American Leadership, Ethnic Conflict, and the New World Politics

Demetrios James Caraley and Bonnie B. Hartman, Editors

1997

Introduction: The Contours of the New World

Robert Jervis

While enough years have passed for us to be embarrassed by calling ours the "post-cold war era, the world scene is still too new and confused to permit a sensible label, let alone a good understanding. But a few things seem clear. Perhaps the name "post-cold war era" is appropriate, if unimaginative, because it reminds us that even if future world politics will not closely resemble the past, it will be influenced by it. The memories and legacies of the cold war will remain strong for decades, shaping the way elites and the general public think, the weapons at people's disposal (from nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia to large caches of arms in Afghanistan and Angola), and powerful institutions such as NATO and the European Community. While this experience has presumably left us more sophisticated about world politics if not wiser, it may also have narrowed our range of vision: as dangerous and unpleasant as it was, the cold war simplified American foreign policy making. The basic outlines of containment, once established over isolationist opposition, commanded general respect despite the enumerable and deep divisions over how it was to be pursued. In part the reason was that even if domestic concerns were pressing, no one could doubt that they could be met only if war were avoided and democracies thrived in the developed world, if not elsewhere. Now, however, almost everything is up for grabs, from the need for an active foreign policy, to the identification of America's dangerous enemies (if any), to whether globalization is radically transforming the world, to the extent to which American behavior should and can influence others, to the prices we are willing to pay to seek influence.

Over the past three years, Political Science Quarterly authors, like many other analysts, have agreed on three general propositions. First, much about the future of world politics will depend on American leadership. Second, ethnicity and ethnic conflict will loom large. Third, even if most countries are being buffeted by the same forces, their politics will evolve quite differently depending on local histories, societies, and choices. It is tempting to believe that we can understand them through applications of abstract theories, especially those we have grown familiar with in dealing with our own country. But in fact a deep knowledge of local particularities is required as well.

One clear lesson of the 1990s is that very little concerted international action is possible without American leadership. The unification of Germany, the liberalization of world trade, the Gulf War, and strong intervention in the former Yugoslavia all required the United States to articulate a clear policy and convince, cajole, and sometimes pressure others into joining. Often, of course, this is what they wanted in the first place. But without the United States providing some collective goods and focal points for coordination, it is most unlikely that much would have happened. To take only the most recent example, the change in American policy was a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for convincing the factions in the former Yugoslavia to sign an agreement and for NATO to dispatch 60,000 troops to enforce parts of it. Similarly, full enforcement of the Dayton Accords could occur only if this became American policy. But abstract policy is not enough. In these and other cases, the United States has been highly active, not only endorsing a course of action but developing it, supporting it with major (if sometimes inadequate) resources, and showing others that the United States was fully involved and would not leave them in the lurch. The reasons seem to be partly material, partly historical, and partly psychological. Despite some decline in American power and perhaps a greater decline in American will, the United States still dwarfs others in resources of almost every kind that can be deployed for a variety of purposes. Europe, were it united, could be a true partner—or a true rival. But getting agreement among even the fairly small number of leading states in Europe is extremely difficult, as "European" policy in the former Yugoslavia illustrates. An important factor may be the expectation of American leadership; perhaps other countries would do more if the United States did less. But, at this point, such an argument must remain an untested hypothesis.

If this much is clear, much else is not, especially about the nature and modes of American leadership and, inextricably linked with this, how others will respond. As John Ikenberry notes, the commonplace argument that American power has declined overlooks the fact that the sorts of resources that were crucial in the cold war may be less important now and, conversely, current leadership may involve not only the use of specific threats and rewards, but constructing common social purposes among a wide range of nations. In a somewhat similar vein, John Ruggie stresses not only that American policy must involve the full and free participation of others, but also that multilateralism resonates with important strands of American thinking and historical experience. In at least one area, the United States has quietly made clear that it will maintain its position in the face of some opposition, but also with allied support. Robert Art argues that not only is a central role for the United States necessary to maintain a strong NATO, and that this in turn helps stabilize Western Europe as well as the areas to the east, but that the immediate post-cold war years saw a sharp struggle for influence within NATO that was settled by an American willingness to continue shouldering significant burdens and a recognition by most Europeans that this outcome was indeed in their interests.

The powerful influence of ethnicity, race, and religion on world politics was partly obscured by the cold war's emphasis on ideology and politico-military power. If scholars, leaders, and members of the interested public who had good historical memories and clear perceptions were not surprised by the rise of ethnic conflict, most of us were. The causes, forms, and consequences of ethnic strife are much debated and enormously varied, but it is clear that this dimension—or these dimensions—of world politics demands great attention. The survey by Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset gives a sense of the range of phenomena we need to understand and stresses that the resulting problems are not limited to weak states and underdeveloped countries. But, as Donald Rothchild and Alexander Groth show, such countries maybe especially prone to wrenching ethnic divisions and spirals of hostility as conflict feeds disparate ethnic identities and these identities crystalize conflict along ethnic lines. Solutions are difficult to come by, but America may be particularly advantaged in a world in which ethnic diversity and identification are increasingly important. Although many commentators argue that multiculturalism weakens America's ability to develop the common purposes that are required to support a consistent foreign policy, Yossi Shain points out that the United States continues to benefit from the connections to other countries provided its numerous immigrant groups. It is also likely to be the case, I believe, that leaders and political systems that are accustomed to dealing with ethnic diversity at home will be better positioned to understand and work with countries and organizations representing a wide variety of races, religions, and ethnicities.

Most if not all countries of the world are feeling similar pressures of internal divisiveness and external competition, rendering government control extremely difficult. But to understand how any particular country or region is evolving, we must also look at the specific problems it faces and the axis around which conflict revolves. For Europe, what is central is the "democratic dilemma," to use Robert Dahl's words, created by integration that has outrun accountability. Citizen participation and governmental effectiveness have been in conflict, and democratic institutions then need to keep pace with and be adapted to the increasing density of important connections and economic activity that so influence people's fates. For Russia, as for Western Europe, the basic question of the identity and self-image of the state is also in flux. As Glenn Chafetz explains, the outcome of these struggles will affect Russian foreign policy, because the way people conceive of their government and its relationships with groups in civil society influences the kinds of relations with the wider world that they seek. How states organize internally and what they think of themselves is connected to how they behave toward others in the Middle East as well. More specifically, Michael Barnett shows the importance of whether the Arab states think of themselves as individual countries or as members of a common Arab entity. Related, of course, is whether and on what terms they will accept Israel as a valid regional partner. Developing security strategies that both maintain domestic identities and minimize external conflict is difficult at best, but can only be accomplished by an acute understanding of the mutual implications of how states think of themselves and how they relate to their neighbors.

At this point it is easier to see that we are moving further from the cold war world than it is to discern what we are approaching. The enduring issues of participation, ethnicity, democracy, and violence are sure to continue, however. If they can be managed at all, it will only be through a better understanding of the forces at work, the alternatives available to us, and the choices we must make.

ROBERT JERVIS is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations and a member of the Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University. His most recent book is System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life.