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Civil Society in Russia

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For some reason, the question "Who is Mr. Putin?" has gained much more attention in the West than the question "What is Russian society?" While the first question is important, especially in assessing Russia's short- to medium-term horizons, an adequate answer to the second question is of greater importance for the long-term perspective. Also, it is necessary for our understanding of informal societal constraints vis-à-vis Vladimir Putin's political and institutional creativity.

Developing a democratic culture and civil society takes time, no less than it does for restructuring the economy. In a mutually reinforcing equilibrium, "norms and networks of civic engagement contribute to economic prosperity and in turn [are] reinforced by that prosperity."[1]

To what extent has Russia developed a civil society? What forces are shaping civil society in Russia? What are the emerging patterns of interactions among civil society, the public sphere, and the state? How can reciprocal linkages among political culture, economic development, and stable democracy manifest themselves in the Russian context? What role, if any, can Putin play in fostering or impeding the development of civil society? What role, if any, can the West play in facilitating or inhibiting the development of civil society in Russia?

In the mid-1990s, the European Commission's Forward Studies Unit identified five reference scenarios for Russia's future:[2]

1) A policy based on improvisation;
2) Enlightened authoritarianism;
3) Hard-line authoritarianism;
4) Weakened central power; and
5) Gradual democratization.

What we observe today is enlightened authoritarianism that may muddle through or else evolve either into hard-line authoritarianism or gradual democratization. Which one prevails will depend not just upon Putin, but also on the quality of civil society.

This chapter starts with working definitions of civil society. It then proceeds with descriptions of two paradigms of Russian society and their relevance to the current domestic environment, underlines emerging patterns of interactions between the state and society, and finishes with short policy recommendations based on the analysis of dominant trends.

CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society is a concept that goes deep below the mechanisms of government into the culture and traditions of society at a more private level. It gained immense popularity in the 1980s and 1990s as a "conceptual code of the epoch" and was "one of the principal hermeneutic keys" to an understanding of relations between the modern state and modern society, especially those undergoing transformation.[3]

According to Gellner, "civil society is that set of diverse nongovernmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing society."[4] Cohen and Arato offer a more detailed definition of civil society as "a sphere of social interaction between the economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication. Modern civil society is created through self-constitution and self-mobilization. It is institutionalized and generalized through laws. In the long run both independent action and institutionalization are necessary for the reproduction of civil society."[5] Habermas underlines communicative connections between civil society, the public sphere, and the state: "Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously emergent associations, organizations, and movements that, attuned to how societal problems resonate in the private life sphere, distill and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. The core of civil society comprises a network of associations that institutionalizes problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside the framework of organized public spheres."[6]

TWO PARADIGMS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

After ten years of transformation one can discern two clusters of thought about Russian civil society. The first is "path dependence"—where you can get to depends upon where you are coming from. History matters, and the weight of Russian history is too great. Zinaida Golenkova has suggested that "in Russia, unlike the countries of the West, another type of social system had evolved historically, and this system was based on the effectiveness of power and not the effectiveness of property. Relations between property and power were inverted."[7] With enforced homogenization gone, a number of constraints going back to the Soviet past continue to restrict the articulation of interests. Yuri Levada, the patriarch of Russian sociology, concludes that "'Homo sovieticus' as a social type has proved to be … much more stable, [and] capable of adapting to the change of circumstances than it seemed ten years ago."[8] The old communist system collapsed from above *before* civil society had grown sufficiently strong enough to challenge it effectively from below. Civil society existed in the old system in a very embryonic form. One of the most extreme conclusions belongs to Tatiana Zaslavskaya: "When we say that civil society is a society of free people we must admit that there is no such society in our country and nothing is possible … in the near future."[9] Thomas Dine shares the opinion that "economic growth by itself will do little to create a civil society where it has not existed in the past."[10]

The second school of thought presents contrasting views of the relevance of history for the development of civil society. Despite its importance, history does not preclude a significant change in Russian culture. Thus, based on their analysis of grassroots attitudes, Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul challenge an established wisdom of comparative politics, which portrayed the process of democratization as a top-level elite affair aimed at the establishment of new institutions, thus facilitating democratic change. They argue that the Russian people "have assimilated democratic values faster than the elite [have] negotiated democratic institutions" and that "Russian society seems more transformed … than the political structures governing it."[11]

Within the framework of this school of thought, special attention is paid to the set of contemporary factors blocking the potential for the development of civil society in Russia. Those factors are mostly attributed to the degradation of Russia's human capital and to the nature of Putin's regime. The following items are the most frequently mentioned: 1) *growing poverty*—more than 40 million people, or about 30 percent of the population, are living below the subsistence level on less than U.S.$1 a day, and more than 70 percent of Russian children are living in poor families; 2) *deepening income disparities*—the biggest income gap of all East European transition economies (incomes of the wealthiest groups are more than 14 times

higher than those of the poorest); 3) *growing number of disabled*—close to 10 million or about 7 percent of the population; 4) *excess mortality*—the Russian population is shrinking by 750,000 every year; 5) *soaring infectious diseases*—the 1999 death toll from tuberculosis was about 15 times the toll in the United States, or nearly 30 times greater when measured as deaths per 100,000 persons in both countries; 6) *skyrocketing unemployment*—about 25 percent; 7) *declining provision of public services*—education, social services, etc.; 8) *escape through substance abuse*—alcohol and drugs; and 9) *rampant corruption*.[12] Needless to say, these factors severely limit social activities. Everyday survival eats up almost all time and energy and produces an apathetic citizenry, whose mobility is additionally constrained by such relics of the past as the residence-permit system, or *propiska*.

Those who follow the path-dependency school differ on their interpretation of Russia's future. Some observers share the view that Russia is unique and will always be different from the West. Others believe that Russia is capable of modernization and adaptation but that the process will take longer. Both subgroups believe, however, that the way out of Russia's multifaceted path dependencies should be "a homegrown affair" with a marginal role for the West to play. As William Odom put it, "adapting U.S. policy accordingly does not mean slamming the door on Russia, but it does suggest fewer U.S. efforts to shape Russian political developments through economic and technical assistance programs."[13]

To some extent, these two schools of thought are somewhat rigid on a conceptual level, which means their conclusions have limited relevance on a policy level. What is lacking here is an analysis of the relationships between state institutions and those of civil society. Interactions *internal* to political, economic, and societal developments in Russia could help analysts understand, for example, the nature of the current debate on Russia's "return to Europe." Does it mean accepting a whole set of political and economic norms (and societal values) that together transform society in a way that is democratically desired, but is not so easily achievable in new democracies without commitment to an extremely fixed rulebook of *acquis communautaire?* Or is it just a rhetorical exercise without significant practical meaning, because if implemented it would contradict the "Russia's own way" paradigm?

There is no doubt that throughout the 1990s civil society in Russia became stronger. However, it remains rather weak on an institutional level, even though the Justice Ministry's registry of nonprofit organizations is about 350,000. About 70,000 of these are actually operational. Every year they create up to one million jobs and provide free services to 20 million Russians—worth 15 billion rubles a year.[14]

As Table 2.1 shows, Russia, classified in the category of "hybrid/transitional states,"[15] and featuring characteristics of "at best an illiberal democ-

racy"[16] with a predominantly closed policymaking procedure, has emasculated legislatures, inefficient and corrupt governmental agencies, weak and unpopular political parties, backward courts, oppressed media with growing habits of self-censorship, and a fragile civil society. Together with the continuation of warfare in Chechnya, Russia firmly occupies a place between the new "democracies with competitive market economies," like Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania, and the new "consolidated autocracies with fully statist economies," like Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

Table 2.1: Nations in Transit 2001: Selected Ratings Summary[17]

Country	CS	IM	PP	GPA	**DEM**	CLJF	CO	**ROL**
Russia	4.00	5.25	4.25	5.00	**4.63**	4.50	6.25	**5.38**
Azerbaijan	4.50	5.75	5.75	6.25	**5.56**	5.25	6.25	**5.75**
Belarus	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.25	**6.56**	6.75	5.25	**6.00**
Uzbekistan	6.50	6.75	6.75	6.00	**6.50**	6.50	6.00	**6.25**
Georgia	4.00	3.50	4.50	4.75	**4.19**	4.00	5.00	**4.50**
=======	===	===	===	===	**===**	===	===	**===**
Bulgaria	3.50	3.25	2.00	3.50	**3.06**	3.50	4.75	**4.13**
Slovakia	2.00	2.00	2.25	2.75	**2.25**	2.25	3.75	**3.00**
Lithuania	1.75	1.75	1.75	2.50	**1.94**	1.75	3.75	**2.75**
Poland	1.25	1.50	1.25	1.75	**1.44**	1.50	2.25	**1.88**

CS=Civil Society; IM=Independent Media; PP=Political Process; GPA=Governance and Public Administration; DEM=Democratization; CLJF=Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework; CO=Corruption; ROL=Rule of Law.

Ratings are provided on a one-to-seven scale, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. The ratings for Civil Society, Independent Media, Political Process, and Governance and Public Administrations subsections are averaged to determine a Democratization score; the Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Framework and Corruption ratings are averaged to provide an overall Rule of Law score. The 2001 scores and ratings reflect the period July 1, 1999, through October 31, 2000.

Organized groups are necessary for people to be able to act independently of or in opposition to the state authority in a sustained way. It is a well-known fact that *organizational membership* is much lower in post-communist countries than in either the older democracies of the West or in the post-authoritarian countries of southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. A country's prior communist experience has a strong negative effect on contemporary organizational membership.

Data from the Post-Communist Organizational Membership Study, a representative survey that was conducted in 1999 in Russia, eastern Germany, and western Germany, shows that three factors have a mutually reinforcing negative effect on public participation in post-communist Europe: 1) a legacy of mistrust of organizations; 2) the persistence of vibrant friendship networks; and 3) the widespread disappointment with the new systems.[18] It means that in order to curb the above-mentioned negativism, organizations (trade unions, political parties, advocacy nongovernmental organiza-

tions [NGOs], etc.) should be perceived as efficient and trustworthy institutions able to undertake autonomous and independent actions, and that standards of living should visibly improve. Both conditions scarcely exist in Russia today and this situation is not likely to be improved in the near future. An immediate implication of this social dynamic would be a negative impact on the process of personal learning, because learning requires a liberal public space, "an arena in which interested parties can communicate and test hypotheses."[19]

Table 2.2 demonstrates the extent to which civil society is able to undertake autonomous and independent actions and meet important criteria on a personal level. A growing majority of Russians prefers the Soviet model of a very modest but guaranteed income. Only 6 percent would opt for the full risk of "ownership of your own business." A relatively higher portion, almost 25 percent, would choose "high work and high earnings," even without guarantees for the future. It means that approximately one-third of Russians value risk-bearing strategies to achieve economic success. Though a dominant majority continue to prefer stability, the figures nonetheless present an encouraging picture of emerging active social groups, which could add value to Russia's social capital. This conclusion is also supported by an observation that the proportion of those valuing "hard work and hard earnings" includes as much as 32 percent of respondents between the ages of 25 and 40.

Table 2.2: Guarantees and Risks: A Choice of Priorities ("What Would You Prefer if You Could Choose?")[20]

What would you prefer if you could choose?	1989	1994	1999
Low wages, but more free time and easier work	10	4	3
Low but guaranteed wages and confidence in tomorrow	45	54	60
Hard work and high earnings, even without guarantees for the future	26	23	23
Ownership of your own business, with all the risk and rewards	9	6	6
Difficult to say	10	19	8

A WEAK STATE AND A WEAK CIVIL SOCIETY IN RUSSIA

We understand "weak state" to mean inefficient state institutions with a weak performance. However, this does not make them less visible. In fact, the situation is just the opposite. In Russia, the state is very inefficient but still excessively visible and "heavy."

Even under the ideal conditions of a strong and vibrant civil society, the state has limited significance if it is weak and inefficient. In a social context, when new "trust networks" or "risk-bearing networks" do not exist or

at least are very fragile, the ineffectiveness of the state forces people to resort to—and then refashion and adapt—the familiar networks, such as labor collectives, which are outside public politics.[21] Therefore, what looks familiar may have new causes. What may seem to be "restorations" of familiar socialist patterns may be responses to new conditions, "produced *by* them, rather than remnants of an older mentality." If one cannot rely upon proven capacities of the government to meet its commitments, there are few incentives to develop civic associations or to lobby respective social interests. The state must be able to implement policies in order to encourage people to shift the locus of their interpersonal networks to partial dependence on governmental agents. If the state becomes more effective, it becomes reasonable to put sustained pressure on it, which might empower civil society and facilitate its healthy input into public politics. If Putin's reform program produces better governance, then pressure from civil society would increase rather than decrease, thus building trust in the sustainability of change. Citizens always have some power, even in illiberal democracies, because elites must compete for citizens' favor.

However, it seems that like Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, Putin is inclined to create political institutions and promote social-economic change without broadening political participation and relying on a loyal bureaucracy as a main modernizing force. Avoiding a *blitzkrieg* strategy, he is carefully implementing a special sequence of reforms—national, political, and economic.[22] In some way Russia's reform process seems similar to what David Kelly and He Baogang wrote on China. They pointed to a "new authoritarianism" offering an "express train to modernization" in which democracy would be for the elite only, and in which it would only be the new rich, property-owning middle class who would enjoy the rights of participation in civil society.[23]

According to Adam Przeworski, when the legitimacy of democracy becomes detached from its efficacy and it is unconditionally accepted by large majorities, we have *prima facie* evidence of normative consolidation. Before achieving this stage of democratization, government authorities are perennially tempted to replace politics with administration, anarchy with discipline, to do the moral or the rational—in other words, to resort to authoritarianism. "The temptation is fueled by several ideologies. Nationalism provides one, religion another. *Organic* views of the nation are incompatible with the tolerance of partial interests. If the nation is an organism, it is not a body that can breed divisions and conflicts.… Individualism and dissent are manifestations of not belonging.… Political forces do not appear as parties representing partial interests against other partial values or projects.… Democracy is then just an *interim moment* of competition for the monopoly in representing the national interest."[24]

Russian post-communist nationalism compounded by persistent nostalgia about lost greatness is on the rise. A set of personalized historical

"markers" proves this convincingly. The first five most remarkable people of all time for Russians were in listed in 1989 as Lenin (75%), Peter I (41%), Pushkin (27%), Lomonosov (22%), Suvorov (18%); in 1994, Peter I (41%), Lenin (34%), Pushkin (23%), Stalin (20%), Suvorov (18%); and in 1999, Peter I (46%), Lenin (42%), Pushkin (42%), Stalin (35%), and Gagarin (26%).[25] It is no surprise therefore to see a portrait of Peter the Great in Putin's office.

Despite many signs of the rebirth of Russian nationalism as one of the forms of adaptation to post-imperial trauma, its usefulness as an effective long-term mobilization tool is limited. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, the Russian people have a very low opinion of the social and economic situations in Russia and a very high opinion of the most developed Western democracies, most notably the United States. The same phenomena would also limit external expressions of nationalism in Russia's foreign policy, including its relations with the United States. After the tragic events of September 11, that becomes even more difficult.

Table 2.3: In What Country?

In which of the following countries…?	Do not know, but definitely not in Russia	**Russia**	Germany	Great Britain	**United States**	Undecided
More guarantees for freedom of speech	-10	**8**	8	7	**41**	26
People are more equal	-11	**9**	15	11	**29**	28
People are more free from state intervention in their personal lives	-10	**8**	11	9	**35**	25
People have more rights and opportunities	-10	**5**	12	8	**43**	26
State cares more about citizens	-12	**3**	23	12	**28**	21
People have more opportunities to influence state politics	-14	**5**	12	12	**30**	16
People are more prosperous	-11	**1**	23	10	**40**	22

Source: All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) nationwide poll of adult Russians conducted in June 2001 (N=1600) available at: www.wciom.ru/vciom/new/public/public_own/010610_mancountr.htm.

Institutional patterns (the rules of the game in a society) are self-reinforcing, even when they are socially inefficient. It is almost always easier to adapt to the existing rules of the game than to seek to change them. Informal norms and culture change more slowly than formal rules, and tend to remold those formal rules, so that the external imposition of a common set of formal rules will lead to widely divergent outcomes.[26]

As long as Putin is perceived as an embodiment of stability and apostle of order, he and the current regime are safe. But what if he ceases to be perceived as a guarantor of order and positive, albeit gradual, change? His current high approval rating does not in itself guarantee future loyalty and support of society. In fact, it could be even double-edged, as it produces excessive expectations and inherently holds a risk of extreme disillusionment. Gorbachev and Yeltsin learned this well. Any events that could fuel those feelings of disillusionment could produce pressure to strengthen authoritarian practices. That would bring back the risk of a legitimate crisis, eroding trust and opening space for both civil disobedience and pathologies.

According to Lilia Shevtsova, one of the mechanisms of bureaucratic stabilization used by Putin's "elective monarchy" is imitation. Another one is co-optation. If the process of "nativization" of the idea of democracy is really under way in Russia,[27] one may not exclude the possibility that the elites are experiencing a kind of perverted nativization. While in foreign policy Putin's Russia is shifting from a "redline" language to a "pipeline" language, in communication with intelligentsia authorities are becoming familiar with the language of civil society. Not incidentally, one can therefore observe previously unthinkable phenomena, such as a roundtable in the Kremlin entitled "Power and Civil Society: Perspectives of Cooperation." A special meeting between Putin and carefully selected leaders of the NGO community was held in June 2001. There an agreement was made to organize a civic forum of NGOs, which was held in November 2001. The NGO Advisory Council under Chairman of the Russian State Duma Gennady Seleznev had been established earlier. In a similar move and in parallel to the authorities, a controversial oligarch, Boris Berezovsky, launched an ambitious Foundation for Civil Liberties with a mission to "provide resources for civil society to defend rights and liberties."[28]

Some observers interpret these moves as an attempt to mobilize and exploit civil society's energy and structures for the Kremlin's ends. In other words, recent "civic forum brainwaves" are about co-opting, controlling, and managing civil society.[29]

Speaking at the meeting with the leaders of pre-selected NGOs, Putin specifically expressed his concern that "many nongovernmental organizations exist on foreign grants.… It does not give us dignity, our civil society should be developed on its own base.… Power in Russia has already strengthened enough to provide support and defend rights and the liberty

of citizens. I wish we would become allies."[30] This is Putin's original answer to the question, "What role, if any, can the West play in facilitating the development of civil society in Russia?" If we take note of these nuances in Putin's vision of partnership between the Kremlin and NGOs, and bear in mind the still unfriendly legal framework for their operation in Russia, it is difficult to avoid feelings of déjà vu: Putin's remarks consititute a vivid reminder of the practice of "building developed socialism" under the slogan "*Narod i Partiya Ediny*." There is a danger that the new campaign, "Building civil society," could well serve as an ideological justification for the emerging "neo-authoritarianism with a human face." It would mean that Russia is moving from enforced homogenization of the Soviet past through enforced change of the Gorbachev *perestroika* and enforced adaptation of the Yeltsin era to enforced civil society as a by-product of Putin's "modernization by order."

Putin himself responded to his critics at the opening session of the Civil Forum at the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses on November 21, 2001, saying that he regards "any attempts to impose a civil society from above as absolutely counterproductive, practically impossible, and even dangerous."[31] Whatever happens after the Civil Forum should be considered a test for the new Russian pattern of interaction between the state and society and viewed through the lens of Putin's clear-cut statement. Further organizational maturing of the Civil Forum type of activities would mean strengthening the pattern of "controlled democracy" with an emphasis on the civil society networks and organizations loyal to Putin. If, on the other hand, Russian society really is more transformed than the political structures governing it, then we would observe more modern and less hierarchical patterns of interactions.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be a mistake to follow a "pendulum pattern" in designing technical assistance programs—that is, shifting from a top-down approach that supports the institution-building of "political society" to a narrowly understood opposite approach of "empowering civil society." It does not mean simply seeing a distinction between supporting the third sector of NGOs and a broader network of civil society. What is more important is to design programs that will facilitate *interaction* between civil society and political society in order to "mobilize counter-knowledge and draw on its experts to make the pertinent translations of issues that administrative power may try to control"[32] and to organize the social learning process around a normative issue.

The same logic is relevant for considering a ratio of Moscow-centered and regionally based initiatives. To simply shift from the capital to the

provinces and push each province to seek its oasis of civil society would be a mistake. What is required is a design of programs that will encourage networking and cooperation both among regional projects, as well as among capital-based groups and regional networks.

A vital civil society requires a political culture in which people actively participate in public debates. The West should do more fostering of communicative structures within *existing* institutions and public spheres. One of the most promising areas is the development of professional associations. Their agenda-setting and opinion-forming power in a society marked by growing differentiation and low respect for political parties should not be underestimated. Citizens' access to information, including such areas as implementation of freedom of information laws, development of freedom of the press, and citizens' watchdog groups in Russian regions, should be a priority. In this light it would be advisable to support programs aimed at improving the public's ability to make sense of policy options, by providing much better access to information and by helping the policy community and media make issues understandable to the public. The West could help in strengthening the ability of nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups to monitor government accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law, and to forcefully advocate measures which limit corruption.

Broadening space for civil society should be considered an important preventive countermeasure vis-à-vis temptations on the part of government to over-regulate in the post–September 11 environment. That would require continuous support in developing and implementing sound tax reform and charitable-giving laws, broadening links to grassroots membership, and ensuring effective civil society input into governmental decision-making.

Coping with isolationist and nationalist trends within Russian society requires constant external pressure from old and new transnational civil society networks. In addition to strategic, diplomatic, bilateral, and multilateral interaction and deepening economic interdependence within the current international system, this would help promote social and cultural interpenetration vital for Russia's reemerging civil society. The patterns of interaction, accountability, and learning that are developing within the framework of the Community of Democracies initiative and the World Forum of Democracy[33] could become an important instrument in ensuring the positive integration of Russian civil society actors into global civil society. Given the fragility of civil society in Russia and the specific understanding of the "partnership between the state and civil society" by some Putinists, this international link is crucial. Civil society forces neglected or silenced inside Russia may well gain a voice at the regional, if not global, level. They should not be sacrificed for the sake of presumably higher national security interests in the post–September 11 strategic geopolitical

environment.

Putin's policy may well become an attempt broken by path dependency linked to a double legacy of imperialism and communism and to the legacy of failed early transition. Whether he will be able to play this historic role depends both on his ability to abandon Russia's ingrown systemic mistrust of society, and on the ability of civil society not to fall into the pattern of "controlled democracy," *a priori* loyal to the Russian state striving to restore its greatness.

Russian society is not a Sleeping Beauty, just passively waiting to be awakened. It is gradually becoming a Cinderella, resembling a story of human transformation and rebirth, and a change from poverty and neglect to personal fulfillment. Still, this process is not yet universal throughout the country. Moreover, the process contains both new oases of autonomous social life and old ghettos of authoritarian order within the regionally and culturally varied social fabric of the former empire. In some places it rather reminds one of the noble image of Don Quixote with his state of personal confusion, peculiar inability to see things clearly, and, alas, vulnerability to manipulations of rulers. Will Russia eventually become Joan of Arc, replete with her sense of leadership, freedom against oppression, and ability to act? It remains to be seen. At the same time, however, we hope Russia will be able to avoid Joan's tragic fate and remain alive.

NOTES

1. Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 180.

2. "Shaping Actors, Shaping Factors in Russia's Future," http://europa.eu.int/comm/cdp/cahiers/resume/russie_en.htm.

3. Michael Emerson, *Redrawing the Map of Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 129–30; Zinaida Golenkova, "Civil Society in Russia," *Russian Social Science Review*, vol. 40, no. 1 (January/February 1999). Christopher Candland has rightfully observed that "as a result of its recent popularity, the concept has become somewhat detached from its intellectual roots. The term 'civil society' is now often used as an elaborate substitute for society, without any substantial difference in meaning." See Christopher Candland, "Civil Society," in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 140.

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6. J. Habermas, *Between Fact and Norms: Contribution to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p. 367.

7. Golenkova, *op. cit.*

8. Yuri Levada, "Soviet Man Ten Years After, 1989–1999," *Russian Social Science Review*, vol. 42, no. 1 (January/February 2001).

9 Tatiana Zaslavskaya and N. Mikhailova, "Social Structure and Civil Society," *Social Sciences,* vol. 31, no. 3 (September 2000).

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14. *Izvestia*, November 21, 2001.

15. Adrian Karatnycky, "Nations in Transit 1999–2000: From Post-Revolutionary Stasis to Incremental Progress," in Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Aili Piano, eds., *Nations in Transit 1999–2000: Civil Society, Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Freedom House and Transaction Publishers, 2001), pp. 10–11.

16. Colton and McFaul, *op. cit.*

17. Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer, eds., *Nations in Transit 2001: Civil Society, Democracy, and Markets in East Central Europe and the Newly Independent States* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Freedom House and Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 25.

18. Marc Morje Howard, "Free Not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe," *Studies in Public Policy,* no. 325 (University of Strathclyde, Scotland: Center for the Study of Public Policy, February 2000).

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22. More information in Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 348–52.

23. Quoted in Bill Lomax, "Reviews," *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 45, no. 3 (1993), p. 559.

24. Adam Przeworski et al, *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 59, 61.

25. Yuri Levada, *op. cit.*

26. See Robert Putnam, *op. cit.*

27. Lilia Shevtsova, "Elective Monarchy Under Putin: Perspectives on the Evolution of the Political Regime and Its Perspectives," *Briefing Papers*, vol. 3, no. 1 (January 2001), available at http://pubs.carnegie.ru/english/briefings/2001/issue01-01.asp; "Power and Political Leadership in Russia under Putin," presentation at the conference "Russia: Ten Years After," June 2001, available at http://www.ceip.org/files/programs/russia/tenyears/presentatiom/shevtsova.htm.

28. See website of Berezovsky's foundation at www.kolokol.org.

29. Ian Traynor, "Putin plays the liberal," *The Guardian,* August 20, 2001.

30. See http://strana.ru/print/992355479.html.

31. See http://strana.ru/stories/01/11/16/2029/85321.html.

32. Michael Welton, "Civil Society and the Public Sphere," *Studies in the Education of Adults,* vol. 33, no. 1 (April 2001).

33. The Community of Democracies Ministerial Meeting was convened in Warsaw on June 26–27, 2000. At the meeting, 110 governments endorsed the Warsaw Declaration, which lays out a comprehensive set of democratic principles and practices that member governments commit themselves to uphold. A parallel, nongovernmental World Forum on Democracy called for support in establishing an alliance of open societies to "foster improved conditions for freedom and democracy within individual countries," to "promote an open society based on the rule of law," and to "ensure more effective cooperative development efforts focused on democratic change."