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Russia's Security Policy

Marcin A. Piotrowski

The orientation and strategic course of Russia's security policy is without doubt the most important issue in interactions between the Russian Federation and all its potential friends, neutral partners and even rivals. With the necessity of a military response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, questions arise once again regarding Russia's intentions toward the United States and the wider Euro-Atlantic community (i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; or NATO). This chapter does not present a full description of President Vladimir Putin's security policy for Russia, but rather offers a general framework of understanding based on Russian perceptions and approaches. The first part of the chapter discusses the foundations of Russia's security policy in the context of political culture and the vision of priorities as outlined in basic official documents approved by Putin. It also touches upon such problems as geostrategic orientation, definitions of security threats and strategic goals, and tensions within the Russian military due to clashing priorities and the National Missile Defense (NMD) "Great Game." It is clear that Russia's expectations about its membership in the antiterrorist coalition are affecting the long-term strategic interests of the United States and many other countries.

The second part of the chapter covers why and how Russia is not able to realize the majority of its traditional geostrategic and security interests through such instruments as military power. Consequently, Moscow is determined to use nontraditional, indirect means and tactics connected with economic strategies. In addition, the chapter assesses the future role of the Kaliningrad district.

In general, the conclusions are not very optimistic. Ten years after the fall of the Soviet Union, we are used to there being a thin margin of influ-

ence over Moscow's future policy. However, this does not and should not exclude the West's ability to modify Russia's geostrategic and security orientation. The West's lack of understanding regarding Russian policymakers' superpower mentality has hampered previous relations with Moscow. Thus, it is a mistake to work from a policy of double standards and agreement with Russian definitions of terrorist threats and proliferation challenges without clarification of their meaning and, where applicable, of the clashing interests behind them.

FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY

The keys to understanding Moscow's present security policy lie in Russia's historical context and political culture. Psychological factors are also useful.[1] For Russians, the basic problem following the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been the issue of identity; and their identity is tied to decisions about the geopolitical orientation of post-Soviet state policy. During the last ten years, we have seen different answers to the question of the desired identity of the Russian state, nation, and society. However, it is wrong to analyze such questions only within the framework of a pro- or anti-Western orientation. Under both former President Boris Yeltsin and current President Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has tried to construct a coherent and effective security policy. Results have been more or less in line with the expectations of different factions in the Russian elite.

Among the options for geostrategic orientation, we can observe three propositions rooted in three historical schools of thought about Russia and Russians themselves:[2]

- *Zapadniki* ("Westernizers") adhere to Russian ideology rooted in the nineteenth century that gives priority to Russia's modernization and its cordial relations with Europe. These ideas were prevalent in the policy of Andrei Kozyryev, the first Russian Federation foreign minister, as well as in later programs of the Center for Strategic Studies (headed by German Gref) and liberal-democratic factions in the Duma (the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko). According to this school of thought, Russia's history differentiates it from European nation-states, though the possibility of a similar path of development is not ruled out. Proponents of this viewpoint think that enlightened elites, or even one person, could Westernize the country, as was the case with Peter the Great. Contemporary *Zapadniki* argue that if the West does not support them, a vengeful "Weimar Russia" could be the result. The best solution, they feel, would be a form of strategic partnership that includes such elements as informal parity with other U.N. Security Council permanent members, *droit de regard* in relation to NATO or

G-7 decisions, and deep ties with the European Union—as motivated by the slogan "Common European Space." Such a partnership would also involve cooperation against the Islamic world and China. The present *Zapadniki* are sure that the West (especially the United States, Germany, and France) will see an inherent and natural connection in an alliance with Moscow and its now-independent neighbors.[3]

- *Vielikorossy* ("Great Russians") base their philosophy on arguments of the nineteenth-century Russophiles, as well as pan-Slavic ideology. They believe the main goal of the state is to lay the foundations for the "Rebirth of the Great Russia." Modern proponents of this school of thought include such diverse personalities as famous dissident Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, foreign affairs experts Sergei Baburin and Konstantin Zatulin, and the grotesque Vladimir Zhirinovsky (now vice speaker of the Duma) and his aide Alexei Mitrofanov. They are nationalists, stressing Byzantine traditions, the Orthodox Church, and other idealizations of the imperial past. To them, all ties between Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians pave the way for creation of a common eastern-Slavic state. They emphasize ethnic issues and the rights of Russian speakers in other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. In other geopolitical matters, they support special ties with Orthodox countries: Armenia, Georgia, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria. There is a strong realpolitik component to this school of thought: spheres of influence, alliance with Germany, and balance of power.[4]
- *Yevraziytsy* ("Eurasianists") base their philosophy on the post-revolutionary emigrant movement developed in the Soviet Union by Lev Gumilev. They argue that Russia is a separate spatial subject, a real and mystical Eurasia or a true Heartland. Moscow's geostrategic interests are even wider than those of the whole area of the CIS. To them, the United States is the most expansionistic and hostile power vis-à-vis Russia. *Yevraziytsy* believe that there is no real conflict of interest with Asian powers, so Russia should create a bloc of countries in Eurasia dissatisfied with American dominance and globalization. They even argue there are no conflicts between Russia and the Islamic world, and that there is a possibility of uniting such different partners as the European Union, Iran, India, and China under strong Russian influence.[5]

Interestingly enough, experts from all schools almost uncritically support Putin's security and foreign policy. This support resurfaced after the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. Russian politicians and experts fully supported the Kremlin's position toward the global antiterrorist coalition, even when they had expectations of different benefits from cooperation with the United States. On the one hand, we can interpret this phenomenon as a sign of strong consensus on national secu-

rity issues among the elites. It suggests compromise among different schools of thought. It means that Putin's previous and current propositions are coherent and are heading in the right direction, at least for Russia and the Russians. On the other hand, it means that there is still no clear Kremlin answer to the issue of geopolitical identity. To put it simply, the Kremlin has not decided where it belongs in the new international system, nor has it reconciled former superpower ambitions with long-term domestic structural problems. Indeed, official documents contain many statements espousing a traditional Russian "besieged fortress" mentality and ambitions that are inconsistent with existing possibilities.

Another plausible explanation arises if we compare Putin's documents with actions undertaken during the last years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency. What has changed is a new and clear message: Russia is hardly determined to carry out its interests and is unsatisfied with Washington's hegemony. NATO's enlargement, alliance action in Yugoslavia, and the U.S. presence in the southern peripheries of Russia exemplify such hegemony. The National Security Concept approved by Putin stated two general tendencies in international relations: 1) a positive tendency toward regionalism and multidimensional integration, and 2) a negative tendency toward the new system based on Western domination with U.S. leadership. The section summing up definitions of an external threat declared: "Threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the international sphere are showing through the attempts to hinder the strengthening of Russia as a center of influence in the multipolar world, and prevent the implementation of its national interests and weaken its position in Europe, the Middle East, the trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region."[6]

Such a perception of the world is far from the previous written version of the concept, which stressed "widening the partnership and possibilities of multiplex integration of Russia within the international community."[7] These two statements not only suggest a more assertive and active approach, but also Putin's rejection of a limited role for Russia in world affairs.

Putin's approach becomes even more visible through comparison of the old and new texts of the Military Doctrine. A document from 1993 stated that Russia did not recognize any country as its foe, whereas the text from 2000 suggests that many actions will pose not only potential challenges but also actual threats to Moscow's security.[8] The interpretation of these and other statements within the framework of the Kremlin's actions suggests that this approach is strongly influenced by propositions offered by Yevgeni Primakov. They may be separated into two groups of strategic directives, focused on two dimensions of Russian security policy.

In the first group, directives are focused mostly on the global level of policy. They are subordinated to the promotion of the multipolar world. As one scholar put it, because Moscow is unable to restore Soviet potential

and positions, its weakness has an essentially long-term character. Thus, Russia should play on the differences and contradictions among the interests of the emerging poles of world power. This type of strategy would not allow for a unipolar domination, and Russia would have no formal security alliances.[9] As we know, this is not only a theoretical recommendation, but also a practical course for Russia's actions toward the United States, European Union, Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China, and India.[10] In a multipolar world, Moscow's interests would be represented in almost all political, diplomatic, and military relations with the European Union, China, India, and Iran, to say nothing of the representation of this goal in contacts with smaller and weaker partners (even "states of concern").[11] Moscow is trying to describe some of these relations as a "strategic partnership"; however, it is clear that not all of the partners prefer this designation. Sometimes it is even a burden for Russia. A good example of the last case are relations with Iran: the Russians stopped describing them in terms of a strategic partnership, but they have continued extensive cooperation in the spheres of security and ballistic and nuclear issues. What is more, Moscow's security relations with Tehran, Beijing, and New Delhi are useful for securing Russian interests in Central Asia. A similar approach may be observed in Moscow's relations with the European Union. An alliance with the European Union is important from the multipolar point of view, but is also desirable as additional support for Russian interests in Ukraine and even EU candidate countries.

The second group of directives is aimed toward the promotion of the Russian equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine in the so-called "near abroad"—i.e., securing an exclusive zone of influence over the whole area of the CIS.[12] Putin has continued Primakov's recommendations for preserving Russia's strategic, security, and economic interests in the CIS countries. In this sense, Russia should use the guise of "integration at a different speed." This approach is focused on differentiation of bilateral relations in each case and selective engagement in military and/or economic dimensions. They may be summarized by three general goals. First, the Russian military's goals presuppose a military presence in client countries, like Belarus, Armenia, and Tajikistan. All of them guarantee possibilities for a Russian military extension into eastern Europe, the trans-Caucasus, Central Asia, and other nearby areas. Second, there is the goal of defending security interests in countries critical toward Russian policy. These countries are trying to create an alternative axis in GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). All members of the GUUAM group rejected the CIS Treaty of Collective Defense, and before Putin became president they had strongly favored cooperation with NATO and the European Union. A third goal is the creation of a common position for the CIS states toward armed Islamic extremists in the Russian northern Caucasus and Central Asian countries. Officially, the Islamic extremist movements are presented

as a kind of common threat to authoritarian regimes. Moscow is publicly stressing those movements' external and international roots (Wahhabis, Taliban, and Osama bin Laden connections) and is silent on their deep internal and structural background. None of these goals can be analyzed outside the context of other Russian interests, such as political and economic influences in eastern Europe and the whole region around the Caspian Sea. In the case of security interests in Georgia and Azerbaijan, there is also a connection with Russia's acute internal problems in Chechnya, Dagestan, and other territories of the unstable northern Caucasus.

The formulation of equally important strategic interests at the global and regional levels has a negative impact on military policy. Even the text of the new Military Doctrine does not explain what kind of a threat is more serious for Russia, the hierarchy of threats, and their probability.[13] According to Alexei Arbatov, Moscow now has two separate and parallel military doctrines: the first focusing on strategic nuclear deterrence toward NATO, particularly the United States, and the second on conventional and local threats in Russia's more immediate environs.[14] Those two doctrines would have been congruent with each other in Soviet times, but current economic constraints make them unsuitable for a contemporary Russian army. If the Kremlin does not choose between them, there is sure to be conflict with Russia's military establishment. Tensions between the two military priorities have been evident in a now-famous conflict between then minister of defense Marshal Igor Sergeyev and the chief of the general staff, General Anatoliy Kvashnin. Conflict erupted in the summer of 2000, but it was no secret that they had been antagonists since 1997. Their disagreement was exactly about the interpretation of the doctrine's statements, its priorities, and interpretation of the secret document entitled "Concept of Development of the Armed Forces in Period till 2005":

- Sergeyev argued that the rebuilding of conventional forces is a long-term process and that Russia must be confident that it is protected by a powerful strategic and tactical nuclear umbrella. He and his supporters gave priority to the deterrence of other powers—i.e., the United States, NATO, and China;
- Kvashnin and younger generals with experience in Chechnya argued that nuclear deterrence is still important, but there is an urgent need to rebuild conventional forces. For them, the huge strategic forces from the Cold War are too expensive and irrational vis-à-vis the Russian military budget and interests in the CIS's territory.[15]

It is interesting that Putin was rather silent about the conflict at the highest level of military command and did not decide to remove Sergeyev and Kvashnin from their posts or clearly support one or the other. The situa-

tion may improve significantly after the nomination of KGB General Sergei Ivanov to the post of defense minister. But even now, it is still unclear how Putin and Ivanov will cope with tensions among strategic ambitions, real threats, lack of funds, and the dysfunctional structure of the army. For instance, Putin did not take radical steps toward rationalizing the military budget. He simply increased the budget without presentation of wider economic analyses and introduction of strict supervision of financial decisions within the Ministry of Defense.[16] The essential question here is whether Putin and Ivanov have an idea of the real changes that will be needed in overall military policy and structural reform of the army if they embrace an American-centered policy. Ivanov's announcements suggest that the Kremlin is determined to carry out the military reform plan. The new document is entitled "Plan for Building and Developing the Armed Forces until 2005," but its thesis is not very different from those in the previous plans. However, Ivanov agreed that the army must be prepared to face the new challenges and tasks. He and Putin have still thought about strong strategic and naval forces.[17] It simply seems impossible for Russia to reform its army when its military planning still remains within the Cold War paradigm.

Such a situation, including the evident weakness of the army, has implications for Russia's position toward the U.S. National Missile Defense plans. Last year, Kvashnin openly spoke about possible reductions in the strategic arsenal to the level of 1,500 warheads. He presented his opinion at the Security Council meeting at the end of July 2000. It received a sharply negative response from commanders of the Strategic Ballistic Missile Forces (RVSN).[18] When we compare Kvashnin's proposition with the evolution of Moscow's viewpoint concerning problems with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and NMD, it seems that Russia had preferred compromise from the outset. In other words, all bargaining turns on the price offered by Washington. In the NMD debate, Moscow wanted to: at the most, according to rules of the ABM Treaty, preserve quantitative nuclear parity with Washington; and at the least, not to suffer evident and serious damage with regard to the rest of its former nuclear superpower image.[19]

Between these two poles, as will be addressed in the second part of this chapter, Russia has been using all the available diplomatic and propaganda tools. All of them are based on the best solution for Moscow—i.e., guarantees of de facto irreversible reductions and de jure parity with the reduced American arsenal. Here, scenarios of the future Russian strategic triad structure (offense-defense mix) are not important. What is important is the impossibility of keeping its level within the limit of 3,000–3,500 warheads set by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II). As mentioned before, Russian experts expect formal agreement and concessions on the basis of a treaty like START, supported by other elements: ceilings for NMD interceptors, a new verification regime, warning data exchange,

and other transparency measures.[20] The "Great Game" of ABM, NMD, and START III is now without a final solution, but the assumed goals enumerated above, the nature of tools used by Russia, and two meetings between President George W. Bush and Putin suggest that sooner or later Moscow will reach a compromise with Washington.

For some time now, there have been interesting debates among U.S. experts about possible strategic compromises with Russia. These discussions were parallel to the accompanying inter-American controversies on the unresolved issue of the future of the Missile Defense architecture. Only a few frank opinions indicated Russia's geopolitical demands (i.e., the expected American concessions) in the agenda of strategic armaments.[21] However, Russia's demands seemed not to be limited to strategic arsenals. In fact, Russia was openly talking about NMD-ABM-START issues. Moscow clearly wanted to strike a deal that would secure its geopolitical and commercial interests.

With new aspects added to the international situation after the terrorist attacks on September 11, the Kremlin realized it had new chances to implement previous strategic goals, both at the global and the CIS level. American and Western public opinion in general underwent a change of attitude toward "Islamic threat theory." Putin and his diplomacy have renewed similar slogans of the terrorism (read "Islamic") threat from the Balkans, through the Caucasus to Central Asia, Kashmir, and Xinjiang.[22] By the end of September, previous strategic goals—even those verging on wishful thinking—turned out to be much more realistic, both in the American-Russian agenda and in Russia's relations with the European Union. We are not capable of reconstructing all long-term motives behind the Kremlin's position on the global coalition created by Washington. We also cannot reconstruct in full detail the reasons behind Russia's acceptance of Washington-Tashkent cooperation against the Taliban in Afghanistan. During his diplomatic offensive in September and October, Putin presented many arguments appropriate for his audiences in the Bundestag, NATO's headquarters, and the European Commission. He stressed Moscow's "European choice," the need to abandon anachronistic policy, and the need for extensive cooperation within all possible spheres. Putin also proposed ideas that were important from the American point of view, such as cooperation in providing military support for the Afghan Northern Alliance, intelligence sharing, and exerting pressure on other CIS regimes.[23]

At this moment—and in the near future—many questions arise: Will Russia be a credible partner in combating the so-called rogue states? Will Putin transform himself into a *Zapadnik?* Are we seeing the beginning of more cooperative behavior on Russia's part? What will the American side offer? At the moment answers to these questions seem simple, but they are not so clear when we take them within the framework of Russian strategic

goals and their influence on American interests. Washington is now facing many hard choices and must carefully assess all options. The price is very high because some options may satisfy Russia, but in a wider context they also touch on strategic or even vital interests of the United States. For example, Moscow would be certainly satisfied with:

- A hands-off attitude by the West concerning Russia's internal politics, freedom of the press, and human rights issues in Chechnya;
- American support for Russian accession to the WTO (which was the case with G-8), although Moscow's accession is now economically premature and will clash with Moscow's dire economic circumstances;
- Washington's pulling out of activities in the post-Soviet sphere, especially in Ukraine;
- American support for a compromise between Western and Russian companies, based on Moscow's transportation monopoly for Caspian oil and gas;
- American and European approval of the transformation of NATO into a political organization subordinate to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or similar in nature to the OSCE and the United Nations (with the possibility of Russian veto on controversial issues);
- Delaying indefinitely the Baltic states' move to join NATO;
- Washington's acceptance of close cooperation between Russia and the European Union on the basis of the common European security and defense policy; and
- Softening of the American position toward Russian security and military cooperation with China, India, and some states of concern.

INSTRUMENTS OF SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Putin's Russia is using a wide spectrum of instruments and modes of action in its security policy. They are not restricted to military means because the current Russian army cannot be effective in the wider world arena. In fact, Moscow has three categories of instruments at its disposal: military, diplomatic, and economic. Due to the doubtful effectiveness of military action, Russia strongly prefers nonmilitary tools, above all diplomacy. Of course, military instruments and actions are still effective with regard to the majority of weak CIS countries, but it is also too risky to conclude that they will guarantee long-term stabilization in the Caspian region.[24]

Apart from the evident weakness of the Russian military machine, the reason for the Kremlin's move toward diplomacy may be the great influence wielded by intelligence officers on the entire Putin administration. The KGB (Committee of State Security, i.e., political and economic intelli-

gence) and GRU (Main Reconnaissance Directorate, i.e., strategic military intelligence) are famous due to their creativity, effectiveness, and smart operations during the Cold War. Maybe it is no accident that a former intelligence colonel has become Russia's second president, as maybe it is no accident that he strongly supports the promotion of his KGB colleagues in all institutions responsible for internal and external aspects of national security. Between May 2000 and June 2001, there were three notable nominations of former KGB and Foreign Intelligence Service officers: 1) Sergei Ivanov, first to the post of the Russian Security Council secretary and since March 2001 to the post of the minister of defense; 2) Viacheslav Trubnikov, to the post of deputy foreign minister responsible for coordination of Russian policy toward the CIS area; and 3) Andrei Bielanov, to the post of chief of the new Rosooboron Agency responsible for the execution of arms export policy (the agency had an 80 percent share in Russian military contracts).

Those persons now seem to be in the most influential positions in the implementation of security policy. An important result of their nominations is the slow, albeit steady, progress in the coordination of Russian foreign and security policy. The most visible implications are preferences for unconventional methods and tactics in security policy. Changes are already visible in rhetoric, declared commercialization, pragmatism, and predictability of Russian diplomacy. Moscow has stressed the predictability of diplomacy as compared to the Yeltsin period. Predictable diplomacy has also had a strong influence on many Western experts, even if it still serves traditional strategic directives.

The main reason for the changes in security policy is the lack of superpower capabilities. The former and then reformulated National Security Concept openly stated that military reform and conversion could not guarantee Russia's military security. This was basically an admission of failure in all military reform plans and programs. If it is true that the military cannot guarantee Russia's security, some decision-makers have surely recognized the deep financial, social, and structural crisis in the Russian army. But on the other hand, even a radical change in the military's higher command cannot ensure a speedy reconstruction of conventional capabilities. There is even a question as to whether the army and other forces are useful in Chechnya. Russia is now emphasizing the lower nuclear threshold in its military policy, and its experts intensively discussed these issues during the Iraq and Kosovo crises, before official changes in security policy were introduced.[25] Their decisions had an impact on all nuclear armament programs approved by the Security Council in April 1999, when Putin was its secretary.[26] In the coming years, Russia will still be dependent on nuclear forces. During the upcoming decade, rationalization and utilization of strategic arsenals with the parallel needs of the Chechen campaign may exclude changes in the overall role of nuclear weapons. Moscow recog-

nized its conventional shortages in the case of NATO attack and/or Chinese and Iranian aggression (in the case of changes in bilateral relations with those countries). The new Military Doctrine assumes wider deterrence even in a regional conflict with a conventional aggressor. For many years, Russian military theoreticians have been preparing wider scenarios of theater and tactical nuclear weapons to be used in regional conflicts for their de-escalation through demonstrational and potential strikes.[27] Such canonic scenarios seem to be recognized commonly as a natural political-military instrument by many military and civil experts. Even after personnel changes in the Ministry of Defense and General Staff take place, this approach would still be viewed with respect.

What was certain in the past, and is even more obvious now, is that external influences are affecting other aspects of Russian behavior. This can be described as the strategic arms-control policy. In this direction, Moscow has almost exclusively been using diplomatic instruments. Examples of these political-diplomatic activities, subordinated to the goal of achieving a compromise with Washington, are wide-ranging:

- Since 1999 the phrase "The ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability" was introduced into all bilateral declarations with China, France, and other countries. For instance, it is also present in documents of the U.N. General Assembly, CIS meetings, and the Shanghai Five, now known as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization;[28]
- Frequently repeated announcements of an asymmetric response to NMD like "MIRV-ization" of strategic missiles, new types of tactical nuclear weapons, and abolition of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) regime. For disinformation purposes, Russian "hawks" always presented those solutions parallel to positive propositions;[29]
- Ratification of the START II and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the Duma in 2000, with general conditions of their realization dependent on American arms control policy. Such conditions were repeated in the Russian military press after the Russian-American consultations on missile defense;
- Opposition to alleged American plans for "militarization in space," common with China, and propagation of multilateral arms control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regency (proposition of the Global Control System, Russian GSK), the Vasenaar Arrangement, and the Zangger Committee;
- Noisy introduction of Russian internal counter-proliferation laws and special meetings of the Security Council dedicated to international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery. Those steps supported the creation of Moscow's image as a more responsible actor, subordinated to bilateral and multilateral agreements;

- Since June 2000, the proposition of a sub-strategic missile defense system created by Russia and NATO as an alternative to the American NMD. Such a Euro-MD system would be based on the Russian S-300 and S-400 systems, as well as Western radar, common Command and ABM Rapid Reaction Forces; and, last,
- Putin's Paris-supported initiative outlining strategic arsenal reductions to the level of 1,500 warheads each for Russia and the United States, and to the joint level of 2,000 strategic warheads for China, France, and the United Kingdom.[30]

Despite this diplomatic flexibility, it is hard to expect swift changes in Russian economic instruments of security and foreign policy. Arms export policy is recognized by many Russian decision-makers both as a source of revenue and an instrument supporting strategic interests. Moscow's arms contracts are now compatible with the buildup of a more multipolar world. During the last five years, most military supplies were directed to China, India, and Iran. Russia was the world's second largest supplier for many years. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (expressed in constant 1990 prices), Russia supplied conventional weapons worth U.S.$4.44 billion in the year 2000, which constituted 10 percent of global transfers and was also a considerable share of Russian contracts worth U.S.$15.69 billion between 1996 and 2000.[31] Russia increased its arms transfers in 2000 by 19 percent and accounted for 15 percent of the transfers in the period 1996–2000.[32] Russia also wants to initiate military aircraft industry cooperation with Germany as a way of rebuilding its position in the central European market.[33] There are actual and practical reasons for such behavior. Russian arms exporters lost many Soviet buyers and are having trouble winning new partners in regions outside Asia. They are determined to sell weapons to anybody anywhere. Moreover, Putin's administration is quite unlikely to refrain from even hazardous cooperation with the rogue states in the next few years, regardless of the climate in Russian-American relations before and after September 11, 2001. Such an approach is clearly in place, judging from recent contracts on fifteen MiG-29 fighters to Yemen, S-300 systems to Iran, and new possibilities for military cooperation with Syria.[34] Changes would depend on the larger-scale modifications in the regional situation and on international markets, such as increased technical demands by current Russian contractors.

If we go on to risk projections from the current situation, we can suggest that arms exports will play a smaller role in Russia than energy exports. Mutual interdependence may grow between Russia's energy exports and the sphere of its strategic relations with the West.[35] In the year 2000, Russia exported 45 percent of its oil and 30 percent of its gas. Russian hydrocarbons exports were and are focused on the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe. In 2000, out of total export revenues of U.S.$105 billion, exports of oil products generated revenues of U.S.$36 bil-

lion and gas exports amounted to more than U.S.$16 billion.[36] Russia uses these products as policy instrument vis-à-vis the European Union, Central Europe, and CIS countries. It is made easier by the new relations between the Kremlin and the energy oligarchs, who are no longer independent as they were under Yeltsin. Companies like Gazprom or Lukoil are now almost obliged to support state interests, a change that is especially visible in policy toward Ukraine and the Caspian-area CIS countries. Among the numerous examples of this change in tactics are:

- Putin's declarations during the last EU-Russian summit concerning "chances for marriage of great economic potentials" (in practice the Russian Ministry of Energy expects western European investments of U.S.$50 billion in the gas sector by 2010);[37]
- Gazprom's lobbying for a new gas pipeline through central to western Europe, which would bypass Ukraine, thus guaranteeing Russia's position in the expanded EU gas market and weakening Kyiv's transportation position;
- Gazprom's long-term contracts with Turkmenistan, which oppose American plans for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. They would guarantee a Russian transportation monopoly;
- Itera's pressing Georgia on energy debt payments (parallel to pressures on the issue of Chechen diaspora activity and the future of Russian military bases in this country); and
- Lukoil's and TNK's expansion in Ukrainian Black Sea oil terminals (directed against Kyiv and Warsaw's plan for an Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline).[38]

Here, it must be stressed that during the last two years we have seen effective coordination of Russian tactics, tools, and modes of action in the CIS area. An examination of several of Putin's initiatives yields interesting insights into his administration's success at extending and consolidating Moscow's control over policy concerning the CIS. Putin's administration, disappointed with the CIS's political and economic structure, has preferred to develop a new framework like the Eurasian Economic Union (with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) as a "core of multi-speed reintegration." Also, Moscow signed a series of bilateral economic agreements with Turkmenistan and every country of the GUUAM group, especially on their vulnerabilities, such as energy and military industry. Russia is still capable of maintaining some kind of control over unresolved conflicts in many post-Soviet "hot spots" as an instrument of pressure on Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian states. Putin sped up the development of cooperation between special services and armies within the multilateral framework by creating the CIS Counter-Terrorist Center and CIS Rapid Reaction Forces (with Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Moscow has been using the issue of visas as leverage against the trans-Caucasus countries whose many citizens have been working legally or illegally in Russian territory. The threat of introducing a new, strict visa regime would threaten many Georgians and Azeris who work in Russia and send their earnings to families back at home. Russia also uses its media, which are very popular in many CIS countries, to influence local public opinion. For example, in Belarus during the summer of 2001, critical programs on pro-Kremlin TV zchannels pressured Alexandr Lukashenka to give in to Moscow's economic expectations. Lukashenka would not have been able to win the subsequent election with continued media criticism or media presentation of Belarusian opposition candidates.[39]

So far, thanks to these actions, Russia has been able to regain much of its lost influence in the CIS, as well as rebuilding its dominant position. Many decision-makers in Moscow are also sure that this trend will be only strengthened by new commitments with the United States and the European Union. The overall result is that Russia is convinced it has gained improved standing on the regional and global scene, despite a lack of resources to account for that feeling.

KALININGRAD AS A LABORATORY FOR CONFLICT AND COOPERATION WITH THE WEST

Kaliningrad is a critical asset in terms of Russian military planning. It is valued as the strongest military base, with the potential for extending its power over the entire Baltic Sea region. It has undergone intensive change since 1989–91, when many former Soviet units were transferred to this area from eastern Germany, Poland, and then from the Baltic states themselves. During the last decade, manpower potential was reduced by approximately 90 percent. Ground forces in Kaliningrad (13,000 soldiers) should be analyzed within the context of the Russian-Belarusian military alliance, considering that for many years all exercises show full integration of command between Kaliningrad/Moscow and Minsk's staff.[40] Founded at the end of 1997, the Kaliningrad Defense Region (*Kaliningradtsky Oboronnyi Rayon,* or KOR) was the first reorganized and restructured autonomous base put directly under the high command in Moscow. In the middle of the last decade, the chief of the Main Operational Directorate in the General Staff (Anatolyi Kvashnin) and the chief of the Baltic Fleet Staff (Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, now head of the Russian navy) prepared plans for an autonomous KOR. Reductions and structural and doctrinal changes are also visible in Kaliningrad's naval organization. Its current naval role seems to be mainly defensive, restricted to the Baltic Sea. The reduced Baltic Fleet does not operate in the Atlantic, as it did during the Soviet period. Apart from some Russian declarations about the strategic

importance of this fleet, what seems to be most important here is the prestige.[41]

In January 2001, an article in the *Washington Post*, containing Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) information about nuclear weapons transfers to Kaliningrad, put many politicians in Poland and the Baltic states on alert. This brought to light the unclear situation in the triangle formed by the United States, Russia, and Kaliningrad, keeping in mind previous Russian declarations about full de-nuclearization of the Baltic region. Moscow denied the transfers to Kaliningrad, but we may also take into account the possibility that tactical nuclear warheads were never transferred from Kaliningrad to the core of Russia.[42] Regardless, it is a pity that after noisy statements from the different sides, nobody could say for certain what was going on in some installations of the KOR.

Ultimately, Kaliningrad is much more important politically than militarily. If certain EU and NATO expansions under discussion take place, Kaliningrad would not only be geographically separated from Russia, but would also become an "alien cell" within the homogeneous NATO and EU territory. As Russia seems militarily fully prepared for NATO's expansion, it is unclear how it will cope with the EU economic challenge. The economic and civilization gap between Kaliningrad and Poland or Lithuania is deep and is deepening. One of the last Kremlin Security Council meetings was exclusively focused on the implications of EU expansion for the district. Putin even criticized the economic and social situation of the district's population.[43] Many of Moscow's problems in Kaliningrad indicate an urgent need for cooperation on social, economic, and border and law enforcement issues between Russia, the entire European Union, Poland, and Lithuania. Real cooperation would improve matters within Kaliningrad and neutralize the region's nonmilitary challenges (organized crime, unemployment, health hazards, etc.).

However, such cooperation between the expanded European Union and Russia should not be viewed as a comparable price or a surrogate for NATO's Baltic enlargement. If the Baltic states joined NATO, the Russians would then see that there are no "red lines" on the territory of the former empire. It may prove that the West could not subordinate its political will to Russian imperial ambitions. It will help Russians to understand the superiority of long-term economic benefits over short-term costs in prestige. The overall result will be a rather swift adaptation on the part of Russia to new strategic realities and a focus on problems other than military ones. Poland's and Lithuania's membership in the European Union will create mutual benefits in regional and local economic cooperation. Unfortunately, Poland and the Baltic countries are not currently perceived in Moscow as potential valuable partners within NATO and/or the European Union. Thus, Russia may prefer to gain some kind of leverage over EU and NATO expansion, above all by playing on different priorities held by the United

States and leading western European countries, as well as emphasizing more important security issues.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Russia's security policy is based on the traditional concept of a hostile international environment and compromise among different schools of political thought. Thus far, Putin's decisions have not resolved issues about Russia's long-term geostrategic orientation. Putin's vision of Russia is not coherent and clear, though it seems so at first glance. Contrary to the satisfaction of many Russian experts, continuation of Putin's approach may damage Russia in the future. Putin wants to achieve strategic goals that are not compatible with the country's current potential or with opportunities for cooperation with the West and the developed countries (G-7). In essence, Russia is still trying to promote a multipolar world and to subordinate all the CIS countries.

In the sphere of traditional military policy, it is hard to expect speedy reform of the armed forces. Their buildup is impossible with present Russian priorities and possibilities, and with a prolonged second war in Chechnya. Only economic constraints can provide some changes, but the example of many previous plans and programs does not give much cause for optimism. U.S. plans for NMD will force the Russians to restructure their strategic arsenal, which means they will help in the general rationalization of its security policy against Moscow's will. Unfortunately, most of the Russian elite is still characterized by the Soviet mentality and security perceptions, with a hostile approach toward the United States and NATO. Renewed cooperation with NATO is directed at softening and weakening its cohesion by transforming it into a political organization like the OSCE or the United Nations.

Even Russia's position toward the European Union seems to be based on the balance of power, not on declared partnership and shared values. These relations will eventually involve the commercial interests of Russia's oil and gas companies to a greater extent (maybe one of the few effective policy instruments for the future). The issue of Kaliningrad will prove to be a serious test for the next round of NATO enlargement and Russian aspirations toward a real partnership with the European Union.

The newly formed global antiterrorist coalition is a good opportunity for testing Putin's long-term intentions, to see whether his policy is really based on the *Zapadniki* concept. The new international context may help in repeating to the Kremlin that the West is interested in a stable and prosperous—but not imperial—Russia. Such a dialogue would be based on strategic interests, which naturally may collide at some point. As a leading power in the Euro-Atlantic community, the United States may compromise

on the issues of the ABM-NMD-START agenda. But those moves are misinterpreted in Russia as not being connected with certain conditions. For example, they should not create an impression of double standards on issues of human rights, democratic values, and freedom of the press.

There is also a need to show counter-productivity in efforts to weaken NATO. Similarly, there is an urgent need to explain what is thought to be a common threat of transnational terrorism. It may be a tragic mistake to accept Russia's interpretation of what is and is not considered "terrorism." (See Moscow's tough policy toward the Chechen minority and Moscow's deep military cooperation with "states of concern" or rogue states.) Exactly this same clarification is needed in defining Russia's share in counter-proliferation efforts. In many critical ways the Kremlin's understanding of its share of the burden is contrary to U.S. understanding, as we can see in Moscow's unfinished transfers of weapons of mass destruction to irresponsible regimes. The United States may also indicate its long-term interests in post-Soviet countries, which are afraid of aggressive Russian policy toward them. Many Russian experts think that the new global coalition is equally committed to transforming the CIS region into an "area of antiterrorist responsibility," which implies acceptance by the West of lower political standards vis-à-vis pro-Moscow authoritarian rulers.

Washington now risks losing some of its influence in many countries and movements that had previously supported the United States, because of geopolitics as well as economic interests and political values. Historically Moscow has extended its power over its weaker neighbors, rather than focusing its efforts on internal modernization. Russians now need not only internal political and economic modernization after communism, but also adaptation to a new era of political and economic globalization. Apart from that, there is a need for a common Western policy toward Russia, oriented much more toward the problems of the Russian economy and society, rather than ambitions of the former Soviet "security community" elite. With this kind of clear policy, Putin and his advisers (or their successors) may recognize that American and Western investments and economic assistance will be contingent on deep internal reforms.

NOTES

1. There are interesting conclusions about this in Alexander Kennaway, *The Mental and Psychological Inheritance of Contemporary Russia* (Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Center M20, 2000).

2. A similar distinction is made in Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Bolshaya shakhmatnaya doska* (Moscow: Myezdunarodnye Otnoshenya, 1999), pp. 120–35; and Dmitri Zamyatin, "Vlast' prostranstva i prostranstvo vlasti," *NG-Stsenari*, no. 6 (2001). For a discussion of differences between Great Russian "Nation-Builders" (Russophiles) and "Empire-Savers" (Eurasians), see Roman Szporluk, "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism," *Problems of Communism*, no. 4 (1990), p. 118.

3. See works of modern *Zapadniki*: Dmitri Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001); and Vadim Makarenko, *Kto soyuzniki Rossii?* (Moscow: Stradiz, 2000). See also Yuriy Davidov, *Should Russia Join NATO?* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information, 2000).

4. See S. Baburin, "Slavanskiye gosudarstva SNG piyered nashzestviem Atlanticheskikh Chennostey," *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta*, January 20, 2001, and A. Solzhenitsyn, *Rossiya v obvale* (Moscow: Russkaya Mysl, 1998).

5. From the long list of publications of contemporary Eurasianists see especially: Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy geopolitiki*, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Arctogeya, 1999); Aleksandr Dugin, "Evraziystvo: ot filosofii k polityke," *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta,* May 30, 2001; and Abdul-Vahed Nyazov, "Yevraziyskiy kontrglobalism—budushche Rossiyi," *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta,* February 3, 2001.

6. Citation from original Russian publication, version approved January 10, 2000: "Kontseptsya natsyonalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii," *Diplomaticzeskiy Vestnik,* no. 1 (2000), pp. 3–13.

7. Citation from original version approved December 17, 1997: "Kontseptsya natsyonalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii," *Rossyiskaya Gazyeta,* December 26, 1997. For further studies, see Jakub M. Godzimirski, "Russian National Security Concepts 1997 and 2000: A Comparative Analysis," *European Security,* vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 73–91; Mark Galeotti, "Russia's National Security Concept," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, no. 5 (1998).

8. Both documents are available in English translations under: http://www.fas.org.

9. The first person who proposed the multipolar model was Konstantin Sorokin of the Russian Academy of Science in 1993.

10. Such a strategy is explained in the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved on June 28, 2000. See relevant passages in document available on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) website: http://www.mid.ru.

11. See Putin's visits map in: Leonid Gankin, "Koniec russkogo otdiela," *Kommiersant-Vlast*, March 27, 2001.

12. It was declared especially in Primakov's report about the CIS published by the Foreign Intelligence Service (Moscow, 1993) and a document entitled "Strategic Course of Russian Federation Policy toward CIS States" (1995).

13. Maybe the reason for this is that only a small team (Security Council and General Staff) has prepared the doctrine without longer and serious consultations with the MFA and Duma, and with no influence from critical opinions. Based on author's interviews with persons from Russian diplomatic and academic circles, March 2000.

14. Alexei Arbatov, "Dillemy voyennoy politiki Rossyi," *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta,* November 16, 2000. Other *Zapadniki* experts (Pavel Felgenghauer, Alexandr Golts, Andrei Piontkovsky, and Dmitri Trenin) frequently use this kind of critical observation about military policy.

15. Details about the essence of their conflict were widely presented in Russian sources: Evgenii Bertlib, "Plan Kvasnina ili plen?" *Novaya Gazyeta*, August 21, 2000; and "Siergiyev i Kvashnin porugalis' iż-za d'yeneg," APN, July 28, 2000, at http://www.apn.ru/inside/2000/07/28/20000728154830.htm.

16. Under Putin there has been a stronger commitment than under Yeltsin to financial strengthening of the army. According to estimates by the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, Russian expenditures for national defense increased from 2.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1999 to a provisional 2.75 percent of GDP in 2000, and further increases are budgeted for 2001. Increases have also been observed in military production: "Military Expenditures and Arms Production" found online at: http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb01/ch4.html.

17. Compare Sergei Ivanov, "Stroytielstvo Vooruzhennykh Sil budyet' otvyechat' vyzovam vremeny," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, August 10, 2000.

18. On the basis of sources in Note 15 and Oleg Odnokolenko, "Nye vynosi yadernyi musor iż izby," *Segodnya,* July 27, 2000.

19. This viewpoint is presented in almost all serious opinions about a new NMD-ABM-START architecture: Alexei Arbatov, "Eshcho raz o PRO," *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta,* July 4, 2001; Konstantin Cherevkov, "Stabilnost na novoi osnovie," *NVO,* no. 4 (2001); Vitaliy Tsygipko, "S Amerikoy—vmyestie ili porozn," *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta*, June 9, 2001; Sergei Rogov, "Slova groznye. A kakove budut dela?" *NVO,* no. 9 (2000); and Nikolai Sokov, *Vopros ne o zhelatelnosti, a o vozmozhnosti dialoga* (Moscow: MFTI, May 22, 2001).

20. Andrei Dyakov, *Rossiysko-amerikanskyie otnoshenya v oblasti sokrashchenya yadernykh vooruzhenyi: sovremennoye sostoyanye i perspektivy* (Moscow: MFTI, 2001). For detailed possibilities, organization, and potential of the Russian strategic triad, see *Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union* (Washington, D.C.: CEIP-MIIS, 2001).

21. Those motives were rather underestimated in many reports, but realistic analyses were presented in Robert E. Hunter, "Nothing's Free in Dealing With Putin," *Los Angeles Times,* August 1, 2001; and Henry Kissinger, "What to Do With the New Russia," *Washington Post,* August 14, 2001.

22. "Teleobrashcheniye prezidenta Rossiyi Vladimira Putina," *Kommiersant Daily,* September 25, 2001.

23. Eduard Batalov and Viktor Kremenyuk, "Rossiya y SShA: druzya, sopernky, partnyory?" *Nezavysimaya Gazyeta,* October 6, 2001; and Sławomir Popowski, "Droga do Europy wiedzie przez Berlin," *Rzeczpospolita,* September 27, 2001.

24. For example, Russian forces in Central Asia are now reduced to garrisons in Tajikistan. But these forces have a semicolonial nature (the majority of soldiers are Tajiks) and officers are engaged in the narcotics trade (based on author's research in Tajikistan, August 2001).

25. About the approach to the role of nuclear weapons, see articles representative of internal discussions in the Russian Security Council and General Staff: Siyergei Kreydin, "O problemakh globalnogo i regyonalnogo yadernogo sdierzhyvaniya krupnomasshtabnoy agresii," *Voyennaya Mysl,* no. 5 (1998), pp. 49–53; Viktor Levshin, Andriey Nedelin, and Michail Sosnovskiy, "O primienienii yadernogo oruzhiya dla deskalacyi voyennykh diyeystviy," *Voyennaya Mysl,* no. 3 (1999), pp. 34–37; Andriey Nedelin, "O teoreticzeskich osnovakh yadernoy strategii," *Voyennaya Mysl,* no. 2 (1999), pp. 37–41; and Siergiei Voronin and Siergiei Brezkun, "Strategiczeskij vygodnaya assimetria," *NVO*, no. 36 (1999).

26. There is a good reconstruction of this meeting in Pavel Felgengauer, "Ogranichennaya yadernaya woyna? A pochiyemu by niyet!" *Segodnya,* May 6, 1999.

27. See sources in Note 25.

28. See documentation in the monthly journal of the Russian Federation's MFA, *Diplomaticheskiy Vestnik,* 1999–2001.

29. Compare Dmitri Rogozin, "Sammit sostoyalsia, glavnaya problema niye reshena," *NVO*, no. 20 (2000); and Oleg Odnokolenko, "Zvyezdne voyny: Epizod 2001," *Itogi,* April 24, 2001.

30. Vadim Solovev, "Washington cheliyesustremliyeno dvizhetsia k razvierty-vaniyu NPRO," *NVO,* no. 26 (2000).

31. See Table in *SIPRI Yearbook 2000* (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2000), p. 357.

32. Compare data from: "Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons," http://www.editors.sipri.se/pubs/yb01/ch5.html.

33. This subject was raised again during a meeting of the Russian and German Ministries of Defense (according to Interfax, August 3, 2001).

34. Gazeta.Ru Service, September 26, 2001, at: http://www.gazeta.ru.

35. Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, "Russia, Energy, and the West," *Survival,* no. 2 (2001), pp. 133–52.

36. According to author's data collected from various Russian sources.

37. Slawomir Popowski, "Putin jedzie na spotkanie z NATO," *Rzeczpospolita,* October 2, 2001.

38. Based on studies of Ukrainian and Caspian cases during Putin's presidency. For details on the Russification of the Ukrainian energy sector see Marcin A. Piotrowski, "Ukraine: In Search for the Lost Time," *Rocznik Strategiczny 2000/01* (Warsaw: Foundation of International Relations, 2001), pp. 208–11 and 215–20.

39. For more information, see Marcin A. Piotrowski, "CIS: Second Chechen War....First Caspian?!" *Rocznik Strategiczny 1999/00* (Warsaw: Foundation of International Relations, 2000), pp. 179–98; and Marcin A.Piotrowski, "CIS: Security Above All," *Rocznik Strategiczny 2000/01* (Warsaw: Foundation of International Relations, 2001), pp. 220–39.

40. This had been implemented previously in Moscow's and Minsk's planning, but since the 1999 exercises Zapad (West) presented a high level of integration between separate units. The scenario is always based on NATO aggression, and this also presented the last large exercises of the Baltic Fleet (Interfax, August 16, 2001).

41. The KOR currently has 25,000 soldiers from all the armed forces. The ground forces have 850 tanks and 369 artillery systems. Most of the Baltic Fleet ships are stationed in the KOR, and most of them are quite modern (with fifteen years or fewer in service). In addition, Kaliningrad District has 5,000 soldiers from the Border Troops of the Federal Border Service and 1,000 soldiers from the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For detailed information, see Pavel Gazkun, *Rossiyskaya armiya na porogie XXI wieka* (Moscow: IEG Panorama, 2000), pp. 59–61, and Marcin Shiele, "Niebezpieczny sąsiad: Flota Baltycka i jej zaplecze," *Raport: Wojsko-Technika-Obronnosc,* no. 2 (2001), pp. 23–32.

42. "Tactical Nuclear Weapon in Kaliningrad," *CES Materials,* available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl.

43. Putin nominated its special representative, also responsible for monitoring relations between Kaliningrad District and the European Union. See notes from the council meeting: "Direktor Kaliningrada," *Vedomosti,* July 27, 2001; and "Kaliningradtskaya arifmetika," *Krasnaya Zvyezda,* July 28, 2001.