# 10

# Russia and NATO Enlargement

*Aleksander Duleba*

Russia's attitude toward the eastward enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been unequivocal since NATO's mid-1990s decision to open the door to the central and east European post-communist countries. Russia has opposed the process, considering it to be a fatal mistake on the part of the West and a lost historical opportunity for building a new and fair European security system in the post–Cold War period. Nevertheless, Russia and NATO did manage to achieve agreement over the first wave of enlargement in 1996–97.[1] This chapter will analyze the prospects of Russia's attitude toward the next wave of NATO enlargement through the assessment of Russia's arguments and policies in this regard.

The chapter begins by evaluating Russian arguments, bargaining positions, responses, and policies in order to analyze Russia's approach to the first wave of NATO enlargement. Special attention is given to consequences that could have an impact on future NATO expansion. Then follows an examination of changes in Moscow's strategy toward NATO since the Yugoslav crisis of 1999, which was a turning point in NATO-Russia relations. This includes an assessment of the security and military strategy adopted by Russia in 1999–2000 after the Yugoslav crisis in order to prevent creation of a NATO-centric security system in Europe. The following section examines Russian debate on the second wave of enlargement and evaluates potential "response actions" from Russian leaders, officials, and security experts. It also discusses feelings that NATO's expansion ignores Russian interests, especially by inviting one or more Baltic countries into the alliance. This is followed by the assessment of Russia's response potential with an attempt to mold basic scenarios of Russia's behavior concerning what types of response actions Russia might implement, depending on the geographical scope of the next round of NATO enlargement.

The end of the chapter attempts to formulate a long-term solution in the Russia-NATO relationship, focusing on the enlargement process and Russia's role in global security. The study also examines significant shifts in Russia-U.S.-NATO relations following the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.

## FIRST WAVE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

According to Russia's expectations from the first half of the 1990s, NATO should disintegrate in the same way the Warsaw Pact did. The other acceptable scenario from the Russian perspective is the transformation of NATO from an exclusive, and mainly military, organization to a Europe-wide, open political structure. As long as the political transformation of NATO would end in its subordination to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia could even accept the accession of the central European countries, except for the Baltic republics.[2] However, NATO's evolution has not met these Russian expectations.

NATO's success during the Cold War went far beyond its accomplishments as an effective military organization for the collective defense of Western democracies and deterrence of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. Member states opted to continue NATO, as the functions it fulfills remain relevant. Thus, NATO's adaptation to the new post–Cold War conditions has been developing contrary to Russia's expectations. Moreover, the Western allies considered NATO enlargement to be part of a broad and long-term strategy supporting the evolution of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe expanding the zone of stability and security eastward. The decision to enlarge NATO was, for the first time, officially signaled by then U.S. President Bill Clinton during his January 1994 visit to Europe, when he stated that enlargement was no longer a question of "whether" but "when."[3]

NATO proved its declared commitment to build a strategic partnership with a democratic Russia. Parallel to the enlargement, NATO proposed a series of initiatives, including a document on NATO-Russia relations and a permanent consultative mechanism that assured Russia an active role in the efforts to build and participate in a new European security system. Even though Russian leaders still perceive NATO enlargement as an approach of military machinery to Russia's borders rather than as an expansion of the zone of stability and security eastward, NATO and Russia managed to come to an agreement in the first half of 1997.

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed on May 27, 1997, in Paris. At the Madrid summit in July 1997, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary

were invited to become members. The first three post-communist countries, also former Moscow satellites, formally joined NATO on March 12, 1999.

Russian arguments against NATO enlargement, formulated at the beginning of the 1990s, are twofold: military-strategic and political. The military-strategic argument followed the fact that Russian troops withdrew from more than 1,500 kilometers of central Europe, from Magdeburg, Germany, to Smolensk, Russia. After that came the development of the strategic central European corridor, which kept NATO and Russian forces at a safe distance. Moreover, Russian territory was inaccessible even to the most modern tactical air weapon systems of west European NATO member countries. Russian security planners wanted the central European countries (CEC)—which created this new strategic corridor between NATO and Russia—to be neutral.[4] NATO enlargement into this central European corridor would mean a breach of the new, post–Cold War strategic stability and a radical change in the European military-operational theater.

In the early 1990s, Russia's security strategy focused on legal endorsement of the CEC's neutral status, a global partnership with the United States in the sphere of strategic stability and nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a European security system via the OSCE. NATO's decision to open the door to the CEC from the strategic corridor was perceived by Russia as a diplomatic failure and a serious blow to Russia's strategic interests.

The political argument followed an old-fashioned Russian perception about NATO. Russian leaders did not change their opinion that NATO is a relic of the bipolar conflict, and thus should dissolve as the Warsaw Pact did. According to this logic, NATO expansion will lead to the international isolation of Russia. If not, NATO should be subordinated to the OSCE, as the only pan-European security structure in which Russia is on equal footing with the NATO countries. Moreover, Russian leadership still perceives NATO enlargement as a deception of the West and an international abasement of Russia. This perception followed the fact that Soviet leadership, namely the first and last Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, was promised by Western counterparts that there would be no NATO expansion if the Soviet Union approved the reunification of Germany and withdrew its troops from central Europe.[5]

Another indirect domestic political effect of NATO enlargement is the strengthening of radical leftist, nationalistic, antidemocratic, and anti-Western forces in Russia, which consequently means the weakening of the democratic and pro-Western political camp and the hampering of the post-communist democratic transformation. Ultimately, an authoritarian and anti-Western Russia would be a less cooperative partner in international security and that is the reason why the price of European, and even global, security would be incomparably higher with NATO expansion.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev (1992–95) based Russian diplomacy on the strategic premise that Russia could avoid international

isolation only by joining Western security and integration structures simultaneously with the Central European countries. Kozyrev thought Russia needed to ensure that the CEC did not get preferential treatment in the process of integration.[6]

In the mid-1990s it became clear that NATO enlargement would continue regardless of Russia's disagreement and that the first period of Russia's post–Cold War foreign policy was finished. In January 1996, Kozyrev was replaced with a new minister of foreign affairs, Yevgeni Primakov, who did not share his predecessor's vision on the subject. Both NATO and Russia came to an understanding that a realistic agreement on the enlargement of NATO would be better than no agreement at all.

For Yevgeni Primakov, who was responsible for negotiations during the first phase of NATO enlargement, there were three options open to Russia:

1. Oppose the enlargement and renounce all relations with NATO;
2. Recognize, or at least do not protest, NATO enlargement, and on this basis define Russia's relations with the alliance; and
3. Continue to oppose NATO enlargement but try to minimize the drawbacks for Russia's security and interests.

Primakov felt the first option would be a road to nowhere, essentially a return to the Cold War. The second option smacked of capitulation and would have been quite unacceptable to Russian society. And that is the reason, in Primakov's view, why Russian leadership agreed on the third scenario, considering it to be the best suited to the situation. In other words, Russian diplomacy decided to focus on influencing the process of enlargement.[7]

During the end of 1996 and the first half of 1997, six rounds of negotiations were held between NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov, as well as two rounds between Primakov and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. At the beginning of the discussions, Russia proposed ten main requirements vis-à-vis its role in NATO enlargement. The requirements may be classified according to the following three categories.

*Legal Form of NATO-Russia Relationship.* Russia requires the NATO-Russia document on the adjustment of their future relationship to be legally binding. According to Russia's proposal at the end of 1996, a NATO-Russia treaty would have to be ratified by all parliaments of the NATO member states, as well as Russia's Federal Assembly. New members would be allowed to enter the alliance only after completion of the process of ratification.

*Military and Strategic Requirements.* The key to the negotiations is Russia's urging of NATO to accept the following military and strategic requirements. First, Russia would be given a veto on NATO decision-making about important issues of European security. Second, the first wave of NATO enlargement would be the last one, whereupon the alliance would close its doors. Third, NATO would not deploy nuclear weapons to the territories of new member states. Fourth, strict limits would be fixed for the NATO conventional forces, which might be deployed to the territories of new members. Fifth, restrictions would be stated for the alliance's accession to military infrastructure on the territory of new members. Sixth, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) would be revised with the aim of meeting Russia's requirements.

*Political and Economic Requests.* In addition to the above-mentioned military requirements, Russia raised three political-economic requests during the negotiations: Russia's membership in G-7 and its transformation to G-8, Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Russia's membership in the Paris Club of creditors and the restructuring of Russian foreign debt.

In order to strengthen its bargaining position, Russian diplomatic efforts have put forth a series of response actions and policies in case NATO does not take Russia's interests seriously. The following actions and policies in this respect are considered most relevant:

1 Suspension of START I implementation and refusal to ratify the START II Treaty on nuclear warhead reduction;
2. Postponement of the withdrawal of tactical nuclear missiles from the western borders of Belarus and the resumption of their deployment, there;
3. Formation of a military pact among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries on the basis of the Tashkent Treaty;
4. Unilateral revision of the CFE Treaty and withdrawal from the international monitoring system on conventional forces, their deployment and movement;
5. Continuation of military and technological cooperation with Iran and other "problematic" countries with anti-Western regimes;
6. Building a strategic partnership with China in order to build a security counterbalance to the West;
7. Independent policy in crisis areas important to European security, e.g., the Balkans and the Middle East;
8. Offering security guarantees under the security-for-neutrality model (to include Russia's "nuclear umbrella") to those CEC that do not choose to join NATO;

9. Threatening economic sanctions on CEC that neglect Russian security interests, using their dependence on Russia's oil and natural gas imports; and
10. Favoring certain key European countries, such as France and Germany, over the United States and NATO in dealing with the European security agenda.

Two years after the first NATO enlargement, it is clear that most of the above-mentioned response actions and policies can be considered part of Russian diplomatic folklore. Russians would say that this is true only thanks to the compromise achieved in May 1997 when the Founding Act was signed. Russia could not stop NATO's enlargement, and it would be difficult to believe that Primakov's diplomats did not understand this. On the other hand, Russia is a country with military potential, which does allow her to raise the price of European security. Some of the Russian countermeasures are back on the agenda in the context of the NATO enlargement.

Russia has not succeeded in concluding a binding document with NATO equivalent to an international treaty. However, NATO has not managed to sign a charter with Russia either, although the alliance originally proposed to prepare a common non-commitment declaration. Compromise has been found in the form of the Founding Act, which was neither a standard binding international treaty nor a noncommitment declaration. Rather, it resembles the Helsinki Act of 1975. The heads of NATO member states and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Founding Act on May 27, 1997, in Paris.

What Russia did not achieve from the requirements instead raised its bargaining position. At first, Russia failed to force NATO to make the first wave of enlargement the last one. Second, Russia was not granted a veto over NATO decision-making. And third, Russia is still not a member of the WTO and the Paris Club. Instead of granting Russia the right to veto NATO decision-making, both sides agreed to create the Joint Permanent Council (JPC) as a venue for permanent consultations and a "no surprise" policy and relationship between NATO and Russia. As far as other points of Russia's bargaining position are concerned, Russian diplomacy enjoyed a certain success. First, NATO agreed that it would not deploy nuclear weapons to the territories of its new members. Second, NATO met Russia's requirements concerning the deployment of conventional forces and use of the new member countries' infrastructure through the revision of the CFE Treaty. And finally, Russia has been invited to take a part in the regular G-7 meetings, which have become known since then as the G-8.

Thus, the signing of the Founding Act in May 1997 did not end the talks between NATO and Russia on eastward enlargement. Negotiations contin-

ued in the form of talks about revisions to the CFE Treaty, which was completed de facto, on March 8, 1999, three days before the official entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into NATO. The new CFE Treaty was officially adopted at the November 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul. The revised CFE established new, lower national ceilings on conventional forces for the three new NATO members, thanks to which a limit has been set on the aggregate total of all types of NATO conventional weaponry deployable on their territory. This refers also to the military infrastructure of the new member states, as limits established by the adopted CFE Treaty do not allow NATO to deploy on a permanent basis significant combat forces to the territory of new member countries.

Thus, it is possible to conclude that although NATO managed to obtain the indirect consent of Russia for the first enlargement, it also met some of Russia's important military requirements for Russia. In sum, NATO met the Russian requirement concerning the non-nuclear status of the CEC, as well as the limits for NATO conventional forces and infrastructure in the territory of the former Moscow satellites. One could interpret this, in a certain way, as NATO's acceptance of a special buffer status of the post–Cold War central Europe strategic corridor as Russian security planners define it, even though the first three CEC joined the alliance.[8]

The first wave of enlargement has left the following legacy to the eventual second wave: if NATO plans to continue its eastward enlargement with Russia's consent, it must deal at least once more with the new adaptation of the CFE Treaty. The next NATO enlargement will take place in a much more complex web of European security obligations than before, even without the kind of Yugoslav crisis that happened in the first half of 1999.

## THE SECOND WAVE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

On March 24, 1999, two weeks after the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary formally became members, NATO launched its military action against Yugoslavia to halt ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to handle the Balkan crisis. NATO's April 1999 Washington summit adopted the new Strategic Concept of the alliance, which envisioned the possibility of conducting "non–Article 5 crisis response operations."

The Yugoslav crisis became a turning point in NATO-Russia relations. Russia had cut off relations with NATO, declaring that the use of military force against a sovereign state without the U.N. Security Council's sanction undermined the basic principles of international law and the European security system as created after World War II. As Russian leaders and security experts allegorically pointed out, the Founding Act after Yugoslavia became only a "tatter." Furthermore, their view was that NATO had completely ignored Russia as a strategic partner in the European security

system and that no transformation of the alliance into a less military and more political structure had taken place. And finally, the new Strategic Concept with its "non–Article 5 crisis response operations" meant that NATO was changing from an organization whose purpose was collective defense of its members into an arbitrary and aggressive pact using military force beyond the borders of the member states.[9]

There were three main approaches identifiable in Russia in response to the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia:

1. *Radical (nationalist and communist):* called for immediate retaliatory action against NATO "aggression" in order to help the Slavic and Orthodox brothers of Serbia and form the so-called Slavic Union of Russia, Belarus, and Yugoslavia;
2. *Pragmatic-official (official representatives)*: requested that the NATO military operation cease immediately, stay away from the conflict, act as a mediator for peace, and thus restore Russia's already feeble international reputation and importance; and
3. *Pragmatic-unofficial (security and military circles):* same as above, plus "kept fingers crossed for Serbs" and undertook steps that would help Serbs to "carry on as long as possible" without Russia's direct involvement in the conflict. This approach counted on procrastination to end the conflict, without visible success for NATO, which would eventually erode the whole of NATO and bring it to extinction.

Another effect of the Yugoslav crisis was a radical shift in Russia's public perception of NATO. According to the Russian VCIOM agency (Vserossiyskiy Centr Izucheniya Obschstvennogo Mneniya), in the course of NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in March–May 1999, Russia's anti-Western sentiments had not run higher since the Caribbean crisis in the 1960s. For the first time since the Cold War, 63 percent of Russian respondents indicated that they considered NATO a direct threat to Russia's national security. Before the Yugoslav crisis this indicator hovered around 31 percent but never exceeded 48 percent. The percentage of Russian respondents who unequivocally condemned the NATO military operation against Yugoslavia ranged from 86 percent to 92 percent (in Moscow from 67–75 percent).[10] Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the Russian public will be far more focused on Russia-NATO relations during the second wave of NATO enlargement than during the first. In addition, the Yugoslav crisis revived the Russian public's image of NATO as a Cold War institution. Thus, new domestic limits on the maneuverability of Russia's leadership in developing a relationship with NATO were created after the Yugoslav crisis of 1999.

Otherwise, the Joint Permanent Council (JPC) resumed its functions in May 2000, a year after the end of the NATO military operation against

Slobodan Milosevic's regime. NATO-Russian relations after the Yugoslav crisis regressed to their pre-1997 state, when consent on the first wave of enlargement had been managed. Both NATO and Russia have changed their strategic security planning. Thus, the second wave of NATO enlargement will take place under the new international juncture and qualitatively different shape of NATO-Russia relations than did the first wave.

Within a year of Vladimir Putin's assuming the presidency in 2000, Russia revised the basic security strategy and defense planning documents. The revisions covered the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, and the Foreign Policy Concept. In addition, a new document called the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation was authorized.[11]

Of the eight factors determining the main threats to Russia's national security under the National Security Concept, the following five (at least) reflect the Yugoslav crisis and NATO military operation of 1999:

1. The struggle of some nations and international alliances to diminish the role of existing international security mechanisms, mainly the United Nations and OSCE;
2. The weakening of Russia's political, economic, and military influence in world affairs;
3. The reinforcement of military and political blocs and alliances, especially NATO's eastward expansion;
4. The possibility of deploying foreign military bases and large-scale combat forces at close distance to Russia's borders; and
5. The escalation of conflicts near the Russian border and external borders of the CIS member states.

What is new in these basic security documents is the treatment of NATO enlargement as a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. The 1993 Basic Principles of Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation defined a military threat as "an approach of military blocs and alliances to the Russian borders."[12] The revised 2000 Military Doctrine states that "an enlargement of military blocs and alliances at the expense of military security of the Russian Federation" presents one of the main military threats. Both the emphasis on nuclear deterrence and on nuclear first-use as the principal pillars of Russian security are new, as are a robust conventional defense against a "Balkan-type" attack by NATO, and regular employment of the armed forces to deal with local—including domestic—conflicts. Accordingly, Russian military spending is expected to rise from 2.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 to about 3.5 percent in the next years.[13]

Russia's foreign policy concept under President Vladimir Putin and Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov does not differ significantly from that formulated by Primakov on the eve of negotiating with NATO over the first wave of the enlargement in 1996 and 1997. The concept is based upon

the premise that even though Russia cannot recapture its leading position in world politics on a par with the United States, it can still contribute significantly to the creation of the so-called multipolar world. This will restore the position of Russia as one of the centers of world politics. What is new in the Foreign Policy Concept from 2000 is also a "post-Yugoslav" emphasis on the need to prevent a weakening of the U.N. Security Council and the OSCE role in ensuring international security. In other words, the main goal of Russia's foreign and security strategy is to prevent both the formation of a new U.S. unilateralist world order and the building of a European security system on the basis of NATO.

These pains overlap the issue of NATO enlargement in Russian security policy and debate over the course of the last two years following the Yugoslav crisis. This is a new moment in comparison with the situation before the first wave of enlargement in 1996–97. What policies does Russia now undertake in this context?

The first priority is to reform the U.N. Security Council in order to boost the effectiveness of the United Nations in dealing with international crises while the expected effect is twofold: to reduce U.S. unilateralism in the post-bipolar world and to limit NATO "wantonness" in conducting "non–Article 5 crisis response operations." The reform involves an enlargement of the U.N. Security Council through the inclusion of new permanent members. This is an instructive idea mainly for such countries as Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil.

Second, Russia seeks to develop a security and defense partnership with the European Union. At first Russia was suspicious of the European Union's plans for developing the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). However, this changed once Russia realized that the purpose of the ESDP was to take over NATO's European peacekeeping functions. At the Munich 2000 Security Forum, the Russian Security Council secretary and minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, proclaimed that Russia considered the European Union a preferred security partner in Europe.[14] A turning point in the EU-Russia relationship was the October 2000 summit in Paris, when both sides agreed to build a consultative mechanism on security and defense issues and develop cooperation in the field of crisis management. According to Russian expectations, the ESDP could gradually decrease the role of NATO in European security.

A third priority defined in the Foreign Policy Concept is the formation of an anti-U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) coalition. The U.S. plan for developing an NMD system and the revision of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was announced after the new George W. Bush administration came to power in the United States under the spotlight of the Russian security debate. Originally, Russia was ready to accept the U.S. proposal to revise the ABM Treaty, but underwent a change of opinion after several European powers (with the first being Germany in the sum-

mer of 2000) raised objections to the U.S. NMD system.[15] Russia appealed to key European countries during President Putin's visit to Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France in 2000, to create a so-called Pan-European Non-Strategic Anti-Missile Defense (EUROPRO) as a European response to the U.S. NMD. Only after February 2001, during NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson's visit to Moscow, did Russia address its proposal to NATO. The ABM/NMD issue became another reason for Russian efforts to reduce U.S. unilateralism in world affairs and to decrease the role of NATO in European security. While Russian diplomacy under Yeltsin was seeking a multi-polarized world above all in cooperation with China, India, etc., Putin's diplomacy shifted its focus on western Europe as well.

Fourth, Russia seeks to expand its relationship with China. In June 2001 Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan created the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to strengthen their ties in the field of security and economic collaboration. This is considered in Russia to be a qualitatively new level of cooperation within the grouping previously known as the "Shanghai Five" established in April 1996. This forum from the beginning has been viewed in Russia as an alternative center of world politics counterbalancing U.S. influence in Eurasia.[16] In addition, Russia's view of the SCO is that it could be a tool for preventing a possible NATO peacekeeping mission in Central Asia and the former Soviet territory.

Finally, the Foreign Policy Concept focuses on deepening collective security and defense cooperation within the CIS. There is a plan in 2001 to create three so-called coalition military units in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Belarus, as well as a united headquarters in Moscow, within the CIS Treaty on Collective Security. The purpose is to develop a common strategy for peacekeeping missions conducted by CIS member countries within the CIS area. Russia has recently begun to increase security and defense cooperation within the CIS, as well as to change the focus on peacekeeping planning and creating special military units under common command.

The points mentioned above are the most relevant moves within Russian foreign and security policy aiming to reduce U.S. unilateralism in world affairs generally, and especially the role of NATO in European security, as defined by Russia after the Yugoslav crisis. However, it would be too simplistic to view them as a part of Russia's response policies against the next wave of NATO enlargement. If we look over Russia's response actions and policies announced during the first wave, it is possible to find some of them on the list. At the moment, Russia's responses to the first wave of enlargement are actually understood in broad terms as "anti-U.S." and "anti-NATO," not only "anti-enlargement" responses. Russia's "post-Yugoslav" understanding presents policies worthy of attention for themselves and not only because NATO is going to expand once again. In other

words, during the first wave of enlargement Russia voiced potential response actions against the *process* of NATO enlargement. After Yugoslavia, response policies criticized NATO as an *organization*.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that Russia's current anti-U.S. attitude means that Moscow wants to remove the United States from the European security system entirely. The Russian perception is that U.S. security policy ignores Russia's interests first in the sphere of global stability (nuclear weapons) by questioning the ABM Treaty, and second in European security by changing NATO's strategic concept (i.e., the Washington summit), which pushes Russia out of the European security system. Both of these factors designate the size and measurement of Russia's current anti-U.S. perception and attitude, which would be changed when consent on both issues has been managed. Actually, these topics overshadow the next wave of NATO enlargement in the current Russian security debate.

## RUSSIA'S INTERNAL DEBATE

NATO enlargement is the issue over which Russian leaders, political parties, security experts, intellectuals, the business elite, and the public reached an unequivocal consensus. According to the ROMIR public poll agency (Rossiyskoye Obshchestvennoye Mneniye i Issledovaniye Rynka), which in September 2000 interviewed members of the Russian political and business elite, 93.6 percent of respondents indicated that NATO's eastward enlargement presents a threat to Russia's national security. As for perceptions of security threats, 99.1 percent of respondents pointed to "Russia's inability to solve its internal problems," while 96.5 were concerned about "interethnic conflicts in Russia and CIS countries."[17] Thus, even two years after the Yugoslav crisis, the Russian elite's negative attitude toward NATO and its eastward enlargement has not changed. This is a constant premise that needs to be taken into account when assessing Russia's willingness and readiness to respond to the second wave.

During the first wave of enlargement Russian debate focused on central Europe as a whole region; however, it has currently shifted to the Baltic countries as the hot candidates for NATO membership. This is also a new moment in the Russian attitude toward the issue, which is explainable by fact that the first wave was to give a principal answer to the question "if yes at all," while the question about "what countries" played a secondary role from Russia's perspective at that time. NATO enlargement was the most important issue for the Russian establishment. However, the eventual NATO expansion into the area of the former Soviet Union, including the accession of the former Soviet republics, is viewed as greatly overstepping the "red borderline," which would mean no chance for normal relations

with NATO. Other hot NATO candidate countries for the next wave of enlargement, such as Slovenia and Slovakia, are far afield of Russian debate and concerns.

There are still two main relevant arguments in the Russian debate formulated during the first wave of NATO enlargement. In addition, new arguments have evolved from the Russian assessment of the 1999 Yugoslav crisis and its consequences for European security. The character of Russian arguments could be divided into two main groups: general arguments of the strategic security character, based on Russia's accusations against NATO regarding infringement of the principles of the Founding Act, and a group of military arguments interlocking with so-called Baltic and/or CIS arguments.

The strategic security arguments against further NATO enlargement are fivefold. First, the continuing crisis in Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Macedonia) proves that NATO's concept of "humanitarian intervention" failed and that NATO is not an adequate structure able to meet the new challenges of European security. Consequently, NATO enlargement is not a contribution to European security, and therefore plans for enlargement contradict the provision of the Founding Act from 1997, which envisages that the next NATO enlargement will take place only in the case of strengthening European security.

Second, both NATO and Russia, in the Founding Act, committed themselves not to undermine the primary responsibility of the U.N. Security Council for maintaining international peace and security, or the role of the OSCE as the only inclusive and comprehensive pan-European security organization. The Yugoslav crisis shows that NATO ignored both the U.N. Security Council and the OSCE, and thus it has challenged the basic principles of European security. Under the post-Yugoslav international juncture, the next wave of NATO enlargement could be regarded only as an act ignoring Russia's legitimate interests. Consequently, any NATO enlargement would mean a threat to Russia's security and will destabilize the whole of Europe.

Third, the NATO-centric architecture of European security excluding Russia is unacceptable from Russia's perspective. In other words, the current NATO-centric security system for Europe is unacceptable for Russia because Russia is not a member of NATO, which means that Russia is left out of decision-making. NATO enlargement will deepen this tendency and Russia has no choice other than an adequate response aiming to protect national interests and security. The future NATO-Russia relationship will depend upon whether NATO will enlarge eastward or not.

Fourth, there is a need to clearly differentiate NATO's proclaimed "good intentions" from the growth of its military and geopolitical potential through accession of new members. "Intentions" is a temporary category, while "potential" is a constant one. If NATO will not change its strategic

concept with the "non–Article 5 crisis response operation," then it cannot be regarded as a "defensive pact." This is why NATO's eastward enlargement presents an objective threat to Russia's national security.

Fifth, the U.S. goal is to cause problems in the Russian-EU relationship, which is the only strategic partnership able to ensure long-term security and prosperity for all of Europe. By initiating the process of NATO expansion, Washington aims to create a rift between Moscow and the western European capitals. Such a move divides Europe and makes it dependent on the United States.

New issues arise concerning the military-operational aspects of the second wave of enlargement. After approaching the Russian borders, NATO will try to "proofread Russia's policies" in the CIS area, which represents a zone of vital Russian interests. Therefore, the probability of new NATO-Russia conflicts will be very high. In addition, NATO enlargement will change the military-strategic theater of Europe and will launch a new wave of armament races that will consequently undermine European security. Further, the admission of small states into NATO, especially the Baltic countries, will mean the strengthening of NATO's anti-Russian character. NATO enlargement will reduce the CFE Treaty to nothing, especially if the Baltic countries enter the alliance. The agreed northern flank ceilings would be utterly broken. The Baltic countries would strengthen their security at the expense of diminishing Russia's security and undermining the CFE Treaty, which is unacceptable from a Russian—but also from a European-wide—viewpoint. Provided that the Baltic and Black Sea countries will join NATO, the Russian navy's maneuvering capacities will be curtailed, and the Kaliningrad region will be isolated from Russia. Last, the Baltic countries, except for Lithuania, have not settled their relations with Russia concerning the status of Russian ethnic minorities and borders. NATO has declared that only countries that have adjusted their relations with neighbors may be admitted to the alliance. Thus, if NATO invites the Baltic countries it proves that its policy is a double standard.

There are two main groups of Russian elites, and each has a different view of NATO. The first is the old-fashioned "revanchist school" (nationalist and radical leftist), which refuses potential agreement with NATO on anything. The second group is the "pragmatist school" (modern Russian *gosudarstvenniki*), which is open to negotiation and potential agreement. The latter have formulated their ideal vision of NATO as follows:

1. NATO is not a hostile organization, but it remains a military pact that changed its security strategy and plans to approach Russian borders, which challenges Russia's interests;
2. If NATO remains a defensive pact without any eastward expansion, with its military supporting collective security in Europe and peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations under U.N. and OSCE regu-

lations, Russia would like to cooperate and become a NATO member in the future; and
3. Meanwhile, in view of the Yugoslav conflict, NATO and Russia need to sign a new binding treaty, which would renew trust in the Balkans, as well as set rules for cooperation and coexistence.

However, Russian "pragmatists" also believe that if NATO develops in a way that is not acceptable from the Russian perspective, Russia must respond as she sees fit.

## MOSCOW'S RESPONSES TO ENLARGEMENT

Some of the principal trends of Russian foreign policy directed at preventing a formation of a NATO-centric security system in Europe are mentioned above. Moreover, many response actions formulated during the first wave of enlargement remain relevant, as the Russian security debate has shown us. Here we will try to briefly summarize the potential response actions that have been emerging or have been repeated during Russia's recent debate over the second enlargement.

The first such group of actions is connected with discussion about the NMD/ABM issue. Russia's perception is that both NATO enlargement and the revision of the ABM treaty are taking place concurrently. If Russia's interests are not given approval or consideration, Russia would have to respond as follows:

1. End implementation of START I;
2. START II would not be enacted;
3. START III would become impossible;
4. The ongoing implementation of Russia's unilateral nuclear initiatives from 1991–92 would be stopped and reviewed;
5. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty would be scrapped;
6. Negotiations with China and Europe on antimissile defense would be initiated; and
7. Military cooperation with Iran would be expanded.

The second group of announced response actions pertain to European security and relations with NATO:

1. Relations with NATO would be disrupted, which would heighten general risks to European security in terms of its transparency and predictability;
2. Russian peacekeeping units would leave the Balkans; and

3. The CFE Treaty would be placed in doubt, especially if the Baltic countries were to be admitted to NATO.

The last group of response actions focuses on the case of eventual admission of the Baltic countries into NATO:[18]

1. Russia would unleash economic retribution against the Baltic countries, namely a reduction in transit of Russia's goods and energy sources. This currently represents an important source for those countries' incomes; and
2. The new joint Russia-Belarus 300,000-strong military corps would be created and deployed to the Baltic countries' borders and would be able to occupy Baltic countries in short order. It would be quite hard for NATO to find an adequate response to this military challenge and to ensure the security of the Baltic countries in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

These are the main security-related response actions to a second wave of NATO enlargement that were raised during the Russian security debate over the Yugoslav crisis. During the 1990s, foreign policy under Yeltsin was characterized as a "policy of strong words but moderate actions."[19] Putin's administration, however, is working hard to change this image. The second wave of NATO enlargement is one of the challenges that it must simply deal with.

The first question is whether Russia would implement response actions against the second wave of NATO enlargement. There are some domestic, as well as external, factors that support answering "yes."

The first wave of NATO enlargement was not an important issue for the Russian public. Russia's elite was very concerned about NATO enlargement, but the Russian public was not. This changed significantly after the Yugoslav crisis in 1999. Russia's elite and the public reached a broad national consensus on the perception of security threats and the character of response policies that Russia should implement. The 1990s are generally perceived in Russia as a decade of foreign policy defeats—Russia's weakness, craftiness on the part of the West, ignorance of Russia's legitimate interests, etc. In addition to the call for changes in Russia's foreign and security policies, the following factors were key in forming the national consensus during the 1990s: the Yugoslav crisis, wars in Chechnya, the status of Russian minorities in the CIS (especially in the Baltic countries), and finally, NATO's eastward enlargement. Therefore, the decision-making power of Russia's leaders in the context of the second wave has been significantly reduced by the broad national consensus that has emerged during the past two years. This is the reason why Russia is likely to respond far more strongly to the second wave than to the first wave.

The CIS area is defined in all strategic security documents as a zone of Russia's primary interests. The former Soviet republics along the Russian borders are not only defined but are also perceived as areas of vital Russian interests due to the ethnic Russian minority population of 25 million living there, the transit connections with other countries, common history, cultural heritage, etc. Security experts and people close to the power structures in Russia use the common name "red borderline" for the Baltic countries, Ukraine, and Georgia. It is true that nationalist, leftist, and Soviet nostalgists (the "revering school" of Russian foreign policy) are not psychologically ready to allow the former Soviet satellite countries of central Europe into NATO. However, the same is true of the new Russian pragmatists when it regards countries from the red borderline. In the case of invitations to the Baltic countries to join NATO, the probability measure of Russia's response to the second wave would increase.

The VCIOM public polling agency reported that at the beginning of April 2001 the first signals appeared that the Russian public's trust in Putin's presidency was decreasing slightly.[20] This is a new challenge for Putin, one he faces for the first time since the 1999 presidential elections. It must be emphasized here that an enormous level of public support is a key factor in Putin's strong political position in Russia. Without such public support Putin could not take domestic political initiatives quickly nor would he be able to successfully enforce important power changes, administrative reforms, anticorruption measures, etc. The Russian public is easily mobilized in political terms through the NATO card. That is why Putin cannot neglect NATO's agenda and let the opposition handle it. Moreover, the Duma already initiated a resolution on May 15, 2001, appealing to the president and the government to elaborate and implement the "Complex Program of Measures against the NATO Enlargement."[21]

The Russian security and political establishment considers the new Russian diplomacy under Putin a success story, especially in comparison with the Yeltsin period. Many Russian experts think that the diplomatic tactics chosen for negotiating the ABM/NMD issue proved that Russia is capable of enforcing and protecting her interests. In this case, Russia clearly defined her interests, developed allies, demonstrated her response actions in order to safeguard her interests, and implemented an offensive and hard-line position. The effect was a revised U.S. position on the subject, which became more moderate in response to Russia's diplomatic pressure. Russian experts agree that the same resolve must be shown concerning the second wave of NATO enlargement as well. Russia has to concentrate her resources on defending her vital interests. The eventual admission of the Baltic countries into NATO represents a challenge to Russia's vital interests. Therefore, Russia must respond even at the expense of breaking relations with NATO and an increase in defense spending.

There are three main groups of domestic actors in Russia who could profit from a worsening relationship between Russia, the United States, and NATO. The Ministry of Defense and the Russian army, who depend on state financing, represent the first group. The ministry and the army already gained some benefits from the Yugoslav crisis and the change of security and defense planning that followed. Russia's defense spending increased 43 percent in 2000 as compared to 1999.[22] The second group is represented by the military-industrial complex (VPK) that benefited from the Russia-NATO confrontation during the Yugoslav crisis, followed by Russia's rapprochement with China. This has opened a huge market in China for Russian military exports, thus creating a new and important source of income for the VPK. The last group comprises Russia's criminal business elite. This group is not interested in too close of a relationship with the West because of Western requirements for business transparency, which do not fit with the venal interests of these individuals.[23]

NATO's success in solving the crisis in the Balkans is crucial for its ability to implement the Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in 1999. However, if the NATO's policy regarding the Balkans proves unsuccessful and the conflicts flare up (e.g., in Macedonia), this will encourage Russia to decide in favor of response actions against the second wave of NATO enlargement. The following two extreme scenarios are possible in this context:

1. NATO peacekeeping missions and the subsequent restoration of democracy in the Balkans achieve success; the regimes in the Balkan countries commit to building democratic and tolerant societies; armed conflicts do not break out again; and the alliance involves Russia to the extent of the country's resources and potential in arriving at a political solution to the postwar situation in the Balkans. This scenario would restore Russia's own view of its the international position to where it was during the first wave of NATO enlargement when the parties were able to arrive at consent.

2. The NATO peacekeeping mission fails; the new democratic regimes in the Balkans are fragile and tend to autocracy and ethnic intolerance; new armed conflicts flare up; new military interventions of NATO are needed; Russia terminates her peacekeeping cooperation with NATO and sides against NATO with traditional allies in the Balkans, meaning the Serbs, Orthodox, Slavs in Macedonia, etc., against NATO; consequently, no consent over the next wave of NATO enlargement is possible. NATO enlarges and Russia responds to the extent of the country's military resources and potential.

Of course, there are possible scenarios in between, but only the first one is the most appropriate for the second round of NATO enlargement. However, the relationship between the NATO mission in the Balkans and NATO enlargement, including Russia's attitude in this respect, is a subject of great importance and is worthy of a special analysis.

The Joint Permanent Council (JPC) began functioning again in May 2000. Up until now no serious shift in NATO-Russian relations concerning the second wave of the enlargement has been visible, not to mention a consent reminiscent of that managed in the course of the first wave. The talks have not even started yet. If one takes into account that the bargaining on the CFE Treaty adaptation in the context of the first wave lasted almost two years, it is time to initiate negotiations again with Russia. Provided that an essential dialogue on the topic with Russia is absent, the likelihood of Russia's response will grow.

The next question is "when" would Russia implement response actions to enlargement, which depends primarily on the regional scope of the second wave of NATO enlargement and on the choice of the countries invited to become members. Following the Russian debate on the topic, it is possible to outline the following three levels of Russia's response actions according to their probability: low, middle, and high.

NATO will invite Slovenia and Slovakia to become members. Both of these countries are small as far as military capacity is concerned and their admission would not require significant changes in the CFE Treaty. Both are geographically far enough from Russia, and their NATO membership would not be reflected as a challenge to Russia's security in an ongoing Russian security debate. In fact, a "Slo-Slo" scenario would be received in Russia as something that has more to do with the completion of the first "central European wave" of enlargement than with the new second one.

Admission of the Balkan countries, like Romania and Bulgaria, would make the probability of Russia's response more likely than in the case of Slovenia and Slovakia. Provided that the Balkan crisis flares up again over Kosovo and Macedonia and no visible positive shift in the NATO-Russia agenda occurs, admission of the Balkan countries will challenge Russia's interests. From the perspective of the Russian security debate the Balkans is a decisive region for the building of a post–Cold War European security system, and that is why Russia must be strongly involved there.

The likelihood of Russia's response will be high when NATO admits one or more of the Baltic countries for reasons mentioned above. The same is applicable for a "big bang" scenario of the next wave of enlargement if NATO decides to invite all nine candidate countries at once. If NATO decides for a gradual expansion, it could follow the logic of a "regional cascade" admitting first central Europe, second the Balkans, and third the Baltics. The likelihood of Russia's response would be significantly lower with the regional cascade expansion in comparison to the big bang sce-

nario. In any case, Russia's attitude in any scenario will depend upon the state of NATO-Russian relations and the availability of consent in this regard. From this point of view, the agenda for negotiating admission of the central European countries of Slovenia and Slovakia will barely be contested by Russia. Russia's response action will significantly expand in the case of the Balkan countries (Bulgaria and Romania) and will increase dramatically in the case of the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia). At the same time a "Balkan agenda" is more easily manageable as it represents an "external" agenda for Russia, while a "Baltic agenda" plays an important role in Russia's domestic politics and security planning.

The last question is "what" actions Russia could implement as her response to the second wave of NATO enlargement. Here follows an evaluation of the probability of implementation for the list of potential response actions cited earlier:

1. Response actions regarding treaties on nuclear armaments and nonproliferation would theoretically be implemented only if Russia and the United States do not achieve rapprochement on the ABM/NMD issue, as well as if NATO enlargement and the disagreement on ABM/NMD become a "one package" challenge for Russia. The most likely scenario is that this would not happen and that both issues will be tackled separately;
2. The enactment of the second radius of potential response actions, as mentioned above, would be probable if Russia and NATO do not achieve agreement over the second wave of the enlargement. Furthermore, this would be least probable when NATO admits Slovenia and Slovakia, more probable when NATO admits Romania and Bulgaria, and most probable when NATO admits one or more of the Baltic republics; and
3. The implementation of the third radius of Russia's potential responses would take place only in the case of a NATO invitation to one or more of the Baltic countries. Finally, economic response is less probable than a military one in terms of creating a new joint Russian-Belarusian military unit on the borders of the Baltic republics.

Altogether, the whole package of Russia's anti-NATO arguments can be reduced to one basic view, which was excellently voiced by President Vladimir Putin during the press conference at the end of the Ljubljana summit with U.S. President George W. Bush. Putin stated the following: "We do not consider NATO to be a hostile organization. But, is it a military organization? Yes, it is. Do they want to have us in? They don't. Is it approaching our borders? Why?" These words express the quintessence of Russia's understanding and attitude toward NATO. Does NATO indeed not want to have Russia in? Would eventual Russian membership provide a

long-term solution to the NATO enlargement process?

It is clear that Russia's NATO membership is not a question of tomorrow or today. The issue, however, is whether or not NATO in principle could provide Russia with a clear—at least political—vision of prospects for eventual membership. One possible solution would be to develop an "open-door policy for Russia" with a ten- to fifteen-year timeline for entry into the alliance. The timeline would have clearly stated conditions and rules for monitoring accession, and it could be shortened or expanded depending on compliance. A serious discussion of the possibility of Russia's membership in NATO started recently in the context of new positive shifts in the U.S.-Russia relationship. There are three basic arguments against Russia's membership: 1) Russia's entry would undermine the operational capability of NATO and radically change its character; 2) NATO never could take over responsibility for guaranteeing Russia's national security (Article 5) because of Russia's geographical size, her active engagement in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Far East, and her problematic relations with China, etc.; and 3) Russia has a deficit as far as basic NATO values is concerned, i.e., democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy.

All these principal arguments are relevant. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the West is interested in a democratic and stable Russia, which is a part of the civilized world, and there is no question that such a Russia would mean a significant contribution to global security. Western assistance to Russia's post-communist political and economic transformation was extremely important, but it did not include a strategy on how to get Russia into the key Euro-Atlantic institutions such as NATO and the European Union. The Founding Act of 1997 was first of all about managing the first wave of NATO enlargement and building a strategic NATO-Russia relationship in which both partners are treated like external entities. Neither the Founding Act of 1997 nor the EU strategy on Russia adopted by the EU summit of June 1999 addressed how to involve Russia in the alliance or the European Union. Once again, we are not dealing with whether to admit Russia to NATO tomorrow. We are just considering the challenge faced by NATO and the European Union as the key Euro-Atlantic institutions in building a strategic relationship with Russia.

While Russian membership in NATO remains a question of the future, its participation in key Euro-Atlantic institutions and the development of a new strategic relationship suited to the realities of the 21st century must be considered carefully by Russia, the United States, and Europe. Specifically, what is the strategic goal of a NATO relationship with Russia? For example, is the goal either to have good relations with Russia as an external partner? Or is the strategic goal to provide Russia with a clear vision that the long-term process of post-communist transformation would end in Russia's joining the West as an insider and an inherent part of it? Regardless

of the answers to these questions, both NATO and the European Union could provide Russia with a clear and political vision. This would be beneficial for both Russia and the West, because Russia would obtain a Western perspective of her transformation as well as be pressed to become more open to the West.

The least that this solution would accomplish is that Russia could never repeat the arguments that NATO does not want to have Russia in the alliance nor that Russia is excluded from the European security system. On the other hand, NATO would demonstrate that it has done its best to show good political will to arrive at consent with Russia and improve mutual relations and strengthen European security. Russia has the right to refuse such a proposal. Yet afterward, Russia must assume political responsibility for the possible results of such a refusal.

Giving Russia the opportunity to become involved in the NATO enlargement process, within the terms mentioned above, would undermine the actual grounds of the government's arguments and policies on this subject. It is possible that the central European countries would first react negatively to an eventual NATO "open door policy for Russia." But it must be made clear that Russia has to qualify for NATO membership in the same way the central European countries did. From this point of view, there is no guarantee that a NATO open-door policy for Russia would result in Russia's admission. If Russia accepts the terms and conditions for eventual NATO membership and will meet them within the next decade or decades, there would be no relevant and rational reason for a negative reaction of the CEC.

## RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONSHIP AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001, challenged the existing system of international relations and patterns of behavior of international actors. The Russia-NATO relationship is no exception. On September 24, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a public statement in which he declared that Russia would support the U.S.-led campaign against international terrorism and the response operation against Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. Putin stated that Russia would share intelligence, provide airspace for humanitarian flights, participate in search-and-rescue missions in Afghanistan, and supply arms to the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban. Moreover, he said that Russia had coordinated this position with her allies in Central Asia and that they shared this position with Russia.[24]

The last decision in particular represents an unprecedented change in Russia's security and defense strategy formulated in the aftermath of the

Yugoslav crisis in 1999. The main goal of this post-Yugoslav strategy is not only to prevent the possibility of a Balkan-type operation by the West or NATO in the post-Soviet area (especially in the northern Caucasus and Central Asia), but also to restrain any Western or NATO military presence in these areas. Russia made the crucial decision to join the antiterrorist alliance, which meant it had to change one of the basic premises of its security and defense concept.[25] The alternative option would have been strict adherence to Russia's national security tenets of 2000, which would mean closing airspace for U.S. or any NATO country flights and pressing Central Asian states to do the same. A decision to limit cooperation with the West to sharing intelligence would have been the most that could have been expected from Russia under the post-Yugoslav international juncture and the "pre-September" character of the Russia-U.S. and Russia-NATO relationship. Russia's offer to open its own and its Central Asian neighbors' airspace, participate in search-and-rescue missions, and supply arms to the Northern Alliance went far beyond what Russia was expected to undertake to protect its interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia in accordance with her national security and defense doctrine.

The Russian decision followed intense diplomatic consultations with the U.S. administration and sharp domestic debate. Especially, conservative military circles were strongly opposed to such a radical shift in post-Yugoslav security policy because of recently adopted national security tenets followed by a growth in defense spending. Putin's decision to join the antiterrorist alliance in the form announced on September 24, 2001, has challenged post-Yugoslav defense planning in Russia. In addition, it requires some redirection and reallocation "on the go" of resources within previously adopted defense spending. All those in the Russian military who are affected by such decisions as well as those security planners who consider Russia's relationship with the West in post-Yugoslav terms were strongly against this shift in security policy. Putin's presidency successfully passed a crucial test in this regard.[26]

To many observers Russia and the United States started to create an entirely new framework for bilateral relations by putting the battle against terrorism at the top of their agendas. This has opened the possibility of collaboration in other areas that would have seemed impossible before September 11, 2001.[27] Naturally, one of them is Russia and NATO's relationship. As much as NATO expansion concerns President Putin, he voiced a significant shift in Russia's attitude during his visits to Germany at the end of September and to Brussels at the beginning of October 2001, where he negotiated with leading representatives of both NATO and the European Union. At a press conference with senior EU officials Putin said:

> As for NATO expansion, one can take another, an entirely new look at this … if NATO takes on a different shade and is becoming a political organization.

> Of course we would reconsider our position with regard to such expansion if we were to feel involved in such processes. They keep saying that NATO is becoming more political than military. We are looking at this (and) watching this process. If this is to be so, it would change things considerably.[28]

During his visit to Germany, Putin was asked whether Russia might ask to join NATO. "Everything depends on what is on offer," Putin responded. "There is no longer a reason for the West not to conduct such talks."[29] NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson told reporters at the joint press conference with President Putin that their discussions marked a major milestone in the NATO-Russia relationship. "We have identified a number of new areas where NATO and Russia can work together," he said. Putin added, "NATO and Russia agreed to initiate creation of a new working body that will examine the possibility of widening, deepening, and qualitatively changing the Russia-NATO relationship."[30]

It would be an exaggeration to conclude that Russia's position on NATO enlargement was dramatically changed in the aftermath of September 11. Russia has not tabled a new bargaining position on the subject since the terrorist attacks against the United States. Rather, Russia has signaled that the window of opportunity for improving the Russia-NATO relationship would be wider if NATO becomes a more political organization as well as involving Russia in the process of enlargement. What could that mean?

First of all, the military phase of the antiterrorist campaign is being carried out by U.S. and some other Western forces, but not by NATO as was the case in Yugoslavia in 1999. This fact is highly welcomed by Russian leadership, as it appears to predetermine a political role for NATO in the antiterrorist war, which will frame the international juncture for a long-term period. And a nonmilitary role is what Russia—and especially the Russian "pragmatist school"—wants for NATO to have for as long as possible. Following this logic, excellently voiced by President Putin as quoted above:

> NATO's nonmilitary role in the war against terrorism—in particular its absence from the current operation in Afghanistan—starts the process of the alliance's transformation de facto into a more political and less military organization.

As already mentioned, if NATO were to remain a defense pact without geographical expansion, with a military capable of protecting collective security only in the European theater, and conducting peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations under U.N. and OSCE sanctions, Russia would wish to cooperate. Russia is an equal partner of the NATO countries in both the United Nations and the OSCE; thus, this option does not need a special Russian-NATO relationship, because NATO would be de facto sub-

ordinated to the United Nations and OSCE. Another option is a European security system based on a NATO in which NATO remains responsible for peacekeeping and peace-endorsing operations and Russia is involved. In any case, Russian involvement in such a NATO-centric security system would mean redefinition of the post-Yugoslav Russia-NATO relationship so that Russia would be an integral member of it. In other words Russia would participate in NATO decision-making as an insider, not as an outsider who can only comment on it.

Provided that NATO plans to continue its territorial expansion—which consequently means that it will remain a building block of any future European security system—it has to address how Russia will participate in Europe's security architecture. There are two basic options on how to address this issue: 1) A new binding treaty with Russia, in which Russia's participation in NATO decision-making would be agreed upon and defined as to the scope and forms with Russia remaining an external partner; and 2) Russia's NATO membership.

While evaluating Russian arguments and policies with respect to a potential second wave of NATO enlargement before September 11, 2001, one conclusion was that NATO would have to develop an "open door policy for Russia." After September 11, we can conclude that NATO would have to develop such a policy even if it decides that only one or two countries—not to include any Baltic countries—will be invited to the Prague summit. In order to meet Russian expectations, NATO would have to develop a practical way of looking at its relationship with Russia, which will define the scope and forms of Russia's participation in NATO's decision-making, including the enlargement process. It would also provide Russia with a clear political vision concerning prospects for her eventual membership in the future. Russia's expectations in this regard are predictable, given Russian security policies and attitudes over the last decade, especially after the Yugoslav crisis of 1999. Both these tasks could be combined, as NATO could ask Russia first to accept conditions for a ten- to fifteen-year timeline leading to membership, and then to negotiate the scope and forms of participation in decision-making. Actually, the proverbial ball is in NATO's court, which means NATO must now develop a long-term strategy on Russia and how to involve Russia in a European security system

An agreement reached by President Putin of Russia and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in Brussels at the beginning of October 2001 on the creation of a new NATO-Russia working body, which will deal with "widening, deepening and qualitative changing" their relationship, confirms another conclusion of this analysis made before September 11. And that is that the JPC is unable to meet the current NATO-Russia agenda and that both sides need a new political start in their relations. The talks between President Putin and President Bush of the United States in Washington, D.C., in November 2001 confirmed that both sides agree that

the NATO-Russia relationship should evolve into an increased alliance between Russia and NATO members against international terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats. Both presidents declared that the United States and Russia will work, together with NATO and other NATO members, to include Russia in the European-Atlantic community, develop new effective NATO-Russia mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, coordinated joint actions, and—what is especially important to stress in the context of this analysis—joint decision-making.[31]

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Russia cannot stop NATO's eastward enlargement, and it is clear that NATO will enlarge. This fact was well understood in Russian foreign policy circles under former President Yeltsin and former Premier Primakov before the first wave of enlargement. And it is well understood under President Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov prior to the second round.

There are two basic scenarios for NATO enlargement in the context of its relationship with Russia. NATO will enlarge eastward with or without Russia's consent. Both scenarios are relevant and differ from each other mainly regarding the price of future European security. Russia cannot stop NATO enlargement, but it can increase the price of European security. The European security system, without or against Russia, will be more expensive than the European security system with or at least in cooperation with Russia. Russia's ability to hike the price of European security is limited by her economic weakness. Russia could pay less for her security than the NATO countries, yet it is very probable that both sides will pay more if no consensus is reached over the second wave of NATO enlargement.

Both NATO and Russia need a new post-Yugoslav start for their relationship, or at least they need to attempt to overcome misunderstandings that appeared in the recent past. The JPC mechanism is a good forum for doing that, but it is not enough for restoring mutual trust from the pre-Yugoslav period. The JPC is about military-to-military cooperation; meanwhile, NATO and Russia need to deal with the political dimension of their relationship.

Following the Russian security debate it is clear that the biggest concern regarding the second wave of enlargement is connected with any invitation to one or more of the Baltic countries to become NATO members. It would be an elegant solution if, at the same NATO summit during which an invitation to join was extended to the Baltic countries, the alliance would adopt, as well, a similar "open door policy for Russia" within the terms mentioned above. Of course, Russia has the right to refuse such a proposal. However, a refusal will force Russia to accept political responsibility for the effects that might result.

While evaluating Russian arguments and policies with respect to a potential second wave of NATO enlargement before September 11, 2001, a conclusion was that NATO would have to develop such a concept especially if it were inviting one or more Baltic countries. After September 11 we can conclude that NATO would have to develop such a concept even if it theoretically decides that the Prague summit will invite only one or two countries, not to include any Baltic countries.

NATO would have to develop a practical concept of its relationship with Russia, which would define the scope and forms of Russia's participation in NATO decision-making, including the enlargement process. It would provide Russia with a clear political vision concerning prospects for eventual membership. At least such Russian expectations after September 11 could be predicted following Russian policies and attitudes toward European security and the relationship with NATO over the last decade, especially after the 1999 Yugoslav crisis.

Finally, if Russia and NATO would reach an agreement on the structure and nature of their strategic relationship—a less probable but not an entirely excludable scenario, especially under the new post–September 11 international juncture—then this chapter's topic would become a subject for historians, not for political scientists or security experts.

## NOTES

1. During the conference discussion, an argument was raised that President Boris Yeltsin of Russia was in his heart a Westernizer and he fundamentally did not believe that NATO enlargement was a threat to Russia. However, even if we agree that "Yeltsin was key at each crucial juncture in steering Russia away from confrontation with the West over this issue [NATO enlargement] and toward a soft landing," it does not mean that it would be correct to interpret his attitude as favorable to NATO enlargement. Russian foreign policy was headed at that time by another leading Westernizer, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (1992–95), who operated on the premise that Russia can avoid international isolation only if she joins the security structures of the West simultaneously with the central European countries, and that she must make sure that CEC are not given preference in the process of integration. At the same time, Russian Westernizers believed it was necessary to create a pan-European security system stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals and standing above NATO. In other words, Russia must seek to become an integral part of any institutionalized security system in Europe. Both Russian Westernizers and hardliners always viewed NATO enlargement without Russia as conflicting with Russia's interests. This was true at the beginning of 1990s and is true at the beginning of first decade of the new century. By the same token it does not disqualify a positive diplomatic role for leading Russian Westernizers in finding consent with NATO over the first wave of enlargement. For Kozyrev's foreign policy doctrine, see *Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* (Moscow: Ministerstvo Vneshnikh Del Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi, 1993).

2. For more about the Russian attitude at the start of serious discussions about prospects for NATO enlargement in 1993, see *Perspektivy rasshireniya NATO i interesy Rossiyi* (Moscow: Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi, 1993); *Programma povysheniya effektivnosti SBSYe* (Moscow: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossijskoy Federatsiyi, 1994); etc.

3. James M. Goldgeier, "NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," *Washington Quarterly,* vol. 21, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 85–102.

4. Alexei Arbatov, "Rossiya: natsional'naya bezopasnost' v 90-ye gody," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya,* no. 7 (1994), pp. 5–15; no. 8–9 (1994), pp. 5–18.

5. Yevgeni Primakov quotes in his book *Gody v bol'shoy politike* (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 2000) the following Western leaders who "promised" Gorbachev that there would be no NATO enlargement: James Baker, Helmut Kohl, John Major, Douglas Hurd, and François Mitterrand. Quoted here from Yevgeni Primakov, *Years in Big Politics,* trans. and abridged J.B.K. Lough, available at: http://www.ppc.pism.org/Projects/csrc/f70-jbkl.htm, p. 1 (ch. 2: "NATO—In the Center of Attention").

6. See note 2 above.

7. Primakov, *Gody v bol'shoy politike,* p. 3.

8. Within the conference discussion, a point concerning the Founding Act and NATO-Russian negotiations over the first wave of enlargement was raised that "Russia never agreed to NATO enlargement, nor did (NATO) ever ask Russia to agree to NATO enlargement. NATO's goal was to negotiate a NATO-Russia relationship that in the short term prevented a train wreck over the issue of enlargement and in the long term launched a process which would lead to a very different kind of strategic relationship with Russia over time." In addition, an argument was stressed that "NATO gave up nothing from the point of NATO criteria when negotiating the text of the Founding Act with Russia." Indeed the Founding Act sustained prospects for an open door policy, did not give up Russia's veto on NATO decision-making, and opened the window for building a strategic relationship with Russia. But, from a central European point of view, there are some implications, which are simply not negligible in terms of security and defense planning. First of all, it concerns non-nuclear status for new members agreed by NATO and Russia, as well as limitations for NATO conventional forces and infrastructure on the territory of new members through revision of the CFE Treaty. However, the last issue is not explicitly treated in the Founding Act, but it is pre-negotiated there and at the end it is a direct consequence of NATO-Russia negotiations over the first wave. Both the above-mentioned limitations for central and east European countries correspond with an idea of special buffer status of the post–Cold-War central European strategic corridor as Russian security planners defined it after the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. In diplomatic terms the question does not address who was a winner or loser of the Founding Act or whether new NATO members should be allowed to have nuclear weapons, etc. However, it seems correct to conclude that, to a certain extent, both NATO and Russia had to revise their original bargaining positions during the process of negotiations over the first wave of enlargement.

9. For an example of the official Russian view, see: Zayavleniye Ofitsial'nogo Predstavitelya MID Rossiyi, *V Vashingtone proshli meropriyatiya po sluchayu 50-letiya NATO,* from April 27, 1999.

10. Vserossiyskiy Centr Izucheniya Obschstvennogo Mneniya (VCIOM), public polls conducted from March to May 1999.

11. *Kontseptsiya Natsional'noy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* ot 10 yanvariya 2000 g. (Presidential Decree No. 24); *Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* ot 21 aprelya 2000 g. (Presidential Decree No. 706); *Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi* (approved by the President of the Russian Federation on June 28, 2000); *Doktrina Informatsionnoy Bezopasnosti* ot 9 sentyabrya 2000 g. (Presidential Decree No. 1895).

12. *Osnovnyye Polozheniya Voyennoy Doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi,* 1993.

13. Alexei G. Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya* (Marshall Center Papers, no. 2), p. 12.

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16. Andranik Migranyan, "Shankhayskiy forum kak protivoves dominirovaniyu Vashingtona," June 14, 2001, www.strana.ru/992522358.html.

17. *Rossiyskoye Obshchestvennoye Mneniye i Issledovaniye Rynka* (ROMIR), 2000.

18. For more about the Russian-Baltic security dialogue see *Rossiya—Baltiya* (Moscow: Doklady SVOP, 2001).

19. Nikolay Sokov, *Russia's Relations with NATO: Lessons from the History of the Entente Cordiale* (PONARS, Policy Memo Series No. 29, 1998).

20. VCIOM, April 2001.

21. *O merakh po protivodeystviyu rasshireniyu Organizatsiyi Severoatlanticheskogo dogovora* (Moscow: Soobshcheniya Press-Sluzhby Godudarstvennoy Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsisiyi, May 16, 2001).

22. Interview given by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Director Adam D. Rothfeld, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, June 5, 2001.

23. See Vitaliy Tsygichko, "S Amerikoy—vmeste ili porozn," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, June 9, 2001.

24. *Zayavleniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi V.V. Putina*. Administratsiya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi, Moskva 24 sentyabriya 2001 goda, www.president.kremlin.ru/events/311.html.

25. For a Russian discussion on relations with the West after the terrorist attacks against the United States and Russia's attitude to the U.S.-led antiterrorist campaign see, e.g., Sergey Sokut and Vladimir Muchin, "Vojna otkryvajet put' k peredelu mira. Rossiya stremitsiya usilit' svoye vliyaniye v Tsentral'noy Aziyi i reshit' problemu agressivnogo separatizma," *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, September 28, 2001; Yuliya Petrovskaya and Lyudmila Romanova, "Sblizheniye—da, smyagcheniye—net. Protivorechiya mezhdu Rossiyey i NATO ostayutsia prezhnimi, khotya i otteneny diskusiyami o borbe s obshchim vragom," *Nezavisimaya gazeta,* October 3, 2001; etc.

26. Ibid.

27. Alan Sipress, "U.S., Russia Recast Their Relationship," *Washington Post,* October 4, 2001.

28. Quoted from Gareth Jones, "Putin Softens Opposition to NATO Expansion" Reuters, October 3, 2001.

29. Quoted from Megan Twohey, "Russia Waits for NATO's Embrace," *Moscow Times,* October 2, 2001.

30. *Vystupleniye Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi V.V. Putina i otvety na voprosy zhurnalistov v khode sovmestnoy press-konferentsiyi po okonchaniyu besedy s General'nym sekretarem NATO Dzh. Robertsonom,* Administratsiya Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsiyi, Bryussel', 3 oktyabrya 2001 g.

31. *Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia* (Washington, D.C.: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 13, 2001). The following part of the joint statement deals with the Russia-NATO relationship: "We support the building of a European-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace, *excluding no one*, and respecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all nations. To this end, the United States and Russia will work, together with NATO and other NATO members, to improve, strengthen, and enhance the relationship between NATO and Russia, with a view to *developing new*, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation, *joint decision-making,* and coordinated/joint action. We believe that these mechanisms should reflect the fact that the *members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied* against terrorism, regional instability, and other contemporary threats, and that the *NATO-Russia relationship should therefore evolve accordingly"* [Italics and breaks are those of author].