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Managing the Pentagon's International Relations

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A critical leadership challenge for the Department of Defense is the management of its international relations — its ties to allies, partners, international organizations, and non-governmental groups. Just as the phenomenon of globalization, or the world's increasing interconnectedness and interdependence, affects many other aspects of Pentagon management described in this volume, it also influences the interaction of the U.S. military with international militaries and organizations. Paradoxically, although the United States has unparalleled military muscle, it is increasingly inhibited from acting alone. For planning purposes, U.S. civilian and military leaders must assume that most if not all future operations will involve non-U.S. forces and in many cases non-military entities.[1]

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1. For the most recent official expression of this requirement by the U.S. military leadership, see Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2020* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000).

The Pentagon must therefore keep multinational operations in mind as it plans, marshals resources, develops doctrine, and trains for all possible contingencies, including combat, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief. Yet the international interface is still generally an afterthought for defense planners. The DOD system is not well constituted to deal with the post–Cold War environment's requirement for continuous interaction with other countries and with international and non-governmental bodies, especially during the planning and preparation stages that precede deployment.

This chapter makes recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the U.S. military's efforts to engage with other militaries. Such activities range from going into battle alongside the principal NATO allies, to training to keep the peace with former Warsaw Pact members, to conducting multinational disaster-relief operations in conjunction with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Because of the vastness of the subject, this chapter does not consider all its aspects exhaustively. Rather, it focuses on opportunities for significantly enhancing American security by improving the U.S. military's capacity to cooperate successfully with other countries and organizations in both wartime and peacetime.

To do so, the chapter describes the changes in the international and domestic environment that require the DOD leadership to be innovative in the management of the Pentagon's international relations. It then presents three recent cases that illustrate the range of challenges the U.S. military faces as it seeks to cooperate effectively with other countries and organizations. The first case concentrates on problems with coalition warfare revealed by the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999. The second case highlights difficulties with peacekeeping as experienced during the UN mission to Sierra Leone in 2000. The third case describes the potential benefits of military-to-military cooperation as exemplified by U.S.-Russian peacekeeping training in the mid-1990s. Each case is followed by analysis and specific recommendations for action.

A Changing Environment Creates New Challenges in the Management of the Pentagon's International Relations

The management of the Pentagon's international relationships requires attention and innovation. Six factors are key to understanding why the status quo is not sufficient:

THE COLD WAR IS OVER, BUT THE U.S. MILITARY IS IN MORE DEMAND TO DO MORE

It is an irony of the post–Cold War world that the U.S. military has not reaped a "peace dividend" from the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Rather, it has been deployed increasingly frequently and has had to cope with a proliferation of missions that threaten to undermine its combat capability. Undertakings ranging from peace enforcement, such as the NATO-led operation in Bosnia, to humanitarian relief such as in Rwanda, have resulted from the reemergence of civil and ethnic conflicts that had been suppressed during the Cold War, as well as from the perception that the U.S. military is now available to do more because it does not need to prepare to fight the Soviet Union. Indeed, the absence of a major threat permits U.S. policymakers to consider deploying U.S. military forces for purposes only distantly associated with protecting vital national security interests.[2] This has created a new set of requirements for which the U.S. military is just beginning to organize adequately.

MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS ARE POLITICALLY PREFERABLE, BUT OFTEN MILITARILY INEFFICIENT

U.S. power must walk the fine line between leadership and hegemony. In today's world, unilateral military action by the United States is increasingly unpalatable politically. This is true for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the U.S. public does not want to shoulder the burden of policing the world alone, and the fact that many countries, including America's closest allies, are apprehensive about what they perceive to be overweening U.S. dominance. For the U.S. mili-

2. For a further elaboration of this argument, see discussion of "Strategy in the Absence of a Major Threat," in Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), pp. 11–14.

tary, however, coalitions often are inefficient mechanisms for waging war. As the technological gap between U.S. forces and other forces increases in the next decade, this reality is likely to become more pronounced.

THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IS CREATING AN EXPANDING CHASM BETWEEN U.S. WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES AND THOSE OF OTHER MILITARIES

As the U.S. military moves to exploit the advances in technology associated with the information revolution, it will create a distinctive advantage for itself in warfighting capabilities. In *Joint Vision 2020*, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that "the continued development and proliferation in information technologies will substantially change the conduct of military operations."[3] Moreover, "DOD will continue to foster both a culture and a capability to develop and exploit [these] new concepts and technologies with the potential to make U.S. military forces qualitatively more effective."[4] However, this enhanced capacity will actually make it harder for the U.S. military to fight alongside other countries in coalitions, and even to operate smoothly with other countries in non-combat contingencies such as peacekeeping. Just when the political imperative for cooperation with other militaries increases, the ability to cooperate will, in the absence of attention to the problem, decline.

PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS WILL CONSUME TOO MANY U.S. MILITARY RESOURCES UNLESS WE BUILD UP THE CAPACITY OF OTHERS TO ORGANIZE AND PERFORM THESE MISSIONS

No other country and no other international organization, public or private, has the capacity to do what the U.S. military can do. As the past decade has proven, the United States will be called upon, if only because of its sheer competence, to solve problems in which it has little direct national security interest. This fosters an environment in

3. *Joint Vision 2020*, p. 2.

4. William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 2000, p. 20. The pursuit of this competitive technological edge, or "offset," has been a centerpiece of American military strategy since the 1970s. For further discussion of the offset concept, see William J. Perry, "Desert Storm and Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 66–82.

which other countries have less incentive to become capable and to organize themselves well for individual and collective action. Furthermore, the vociferous and influential anti-UN contingent in the U.S. Congress generates significant friction over giving the UN greater responsibilities. As a result, the United States often appears to be diminishing rather than enhancing the capacity of the UN, and ironically has to expend its military resources to compensate for the UN's limitations.

DOD STILL DOES NOT HAVE STANDING MECHANISMS FOR INTERFACE WITH INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Despite a decade of experience operating in the post–Cold War security environment, the Department of Defense has not yet established or made fully functional the processes required for it to be able to interact on a continuous basis with outside entities. This is the case even with the largest and most well-established international and non-governmental organizations such as the UN and the Red Cross. Because it has historically done its job more efficiently on its own, the U.S. military is not accustomed to depending on others. In addition, the culture of the defense establishment is not naturally an open one; it has traditionally relied on secrecy as a means of bolstering military advantage, and therefore the connections required to maintain ties to the outside can challenge standard operating procedures.

THOUGH OFFICIALLY MANDATED, THE "SHAPING" MISSION IS NEITHER INSTITUTIONALIZED NOR ADEQUATELY FUNDED

In the post–Cold War world, the U.S. military has been ordered to play an increasingly active role in shaping the international environment. This means employing the armed forces as an instrument of American diplomacy, not in the traditional sense of backing up negotiators with the threat of force, but rather in the new sense of using them as leaders in building cooperative relationships with countries that might otherwise be hostile to the United States and its interests. This "peacetime engagement" approach has been embraced by senior civilian defense leaders, and was mandated in the Quadrennial Defense Review in

1997.[5] However, the "shaping" mission has not yet been incorporated thoroughly in the annual military planning process.

The issues highlighted here — coalition warfare, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and military-to-military cooperation — can best be understood as dimensions of the Pentagon's international relations, effective management of which will be increasingly important to U.S. military effectiveness. Three cases that vividly illustrate the leadership challenges they entail are presented next. Each case is followed by a set of recommendations for turning existing problems into opportunities for innovation.

Coalition Warfare: The Case of NATO's Kosovo Campaign

NATO faced significant challenges to its effectiveness during Operation ALLIED FORCE, the spring 1999 military action intended to compel Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosovic to cease his harassment of Kosovar Albanians and to create the conditions for their eventual return to the province of Kosovo. This operation showed NATO weaknesses in three critical areas: secure communications; intelligence cycle time and information sharing; and compatible equipment.

The NATO allies lacked secure communications, despite more than half a century of preparation for combat together.[6] They had few secure phone lines, and the major U.S. and NATO secure-messaging systems (SIPRNET and CRONOS) were not interoperable.[7] As a result, all sensitive information, such as the daily Air Tasking Order (ATO), had to be printed out and hand-delivered to allied counterparts. The allies then typed that information into their own secure communications

5. Section III on "Defense Strategy" in U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 1997, at <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/sec3.html>.

6. The Pentagon concluded in its after-action report to Congress that: "Problems regarding communications interoperability persisted throughout the campaign." See U.S. Department of Defense, *Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, p. 25.

7. Benjamin S. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 213; and James P. Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, Adelphi Paper No. 333 (London: IISS, May 2000), p. 53.

systems to transmit it to their national forces. This same problem had been encountered almost a decade earlier during DESERT STORM, but had not yet been rectified.[8]

The absence of secure and interoperable aircraft communications and radio links was particularly frustrating given NATO's heavy reliance on air power during the Kosovo campaign. U.S. pilots could not use their more sophisticated data-link systems because, with the exception of the British, other major allies did not have a means of connecting to or making use of them. For example, U.S. and British combat aircraft equipped with the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS) and "Have Quick" secure radios could not use them because other allied planes did not have similar equipment. Instead, allied personnel had to transmit aircraft positions and target coordinates over open frequencies. The Serbs easily intercepted voice communications signals and frequently moved targets out of the way before they could be hit.[9] Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ground forces used commercial cellular telephones to transmit reconnaissance information and target coordinates to NATO commanders. The Serbs could intercept these open communications, so the information was often no longer accurate by the time NATO launched its attacks. After the campaign, U.S. and NATO commanders commented that Yugoslav forces often had advance knowledge of NATO's intended targets.[10]

8. Fulghum, "Serb Threat Subsides, But U.S. Still Worries," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 12, 1999, p. 24; John D. Morrocco, "Kosovo Conflict Highlights Limits of Airpower and Capability Gaps," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, May 17, 1999, p. 31. See also Lt. General Marvin R. Esmond, prepared statement for the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Procurement, October 19, 1999.

9. John D. Morrocco, "Kosovo Reveals NATO Interoperability Woes," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 9, 1999, p. 32; David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, "Data Link, EW Problems Highlighted by Pentagon," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 6, 1999, pp. 87–88; Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, p. 203; Testimony of General John P. Jumper, Commander, U.S. Air Force in Europe, before the House Armed Services Committee, October 26, 1999; and Thomas, *The Military Challenges of Transatlantic Coalitions*, p. 54.

10. See Testimony of General Wesley K. Clark, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, July 1, 1999; see also Jumper testimony, October 26, 1999.

The NATO allies also encountered major problems with their intelligence cycle time — the amount of time needed to obtain, analyze, and transmit information to those making warfighting decisions. There were bottlenecks due to insufficient bandwidth linking the Combined Air Operations Center to operating units, and due to the slow operating speed of the classified NATO internet link. NATO operators expressed frustration over how long it took to move information about enemy air defense threats and targets from sensors to allied forces positioned to engage them. Benjamin Lambeth explains that: "Although the requisite architecture was in place throughout most of the [Kosovo air] campaign … it lacked a sufficiently high-volume data link with enough channels to get the information where it needed to go quickly."[11] Compounding these problems, the allies used different security classification standards to protect information and did not have interoperable intelligence networks.[12]

Another serious problem with information-sharing arose over the suggestion that some NATO allies deliberately leaked information to the Serbs.[13] This, of course, is more a low-tech than a high-tech problem; it involves human beings, not machines. But it is a problem endemic to coalition operations; the more parties involved, the more likely it is that information will not remain secure. For this reason, the United States deliberately withheld some information from its allies regarding the specifics of sorties for B-2 bombers, F-117 fighters, and Tomahawk missiles. These assets were tasked using a separate ATO, distributed only to U.S. officials, creating some confusion when U.S. assets showed up on NATO radar screens with no advance warning.[14]

Finally, the allies found that despite their years of preparation for war together, they had equipment that was still incompatible and inadequate to the needs of a coalition operation. For example, some allied planes lacked the IFF (identification friend or foe) equipment

11. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, pp. 202–204.

12. *Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report*, pp. 49–51.

13. Roberto Suro and Thomas E. Ricks, "Pentagon Acknowledges Leaks of NATO Kosovo Air War Data," *Washington Post*, March 10, 2000, p. A2.

14. John Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Campaign," *Air Force Magazine*, Vol. 82, No. 9 (September 1999), at <www.afa.org/magazine/watch/0999watch.html>.

that enabled NATO controllers to distinguish between allied and enemy aircraft.[15] Additionally, only U.S., British, Canadian, and French combat aircraft had the ability to deliver laser-guided bombs; no other allied aircraft could participate in the bombing campaign. Thus U.S. aircraft had to carry out about 80 percent of the strike sorties.[16]

The Kosovo campaign pitted the world's greatest military capabilities against one tough but ultimately insignificant adversary. The experience nevertheless revealed significant weaknesses in NATO's collective warfighting capabilities, especially in the domain of command, control, and communications. SACEUR General Wesley Clark commented, "It is sobering to note that over the last decade we witnessed a growing technological gradient rather than a convergence of national capabilities."[17]

THE LESSONS OF KOSOVO

U.S. defense planning for future warfighting must anticipate the high probability that U.S. forces will operate alongside forces from other countries. Coalition operations demonstrate international support for military action, spread burden and risk and, at least theoretically, enhance capability. They are also more palatable domestically; polling data shows that the American people prefer multilateral approaches to unilateral ones. For example, 72 percent of the public think that "in responding to international crises … the United States … should not take action alone if it does not have the support of its allies."[18]

However, coalitions must not only be politically effective; they must also be militarily effective. Reaching agreement to establish a multinational coalition is the first step; making that coalition into a capable fighting force requires many more. There is a wide range of

15. Morrocco, "Kosovo Reveals NATO Interoperability Woes"; and Jumper testimony, October 26, 1999.

16. Lambeth, *The Transformation of American Air Power*, pp. 213–14; and Barton Gellman and William Drozdiak, "Conflict Halts Momentum for Broader Agenda," *Washington Post*, June 6, 1999, p. A21.

17. Wesley K. Clark, "Meeting Future Military Challenges to NATO," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1999, p. 44.

18. Polling data in *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1999* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp. 24–25. Interestingly, at the leadership level sentiment is different: only about half of the leaders polled believe in the necessity of allied support.

potential partners, from America's closest NATO allies, to *ad hoc* partners with whom the United States has never deployed before. In *Joint Vision 2010*, the Joint Chiefs concluded: "We must find the most effective methods for integrating and improving interoperability with allied and coalition partners. Although our Armed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength, we expect to work in concert with allied and coalition forces in nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, our procedures, programs, and planning must reflect this reality."[19]

In seeking to conduct militarily effective coalition warfare, the single greatest challenge that the United States faces today is the yawning gap between American military technology and everyone else's technology. The paradox for U.S. defense leaders is that American predominance is creating a potential dysfunction, as domestic and international politics increasingly require the United States to fight in coalitions but U.S. military capabilities make it increasingly harder to do so. The dangers associated with a failure to address this problem are enormous. They have the potential to undermine the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and of other U.S. bilateral military alliances, such as those in the Asia-Pacific region.

In the United States, the Revolution in Military Affairs is moving ahead rapidly (although critics say it is not moving rapidly enough, while skeptics believe its potential is exaggerated).[20] It is transforming capabilities in the hardware — the tanks, planes, ships, and munitions — that equips American forces for fighting, and in the software that is revolutionizing command and control for military operations.[21] U.S. allies and coalition partners are not keeping up in either domain.

Although the hardware gap matters, it is not the disparity that will have the greatest impact on allied battle cohesion or coalition capabilities. Rather, the burgeoning information technology gap

19. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, p. 9 <www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf>.

20. For a critic, see Admiral Bill Owens, *Lifting the Fog of War* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000); for a skeptic, see Michael O'Hanlon, *Technological Change and the Future of Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2000).

21. For further discussion of the software revolution, see Chapter 3 by Victor DeMarines.

poses the greatest threat to future coalition operations. David Gompert, Richard Kugler and Martin Libicki argue that:

> The use of information technology is far more extensive in U.S. forces than in European forces. The quality of U.S. precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) has improved greatly since the Gulf War, whereas European forces still remain incapable even of the type [of] operations that U.S. forces conducted in 1991.[22]

It is easy to imagine a scenario in which the U.S. military has dominant battle-space awareness but its fighting partners do not. Using advanced sensors, databases, weapons, and information links, U.S. forces would be able to spot enemy vehicles long before their allies could do so. Acting alone, U.S. forces could launch strikes on those assets. However, allied troops could be maneuvering in the area; they might not receive the information because of poor communications equipment or limited bandwidth, and therefore might be at risk of friendly fire or obstruct U.S. action.[23] At best, U.S. forces would not be as effective as they could be; at worst, they might not be able to operate because of an "intelligence blind spot" caused by the less advanced technology fielded by allied forces.

Most of the work done to date on the emerging technology gap has concentrated on NATO, which is the only multinational coalition with an effective integrated military command structure that has been tested in battle in the past decade. However, in the future the United States may well need to fight alongside other countries, such as its Asia-Pacific region allies, with which it has mutual defense treaties but no standing integrated organizational arrangements. Indeed, the risks of major conflict seem much greater in Asia than they do in the European theater. Thus a parallel effort must be undertaken to address the challenges that U.S. technological innovation poses to waging war in coalition with non-NATO countries with which the United States has a security alliance, such as Australia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

22. David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, and Martin C. Libicki, *Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in Military Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), p. 4.

23. Gompert, Kugler, and Libicki, *Mind the Gap*, p. 50.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Given the likelihood that U.S. forces will deploy with allies and partners in future operations, the Pentagon should make it a first-order defense priority to ensure that fighting in coalitions is a net benefit to the U.S. military.

Establish a Combined Joint Task Force within NATO That Develops a Model for an Enhanced Alliance C3 Capability

It is unrealistic to expect that all of the military forces of the nineteen NATO nations will achieve a high degree of C3 compatibility in the foreseeable future, given the disparities in allies' information technology capabilities as well as in resources available to devote to improvement. Instead, the Alliance should use its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) structure to pursue the development of enhanced interoperability for a select group of allied forces. NATO invented the CJTF as a vehicle to be used by "coalitions of the willing," or those countries with the interests, resources, and political will necessary to pursue a given task. This offers a framework for the establishment of a self-selecting CJTF that would build a model force and develop an Alliance standard for C3 compatibility. Interested countries would initially designate specific units to participate; then, as the model was elaborated, participants could work to bring the rest of their forces up to the new standard. Other allies and even non-allied partners might then be motivated to join in the process. DOD could give the U.S. Joint Forces Command the principal role in supporting this effort.

Require the U.S. "System of Systems" Architecture to Accommodate Allied "Plug-Ins"

Although NATO has undertaken a "Defense Capabilities Initiative" to address the growing technology gap, the United States bears the lion's share of the responsibility for ensuring that its new systems are designed and built to allow other countries to "plug in" and connect with them.[24] Furthermore, the bulk of fielded systems are national

24. At NATO's fiftieth birthday celebration in the spring of 1999, Secretary of Defense William Cohen lobbied successfully for NATO to work toward establishing a single, integrated, or at least compatible command and control structure in the future. See William S. Cohen, "The Atlantic Alliance: A View from the Pentagon," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1999, p. 33. The resulting Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) provides an institutional home at NATO for addressing many of the issues raised in this section of the chapter.

systems rather than NATO systems, so what matters most is what individual national defense establishments procure. Although the technical challenge is great, the politico-economic challenge is greater.[25] In addition to the problem of generating the political momentum for progress, solutions will also depend on whether the United States and its principal European and Asian allies can agree on a fair allocation of costs. For those countries that will not be major players, the United States needs to offer cost-efficient options that provide basic capacity. DOD also needs to give clear policy guidance on requirements and standards to the industrial providers of systems and services.

Set in Advance the Information Security Standards Needed to Enhance Coalition Warfighting Capabilities

In multinational operations, sharing intelligence is a prerequisite for success. Yet information security has been a major obstacle to achieving C3 compatibility. The current system is largely reactive; as a result, questions about whether or not particular information can be released are only asked after an operation is underway. To remedy this, the Secretary of Defense should establish an office reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy that is charged with establishing policy guidelines to define what kind of information may be released to whom, under what conditions, and over what systems. Through this office, the Pentagon also needs to ensure that U.S. national systems have effective technical interfaces with foreign systems. This means establishing standards and directing industry to build U.S. systems that assume information will need to be released to allies and partners.[26] These two efforts, policy and technical, should

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For more on the DCI, see Elinor Sloan, "DCI: Responding to the U.S.-led Revolution in Military Affairs," *NATO Review*, Vol. 48 (Spring–Summer 2000), pp. 4–7. For more on the concept of "plugging in" to the U.S. architecture, see Gompert, Kugler, and Libicki, *Mind the Gap*, pp. 47–51.

25. Francis J. Powers, "Multinational Operations C4I Interoperability/The State of Play: Europe Focus," MITRE briefing, May 18, 2000, p. 11; and Charlie Arouchon, "Overview of MITRE's International DoD Programs," MITRE briefing, May 30, 2000.

26. Arouchon, "Overview," p. 19. The Defense Science Board 1999 Summer Study also recommended the establishment of an Integrated Information Infrastructure Executive Office.

proceed simultaneously, so that once the policy is defined, the technology stands ready to implement it.

Encourage the European Security and Defense Identity to Enhance Military Capability and Especially C3 Compatibility among European Nations

Although U.S. policy toward European economic and political integration has been generally positive, America has traditionally been more ambivalent about a distinct European defense identity. In the post–Cold War era, it is clearly in the U.S. interest that Europe organize itself differently with respect to defense. Specifically, the United States should encourage the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), but only on the condition that it concentrate explicitly on improving European military capabilities, both individually and collectively. Redundancy in forces and procurement should be reduced, with the savings redirected to spending on research and development as well as on command, control, and communications, two areas in which the Europeans need to do more to keep pace with U.S. technological advances.[27] This would facilitate efforts to build an integrated or at least compatible C3 system for the Alliance.

Encourage Trans-national Defense-Industrial Linkages with NATO Countries and Other Major Military Allies to Enhance Interoperability

If the U.S. goal is to achieve much greater C3 compatibility with allies, then it is not logical to maintain two entirely separate and competitive defense industrial bases. DOD should encourage cross-border defense-industrial linkages with its major military allies in both Europe and Asia.[28]

Build Basic C3 Compatibility with Partners

The Department of Defense should assume that non-allied coalition partners (countries with which the United States does not have explicit security guarantees) will face even greater difficulties operating

27. See François Heisbourg, "European defence takes a leap forward," *NATO Review*, Vol. 48 (Spring–Summer 2000), pp. 7–11.

28. For more on trans-national defense-industrial collaboration, see Chapter 6 by Ashton B. Carter. For a variety of additional recommendations on achieving this objective, see also *Making Transatlantic Defense Cooperation Work*, CSIS Report on the Findings and Recommendations of the CSIS Atlantic Partnership Project, Washington, D.C., 2000; and Gompert, Kugler, and Libicki, *Mind the Gap*, pp. 65–78.

alongside U.S. forces in the foreseeable future. With these countries, the United States should concentrate its efforts on improving C3 capabilities. It should identify bare-minimum information compatibility requirements and should provide basic communications packages consistent with anticipated missions. In the case of members of the Partnership for Peace in Europe, NATO and other individual European nations should be contributors to this effort.

Pursue Military-to-Military Cooperation to Improve Operational and Tactical Coordination

The military-to-military cooperation programs that have been established with many countries offer a tremendous resource for preparing to operate together in real-world scenarios. The Pentagon should fully exploit the opportunities they afford to improve operational and tactical coordination with non-allied nations that are likely to participate in coalition operations of the future.

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventions: The Case of the UN Debacle in Sierra Leone

Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping missions have proliferated. Most often, the United Nations has taken the lead in putting together these operations. It has done so with good intentions but poor planning and coordination. Although ten of the current fourteen peacekeeping missions (and 26 of the 39 missions that have been completed) were established after 1990, the UN still lacks the organizational infrastructure to lead, manage, and provide resources to these undertakings.[29] A high-level panel convened by the UN Secretary General to study the problems associated with peacekeeping reported recently that: "Without renewed commitment on the part of Member states, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years."[30] If proof were needed, proof was found in Sierra Leone during the spring of 2000.

29. Statistics on UN peacekeeping missions undertaken and completed since 1990 at <www.un.org/Depts/dpko>.

30. Lakhdar Brahimi, et al., "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," August 17, 2000, A/55/30-S/2000/809, p. viii.

To bring an end to the devastating civil war that had torn apart the small West African country of Sierra Leone, rival factions signed a peace accord in July 1999. Seeking to support that agreement, the UN slowly began to assemble and deploy a peacekeeping force. In February 2000, after some of the initial UN troops were ambushed and forced to hand over their weapons, the UN Security Council voted to double the force sent to police the shaky peace. Although more than 11,000 troops were to have been sent, only some 8,000 arrived. Leading contributors were Nigeria, Ghana, and Guinea, as well as India and Kenya.[31] In May, approximately 500 of the UN peacekeepers were seized by anti-government rebels and held hostage, 200 or so until mid-July. A number of peacekeepers were also reported killed, though no firm figures have been available. Seeking to gain greater control over the situation, the UN worked to expand the force further; as of July 2000, it had swollen to 12,394 troops and observers.

This force had been cobbled together, like most UN peacekeeping forces, with troops that had never had any joint training or operational experience. The Indian commander of the force, General Veejay Jetley, commented that the UN planning was so chaotic that he did not know what troops were coming, from which countries, until they arrived.[32] On the ground, there was inadequate organization to ensure the commander's knowledge of the troops' whereabouts. The UN forces were minimally armed, and therefore lacked the capability to perform the essential function of patrolling Sierra Leone's borders, across which a diamonds-for-arms trade continued to resupply the rebel forces.

The noticeable absence of any Western military in the UN operation underscored the strong U.S. preference to avoid situations that might lead U.S. troops into "another Somalia." However, Sierra Leone put the United States under fire at the UN for "talking the talk" but not "walking the walk" of engagement with Africa. Without U.S. involvement, many believed the mission was doomed from the start. The United Kingdom had also initially refused to participate, al-

31. Robert Holloway, "UN doubles Sierra Leone peacekeeping force," *Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), February 8, 2000 <http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/2000feb1/8feb-sierra.html>.

32. Jane Perlez, "A Doomed Peace: Missteps and a Weak Plan Marred Effort for Sierra Leone," *New York Times*, May 10, 2000, p. A14.

though Sierra Leone had once been part of its colonial Empire; it only dispatched forces under its own command after the UN peacekeepers had been seized. The British helped keep the peace in Freetown and assisted with training the other peacekeeping troops on the ground, but withdrew the bulk of their contingent within a month. Exasperated by unsuccessful efforts to stabilize the situation, the Clinton administration decided in August 2000 to send several hundred U.S. Special Forces soldiers to train and equip West African troops to join the United Nations force.[33]

As this saga unfolded, a place that most Americans could not identify on a map became a front-page newspaper story, and appeared on the brief segment allotted to international events on the nightly television news. The consistent theme of that coverage was that the United Nations had bungled another peacekeeping mission.[34] Sierra Leone was added to the list of fiascoes associated with the UN's efforts to conduct peacekeeping operations that included Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia.

The consequence of the UN debacle in Sierra Leone was a further erosion of U.S. public support for the United Nations and a further weakening of the UN's ability to conduct the operations that no one else wants to undertake. For example, within days of the hostage-taking in Sierra Leone, a key Republican senator used an obscure parliamentary maneuver to block the United States temporarily from paying $356 million that it owed the UN for peacekeeping missions in Congo, East Timor, and Kosovo as well as Sierra Leone.[35] A still more portentous consequence of the UN's failure in Sierra Leone was that the United States, with the requisite military resources to help train peacekeepers for effective action, was ultimately drawn into trying to salvage another mission gone wrong.

33. Jane Perlez, "U.S. to Send G.I.'s to Train Africans for Sierra Leone," *New York Times*, August 9, 2000, p. A1.

34. For a succinct and savage example of this view, see Michael Ignatieff, "A Bungling UN Undermines Itself," *New York Times*, May 15, 2000, p. A25.

35. Tim Weiner, "One GOP Senator Blocks Spending on Peacekeepers," *New York Times*, May 20, 2000, p. A1.

THE LESSONS OF SIERRA LEONE

In the post–Cold War era, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations have become a major component of what the U.S. military does on a daily basis. This is in large part because the international security environment has permitted a dramatic shift in focus. Rather than preparing to fight one or possibly two major wars simultaneously, the U.S. military today is asked to undertake activities far beyond the traditional definition of its role. It is spread thin responding to crises in collapsing states, supporting processes of national political reconstruction, protecting civilians from ethnic strife, conducting refugee relief operations, and helping people cope with natural disasters. The Pentagon coined a pointed phrase to describe this new set of missions: "operations other than war" — or OOTW.

In an ideal world, America's civilian defense leadership and military establishment would not devote the preponderance of their attention or energy to addressing these kinds of problems. These are not the major security challenges for which the U.S. military trains to fight; they are problems that absorb much time and effort, but do not present vital threats to U.S. interests. They distract policymakers from spending time on more important issues, and remove U.S. forces from their routine combat training (although U.S. troops do derive some training benefits from these deployments). They also contribute to significant morale problems that cause difficulties with military recruitment and retention.

Yet the United States cannot close its eyes to these crises, nor shield itself from criticism when it fails to act. Indeed, despite the often remote and seemingly obscure relevance of the places that become enflamed, the brutality of these conflicts makes it nearly impossible to ignore them. Furthermore, in most crises, the world looks to the United States for leadership and guidance; without some U.S. involvement, most operations will not happen. The international institutions, such as the UN, that should shoulder some of the burden are only as capable as their members enable them to be. Thus it would not be realistic to recommend that the United States offload these missions completely, though it might be the best thing to do if the Pentagon's sole goal were to maintain the most combat-effective force on the planet.

As these kinds of operations proliferate and impose more on the resources of the U.S. military, it becomes increasingly important that

DOD be able to differentiate among missions to be conducted mainly by U.S. forces and those to be undertaken with or by others. Some will require U.S. leadership; some should be handled principally by other countries or organizations. The range of needs is wide, from situations involving UN Chapter VII peace enforcement, where the initial environment is hostile and skilled combat troops are required, to more traditional peacekeeping, where the presence of foreign troops is largely uncontested. The line is often blurred between peacekeeping and the follow-on tasks of post-peacekeeping policing and civil reconstruction. The latter are huge jobs that have by default fallen to military forces because no one else is able or available to perform the necessary tasks. Humanitarian missions, too, may require military support, especially if a prompt response is necessary to avert greater human suffering.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Two types of recommendations follow from this analysis. First, the United States should commit to the long-term goal of strengthening other nations and organizations, including the United Nations, in order to reduce its own peacekeeping and humanitarian operations burden. Second, the Department of Defense should organize itself better to facilitate cooperation with the multiple national, international, and non-governmental entities that will most likely be part of any operation in which U.S. involvement is deemed appropriate.

Reduce the U.S. Burden by Strengthening Others

The United States should be selective about how and what it contributes to international peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts so that its participation enhances the role and capacity of others. It should pursue a strategy that helps other countries and organizations to be effective players in peacekeeping, policing, and establishing viable civil institutions. For example, it should be prepared to play a leading role in justifiable missions that involve peace enforcement, a euphemism for creating security where it does not exist that almost inevitably requires combat troops supported by advanced C3, intelligence resources, and strategic lift. In lower-intensity cases, however, countries that emphasize peacekeeping as a principal purpose for their militaries, such as Canada and Denmark, should more often take the lead. There, the United States should seek to limit its in-

volvement to providing assistance in areas of its distinctive competence, such as airlift or intelligence support.

Devote More Political and Financial Capital to Enhancing the United Nations and Other Regional Security Organizations

The only way to achieve the goal of enhanced burden-sharing is to enhance the capabilities of the UN and other international organizations, and this will not happen unless the U.S. leadership makes the case for it. If the United States continues its passive-aggressive relationship with the UN (and other regional bodies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), it is unrealistic to expect that their capacity will be strengthened enough to markedly reduce the burden on the United States. The U.S. Ambassador to the UN presents the argument succinctly with respect to the UN: "Peacekeeping needs three things: More financial resources, more and better-trained military and civilian personnel in the field and a coherent command structure overseas with better central direction out of New York."[36] Two specific actions could demonstrate U.S. willingness to improve the UN's effectiveness. First, the U.S. military advisory presence at the UN should be enhanced by establishing a defense advisor's office similar to that of the U.S. defense advisor at NATO. Second, a UN peace operations training academy should be created with active U.S. support to provide standardized peacekeeping training in such areas as rules of engagement, doctrine, planning, and exercising.[37]

Promote the Establishment of an Effective UN Policing Force

It is highly unlikely that the UN will be authorized by its members to build, train, and maintain its own standing military force. More feasible would be the creation of an international police force under UN auspices. Such a force could be trained and equipped to help maintain law and order after a peacekeeping mission has been completed so that national military forces could go home. To date, U.S. resis-

36. Richard Holbrooke, quoted in Barbara Crossette, "U.S. Ambassador to UN Calls for Changes in Peacekeeping," *New York Times*, June 14, 2000, p. A6.

37. For a variety of complementary ideas that focus on what the UN can do to enhance its capacity to conduct such operations effectively, see Brahimi, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," especially Annex III.

tance to such a force has been one of the main obstacles to its establishment. Given the lessons learned in the former Yugoslavia over the last five years, the United States should recognize that it has a compelling interest in the existence of a competent international policing capability.

A first step and necessary condition in moving toward this goal would be to establish international standards for training and participation in policing roles. The only requirements to qualify for the kind of police force that was deployed in Bosnia were fluency in English, the ability to drive, and eight years of policing experience as defined in the donor country rather than by the UN.[38] Seeking to address the need to build greater transitional policing capability in countries in which peacekeeping missions have been undertaken, President Clinton issued a Presidential Decision Directive in February 2000 to "improve America's ability to strengthen police and judicial institutions in countries where peacekeeping forces are deployed."[39] In addition to fulfilling the goals set forth in this PDD, the United States should work with the UN to define the purposes, capabilities, and requirements of a UN-led policing force.

Prepare from the Start for Interaction with International and Non-Governmental Organizations

In the case of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, the Pentagon should organize itself to interact regularly and efficiently with multiple non-DOD and non-state organizations that are increasingly involved in providing services in such contingencies. Despite the growing role that these missions play in the daily life of the U.S. military, the United States has resisted making organizational adjustments to reflect this new reality. This is true both internally — within the U.S. government — and externally, in the nodes established to deal with international and non-governmental organizations and institutions.

38. Larry Wentz, contributing editor, *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), p. 143.

39. See Clinton Statement on New Presidential Decision Directive, February 24, 2000, at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-2.htm>; and "The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations," February 24, 2000, at <www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm>.

The U.S. government does not have an efficient interagency coordination process for managing these kinds of operations internally. Despite several attempts to provide direction and order to U.S. involvement, much of the U.S. process is still *ad hoc*. Three Presidential Decision Directives since 1994 have addressed the complex of problems associated with such operations. However, the general consensus is that these PDDs have yet to be fully implemented.[40] The Pentagon should not wait for the rest of the government to organize itself perfectly before it builds the bridges necessary to mission success. Rather, it should take steps immediately to improve its links to international organizations and NGOs in order to enhance operational effectiveness, all the while participating fully in whatever interagency management system is available.

With respect to sustaining external ties to non-state entities, DOD does little planning and has limited organizational capacity for work at the strategic level. What does happen occurs on a case-by-case basis, or in the field at the operational or tactical level. The Pentagon has some liaison arrangements with the UN, but no formal links with any NGOs, nor any mechanism for establishing or maintaining them. For example, there were an estimated 530 NGOs in Bosnia when the NATO-led IFOR forces deployed in the peacekeeping operation that began in December 1995.[41] Yet in preparing for the operation, U.S. military planners did not have any mechanism for exploiting the "on the ground" experience or expertise of these NGOs. Furthermore, because the United States did not have an overall strategy for work-

40. PDD 25, signed on May 3, 1994, represented an early Clinton administration initiative to reform U.S. and UN involvement in multilateral peace operations. PDD 56, signed on May 29, 1997, concentrated on managing complex contingency operations. PDD 77, signed on February 24, 2000, was intended to improve U.S. ability to strengthen police and judicial institutions in countries where peacekeeping forces are deployed. Some critics believe that the very use of PDDs for this purpose reveals the extent to which these issues are being treated as ancillary, at best, to the planning process. See, for example, Chris Seiple, "Window Into an Age of Windows: The U.S. Military and the NGOs," *Marine Corps Gazette* (Quantico, Va.), April 1999, pp. 63–71.

41. Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia*, p. 135. For more on this case and on the failure to develop adequate liaison with the NGO community, see ibid., pp. 419–420.

ing with these groups, the military was largely reactive in providing support to the humanitarian aspects of the operation.[42]

To plan and train from the start for U.S. military interaction with international and non-governmental organizations, DOD needs to identify points of contact, on the Joint Staff and at regional commands, with the relevant players. Such standing cooperative liaison arrangements would mean that, where appropriate, these entities would be included throughout the conceptualization and planning of humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and, crucially, would participate in exercises. Initial efforts are underway in the field; for example, the Third Fleet conducted a novel humanitarian assistance exercise in June 2000 involving UN agencies, the American Red Cross, and other non-governmental organizations.[43] Another organizational innovation that could be replicated as needed is the establishment of Civil Military Operations Centers, or CMOCs, which were used to coordinate more effectively with NGOs and other assistance providers when U.S. forces were deployed in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia.[44] In the case of the United Nations, a senior U.S. military advisory presence along the lines of the U.S. defense advisor to NATO would not only enhance the UN's operational capabilities but also contribute to greater coordination between the Pentagon and international efforts.

Finally, the recommendations offered above for improving upon the U.S. capacity to operate effectively with *ad hoc* partners in warfighting apply in the peacekeeping and humanitarian relief context as well. The United States should identify bare-minimum information compatibility requirements, provide basic communications packages consistent with anticipated missions, and pursue military-to-military cooperation to improve operational and tactical coordination.

42. Wentz, *Lessons From Bosnia*, p. 429.

43. Bryan Bender, "U.S. Forces Seek Closer Links with UN on Disaster Assistance," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, June 28, 2000, p. 9.

44. Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, *Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 69.

Military-to-Military Cooperation Programs: The Case of Russian Participation in Bosnian Peacekeeping

Although initial military-to-military contacts were established during the late Soviet period, cooperative relations between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Russian Ministry of Defense were only institutionalized by a Memorandum of Understanding in September 1993. From the U.S. perspective, the goal of this initiative was to do nothing less than revolutionize the relationship between the American and Russian defense establishments, which had been mortal enemies for nearly fifty years.[45]

The military-to-military contacts program proposed by the United States was designed to break down the barriers to communication and reduce the high levels of suspicion and hostility that had characterized relations between the superpowers' armed forces throughout the Cold War. It therefore contained opportunities for senior defense and military leaders to meet regularly, and for soldiers to get to know one another and pursue joint training experiences appropriate to the challenges both countries would face in the future. As the cornerstone of this new program, the United States proposed to Russia the initiation of a series of peacekeeping exercises. This was deemed to be a relatively non-controversial first step, as peacekeeping did not involve combat training and therefore would raise fewer barriers on both sides.

U.S. and Russian planners worked together for nearly a year to develop a landmark manual entitled *Russian–United States Guide for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises*, which was the first-ever jointly developed document on how U.S. and Russian forces would conduct a peacekeeping operation together. Published in both English and Russian, it served as the basis for the unprecedented "Peacekeeper-94" exercise that took place at Totskoye, Russia, in September 1994. This event, and the planning process that led up to it, laid the groundwork for future cooperation that would culminate in U.S. and Russian forces deploying together in

45. For a more detailed account of the role of military-to-military cooperation in revolutionizing relations with the former Soviet states, see Elizabeth D. Sherwood, "Revolution and Evolution in Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia," *Defense '95* (Department of Defense), No. 6, pp. 20–27.

Bosnia to support implementation of the Dayton peace accords. In October–November 1995, the United States hosted a follow-on joint exercise in Fort Riley, Kansas. This occasion also provided Secretary of Defense William Perry and his Russian counterpart, Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, with an opportunity to work out the details of the real-world military operation that was taking shape to address the crisis in the Balkans.[46]

In February 1996, Russian airborne forces deployed alongside the U.S. First Armored Division in Bosnia. The overall operation was led by General George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe; the Russian brigade was subordinated to Joulwan in his capacity as a U.S. general. This was the first time since the Second World War that U.S. and Russian troops had jointly pursued a shared military objective. More than four years later, U.S. and Russian forces continue to patrol the enforcement of the Bosnian peace agreement together. Furthermore, building on this historic precedent, Russian forces also participate in the NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping effort established in 1999.

THE LESSONS OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

During the Cold War, U.S. military forces undertook cooperative programs with other militaries for two principal reasons: first, to increase American combat capabilities; and second, to improve the capabilities of multinational coalition forces. With the end of the Cold War, Pentagon civilian leaders envisioned an additional role for America's military forces. The logic of the case they made was that the United States should engage former enemies through military-to-military cooperation in order to transform relationships from confrontation to cooperation. Thus a third more explicitly "political-military" rationale was articulated for military-to-military programs. They would be used as an instrument of U.S. diplomacy, both to diminish the prospects of future conflict and to develop the capacity to operate together to advance common interests.

Three broad policy initiatives were undertaken in the mid-1990s that made this objective a reality. The first was the Nunn-Lugar Co-

46. For a detailed discussion of the events that led up to Russian participation in IFOR, see Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense*, pp. 23–46.

operative Threat Reduction Program, which provided U.S. funding and technical support in the four former Soviet nuclear states to assist with reducing their weapons of mass destruction. Working in collaboration with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, the United States organized an unprecedented effort to dismantle and destroy weapons delivery systems, and to provide for safe storage of the fissile material in nuclear warheads. The second initiative was an expanded military-to-military cooperation program, initially funded through the Nunn-Lugar appropriation, that developed bilateral defense relationships with all the countries of the former Soviet Union. In a parallel undertaking that progressed more slowly, DOD also sought to reestablish military ties with China, which had been cut off in 1989 after Tiananmen Square. The third endeavor was a major U.S. push to develop NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program as a vehicle through which former Warsaw Pact members could establish tangible security ties with the West. In each of these three efforts, the logic and goals were similar: to reduce suspicion and establish relationships among counterparts, especially at the leadership level; to sustain a dialogue about security concerns; to reduce possibilities of misunderstanding and inadvertent action in a crisis; and to pursue prospects for both policy and operational cooperation reflecting the real-world interests of both sides.

These efforts called upon the U.S. military to stretch itself to fulfill a new mission. Indeed, the initial use of the military for such "diplomatic" purposes preceded the formal mission definition. It was not until 1997 that the military's leading role in transforming the international security environment was codified. In "A New National Security Strategy for a New Century," the so-called "shaping" role was officially established: "Our military promotes regional stability in numerous ways…. With countries that are neither staunch friends nor known foes, military cooperation often serves as a positive means of engagement, building security relationships today in an effort to keep these countries from becoming adversaries tomorrow." In addition, the U.S. strategy statement asserted that the armed forces are "a role model for militaries in emerging democracies around the world. Through modest military-to-military activities and increasing links between the U.S. military and the military establishments of Partner-

ship for Peace nations, for instance, we are helping to transform military institutions in central and eastern Europe."[47]

Although the political value of the "shaping" role is increasingly clear, it is a controversial military goal because there is no direct combat-proficiency payback. Given the numerous new missions that the U.S. military has been assigned — missions that often seem far removed from its warfighting responsibilities — this is sometimes seen as yet another distraction that consumes resources and diminishes combat readiness. Furthermore, it has been difficult to translate the new mandate into specific military requirements. "Shaping" programs are not integrated into the annual training cycle developed by the Joint Staff and the Services, and the funding is still piecemeal and *ad hoc*, coming from sources such as CINC Initiative Funds, rather than being funded in a coherent and systematic fashion.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

A challenge for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, working closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is to ensure that these new programs are understood to be an important dimension of deterrence — as important as fielding the most capable troops, or the most advanced weapons systems.

Institutionalize and Use Military-to-military Cooperation to Prepare for Future Coalition, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Action

Because of its relative novelty as a defense tool, the "shaping" mission has not yet been thoroughly institutionalized within the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, the CINCs, and the services. It continues to require a high degree of intervention by the civilian policy leadership to ensure its implementation. Over time, military-to-military events should become part of the formal defense resource allocation process so that they are treated like other regularly scheduled rotations for U.S. forces. To ensure consistent and adequate levels of funding, they should be incorporated into the Planning,

47. "A New National Security Strategy for a New Century," The White House, Washington, D.C., May 1997, p. 10. See also Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 3, 1998, entitled "New Defense Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare."

Programming, and Budgeting System, the complex Pentagon exercise that results in the formulation of the annual DOD budget.[48] Yet some flexibility must also be preserved to ensure that out-of-cycle opportunities for improving critical military-to-military relationships can be exploited.

Military-to-military cooperation is, literally, defense by other means. Consistent with this understanding, these programs need to be used fully and effectively to prepare for real-world contingencies. This means that they should focus increasingly on meaningful military training across the spectrum of anticipated operations. With reference to the issues raised in the previous discussion of coalition warfare, a specific focus of U.S. military-to-military cooperation programs, especially with countries that belong to the Partnership for Peace program, should be to enhance command, control, and communications compatibility. Exercises should place special emphasis on the C3 dimension of operating together.

Use the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to Full Effect

The highly successful Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, which has until now concentrated on reductions in former Soviet nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, should develop a fissile materials storage and disposition program of comparable effectiveness. The efforts of the national nuclear laboratories, in particular those at Livermore and Los Alamos, have laid the groundwork for concrete progress to be made at key Russian facilities. To achieve results on the scale intended, such important programs require steady funding and sustained involvement by the U.S. government, with DOD and the Department of Energy fully coordinating their efforts. DOD should also continue to pursue fissile material and weapons export control initiatives in the former Soviet states that have vulnerable borders.

In addition, the CTR program should be utilized to reduce the chemical and biological weapons stockpile on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Funding constraints have impeded program development in both of these important areas. A renewed effort

48. For more on the defense resource allocation process, see Executive Level Text in *Resource Allocation*, Vol. 1: *The Formal Process*, 3d ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, March 1999).

should be made to persuade Congress that these initiatives merit significant and sustained support.

Make the Most of DOD's Newly Established Regional Centers

The Pentagon's five relatively new regional security studies centers should be fully utilized as instruments of military engagement by DOD's civilian and military leadership. The centers include the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Marshall Center for European Security Studies, and the Near East–South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Although each has its own distinct identity, they share common purposes: to foster communication and build relationships among future U.S. and regional security leaders, both military and civilian; to create an environment in which cooperative approaches to regional security problems can be safely explored; and to seek innovative solutions to challenges that might otherwise result in conflict.

Ensure that the Partnership for Peace Remains a Vital Institution in Eurasia and Explore Similar Arrangements Elsewhere

NATO's Partnership for Peace, created in 1994 as a means of building bridges between NATO nations and former Warsaw Pact states, should be utilized fully to foster security cooperation across Eurasia. For countries most active in the program, such as Ukraine, the United States and NATO should seek to make membership in PFP as similar to membership in NATO as possible. The United States should also consider developing similar security cooperation mechanisms for regions that lack institutions to facilitate bilateral and multilateral military-to-military engagement, such as in Asia, where the need is likely to be greatest.

Managing Global Roles and Relationships

The U.S. Defense Department must manage far broader roles and far more complex international relationships for the U.S. military than ever before. Both demand innovative leadership, imaginative policies, and inventive organization, a number of suggestions for which are spelled out in this chapter. To ensure effective coalition capabilities in the future, the Pentagon must develop a coherent and sustainable plan for connecting America's likely partners to the U.S.

military information architecture of the future. To enhance overall international capacity but reduce the U.S. burden in conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, DOD must strengthen other participants and at the same time cooperate more efficiently with them. To fulfill the ambitious goals of the "shaping" mission, it must pursue innovative military-to-military cooperation programs that advance U.S. national security goals and are fully integrated into the defense resource allocation process. Taken together, these recommendations comprise a blueprint for managing critical aspects of the Pentagon's global ties in the first decade of the new century.