The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism

Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little

New York

Columbia University Press

1993

4. Beyond Neorealism: Interaction Capacity

 

The design of Neorealism tends to blur the distinction between structure and system (Keohane and Nye 1987:747). Waltz constructed it on the basis of two levels of analysis--unit and structure--that were supposed to comprehend the principal features of the international political system. As far as it goes, this logic is correct inasmuch as the definitions of structure and unit levels provide distinct sources of explanation that range from the nature of the political units, at one end, to the nature of the international political system as a whole, at the other.

This logic does not, however, capture all of the main features of the international political system. The criticisms of Ruggie, Keohane, and others suggest that it does not, because their concerns with factors such as "dynamic density," information richness, communication facilities, and suchlike do not obviously fit into Waltz's ostensibly "systemic" theory. With the new formulations developed in the previous chapter to hand, one can now identify more clearly where the problem lies. It goes right back to the basic definition of system as units, interactions, and structures. Waltz sees interactions as part of the unit level, varying according to the dispositions and capabilities of the units as mediated by structural pressures. Many of his critics think that the interaction component of system needs a higher profile in the theory, but are blocked by Waltz's preemption of structure as the sole system level component of Neorealist theory. The argument in this chapter is that interaction cannot be confined to the unit level. There is a massive and vital interaction component that is systemic, but not structural. The identification and explanation of this third level is a major key to the transition from Neorealism to Structural Realism.

Despite its scale and scope, the logical entrance to this level is not all that easy to find. The distinctions involved in identifying it are subtle but important, and require a rather lengthy excursion. As one might expect, they hinge on the question of capabilities, which already lies at the heart of many people's uncertainties about the boundary between the structure and unit levels. Neorealism makes extensive use of capabilities at both the unit and structure levels, leaving no room for doubt that capabilities are a major component of the international political system. In drawing the boundary between the unit and structure levels, Waltz relies heavily on the distinction between the distribution of capabilities, which he argues is structural, and the possession of them by individual units, which is not. This distinction points toward a more general one between absolute and relative capabilities, and it is this that reveals the missing level. The aggregated concept of power provides a good illustration of the point, and is worth developing in some detail.

 

Definitions of Power: Attributive Relational and Control

The meaning of power in absolute terms is derived from the natural sciences, and refers to the capability of units to perform specified tasks as a result of the attributes they possess. In order to avoid the unwanted overtones of extreme political centralism implied by "absolute power," this understanding of power can be referred to as attributive. Depending upon their attributes, states either can or cannot do certain things, like building nuclear weapons, or putting 12 million men into uniform. This is the same type of power as one refers to when talking about the horsepower of engines or the lifting power of rockets. In the international political system, as in engineering, attributive power is non-zero-sum. It is open-ended, in that all units can increase (or decrease) their levels of it through such capability-expanding activities as technological development, industrialization, administrative efficiency, and collective identity. In theory, attributive power should be objectively measurable. As it can and does change markedly and rapidly in both quantity and quality, state power, and its implications for international relations, are continuously subject to significant change. Think, for example, of the way the absolute power of states both to inflict damage on each other, and to absorb each other's exports, has increased over the last 150 years. These increases have of course had an impact on the relative power of states, but within the logic of relative power the level of attributive power has been rising steadily.

By contrast, power seen in relative terms is wholly positional and zero-sum, referring only to the pattern of distribution of power amongst the units in the system. This understanding of power can be referred to as relational. Relational power takes no cognizance of the open-ended character of attributive power except inasmuch as this affects the zero-sum distribution of power among units. If all units increased their attributive power in the same proportion, there would be no change in the relational power ranking among them, even though their absolute capabilities might have increased enormously. The bipolar distributional structure after the Second World War would have existed regardless of nuclear weapons, but the existence of those weapons made a huge difference to the absolute capabilities of the two superpowers to inflict damage on each other and the rest of the world.

Measuring relational power is extremely difficult. The task can be approached by trying to compare levels of attributive power. It can also be approached, though only retrospectively, in terms of outcomes (control power), the ultimate traditional test here being the outcome of war. Using control power creates the widely recognized difficulty of a circular definition (where the erstwhile cause is defined in terms of its effect). Short of the test of war, relational power is highly subject to perceptual variables. Social "facts" may be more important than real ones in determining outcomes: the perceived power of a state, and therefore its ability to determine outcomes, may exceed (or understate) its real capabilities.

In Neorealism, relational power is incorporated in both levels of analysis, but attributive power is found only at the unit level. Relational power defines the distributional structure: "polarity" is simply the label given to the main pattern of relational power. At the unit level, relational power plays a major role in action-reaction dynamics such as arms racing. Waltz acknowledges the importance of attributive power, but assigns it firmly to the unit level.

In my view, the two biggest changes in international politics since World War II are the structural shift from multi- to bipolarity and the unit-level change in the extent and rapidity with which some states can hurt others.= . . . Wars that might bring nuclear weapons into play have become much harder to start .|.|. A unit-level change has much diminished a structural effect (Waltz in Keohane 1986:327).

The nature of Waltz's definitions excludes attributive power, with its open-ended qualities, from the structural level. Given the overall dyadic construction of Neorealism, this forces the placement of attributive power exclusively in the unit level.

The problem is that this placement does not encompass the full nature of attributive power. Up to a point, Waltz's formulation serves. It does capture the significance of capabilities both in the domestic determination of individual unit behavior and in specific action-reaction dynamics between units such as arms racing and trade wars. Beyond that point, however, there are still substantial elements of attributive power that cannot be located in the unit level without seriously straining the sense of what "unit level" means. In confusing structure with system, Waltz has lost sight of the systemic interaction element that is essential to give the notion of system meaning.

 

Systemic Capabilities

This discussion now becomes clearer if we revert to talking about the absolute quality of specific capabilities, rather than power generally. Whether capabilities are aggregated into power or treated separately makes no difference to the logic that brought us to this point.

There are at least two key aspects of absolute capabilities whose very nature, and not just their effects, are clearly systemic in character when they are central to the interaction component of the system: one is technological capabilities, and the other is shared norms and organizations. These factors not only affect the ability and the willingness of units to interact, but also determine what types and levels of interaction are both possible and desired. They are systemic even though they clearly fall outside the meaning of structure.

The evolution of technology continuously raises the absolute capability for interaction available within the system. It is true that many extremely important technological factors, especially those relating to military power, can be captured at the unit level in terms of the particular capabilities commanded by individual states, and the way those capabilities affect relations with other states. But in some important areas, most obviously communication, transportation, and information, these capabilities cannot adequately be expressed in unit terms. Communication and transportation technologies are in an important sense system-wide in their deployment, as well as in their effects. Things like shipping capacity and telecommunications are more system- than state-based. Once developed to the point of cost-effectiveness, such technologies tend to spread quickly throughout the system, just as steamships and telegraphs did in the nineteenth century, and civil aviation and computer networks have done since the Second World War. Although command of these technologies is unquestionably an element of unit power, their availability quickly transforms conditions of interaction for all units, and therefore transforms the system itself.

Compare for example a system in which the best transportation technology is horse-drawn wagons and wooden sailing ships, with one in which transportation capability is defined by jumbo jets, high-speed trains, 500,000 ton ships, and trucks using extensive networks of paved roads. Across a wide range, the interaction possibilities--military, economic, and societal--in the former are vastly more constrained than those in the latter. Both levels of technology permit an uneven distribution of power, but the quality, quantity, and impact of interaction in the two systems will be radically different. The present day example could itself be compared to a possible future in which "star Trek" technology makes the direct, and virtually instantaneous, transmission of matter (including nuclear bombs) the principal method of transportation. A similar exercise could be performed for communication and information. As technologies in these areas spread, they change the quality and character of what might be called the interaction capacity of the system as a whole. This is both a characteristic, and an effect that is qualitatively different from the way the particular attributes of particular states affect their interactions with other individual states.

The other area of absolute capability relevant for the interaction capacity of the system is shared norms and organizations. The sharing of norms and values is a precondition for establishing organizations, but once established, such organizations greatly facilitate, and even promote, interactions that shared norms and values make possible and desired. It is difficult to see global or even subglobal international institutions as unit-based, and easier to see them as in some important sense system-based. Political communication in a system with no such international norms or institutions will be quite different from one that is richly endowed with them. Institutions provide not only more opportunities to communicate, but also more obligations and more incentives to do so. They also prestructure communication in a variety of ways. The interaction capacity of a system not served by such norms and institutions, other things being equal, will be systematically different from one that is well served. In effect, we are talking here about the difference between systems with and without a developed international society (Bull 1977; Wight 1977; Bull and Watson 1984). The interaction capacity of a system with few shared norms will be much lower than one where significant norms are shared widely among the major actors, which will in turn be much lower than one in which shared norms have given rise to the communal institutions and organizations that are the hallmark of a maturing international society. "Lower" here refers to both the quantity and the variety of interactions.

Between the technological and societal elements of interaction capacity the former is both prior and more basic. Technology determines the level of interaction in a very fundamental sense. Without a substantial impact from technology on levels of interaction it is difficult to see how or why common norms and communal institutions could develop other than in geographically limited subsystems. Once they do develop, however, they become an important element of interaction capacity which is quite distinct from technology in its effects.

A proper sense of interaction capacity as a feature of the system as a whole is missing from Neorealism. This causes Neorealists to ignore (or rather to dismiss as unit level factors) the impact of systemically distributed absolute capabilities. As will be expanded upon in Section II, this misclassification causes Waltz to overlook entirely the fact that the whole operational logic of his structural theory depends on prior assumptions about the nature of interaction capacity. These assumptions are never examined in Neorealism.

The systemic, as opposed to unit or structure, status of interaction capacity is easily demonstrated by elaborating the scenario sketched above. Think of two international systems that are identical in both deep and distributional structure, and in unit characteristics, except that the predominant communication capability differs. In the first system, communication capability is defined by the speed and capacity of human messengers using horses or sailing vessels as their means of transport. In the second, communication capability is defined by globally distributed satellite, satellite receiver, and cable networks. The interaction capacity in these two systems is profoundly different for all the units in terms of the speed, volume, and reliability of their communications. Information and communication will move much faster, and in much larger volumes, in the second system than in the first. Add in similar magnitudes of difference in transportation technology and institutionalization, and it is apparent that the whole quality, scale, and intensity of international relations in the two systems will be radically different. Indeed, it becomes impossible to sustain the assumption that the units themselves would be "otherwise similar" in the two systems, a linkage taken up in Section II. Because the differences in absolute capability are system-wide in operation, they can, as will be shown below, serve as a basis for hypotheses at the system level about the impact of this variable on international relations.

These scenarios illustrate a set of variables that clearly belong within a system theory of international politics, but which are neither structural nor unit level in character. They are aspects of absolute capability that transcend the unit level, but which are not structural in the sense of having to do with the positional arrangement of the units. They are systemic not only because they represent capabilities that are deployed throughout the system, but also, and mainly, because they profoundly condition the significance of structure and the meaning of the term system itself. This is a different quality from selective unit capabilities that have system-wide effects, such as nuclear weapons, which Waltz rightly places within the unit level.

Interaction capacity is an appropriate label for this category, distinguishing it from the structure and unit levels as a distinct source of explanation (and thus as a level of analysis), and expressing the idea of a range of system-wide variables that affect the interaction capacity of the system as a whole. Interaction capacity captures the importance of the absolute quality of capabilities as both a defining characteristic of the system, and a distinct source of shoving and shaping forces playing on the units alongside those from the structural level. As with distributional structure, a case could be made for both aggregative and disaggregative conceptions of interaction capacity. Ruggie's concern with "dynamic density," noted above, captures the effect of interaction capacity without specifying the cause, and perhaps captures the essence of an aggregative view. A disaggregative approach would look separately at technological and societal capabilities in the system. One advantage of disaggregation is that it enables account to be taken of the different logistical requirements of interaction in different sectors. Significant societal interactions can take place by the movement of a few individuals carrying ideas. Its logistical requirements are rather low even over long distances. Significant military and economic interaction, by contrast, require major logistical capability, especially over long distances. These sectoral differences reinforce the case for disaggregating power. They also have profound implications for the way in which international systems develop.

The standing of interaction capacity as a third level of analysis is demonstrated by its profound impact on the operation of Neorealism's whole structural logic. As the basic definition of system indicates, the absolute quality of interaction capacity is fundamental to the existence of a system. How much interaction, and of what type, is necessary before one can say that an international system exists? This question has not been addressed in Neorealism. Yet so basic is the effect of interaction capacity that unless its level and type are specified first, one cannot say whether structural logic will operate or not. Units can exist without being in a system if their capabilities are so low as to prevent significant interaction among them. Waltz simply presupposes an adequate level of interaction to make the political dynamics of socialization and competition operate. But if structural theory is to be applied across the whole history of the international system, as it can and should be, then many interesting and important questions about degree and type of interaction arise. We explore some of these in more detail in Section II.

One can start, as Waltz does, with Rousseau-like assumptions of a nonsystemic state of nature in which political units evolved in isolation from one another. An international system comes into being when these units begin to interact. But the studies of international historians such as McNeill (1963) and international historical theorists such as Wallerstein (1974) suggest strongly that, for the great bulk of its history, the international system has not obeyed Neorealist logic, or at least has done so only very slowly and weakly, and on a regional rather than on a global scale. The reason is to be found in interaction capacity. For most of its history, the international system has been characterized by low levels of the technological and societal capabilities necessary for system-wide economic and military interaction. Strategic interaction among the units has thus been poorly developed and highly constrained. When low quality of technological capabilities across the system puts heavy restraints on the speed, volume, range, and reliability of communication and transportation, and hence of the capability and incentive to develop international society, then the strong interaction between organizing principle and functional differentiation of units in deep structure does not operate effectively or rapidly, and may not operate at all except over rather limited distances.

As McNeill tells the story, significant interaction among major centers of human civilization can be traced back to at least 3000 B.C. From the earliest origins of civilization in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Indus valley, cultural interaction played an important role in shaping the development of human communities. Technologies, religions, styles, and a limited trade in goods traveled between communities too remote from each other to make strategic rivalry possible. For long periods, civilizations in Egypt, India, China, and the Americas existed in strategic and economic, though not cultural, isolation from other centers of power. McNeill's core theme is that until the expansion of Europe beginning in the fifteenth century A.D., the international system consisted of four largely autonomous civilizations centered in the Middle East, India, China, and Europe. There was enough cultural exchange and impact to support the idea that a weak (i.e., nonstrategic) international system existed. Think, for example, of the spread of Buddhism from India to East Asia, and of printing and gunpowder from China to Europe. But in trade, and even more so in military threats, the overall interaction capacity of this system was low. Only in rather specific situations did strategic interaction occur. Strategic interaction could be intense within civilizations, as in classical Greece and ancient Mesopotamia. In addition, all civilizations had periodically to face onslaughts from barbarians equipped with the transportation and military technologies of civilization. In a few places, most notably on the boundary between the Greco-Roman and Middle Eastern civilizations, there was sustained military rivalry between the major centers of power.

But except where adjacency made war possible, the constraints on economic and strategic interaction meant that the structure of international anarchy did not produce the "like units" that Neorealism predicts. Interaction capacity was so low as to prevent the pressures of socialization and competition (discussed in 3.5 above) from working. Because interaction capacity was low, a type 4 system (anarchic, with dissimilar units) could exist in a stable state. Unlike units were under no pressure to conform, because distance and ignorance insulated the weaker from the stronger. Distance could only provide insulation because the absolute capabilities of transportation and communication across the system were low.

Should this be considered to constitute an international system? If a system exists as soon as coaction begins, then the answer is clearly yes, but then structural hypotheses need to be modified to account for the impact of low -interaction capacity. If the answer is no, then careful thought needs to be given to how much and what kind of interaction it is that constitutes a system for Structural Realist purposes. Trade and military contact create peculiarly intense pressures between political units, and there is an unspecified but strong assumption in Neorealism that the interaction capacity of the sys-tem is sufficiently developed to permit extensive contact of this type.

Wallerstein's idea of world empires suggests one solution to the dilemma of how to deal with the 4,500 years of the international system predating the modern world system. Somewhat like McNeill's civilizations, world empires point to the idea that prior to the modern period, the international system is best understood by posing a regional or subsystemic level between units and systems. Waltz, refuting Kaplan's notion of a "subsystem dominant system" (where "subsystem" refers to individual states), has argued that "a subsystem dominant system is no system at all" (1979:58). But in relation to subsystems of states this may be too hasty a judgment. Unless one assumes that an international system has existed only for the last half-millennium or less, the idea of a subsystem dominant system is a precise way of describing most of the history of the international system. It captures rather well the limitations imposed on the system by a poorly developed interaction capacity. In a subsystem dominant system, the subsystems are defined by their internal strategic interaction with its structural consequences, whereas the system as a whole is defined mostly by cultural interaction with its low structural effects.

The image that emerges is one of subsystems in which adjacency compensates for low levels of interaction capability. Within these subsystems, structural logic begins to operate much earlier than it does for the system as a whole. It is for this reason that one can read Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War (as a subsystemic strategic story) and still see clear parallels with modern history. The argument is that in order to understand the concept of international system in its full historical context, one must accept the centrality of a subsystem level between unit and system. History did not move directly from a Rousseauian state of nature to a Neorealist international anarchy. Instead, a weakly interactive international system came into being quite early, but for a long period the main force of structural logic worked almost exclusively within regional subsystems. The international system as a whole remained a stable type 4 (anarchy with unlike units), but within the subsystems, the forces of socialization and competition worked more vigorously. In theory, this subsystem dynamic should have resulted either in anarchic subsystems with like units (the Greek and Italian city state systems, the Middle Eastern empires, the European state system), or in unifying "world empires" that took over a subsystem (China, Rome, Persia). As interaction capacity improved, these subsystems increased their range. Contact eventually led to rivalry. The more effective subsystems either absorbed the less effective ones, as Rome did, or entered into long-term strategic rivalry with them, as between Rome and the Parthian empire (see Section II).

At some point, the logic of this progress suggests that interaction capacities must improve sufficiently to end the dominance of subsystems, and shift the structure to one in which the forces of socialization and competition work most strongly at the global system level. This can occur either because several centers become strong enough to bring economic and military pressure to bear on the whole system, or because one center becomes so disproportionately powerful that it is able to impose a higher level of interaction on the rest of the system. World history followed the latter course. The highly competitive internal dynamics of the European subsystem created a developmental hothouse that gave rise to units that were much more effectively organized and better equipped than any others in the system. Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, this European system took over most of the world. In so doing it not only imposed its own form of political organization (the sovereign state) on all of the other units, but also created a truly global system in which subsystem logic became subordinate. By the late twentieth century, this lopsided development had waned. Europe was merely one of several centers of power having global influence, and the foundations were laid for an international system resting on a more even distribution of power and activity. Subsystems remain only as a shadow, though one still strong enough to have inspired a literature on regional international relations and regional security (Ayoob 1986; Brecher 1963; Buzan 1991:ch. 5; Cantori and Spiegel 1970, 1973; Haas 1970, 1974; Russett 1967; Thompson 1973; Väyrynen 1986; Waever 1989). Regional security complexes identify persistent patterns of relatively intense local security interaction. Although the global system rules, most threats still travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, thus giving regional security relations a particular priority within the broader global pattern (Buzan 1991:ch. 5). The linkage between interaction capacity on the one hand, and subsystem and system level dominance on the other, is shown in figure 4.1.

In historical perspective, the impact of low density on the logic of anarchy thus becomes very clear: the variable of interaction crucially affects the meaning and construction of the system. When interac tion capacity is low, even the existence of a meaningful international system is in question. Structural logic is suppressed by the overall thinness of interaction, operating mainly at the subsystem level. In some middle range of interaction capacity subsystems decline in importance, and interaction is sufficient to support the structural logic across the system as a whole. The international system has been within that range for several centuries, and still is.

The argument that interaction capacity crucially conditions structural logic can also be cast in a future where it is much higher than at present. For this purpose one can hold the structural logic constant by assuming that anarchy continues to define political relations in the international system. The question then becomes what impact does high interaction capacity have on the logic of anarchy? Put in other terms, how do the logics of anarchy and interdependence interact? This question puts into Structural Realist terms the feelings of many enthusiasts for interdependence and world society. It avoids the rather silly issue of choosing between either interdependence or anarchy, and asks instead what kind of dialectic emerges when both fragmenting anarchic and integrating market logics are powerfully and durably in play. Structural Realism provides a basis for synthesizing the Neoliberal and the Neorealist approaches to the study of the international system, as called for by Keohane and Nye (1987:747), opening the possibility of transforming a theory of international politics into a theory of international relations. The proponents of interdependence and world society are essentially supporting the systemic hypothesis that high interaction capacity profoundly conditions the logic of political structure. One early attempt to think through the logic of anarchy under conditions of high interaction capacity is Rosenau's Turbulence in World Politics (1990), which puts an interesting focus on the impact of a better educated, more aware, more critical, more engaged, and more networked global citizenry.

When interaction capacity moves from middling to some higher level, it does not seem unreasonable to hypothesize that the interaction variable might once again begin to override structural effects in the overall logic of the s(ystem just as it does when it is low. In other words, when the volume, speed, range, and reliability of interaction become sufficiently high, they might begin systematically (and systemically) to override the deep structural effects of anarchy. They could override the tendency for similarity of units to foster low interdependence, as already seems to be the case among the leadi(ng capitalist powers, which are becoming simultaneously more similar and more interdependent. They could erode the anarchic imperative of "take care of yourself," by allowing some units to survive and prosper through specialization. That trend would eventually regenerate a type 4 system (anarchic, with functionally differentiated units), though on a very different basis from the type 4 system created by the weakly interactive international system of premodern times. Some see a development along these lines in the current rise of multinational corporations. It might also be indicated by the ability of Japan, Italy, and to a lesser extent Germany, to play a significantly specialized role in the system for an extended period, by keeping thei(r military and political power much lower than their economic strength could easily support. A type 4 system, if it proved stable under these conditions, could pave the road for an eventual deep structural shift to hierarchy, or if not that, then to a system in which political logic took a back seat to economic and societal structures.

Here is an issue where theory really matters if the theoretical assumptions of policymakers breed self-fulfilling expectations. If Japanese statesmen side with Waltz they will see their strategy of these past four decades a-s one of delaying the evil day when they have once again to grapple with being a great power; if they accept the argument made above, they might abandon thoughts of having eventually to convert economic into military power in order to compete in terms of aggregated power, seeing their specialized economic role not as a stopgap, but as a viable long run strategy.

There is a strong case for saying that interaction capacity ranks alongside structure as a "shoving and shaping" force on the interactions of the units throughout the system. It provides the essential third leg of a full system theory (units + interaction + structure). One of the challenges of interaction capacity is that it generates a rather difficult requirement for indexe-s of measurement. This, however, is a technical rather than a theoretical problem, and one that is already familiar to the behavioral side of International Relations. It may be an obstacle to the mechanical operationalization of the theory, but it does not stand in the way of the basic conceptualization. Measuring interaction is no more and no less difficult than measuring power. One of the great advantages of interaction capacity is that it meets the requirement of so many of Waltz's critics that structural theory somehow be more sensitive to the dynamics of change. Because it expresses the absolute quality of capabilities, interaction capacity is highly sensitive to the dynamics of change. It is by definition open-ended, and its largely technological, normative and organizational determinants are rooted in the main drivers of change for the international political system. Adding in interaction capacity as a third level of analysis is thus a major step from Neorealism to Structural Realism.

If all this is acceptable, then figure 3.3 needs to be extended as in figure 4.2.