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Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline
Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, editors
New York
1993
5: The Political Repercussions of Economic Malaise
N AOMI C HAZEN and D ONALD R OTHCHILD
Economics, Politics, and the Dynamics of Change
The beginning of the third decade of African independence was marked by a retrogressive cycle of economic recession and political enfeeblement. 1 Explanations for the continental crisis of the early 1980s highlighted the close connection between state incapacity and economic deterioration. While some observers stress neo-orthodox interpretations (such as the deleterious economic effects of policy distortions, untethered bureaucratic expansion, and poor implementation) and others emphasize structural concerns centering on the adverse consequences of external dependence, socioeconomic inequality, and limited access to resources, most analysts today concur on the centrality of political factors underlying the contemporary African predicament. 2 Yet equally important has been the growing realization that economic decline undermined state structures and exacerbated political unrest. "There is a crisis of political authority that is just as severe as the well-known crisis of economic production. These two crises are intimately interrelated, each being both a cause and an effect of the other." 3
The 1980s were punctuated by diverse attempts to overcome the debilitating effects of the postcolonial syndrome by replacing the destructive link between scarcity and political impotence with a reinforcing dynamic of economic growth and political stability. 4 The food shortages of the early part of the decade, however, coupled with growing financial distress, compelled African governments to address pressing economic problems first. The adoption of externally devised economic reforms inevitably impinged on the relationship between politics and economics. If political rationales for economic measures predominated in the past, economic initiatives assumed center stage during the 1980s. What are the political effects of reversing the sequence of economic and political priorities? How has economic liberalization affected the nature and direction of political life? What will the political repercussions be if measures of political and economic liberalization do not yield palpable economic gains, or if these changes prove ephemeral?
This chapter explores the political impact of economic malaise and reform. First, it examines the postcolonial structure of power in Africa and its relationship to the economic deterioration of the late 1970s. Second, it analyzes the various manifestations of the accompanying crisis of the state. On this basis, it delves into the impact of economic and political reforms and the concomitant constraints imposed by the international community on the construction of the social order, state agencies, and regime forms. And third, it considers the relationship between economic crisis, the reorganization of civil society, and the nature of social demands that proliferated in 1989 and the early 1990s. Finally, it assesses the possible political consequences of the failure of economic adjustment policies.
In order to grasp the nature of change in the contemporary African political world, it is necessary to look beyond the formal realm of official institutions and policies and to delve into the informal arena of hidden politics at the societal, state, and international levels. Formal politics is manifest in political practice and especially in the various uses of political exchange, reciprocity, coalition, cooptation, persuasion, coercion, and repression that illuminate the main features of state power. Informal politics is traced through forms of societal construction as expressed in patterns of incorporation, collaboration, resistance, and withdrawal from state involvement. 5 Since the locus of effective authority in Africa is still fluid, the study of the interaction between these spheres is vital to understanding the structure of power relations in particular contexts. 6
Power configurations are therefore determined by the connection between three main components: the social order (the organization of social groups, the resources at their disposal, the norms that bind them, the interests they pursue, and their relations with other social networks); the state (specifically the organizing framework, the official administrative, coercive, and political apparatuses, the composition of ruling elites, and the spheres of formal action); and the regime (the principles, rules, and mechanisms that govern the interaction between the state and its society). The relationship between political processes and economic growth and development is an outgrowth of shifts in the concentration and distribution of power among these elements over time.
Different patterns of power construction and allocation have developed in Africa since the beginning of the colonial period. Formal and informal political institutions reflect changing foci of economic and social interchange in particular contexts. Political trends in the 1980s are a manifestation of the dynamic combination of these historical socioeconomic processes, immediate responses to particular circumstances, and the impact of adjustments in social structures and economic orientations. Thus specific power constellations have influenced policy choices and generated power realignments that themselves constitute constraints on the range of choice open to political actors. "If the consequences of policy become sources of new policy, there is a strong argument for considering the sources and systemic consequences of policy together." 7 In these circumstances, the political repercussions of economic reform are not only a direct result of particular measures but also the unintended outcome of the conditions that induced new policy initiatives. 8
The quest for authoritative structures has been the dominant theme of modern African politics. During the first phase of independence, authoritarian forms prevailed throughout much of the continent largely because the authority of official agencies was so tenuous. 9 Despite the diversity of types of authoritarian rule, 10 most African governing elites evinced statist propensities. Statism accentuates the domination of the state as an autonomous actor, in contrast to stateness, which highlights the capacity to entrench the authority of the central state and to regularize its relations with society. 11 In weak state circumstances, exclusionary and coercive arrangements encouraged clientelism, thereby introducing a political logic that often hindered economic growth and gradually undermined organizational capacity.
The second postindependence phase was marked by economic decline and state decay. Political instability was pronounced, and individuals and groups developed elaborate coping mechanisms to deal with the exigencies of profound scarcity. The foundation was prepared at this juncture for a more fundamental reordering of power relations between state and society. 12
The adoption of structural adjustment programs by some African countries (which frequently accompanied a third and ongoing phase) has contributed significantly to the direction of this reorientation. By reducing the amounts of resources at the disposal of the state and limiting the size of state agencies, reform measures have had the effect of curtailing the scope of state activities. At the same time, social groups have been able to take advantage of local initiatives to expand the informal economy, generate a new breed of entrepreneurs, and enrich associational life. The creation of discrete political spaces at the state and societal levels has begun to alter the distribution of power in many African countries. A revised logic linking political survival more directly to economic rationality is beginning to emerge. 13
The fourth phase consists of experiments with political liberalization in the 1990s. Partial and hesitant though they may be in many countries, they represent an awareness of the need to create an enabling political environment in which economic development can occur. Such political reform measures may have the effect of reformulating the rules of postcolonial politics, linking a strong and legitimate state with a strong and active society. By developing new norms and types of regime, these emergent democratic orders hold out a significant potential for "getting politics right." 14 State leaders, determined to remain in office, have an incentive to be responsive to the legitimate demands of society, encouraging a sense of public involvement in civic affairs that promotes stability and coherent state-society relations. In principle, responsive government and economic efficiency become intertwined with the development of organizing principles of state and of effective mechanisms of political exchange. As a consequence, ongoing efforts in a number of African countries to design innovative forms of democratic rule may replace the statist schemes of the past with more open and interactive forms of governance in the years ahead.
State Construction in Postcolonial Africa
Africa's political configurations on the eve of independence resulted from varying combinations of precolonial and colonial influences and specific arrangements negotiated during the process of decolonization. Colonial rulers imposed a functional state structure on diverse African societies lacking a common tradition of centralized authority. 15 The efficacy of the colonial state was derived from its superior coercive capabilities and was cemented, albeit in different ways, by the colonial powers, through, for example, pacts with local leaders who frequently continued to administer indigenous law under external supervision.
Although nationalist movements challenged the authority of the colonial state, they rarely created substitute sources of legitimacy acceptable to a broad gamut of their populations. 16 Confronted with heightened public expectations, competing group claims for scarce, state-controlled resources, and the limitations of dependent economies, the leaders of most newly independent African states hastily abandoned their independence constitutions for authoritarian and semi-authoritarian arrangements. The new ruling elites hoped that state-controlled exclusionary regimes would facilitate their quest for state hardness. 17
The process of state reorganization during the first years of independence resulted in the creation of neopatrimonial, centralized bureaucratic structures which, while lacking a clear conception of the general interest, worked to promote the concerns of their office-holders and clients. 18 Even though the state was detached from key social groups, it was not necessarily autonomous. Nor was it able to penetrate society and extract sufficient resources to implement its own policies. 19 The political logic of postcolonial regimes thus tended to accentuate extractive and instrumental norms at the expense of broader developmental concerns. This syndrome had several important consequences. It exposed the political leadership to pressures from powerful patrons, thus limiting its autonomy and contributing to the erosion of the state's organizational capacity. It also affected policy direction, encouraging the lowering of prices paid to rural producers and the allocation of subsidies granted to urban consumers. The growth of parastatal corporations and marketing boards that gained a monopoly over the extractive and distributive systems also led to reduced incentives in the agricultural sector. The effect was to deepen the countries' dependence on foreign food sources, 20 while the utilitarian nature of patronage tended to reinforce elite politics, especially in party regimes where the ritual of elections was sustained. In these instances (Cameroon, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya) elitism was accompanied by some proportionality in official allocations. In countries where the elites were fractionalized (Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Uganda), however, the military intervened, setting in motion a cycle of regime changes that magnified the extent of unpredictability in the official realm.
In each African country, societal organization underwent certain modifications to adapt to the political realities of postcolonial times. Society had been organized during the first independence decade primarily along ethnic, religious, and occupational lines. The associational vibrancy that characterized many African cities in the latter part of the colonial period was subdued in most places, however, as the new ruling elite placed limitations on organizational freedoms. 21 Even so, some groups had been incorporated directly into ruling circles, and others, particularly those controlled by powerful patrons, collaborated openly with state officials (the leaders of the Muslim brotherhoods in Senegal are one case in point). Because of their geographical location near the seat of government, these urban-based organizations were also among the first to voice dissatisfaction with governmental policies and to question the uses and abuses of state power. Their reluctance to extend support usually presaged political unrest; consequently, it was imprudent for ruling elites to dismiss their concerns summarily. 22
The stability of these arrangements varied substantially. The most resilient patterns of power construction were those in which the boundaries between the formal and the informal were well demarcated and respected. The greatest amount of instability occurred where these frontiers were violated, either through the infiltration of informal factions into the formal realm (especially in cases of personalistic takeovers) or through attempts at total control, measures that quickly brought on intense opposition, including armed resistance (Angola, Ethiopia). 23
Two common features of these heterogeneous patterns stand out: the incomplete institutionalization of the state apparatus and the tendency for administrative-bureaucratic propensities to exceed the actual degree of state consolidation. The political experience of independent African countries has highlighted the risks attendant upon the expansion of administrative devices at the expense of participatory mechanisms. In terms of effective governance, therefore, the initial frameworks of public life in Africa, with all their unique and distinguishable features, appear too detached from social concerns, economic exigencies, and local processes.
Crisis and Response
The 1970s witnessed the entrenchment of postcolonial political structures and the first signs of the harmful effects of authoritarian systems on Africa's economies. The rise of world oil prices and the concomitant economic recession reduced the profits gleaned from an already stagnant agricultural export sector. At the same time that fiscal reserves were largely depleted, state officials artificially propped up expensive food imports, overvaluing local currencies and increasing price supports. Incentives for production diminished substantially and efficiency suffered.
By the close of the second independence decade, governments were barely supported by weak, overextended, costly, and increasingly inefficient state structures. The state continued to expand central functions while accomplishing less. At this juncture, state capacity was constrained in three ways. First, economic difficulties in the industrialized world coupled with an apparent donor fatigue to create increasing immobility. Second, internal discontent mounted as agricultural production declined, population pressures intensified, and inflation soared. Clientelistic politics remained in evidence but no longer provided an adequate response, especially in the major urban areas. Third, as structural imbalances became more pronounced, much of the continent was subjected to environmental threats: desertification, soil erosion, and the absence of rainfall. 24
Such external and internal factors imposed severe constraints on all political actors, drastically limiting their range of choices. State leaders strove to mitigate the adverse political effects of economic deterioration and to appease their urban support groups. To this end, they adopted a package of policies, including the imposition of price controls, the overvaluation of exchange rates, and the borrowing of features, appear too detached from social concerns, economiextensive funds from foreign sources. 25 Despite these efforts, the circle of beneficiaries of state handouts contracted in most countries. To cope with the shortfall, state elites frequently reduced allocations for education, health, and welfare, bringing on civilian unrest.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the late 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by a dramatic rise in strikes, demonstrations, riots, military takeovers, and civil strife. In Kenya, Zaire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Zambia, and Uganda urban wage-earners organized strikes to protest rising prices and growing economic hardships. Food riots broke out in Liberia, Tanzania, and Sudan, generally as spontaneous reactions to the high cost and decreasing availability of basic commodities. Between 1979 and 1985, 22 successful coups d'état occurred; moreover, aborted coups were recorded throughout the continent, notably in Tanzania, Niger, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. 26 Personal security deteriorated and massive dislocations became commonplace in areas prone to protracted civil wars. Thus in the Western Sahara, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Zaire intense poverty and civil wars proved to be adversely intertwined. The proportion of military expenditures to GNP was highest in the poorest countries on the continent, whose governments diverted scarce resources to military spending, thus further aggravating the conditions that necessitated these expenditures. 27
Economic discontent was also a factor in the rapid turnover that took place in the top leadership of the African states. Some heads of state were ousted by military interventions, putsches, or, in the case of Idi Amin, by armed invasions. In five countries (Kenya, Angola, Botswana, Guinea, and Mozambique), the founding fathers died in office and peaceful successions occurred. And in four countries (Senegal, Cameroon, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania), the first generation of independent leaders stepped down from their positions, transferring power to hand-picked successors. By the middle of the 1980s, only three of the original founding fathers remained in office in sub-Saharan Africa-Félix Houphou‘t-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, and Hastings Kamuzu Banda in Malawi. 28
Political upheavals varied considerably in intensity. In some countries the elites maintained their unity while factionalism was held in check, social and ideological cleavages were contained, mediations were regularized between the state and key constituencies, and some administrative capabilities were maintained. In those countries (Zambia, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon) political unrest did not lead to major disjunctures. 29 In others (Ghana, Burkina Faso, Uganda), however, the absence of such cushioning factors increased the degree of political disruption. Most African states stood somewhere in the middle: political enfeeblement further strained the capacities of overextended state institutions; performance levels diminished; and economic progress, where it had occurred, declined significantly.
Throughout the continent the fall in economic production was compounded by the shortcomings of political and economic management. 30 Immiserization spread as smaller and more coercive ruling cliques monopolized entitlements, limited opportunities in the formal economy, and relinquished responsibility for the welfare of their citizens. Increasingly, state officials "de-linked" public institutions from their social groups. 31 The contraction of the formal political arena may have accentuated the autonomy of ruling coalitions; it did not, however, harden state institutions. 32
In the early 1980s, the antidevelopmental character of bureaucratic-centralist arrangements became exposed in sharp relief. Authoritarianism, in its multiple institutional and ideological manifestations, encouraged the dissipation of public resources and the continuance of external dependency. Public institutions, increasingly unable to implement their own regulations, contributed to policy failure. As economic conditions deteriorated and famine set in, overburdened state institutions became progressively less responsive to public demands. The effect was to accelerate the process of societal disengagement by the latter part of the decade. As one observer put it: "Neo-colonial economic structures decayed while state power could not be used decisively to transcend them." 33 Statism thus helped to bring on economic decline which in turn further undermined state capacities.
In the context of economic failure, renewed attention to issues of political and economic power-its concentration, its dispersion, and its possible redistribution-became essential. The initial reaction of many Africans to the disappointments of the early 1980s was to attempt as far as possible to enclose themselves in the informal domain. In doing this, they sought to insulate themselves from an unpredictable state bureaucracy, and to ensure a modicum of survival in conditions of great adversity. Unlike previous activities in the informal sector, societal adaptations to the economic constraints of this period were not merely a continuation of past patterns or a response to the withdrawal of official services, but attempts to fulfill basic needs under dire circumstances. 34
By the late 1980s, public disillusionment with state and public sector performance became widespread. Hence the rapid expansion of the informal sector became directly linked to economic scarcity, to blocked access, and to the inability to influence formal state institutions. 35 Stringent state controls accelerated its spread. "Every increase in centralization and every additional attempt to control the economy increase[d] the losses and delays due to inefficiency and thus stimulate[d] the growth of informality as a palliative to scarcity." 36
Societal groups honed a variety of survival techniques. 37 The first strategy, primarily employed by urban dwellers, involved finding ways of accommodating to reduced circumstances. They ignored some laws and flouted others. In addition, social groups used silent means to resist perceived exploitation. 38 A second coping technique revolved around the parallel market. The underground economy burgeoned in the 1980s, frequently accounting for well over half of the productive activity. 39 The elaborate (and often illegal) informal economy became the most important funnel for the distribution of goods and services as well as a significant setting for petty manufacturing and small-scale food production, particularly in the urban areas. 40 Effectively organized, the informal sector developed norms of interchange that were carefully enforced by popularly backed arbiters. These activities progressively became the mainstay of economic life in many parts of Africa.
A third survival mechanism, employed mostly in the first part of the 1980s, consisted of self-encapsulation, primarily in the rural areas. A shift from the production of commodities for export to food crops was one expression of this trend. 41 In many villages self- provisioning and bartering relations were nurtured. Local communities began to make farm and household implements from available materials, organize their own schools and clinics, construct substitute marketing networks, and, above all, enunciate an ethic of self-reliance. 42 The deliberate disengagement from state channels was not feasible everywhere. Where it did take place, however, it was usually accompanied by the adaptation of new technologies to local conditions.
Finally, some individuals turned to emigration as a mode of survival. The escape option, which required considerable initiative, was used by unemployed laborers as well as by highly skilled professionals. In the 1980s, Africa had the highest proportion of refugees in the world. Millions of Africans migrated to neighboring countries or abroad in an effort to gain safe sanctuary, avert starvation and seek gainful employment. In escaping civil wars and government repression, however, such population movements often placed heavy constraints upon the efforts of receiving countries to achieve their own developmental objectives. For example, the military destabilization of Mozambique by South African-backed Renamo insurgents pushed hundreds of thousands of rural dwellers into neighboring Malawi; similarly, the protracted war in Eritrea created a heavy burden on Sudan.
Survival mechanisms were apparent in other spheres as well. Social groups and village communities engaged in educational activities, developed apprenticeship programs, organized work groups, and periodically staged performances. Songs, jokes, music, and an informal market literature became part and parcel of the quest for survival. 43 Through these channels disaffection with official policies was voiced, leaders berated, standards of accountability defined, alienation articulated, and avoidance advocated. 44 Religious movements, and especially spiritualist churches and fundamentalist Islamic sects, provided vehicles for other forms of exit. In extreme cases, outlets for survival were found in organized crime-armed robbery, banditry, smuggling, and drug-dealing.
These activities were conducted by a variety of organized social interests. Some of these groups date back to the precolonial and colonial periods; others are relatively new constructs. These groups consisted of primary associations (households, villages, kinship units, and local development societies); occupational societies (traders, teachers, farmers); youth and women's organizations; 45 religious communities; and a variety of voluntary associations. These evolving social networks provided alternative frameworks for communal identification and social interaction. Specific social formations served as vehicles for self-preservation, and in some instances they provided a means for growth independent of the state.
Such survival mechanisms displayed several common features. They required a framework for conflict resolution, a credit and finance system, a means of enforcement, a measure of secretiveness, strong bonds of friendship or trust, a modicum of security, and some durability over time. 46 During the turmoil of the early 1980s, most people kept their options open. They sought flexibility as well as continuity and tended, in ingenious ways, to maximize their opportunities within a context of substantial constraint. 47
No consensus exists as to the significance of this informal response to Africa's economic and political crisis. Some observers have insisted that these activities represented necessary yet ephemeral strategies for coping with economic contingencies, and that they did not obviate the ongoing centrality of patronage ties, cancel the paramountcy of the ruling classes, or reduce the key position of the state in providing economic leadership or in shaping social relations. Others have argued forcefully that local initiatives and institutions were evidence of counter-centralizing processes at work and that they provided a critically needed incentive for the designing of novel forms of development. 48 These debates have centered primarily on the activities of rural producers and have largely overlooked significant processes taking place in the urban areas. More to the point, they have tended to focus on the origins of survival strategies rather than on the outcome of these endeavors. 49 Actually both interpretations may be correct.
These conflicting interpretations aside, there is broad agreement at this juncture as to the extensiveness of group and individual initiatives outside the state arena. As economic conditions worsened in the early 1980s, the pace of migration to the cities subsided in many countries. The percentage of GDP contributed by agriculture rose, and urban residents suffered far greater reductions in incomes at this time than did their rural counterparts. 50 The immediate political significance of an expanded informal sphere was to circumscribe the reach of the African state, to further curtail the state's penetrative capacities, and to create organized pockets of resistance to official repression. Informal activities had the effect of chipping away at the state from below. They defied statist pretensions by limiting the extent of state penetration within the periphery. 51 Whether these activities possessed the organizational, material, and normative attributes necessary to promote the emergence of alternative political entities was another question. Informal coping mechanisms were fragmented and frequently highly particularistic and parochial. They accentuated protest but did not usually point to any non-statist models of power restructuring. 52
The multifaceted African crisis of the early 1980s helped to illuminate the organization and structure of social systems at large. 53 It accentuated struggles for social control and highlighted contending strategies that vied with each other for moral as well as instrumental supremacy. The decisions and actions of public officials and societal interests clearly diverged. Formal policies often widened the gap between enfeebled state organs and social groups; survival strategies magnified the fragility of the social order. Hence the disengagement of society from the state became the overriding feature of initial societal responses to the crisis in the early 1980s. Both local rebellions and official repression were expressive of this confrontation. 54 The contraction of the formal political arena and the social enclosure that ensued varied in intensity. But as political structures became embedded in increasingly narrow social segments, no state was spared at least some loss of capacity.
The crisis and its immediate responses revealed several core political constraints on effective economic management: the unwieldy character of the bureaucratic apparatus and its ambiguous relationship to political institutions; the problematic correlation between state power and the amassing of personal wealth; the contradiction between extractive practices and the fundamental norms of public responsibility and accountability; the ironic link between state maintenance and external dependence; 55 and, above all, the weakening of state structures in light of the strained nature of state-society relations. It became increasingly evident that the unintended consequences of administrative-centralizing and exclusionary rule could not be overcome without a fundamental reassessment of power configurations. 56
Reform and Restructuring
By the mid-1980s African leaders, faced with economic decline, increasing balance of payments problems, and heightened unrest, could no longer avoid confronting the ramifications of their policies. They began to investigate ways of strengthening the capacity of the state and its institutions. In doing this, they faced a threefold challenge: to devise appropriate methods of reviving public institutions, to reorganize their relationship with disenchanted societal groups, and, above all, to restore control over the economy.
Given the alarming conditions prevailing at the time, the reassessment process focused mainly on the economic dimensions of the challenge. With only a limited ability to extract resources from domestic sources and with state treasuries near empty, leaders found themselves "hemmed in," with little recourse but to seek foreign assistance. Country after country acceded, formally at least, to the International Monetary Fund's and the World Bank's reform packages. Formal acceptance of IMF conditionalities regarding a stabilization regimen entailed additional constraints on African policymakers. First, the difficulties arising from the dependence of the African governments on external sources for operating budgets was compounded by the establishment of new mechanisms for an ongoing monitoring by international agencies. Second, formal agreement to the substantive provisions on structural adjustment implied a reduction in resources available for political allocations. And third, the stress on the economic as opposed to the political dimensions of the African crisis fostered an element of ambiguity about the role of the state in the development process. These limitations, coupled with existing constraints, had an important influence on the political byproducts of economic reform. Because of such factors, compounded by the increasing limitations of exit options, societal responses to the crisis have in recent years taken on qualitatively different forms than those of the early and mid-1980s.
Societal Readjustment
International demands for structural adjustment and the effort by Africa's state elite to accommodate them had an extensive impact on African economic and societal relations. In terms of burgeoning informal sector activities, the new pricing policies, the reduction of subsidies, and the deregulation of many markets encouraged the refinement and institutionalization of local initiatives. In particular, parallel market activity was allowed to expand as employment prospects in the formal sector contracted, opportunities for migration decreased, and withdrawal to local-level self-sufficiency occurred. 57 Microindustries in the rural and urban areas became increasingly important foci of domestic production. Manufacturing cooperatives emerged and produced goods for growing local markets-now revived after a long hiatus. New distribution networks were created and transportation channels improved.
Economic reform contributed to a process of straddling between the formal and informal sectors. Thus initial investments in the informal economy were frequently funded by capital derived from formal sources; informal activities were bolstered by wages earned in the formal sector; and, most notably, the profitability of the second economy depended upon its forward and backward linkages with the official one.
Governmental reactions to proliferating parallel market activities varied from country to country. At first, governments attempted to control informal initiatives and, where possible, to eradicate them (particularly in the urban areas). 58 Next, some governments tried to tax revenue derived from informal activity. Most recently, and sometimes in tandem, there has been a growing awareness of the need to strengthen and expand the informal economy and to integrate it more fully into the formal sphere. 59 This integrative approach reflects a recognition of the essential interlocking of the two economic networks. Politically, a greater acceptance of the parallel market came together with enhanced bargaining possibilities for local communities and social groups.
Another effect economic recovery programs had on the informal sphere was to facilitate the growth of entrepreneurs who possessed sources of accumulation independent of the state. This group flourished in the latter part of the 1980s because a number of diverse processes converged: office-holders continued to exploit state resources, translating their power into private wealth; local businessmen and women emerged in numbers, deriving their income and their status from their positions in the informal sector; and privatization measures were carried out through the sale of state corporations and marketing boards. 60 In some cases, a new set of entrepreneurs came to control indigenous markets; establish manufacturing, construction and trading firms; engage in external trade; and, some times even help subsidize social services, sanitation, health, and private education. Economic recovery programs thus exacerbated income differentials and accentuated the enormous social inequalities that accompanied the growth of the parallel economy. Entrepreneurs in Nigeria, Kenya, Zaire, Cameroon, and elsewhere formed a nouveau riche stratum whose lifestyle diverged from the bulk of the population.
Inevitably, the emergence of this group had considerable political ramifications. It suggested the beginning of the alteration of patronage structures away from an exclusive focus on the state, 61 and set in motion processes of class formation based on material rather than political criteria for social stratification. In this respect, alternative channels for accumulation constituted the first signs of a potentially fundamental process of power redistribution. Moreover, in countries where a distance developed between state power and capital accumulation (Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, and Cameroon), business groups could play a vital role in the coalescence of civil society (that part of society that interacts with the state). 62 Yet the discrepancies in income and wealth could not but fuel populist sentiments, especially where access to resources for weaker groups continued to be blocked (particularly evident in parts of Kenya, Nigeria, and Côte d'Ivoire).
Still another key repercussion of economic reform has been to broaden the space available for associational life. Networks of occupational, service, local community, religious, and voluntary organizations have blossomed in recent years. Some of these groups have been concerned primarily with the welfare of their members, offering goods and services on a regular basis. Others have concentrated on development efforts (local self-improvement associations, neighborhood development committees, self-help cooperatives, credit unions). And another set has dealt with issues of empowerment. 63 All these organizations have evinced a special interest in group maintenance. Within their frameworks they have evolved specific notions of authority, community, and distributive justice. They have stressed norms of reciprocity, trust, leadership responsibility, and accountability. Perhaps most significantly, they have nurtured group identification and endowed membership with consciousness and meaning. 64
Social organizations sometimes developed an intricate relationship with state agencies and with the international community. Within individual countries, the operational space of associational networks was repeatedly redefined by the interaction of governments with NGO's, and particularly by the economic strategy and administrative capacities of formal institutions on the one hand and the geographical locations and contents of group activities on the other. 65 To avoid dissolution, as in the early years of independence, voluntary groups tended to maintain a low profile and to engage in selective collaboration with other groups and with the government. In turn, governments permitted the expansion of voluntary agencies and, when unable to coopt them, tried to coordinate and direct their activities. 66 An intermediate level of social organization began to emerge at this juncture which had important transnational and international linkages.
Structural adjustment programs thus had a direct influence on the organization of Africa's social life, creating a variety of new opportunities for civil associations in the late 1980s. By cutting back on the size of the civil service, marketing boards, and parastatal bodies, and by adopting a series of privatization measures (for example, the Ghana government indicated that it was prepared to accept bids on all but eighteen of its 185 state-owned enterprises), the state inevitably enlarged the space available for associatiational activities. 67 Moreover, in response to donor preferences for greater public involvement in decision-making, governments decentralized responsibilities to local councils and relaxed some restrictions on the endeavors of civil associations. The effect was to relieve central authorities of certain responsibilities for public welfare while opening the way for a significant increase in the variety and range of associational activities.
At times, however, this process led to the emergence of conflicts of interests among groups and their representatives. The reversal in rural-urban terms of trade, encouraged in part by donor support for increased producer prices for cash crops and agricultural productivity generally, exacerbated tensions and rivalries among their respective elite representatives. 68 In certain countries-Ghana is a notable example-the urban bias of the past was largely reversed, as the population of the countryside benefited substantially while key urban groups shouldered a large share of the cost of the country's infrastructural improvements. As a consequence, powerful urban groups-trade unions, middle class professionals, and students-came to form the main opposition to certain reform policies and programs. Leaders now had to devise methods of capitalizing on diffuse rural support without further antagonizing better organized urban populations. 69
By the late 1980s, a number of associations, particularly at the middle rung, had seized the opportunity to expand their roles and objectives. Thus civil associations-such as professional, worker, student, and women's groups-displayed a new vigor. In other cases (human rights associations, consumer protection groups, political clubs, and civil liberty unions) new intermediate groups emerged and, in a process reminiscent of the spurt of associational activity at the time of decolonization, made a variety of demands upon state officials. 70 At the local level, voluntary development organizations surfaced throughout the continent, creating a constituency for welfare and self-help projects on a countrywide scale.
Within these social groups, participatory values were inculcated on a small scale. These groups opened new channels to economic and political opportunities and set out citizen rights and duties. Most significantly, they had the potential to bring scattered groups into overarching networks, pluralizing Africa's institutional terrain during the latter part of the 1980s. 71 In many respects, social groupings carved out their own political spaces; by asserting niches of autonomous action, they substantially strengthened civil society. 72
The variety evident in the formal sector facilitated a restructuring of social life. As specific groups affirmed their separate spheres of activity, wider communication networks based on lateral transactions became possible. In many countries horizontal channels of group interaction evolved alongside vertical political links, laying the groundwork for a reorientation of the direction of societal interaction. Therefore, the development of new forms of pluralism through the growth of informal frameworks buttressed by distinctive rules and binding values led to a greater degree of societal interlocking.
By the end of the 1980s, Africa's informal system was so rich and so pervasive that it constituted a network of horizontal and vertical exchange relations that paralleled the formal hierarchy. 73 The broadening scope and shifting boundaries of informal politics served notice that politics no longer coincided fully with state structures and that state-led initiatives would be met with overt or increasingly sophisticated covert resistance. But if patterns of social interaction began to coalesce separately from the state, they neither ignored its presence nor rejected its significance. Changes in informal politics in the aftermath of the introduction of economic reforms highlighted the extent of interchange between the two realms. Not only were the boundaries of the state recognized and internalized by informal actors, but also much informal economic, associational and entrepreneurial activity depended on various forms of linkage with official agencies. New forms of interaction between the formal and informal systems began to replace the dynamic of state-society confrontation that had marked the first decades of independence. 74
Thus market orientations and liberalization measures introduced by structural adjustment had the effect of reinforcing and entrenching patterns of societal self-reliance. 75 The impact of economic reform on informal politics underlines the changing location of decision-making authority, highlighting, with renewed intensity, basic questions about the balance of power between state organs and society in many parts of Africa. 76
The political significance of readjustments in the informal sector was directly related to shifts in the form and nature of official state institutions. The most apparent changes took place in the organization and scope of the state apparatus. In most countries, at least on the declaratory level, state agencies were revamped in three major ways: the freezing and, in some cases, retrenchment of the civil service; the reorganization, sale, or closing of a number of unprofitable state corporations and the dismantling of some marketing boards; and the exploration of possible decentralization measures. The net result of these programs has been to pare down the size of the state apparatus and limit the institutional pervasiveness of state agencies. However, economic recovery measures achieved success only where political and administrative patterns of decision-making were altered, administrative institutions were insulated more carefully from political interference than in the past, bureaucratic norms of accountability and probity were enforced, and bureaucrats were protected from direct pressures applied by vocal social groups. In short, the capacity of the formal sector was improved only where officials were able to detach themselves from the postcolonial syndrome at the heart of the current development crisis. 77
For example, countries such as Ghana and Uganda were able to revise administrative practices precisely because they had experienced severe economic and political upheavals. Other states (Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon) operated reasonably efficiently in the 1980s, because they had earlier avoided some of the more problematic manifestations of the postcolonial administrative predicament. Either way, the economic reform programs of the late 1980s were implemented top-down by authoritarian regimes that imposed a variety of austerity measures in the face of intense opposition from urban workers and their allies.
In general, structural adjustment did not accomplish the political reforms necessary for the creation of an enabling environment in which the economic reforms could succeed over the long term. Sustainable development required the creation and maintenance of legitimate political structures, something that we turn to in the next section.
The Moves Toward Political Liberalization
If structural adjustment initiatives were launched by the state to comply with the demands of external donor agencies, political reforms were conceded by state elites, often reluctantly, in order to fulfill long pent-up societal claims for public participation and governmental responsiveness and accountability. The bureaucratic-centralizing state had come to seem remote from the citizenry, an alien institutution "suspended . . . in mid-air above society." 78 The authoritarian one-party regimes, moreover, had not proved to be a short cut to economic development-a major explanation put forth by some to justify the limitations they imposed on partisan contestation and civil liberties. By 1989, various regime opponents, and particularly such urban middle-class spokespersons as church leaders, lawyers and other professionals, lecturers and students, businessmen, trade union officials, and some elements within the dominant political party itself, evinced a new spirit of dissatisfaction with the political status quo, calling for an end to state repression and an acceptance of increased political openness. 79 Political repression became identified with poor economic performance. 80 As Frederick Chiluba, the newly elected President of Zambia, put it following his inauguration: "We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on earth-through the freedom to work, the freedom to toil, through free speech, free elections and the exercise of free will unhampered by the state. . . . The great nations, the prosperous nations, are the free nations." 81
Certainly the call by many Africans for democratic reforms has been manifest throughout the postcolonial period. The revolt against arbitrariness and erratic personal rule, observes Colin Legum, is rooted not in external pressure for change, but is "initiated by Africans who have become increasingly resentful of the abuse of human rights, denial of effective representation in government, corruption, and the economic inefficiency of governments not accountable to an electorate." 82 To be sure, events in Eastern Europe and elsewhere did influence the process of change, but for the most part it was internally generated. 83 It reflected "long harbored deep-seated dissatisfactions with the single-party system as a device for arbitrary rule and private enrichment." 84 In Ghana, for example, a group of courageous leaders, including B. B. Asamoah, Adu Boahen, and Hilla Limann, broke the "culture of silence" prevailing under the Rawlings regime and called for the implementation of a process of transition to constitutional government. Firmly rejecting the description of Ghanaians as "passive," Boahen asserted: "We have not protested or staged riots because we trust the PNDC but because we fear the PNDC!" 85 The middle-class elite was fighting back, seeking to secure the liberal promise of the independence struggle.
Even during the heyday of authoritarianism in Africa, some countries were careful to maintain the bargains they struck at the time of independence or to launch new experiments. Politics was structured to promote two- or multiparty systems in Botswana, Mauritius, Gambia, and Senegal (since 1976). To those countries' credit, elections have occurred regularly and governments have remained reasonably responsive to societal demands. And in something of a high point for the democratic process in the 1980s, the government in power in Mauritius was replaced peacefully by another following a national election.
Although they successfully bucked the authoritarian trend of the times, these were unique country situations in Africa. All of them are relatively small in size and/or population and display special features which tend to be supportive of a democratic experience: Senegal's ruling Parti Socialiste, largely backed by the marabouts, managed to win convincing electoral victories in 1983 and 1988; the stability of constitutionalism and multiparty electoral processes in Gambia and Botswana are bolstered by the presence of a preponderant ethnic core group-the Mandinka in Gambia and the Tswana in Botswana; and in Mauritius, despite the ethnic appeals of several of the major parties, a broad consensus on democratic norms and values appears to have gained widespread acceptance. 86 In all four countries, then, democratic forms of governance could be said to have prevailed over a significant period of time but on the whole their systems "legitimate[d] the rule of the powerholders without endangering their continued supremacy." 87
With the urban protests of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the leaders of voluntary groups in much of Africa escalated their demands for decisive moves of political liberalization. Associational activity increased markedly in range and intensity, as trade union, professional organization, student, and disaffected political leaders, among others, expressed their disapproval of the repressive tactics, corruption, and inefficiency of the authoritarian regimes then in power. The impact of this internally generated opposition was enormous, for by the end of 1991 a large proportion of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were either scheduled for or had already pledged themselves to some form of democratic governance. In Namibia, where the leadership has voiced a strong commitment to democratic values, a still-to-be-tested constitution grants all citizens the right to form or join political parties. 88 Moreover, as noted above, Zambia has seen one president replaced by another in a hotly contested but peaceful election, and the ballot box has been used to bring about regime changes in Benin, Cape Verde, and S‹o Tomé and Pr’ncipe.
In light of its influence and size in the region, Nigeria's process of regime change is currently being closely watched. If that country's transition to constitutional rule can remain on track despite the eruption of economic, regional, and ethnic confrontations and violence of 1992, it will signal a major move toward the acceptance of political liberalization on the continent. Certainly Nigeria's constitution framers have been most careful in preparing the ground for a resumption of civilian rule. Nigeria's Political Bureau, using the U.S. constitution as a model, recommended the continuation of a federal system of governance. It also proposed a federal executive branch composed of a directly elected president and vice president, assisted by appointed cabinet ministers. To be elected to the presidency, a candidate would have to gain a simple majority of the total national vote cast as well as 25 percent of the total votes in at least 230 (out of 302) local government areas. If no candidate met these requirements, an electoral college consisting of the national and state assemblies would be convoked, and this body would elect a president on the basis of a simple majority of those present and voting. 89 As a check on the executive branch, the Political Bureau suggested adopting a unicameral federal legislature; its 302 members would be elected from the 302 local government areas on the basis of a first-past-the-post system, although some seats would be reserved for women and minorities.
Nigeria's constitution framers also took pains to recommend a number of institutions intended to promote societal participation and inclusiveness. Continuity with the past was assured by the maintenance of federalism; however, the form of this federal system was altered when the military government of President Ibrahim Babangida, in part responding to societal pressures, decreed the creation of additional states. Moreover, the Political Bureau encouraged the establishment of such institutions as a two-party political system, the use of the "federal character" principle when making appointments to the federal cabinet, and the continuance, with minor modifications, of the revenue allocation formula hammered out under the administration of President Shehu Shagari in the early 1980s.
With the launching of the new constitution and the entrance into the transition period, the Nigerian government modified a number of these provisions. President Babangida, refusing to allow the registration of the political parties that initially had put themselves forward, designated his own political parties-the left-of-center Social Democratic Party and the right-of-center National Republican Convention. In addition, the 1992 constitution provided that the federal character principle would apply at every level of government, and not, as before, in appointments to federal positions only; 90 moreover, it raised the requirement for electing the president to one-third of the votes in at least two-thirds of the states. Nigerians were making significant efforts to reformulate the rules of the game, seeking to provide the basis for both societal participation and state efficacy for the years ahead.
Certainly if future governments in Africa can implement these political liberalization measures, they will greatly enhance the capacity of the state to establish the routines and institutions for sustained economic reform. 91 Such political liberalization measures appear to hold out the greatest possibilities for channeling state-society conflict along constructive lines, encouraging the development of learned patterns of relationship over time. And by buttressing practices of reciprocity and political exchange between state and societal elites, these political reforms help to firm up an environment that will promote economic growth and development.
The Fragility of Political Reforms
Political liberalization is occurring alongside economic liberalization efforts throughout much of Africa at the present time. A notable increase in the activities of voluntary associations has occurred, inhibiting a relapse into authoritarian practices as well as contributing substantially to processes of political reform. Even though the political mood on the continent is far more optimistic than at any point since the early years of independence, however, the recent wave of political liberalization should not be confused with democratization. It is important not to overstate the extent of the political change that has occurred, for in many countries the reform process has been a limited one, leaving many of the ruling elites firmly in control of their polities. In Bratton and van de Walle's words, "the partial liberalization of authoritarian regimes does not amount to a transition to democracy." 92
If the political liberalization seems partial and somewhat brittle, this can be explained in part by the constraints facing these overburdened regimes: the inadequacy of the channels of political communication, the difficulty of establishing responsive political institutions, the problems associated with too many competitors and too intense a conflict (involving religious fundamentalism, ethnic nationalism, and class antagonism), the obstacles in the way of maintaining a dynamic civil society, and the complications in the way of reversing Africa's economic and social decline over the last 25 years. The relationships between newly empowered groups at the local level, civil society, and voluntary associations remain extremely tenuous. 93
In this respect, external donor pressures for a restructuring of regimes impose costs on many sections of the population (austerity measures, provocation of resentment over privatization, exacerbation of existing interregional differences) that are likely to provoke determined resistance on the part of class, regional, and ethnic groups to change. "The winners of economic reform in Africa," warns Thomas Callaghy, "are few; they appear only slowly over time and are difficult to organize politically." 94 Given such a mix of economic and political constraints, sustained efforts to put democratic reforms into effect are likely to prove difficult. As a consequence, alternative forms of governance, which seek to facilitate the processes of economic reform by combining societal participation and (short-term) state capacity in various ways can be anticipated. The sequencing of reforms, possibly placing economic reforms before political reforms or vice-versa, may be utilized by hard-pressed ruling elites intent on enhancing their ability to deal effectively with multiple challenges in a difficult world environment.
In brief, current experiments with democratic forms of governance remain uncertain and somewhat fragile, especially in light of the tensions between societal demands and the capacity of the state to accommodate these demands. To reduce the burden on governments, it seems likely that many countries will attempt to rechannel popular demands. Hence in the next section we look briefly at the options open to Africa in the event that the present course of political and economic reforms proves beyond the grasp of current regimes and new political formulas for combining substantial societal participation with considerable state capacity to guide the process of economic change become necessary.
Trends and Prospects
The interrelationship between Africa's economic and political processes has been reconfirmed during the course of the 1980s and early 1990s-a period during which the momentum of economic change has been hampered by the lack of political measures necessary to buttress state authority and by changing conditions on the domestic and international fronts. The momentum of political change, constrained by economic deterioration and lack of economic resources to satisfy legitimate societal demands, has also stalled in some instances, pulling back from a full reorganization of the rules of political relations and reviving some of the old practices of heavy-handed administrative centralization and exclusion.
Within African states, some of the benefits accruing from economic reform have tended to diminish over time. As IMF and World Bank programs took hold, income and regional inequalities were exacerbated and social discrepancies became pronounced. In addition, the reforms entailed rising debt burdens and shrinking operating budgets. The political stabilization achieved by the recovery programs was itself dependent on continuing aggregate gains in economic performance. Given some of the negative byproducts of the new plans, the will, let alone the capacity, to implement policy changes was frequently lacking.
These difficulties were compounded by the end of the Cold War and the reluctance of the developed countries to make the kind of long-term aid commitments necessary to lift Africa from its present economic impasse. By the mid-1980s, there were signs that Western and Soviet assistance might decline, reflecting domestic budgetary difficulties, rising internal demands, the pressures of competition with other industrialized countries, donor fatigue, and disenchantment with Africa's progress. For John Ravenhill, there is a link between Africa's decline in importance as an economic partner with West Europe and "the growing disinterest of many European countries in Africa." 95 Thus, even if African debts are significantly rescheduled and credit lines extended, the possibilities of reversing stagnant growth rates do not appear encouraging.
To the extent that structural adjustment plans fail to measure up to current expectations, such occurrences are likely to have diverse political consequences. African states, already heavily constrained and lacking in meaningful choices, will then find themselves more hemmed in than ever. Although it is difficult to foresee the likely possibilities under these circumstances, we feel it necessary to point to a few of these trends and prospects.
One possibility is a kind of "enforced self-reliance," where a number of African countries, locked helplessly in situations of destructive civil wars or unable to produce substantial marketable exports, are involuntarily de-linked for all intents and purposes from the international community. The kind of destructive internal conflict that currently holds Somalia and Liberia in its grips could be a foretaste of similar developments on the horizon. Moreover, in other situations, exports and imports may decline further, indebtedness mount, and major agricultural and industrialization programs grind to a halt. In extreme cases, it is not inconceivable that civilian groups would launch autonomy movements against state domination, yielding anarchy; clearly this latter scenario could lead to a breakdown of authority and to worsening poverty and despair, furthering pockets of hopelessness. In other cases, some kind of autarchic development may be possible.
More constructively, but not very likely, is the prospect of some form of trans-state collective action. Certainly regional harmonization has considerable appeal for many African leaders and others. In principle, such strategies offer prospects for economies of scale, administrative economies, better coordination of planning, and enhanced international status. Yet efforts to develop regional organizations-the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Cooperation Conference, the Preferential Trade Area of East and Southern Africa, and the Economic Community of Central African States-point up the strength of political forces working against effective regional integration. Economic integration without political will lacks a dynamic of change; political integration linked to economic union appears threatening to the interests, and even the identity, of the constituent units. Although a logical aim, regional integration schemes are clearly constrained for the time being by a web of political anxieties and uncertainties.
The most likely eventuality would be a continuation of the processes evident in the 1980s and early 1990s. At the state level, this would mean combining efforts at political liberalization with the continuation of clientelistic practices, attempts to coopt oppositional elements at the margins, and the perpetuation of political and economic uncertainties. Soft states would still be unable to extend their regulations throughout the society under their control. At the societal level, the burst in civil society activity that took place in the early 1990s might recede slightly; growing alienation from the state and state institutions, however, would likely lead to a continuing expansion of informal social and economic activities at the expense of the political center.
A more promising option points in the direction of increased experimentation with regime change. Certainly the domestic and international constraints upon a thoroughgoing reformulation of political norms and practices are weighty. Yet even within current parameters, some intriguing explorations in the area of regime change will likely occur, revolving around attempts to consolidate new, more responsive orders on the continent. Such efforts might range from the establishment of authentic populist regimes to the creation or resurrection of democratic systems. If political liberalization is conceived of as the institutionalization of power sharing and the injection of new forms of reciprocity and political exchange, then the recent African experience contains components for building diverse and self-fulfilling forms of participatory rule.
Some African lands (Ghana and Burkina Faso), despairing over the poverty and inequality evident in their countries, determined that leftist-oriented populist regimes would be an appropriate response to their situations. Such regimes avoided the vanguard party associated with the classical Marxist-Leninist regime (although they used the rhetoric of Afro-Marxism) and rejected the individualism and acquisitiveness they associated with capitalism. Instead, they searched for their own genuine African forms of governance, emphasizing the values of social inclusiveness and broad citizen participation in political and economic decision-making as well as in the juridical proceedings of government. These populist regimes reorganized the institutions of state to rid the civil service of officials deemed corrupt or unsympathetic with the goals of the new rulers. They also sought to build new, cohesive social orders, linking the rural areas more closely with the lives and opportunities of the urban centers. In those contexts where the constraints of the domestic and international environments seem overwhelming, and leaders come to despair over the possibility of eliminating inequality and external dependence or achieving reasonable economic and social well-being for their people, some form of state populism may well be envisioned by some champions of the general public as the best of a series of stark political choices under the circumstances. 96
The challenge of creating more democratic forms of rule in Africa hinges on finding ways to put existing democratic features together in a workable fashion. Economic development requires an enabling political environment, but the form that this political liberalization takes depends very much on the circumstances in each country-its norms, values, and configurations of power. If democracy is a developing idea whose meaning is enriched by contributions from all cultures and countries, as Richard Sklar has posited, then it might not be too far-fetched to suggest that new adaptations and models of democracy could emanate from Africa in years to come. 97 Clearly, the economic as well as the political future of Africa's societies may well rest on the outcome of these efforts to move toward more open political systems.
This chapter has argued that the ability to pursue extensive economic reforms, enhance the quality of life, and achieve social equality is constrained by internal and external influences beyond the control of Africa's contemporary regimes and depends in no small part on the institutionalization of participatory alternatives to the bureaucratic-centralist and exclusionary propensities that have largely prevailed in postcolonial times. Sustained economic development requires the institutionalization of norms and practices that ensures the process of state-society relationships will be regularized and predictable. Such recurrent patterns of relations will promote coherency and stability, thereby setting a firm foundation on which economic activity can take place. Whatever course is followed in the years immediately ahead, it seems clear from the preceding discussion that the key to establishing a productive dynamic of economic progress and state reform lies in the transformation of regimes toward greater and more regularized responsiveness to the demands of civil society.
Note 1: Special thanks are due to Letitia Lawson for her valuable suggestions on the second draft of this chapter. Back.
Note 2: The terminology, as well as the conclusion, draws on Thomas Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria," in Joan Nelson, ed., The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Developing Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 257-319. Back.
Note 3: Michael Bratton, "The State, Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," World Politics 41, 3 (1989): 409. Back.
Note 4: Richard Crook, "Patrimonialism, Administrative Effectiveness and Economic Development in Côte d'Ivoire," African Affairs 88, 351 (1989): 227-228. Back.
Note 5: Victor T. Le Vine, "Parapolitics: Notes for a Theory" (Jerusalem, July 1989). Our thanks to Professor Le Vine for permission to quote from his draft ms. This formulation may also be found in various communications with Catherine Boone of the University of Texas, Austin, whose insights are appreciated. Back.
Note 6: This observation is at the core of Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). The importance of the two spheres was first highlighted in the seminal article by Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement," Comparative Studies in Society and History 17, 1 (1975): 91-112. Back.
Note 7: Donald L. Horowitz, "Cause and Consequence of Public Policy Theory: The Malaysian System Transforming Itself" (Duke University Program in International Political Economy, Working Paper No. 32, January 1988), pp. 1-2. Back.
Note 8: Albert O. Hirschman, Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 298. Back.
Note 9 Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 32 and elsewhere. Back.
Note 10: Richard Hodder-Williams, An Introduction to the Politics of Tropical Africa (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), pp. xxi-xxii. Back.
Note 11: Otwin Marenin, "The Managerial State in Africa: A Conflict Coalition Perspective," in Zaki Ergas, ed., The African State in Transition (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 61; and Donald Rothchild, "Hegemony and State Softness: Some Variations in Elite Responses," ibid., pp. 119-122. Back.
Note 12: On the relationship between scarcity and political reordering see John Kincaid, "Introduction," International Political Science Review 4, 3 (1983), pp. 275-278. Back.
Note 13: John Ravenhill, "Africa's Continuing Crisis: The Elusiveness of Development," in John Ravenhill, ed., Africa in Economic Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 13. Back.
Note 14: Goran Hyden, "Governance: A New Approach to Comparative Politics," a paper presented at the African Studies Association, Chicago, October 1988, p. 23. Back.
Note 15: Jean-Fran¨ois Bayart, L'état en Afrique: La Politique du Ventre (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 58. Bayart places contemporary political developments firmly within an African "historical sociology of action" (see pp. 19-31). Back.
Note 16: Richard Crook, "Legitimacy, Authority and the Transfer of Power in Ghana," Political Studies 35 (1987): 552-572. Back.
Note 17: Rothchild, "Hegemony and State Softness," pp. 141-134; and Joshua B. Forrest, "The Quest for State 'Hardness' in Africa," Comparative Politics 20, 4 (1988): 423-442. Back.
Note 18: This thesis is summarized in Thomas M. Callaghy, "The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial-Administrative State in Africa," in Ergas, The African State in Transition, pp. 87-116. Back.
Note 19: The controversy over the relative autonomy of the African state has not been resolved. Some researchers claim that postcolonial African states were overly autonomous. See, for example, Robert J. Fatton, "The State of African Studies and Studies of the African State: The Theoretical Softness of the 'Soft State' Ō' (Paper Presented at the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Chicago, October, 1989). These analyses, however, tend to confuse the detachment of state structures and the creation of a state-based system of domination with autonomy. See John Lonsdale, "The State and Social Processes in Africa," African Studies Review 24, 3 (1981): 139-225. Back.
Note 20: Rolf Hanisch and Rainer Tetzlaff, "Agricultural Policy, Foreign Aid and the Rural Poor in the Third World," Law and the State 23 (1982): 120-143. Back.
Note 21: See Sandra T. Barnes and Margaret Peil, "Voluntary Association Membership in Five West African Cities," Urban Anthropology 6, 1 (1977): 83-106. Back.
Note 22: See Naomi Chazan, "The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa," Comparative Politics 14, 2 (1982): 169-189. Back.
Note 23: Le Vine, "Parapolitics," pp. 9-14. Back.
Note 24: John Iliffe, The African Poor: A History (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 230-259. Back.
Note 25: Paul Streeten, "Food Prices as a Reflection of Political Power," Ceres 16, 2 (1983): 16-22. Back.
Note 26: Figures in this section are based on Naomi Chazan and Timothy Shaw, "The Political Economy of Food in Africa," in Naomi Chazan and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., Coping with Africa's Food Crisis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), pp. 4-19, and Chazan et. al., Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa, pp. 423-435. Back.
Note 27: The World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981, mimeo.), p. 186. Back.
Note 28: In the Maghreb, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia remained in office until ousted by the military in 1987. Back.
Note 29: See Joan Nelson, "The Political Capacity of Stabilization: Commitment, Capacity and Public Response," World Development 12 (1984): 983-1006. For a case study consult: Henry Bienen, "Populist Military Regimes in West Africa," Armed Forces and Society 11 (1985): 357-377. Back.
Note 30: Sara S. Berry, "The Food Crisis and Agrarian Change in Africa: A Review Essay," African Studies Review 27, 2 (1984): 59 and passim. Back.
Note 31: The notion of de-linkage is developed in Kwame Ninsin, "Three Levels of State Reordering: The Structural Aspects," in Rothchild and Chazan, The Precarious Balance, pp. 265-281. This idea is captured in the concept of prebends, as developed in Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Back.
Note 32: The tendency to confuse the autonomy of ruling coalitions with the autonomy of the state may be seen in Fatton, "The State of African Studies and Studies of the African State." Back.
Note 33: Communication from Catherine Boone, May 1989, p. 11 Back.
Note 34: Contrast with Jeffrey Herbst, "The Exit Option and the Politics of Protest in Africa" (Princeton University, Draft ms., 1988), pp. 15-16. Back.
Note 35: René Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems," in Rothchild and Chazan, The Precarious Balance, pp. 149-170. Back.
Note 36: Lomnitz, "Informal Exchange Networks," p. 37. Back.
Note 37: The following analysis is based on Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, "Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the Experiences of Ghana and Guinea," Comparative Studies in Society and History 19, 1 (1987): 106-131. Back.
Note 38: Robin Cohen, "Resistance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers," Review of African Political Economy 19 (1980): 8-22. Back.
Note 39: Pierre Mettelin, "Activities Informelles et Economies Urbaine: Le Cas de l'Afrique Noire," Mois en Afrique 223/224 (1984): 57-71 Back.
Note 40: Richard Stren, "L'état au Risque de la Ville," Politique Africaine 17 (1985): 74-85. Back.
Note 41: For one example see Stephen G. Bunker, "Bagisu Agricultural Innovation and Political Organization in the Ugandan Crisis" (Paper Presented at the Twenty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Boston, December 1983). Also see Bayart, L'état en Afrique, esp. pp. 308-315. Back.
Note 42: Roy Preiswerk, "Self-Reliance in Unexpected Places," Genéve-Afrique 20, 2 (1982): 56-64. Back.
Note 43: These processes are analyzed in depth in Karin Barber, "Popular Arts in Africa," African Studies Review 30, 3 (1987), esp. pp. 1-4. Back.
Note 44: For an excellent case study see Thomas M. Callaghy, "Culture and Politics in Zaire" (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence Research, 1987). These ideas are elaborated in Naomi Chazan, "African Political Cultures and Democracy: An Exploration" (Paper Presented at the Conference on Political Culture and Democracy, Stanford, September 1988). Back.
Note 45: For a general treatment of the role of women in the informal economy see Michele Hayman, "Female Participation in the Informal Economy: A Neglected Issue," Annals, AAPSS 493 (1987): 64-82. Back.
Note 46: Le Vine, "Parapolitics," pp. 4-9. Back.
Note 47: Sara Berry, Fathers Work for their Sons: Accumulation, Mobility and Class Formation in an Extended Yoruba Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), esp. p. 83. In this work Berry challenges the assumption of peasant resilience developed in Goran Hyden, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Back.
Note 48: This debate has been conducted in the pages of Development and Change . See Nelson Kasfir, "Are African Peasants Self-Sufficient?" Development and Change 17 (1986): 335-357, Goran Hyden's response, "The Anomaly of the African Peasantry," in the same volume, pp. 1677-705, and the exchange between Lionel Cliffe, Gavin Williams, and Goran Hyden in Development and Change 18 (1987). Back.
Note 49: For an analysis of various approaches to developments in the informal sector see Naomi Chazan, "State and Society in Africa: Images and Challenges," in Rothchild and Chazan, The Precarious Balance , pp. 325-341. Back.
Note 50: See the example of Ghana as documented in Republic of Ghana, 1984 Population Census of Ghana, Preliminary Report (Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics, February 1985). Similar evidence for Tanzania is cited in Goran Hyden, "Governance and Liberalization: Tanzania in Comparative Perspective" (Paper prepared for Presentation at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, August 1989), p. 13. Back.
Note 51: Jean-Fran¨ois Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa," in Patrick Chabal, ed. Political Domination in Africa (London: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 119. Back.
Note 52: Martin Kilson, "Anatomy of Class Consciousness: Agrarian Populism in Ghana from 1915 to the 1940s and Beyond," in I. L. Markovitz, ed., Studies in Power and Class in Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 50-66. Back.
Note 53: Michael John Watts, "The Political Economy of Climatic Hazards: A Village Perspective on Drought and Peasant Economy in a Semi-Arid Region of West Africa," Cahiers d'études Africaines 23, 1-2 (1983): 43. Back.
Note 54: John Dunn, "The Politics of Representation and Good Government in Post-Colonial Africa," in Chabal, Political Domination in Africa, pp. 158-174. Back.
Note 55: Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35, 1 (1982): 1-24. Back.
Note 56: Michael Ford and Frank Holmquist, "Crisis and State Reform," in Chazan and Shaw, Coping with Africa's Food Crisis, p. 229. Back.
Note 57: Most of the recent information on the informal sector is contained in case studies. For some notable examples see: Janet MacGaffey, "How to Survive and Become Rich Amidst Devastation: The Second Economy in Zaire," African Affairs 82, 328 (1983): 351-363, and Cyril Kofie Daddieh, "Economic Development and the Informal Sector in Ghana Reconsidered: Notes Towards a Reconceptualization" (Center for International Affairs, Harvard University: African Research Program, 1987). For a summary consult: Naomi Chazan, "Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa," in Rothchild and Chazan, The Precarious Balance , esp. pp. 124-130. Back.
Note 58: For two examples see: Lillian Trager, "The Creation of an Illegal Urban Occupation: Street Trading in Nigeria" (Paper Prepared for Presentation at the Twelfth Congress of ICAES, Zaghreb, July 1988), and Claire Robertson, "The Death of Makola and Other Tragedies," Canadian Journal of African Studies 17, 3 (1983): 469-495. Back.
Note 59: This approach is advocated in The Economic Commission for Africa's "African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation." See summary in Toby Shelley, "Answers to Solutions," West Africa 3752 (July 17, 1989): 1160-1162. Back.
Note 60: The best case study of these processes is Janet MacGaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites: The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Back.
Note 61: Lemarchand, "The State, the Parallel Economy, and the Changing Structure of Patronage Systems." Back.
Note 62: Bayart, "Civil Society in Africa," p. 116. Back.
Note 63: This classification is the basis of the arrangement of the articles in the special supplement of World Development 15 (1987), edited by Anne Gordon Drabek, "Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs." Back.
Note 64: This theme is developed in Catherine Newbury, "Survival Strategies in Rural Zaire," in Nzongola-Ntalaja, ed., The Zaire Crisis: Myths and Realities (Trenton: Third World Press, 1986), pp. 99-112. Back.
Note 65: Michael Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa" (Draft ms., 1988), pp. 19-23. Back.
Note 66: Shelley, "Answers to Solutions," p. 1162. Back.
Note 67: Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge," World Policy Journal 9, 2 (Spring 1992): 286, 296; and Donald Rothchild, "Introduction," Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 9. Back.
Note 68: See Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market," pp. 257-319. Back.
Note 69: See ibid., pp. 28-29. Back.
Note 70: Adebayo Olukoshi, "Associational Life During the Nigerian Transition to Civilian Rule," a paper presented at the Conference on "Democratic Transition and Structural Adjustment in Nigeria," Stanford, The Hoover Institution, 1990, p. 1. Back.
Note 71: Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa," p. 49. Back.
Note 72: One of the first analysts to document this development was Frank Holmquist, "Defending Peasant Political Space in Independent Africa," Canadian Journal of African Studies 14, 1 (1980): 157-167. Back.
Note 73: Lomnitz, "Informal Exchange Networks in Formal Systems," p. 5. Back.
Note 74: This is the main thesis of Bratton, "The State, Civil Society, and Associational Life in Africa." Back.
Note 75: Ford and Holmquist, "Crisis and State Reform," pp. 231-232. Back.
Note 76: Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa," p. 12. Back.
Note 77: This is the thrust of the argument in Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market." Back.
Note 78: Goran Hyden, "Problems and Prospects of State Coherence," in Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsola, eds., State Versus Ethnic Claims (Boulder: Westview, 1983), p. 69. Back.
Note 79: On this process in Zambia, see Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa: Popular Demands and State Responses," in Goran Hyden and Michael Bratton, eds., Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), pp. 50-51; and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, The October 31, 1991 National Elections in Zambia (Atlanta: Carter Center, 1992), p. 26. Back.
Note 80: P. Anyang' Nyong'o, "Democratization Processes in Africa," Codesria Bulletin, No. 2 (1991): 3. Back.
Note 81: Quoted in The October 31, 1991 National Elections in Zambia , p. 8. Back.
Note 82: Colin Legum, "Africa: Who is Behind the Demand for Multi-Party Democracy?" Third World Reports (July 18, 1990): 2. Back.
Note 83: On the processes of diffusion, see Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, "The Contagion of Political Conflict in Africa and the World," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, 4 (December 1986): 716-735. Back.
Note 84: Bratton and van de Walle, "Toward Governance," p. 42. Back.
Note 85: Albert Adu Boahen, The Ghanaian Sphinx (Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1989), pp. 51-52. Also see his manuscript, "Governance as Conflict Management in West Africa : Ghana since Independence, 1957-1991," April 1992, pp. 120-123. (Typescript copy.) Back.
Note 86: This section draws on Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lawson, "The Interactions between State and Civil Society in Africa: From Deadlock to New Routines," in Naomi Chazan, John W. Harbeson, and Donald Rothchild, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming). Back.
Note 87: Robert Fatton, Jr., The Making of a Liberal Democracy: Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975-1985 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 169. Back.
Note 88: Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Article 17 (1). Back.
Note 89: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Report of the Political Bureau (Lagos: Government Printer, 1987), p. 137. Back.
Note 90: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Official Gazette 76, 29 (May 3, 1989), Sects. 15 (3), 144 (3). Back.
Note 91: These ideas are developed in greater detail in Donald Rothchild, "Structuring State- Society Relations in African States: Toward an Enabling Political Environment," a paper presented at the Colloquium on the Economics of Political Liberalization in Africa, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, March 6-7, 1992. Back.
Note 92: Bratton and van de Walle, "Toward Governance in Africa," p. 51. Back.
Note 93: On the critical link between democracy and a viable and active civil society, see Naomi Chazan, "Africa's Democratic Challenge," pp. 222-224. Back.
Note 94: Thomas M. Callaghy, "Africa and the World Economy: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place," in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1991), p. 60. Back.
Note 95: John Ravenhill, "Africa and Europe: The Dilution of a 'Special Relationship,'" in Harbeson and Rothchild, Africa in World Politics , p. 179. Back.
Note 96: Donald Rothchild and E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Populism in Ghana and Burkina Faso," Current History 88, 538 (May 1989): 221-224, 241-244. Back.
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