Notes

Introduction

1. The standard Arabic transliteration is *qismah* or *qismat* in combining form. Interestingly, the word appears only three times in the Qur'an and never in the sense of fate. Two verbal forms come closer to that meaning: 15:43–44 where the seven gates of hell have, each, their apportioned lot and 43:32 where God, blaming those who would "apportion" His mercy, proclaims that He has apportioned ranks in this world. Moreover, "God's mercy is better than worldly wealth."

2. *Maktub*, as such, appears just once in the Qur'an, but *kitab* (the Book, i.e., the Qur'an) and other forms of the k-t-b root conveying the ideas of what is written in the sense of being prescribed provide one of the most prominent Qur'anic motifs.

3. The Persian word is *gharbzadegi*, which was the title of an influential short book written in the early 1960s by the Iranian social critic Jalal Al-e Ahmad. *Gharbzadegi* soon became one of the preferred watchwords used against the Pahlavi regime in Iran. Ironically, Jalal Al-e Ahmad and many other opponents of Muhammad Riza Shah who bandied the word "Westoxification" were themselves quite "Westernized," especially so when set alongside the mullahs who seized control in 1979.

4. An oft-cited slogan that has rather convincingly been shown to have been coined no earlier than the late nineteenth century.

5. Qur'an 2:143: "We have appointed you a community of the middle way, so that you might be witness before all mankind." This is the translation of Abu A'la Mawdudi, who figures prominently later in this book as a leading Islamist.

He is not usually thought to be flexible or moderate. Yet, his commentary on that verse, while giving Muslims a leadership role in the world (but not unlike the Christian "light for revelation to the Gentiles and for glory to thy people Israel," Luke 2:32), adds this touching sentence, "What is expected of this community is that it should be able to make known, both by word and deed, the meaning of godliness and righteousness, of equity and fair play." *Towards Understanding the Qur'an*, vol. 1 (Surahs 1–3), English version of Mawdudi's *Tafhim al-Qur'an*, pp. 120–121. Caution in classifying the good and the bad (from whatever perspective) in religio-political confrontations is advisable.

1. Setting the Stage: Islam and Muslims

1. These estimates and those in the following three paragraphs are taken (rounded) from the table on p. 315 of the 1999 *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year*.

2. For the 1994 pilgrimage season, for example, roughly 2.5 million Muslims are reported to have come. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year*, 1995, p. 274.

3. Estimates a few decades ago usually advanced a 90 percent/10 percent Sunni-Shi'a split. It can be speculated that the number of Shi'a in countries of majority Sunni populations, or of non-Shi'a political control (e.g., Iraq or Lebanon), were often underreported and that present estimates are more accurate. Neither conversions to Shi'ism nor significant birth rate differentials would appear to be a factor. High birth rates among Shi'a (as in Lebanon) are more than matched globally by high or even higher birth rates among Sunnis (as in Jordan). A cautionary note on all such speculation: most of the essential demographic and quantitative research and analysis on such issues remains to be accomplished.

4. It was the Fatimids who founded Cairo (*Al-Qahira*, "the victorious," in Arabic) in 969 C.E. and soon thereafter built the celebrated al-Azhar mosque-university. After the end of Fatimid rule (definitely achieved two centuries later in 1169) and Egypt's return to Sunnism, al-Azhar became and has remained the most famous Sunni religious seminary in the world.

5. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat labeled his Muslim fundamentalist opponents Kharijites, perhaps an appropriate tag for those uncompromising, puritanical religious radicals whose tactic of assassination later extended to the president himself. Sadat's evoking the name of this earliest of Muslim schisms, the Kharijites, also underscores how very important the early history of Islam remains in today's political lexicon.

6. One might add, for example, the Ahmadiyya movement in the Indian subcontinent, named after Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908), who is seen as

the promised mahdi or messiah. They consider themselves to be Muslim but are not so regarded by many Muslims and have suffered considerable political oppression in Pakistan. Another example is the American Black Muslim movement, which in its origins was demonstrably a syncretist religion, but in the intervening years many have come to embrace "orthodox" Sunni Islam. Such was the case with the late Malcolm X.

2. Islam, Judaism, and Christianity in Comparative Perspective: An Overview

1. Bowles, *The Spider's House*, p. 6. Bowles, alas, is not usually "right on target" about Moroccans or Muslims. In most of his fiction they are presented as the "Other" who are just not like us. See Coury, "Paul Bowles and Orientalism."

2. Hodgson is author of the monumental three-volume *The Venture of Islam*.

3. In recent years it has become chic in certain circles to deny the possibility of value-free scholarship. Of course, value-free scholarship is a goal that can only be approximated, never achieved. It is a methodological convention, but one that enhances cross-cultural communication.

4. Crone, "Islam, Judeo-Christianity, and Byzantine Iconoclasm," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, p. 63.

5. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Comments on a Few Theological Issues," p. 463.

6. Hodgson, "A Comparison of Islam and Christianity," pp. 56–60.

7. And yet there is something of the deathbed conversion syndrome deep in Christian culture. Remember Mistress Quickly in reporting the last mortal moments of Shakespeare's classic rogue, Falstaff: "So a' cried out 'God, God, God!' three or four times: now I, to comfort him, bid him a' should not think of God. I hoped there was no need to trouble himself with any such thoughts yet." *Henry V*, 2.3.9.

8. Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace," pp. 164–165. A useful compilation is Peters's *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader*.

9. Perhaps even more than in Judaism with such images as "The lord is my shepherd" (23d Psalm)?

10. In traditional pious formulations of the majority Sunnis, Islam's golden age came to a close after the time of the "four rightly guided caliphs" who immediately succeeded Muhammad (the minority Shi'is maintain that the fourth caliph, Ali, should have immediately assumed the caliphate followed thereafter by his descendants). Thereafter, under the Umayyads, came *mulk* (kingship) and a falling away from Islamic political virtues. In any case, whether the early Muslim community was to remain centered in Arabia was never the issue. The fourth caliph and Muhammad's son-in-law, Ali, had already moved to Basra in Iraq. Even if Ali had won the civil war rather than Mu'awiya, the

founder of the Umayyad dynasty, the political center of gravity would have left Arabia, not to return.

11. The singular is *faqih*, a term brought to Western attention by the Ayatullah Khomeini, who insisted that a religiously learned individual, the *faqih*, should serve as principal guide to the conduct of government among Muslims. This was *wilayat al-faqih*, or, in Persian transliteration, *velayat-e faqih*, which is the stewardship or guardianship exercised by one learned in Islam. In its comprehensiveness and legalistic rigor the Khomeini ideal is reminiscent of John Calvin's plans for Geneva.

3. Muslim "Church Government"

1. The Sufi brotherhood leaders (shaykkhs or *pirs* or *babas* . . .), as noted in the previous chapter, are religious specialists in a different sense, being guides to a more gnostic approach to God. As such, they run the gamut from learned intellectuals to uneducated "seers."

2. It was technically only a military occupation from 1882 until 1914 when Britain declared a protectorate. These nuances, important for diplomatic history, can be disregarded here. More important for our subject was the option that Abduh represented of cooperation with foreign non-Muslim power in the conviction that this policy, rather than active or even passive resistance, would best serve the long-term interests of Egypt and of Islam.

3. Followers of this doctrine reject the label *Wahhabi* as implying a partial transfer to a mere mortal of the veneration due exclusively to God. They use, instead the term *Muwahhidun*, which translates literally as "unitarians" (i.e., accepting the oneness of God), but given the theologically liberal sense of *Unitarian* in the Christian context that translation would occasion different misunderstandings.

4. Note the parallel with English constitutional history: Trevelyan in his *History of England* writes, "James and Charles held, with the students of Roman Law, that the will of the Prince was the source of law, and that the Judges were 'lions under the throne,' bound to speak, as he directed them. (Sir Edward) Coke, on the other hand, in the spirit of the English Common Law, conceived of law as having an independent existence of its own, set above the King as well as his subjects." Richard H. Nolte, after citing Trevelyan, added, "To borrow Coke's metaphor, the ruler in classical Islam had lions under the throne in the form of his Islamic law judges. But he could not command them. He could leash them and unleash them, but they listened to the command of the sacred law, which was beyond his control." Nolte, "The Rule of Law in the Arab Middle East." Writing at a time when secularization seemed unstoppable and the ulama in full retreat, Nolte continued that the modern Middle Eastern ruler "has equipped

himself with powerful new lions borrowed from the West who are fully sub-servient to his command and has also asserted his control over the sacred law itself." This interpretation from the 1950s offers a stimulating backdrop to the different situation Middle East political authority confronts today.

5. Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) was author of the justly celebrated philosophy of history that has been translated in its entirety by Franz Rosenthal, *The Muqaddimah*. A convenient selection of short passages illustrating Ibn Khaldun's principal ideas is *An Arab Philosophy of History* translated and arranged by Charles Issawi.

6. An apparent exception was the action of the Egyptian Higher Committee of al-Azhar ulama in 1925 against Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq, whose celebrated book, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm,* argued for separation of religion and state. They voted to expel him from the ranks of Azhar ulama and to deprive him of his judgeship. They were acting as a "church," but this was no "church-state" confrontation. King Fuad and the Azhari ulama were cooperating in this very political decision. Interestingly, Abd al-Raziq's supporters argued, inter alia, that the action resembled "religious courts in the Middle Ages" and the Egyptian intellectual Taha Husayn insisted that the Sunni Azhari ulama were acting like Shi'is (which is somewhat like a Baptist accusing his opponent of popery). See Smith, *Islam and the Search for Social Order*, pp. 77–79.

7. For details on each case see Green, "A Tunisian Reply to a Wahhabi Proclamation"; Ali Mahjoubi, *Les Origines du mouvement national en Tunisie*, pp. 486–510; *Al-Ahram*, May 10, 1979; and *Middle East Journal* (Autumn 1960), pp. 452–453. See also the many examples cited in the article "Shaikh al-Islam" in the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

8. In this treaty the Ottomans lost control over the Crimean Tatars, but article 3 stated that these Muslims should follow the Ottoman sultan "in his capac-ity of Grand Caliph" in religious matters. This was balanced by the Russian claim to protect Orthodox Christian Ottoman subjects (article 7). See Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, pp. 92–101, for the English text of the treaty. European claims to intervene on behalf of non-Muslim sub-jects (a leitmotif of "Eastern Question" diplomacy, with France and Austria vying to protect the Catholic and Uniate Christians, Britain supporting the few Protestants, plus, interestingly, the Druze, and Russia championing the Orthodox Christians) has as its logical corollary the Ottoman right to speak for Muslims under non-Muslim political authority. See also pp. 108 ff., this volume.

9. See "Shaikh al-Islam," in the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

10. More precisely, the twelfth imam went into occultation in 874 C.E. Thereafter, he was deemed to have contacted the Shi'i community by means of a representative or agent (*wakil*) who upon his death was replaced by another *wakil*. The fourth wakil announced just before his death in 941 that henceforth the imam would not communicate with the community through

human mediation until his return as the mahdi. Shi'is call the period from 874 to 940 the lesser occultation (*al-ghayba al-sughra*). Thereafter, the Shi'a community has been living in the period of greater occultation (*al-ghayba al-kubra*).

11. Unlike the various groups stemming from Sevener or Ismaili Shi'ism, who were politically active. Thus, the Fatimid challenge to the Abbasid caliphate and the Fatimid offshoot that became the Druze community.

12. *Akhbar* (sing. *khabar*) is identical to *hadith* (pl. *ahadith*) as used in Sunni Islam. Both Sunnis and Shi'is use maxims and sayings from the Prophet and from those living during the Muslim patristic age, but their collections of such material to guide the faithful differ somewhat. In Shi'ism the tracing of *akhbar* to Ali and the imams predominates.

13. Cole, "Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama," p. 40.

14. Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam*, p. 265.

15. In 1890 the Shah granted a British subject a monopoly over the production, sale, and export of all tobacco. Dismay from within Iran at this sellout to foreign control and an appeal from Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (recently deported from Iran), in neighboring Iraq, ignited action. The order of the leading Shi'i 'alim of the day, Hajj Mirza Hasan Shirazi, to boycott all use of tobacco forced the Iranian government to cancel the concession. See Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, pp. 66–67, plus the same author's *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani,"* chapter 12: "The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892." The classic study of the constitutional revolutionary period in Iran is Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1910*. A summary account is given in *Roots of Revolution*. Note also chapter 2, "The Constitutional Revolution," in Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*.

16. In a short introduction to his translation of Khomeini's writings and declarations, Hamid Algar observed that Khomeini was called "imam" and not "ayatullah" in Iranian usage, adding, "The title 'Ayatullah' in Shi'i Islam is generally bestowed on high-ranking religious scholars, and has also been applied to Imam Khomeini. However, since his role has been unique among the religious scholars of Iran and has exceeded what is implied in the title 'Ayatullah,' he has received the designation of Imam in recent years. It is important to note that the word *imam* applied to Khomeini has its general and original sense of leader, and not the particular and technical sense it has acquired when applied to the Twelve Imams believed by Shi'i Muslims to be the successors of the Prophet." Algar buttresses the distinction between the two uses of "imam" by two citations from Khomeini's celebrated *Islamic Government*. See *Islam and Revolution*, p. 10. There is every reason to accept that Khomeini, precise Islamic scholar that he was, intended just such a distinction to be made. He was not presuming to be *the* imam returning from his long occultation. Even so, given the apocalyptic atmosphere prevailing in Iran during the period that brought down the shah and created the Islamic Republic, and given the charismatic quality of Khomeini's

leadership, the two meanings of *imam* may well have become somewhat conflated in the popular mind.

4. *The Historical Bases of Traditional Muslim and Christian Political Theory*

1. Lest this very worldly interpretation and the use of the lowercase *he* in speaking of Jesus appear abusive to (my fellow) Christians, let me explain that it stems from an effort to study human history in strictly human terms without reference to divine purpose or divine intervention, always differently understood in different religions. The different religions and their relations to politics and history can and should be studied comparatively, but not from the dogmatics of any particular religion. Scholarship is necessarily earthbound. Religious faith is something else.

2. The historical development among Orthodox and Eastern churches was different, but since the Western experience in the long run has had a decidedly greater *political* impact on the world it seems appropriate to discuss just the two—Western Christendom and the Muslim umma for comparison.

3. Exceptions that test the rule are the Kharijites during the time of the early Muslim community and the *Takfir wa al-Hijra* movement in modern Egypt.

4. Abd al-Raziq, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm*. Khalid, *Min Huna Nabda*.

5. That is, the tradition of deriving political theories from an examination of how humans actually behave rather than how they ought to behave. As Francis Bacon insisted, "We are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what men do, and not what they ought to do."

6. Luther, *Secular Authority*, 3:237.

5. *Unity and Community*

1. Even the Shi'a community had reached this point by 869 C.E. with the *ghayba* of the twelfth imam. Thereafter, Twelver Shi'ism, like Sunnism, could avoid the political problems that come with a divinely guided leader present in this world. Ismaili or Sevener Shi'ism took a different development, as seen in the messianic religio-political movement of the Fatimids or, for that matter, the position of the Agha Khan among present-day Ismailis.

2. Qur'an 4:59

3. Al-Suhrawardi, *Kitab Adab al-Muridin*, p. 29.

4. Ibn Jama'a, *Tahrir al-Ahkam fii Tadbir Ahl al-Islam*, p. 357: "Jurists in Morocco have summed up the rule in the brief maxim: 'To him who holds power obedience is given.' " Santillana, "Law and Society," p. 303.

5. For example, the Westernizing Tunisian statesman, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, cited this as part of his argument for constitutionalism. See *The Surest Path*, p. 83.

6. Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, extracted and translated by Lewis, *Islam from the Prophet Muhammad*, p. 161.

7. Ibn Batta, *Kitab al-Sharh wa al-Ibana 'ala Usul al-Sunna wa al-Diyana*, cited in Lewis, *Islam from the Prophet Muhammad* p. 171.

8. Cahen, "The Body Politic," p. 157.

9. Arguing, as I do, for a greater cultural uniformity among the world's Muslims than among Christians requires careful footwork lest I contribute to the Western penchant for depicting Islamic civilization as a monotony that scarcely changes in time or place. A good antidote to such "essentializing" of Islam is Clifford Geertz's classic *Islam Observed*. The conclusions presented in *Two Worlds of Islam* by von der Mehden should also be mentioned. Still, I would emphasize—even while accepting the elusiveness of accurate measurement—the striking degree of shared cultural values and mores by Muslim world as compared with Christians.

10. Quran 3:103–104, 3:110, and 2:143.

11. The first, third, and fifth of these hadiths are from the *Sahih* of Muslim, the second from *Mishkat al-Masabih*, and the fourth from *Sunan al-Tirmidhi*. As an indication of the extent to which such hadiths are still very much part of the living political tradition, all five were cited by the well-known Pakistani fundamentalist Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi in his booklet *Al-Da'watu al-Qawmiyya wa al-Rabita al-Islamiyya* (The Ideology of Nationalism and the Islamic Tie).

6. The Roots of Political Pessimism

1. H. A. R. Gibb, "An Interpretation of Islamic History," in Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, p. 22.

2. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*.

3. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p. 347.

4. Cited in Turner, *Weber and Islam*, p. 77. This book as well as Turner's *Marx and the End of Orientalism* offer useful discussion of this general subject.

5. "For the greater part of the Middle Ages and over most of its area, the West formed a society primarily agrarian, feudal, and monastic, at a time when the strength of Islam lay in its great cities, wealthy courts, and long lines of communication." Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, p. 7. Southern continues, illuminating a comparative point we have discussed earlier: "To Western ideals essentially celibate, sacerdotal, and hierarchical, Islam opposed the outlook of a laity frankly indulgent and sensual, in principle egali-

tarian, enjoying a remarkable freedom of speculation, with no priests and no monasteries built into the basic structure of society as they were in the West."

6. Levi-Provençal, *Conferences sur l'Espagne Musulmane*, p. 90.

7. This view is forcefully presented in chapter 3, "Ethnicity, Social Class, and the Mosaic Model" of Turner's *Marx and the End of Orientalism*.

8. "Kitab al-Imara," *Sahih Muslim*, 3:1033. In another hadith Muhammad is reported to have said, "There will be leaders who will not be led by my guidance and who will not adopt my ways. There will be among them men who will have the heart of devils in bodies of human beings." When asked what should the believers then do, the Prophet answered, "You will listen to the amir and carry out his orders, even if your back is flogged and your wealth is snatched you should listen and obey." Ibid., p. 1029.

7. Muslim Attitudes Toward the State: An Impressionist Sketch

1. Grafftey-Smith, *Bright Levant*, p. 67.

2. A part of the oral tradition from Ottoman days that Geoffrey Lewis recalls having first heard many years ago from a Turkish elder who grew up during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The same sense of remoteness from government is also conveyed throughout Ivo Andric's celebrated novel, *The Bridge on the Drina*. For example, Ottoman grand vizier Mehmed Sokolli ordered the building of a bridge over the river in his native Bosnia. At first viewed as a boon by all the villagers, Muslims and Christians, the disorder caused by the actual building of the bridge brought second thoughts. As for the Muslims, "It was a fine thing, they thought, to belong to the pure ruling faith; it was a fine thing, to have as a countryman the Vezir in Stambul, and still finer to imagine the strong, costly bridge across the river . . . (but) their town had been turned into a hell." Indeed, they "in private among themselves, avowed that they were fed up to the teeth with lordship and pride and future glory and had had more than enough of the bridge and the Vezir. They only prayed Allah to deliver them from this disaster." The Christians felt the same, but "no one asked their opinion about anything." Andric, *The Bridge on the Drina*, pp. 31–32.

3. In addition to Andric's *The Bridge on the Drina*, note the following passage from Eric Ambler's *Judgment on Deltchev*, p. 57:

" 'Did you notice our wall?'

'It's very fine.'

'You will see such walls round most of our houses. In Bulgaria, and in Greece, in Yugoslavia, in all the countries of Europe that lived with Turkish rule it is the same. To put a wall around your house then was not only to put up a barrier against the casual violence of foreign soldiers, it was a way to deny their exis-

tence. Then our people lived behind their walls in small worlds of illusion that did not include the Ottoman Empire.' ''

Although these two novels are set in the Balkans—which did have appreciable Muslim minorities—the interaction with political authority would hold for Ottoman Afro-Asia as well. Nor was such blocking out of the state and the public more characteristic of non-Muslims. Indeed, the penchant for privacy was more in evidence among Muslims.

4. Munif al-Razzaz, *Ma'alim al-Hayat al-'Arabiyya al-Jadida*, 3d ed. (Beirut, 1956), as cited in Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics*, p. 245. Note also the following:

"Throughout the Arab world the citizen has only a narrow choice: obedience or submission. He ends up regarding the state and its representatives as a sort of fate that enchains him and lies in wait for him or fills and satifies him." Masmoudi, *Les Arabes dans le Tempete*, p. 77.

5. Gamal Abdel Nasser, *Egypt's Liberation*, p. 65. It is now generally accepted that Nasser's friend, the journalist Mohamed Heikal, actually wrote the book. This does not, however, detract from the value of the book as a portrait of the Nasserist self-image.

6. Pellissier de Reynaud, *Description de la Regence de Tunis*, p. 45.

7. Adapted from the translation from al-Jabarti that appears in Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, p. 205.

8. Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry*, p. 112.

9. Ibn Abi Diyaf, *Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman fi Akhbar Muluk Tunis wa 'Ahd al-Aman*, 2:172–173.

10. Lybyer, *The Government of the Ottoman Empire*.

11. A clear, short statement of these major modifications of the Lybyer thesis is chapter 2, "Ottoman Society and Institutions," in Itzkowitz, *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition*. For a cogent review of this historiographical dispute concerning the nature of the Ottoman state, with a convincing resolution of the issue, see chapter 1 in Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, especially pp. 44–58.

12. Ismail Urbain, in the French official publication *Tableau de la situation des Etablissements francais dans l'Algerie*, published in the late 1830s and 1840s. Cited in Boyer, *L'Evolution de l'Algerie mediane*, p. 49.

13. Cited in Charles-Andre Julien, *Les Techniciens de la colonisation*, p. 65.

14. Note the following example of modern political thinking: "When Mr. Gladstone was making up to the Irish and Cromwell was mowing them down, they were both applying democratic diplomacy. They recognized that a subject race must ultimately either be enfranchised or enslaved, and they faced the facts accordingly." Young, *Diplomacy Old and New*, p. 18. In a traditional bureaucratic empire, on the other hand, the subjects are neither enfranchised nor enslaved, but controlled, more or less, in a strictly limited arena of governmental activity.

8. Islam and Politics in Modern Times: The Great Transformation

1. *Jahiliyya* in traditional Muslim theology was the historical period prior to mankind's receiving God's final revelation, the Qur'an (the seal of prophecy), through the instrumentality of Muhammad. It has been adapted by Muslim radicals to designate the status of those deemed to have so fallen away from Islamic belief and practice as to lose their status as Muslims. This significant reworking of a venerable Islamic term, *jahiliyya*, was first advanced by the Indian (later Pakistani) Abu al-A'la Mawdudi as long ago as the 1930s and developed in the l950s and 1960s by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb.

2. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* in Tucker, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, p. 437. Marx continued, "Thus Luther donned the mask of the Apostle Paul." Comparisons between the thoughts and actions in today's Muslim world and those of the Reformation in Europe will be developed later. Marx's reference to "costume" is especially apt in the light of attention among Muslims today to such matters as beards and "Islamic dress."

3. The two classic battles that sealed Muslim success took place at Yarmuk (636 against the Byzantines) and Qadisiyya (637 against the Sassanids) and occurred within the first five years following the death of Muhammad. Both battles have figured often in later religio-political symbolism. During the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988), for example, Saddam Husayn's regime depicting Iraq as the legatee of both Arabism versus Persia and Islam versus Manichaeanism.

4. The Mongol onslaught was finally halted by the Mamluks of Egypt, under Baybars, at the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260. Ain Jalut is thus a powerful symbol that can be used to good effect by contemporary Egyptian leadership, even though scholarly purists could protest that the Mamluks were scarcely "Egyptian." It is related that Baybars restored the Abbasid caliphate, bringing to Cairo a surviving family member who was given the throne title of *al-Mustansir lil-Allah.*

5. A partial exception, certain Ottoman ideas of statecraft can be traced to Mongol influence, but, then, the original Ottomans were themselves nomadic warriors from Inner Asia.

6. The tendency in all religions is to make the period of origins paradigmatic and ahistorical. The scientific study of religions needs to both understand the importance of "golden ageism" in a religion and probe the worldly reality of what actually transpired. Thus, it is not surprising—and certainly not a derogation of Islam—to point out that three of the four "rightly guided caliphs" met a violent death. Similar stresses and strains can be identified in other religions, certainly in Judaism and Christianity.

7. The mutineers from various army units, after having captured Delhi in 1857, declared Bahadur emperor of all India. With the suppression of the mutiny in the following year, the last Moghul emperor's fate was sealed. That, however,

was already a foregone conclusion. Moghul emperors had ceased to appear on Indian coinage in the 1820s and even before the Sepoy Rebellion Bahadur had been informed by the British that he was to be the last emperor. In 1858 the British government assumed direct control over India, taking over from the East India Company.

8. Texts and commentaries of the two treaties are in Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, pp. 197–199, 231–237.

9. Text and commentary ibid., pp. 92–101.

10. Generally successful from the European perspective except for the Crimean War. Not at all a success story when viewed through the lens of Ottoman or Middle Eastern history.

11. In my *International Politics and the Middle East* I argue that the confrontation between the dominant Western state system and the vulnerable Ottoman system, beginning some two centuries ago, has produced a distinctive "diplomatic culture" that, surviving the death of the Ottoman Empire, continues to this day.

12. Southeast Asia includes, it is true, the Muslim states of Indonesia and Malaysia plus tiny Brunei. Yet, ironically, for the latter two the major domestic issue is the Muslim majority's perception that the non-Muslim minority (mainly Chinese) is too dominant in business, the professions, and administration. Indonesia, with an encouraging economic performance—not lacking in ups and downs, however—in recent decades remains in the group of "low-income economies," ahead of China and India and just below Egypt. See World Bank, *World Development Report* (1992) "Table I: Basic Indicators," p. 218.

9. Meeting the Western Challenge: The Early Establishment Response

1. Akbar was one of the rare Muslim rulers of an established dynasty (not a challenger in the process of establishing a dynasty as with the Abbasids, Fatimids, Safavids, and others) who sought to impose religious doctrine. His plans came to naught. A later Moghul emperor, Aurangzib (1618–1707, r. 1658–1707) went to the other extreme and attempted to impose an austere Sunni Islam, alienating Shi'is and actively persecuting Hindus and Sikhs. His actions, following the earlier flip-flops of Moghul religious policy, contributed to the dynasty's rapid decline following his reign. Given the minority status of Muslims throughout the Moghul Empire, a de facto secularism, bestowing religious and communal autonomy to India's diverse population, offered the best prospect of holding things together.

2. Several general studies of the entire Muslim world in modern times can be

recommended: the appropriate chapters treating the last two centuries in the two-volume *Cambridge History of Islam* and in Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, plus volume 3, "The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times," in Hodgson's three volume *The Venture of Islam*. Not quite so comprehensive but readable and reliable is Mortimer, *Faith and Power*. Among the classic interpretations of Islam and Muslims in the modern period, but with scant historical narrative, are Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, and Smith, *Islam in Modern History*. All are available in later paperback editions.

3. The last vestige of Ottoman Turkish rule in Algeria was represented by Ahmad Bey, who held out in Constantine until 1837. Interestingly, French military authorities soon came to realize that their conquest of Algeria would have been easier had they chosen to co-opt rather than banish the Ottoman Turks.

4. Ibn Abi Diyaf (Bin Diyaf), *Ithaf*, 3:182–183. Other examples are cited in chapter 7, "The Encroaching Outside World," of my *The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey*.

5. The imagery of a "game" deftly captures a significant aspect of the British—and, in general, Western—mindset during the heyday of European imperialism. Didn't the Duke of Wellington assert that "the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton"? To this should be added the impact of Thomas Arnold, headmaster of Rugby, on British imperial thinking. Much later, in this century, a friend of mine who grew up in Egypt and worked in Sudan in the period immediately before and after Sudanese independence in 1956 labeled the British officers of the elite Sudan Political Service "Boy Scouts who never grew up." The Muslims, however, living in these territories of the "great game" and the later cold war saw it differently. They were at best very subordinate players and at worst no more than the playing field.

6. Colonial and imperial historiography is filled with (usually pejorative) accounts of divide-and-rule tactics employed by the dominant powers. That the weaker powers just as often adopt the opposite tactic is often overlooked. To ignore this ongoing dialectic is to view modern history too much in terms of a dynamic West and a largely inert non-West—ironically, just what those of adamant anticolonialist orientation most seek to transcend.

7. On "defensive modernization" see Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization*, pp. 119–123. See also Black and Brown, *Modernization in the Middle East*.

8. My translation, with introduction and commentary, *The Surest Path*, is of the *Muqaddima* (or "introduction"), which amounts to a scant 110 pages in English. The *Muqaddima* is followed by what can properly be described as a textbook on comparative governments and societies treating twenty-one different European countries, 366 pages in the original Arabic.

9. An earlier English translation was later discovered by the Tunisian historian Moncef Chenoufi, but since this translation was not cited by any contempo-

rary or later sources known to me it must be assumed that only the Arabic original plus the French and Turkish translations reached a significant readership.

10. Sadiqi College, actually a secondary school, almost died of neglect after Khayr al-Din's dismissal but was resusitated and became the flagship of the bilingual, bicultural "Franco-arabe" educational system installed during the French Protectorate period (1881–1956). Eight of the eleven members of an early postindependence Tunisian cabinet, for example, were Sadiqi alumni. A thorough study of this one school that played such a major role in modern Tunisian history is Sraieb, *Le College Sadiki de Tunis*.

11. Two good biographies exist: Troll, *Sayyid Ahmad Khan*, and Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan*. See also Smith, *Modern Islam in India*, especially pp. 8–26. This book offers a sound presentation of the several Indian Muslim orientations in modern times.

12. Cited in Malik, *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan* p. 96.

13. This assertion, defensible as a general guideline, does require some modification. First, it is inaccurate to write of the ulama as a monolith (the same could be said for the Christian clergy or other religious specialists). There were "establishment ulama" holding high position and generally supporting government. At the other end of the ulama spectrum were Muslim equivalents of the poor parish priest often of limited formal education and identifying with the needs and lifestyles of those they served. Second, the former group were, in the Ottoman context, virtually members of the ruling group. As such, some of them became involved quite early in the Westernizing activities. Even so, for the establishment ulama to support government was consistent with traditional behavior and did not necessarily indicate conversion to Westernization. See the pioneering article by Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization."

14. He used the rubric *al-Afghani* as part of his false claim of having been born in Afghanistan and raised as a Sunni Muslim, for he was intent on being an effective political activist in Sunni circles. It is now clearly established that he was born into a Shi'i family in Iran.

15. Unrelenting in his attacks on Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, seeing him as simply a tool of British imperialism, Afghani was, however, was no religious mossback. Most of his ideas were radical and modernist, often shockingly so in the context of the times. Yet in attacking Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's pro-British modernism Afghani used many traditionalist themes. This is but one more aspect of the convoluted Afghani legend resulting in later traditionalists, secular nationalists, and others all claiming him as their own.

16. Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, p. 18.

17. *Shura* appears just once, in the Qur'an 42:36 (*wa 'amruhum shura—* their affair being counsel between them). The verbal form—to take counsel—

also appears just once, in Qur'an 3:159. Such is often the case with scriptural proof texts. Witness the major role played in Christian political thought by the one verse, Matthew 22:21: "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." Traditional Islamic political thought did enjoin rulers to consult with community leaders who were, in turn, expected to offer advice. Still, "there was no clear idea *who* exactly should be consulted and should warn, and how far the ruler should be bound by what they said." Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 6.

18. See, for example, the perceptive article by Reid, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age," especially pp. 550–552, a critique of Albert Hourani's classic study which—as the title indicates—emphasizes the contribution of the liberal, Weseternizing Arabs in the nineteenth century and after. Hourani, himself, in introducing his *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East*, felt that his earlier work had perhaps exaggerated the "impact of the West": "Intermingled with the movement of acceptance of new ideas were other movements, of thinkers who still lived within one or other of the ancient traditions of Islamic piety and learning and tried to preserve them. . . . Throughout the nineteenth century, the movements of thought in which social and political change was reflected had to be seen in terms not only of the tensions between 'Islam and the West,' but also of an older tension between different Muslim ideals, those of personal devotion and legal correctness." Ibid., p. xvii.

19. Including both indigenous and alien political leadership. Thus, Sayyid Ahmad Khan or Shaykh Muhammad Abduh could influence the policy of their alien colonial overlords just as Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi or the men of the Tanzimat could work within still independent governing structures.

10. The Early Antiestablishment Response to the Western Challenge

1. Involving, of course, both Hindus and Muslims.

2. This school grew out of the earlier School of Languages and Administration founded by Muhammad Ali in 1835 and first led by al-Tahtawi. Closed by Abbas in 1850, it was reopened by Ismail and then developed into a law school with a French jurist, one Vidal Pasha, as director. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt from Muhammad Ali to Mubarak*, p. 102.

3. See Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 114 and 102.

4. See Minault, "Islam and Mass Politics," pp. 170–171. She notes that the Islamic modernists (such as the graduates of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Aligarh) were at one with the conservative ulama on this issue.

5. See Ben Achour, *Categories de la Societe Tunisoise*, pp. 443–444.

6. See Shaw, *Between Old and New*, part 5, "The Triumph of Reaction," and especially pp. 378–383 and 404–405.

7. Bin Diyaf, *Ithaf*, vol. 7, biography no. 138.

8. Mahdism can usefully be compared with equivalent movements in Judaism and Christianity. See my "The Sudanese Mahdiya," especially pp. 146–149.

9. This entire period looms large in late Victorian British history. The death of General Charles "Chinese" Gordon when Khartoum fell stunned the British government, and Queen Victoria violated emerging constitutional practice by sending Prime Minister Gladstone a telegram *en clair* expressing her dismay. Then, the Anglo-Egyptian Reconquest (Britain, having occupied Egypt since 1882) led by General Kitchener had, as a very young officer, Winston Churchill, who later wrote of the campaign in his *The River War*. Later movies such as *The Four Feathers* (1939, 1978 remake) and *Khartoum* (1966 with Charlton Heston as Gordon and Lawrence Olivier as the mahdi) have kept alive the sense of exoticism and high adventure.

10. This continuing social dynamic pitting prudence against passion can shed light on the mass support throughout the Muslim world given such wildly different twentieth-century leaders—some not even religious in personal orientation or political program—as Kemal Ataturk, Ibn Saud, Ayatollah Khomeini, Nasser, and, yes, even Saddam Husayn. All, at least for a time, were viewed as standing up to the foreign oppressor. This is a very human reaction. It would be erroneous to attribute it to some characteristic of Islamic culture.

11. The best scholarly studies are Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani"* and Pakdaman, *Djamal-ed-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*. The classic, and controversial, depiction of Afghani (plus his early disciple, Abduh) as dissimulators is Kedourie, *Afghani and 'Abduh*. Appraisals by most Muslim writers continue to be overwhelmingly favorable. An influential earlier example was the chapter on al-Afghani is Amin's *Zu'ama al-Islah fi 'Asr al-Hadith*.

12. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism."

13. See Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2:191.

14. Article 3 of the text in Hurewitz, *The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics*, p. 94.

15. Pan-Islamic ideas were "a reaction against the Tanzimat doctrine of fusing Muslims and non-Muslims into an Ottoman nation. Only Muslims, according to Pan-Islamists, should unite to form the national basis of the Ottoman Empire under the caliph who was also head of that Empire. Even Muslims outside the Empire should rally round the caliph in their struggle for independence from European domination." Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 267. Berkes adds that the caliph "began to appear as the actual or potential

ruler of Muslims everywhere. The caliphate was not merely a spiritual power; it was a state. Islam was not merely a religion; it was a nationality, a political community, a civilization." Ibid., p. 268.

16. The title the pope had granted Henry VIII in 1521, just thirteen years before the Act of Supremacy set in motion the creation of a national church separated from Rome.

11. From World War I to the 1960s: The Years of Muted Islamist Politics

1. Not just territorially a single political unit under French rule beginning in 1830 but an autonomous Ottoman polity since the late sixteenth century. Under nonindigenous rulers, of course, but such has been the pedigree of many states that later became nation states.

2. Somewhat surprisingly, the Berbers of Morocco and Algeria (there are only minuscule pockets of Berber speakers in Tunisia) could well have been another such group, but developments in the colonial period actually fostered reasonably good Berber-Arab relations. In simplest terms, the French "Berber policy" seeking to split the two backfired. See Gellner and Micaud, *Arabs and Berbers*.

3. Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane and founder of the celebrated Moghul dynasty, used Kabul as the base for his conquest of India. Then, in the early eighteenth century, it was invaders from Afghanistan who overthrew the Safavid dynasty in Iran.

4. Pakistan, a neologism, means "Land of the Pure" in Urdu and is said to have been popularized by Indian Muslim students in Britain during the 1930s responding especially to the appeal launched by the poet and intellectual Muhammad Iqbal for a distinctive Muslim nation. The political union of Westernized secularists and pious traditionalists is a common theme in modern nationalist movements based on religion. There are, for example, several striking points of comparison between Zionism and the movement creating Pakistan. Both leaders (Herzl and Jinnah) were secular, for both movements the basic problem concerned absorption into a larger cultural unity (assimilation for Jews, becoming a minority component in a majority Hindu state), and both succeeded because they managed to win over—almost in spite of themselves—the support of a constituency embracing more traditional religious loyalties.

5. Interestingly, the struggle of would-be modernists to implement change, which in religious terms was usually presented as going back to a pristine golden age, was often depicted in terms of youth against age. This, moreover, took

place in societies that had traditionally offered great respect to age. In Tunisia, for example, the image was that of "young Tunisians" against "old turbans."

6. "Tribalism" and "clan rule" are terms often used to mean "primitive" and not ready for "statehood." Reacting against such supercilious dismissals (often, it is true, expressed by adamant apologists for European colonial rule), scholars have perhaps glossed over the difficulty of converting such polities into nation states. So-called tribal or clan political systems have a considerable stability that is not easily overcome. Witness recent developments in Somalia and Afghanistan.

7. The last Ottoman sultan, Muhammed VI, fled from Istanbul on a British ship. His cousin, Abdulmajid, replaced him as caliph.

8. Kemal, *Nutuk*, p. 433, English translation, pp. 591–593, cited in Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 459. The "speech," given on successive days on October 15 to 22, 1927, serves as a major statement of Ataturk's political philosophy.

9. This is convincingly argued by Minault in her *The Khilafat Movement*.

10. It has been plausibly suggested that after the 1857 Indian Mutiny and the deposition of the last Moghul emperor the Ottoman sultan, as the last significant Sunni Muslim head of state, could readily be embraced as caliph by Indian Muslims. See Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 184–185, where he also notes that the name of the sultan/caliph "was proclaimed in the Friday sermons." He adds that there is some doubt about when this practice began and implies that it may not have been all that widespread. Mention of the ruler's name in the Friday sermon is the established Muslim means of recognizing political legitimacy, and throughout the centuries dropping the name of an existing ruler has signaled revolt.

11. See Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement," 1:571ff. See also the solid (strongly pro-Ataturk) account in Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, pp. 446–460. Berkes archly dubs this Indian intervention a "gift of British diplomacy" (p. 458).

12. Ibid., pp. 458–459, and the sources cited there.

13. Text in Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, appendix 4, pp. 181–182. Kramer's book studied the evolution of the Islamic international congresses that he convincingly argues replaced the caliphate as symbol and instrument of Islamic unity. On the general subject of Pan-Islam see the thorough study with a very rich bibliography by Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*.

14. The Khilafat movement had earlier (in late March, only days after Ataturk's abolition of the caliphate) cabled Egyptian prime minister Sa'd Zaghlul warning against hasty action (i.e. announcing the appointment of King Fuad). It was just the message that Zaghlul and his Wafd Party wished to hear, for they were fighting a two front nationalist struggle against 1. the British and 2. the king and his entourage. See Kedourie, "Sa'd Zaghlul and the British."

15. Shaukat Ali, the Khilafat movement leader, was still concerned about the caliphate, and his candidate was the last Ottoman caliph living in exile. This upset the Egyptian, Saudi, and Turkish governments and the Hashimites ruling in Transjordan and Iraq—one of the few issues those governments could agree on. See Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, pp. 125ff.

16. The British, reacting to pressure from Ibn Saud, would not let Sharif Husayn establish himself with his sons either in Transjordan or Iraq. When he became mortally ill he was allowed to join his son, Abdullah, amir of Transjordan, for his final months. He died on June 4, 1931, at the age of seventy-eight. See Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan*, pp. 88–89.

17. Good general works on this subject include Porath, *In Search of Arab Unity*, and Pipes, *Greater Syria*. A solid monograph on the principal nationalist party pushing Fertile Crescent unity, with good analysis of that party's founder, the charismatic and mercurial Anton Sa'adeh, is Zuwiyya Yamak, *The Syrian Social Nationalist Party*.

18. Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, p. 94.

19. Avery, *Modern Iran*, p. 275. Chapter 17, "The New Order," pp. 269–303, is a good brief account of Riza Shah's forced draft modernization program. For the Turkish equivalent (and Riza was often inspired by Ataturk) the classic account is Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, especially chapter 8, "The Kemalist Republic," but all of part 2, "Aspects of Change," offers a "before and after" breakdown according to different subjects. Especially relevant to the general theme of this book is chapter 12, "Religion and Culture."

20. Hardly an accurate count, for there had been no Persian monarchy from 640 c.e. (at the time of the Arabo/Islamic conquest) to 1501 (the rise of the Safavid dynasty). See Keddie, *Roots of Revolution*, p. 180. Chapters 5 through 7 offer a good narrative of the Pahlavi period.

21. Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence*, p. 342.

22. See the very evocative appraisal of the Wafd in Lacouture and Lacouture, *Egypt in Transition*, in chapter 10, "The Wafd," pp. 86–96. Note also, p. 240, the following valedictory for the Wafd: "The Wafd stands for a certain mob appeal, a certain dynamic and nationalist view of the State: it stands also for parliamentarians, and free thought. It is everything that the military leaders (i.e., the Free Officers who came to power by coup in 1952) are not. . . . It is an Egypt of cafe terraces, where eloquence is more important than results, where principles count for more than effectiveness, and where there is a fairly sincere and generous basis of respect for the will of the people. It stands for freedom of the Press, questions in the House, student gatherings, congresses and back-slapping. . . . It is also a form of liberalism, a typically Egyptian tolerance in the approach to religious and racial problems."

12. The Return of Islam?

"The Return of Islam" was the title of an article by Bernard Lewis that first appeared in *Commentary* and has since been reprinted in several different collections. Lewis is among the most eminent of those insisting on the importance of Islam as a factor molding the attitudes and actions of Muslims past and present.

1. See my "Nasser and the June War." See also Parker, *The Six-Day War,* especially the introduction and chapter 1, "Origins of the Crisis."

2. For the argument that the June War did not radically change the underlying systemic structure of politics and diplomacy even in the Middle East, see my "The June 1967 War," in the volume edited by Lukacs and Battah, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict.* The opposite view is presented in the following chapter by Tibi, "Structural and Ideological Change."

3. This is after the breakaway of East Pakistan to form Bangladesh. The 1980 estimated population of Bangladesh was 88,678,000. For 1990 the figure was 109,291,000. The population increase, thus, from 1950 to 1990 for the original Pakistan (and after 1971 the remaining Pakistan plus Bangladesh) would be

1950	1960	1970	1980	1990
75.04	93.73	114.19	170.82	221.34

4. See my "Tunisia."

5. Malcolm Kerr, "Egypt," p. 173.

6. World Bank, *World Development Report* 1980, 1984. 1994, 1995. This figure, the World Bank explains, "is calculated by dividing the number of pupils enrolled in all post-secondary schools and universities by the population in the 20–24 age group." The higher education figures are not broken down by gender. Some rough adjustments have been made in producing this table. For example, the 1980 column is drawn from data given for 1981 in comparison with 1979 and other years (no figures for 1980 appearing in any *World Development Report* annual). Moreover, later year reports often modify earlier reports. The figures given in the 1990 column are in line with those given in the 1995 *Report,* which lists results for the year, 1992, with one interesting exception. The higher educational enrollment percentage for Iran is listed as double that of 1990, jumping from 6 percent to 12 percent. Tunisia's percentage rose from 9 percent to 11 percent, while Bangladesh and Turkey each rose one percent to 4 percent and 15 percent respectively.

7. Cited in Charles Issawi, "Economic Growth and Development," p. 233, and Szyliowicz, *Education and Modernization in the Middle East*, pp. 464–465 (correcting the figure for Turkey in 1945).

8. Kitchen, *The Educated African*, p. 367; *Britannica Book of the Year 1996* p. 683.

9. Mahmud Messadi in *Al-Mabahith* (October 1947). Cited in my "Tunisia," p. 158.

10. Ministry of Education, *Perspectives decennales de l'enseignement* (Tunis, c. 1958). Cited in ibid., p. 157.

11. Cited in my "Tunisia: Education, 'Cultural Unity,' and the Future," originally a report to the Institute of Current World Affairs, December 1, 1960. Reprinted in Zartman, *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib*.

12. The first phrase figures in the title of the book by Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, which was very influential in its day. The notion of a society being able to attain, if the right modernizing steps are taken, a "take-off" stage of economic development was advanced by W. W. Rostow. See his *The Stages of Economic Growth*.

13. Writing soon after the three countries of French North Africa had received their independence, Roger Le Tourneau (who had served in the French educational administration of all three during his long Maghribi career) described the impact of the "European ideas" in these terms: the North Africans "have experienced a bewilderment at once terrible and enervating in losing their intellectual security, of having everything again put in question even to the very foundations of their civilization, to see opening before their curiosity immense new horizons that their fathers never even suspected. . . . The old Islam of North Africa has been profoundly shaken. . . . Many Muslims of the Maghrib no longer believe as their ancestors did. . . . For many Islam is no longer a spiritual conviction but only a principle of social organization deemed superior to others." *Evolution politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane*, pp. 39–40.

14. That is, 1948–1949 (the creation of Israel and the ensuing failed Arab military effort), 1956 (Suez War), 1967 (Six Day War), 1969–1970 (War of Attrition), 1973 (Ramadan or Yom Kippur War), and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The Suez War was a political victory for Nasser's Egypt, as was the 1973 war, being a near military victory that turned sour but a sharp demonstration to Israel and the United States that the existing "no war, no peace" status was unstable and unacceptable to the Arabs. In strictly military terms, however, all wars were Arab defeats. Perceptive Arabs realized as much.

15. The undeclared war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (1947–1949), with India maintaining control, the short 1965 war that ended in a draw, and the decisive 1971 Indian intervention supporting East Pakistani secession and the creation of Bangladesh.

16. Afghanistan ultimately prevailed against the Soviet invasion beginning in December 1979, the last Soviet troops leaving nine years later, in February 1989. The Somalia case was quite different. Essentially, UN and U.S. efforts beginning in 1992 to provide humanitarian aid to the Somalis facing mass starvation resulting from civil war ran afoul of the continued tribal divisons. UN

losses of seventy-four and American losses of eighteen in 1993 led to withdrawals in early 1994.

13. The Radical Muslim Discourse

1. Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, "Conclusion: Remaking the State: The Limits of the Fundamentalist Imagination" in Marty and Appleby, *Fundamentalisms and the State*, 3:620. This is volume 3 of the five volumes published—over thirty-five hundred pages on fundamentalism worldwide.

2. Several have suggested this comparison. See the compelling presentation by Goldberg, "Smashing Idols and the State." Such a comparison is not intended to suggest that the Islamists modeled themselves on the Reformation. That an earlier generation of reformist Muslims did is quite a different matter. Writing in the 1950s, Wilfred Cantwell Smith observed that Republican Turkey might be "accused of aping the West even in religion, in seeking to reproduce in Islam a Reformation that Christendom effected in earlier times and different circumstances. Certainly it is startling to hear the name of Luther on many Turkish lips that could scarcely discourse on the works of al-Ash'ari or al-Ghazzali or Iqbal." *Islam in Modern History*, p. 206.

3. Beginning with Frederick Engels, in 1850, who in *The Peasant War in Germany* argued that Luther moved from an early "revolutionary stance" only to later join "the train of the middle-class, the nobility and the princes." See Aland, *Four Reformers*, pp. 13–15.

4. I claim no Olympian impartiality and confess to a distaste for the harsh rhetoric and actions of today's Islamists. If transported back to the sixteenth century, I would probably have sided with Erasmus over Luther. Indeed, I rather like the ingenuous remarks attributed to the Duke of Buckingham in the eighteenth century (after religious confrontation in England had, admittedly, somewhat cooled): "I have not faith enough to be a Presbyterian, nor good works enough to be a Papist, and therefore I am an honest old Protestant without either faith or good works." Cited in Stone, "The Results of the English Revoluton," pp. 72–73.

5. Luther completed his translation of the New Testament in 1522 and the rest of the Bible by 1534. Tyndale's translation of the New Testament (1525–1526) was the first to appear in print.

6. The claim that the several Arabic dialects are so different from each other and from classical Arabic as to constitute separate languages is a touchy subject provoking both scientific and—even more—religious disputes. Although it is foolhardy for a layman to enter the linguist's lair, personal experience indicates that while, for example, an illiterate Moroccan would have difficulties understanding an illiterate Iraqi, educated native Arabic speakers can communicate

easily with their educated peers. Moreover, the educated native Arabic speaker can pick up the Arabic of the Qur'an as well as the corpus of material from the premodern period (certainly the earliest Arabic poetry) far more readily than the educated native English speaker can make sense of Chaucer. The linguistic history of modern Arabic speakers and modern Hebrew speakers (cognate languages, moreover) would be a fruitful study with just enough similarities and differences to provide useful findings.

7. From the early years of the sixteenth century to at least 1648 (the end of the Thirty Years War) but, more meaningfully, until the late 1680s (the 1685 Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France and the 1688 "Glorious Revolution" in England).

8. Weber adopts a four-part system of religious options: asceticism (or mastery) and mysticism (or resignedness) are given either otherworldy or innerworldy orientations. Both otherworldy options devalue activity in the here and now. Innerworldly mysticism accepts the world but gives it slight positive value. The innerworldly ascetic, in Talcott Parsons's summary of Weber, "seeks mastery over the worldly component of his individual personality, and seeks in principle to extend this mastery to *all* aspects of the human condition." Weber saw Protestantism as the purest example of innerworldly ascetism. Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, pp. l–lii.

9. See the classic study by Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints*, where in the preface he writes of the Calvinist saint as "the first of those self-disciplined agents of social and political reconstruction who have appeared so frequently in modern history. He is the destroyer of an old order for which there is no need to feel nostalgic. He is the builder of a repressive system which may well have to be endured before it can be escaped or transcended. He is, above all, an extraordinarily bold, inventive, and ruthless politician."

10. Not to mention the many examples of governmental cooperation within the Muslim world that are more readily explained by realpolitik than religion. The best example might well be the Ba'thist government of Syria lined up with Iran in order to better confront the Ba'thist government of neighboring Iraq.

14. Al-Banna, Mawdudi, and Qutb

1. Treatment of al-Banna draws largely on Mitchell's excellent study, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*.

2. British military presence in the canal zone remained well beyond Egypt's ostensible independence (1936) and admission into the League of Nations (1937). Britain finally evacuated its canal zone military bases only in June 1956. One month later, Nasser nationalized the canal, setting in motion the diplomat-

ic crisis that briefly brought back British troops, allied with France and Israel, in attacking Egypt that fall.

3. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* p. 328.

4. Indeed, his early mission was "at first misinterpreted as merely another *sufi* (mystic) order about to take its place with all the other *sufi* orders." J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*, p. 33.

5. These data from Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* and Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren*, but following Mitchell's more detailed account where they diverge.

6. A replay, one might say, of the all-or-nothing Kharijite claim that Ali had betrayed the good cause by compromising with the enemy, and it will be remembered that the assassination attempt against Ali was successful. The uncompromising fanatic turning violently against those who might consider negotiating with the enemy stands out as a constant, transcending centuries and cultures. Even Oliver Cromwell was led to caution his more adamant followers, "I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible you may be mistaken."

7. Paul in 1st Corinthians 9:22. Al-Banna's "pastoral letters" (a good way to characterize much of his writing) are in style and substance rather like Paul's letters to the early Church. They both deal with very down-to-earth issues of human relations and make their points with homely images.

8. "Islamist" is chosen rather than "Muslim" to escape implicit conflation with many other Muslim approaches that certainly cannot be dubbed totalitarian. The Muslim Brethren, of course, has had a continued existence since 1928, but it has been presented in the past tense here (i.e., during the time of al-Banna). This leaves open the question of whether today's Muslim Brethren has, as its leaders maintain, become moderate and accepting of establishment rules.

9. Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami," p. 99.

10. Ibid., citing Mawdudi's autobiography. Qasim Amin was an Islamic modernist championing women's liberation. That the young man would translate this work, so out of harmony with Mawdudi's later very traditionalist views concerning women in Islam, would seem to buttress the image of him as a liberal nationalist in his earliest years.

11. Ibid., p. 101.

12. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State," pp. 100–101.

13. Ibid., pp. 104–105.

14. Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami," pp. 114–115.

15. The death sentence, a classic example of judicial excess, undercut the very strong case demonstrating the danger of the harsh Islamist ideology Mawdudi presented. A thorough study of these tragic days is the official *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act II*. Usually referred to as the Munir Report, after the presiding judge, Muhammad Munir, this "unusually revealing and at times brilliant" official study set alongside the 1949 Objectives

Resolution of the Constituent Assembly offers "in polar fashion much of the fundamentals of Pakistan's early religious development." Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 232 and 218.

16. From Mawdudi's *Islam ka Mazriyah Siyasi* (Islam's Political Views), Delhi 1967, as cited in Nasr, "Mawdudi and the Jama'at-i Islami," p. 108.

17. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State," p. 123.

18. The best treatment of that talented group of thinkers, including al-'Aqqad, Taha Husayn, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Ahmad Amin, and Tawfiq al-Hakim, who helped shape Egyptian intellectual life during the interwar years is Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, especially part 4. See also Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment*, in particular, chapter 8, "Intellectual Eddies and Currents."

19. A point stressed in Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, pp. 165ff, and Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment*, 230ff. See also the perceptive portrayal by Tripp, "Sayyid Qutb."

20. Sayyid Qutb's letters and articles have been brought together in *Amirika min al-Dakhil bi-Mundhar Sayyid Qutb*.

21. *Amirika*, p. 135, and Qutb, "Aduwunna al-Awwal: Al-Rajul al-Abyad" (Our Primary Enemy, the White Man), *Al-Risala* 2, 1009 (November 3, 1952), p. 1217. Cited in Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence*, p. 134 and p. 301, note 150.

22. Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, pp. 132–133.

23. A point caught by Abu-Rabi', *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence*, p. 296, note 73.

24. Exemplified in such works as *Ma'rakat al-Islam wa al-Ra'smaliyyah* (The Struggle Between Islam and Capitalism) and *Al-Salam al-'Alami wa al-Islam* (World Peace and Islam), both appearing as early as 1951.

25. Translating Qutb's *hakimiyya* as sovereignty best reveals his sense of the Qur'anic meaning, but the Arabic root used in each case, H-K-M, more accurately conveys the sense of judging or judgment. Thus, the Pickthall translation of Qur'an 12:40 reads, "The decision rests with Allah only" and of Qur'an 5:47, "Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah hath revealed; such are evil-livers." Ahmad S. Moussali makes the point that Qutb, "like the Kharijites" in the early days of Islam, managed to give the Qur'anic *hukm* a political as well as a juridical meaning. See his *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism*, pp. 150–151.

26. Qutb, *Fi Zilal al-Qur'an*.

27. See on this and for Sayyid Qutb in general the excellent chapter by Tripp, "Sayyid Qutb." See also Moussali, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism*, a major source for Tripp's interpretation.

28. Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb," p. 73, relying on the account in Mahdi Fadlallah, *Ma' Sayyid Qutb fi Fikratihi al-Siyasi wa al-Dini* (With Sayyid Qutb in His Political and Religious Thought) (Beirut, 1978), p. 91. Fadlallah seems to be the

source of accounts relating Qutb's warm contacts with the Free Officers in those early months.

29. This, too, is from Fadlallah, *Ma' Sayyid Qutb fi Fikratihi al-Siyasi wa al-Dini*. The Liberation Rally, created in January 1953, was the first of the Nasserist efforts to create an overarching political movement that would eliminate the need for political parties, which were, accordingly, banned. It was succeeded by the National Union (1957–1961) and the Arab Socialist Union (1962).

30. Even more than was the case with the massive trials following the October 1954 assassination against Nasser. Then, at least, bullets had been fired and conspirators identified, even though the Nasserist government seized the opportunity to try many others, including the brotherhood leader Hasan al-Hudaybi, almost certainly innocent of and opposed to acts of violence.

31. Ibrahim was the dynamic leader of the Malaysian Muslim Youth movement. In the early 1980s he joined the ruling political party, assumed increasingly important government positions, and as deputy prime minister was poised to succeed the longtime prime minister, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammed. In September 1998 Mahathir, apparently jealous of his rising importance, had him fired and later jailed on what most consider trumped up charges.

15. Khomeini and Shi'ite Islamism

1. The best short biographical sketch is found in Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, pp. 5–12. See also Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, translated and edited by Algar, pp. 13–21, and two chapters in Keddie, *Religion and Politics in Iran*: Tabari, "The Role of the Clergy," and Rose, "*Velayat-e Faqih* and the Recovery of Islamic Identity."

2. Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, p. 6. Algar mentions only that the father was "murdered by bandits." Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 13.

3. "Assassinated by the Shah's U.S.-instituted security policy, *Savak*," according to Algar, who adds, "Imam Khomeini bore this blow stoically, but the tragedy inflamed the public in Iran." Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 19.

4. There is disagreement concerning the publication date, ranging from 1941 to as late as 1944.

5. Cited and translated (from p. 184 in the 1979 Persian edition of *Kashf al-Asrar*) by Tabari, "The Role of the Clergy," p. 61. Tabari provides a stimulating summary of *Kashf al-Asrar* on pp. 60–64.

6. Ibid., p. 62.

7. Ibid., p. 62. (Persian, p. 189). Compare with the extract translated by Hamid Algar from pp. 221–224 of the 1941 edition (? see note 4): "We do not say that the government must be in the hands of the *faqih*; rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's law, for the welfare of the country

and the people demands this, and it is not feasible except with the supervision of the religious leaders." Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 170.

8. Cited in Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*, p. 23 (p. 186, Persian edition—date not specified).

9. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution* p. 172. The association of Westernization with wanton sexuality is a persistent theme in Khomeini's writings and, for that matter, in the writings of many radical Islamists. Of course, strictly defined gender roles and rigidly puritanical sexual codes characterize fundamentalist movements, Muslim and non-Muslim.

10. Khomeini's slap (Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 170) at Hitler for having invaded Poland served, of course, to denigrate Riza Shah for his Nazi leanings (which cost him his throne), but it is not perhaps overly cynical to note that such a reference would go over well with the British and Soviet occupying powers.

11. Ibid., p. 169.

12. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 87.

13. A program not all that successful, but, then, few third world land reforms have been. See on this subject Kazemi, *Poverty and Revolution in Iran*, and Lambton, *The Persian Land Reform*.

14. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, especially pp. 435–446.

15. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 531.

16. Arjomand, *The Turban for the Crown*, p. 98.

17. Shari'ati is usually described as a sociologist and certainly saw himself as a social theorist. Still, his dissertation was in medieval Persian philology. See Richard, "Modern Iranian Political Thought," p. 215. Pp. 215–228 of Richard's chapter offer a solid summary of Shariati's life, thought, and influence. Another fine account is Akhavi, "Shariati's Social Thought."

18. Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, p. 534. It must be pointed out, however, that Khomeini himself in his *Islamic Government*, pp. 83–84, distinguished between an "imam" who is leader or guide or judge and any of the succession of twelve imams after Prophet Muhammad (the twelfth and last imam being "hidden" only to return at the end of time). The former usage of imam is, according to Khomeini, the just *faqih*.

19. The death of Ayatullah Khomeini's oldest son, Mustafa, and now Ali Shari'ati both assassinated by SAVAK? A superficial cynicism might see in these allegations the Middle Eastern penchant for conspiracy theories overlaid with the Shi'i emphasis on martyrdom. The SAVAK record for brutality must not, however, be minimized. Shari'ati left for England with the understanding that his wife and daughters would be permitted to follow. When he later went to meet the plane bringing his family he found that his wife and one of his daughters had been refused permission to leave Iran. He died soon thereafter in June 1977. Richard, "Modern Iranian Political Thought," p. 216.

20. Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, p. 129. The last sentence in the original text uses the Islamic injunction *al-'amr fi al-ma'ruf wa al-nahya 'an al-munkar* (command the good and resist the evil), which is the classic text used to buttress the claim that each believer must strive to achieve the divinely mandated good society in this world. A nice touch, that, asking these fledgling clerics if they are to await receiving instructions concerning their religious duties from those educated in secular institutions.

21. The first entry in Algar's collection of Ayatollah Khomeini's writings, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 26–149, with translator's notes pp. 150–166. There remains some disagreement concerning whether the original lectures were given in Persian or Arabic. Algar and also Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, p. 11, insist on the former. Abrahamian adds, "Khomeini, like many Iranian senior clerics, never attained fluency in spoken Arabic." Others insist that lectures at the Najaf religious seminary would necessarily have been given in Arabic.

22. Khomeini, *Islamic Government*, p. 79.

Conclusion

1. John P. Meier challenging Robert Gorham Davis's criticism of his review of Robin Lane Fox, *The Unauthorized Version*, in the *New York Times Book Review*, August 2, 1992, p. 27.

2. Iran just may be evolving from Islamist rigor to a more moderate and humane polity. The surprising election of Muhammad Khatami as president in May 1997 followed by the sweeping victory of the liberals in the February 2000 elections to the Majlis are positive signs of such. See on these developments during the past few years Wright, *The Last Great Revolution* and Adelkhah, *Being Modern in Iran*.

3. "O People, all of you are from Adam and Adam is from dust. There is no special distinction among mankind. There is no boasting for the Arab over the Persian, nor the Persian over the Arab. The noblest to God is the most Godfearing." Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, cited in Ibn Hisham, 4:32.