September 11, Terrorist Attacks and U.S. Foreign Policy

CIAO DATE: 12/03

Demetrios James Caraley, Editor

August 2002

This book looks into important policy considerations that confront a democratic state when trying to combat terrorism. A distinguished group of authors, including Walter LaFeber, Richard K. Betts, Ruth Wedgwood, and Robert Jervis, contribute authoritative insights toward explaining the causes and consequences of the terrorist attacks on September 11.

Table of Contents

Part I. Introduction

1. September 11: An Overview
Demetrios James Caraley and Alexander A. Cooley, Barnard College and Columbia University

Part II. The Attacks

2. The Post September 11 Debate Over Empire, Globalization, and Fragmentation
Walter LaFeber, Cornell University

Walter LaFeber proposes that the September 11 attacks resulted from processes of globalization that had begun a generation earlier. He explains that those processes triggered an uneven distribution of wealth, and, especially, a decentralization of power that led to an attack on the United States by an individual, non-state, terrorist group that utilized some of the most advanced methods provided by globalization technologies. The article uses these contexts to explore the Clinton and Bush administrations' responses to the globalization/decentralization phenomena that climaxed in the September 11 tragedies.

3. The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror
Richard Betts, Columbia University

Richard K. Betts argues that the September 11 attacks were a response to American primacy and then applies offense-defense theory to explain the intense advantages that terrorist groups have in launching offensive strikes and in exploiting the defenses that a nation can put up in this era of globalization and asymmetric warfare.

4. The Pragmatic Fanaticism of al Qaeda: An Anatomy of Extremism in Middle Eastern Politics
Michael Doran, Princeton University

Michael Doran analyzes Osama bin Laden as a rational actor, arguing that his extremist religious beliefs did not dictate his short-term political behavior, which is actually based on the principle of realpolitik. Al Qaeda's defeat in Afghanistan resulted not because its strategic thinking was clouded by religious dogmas, but rather because the balance of power in the Middle East is inherently difficult to read.

Part III. The Axis of Evil

5. North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields or Swords?
Victor D. Cha, Georgetown University

Victor D. Cha examines the question about relative merits of engaging or containing North Korea that has resurfaced after President Bush's "axis of evil" statements. The author argues that this policy question cannot be answered without an understanding of the strategic doctrine behind North Korea's alleged nuclear weapons capabilities.

6. U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Since Desert Storm
Daniel Byman, Joint U.S. Intelligence Committee

Daniel Byman argues that criticism of U.S. policy toward Iraq is often overstated and fails to appreciate the accomplishments of the Bush and Clinton administrations. The author discusses which mechanisms have proven particularly effective but also analyzes the room for improvement in U.S. policy.

7. CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq
Richard L. Russell, National Defense University

Richard L. Russell examines the strengths and weaknesses of American intelligence during the Gulf War in gauging Iraqi political intentions and military capabilities. He finds that overall strategic intelligence served policy makers well, but that some shortcomings, particularly in human intelligence collection, need to be corrected if the United States is to successfully deal with Iraq in the post-September 11 world. The role of the CIA was diminished after the war, even though he finds that the CIA's estimates were more accurate than those of the Defense establishment.

8. Contradictions in Iranian and Indonesian Politics
Daniel Brumberg, Georgetown University

Daniel Brumberg offers alternative concepts of state building, ideological change, and transitions in Islamic policies. Dissonant states, he argues, institutionalize competing visions of political community in ways that promote inter-elite competition, bargaining, and ideological innovation. He illustrates his argument by exploring the evolution of dissonant politics in Iran and Indonesia.

Part IV. Looking to the Future

9. Al Qaeda, Military Commissions, and American Self-Defense
Ruth Wedgwood, Yale University

Ruth Wedgwood critically examines the U.S. detainment of al Qaeda prisoners and others accussed of visa violations or of being enemy combatants and explains why such detentions as of the date of her writing, are in conformity with the Constitution, legislation, and historical precedent.

10. An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not? (PDF, 22 pages, 99.4 KB)
Robert Jervis, Columbia University

Robert Jervis argues that, contrary to much conventional wisdom, terrorism has not weakened most states, understanding the "root causes" of terrorism is not a firm foundation for policy, the concept of a "war" on terrorism is flawed, and the American policy is likely to be more unilateral than multilateral.