolution would be divided into two stages: the stage of new democratic revolution and the stage of socialist revolution. During the first stage, the revolution had to overthrow the rule of the bureaucratic-capitalist class, wipe out foreign influence, eliminate remnants of feudal tradition, and establish a Communist-led regime that would unify all patriotic social classes in China. The second stage of the revolution would transform the Chinese society, including the economic system, political structure, and social life, under the leadership of the Communist regime. This transformation would lay the foundation of China's transition into a socialist and later Communist society. In Mao's view, the two stages in the revolution were closely linked: without the first stage, the second stage of the revolution would be impossible; without the second stage, the first stage of the revolution would become meaningless. ₂₀ When Mao called for "carrying the revolution through to the end" in 1949, he was thinking about leading the revolution into its necessary second stage. ₂₁

How could, then, the inner dynamics of the great Chinese revolution be maintained and enhanced after the Communist seizure of power? This question concerned Mao in 1949-50 and would occupy his primary attention during the latter half of his life (In a sense, here lies one of the most profound origins of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution"). When Mao first touched upon the problem of how to push the revolution forward in 1949, he would try all the means he had been familiar with, especially mass propaganda and mass mobilization, and his train of thought developed in terms of the continuous existence of outside threats to the revolution. In actuality, starting in early 1949, Mao constantly stressed that enemies of the revolution had not disappeared with its victory. On the contrary, he claimed that victory had created greater internal and external threats. A brief examination of the CCP leadership's changing assessment of the "American threat" will help expose Mao's train of thought.

During the first two years of the 1946-1949 civil war, the CCP leadership acted on the assumption that direct American intervention was unlikely. Mao and his comrades believed that because American strategic emphasis lay in Europe and that the "reactionary American ruling class" was in nature vulnerable, it would be difficult for Washington to send significant numbers of military forces to China to support the GMD. ₂₂ Nearing complete victory in late 1948 and early 1949, however, CCP leaders began to demonstrate great concerns about direct American intervention in China's civil war. During the January 1949 enlarged Politburo meeting, American intervention was a central topic. In spring 1949, CCP leaders and military planners continued to emphasize the danger involved if Washington should decide to send its troops to China to rescue the GMD regime. ₂₃

In addition to its conviction that Washington was profoundly hostile toward the Chinese revolution, the CCP leadership's vigilance against American intervention at the last stage of the civil war was caused by the fact that the People's Liberation Army (PLA)attacked coastal commercial centers like Shanghai, where the Western presence had been significant. ₂₄ But in a deeper sense, the CCP leadership's emphasis on the danger of direct American intervention in early 1949 had to be understood in the context of Mao's deep concern for maintaining the inner dynamics of the Chinese revolution after nationwide victory.

When Mao and the other CCP leaders tried to define "American threat" in early 1949, they never restricted their vision to the immediate danger involved in direct American intervention in China. Rather, they emphasized long-range American hostility toward the victorious Chinese revolution, as well as the U.S. imperialist attempt to sabotage the revolution from within. At the January Politburo meeting, Mao noted the possibility of American direct intervention in China; but he believed that well-prepared Chinese revolutionary forces could defeat American military intervention. ₂₅ Mao emphasized that an American strategy of sabotage could be a more serious threat than military intervention. Both at the January enlarged Politburo meeting and the March Central Committee's Plenary Session, Mao spent considerable time discussing the threat of American sabotage of the Chinese revolution and "the danger of winning the victory." He stressed that "after the destruction of the enemies with guns, the enemies without guns were still there, and they were bound to struggle desperately against us." He therefore warned the entire party: "If we fail to pay enough attention to these problems, if we do not know how to wage the struggle against them and win victory in the struggle, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, and we shall fail." ₂₆

Not surprising at all, an important gap would emerge between the CCP leadership's real assessment of the nature of the "American threat" and the party's open propaganda about it when Communist forces occupied Shanghai, Qingdao, and other major coastal areas in mid-1949. In internal correspondences, Mao and his comrades were by then convinced that the danger of American direct intervention had disappeared. ₂₇ But in the party's open propaganda, they would continue to emphasize the "American threat." On one occasion, for example, Mao warned the whole country that the United States and Chinese reactionaries were unwilling to "resign themselves to defeat in this land of China" and would "gang up against the Chinese people in every possible way," even by sending "some of their troops to invade and harass China's frontiers." ₂₈

Given that the Chinese revolution was at a crucial juncture in 1949, Mao's warnings could be understood in two ways. First, as a revolutionary, Mao hoped that his comrades would maintain revolutionary vigilance at the time of victory so that the achievements of the revolution would not be lost. Second, as a revolutionary strategist, Mao looked into the future. Many revolutionary movements in history have lost their momentum after the victory because their objectives disappeared. Mao did not want to see this to happen in China. When he stressed the continuous existence of external threat to the Chinese revolution after its victory, he had actually issued the most powerful appeal for maintaining its inner dynamics. It is apparent that this approach made it easier for Mao and his fellow CCP leaders to emphasize conflict, rather than reconciliation or accommodation, with the Western countries, particularly with the United States.

International Outlook

In the late 1940s, when Mao and his comrades focused their vision on the outside world, they encountered an international environment that had been divided by the Cold War. The deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States drove the world into incessant crises, making the world situation replete with elements of instability and conflict. In the meantime, with the declining influence of the old European powers in international politics, national liberation movements developed rapidly in the non-European world, especially in East Asia. ₂₉ Facing such a situation, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders defined the nature of the emerging Cold War in light of the Marxist-Leninist theory of international class struggle, as well as of the CCP's need to win the war against the GMD. In the meantime, they demonstrated a strong desire to come to the fore in the international arena and to make China a significant actor in the changing world. All of this was clearly manifested in the late 1940s by the CCP's introduction of the theoretical concept of the "intermediate zone."

After the Second World War, Mao and the CCP leadership initially believed that the American-Soviet contradiction was the "main contradiction" ₃₀ in world politics and that the conflict between the CCP and the GMD was subordinate to the confrontation between the two super powers. ₃₁ The disclosure of the secret agreement on China between Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta challenged this view. Mao and the other CCP leaders found that between Moscow and Washington there existed not only confrontation but also areas of compromise. ₃₂ With the development of China's civil war, especially after Mao and the CCP leadership became convinced that the United States would not use its military forces directly in China because its strategic emphasis lay in Europe, Mao's understanding of the "main contradiction" in the world underwent a fundamental change, becoming more complicated. Beginning in late 1946, Mao and the CCP leadership introduced a series of new ideas about the postwar world situation and China's position in it, known as the theory of "the intermediate zone."

In an August 1946 interview with Anna Louise Strong, an American leftist journalist visiting Yanan, Mao asserted that sharp differences existed between the United States and the Soviet Union and that "the U.S. imperialists were preparing to attack the Soviet Union." However, he did not believe that the United States was ready to start a new world war. He observed that the United States and the Soviet Union were "separated by a vast zone including many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa," and it was therefore difficult for "the U.S. reactionaries to attack the Soviet Union before they could subjugate these countries." He speculated that the United States now controlled areas in the Far East larger than all the former British spheres of influence there, including Japan, the part of China under GMD rule, half of Korea, and the South Pacific. As a result, it was not the Soviet Union but these countries that became "the targets of U.S. aggression." Mao concluded that America's anti-Soviet campaign was designed to oppress the American people and to expand U.S influences in the areas between the United States and the Soviet Union, including those capitalist countries. ₃₃

Underlying these speculations was the belief that the United States was by nature a "paper tiger." In a long conversation with Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi on November 21, 1946, Mao stressed that the CCP should not overestimate the strength of the United States and other Western countries, which he felt were on the verge of a new destructive economic crisis. Furthermore, the competition for raw materials and potential markets between major imperialist powers would cause serious problems between the United States and such imperialist countries as Britain and France, thus weakening the strength of the "reactionary ruling classes" in these countries. As a result, leftist forces in Western countries would further develop in the wake of the economic crisis. Mao therefore concluded that the "reactionaries" in the United States and other Western countries were vulnerable. ₃₄

Mao introduced here the CCP leadership's unique comprehension of the nature of the emerging confrontation between the two superpowers: although the postwar world seemed to be characterized by the sharp confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Cold War at the present stage was nevertheless in its essence a struggle between, on the one hand, the American people and peoples in the "intermediate zone," of which China occupied a crucial position, and, on the other hand, the reactionary American ruling class. This struggle would determine not simply the direction of the emerging Cold War but actually the fate of the entire world.

In early 1947, an important article entitled "Explanations of Several Basic Problems Concerning the Postwar International Situation" offered a more detailed analysis of the "intermediate zone." Published in the name of Lu Dingyi, the CCP's propaganda chief, the article had been discussed by top CCP leaders and personally revised by Mao. ₃₅ It argued that the postwar confrontation was between the "anti-democratic forces" headed by the United States and the "peace-loving and democratic forces" headed by the Soviet Union. In this sense it is true that the international scene after the Second World War had been bipolarized. As the strength of the Soviet camp far surpassed that of the American, it was erroneous to believe "that a new world war was inevitable or that a lasting world peace was impossible." Stressing that the United States was separated from the Soviet Union by the vast intermediate zone in Asia, Africa, and Europe, the article repeated Mao's view that Washington's anti-Soviet campaign was designed for "internal oppression and international expansion in the intermediate zone." The article continued to analyze the "main contradiction" of the postwar world. It emphasized:

After the end of the Second World War, the main contradiction in world politics exists not between the capitalist world and the socialist Soviet Union, nor between the Soviet Union and the United States, but between the democratic and anti-democratic forces in the capitalist world. Or more concretely speaking, the main contradiction in today's world is that between the American people and American reactionaries, that between Great Britain and the United States, and that between China and the United States. ₃₆

It can thus be seen that in the view of Mao and his fellow CCP leaders, sharp differences did exist between the Soviet Union and the United States. The real thrust of the Soviet-American confrontation, however, lay in the competition over the intermediate zone, and the fate of the competition would be decided by the struggle between the peoples of the intermediate zone and the "reactionary" U.S. ruling class, rather than between the two superpowers themselves. As China occupied a crucial position in the intermediate zone, Mao and his comrades believed that China would play a central role in determining the result of the Cold War.

The CCP leadership's introduction of the intermediate zone theory came at a time when China's civil war had been escalating. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders obviously hoped to use this theory, especially the part about "all reactionaries were paper tigers," to encourage the whole party to pursue a victorious end in the war against the American-backed GMD regime. In this sense, the theory served the party leadership's need to mobilize the party to win the civil war.

In a broad sense, the theory of the intermediate zone reflected CCP leaders'fundamental perceptions of China's position in the postwar world. First, it mirrored the CCP's commitment to transform the existing international order by challenging the United States as a dominant power in the Asian-Pacific area. In Mao's view, since the American intention to control the Asian-Pacific area served the interests of "the dark reactionary forces," the CCP's challenge to the existing order was just and necessary. And since the reactionary forces headed by the United States faced themselves a variety of internal and external crises, such a challenge was feasible. The Chinese people and other peoples in the Asian-Pacific should have the courage to challenge American domination in international politics.

Second, the theory of the intermediate zone demonstrated that the CCP's postwar policy had a strong "lean-to-one-side" tendency from the beginning. Although Mao stated that China belonged to the "intermediate zone" between the Soviet Union and the United States, he opposed China to take a middle ground between the two superpowers. ₃₇ Lu's article made it clear that China belonged both to the "intermediate zone" and the Soviet camp. In a report on domestic and international relations in December 1947. Mao placed the United States squarely as the head of the imperialist camp with the Soviet Union as the leader of the anti-imperialist camp, of which China should become a member. ₃₈ In December 1948, Liu Shaoqi published a lengthy article, "On Internationalism and Nationalism" (again, a collective work of the CCP leadership). He postulated that sharp confrontation did exist between the Soviet-headed "new democratic" camp and the U.S. headed "reactionary" camp, which involved "all the peoples of the world-of all countries, classes, sections of the population, parties and groups." Therefore one must "line up with one side or the other....If one is not in the imperialist camp . . . one must be in the anti-imperialist camp." ₃₉ It had never been a problem for the CCP leadership that China belonged in the Soviet camp.

Third, the theory of the intermediate zone reflected a strong tendency toward Chinese ethnocentrism in Mao's and the other CCP leaders'perception of the postwar world. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders stated vigorously that the American-Soviet competition over the intermediate zone would be finally determined by the result of the struggles between China and the United States, and that the "main contradiction" in the postwar world was thus of a Sino-American nature. This emphasis upon China as a critical front in the postwar world may have been part of an attempt to win more Soviet assistance to the CCP. It indicated also that the CCP leaders'thinking was strongly influenced by the desire to pursue China's worldwide influence, even during the time when the party was still fighting for a dominant position in China.

Within this context the CCP leadership's concept of revolution, especially its understanding of the relations between their own and the world proletarian revolution, evolved during the civil war. Mao and his comrades had consistently viewed the Chinese revolution as part of a world proletarian revolutionary movement initiated by Russian Bolsheviks. As the Chinese revolution progressed, however, a different model from that of the Russian revolution emerged: instead of concentrating on urban areas the Chinese revolution was largely rural-oriented. Mao and the CCP leadership now had second thoughts about the nature and significance of the Chinese revolution. During 1948-49, they began to think in terms of a much broader anti-imperialist Asian and world revolution. They had come to believe that their model of revolution transcended China. They concluded, first, that the Chinese revolution offered an example of universal significance to other peoples struggling for national liberation and, second, that the victory of the Chinese revolution was the beginning of a new high tide of revolutionary movements of oppressed peoples in Asia and in the world. Consequently, Mao and his comrades believed it their duty to assist Communist revolutionaries and national liberation movements in other countries in order to promote a worldwide revolution. ₄₀

Ironically the desire to make a total break with the "old world" reveals the CCP's inheritance of a heavy cultural-historical burden. In the CCP leaders'eagerness to make the Chinese revolution Asian-wide or even worldwide, we see the reemergence of a familiar Chinese ethnocentrism and universalism, an age-old tradition seriously challenged during modern times by the Western invasion of China. "China's standing up among the nations of the world," according to Mao's logic, would be realized through China's promotion of Asian and world revolutions, thus bringing about the rejuvenation of China's central position in the international community, that is, the cultural and moral superiority of the "Central Kingdom," now represented by Mao's revolutionary China, would achieve an international recognition.

We have encountered at this point a key rationale underlying the CCP's foreign policy: Mao's and his comrades'revolutionary nationalism. China has a long history and a profound civilization. The traditional Chinese were deeply convinced that Chinese civilization and the Chinese way of life were the most superior in the known universe. Indeed, the Chinese during traditional times had only a vague impression of the "world" or the distinction of nation-states; they would be more comfortable using the concept "tian xia" (all under the heaven), which implied that the "Central Kingdom" was the only civilized land in the world; or in other words, China was civilization in toto. ₄₁

This Chinese view of the world had been severely challenged when China had to face the cruel fact that China's door was opened by the superior forces of Western powers, and that the very survival of the Chinese nation was at stake. Mao's and his comrades'viewpoints of China's international status and foreign connections were deeply influenced by the unequal exchanges between China and the foreign powers. They became indignant when they saw Western powers, including the United States, treat the old, declining China with arrogance and a strong sense of superiority. They also despised former Chinese governments, from the Manchu dynasty to the regimes of the warlords, which had failed to protect China's national integrity and sovereignty. An emotional commitment to national liberation provided a crucial momentum in Mao's and his comrades'choice of a Marxist-Leninist style revolution. As Mao expressed it, China's national crisis early in the twentieth century had a decisive impact on his decision to join the revolutionary movement aimed at transforming Chinese society. ₄₂ For Mao and his comrades, the final goal of their revolution was more than the total transformation of the old Chinese society they saw as corrupt and unjust; they would pursue at the same time changing China's weak power status, to prove to the other parts of the world the strength and influence of Chinese culture, and to redefine the values and rules underlying the international system. ₄₃ We certainly can call Mao and his fellow CCP leaders Chinese nationalists. But their nationalism had not only a strong revolutionary orientation but was also interwoven with the deep-rooted image of a "Sinocentric world order," as once defined by John K. Fairbank. ₄₄

This revolutionary nationalism, under the Cold War environment, led Mao and his comrades to emphasize persistently that the Chinese Communists would not tolerate Washington's disdain of China and the Chinese people. While Washington's hostility toward the Chinese Communist revolution offended Mao and his fellow CCP leaders, the perceived American disdain for China as a weak country and the Chinese as an inferior people made them angry. When the Chinese Communist revolution approached nationwide victory, Mao would personally initiate a series of propaganda campaigns calculated to expose the "reactionary" and "vulnerable" nature of U.S. imperialism and to encourage the Chinese people's national self-respect. Although Mao and the CCP media frequently used Marxist-Leninist terminology in these campaigns, how to face the "U.S. imperialists" was to the CCP a problem concerning values and beliefs, which was related to their feelings as Chinese.

Under the influence of the same revolutionary nationalism, the CCP's relationship with Moscow was close but never completely harmonious. Around the time of the establishment of the People's Republic, conditioned by both ideological considerations and practical interests (the Soviet Union was more than a Communist friend; it was also the only great power that was willing to back the PRC), Mao and the CCP leadership would adopt the policy of allying China with the Soviet Union. Mao and his fellow CCP leaders, however, would be extremely sensitive to being treated by Stalin and the other Soviet leaders as the "little brother."

In sum, underlying the CCP's perception of the outside world were not only political ideological considerations, but also, and more important, profound historical-cultural factors: the conceptual world of Mao and his fellow CCP leaders as twentieth-century Chinese revolutionaries was consciously or unconsciously dominated by the age-old "Central Kingdom" mentality. The international goal of the revolution therefore mirrored its domestic tasks. Just as it would destroy traditional Chinese society and establish a new China, so too it would challenge and destroy the old world order, and create a new one.

Defining China's Security Interests

The CCP's domestic agenda, its perception of the postwar world and China's position in it, and its revolutionary nationalism carried Mao and the party's leadership to an exceptionally strong sense of insecurity and, correspondingly, the pursuit of special means for security. Consequently, the CCP leadership's definition of China's security interests was deeply penetrated by the party's revolutionary commitments.

In a general sense it is understandable that, in a divided world in which the balance of power had been severely threatened by such factors as the emergence of nuclear weapons and the increasing confrontation of the two superpowers, any country had reasons to feel less secure than ever before. The sense of insecurity on the part of Mao and the CCP leadership, however, was special in several respects in comparison with the typical considerations of insecurity during the early Cold War period. It was not so closely related to fear of America's nuclear power since Mao emphasized that the Chinese Communists would not be intimidated by it. ₄₅ Nor would Mao believe, as the result of his deep conviction of China's ability to rely on its own resources for survival and development, that revolutionary China could easily be knocked down by the "imperialist plot" to isolate it from international society. Rather, the CCP leadership's deep sense of insecurity had a close connection with its understanding of the nature and influence of the Chinese Communist revolution. Three hypothetical observations might be made here. First of all, the ambitious hope on the part of Mao and the other CCP leaders to change China into a central international actor conflicted with China's weak power status at the time of the PRC's formation- in 1949, as Frederick C. Teiwes once put it, "China's fundamental economic and military backwardness created monumental impediments to the (Communist)elite's goals of national wealth of power." ₄₆ As Mao and his fellow CCP leaders would not give up the effort to chart their own course in the world and to make China a leading world power, they would continue to feel insecure until China's weakness had been turned into strength. ₄₇

Second, since Mao and the CCP leadership emphasized the significance and influence of the Chinese Communist revolution and regarded the struggles between revolutionary China and the United States as the "main contradiction" in the world, they would logically feel that they faced a very insecure world. One could find here a mutually restrictive or mutually promotive relationship in the CCP leadership's security concerns: the more they stressed the significance of the Chinese Communist revolution, the less secure they would feel in face of the perceived threat from the West and the United States.

Third, the continuous emphasis by Mao and the CCP leadership on the necessity of maintaining the inner dynamics of the Chinese Communist revolution would represent another constant source of insecurity. In order to use the continuous existence of the foreign threat to mobilize the Chinese masses, Mao and his comrades enhanced anti-foreign-imperialist propaganda. This propaganda, in turn, might lead to a deepening sense of insecurity on their own part. Allen Whiting's analysis certainly makes good sense in this regard: "Perhaps Mao spoke propagandistically while retaining more sophisticated judgments privately. The consistency of the bias in his erroneous forecasts, however, makes probable his wholehearted acceptance of Communist assumptions of world affairs." ₄₈

Consequently, when defining China's security interests and the threats to them, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders would not restrict their vision to China's physical security. Rather, they perceived China's national security interests at three different yet interrelated levels. First, as noted earlier, they emphasized that one threat to the Chinese revolution and the Communist regime came from within. In Mao's opinions, the imperialists would try to use representatives within the revolutionary camp to sabotage the revolution; and some revolutionaries could shift their revolutionary stand as the result of being unable to meet the challenges brought about by the revolution's nationwide victory. In both cases the vital interests of revolutionary China could be in danger.

Second, Mao and his fellow CCP leaders paid special attention to the connection between the safety of China's neighboring areas and the security of China itself. In this regard, following China's modern experiences (especially those of the 1884 Sino-Franco War over Vietnam and the 1894 Sino-Japanese War over Korea and Manchuria), CCP leaders placed great value on defending the suzerain spheres of traditional China, the Korean peninsula and the Indochina area in particular. Believing that these two regions had special connections with China's overall security interests, the CCP leaders endeavored to promote revolutionary movements there in the early days of the PRC, and would treat them, together with Taiwan, as the most possible sites for a direct confrontation with the United States. ₄₉

Third, Beijing leaders believed also that China's security interests were linked with the scenario in the entire Asian-Pacific area or even the entire world. Viewing China as an emerging power in the international arena, CCP leaders were concerned about the possible influence of major changes in Asia and other parts of the world upon China's security status. Starting in early 1949, the CCP demonstrated strong interests in the internal and external affairs of countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Japan. The party emphasized that the development of revolutionary movements in these countries was closely related to the fate of the Chinese revolution- while their failure would create greater pressure on the Chinese revolutionaries, their success would strengthen the new China's international position. ₅₀ On a global scale, CCP leaders believed that the changing world situation was in one way or the other connected with the status of China's security. In accordance with the Marxist-Leninist rules of social progress and the CCP's understanding of the postwar situation, Mao and the CCP leadership were convinced that Communist China's security would be guaranteed only when the outside world was no longer dominated by hostile capitalist-imperialist forces. ₅₁

These specific considerations and, as a result, the unique definition of China's security interests led Mao and the CCP leadership to believe that special means were required to maintain China's national security. In pursuing China's security interests, Mao and the CCP leadership would often resort to such conventional means as allying China with other powers, trying to split China's enemies (often combined with the Chinese tradition of "utilizing barbarians to check barbarians"), pursuing effective means of deterrence, and "preparing for the worst while at the same time pursuing the best." However, strongly influenced by the party's successful experience of mobilizing the masses in the confrontation with the GMD, they would emphasize the importance of maintaining China's security interests through a total and continuous mobilization of the party and the Chinese people. Mao believed that if the Chinese nation, which was composed of almost one quarter of the world's population, could be fully mobilized under the CCP's strong central leadership, China's national security interests would be best maintained. ₅₂ For Mao, the question of the best means to maintain China's security interests had thus turned into the question of how to achieve full mobilization of the Chinese nation under the Communist leadership.

Mao at the Center

By the late 1940s, Mao Zedong had established himself as the CCP's indisputable leader. His comrades became increasingly accustomed to echo his judgment, rather than to challenge his wisdom. The revolutionary features of the CCP's foreign policy reflected Mao's ideas and, in a sense, epitomized his rebellious character, his consciousness of challenge, and his devotion to Chinese revolutionary nationalism. In order to understand better the CCP's revolutionary foreign policy, we need to comprehend Mao as a person and his dominant position in the CCP's decision-making structure.

Born in 1893, Mao was from a peasant family in Shaoshan, a village in Xiangtan County, Hunan Province. During his childhood, he had a frequently conflicting relationship with his father, which, as many scholars believe, contributed to the making of his rebellious character. As a schoolboy, he read Confucian classics, but only to the tales of rebelling peasants fighting against the exploitative and corrupt bureaucracy (such as the popular novel Water Margin)would he devote his heart and soul. As he left Shaoshan to pursue more advanced studies in Changsha, Hunan's capital city, all of this was reinforced by the rebelliously oriented cultural environment in Hunan Province. The result was his deep conviction that "rebellion was by nature legitimate" zaofan youli). ₅₃

When Mao further touched upon the realities of Chinese society and China's declining status in the world, his rebellious and challenge-oriented character began to combine with the strong desire of "transforming China and the world," leading to a profound and persistent consciousness of challenging the "old world." In Mao's conceptual realm, there existed little respect for the existing rules or regulations in either Chinese society or the international community; rather, Mao's way of thinking was dominated by "the philosophy of struggle," which emphasized that "only through struggle was progress in human history possible." ₅₄ In Mao's mind, the very dynamics of his revolution lay in the constant needs of defining and redefining the objective(s) that the revolution was to challenge. These ideas, in the late 1940s, became the spiritual backbone of the CCP's revolutionary foreign policy.

Mao's central position in the CCP's policy-making structure in the late 1940s allowed him to change his opinions into the party's policies without much checking and balancing by other top party leaders. As a Communist party, the CCP had long taken the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" as the basis of its decision-making framework, which meant that only before the decision had been made would different opinions be allowed to exist and that in no circumstance would factional activities within the party's leading circle be tolerated. In practice, the CCP's policy-making procedures following "democratic centralism" were steeped in the deep-rooted patriarchal tradition in China's political culture, allowing the party's paramount leader to act as the head of the party "family." Indeed, since Mao's emergence as the CCP's top leader in the mid-1930s, his authority in the party's decision-making structure had increased continuously. A decision by the Politburo in March 1943 made Mao the party's undisputed leader and granted him the power of "making the final judgement for important decisions." ₅₅ The party's seventh congress in 1945 further established "Mao Zedong Thought" as the party's guiding ideology. In the wake of the CCP's victory in China's civil war, Mao's credibility and authority within the party leadership rose further; so did his confidence in his own political wisdom. With the emergence of the "Mao cult" that was to characterize Communist China's political and social life, Mao's leadership role became of a patriarchal nature- it was no longer possible and meaningful to distinguish his voice from the party's.

Until late 1948, domestic affairs dominated the CCP's agenda. The nationwide victory, however, made Mao feel an urgent need to place the party's diplomatic affairs under tighter control of the party's central leadership and himself. He could see that most of the CCP's local and provincial cadres were from rural areas. While familiar with military and domestic political matters they had little experience in foreign affairs. As the CCP emerged as the ruling party, it encountered new problems (especially in the field of diplomacy)that did not fit into the party's previous strategies and policies. Mismanagement of foreign affairs by local party cadres might undermine the CCP's whole foreign policy. Furthermore, Mao's understanding of the decisive role the new China's foreign policy was to play in continuously promoting the Chinese revolution prevented him from releasing his decision-making power on diplomatic affairs- he believed that his direct leadership would best guarantee the party's foreign policy to serve his grand revolutionary designs. Under these circumstances, Mao emphasized repeatedly in late 1948 and early 1949 that "there existed no insignificant matter in diplomatic affairs, and everything should be reported to and decided by the Central Committee," and, particularly, by Mao himself. ₅₆ There is no doubt that Mao Zedong was the single most important policymaker in Communist China's foreign affairs- the other CCP leaders, including Zhou Enlai and his staff, were more policy-carriers than policymakers. ₅₇

Mao in 1949, though, was not an experienced master at foreign affairs in a conventional sense. As of 1949, he had never been abroad. His knowledge of other parts of the world was based largely on his highly selective reading, which focused more on Chinese history, Chinese politics, and Chinese translations of Marxist-Leninist classics than on world politics or international relations. ₅₈ In addition, Mao's direction of the CCP's foreign policy was strongly influenced, as noted earlier, by a preoccupation with the ongoing Chinese revolution. These factors generated misperceptions and improper initiatives and responses in Communist China's foreign policy.

But Mao also brought strength. Deeply convinced of the just nature of his cause, Mao was determined to challenge and destroy the unjust and exploitative "old world." He was not alone; a nation with a population equal to one quarter of that of the world would be under his rule. He had learned to be a master at mobilizing the party and the revolutionary peasantry to realize the revolution's domestic tasks; now, as China's ruler, he was more than willing to apply the same strategy to mobilize the Chinese nation in pursuing the revolution's international aims. To underestimate the determination and potential of a China led by this man would be a fatal misperception.

Toward the end of the 1940s, China had emerged as a revolutionary power. In domestic affairs, Mao and the CCP leadership placed extraordinary emphasis on the need to maintain the inner dynamics of the Communist revolution, so that the revolution would eventually produce a profound transformation of China's state and society. In international politics, Mao and his comrades were determined to break with the legacies of the old China, to "make a fresh start" in China's foreign affairs, and to lean to the side of the Soviet-led socialist camp. Indeed, Mao's new China challenged the Western powers by questioning and, consequently, negating the very legitimacy of the existing "norms of international relations," which, as Mao and his comrades viewed them, were of Western origins and inimical to revolutionary China. In order to pursue their domestic and international goals, the Chinese revolutionaries would in no circumstance allow themselves to be restricted by the rules of the "old world."

To be sure, the foreign behavior of Communist China appeared to have its own language and own theory, and would follow its own values and codes of behavior. In a world that had been divided by the Cold War, the adoption of a new and revolutionary discourse by the world's most populous country inevitably brought about factors of instability and demands for radical change in both East Asian regional politics and the worldwide political scenario. What made the situation even more complicated is that at the time of its formation, Communist China's ambitious international aims were yet overshadowed by the prevailing images of China as a weak country. While this cognitive gap turned out to be one of the most important sources for foreign misperceptions of China's intention and capacity, it also caused an extraordinary sense of insecurity on the part of the Chinese leaders. In retrospect, indeed, it would be surprising if Communist China's emergence as a revolutionary power had not been followed by its confrontations with the Western powers in general and the United States in particular.

Notes

Note 1: The GMD neared financial and economic collapse by the end of 1948. From August 1948 to March 1949, the price index in Shanghai increased 83,000 times, and Jinyuanjuan, the paper currency issued after the end of the Second World War, became little more than scraps of paper. Meanwhile, GMD military forces lost 173 divisions and 1.54 million men in three major campaigns (Liaoshen, Huaihai, and Pingjin), and, for the first time in China's civil war, the Communist forces established a numerical superiority. See Mo Yang and Yao Jie et al., Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhanshi (The War History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army), 3 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1987), 3: 305-6, 313; Mao Zedong, "The Momentous Change in China's Military Situation,"Mao Zedong xuanji, 5 vols. (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, hereafter cited as MXJ, Beijing: People's Press, 1960, 1977), 4: 1363-64. Back.

Note 2: Mao Zedong, "Carry the Revolution through to the End,"MXJ, 4: 1377; "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949," MJWX, p. 328. Back.

Note 3: Mao Zedong, "Report and Conclusion at the CCP Central Committee Politburo Meeting," September 8 and 13, 1948, Dangde wenxian (Party Historical Documents), no. 5 (1989): 3-7; Chen Enhui, "An Important Conference of Strategic Decision Making: The Politburo's Meeting of September 1948," ibid., pp. 12-15. Back.

Note 4: Mao Zedong, "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949," MJWX, pp. 326-332; Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1425-1440. Back.

Note 5: Zhou Enlai, "The Principles and Tasks of Our Diplomacy," Zhou Enlai xuanji, 2 vols.(Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, hereafter cited as ZXJ, Beijing: People's Press, 1984), 2: 85-87; for the CCP leadership's design of principles in the building of Communist China's foreign policy, see Han Nianlong et al., Dangdai zhongguo waijiao, pp. 3-6. Back.

Note 6: Mao Zedong, "Basic Problems of the Chinese Revolution," MXJ, 1: 281. Back.

Note 7: Scholars should not be confused or misled by the term "people's democracy" here. CCP leaders widely used the term "democracy" in the 1940s, especially in denouncing Jiang Jieshi's "dictatorship." As Mao made it clear in "On New Democracy," the CCP defined "democracy" as "the other side of the proletarian dictatorship," which had nothing to do with establishing a political institution with checks and balances. See Mao Zedong, "On New Democracy," MXJ, 2: 655-704, especially pp. 659-664, 672-676; "On People's Democratic Dictatorship,"ibid., 3: 1473-1486, especially pp. 1481-1485; and Liu Shaoqi, "On the Nature of the Government and State of China's New Democracy," in Liu Wusheng et al., Gongheguo zouguo de lu: jianguo yilai zhongyao wenjian xuanbian, 1949-1952 (The Paths the Republic Has Walked through: A Selected Collection of Important Historical Documents, 1949-1952, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1991), pp. 56-59. Back.

Note 8: Mao Zedong, "Carry the Revolution through to the End," MXJ, 4: 1380, 1382-1383; "Comments on the War Criminal's Suing for Peace," ibid., pp. 1387-90; and "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949," MJWX, p. 327; MJWJ, 5: 472.. Back.

Note 9: Liu Guoguang et al., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dangan ziliao xuanbian: zhonghejuan (A Selected Collection of Economic Archival Materials of the People's Republic of China: The Comprehensive Volume, 1949-1952, Beijing: Chinese Urban Economic Society Press, 1990), pp. 36-135; Guo Bingwei and Tan Zongji, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jianshi (A Brief History of the People's Republic of China, Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 1988), pp. 6-7; Chen Yun, "Check the Skyrocketing Prices," Chen Yun wengao xuanbian, 1949-1956 (Selected Manuscripts of Chen Yun, 1949-1956, Beijing: People' Press, 1984), pp. 29-32. Back.

Note 10: Mao Zedong, "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949," MJWX, pp. 329, 332; "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1429; and Mao's conclusion at the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, minute. The original of this document is maintained in Chinese Central Archives in Beijing (hereafter cited as CCA). Back.

Note 11: Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee"; and "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," MXJ, 4: 1432-34, 1479-1480. Back.

Note 12: Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," Ibid., p. 1434. Back.

Note 13: Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," Ibid., pp. 1432-34; " Chen Yun, "To Overcome Serious Difficulties in Financial and Economic Affairs," Chen Yun wengao xuanbian, p. 2. Back.

Note 14: Mao Zedong, "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan"; "On Protracted War," MXJ, 2: 395-504; see also Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," ibid., pp. 615-626. For a discussion of the development of Mao's view on self-reliance, see Stuart Schram, The Though of Mao Tse-tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 92-93; for a discussion of the CCP's self-reliance strategy during the Yanan era, see Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 249-259. Back.

Note 15: The CCP Central Committee, "Instructions on Problems Concerning Foreign Trade Policy," February 16, 1949, ZYWJXJ, 18: 136. Back.

Note 16: Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1434, 1436. Back.

Note 17: Zhou Enlai, "The Present Financial and Economic Situation and Relations Between Different Aspects of the Economy of the New China," ZXJ, 2: 10-11. Back.

Note 18: Zhou Enlai, "Report on Problems Concerning the Peace Talks," ZXJ, 1: 318. Back.

Note 19: Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1439-40. Back.

Note 20: Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," and "On New Democracy," MXJ, 2: 626-47, 656-72. For a discussion of Mao's definition of "New Democracy" in a historical context related to Marxist-Leninist analysis, see Schram, The Thought of Mao Zedong, pp. 75-79; on the political implication of Mao's introduction of the "New Democracy" thesis in 1939-1940, see John Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 126-128. Back.

Note 21: Mao Zedong, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship," MXJ, 4: 1473-86. Back.

Note 22: See Zhou Enlai to the CCP Central Committee and Mao Zedong, August 10, 1946, and Zhou Enlai to the CCP Central Committee, August 31, 1946, in Tong Xiaopeng et al., Zhonggong zhongyang nanjing jŸ (The CCP Central Committee's Nanjing Bureau: Selected Documents, Beijing: CCP History Press, 1990), pp. 117-118, 138-139; The CCP Central Committee to Dong Biwu and others, January 30, 1947, ibid., pp. 222-223; Mao Zedong's talks with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, November 21, 1946, minute, CCA, and MNP, 3: 150-51; and Liu Shaoqi, "Speech to A Party Cadres Meeting, July 1, 1948," Dangshi yanjiu (Party History Studies), no. 3, 1980): 14. Back.

Note 23: Mao Zedong, "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949," MJWX, p. 328; the CCP Central Military Commission's instructions, 28 February 1949, ZYWJXJ, 18: 157; Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan (A Biography of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949, Beijing: The Press of Party Historical Materials, 1987), p. 751; and Li Ping and Fang Ming et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1898-1949 (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai, 1898-1949, Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents and People's Press, 1989), p. 808. Back.

Note 24: The Resolution of the CCP's Front-line Committee of the Third Field Army, January 25, 1949, Ba Zhongtan et al., Shanghai zhanyi (The Shanghai Campaign, Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 1989), pp. 290-291; Zhang Zhen, "In Reminiscence of the Shanghai Campaign," ibid., pp. 87-88; and Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang dao banmendian, p. 2. Back.

Note 25: Mao Zedong, "The Current Situation and the Party's Tasks in 1949," MJWX, p. 328 and MJWJ, 5: 473. Back.

Note 26: Mao Zedong, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee," MXJ, 4: 1425-26, 1428; see also MNP, 3: 410-411. Back.

Note 27: Mao Zedong, "Plans to March to the Whole Country," May 23, 1949, MJWX, p. 338; and MJWJ, 5: 591. Mao pointed out here that "if Shanghai, Fuzhou and Qingdao were quickly and smoothly occupied, the possibility of American military intervention would disappear." See also Liu Shaoqi's memo on the CCP's domestic and international policies, July 4, 1949, in Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jŸren shenbian, p. 399. Back.

Note 28: Mao Zedong, "Address to the Preparatory Committee of the New Political Consultative Conference," MXJ, 4: 1469. Back.

Note 29: For a discussion of the emergence of revolutionary movements and revolutionary states in East Asia and its challenge to the West in general and the United States in particular, see Michael Hunt and Steven Levine, "The Revolutionary Challenge to Early U.S. Cold War Policy in Asia," In Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 13-34; see also Odd Arne Westad, "Rethinking Revolution: The Cold War in the Third World," Journal of Peace Research, 29, no. 4 (November 1992): 455-464. Back.

Note 30: "Main contradiction" was a term Mao frequently used. He believed that the natural world and human society were full of contradictions, and that among all contradictions there was a decisive one, the "main contradiction," which would determine the changing course of all contradictions. It was therefore important for the Chinese revolutionaries to distinguish the "main contradiction" from the others in making their strategies and policies. See Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction," MXJ, 1: 308-314. Back.

Note 31: Niu Jun, Cong Yanan zouxiang shijie: zhongguo gongchandang duiwai guanxi de qiyuan (From Yanan to the World: The Origins of the CCP's External Relations, Fuzhou: Fujian People's Press, 1992), chapter 9. Back.

Note 32: Ibid.; Yang Kuisong, "The Soviet Factor and the CCP's Policy toward the United States in the 1940s," Chinese Historians, 5, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 23. Back.

Note 33: Mao Zedong, "Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," MXJ, 4: 1191-1192. Back.

Note 34: Mao Zedong's conversations with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, November 21, 1946, minutes, CCA; see also MNP, 3: 150-151. Back.

Note 35: For an official confirmation of Mao's personal revision of the article, see ZWJWX, p. 554, n. 343; and MNP, 3: 158. Back.

Note 36: See Renmin ribao (People's Daily), January 4 and 5, 1947. Back.

Note 36: In his influential study, The World and China, 1922-1972(London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), p. 124, John Gittings argues that Mao's theory of intermediate zone represented an effort on the part of the CCP to pursue an independent status from both Washington and Moscow. Such a view neglects the CCP's strong anti-American stand as well as its persistent desire to attach the Chinese Communist revolution to the Soviet-headed international proletariat movement. Back.

Note 38: Mao Zedong, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks," MXJ, 4: 1258-1259. Back.

Note 39: Liu Shaoqi, "On Internationalism and Nationalism," Renmin ribao, November 7, 1948. Back.

Note 40: This approach is most explicitly expressed by Liu Shaoqi in his speech to the Trade Union Meeting of the Asian and Australian Countries: "The path taken by the Chinese people in winning their victories over imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the road that people of various colonial and semi-colonial countries should traverse in their struggle for national independence and people's democracy." Xinhua yuebao (New China Monthly), 1, no. 2 (1949): 440; see also Liu Shaoqi, "On Internationalism and Nationalism"; Si Mu, "The International Significance of the Victory of the Chinese People's Revolutionary War," Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), 21, no. 1 (December 1949): 19-21; Lu Dingyi, "The Worldwide Significance of the Chinese Revolution," Lu Dingyi wenji (A Collection of Lu Dingyi's Works, Beijing: People's Press, 1992), pp. 432-439. Back.

Note 41: For discussions of the traditional Chinese view of the world and China's position in it, see Samuel S. Kim, China, the United Nations, and the World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 19-23; Mark Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1984), pp. xii-xiii; John K. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in J. K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 1-2; Immanuel HsŸ, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 6-16; and Charles P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). Back.

Note 42: See Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1938), pp. 118-119. For a good discussion of Mao's adoption of the restoration of China's historic status as one of the top goals of his revolution, see Mancall, China at the Center, chapter 9, Back.

Note 43: Scholars in the West have been divided on assessing the impact of the traditional Chinese world view on Chinese Communist foreign policy. While some scholars emphasize "continuity," i.e., that the Maoist image of the world had not been altered in its fundamentals compared with the traditional one, others allege a "complete break," that is, there existed a sharp gap between the CCP's view of the world and the traditional image. For a summary of the two schools, see Kim, China, the United Nations, and the World Order, pp. 90-93. My argument here, as the reader can see, is more toward the continuity school. Back.

Note 44: Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order, pp. 1-4. Back.

Note 45: See, for example, Mao Zedong's conversations with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, November 21, 1946, minute, CCA; Mao Zedong, "Talks with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong," MXJ, 4: 1192-1193; see also John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 7. Back.

Note 46: Frederick C. Teiwes, "Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime," in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 14: 51. Back.

Note 47: For a useful analysis of the security policies of China as a weak state, see Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 193-253. There is one major problem, though, existing in Mandelbaum's analysis. Throughout the chapter about China's security policies, he suggests that the maintenance of China's independence be the single most important goal in Mao's security strategy. The goals of Mao and the CCP leadership, in my opinion, were much more ambitious. Back.

Note 48: Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 10. Back.

Note 49: For more extensive discussions on this problem, see Chen Jian, "The Making of a Revolutionary Diplomacy: A Critical Study of Communist China's Policy toward the United States, 1949-1950," Chinese Historians, 3, no. 1 (January 1990): 36-38; see also discussions in chapters 4 and 5. Back.

Note 50: For the CCP leadership's interests in East Asia around the formation of the PRC, see Du Ruo, "China's Liberation and the Southeast Asia," Shijie zhishi, 20, no. 1 (June 1949): 13; Shi Xiaochong, "The Crisis in India," ibid.,20, no. 4 (July 1949): 20-21; Hu Jin, "India and the British-American Imperialism," ibid.,20, no. 14 (October 1949): 12-13; Huang Caoliang, Zhanhou shijie xinxingshi (New Situations of the Postwar World, Shanghai, 1950); and Mao Zedong to Hu Qiaomu, January 14, 1950, MWG, 1: 237. Back.

Note 51: For the CCP leadership's understanding of the relationship of the changing world situation and the prospect of the Chinese revolution, see, for example, Mao Zedong, "Report to the CCP Politburo Meeting," September 8, 1948, in Liu Wusheng et al., Gongheguo zouguo de lu, pp. 10-11. Back.

Note 52: Mao Zedong, "The Chinese People Have Stood Up," MWG, 1: 6-7; "Long Live the Grand Unity of the Chinese People," ibid.,pp. 10-12; and MNP, 3: 575, 580. Back.

Note 53: For an excellent discussion about Mao's relationship with his father and the making of his rebellious character, see Chen Jin, Mao Zedong de wenhua xingge (The Cultural Character of Mao Zedong, Beijing: The Press of Chinese Youth, 1991), pp. 316-317; see also Snow, Red Star Over China, pp. 129-139; Stuart Schram, Mao Tse-tung (London: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 19-21. For a discussion of the rebellious-oriented Hunan regional cultural and its influence upon the making of Mao's rebellious character, see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 29-30. Back.

Note 54: See Chen Jin, Mao Zedong de wenhua xingge, pp. 233-259; and Li Rui, Mao Zedong de zaonian yu wannian (Mao Zedong's Early and Late Ages, Guiyang: Guizhou People's Press, 1992), pp. 7-8. Back.

Note 55: Hu Sheng et al., Zhongguo gongchandang de qishinian (A Seventy-year History of the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing: CCP History Press, 1991), p. 231; and Li and Fang et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 551. Back.

Note 56: : See, for example, the CCP Central Committee to the CCP Northeast Bureau, November 10, 1948, cited from Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai zhuan,p. 739; Mao Zedong to the CCP Tianjin Municipal Committee, January 20, 1949, telegram, CCA. Back.

Note 57: For a good discussion, see Zhang Shuguang, "In the Shadow of Mao: Zhou Enlai and New China's Diplomacy," in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim eds., The Diplomats, 1939-1979 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming). Back.

Note 58: See Gong Yuzhi, Pang Xianzhi, and Shi Zhongquan, Mao Zedong de dushu shenghuo (The Reading Experiences of Mao Zedong, Beijing: The Sanlian Bookstore, 1986); and Zhang Yijiu, Mao Zedong dushi (Mao Zedong's Reading of History, Beijing: The Chinese Friendship Press, 1992). Back.