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Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making
New York Chichester, West Sussex
1994
5 Jordanian-Syrian Relations
Of the five bilateral relationships examined in this work, Jordanian-Syrian ties have witnessed the most, and the most serious, fluctuations. The mobilization of 1970, during which Syria sent troops into Jordan to support the Palestinian resistance in its clashes with the Jordanian army came just before Hafiz al-Asad took power. But this was only the first of several turns in relations between the two. Previous work on inter-Arab relations suggests that the shifting alliances between these two countries may be explained by balancing or bandwagoning, by tensions owing to differences over ideology or superpower affiliation, or by regional political rivalries. The empirical material presented in this case study, as well as the two that follow it, suggests a different explanation for seemingly unpredictable fluctuations in ties. The weaving together of the political and economic histories demonstrates clearly that considerations of budget security, at least on the Jordanian side, account for the timing and direction of Jordanian shifts in a way that the other explanations cannot.
The Rapprochement of 1975-77
Only a few works have attempted to explore this period in inter-Arab relations and they shed very little light. In one study, Alan Taylor presents Syrian-Jordanian relations as a function only of Syrian involvement in Lebanon and explains Husayn's decision to ally himself with Asad at this time "largely because a Muslim-PLO victory in Lebanon might isolate Jordan in its immediate regional situation and also preclude the possibility of rapprochement between Amman and the PLO. In the long run, he looked to a solution to the crisis that would be imposed by the surrounding Arab states." 1 Stephen Walt, although he devotes scant attention to it, in one place attributes the improvement in Syrian-Jordanian relations to the beginning of feuding between Egypt and Syria, and in another place to a desire on the part of the two states to balance the United States and Iraq. 2 None of these three explanations is systematically arrived at, nor particularly convincing. As the empirical material presented in this section will show, a closer examination of the historical record demonstrates all of these explanations to be inaccurate.
Political Developments 3
Syria's participation in the 1973 war with Egypt against Israel confirmed its status as an increasingly important power in the region. At the same time, ironically, the 1973 conflict marked the first step in Egypt's path toward ending its state of war with Israel. Syria, although not of Egypt's size and weight in Arab politics, was nonetheless intent upon diverting Egypt from its new path. Failing that, it was poised to assume for itself the role that Egypt would gradually relinquish.
During the same period, Jordan was recovering from successive economic recessions brought on by the 1967 war and the 1970-71 crackdown on the Palestinian resistance movement. Syria had closed its borders with, and airspace to, Jordan in 1970, while Kuwait and Libya suspended the aid they had promised the kingdom at the 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum. In a first and tentative attempt to end the ostracism, King Husayn sent a token brigade to the Syrian front in the 1973 war. Syria was clearly militarily more powerful as well as economically stronger and more diversified than Jordan. The two also differed in superpower orientation. Nonetheless, as frontline states with large military expenditures, the two countries did share at least one key characteristic: a reliance on external (primarily Arab) budgetary assistance.
Relations between Syria and Jordan, broken in 1970, were officially resumed on October 4, 1973, shortly before Jordan sent its brigade to the Golan as symbolic assistance for the Egyptian-Syrian war effort against Israel. In early June 1974 Syrian Vice President 'Abdal-Halim Khaddam delivered a letter from President Asad to King Husayn. However, the clearest moves toward a full rapprochement (and more) came several months after the 1974 Rabat Arab League summit conference, during which the oil states had promised support for the confrontation states (Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the PLO). In early March 1975 Asad received Jordanian prime minister Zayd al-Rifa'i for a series of talks that touched on regional issues and bilateral relations, especially in the field of economic cooperation and commercial exchange, transport, and electricity. This series of talks resulted, at the initiative of Rifa'i, in the establishment of a Joint Committee, the first of its kind to be set up between two Arab countries and a move that set a pattern, particularly for inter-Arab economic relations, in the years to come. 4 The committee was to be headed by the ministers of economy of the two countries and was charged with expanding cooperation between the two and with following up on the implementation of decisions. It was to alternate its meetings between Damascus and Amman, and would have several specialized branch committees: Economic and Trade Affairs; Industrial Cooperation; Electricity Concerns; Transport and Communications; and the Yarmuk (to deal with the longstanding project for joint exploitation of the Yarmuk River waters).
Shortly thereafter, on April 3, Husayn traveled to Damascus where another, more substantive, agreement on increasing trade cooperation between the two countries was signed. This agreement was followed by an accord on information (television, news broadcasts, the press, films, etc.) on May 22. Asad then made his first visit to Amman from June 10-12, 1975. As a result of this visit it was decided that the two countries should have a Joint Higher Committee, much like the committee formed a few months earlier, but charged with addressing a whole range of issues, not just economic ones. The Higher Joint Committee met for the first time July 28-30, 1975.
Rifa'i, who had assumed the prime ministership for the first time in May 1973, contended that the rapprochement had been at Jordan's initiative. One of Jordan's primary concerns at the time was Gulf state financial assistance: despite the promises made at Rabat, assistance had not been forthcoming in the promised amounts.
Top Jordanian policymakers believed that if they formed a united front with Syria, also a major recipient of Gulf state aid, they might have more success "persuading" the oil producers to forward the promised amounts. 5 This is not to say that other factors were far from Jordanian policymakers' minds: the need further to repair relations with Arab states, the desire to end Jordan's relative regional isolation, and even perhaps a hope of greater coordination to confront Israel may all have been involved at some level. The argument regarding ending regional isolation makes sense, but if that is meant (as it usually is) in a strictly political sense, then the nature of the earliest moves toward rapprochement, which were overwhelmingly economic, and which we shall see in greater detail below, do not make much sense. The evidence points to the primacy of economic factors in this period.
In the meantime, cooperation on the political level continued and broadened as well. Husayn returned to Damascus on August 18, 1975 for a four-day trip which no doubt focused in no small part on events in Lebanon (where civil war had broken out in April) as well perhaps as on the progress toward the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement (Sinai II), which was signed only two weeks later, on September 1. At this meeting the two leaders decided to establish a Joint Higher Command, comprising Asad and Husayn, which would in turn convene a Joint Higher Council, which would then issue decisions and directives relating to suggestions from the ministerial level Higher Committee. The council was also charged with working toward greater political coordination between the two, leading to the construction of a unified foreign policy including: making the necessary preparations and plans to uphold regional and national security; formulating economic policy aimed at achieving integration between the two (through coordinating economic and social development planning, establishing joint companies and economic institutions, unifying the markets of the two countries, and determining a unified customs policy); and coordinating information policy. 6
While Jordanian-Syrian relations grew stronger, Jordan sought to mediate between Syria and Egypt, who were feuding over the Syrian role in Lebanon and over Egypt's conclusion of a second disengagement agreement with Israel. 7 Unlike Syria, Jordan's criticism of the first agreement had been restrained, as Crown Prince Hasan cautioned Egypt's Arab allies "not to judge Egypt too harshly." 8 As for Lebanon, both Syria and Jordan sought to prevent a further escalation of the civil war, just as they both, for regional and domestic reasons, sought to prevent the PLO-Lebanese National Movement alliance from overthrowing the existing regime in Lebanon.
On May 8 Husayn returned to Damascus for a meeting of the Higher Command, at which he reaffirmed his complete support for the Syrian role in preserving the unity, independence, and security of Lebanon. 9 Shortly thereafter on May 31 and June 1 Asad sent some 5,000 Syrian troops into Lebanon, plans for which he may have discussed with Husayn at this meeting. Husayn returned for a three-hour meeting on July 10 (during the siege of the Palestinian refugee camp Tall al-Za'tar), again to talk about Lebanon, as well as other matters. Indeed, Husayn was alone in the Arab world in offering "wholehearted political and propaganda support" for Syria's intervention in Lebanon. 10
It is significant that during this period both Egypt and Saudi Arabia were attempting to pressure Syria on Lebanon and on its opposition to the second disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. Egyptian pressure took the form of propaganda, designed to encourage elements within Syria, including in the ruling Ba'th party, that were pressing Asad to support the regional and international policies advocated by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 11 Saudi Arabia had stopped its development aid (not the Rabat-promised aid over which concern had already been expressed) to Syria in January, leading to a drastic revision of the 1976 budget. Given both Jordanian and Syrian concerns with Gulf financial aid, it is not unlikely that while not officially noted as an agenda item, Gulf state assistance was among the topics discussed in the Asad-Husayn meetings noted above.
Indeed, according to then-Prime Minister Mudar Badran, during the second half of 1976 Jordanian budgetary problems had multiplied as a result of the failure of Gulf states to provide the kingdom what it believed it had been promised at Rabat in 1974. Badran described the strain at the time as severe and contended that he was uncertain month to month how he would pay state employees' salaries. While the evidence is far from conclusive, there is reason to believe that the strong push toward unity was likely the continuation of the tactic Rifa'i noted of making common cause with Syria in order to force the Gulf states to take notice and provide the financial assistance Jordan and Syria sought. 12 Unified ranks in solicitation of funds was no doubt a more successful strategy than going it alone; in the same vein, effectively threatening the Gulf states with a political unification project between these two key confrontation states could only put additional political pressure on the prospective patrons to pay attention and pay up.
In January 1977 a number of meetings took place that appeared to preview the coming political federation between the two countries. Coincidentally or not, it was also in January that a meeting was held in Saudi Arabia to review the 1974 Rabat summit aid promises that Syria and Jordan so desperately sought. As a result, the promises were reportedly renewed. As becomes clear below, the excitement regarding political unification began to wane shortly thereafter.
A joint or federal (ittihadi) planning committee, with Jordanian and Syrian components, 13 met in Amman on January 5, 1977 and agreed to hold joint seminars and form joint specialized committees in the fields of planning. The joint committee held another meeting on February 21-22, 1977, in which it recommended that a development strategy including general goals be drawn up, with the year 2000 set as the most distant time frame for a joint Jordanian-Syrian development strategy. Husayn then returned to Damascus on February 6 for a one-day visit with an official delegation. He met with Asad while Badran and Syrian Prime Minister Khulayfawi also met for discussions of regional developments and of the progress being made toward integration. By early March, press reports indicated that federal unity between Syria and Jordan was expected to be announced in the next few weeks, with final touches being put on the declaration of unity. 14
But the unity never came, and indeed, as the spring unfolded, the fervor for federal unity seemed to subside. The march of visitors between the two continued, and it was announced on March 24 that the formal declaration of unity would be issued on April 17. 15 Shortly thereafter a number of senior Jordanian Army officers, including armed forces Commander-in-Chief Zayd bin Shakir, went to Syria to attend tactical exercises. Nonetheless, despite the continued meetings of the various joint committees and a continued parade of high-level visitors, the march toward unity appeared to have stalled.
Husayn returned to Damascus on December 7, although Badran and Sharaf were back on the 27th. By this time, the primary concern was how to deal with Egyptian president Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Asad continued to stress the need firmly to reject Sadat's policy, while the Jordanians took more of a wait and see attitude. In February Jordanian papers hailed Jordanian-Syrian cooperation and Syrian Information Minister Ahmad noted in a press conference that relations were proceeding well. 16 However, in a February 26 interview, Badran indicated that Jordanian-Syrian relations had cooled recently, although he insisted that relations were still good and that coordination and regular contact between the two leaders were continuing. 17
Did the Jordanians or the Syrians really expect the unity attempt to succeed, especially in the light of past failures in the Arab world? Rifa'i claimed he stressed in meetings with the Syrians the need to develop complementarities, but at the ground level, since the lesson of the past was that starting at the top did not work. Ground-level ties, particularly economic ones, were more effective and longer lasting. Moreover, if political relations later deteriorated, the lower level relations would hold, or would not break as easily as they had in the past. Here, the Jordanians had particularly clear memories of Syria's 1970 closure of the joint border. Oral accounts also indicated federal unity was not a Jordanian priority. Badran noted that one group of Syrians involved in the discussions wanted to press for a swifter move toward unity, while the Jordanians preferred not to rush into anything. This Jordanian caution then made some Syrians skeptical of Jordanian intentions. Rifa'i insisted that although the two sides discussed some details of the unity plan in 1977, there was never a decision that it would be announced imminently, as was reported in the press. 18
What is one to conclude from this? The timing of the initial rapprochement as well as the timing of the cooling indicate that certainly the Jordanians and possibly the Syrians as well hoped through their move toward closer cooperation and then toward unity to pressure the Gulf states, who would have found any such move threatening, to "persuade" them to make good on their Rabat promises of financial aid. Both Jordan and Syria had counted on such aid in their budget calculations, and when it was not forthcoming it appears both regarded their financial position, their budget security, as being in jeopardy.
In addition, however, as the section on economic developments argues below, much of the attention in the bilateral talks was directed toward economic matters and major steps were taken toward increasing economic cooperation between the two. No attempt is made here to second guess the intentions of the Syrian leadership. However, as chapter 2 made clear, Jordan's decisionmakers view the country's economic future and security as closely related to the good ties it has with its Arab neighbors. Having been severely hurt economically by the closure of the Syrian border in 1970, Jordan was keen to strengthen economic ties as a way of precluding the possibility of a repetition of this policy response by the Syrians. The stronger the economic ties, they reasoned, the more likely the Syrians would be to think twice about taking such a step in the future. Hence, various forms of economic statecraft took on great importance in Jordanian calculations of how to build greater economic and budget security. It is to a fuller presentation of developments in the economic realm that the discussion now turns.
Economic Developments
TRADE
As noted above, a protocol on economic cooperation was signed at the March 1975 meetings between Asad and Rifa'i. These were the first such meetings since 1967, when there had been disagreement between the two sides over the issue of the transit of Syrian goods across Jordan to Aqaba in the wake of the closure of the Suez Canal. Unlike the minutes of the 1967 meeting, the March agreement was more general and void of reference to difficulties. The two agreed to lift the barriers on exchange of products without reservation. 19 In part because of the closure of the Suez Canal, overland trade had become a key element in bilateral relations, and by 1974 Syrian ports had become significantly more important to Jordan than Beirut was. 20
According to the April 6 agreement that followed, Syrian public sector establishments agreed to buy annually $3 million of Jordanian products whose importation had been limited. Both countries also agreed to import agricultural, animal, and natural wealth and industrial products from the other as exceptions to the standing prohibitions and as exceptions to all the administrative and currency regulations. Each agreed not to provide special assistance to its own exports to the other country when a similar product was manufactured by the other. Each side was permitted to establish a trade center in the other empowered to import goods without restrictions, with the exception of Jordanian products whose importation was limited by the relevant Syrian public sector institutions. 21
The minutes of the August 1975 meeting of the economic council suggested that Jordan was less than satisfied with the unfolding of bilateral economic relations to date, particularly, it seems, in relation to the Syrian public sector. The Jordanians proposed that all restrictions on their products be lifted; however, if that posed a problem they suggested that, at very least, the restrictions on items produced by the Syrian private sector be dropped and that the Syrian private sector be permitted to import directly from the Jordanian private sector, without going through the public sector. In the case of other products, the Jordanians asked that the Syrian public sector be offered the first opportunity to buy and that, in the case of lack of interest or response within a one-month period, the product be offered directly to the Syrian private sector. Jordan also asked that payments be made for its exports to Syria immediately upon their receipt, and according to accepted commercial principles. 22 The failure of Syria or Syrian institutions to pay for Jordanian products was a problem throughout even this period of close economic relations.
In mid-autumn 1975 the two countries took steps to unify their customs charges. The recommendations dealt with customs fees on primary domestic products used in production in forty-four similar industries in the two countries, exempting some industries from all charges, and unifying charges on thirty-five other industries. Both sides recommended total exemption, not just from customs charges but from all charges, taxes, and other current burdens, in fulfillment of suggestions made in Amman at the August meetings. 23
On October 19 there were also discussions of the phosphate industry. It was agreed to assemble a joint committee of phosphate specialists for greater coordination in the field of production and marketing, and to establish a program to exchange expertise. Syria also agreed to facilitate the passage of raw phosphates across Syrian territory and to work to complete all the necessary facilities to increase the capacity of the Tartus port to export larger amounts. In accordance with the Jordanian requests at the August meeting, the Syrians agreed to take steps to facilitate payment for imports from Jordan. They also agreed to the Jordanian request that Jordanian products, the importation of which was restricted to the public sector, be offered to the Syrian private sector if the public sector showed no interest.
On December 30, 1976, the joint Syrian-Jordanian customs committee concluded six days of meetings in Damascus. Perhaps encouraged by the communiqué of an August 1976 meeting of the Joint Higher Committee, which had called for greater industrial coordination, and for the completion of measures to unify customs charges on domestic primary products in industries, and on minerals, industrial equipment, and tools, 24 its recommendations also included unifying customs duties on raw materials used in similar industries in the two countries, as well as unifying duties on equipment and tools. The committee scheduled follow-up meetings in February to complete both the discussion and preparation of a comparison of the customs duties between the two in order to unify laws and legislation. 25
INDUSTRY AND JOINT PROJECTS
The March 1975 meetings also agreed upon exchanging expertise to prepare and implement a program of industrial development that would include joint industrial projects. They further produced an agreement in principle to develop an industrial free zone, to strengthen the rail line between Damascus and Amman, to act swiftly to link the electricity networks between the two; and to revive microwave communication. 26
On August 26, 1975 a full and formal industrial cooperation agreement was signed, according to which the principle of economic integration (takamul) was to be the basis for industrial cooperation in all planned industrial projects in both countries in which the fixed capital exceeded $6 million. A joint Syrian-Jordanian industrial company with capital of $60 million was to be set up in Amman, just as joint land and sea transport companies were to be established. 27 The signing of the formal agreement on the land and maritime transport companies between Jordan and Syria came in Damascus on December 26.
Accord was also reached at the August 26 meeting to establish an industrial free zone, the first of its kind in the Arab world, at a cost of $15 million, on the border. There was further agreement to found a limited shareholding company to invest in the industrial free zone. 28 At this point the preliminary technical studies for the zone had been completed and the bylaws, structure, and investment, financial, accounting, storage, banking, and customs systems had all been set up. Dar'a in southern Syria was chosen for the headquarters. 29
Meetings throughout 1976 continued to focus on the possibility of setting up joint industrial projects and of increasing the size of trade and transit between the two countries. These goals were to be accomplished by encouraging the growth of the joint companies, and through such projects as the wide-gauge railroad. It was decided that the joint industrial company should set up a white cement factory in Jordan, as well as both a ready-to-wear clothing factory and a metal frames and ball bearing plant in Syria. 30 All of these meetings were held in the framework of the projected move toward political integration.
On January 10, 1977 Jordanian Minister of Trade and Industry Najm al-Din al-Dajani arrived in Damascus to continue discussions with Syrian officials on coordination in industrial and economic sectors. The minutes of the meeting of the joint Syrian-Jordanian Committee for Industrial Integration signed January 12 called upon the two sides to prepare lists of those industries whose investments exceeded $6 million in the areas of foodstuffs, chemicals, textiles, construction materials, and mining and engineering industries. A day later it was announced that a contract was to be signed in Amman establishing a Jordanian-Syrian commercial bank, first proposed in May 1976, intended to finance development projects and assist in economic integration between the two countries. 31
At the end of May the joint Syrian-Jordanian ministerial committee met in Amman to follow up on the progress of economic integration between the two countries, and in particular to review the plans of the joint companies. As a result of these meetings, the committee approved the investment plan of the Jordanian-Syrian Company for Land Transport, which was to cost $27 million and be insured by the two governments, and to operate the company commercially. It also approved the investment plan of the industrial company, which included plans to participate in a ready-to-wear clothing factory, and agreed to prepare studies for the cement plant as well as for a tire and insecticide factory. 32
In early June 1977 the Joint Higher Committee agreed on additional measures to promote coordination and integration of the countries' economies, but the principles resembled much of what had been resolved or decided at previous meetings. The content of the continuing discussions of the various committees indicates both ambitious goals as well as little concrete progress on such issues as significant market integration. But again, by now, the initial fervor for political unity had already begun to fade.
THE YARMUK PROJECT
In a region that is water poor, the Yarmuk River, one of the three main streams of the Jordan River basin system, is of both economic and strategic significance. Providing 75 percent of Jordan's water supplies, the Yarmuk forms part of the boundary between Jordan and Syria, and a bit farther south, between Jordan and Israel. 33 Over the years, numerous proposals have been made to develop the Jordan River basin system for more efficient use, but all have ultimately foundered, largely because of the continuing state of war between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
In 1974, as Syrian-Jordanian relations gradually improved, the Jordanian government revived planning, first initiated in the 1950s, for the Maqarayn dam on the Yarmuk. In January 1975, the Jordanians requested, and subsequently received, financing totaling $15 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development for a feasibility study and engineering design work. 34 During the March 1975 joint meetings the Jordanians agreed to commission feasibility studies on the use of the Yarmuk river waters and to follow up by setting an immediate time to implement the dam project. 35 An August 26 adjustment of a 1953 agreement between the two countries regarding the Yarmuk provided for Jordanian construction and financing of the project, as well as Jordanian compensation to those who stood to lose their lands because of the dam's construction. In return, Jordan was to have the right to use all water and electricity from the dam as long as it provided the local villages with water. 36 Jordan also agreed to provide 80 percent of the work force for the scheme, which was to be supervised by a joint Syrian-Jordanian committee. Machinery and vehicles imported for the project were to be exempted from customs duties and workers were to have freedom of passage across the border. 37
With a live storage capacity of about 350 million cubic meters a year of water, the dam was to irrigate an additional 10,000 hectares of land in the Jordan Valley and convert 12,000 hectares to sprinkler irrigation from the existing system of surface flooding from the East Ghor Canal. In 1979, the kingdom was importing about 60 percent of its food needs. Broader economic policy was targeting a reduction of these imports. 38 But such a reduction required agricultural expansion, and, given the kingdom's limited water resources, the envisioned expansion required substantial additional water. While progress on the Maqarayn project hardly appears to have been a moving force behind the rapprochement, the prospect of gaining access to greater water resources could hardly have escaped the attention of Jordan's decisionmakers. They must certainly have seen the importance of exploiting the improvement in bilateral relations to push greater cooperation in this critical area of national economic security.
Summary
The 1974-77 period witnessed an unprecedented rapprochement between Jordan and Syria. Relations not only warmed, but approached formal unity. Regional conditions-the situation in the area following the 1973 war, Sadat's growing ties with the United States, the war in Lebanon-all certainly influenced the course of relations. However, economic concerns, which have not previously been factored into an analysis of this bilateral relationship, clearly played a key role. Both Jordan and Syria, because of the structures of their economies and the nature of their reliance on Gulf financial assistance aid, found common cause in courting the Gulf states with a united front. Indeed, both faced potentially severe budget crises at home without such aid. By working together and ostensibly moving toward greater political and economic integration, they appear to have succeeded in convincing the Gulf states to provide them the support they had already figured into annual budget calculations and which, by all accounts, they desperately needed. Moreover, it seems not to be coincidental that the moves toward unity gradually came to a halt shortly after meetings in Riyadh in which the financial aid the two states were demanding was approved. The evidence therefore strongly suggests that their alignment and the "threat" of federal unity served a purpose akin to extortion, although the funds sought had in fact already been promised.
It does not appear that Jordanian policymakers were as keen on movement toward real political integration as perhaps their Syrian counterparts were. Economic cooperation, on the other hand, was a primary Jordanian concern and a primary form of statecraft aimed at achieving greater budget and economic security. Here, Jordan was largely responding to or seeking to alter the conditions that had enabled Syria to close its border in 1970. It sought to lay the groundwork for stronger and deeper economic ties with Syria that would make Syria think twice in the future before it closed its border. Economic cooperation developed during this period to include attempts to lower barriers to trade, to increase industrial integration through participation in joint projects, and jointly to exploit the Yarmuk waters. Despite the lack of fulfillment of the most optimistic expectations, the economic statecraft of this period did lay a basis for continued cooperation through the difficult times ahead.
From Cooling to Confrontation: 1978-1983
Political Developments
The period 1978-1980 witnessed a further cooling of relations, perhaps initially because of Syrian suspicions regarding the Jordanian failure to condemn Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. However, as time went on, not only had the brotherhood of 1975-76 passed, but a new cold war had developed between the two, which almost culminated in armed clashes in late 1980. The empirical material in this section suggests again that an economic or budget security argument provides a clear explanation of what has long appeared to be a murky period in Syrian-Jordanian relations.
In the spring of 1978 Sharaf went to Damascus on several occasions. Some of the discussions no doubt dealt with the March 15 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, as Jordan contacted various Arab capitals to promote a call for an Arab summit. 39 Press reports also indicated that Husayn, as well as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, was attempting to mediate between Sadat and Asad over the fallout from Sadat's Jerusalem trip the previous November. Contacts between the two on regional peace issues also continued, and by late September, Syrian sources were expressing satisfaction with the Jordanian position on the outcome of the Camp David summit. 40 Husayn had made clear he would not go the way of Sadat, although he refused to join the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. 41 In the meantime, however, there were rumors that Jordan and Syria would meet soon to revive the concept of the Eastern Front, which dated to before the 1967 war, as a means of confronting Israel. 42 Hence, while relations were no longer as warm as they had been in 1975-76, they were nonetheless clearly cordial. Not until later in the year, at the Baghdad summit, did signs of additional stress manifest themselves.
The Arab League meetings in Baghdad in November 1978 and March 1979 were crucial to Jordan. By late 1978, Jordan, ever aid-dependent, was suffering from the fact that some Arab states had still not forwarded their Rabat-promised aid. Iraq's Saddam Husayn was the moving force behind convening the summits, and was particularly instrumental, according to reports, in convincing the Gulf states to commit to making annual aid payments to the confrontation states. Jordanian-Iraqi relations had been gradually improving in any case, and that trend was reinforced by the November summit.
The improvement in Jordan's ties with Iraq (Syria's nemesis) undoubtedly made the Syrians uneasy. However, drawn together by the threat of Camp David, the Syrians and Iraqis, who had been feuding since 1975, had begun to hold meetings aimed at reconciliation, a very positive development from Jordan's perspective. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam went to Amman on February 8 with a message for King Husayn shortly after meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa'dun Hammadi. On March 26 Husayn was back in Damascus for talks, this time on a trip that also took him to Iraq. However, the Jordanians were not directly included in the reconciliation process, which reached the verge of a Syrian-Iraqi unity announcement. Instead, according to policymakers, Jordan heard about developments in this critical relationship second hand, even though it had a joint command with Syria, which meant that any move toward unity between Syria and Iraq directly involved the kingdom as well. 43
On July 21 Husayn was back in Damascus, again with an entourage. However, this meeting came about a month after an attack on military cadets in Aleppo that signaled the beginning of several years of internal violence in Syria. During this period, the Syrians began asking the Jordanians to put more effort into "internal" security to help defuse the threat to Syria from some elements operating out of Jordan. While the Jordanians were willing to assist, they argued that they could not patrol the entire border, long permeable to smugglers, to prevent the entry into Syria of all potential subversives. 44 Moreover, when it became apparent that members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) were involved, the Jordanians argued that the Ikhwan had not been a problem in Jordan, and that Jordan, for instance, had never asked Syria to arrest its Communists when Jordan cracked down on Communists domestically. 45 However, according to Badran, whom the Syrians later accused of sheltering and supporting the Brotherhood, given the deteriorating state of internal security, the Syrians were no longer distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable policy demands. 46
At about the same time, an attempted coup in Baghdad that Saddam believed had Syrian backing led to a cooling in Syrian-Iraqi relations. King Husayn actively engaged in mediation, with the blessings of both Saddam and Asad. But violence in Syria continued with clashes in Latakia in the late summer and fall. In October 1979 Jordan reportedly did hand over to Damascus some 100 Syrian members of the Ikhwan. 47 Husayn's final trip to Damascus in 1979 came on October 21 during which he sought to coordinate with Asad about the upcoming Arab summit in Tunis in November, as well, no doubt, as to discuss internal Syrian unrest and Syrian-Iraqi relations. Beyond its mediation, Jordan tried to stay out of the fray. When the charges and countercharges flew, Jordanian policymakers often did not know which side to believe, although they admitted that the Iraqis had encouraged those Syrians outside Syria who opposed the government, especially members of the Ikhwan, to engage in anti-Syrian sabotage. 48
The internal unrest in Syria, the belief that Jordan was providing aid and comfort to Muslim Brothers hostile to Syria, Jordan's growing ties with Iraq, and the beginnings of the king's dissatisfaction with Syrian policy in Lebanon were adding further strains to a relationship that had first been tested by the spring 1977 failure of the federal unity plan to move forward and Jordan's failure to reject outright Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Husayn himself noted problems in the relationship, but denied-most would argue, implausibly-that Jordan had played any role in the unrest in Syria. However, he stated that Jordan opposed the politics of axes and polarization (referring to the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front-which excluded Iraq), and he further stated that the Lebanese problem had not been handled properly. 49
Rifa'i contended that, whatever was said, Lebanon was not a central issue. The king's major concern in Lebanon, at least in a Cold War framework was that "internationalization" of a conflict, which he seemed to fear in Lebanon, really meant polarization of the Arab world, and that the king did not want the East-West Cold War divisions to be fought out in the already division-riddled Arab world. For Husayn, internationalization also meant an infringement on Lebanese sovereignty (and possibly even Jordan's), which would only exacerbate standing problems. 50
Whatever the king's concern over Lebanon, the central problem was the differing approach to the conflict on the part of Syria and Iraq, two countries whose interests Jordan has had to balance carefully over the years. Perhaps needless to say, the worse relations are between the two, the more difficult such a balancing act is for Jordan. However, the better relations are between the two, the less important Jordan is to either of them. To further complicate matters, the Saudis reportedly become suspicious whenever relations between Jordan and Syria or Iraq grow too strong. 51 The significance of these relations to the Saudis was demonstrated above by the apparently successful Syrian and Jordanian use of a "rapprochement strategy" to convince the Saudis to provide the aid promised at Rabat.
In May 1980 Prime Minister 'Abdal-Hamid Sharaf denied Syrian charges that Jordan was supporting opponents of the Syrian regime 52 as did the semi-official al-Ra'i on August 11. Information Minister 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah announced Jordan's support for the Libyan-Syrian Union on September 16 53 , but relations continued to deteriorate as Jordan vocally supported Iraq's attack on Iran, launched in September 1980. In November, Damascus charged Amman with mistreating Syrian citizens heading for Jordan and threatened to take appropriate action. 54 A day later the charges of support for saboteurs were leveled again: Jordan was accused of being a haven for Muslim Brothers plotting against Syria, an arsenal for their arms, an arena for training their members, a route to enter Syria, and a bridge to funnel arms, men, and funds to the conspirators. Directly implicated were the brother of the head of the Jordanian intelligence service, the dean of Jordan University Shari'a college and Crown Prince Hasan. Jordan continued to deny all charges. 55
At the same time, Syria was engaged in efforts to prevent the convening of a December Arab summit, which, along with Libya, Algeria, Lebanon, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the PLO, it was expected to boycott. The 1980 summit in Amman was to focus on the Arab regional economy and Syria evidently feared that it would serve further to enhance the standing that Iraq had begun to develop at the Baghdad I (November 1978) and Baghdad II (March 1979) meetings. Indeed, coming immediately after the beginning of Iraq's war with Iran, the summit threatened to catapult Iraq to even greater regional prominence. Asad's worst fears were all materializing at one time: Egypt's withdrawal from the front, domestic instability, and the rising power of Iraq. Syria asked for a postponement of the summit and even a change of venue, but Jordan rejected the request. In response, Syria boycotted the summit and then on November 26 massed some 20,000 troops and 400 tanks on the joint border-the highest state of tensions between the two since September 1970 when Syrian troops had crossed the border in support of the Palestinian guerrillas. Jordan responded militarily to the mobilization by dispatching three of its own armored divisions to the Syrian frontier along with 35,000 reservists. 56 The Syrians were demanding not only a Jordanian disavowal of support for the Ikhwan, but also a Jordanian reaffirmation of its recognition of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians. 57 Saudi mediation began almost immediately and in a few days succeeded in brokering a Syrian withdrawal, beginning on December 9. It was rumored that Saudi Arabia had provided Syria with substantial (no figures available) aid following the mediation visit that had led to the withdrawal. 58
Jordanian policymakers differ in their assessments-at least those they were willing to share-of the reasons behind the deterioration in relations. Rifa'i blamed the deterioration on the change in political orientation (toward Iraq) undertaken by his successor, Badran. For his part, Badran insisted that Jordan did nothing to undermine Syrian security. He insisted-although it is difficult to believe-that the training of the Ikhwan in Jordan took place without his knowledge. He also insisted that much of the responsibility for the real hostility between the two lay with Rif'at al-Asad, the president's brother. Badran argued that Asad himself did not know many of the specifics of the unfolding Cold War. 59
Whatever the Jordanians' assessments, it seems that Asad was perhaps closest to the mark when he was quoted as saying, "Husayn will fight to the last Iraqi dinar," indicating the financial and budgetary considerations that had likely been the most influential factors in the king's decision. 60 Several top policymakers noted the strong and important role Saddam Husayn had played in convening the 1978 Baghdad summit, in pushing for Gulf state financial support for the remaining confrontation states, and in offering to pay himself whatever promised contributions might not be made by other states. Iraq had thus begun to demonstrate its full economic and political potential. 61 Saddam was also clearly interested in Jordan for his own strategic reasons 62 , and could back up his interest with a strong economy, a large market, and oil money. One source also indicated that Saudi Arabia had conditioned further aid to Jordan upon a "Jordanian-Syrian political disengagement, among other things." 63 If true, this is just one more indication that financial concerns were paramount in Jordanian calculations. While, again, it is clear that numerous regional and domestic forces were at work, Iraq could offer both relations. Rifa'i blamed the deterioration on the change in political or strategic depth and economic support. Syria could offer only the former, and at that was beset with domestic instability. When it became clear that relations could not be maintained with both, Jordan chose Iraq, for sound financial, budget security reasons.
Throughout 1981 Syria continued to be concerned with internal instability. It was also preoccupied in the spring with the missile crisis in Lebanon, with the Saudi and Kuwaiti decisions to withhold their subsidies for the Arab (largely Syrian) Deterrent Force in Lebanon, and with the possibility that Jordan might join in the Camp David process. Charges and countercharges became a regular feature of the bilateral relationship, as Syria came under increasing regional fire for its policies in Lebanon and for its support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. (Syria was then further weakened and exposed by the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.)
In a move that was evidently coordinated with the Iranians, Syria closed its border with Iraq on April 8, 1982 and its part of the pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean on April 10, 1983. The intent, of course, was to increase Iraq's financial burdens; however, the move had domestic repercussions as well. Badly affected were operations at the country's two main ports, Tartus and Latakia. As a result, the quantities of crude oil and oil products loaded at Syrian ports fell from 162.2 million tons in 1981 to 10.8 tons in 1982. 64
In late May 1983, secret talks took place between the Jordanians and the Syrians to try to achieve a reconciliation. As in 1974, the reconciliation talks came at Jordan's initiative. One of the reasons for the attempt at reconciliation may have been a desire on Husayn's part to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the Americans and their push for negotiations within the framework of the Reagan Plan, which had been announced on September 1, 1982. However, probably more important were several issues directly or indirectly related to Jordan's financial and budgetary health. At this point, Husayn wanted Syria to reopen the Iraq-Mediterranean pipeline. The broader economic crisis in Iraq had led to a decrease in critical Iraqi aid to Jordan. Moreover, several months earlier, Iraq had announced that it was imposing austerity measures, which meant drastic cuts in imports. This further threatened the Jordanian economy, whose private sector had rushed into the Iraqi market following the outbreak of war. Reopening the pipeline held out the hope of some economic relief for Iraq, and by extension for Jordan. 65 Beyond that, however, reconciliation with Syria would have opened up the possibility of reenergizing Syrian-Jordanian bilateral trade, which had dropped substantially since the 1980 border crisis. Unfortunately for the Jordanians, however, the Syrians were not interested at this point. The bilateral feuding continued and Jordan continued to suffer financially both directly and indirectly as a result.
Economic Developments
By late 1978 or early 1979, Jordanian policymakers appear to have made the determination that their budget security required a shift in political alignment, putting Jordan more clearly in a pro-Iraq camp. This was not a serious problem for Syrian-Jordanian relations until Syrian-Iraqi relations deteriorated in mid-summer 1979. At that point, unable to maintain peaceful coexistence with both, Jordan chose the Iraqi option, the natural consequence being a clear deterioration in its relations on all fronts with Syria. Economic developments during this period certainly serve as indicators not only of the gradual deterioration in political relations, but also of the degree to which the Jordanians and Syrians had, during the previous period, established economic institutions and ties that could have a life outside of or above politics.
TRADE
Well before the beginning of bilateral feuding, the joint ministerial committee met in early August 1978. It urged the relevant authorities to lift all administrative and financial restrictions impeding trade between the two countries, to apply the provisions of the economic cooperation agreement, and to regulate the trade agreement signed in Amman on April 6, 1975. This was likely an indication of dissatisfaction with the development of the trade relationship, although by 1979 Jordan's exports to Syria had more than tripled from their 1975 level (from $11 million to $40.7 million), while Syrian exports to Jordan had nearly doubled (from $18.9 million to $38 million.) 66
Even as late as April 1980 Jordanian Minister of Trade and Industry 'Ali al-Nusur and his Syrian counterpart discussed joint economic relations and agreed to increase further the volume of bilateral trade. 67 However, the number, extent, and diplomatic level of involvement in the various economy-related meetings declined, and by the middle of 1980 the joint committees had ceased to function. It is therefore rather remarkable that despite the massing of troops on the border in December 1980, traffic continued to flow in both directions as the six-year old economic and trade agreement remained in full force. 68 Goods entering from both sides continued to be cleared by both countries free of customs duties. The only change was that goods transiting by land had to pass customs on both the Jordanian and Syrian sides, whereas previously they had cleared at a unified customs point. 69
However, at this point, Syrian domestic economic problems began to have an impact on trade, quite apart from the effects of political feuding. The domestic economy was in crisis, one manifestation of which was a level of foreign currency reserves estimated as sufficient to finance only about one month of nonmilitary imports ($385 million). Two government decrees, 181 and 182 of April 22, 1981, put new restrictions on private sector access to foreign exchange. In practice, it appeared that the new law was to serve as the basis of a freeze on private sector imports. 70 Although it is difficult to distinguish between trade lost for political reasons and that lost for reasons of foreign currency shortage, Jordanian exports to Syria dropped from $41 million in 1980 to $32.1 million in 1981 and $23.2 million in 1982. 71 Private transport faced other difficulties. Although the new regulations were not officially announced, haulers were made aware in late August 1982 that new restrictions on the transit of goods had been imposed. The most important change was a ban on goods being conveyed to destinations beyond Syria, including specifically trucks carrying cargoes to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This, along with the ban on traffic to Iraq, substantially cut into Syria's transit income. 72 But the impact on Jordan was clear as well.
INDUSTRY AND JOINT PROJECTS
Again, at the beginning of this period the joint committees and companies continued to operate normally, if not with the same fervor of a year earlier. The general assembly of the Jordanian-Syrian Overland Transport Company met in Amman in mid-May 1978 to review a fairly successful record to date. At the beginning of 1978 it owned 300 Mercedes and 68 refrigerator trucks, and of the initial capital of $24 million, $15 million was paid up. In mid-July it was announced that the company expected a $3 million turnover in 1978. At this point the company had contracts to transport cement from Lebanon to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and to carry imported foods from the ports of Aqaba, Latakia, and Beirut to various parts of the Middle East. In June 1978 it won a contract to haul 20,000 tons of wheat from Aleppo to Amman and began to build an operations base costing more than $2 million at Qastal, about 30 kilometers south of Amman, to be completed by the end of the year. The company was also planning to expand beyond the Middle East and was negotiating a transport agreement with Intras of East Germany to haul freight from Europe to the Gulf. 73
Throughout the summer of 1978 there were meetings of the joint committees, all of which were aimed at continuing the process of integration. Funds were allocated for the Land Transport Company, the Maritime Transport Company, the Joint Industries Company, and the Jordanian-Syrian Commercial Bank. The proposed Jordanian-Syrian Industrial Holding Company was to have capital of $60 million and intended to seek foreign loans of $120-$180 million to finance joint manufacturing projects in both countries. 74 By the end of the year the Maritime Company had placed orders for two additional ships, one of which was to be ready in March of 1979 and the other the following November. 75
By June 1979 the rapprochement between Syria and Iraq had reached the point that the joint Syrian-Jordanian Industrial Company was contacting foreign manufacturers as a first step toward setting up a joint venture with Iraq to assemble cars for the domestic markets of the three countries. The plan had been proposed earlier, but did not really begin to take shape until Iraq offered to join the scheme, thereby more than doubling the potential market. According to the proposed plan the Baghdad-based Arab Industrial Investments Company (set up by Iraq and Egypt in 1975 to manufacture vehicles) was to take a 50 percent share in the company and the joint Syrian-Jordanian company the other half. 76
The Free Zone Company, on the other hand, continued to languish. The Board met in May 1979 to decide whether or not to invite tenders for the completion of the first stage of the project. A Syrian-Jordanian consortium working on the project under a $6.6 million contract had completed only 15 percent of the first stage, and completion costs were estimated at $12.6 million. 77 The commercial bank was also in trouble. In late August 1982 the Jordanian government, through the Economic Security Committee, revoked the 1979 contract with Syria establishing the Jordanian-Syrian Commercial Bank. The reason, reportedly, was Syria's refusal to open a branch in Damascus, in violation of the contract establishing the bank and its bylaws. 78
Summary
Jordan's gradual move toward Iraq beginning in late 1978 eventually made a political break with Syria inevitable, given developments in Syrian-Iraqi relations. By early 1980 political interaction between the two had become minimal. Jordan did seek a rapprochement in 1983, but again, its goal appears to have been the reopening of the oil pipeline though Syria from Iraq in order to secure relief for both the Jordanian and Iraqi economies. This rapprochement attempt failed and the Syrians launched a period of "coercive diplomacy," consisting of sabotage and assassinations. 79
During the early period of the cooling of relations, 1978-1979, economic meetings and interaction continued, if not with the intensity of the previous three years. Although some of the joint ventures (the bank and the free zone) were unable to survive the deterioration in relations, others, remarkably, continued to function normally. Bilateral trade did drop, although it is unclear how much of the drop was due to the political situation and how much owed to Syrian austerity measures. Nonetheless, the border remained open, a critical fact for Jordan, a country dependent on transit trade. The bases of economic integration or cooperation that the Jordanians had viewed as critical to preventing a repetition of 1970 had at least in part succeeded in playing their economic security role. Thanks to the initiatives of the 1975-77 period, even in the most strained of days Jordan managed to avoid the economic damage that the 1970 border closure had caused. 80
The Beginnings of a Thaw: 1984-85
Political Developments
By mid-1984, hurting from the Gulf war and eager to find a way to bring it to an end, Jordanian officials made several statements to the effect that the major difference between Amman and Damascus concerned Syria's support for Iran in the Gulf war. 81 In July Husayn and Asad exchanged cables on the occasion of 'Id al-Fitr (the feast at the end of the holy month of Ramadan), the first such message from Asad since 1980. Two weeks later, Jordan's Speaker of Parliament, 'Akif al-Fayiz, went to Damascus to attend the Arab Parliamentary Union meetings, and while in the Syrian capital met with Foreign Minister Khaddam. Thereafter additional signs of warming in relations begin to appear. The Jordanian semi-official daily al-Dustur urged rapprochement with Damascus on July 23 82 and in his meeting with the Jordanian parliamentary delegation, Asad stated that the chill that characterized the bilateral relations was not an inevitable result of the Iran-Iraq war. Indeed, the chill had appeared before the war. 83 Husayn subsequently confirmed this in an interview with al-Hawadith. 84
This minor improvement in relations was short-lived, however, as Jordan did the unthinkable (in the Syrian view) by restoring relations with Egypt on September 24, 1984. It then continued along a path that Syria could only have found threatening by hosting the controversial seventeenth session of the Palestine National Council in Amman, while the Syrians were still trying to depose PLO chief Yasir 'Arafat. The chill was renewed as were attempts on the lives of Jordanian diplomats abroad and sabotage at home. Renewed restrictions were put on travel to Syria: permits were to be issued only in exceptional circumstances. 85 The announcement of the February 11 accord between Jordan and the PLO to coordinate activities aimed at future participation in a peace conference only made matters worse, since Asad feared the King and Arafat would soon be marching off to separate peace talks, as Sadat had done before them.
The change in prime ministers in Jordan from Ahmad 'Ubaydat to Zayd al-Rifa'i on April 5, 1985 to a large extent owed to the king's desire to improve relations with Damascus and hence constituted in effect a renewed Jordanian overture. No small matter was the Jordanian desire to put an end to Syrian-sponsored attacks on Jordanian diplomats abroad as well as sabotage at home. However, as was demonstrated above, Amman had clearly been interested in reconciliation before, as had Damascus before Jordan renewed ties with Egypt. Not until spring 1985, as Syria's problems with oil supplies from Teheran began to take a serious economic toll (see below), did it evidently feel its need for improved ties with Jordan was sufficient to enable it to set aside its outrage over the restored links with Egypt.
On August 12, 1985, Syria and Jordan agreed to receive a committee that had been formed earlier in the month at the Casablanca summit (which Syria had not attended) intended to end Syrian-Jordanian disagreements. At the invitation of Saudi Prince 'Abdallah, chair of the committee charged with trying to resolve inter-Arab disputes, Syrian prime minister Kasm and Rifa'i held talks in Jeddah on September 16-17. (Initially these reconciliation efforts were to have included Iraq as well.) As a first step toward reconciliation, Jordan and Syria agreed to stop the propaganda warfare, lift border restrictions, and increase trade. 86 Indeed, one Jordanian motive for trying to restore relations was to facilitate the exchange of produce across the border. Jordanian fruit and vegetables exported to Syria were said to be rotting at the frontier because of travel restrictions (which were not lifted until late 1985). 87
In the meantime, however, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, the Arab states that had promised regular budgetary assistance to the confrontation states at Baghdad were not paying what they owed. Whether for reasons of budgetary constraints brought on by the regional recession, the large demands for aid by Iraq, or political discontent with confrontation state policy, the aid had largely dried up. 88 Kuwait had not only cut back, but had threatened to terminate payments to Syria entirely, reportedly because of Asad's policy in Lebanon. The amirate had also suspended aid to Jordan because of the conclusion of the February 11 accord, which it opposed. Iraq, because of its involvement in the war with Iran, had of course stopped payments much earlier. Both Jordan and Syria were clearly in need of whatever economic boost an improvement in bilateral relations could secure.
On October 20-21 Rifa'i and Kasm met again, this time in Riyadh, as the reconciliation proceeded. One of the major issues that was solved was the presence on Jordanian soil of Syrians opposed to the Asad regime: the Jordanian government reportedly immediately asked them to leave Jordan. 89 As the reconciliation continued the most surprising development was the November 11 speech by King Husayn in which he admitted publicly that Jordan had in fact sheltered those who were plotting against Syria. The day following the speech, Rifa'i left for Damascus, taking with him the foreign minister, the minister of trade, industry and supply, the minister of finance, the governor of the central bank, the undersecretary of trade, industry and supply, director-general of the Jordanian Agricultural Marketing Products Corporation, director of the prime minister's office and an economic adviser from the prime ministry. The list of ministers involved indicates that economic issues must have been high on the agenda. By November 13 the two sides were proclaiming that a new era had arrived. The joint communiqué from their meeting referred directly to the need to revive the joint committees. It said nothing, however, about resuming political unification efforts. 90
TRADE
By the spring of 1984 Syria was facing economic strains beyond those mentioned in the earlier period. This time, it was the Iraqi blockade of Kharg Island, which was preventing Iran from honoring its agreement to provide Syria with 160,000 b/d of crude oil. Asad sought help from Libya's Qaddafi, but Libyan light oil did not meet the needs of Syria's refineries. 91 It appears these economic strains were sufficient to lead Syria to overcome or overlook the obstacles to reconciliation that had existed for it in 1983, when King Husayn had made his first overture to Damascus.
In the context of this new move toward reconciliation, on April 25, 1984 a delegation from the Syrian Supply Company arrived in Amman, requesting the urgent shipment from Jordan of 3000 tons of citrus fruit and another shipment of 500 tons of lemons. It further requested an increase in the shipment of tomatoes from 200 to 400 tons daily. The delegation met with officials from the Jordanian Cooperative Organization and the Jordanian Agricultural Marketing Products Corporation (AMPCO) and reviewed an agreement, originally signed in 1983, aimed at facilitating the transport of agricultural products between the two. The agreement called for the exchange of produce in the amount of $9 million by each side. Up to that time $11.6 million total per year had been exchanged. 92
On July 29, the Chamber of Commerce sent a delegation to Syria to find ways to increase trade. In a meeting with members of the Syrian Chamber of Commerce they examined bilateral trade over the previous five years (five very bad years in relations) and suggested means of increasing exchange. There was also discussion of the possibilities of Jordan's participating in the Damascus trade fair. The delegation met the Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade, Dr. Salim Yasin, to discuss the importance of implementing joint industrial and agricultural projects between the two countries and with Muhammad Shafiq Shukr, president of the Syrian Chamber of Industry, and the members of its board to discuss the possibilities of joint projects between both the public and private sectors.
While the further expansion of economic relations appears to have been stalled by Jordan's September 1984 restoration of ties with Egypt, the appointment of Rifa'i as prime minister seemed to signal full steam ahead again. On April 20, 1985 the undersecretary of Jordan's Ministry of Agriculture returned from a two-day trip to Syria, where he had held talks with officials from the Syrian General Company for Vegetables and Fruits to develop areas of cooperation. 93 Shortly thereafter, large numbers of Syrian merchants began arriving in Amman to purchase Jordanian agricultural products from farmers, following the Jordanian government's rescinding of an earlier decision that had required the marketing of Jordanian agricultural products through AMPCO. 94
At the end of April 1985 the cabinet decided that Jordan would participate in the 1985 Damascus International Fair, in response to an official invitation received by the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In a further sign of warming relations, travel restrictions between the two began to be eased in May 1985. Jordanians arriving from Syria began reporting greater ease of passage at the border. By late September a Jordanian economic delegation led by Hamdi Tabba', chairman of the Amman Chamber of Commerce, met with Syrian Minister of Industry, 'Ali al-Tarabulsi. In response, Tabba' invited the chairman of the Damascus Chambers of Industry and Trade to visit Jordan. 95
November meetings between Trade and Industry Minister Raja'i al-Mu'ashshir and Syrian Minister of Economy and External Trade 'Imadi led to an agreement on increasing the volume of trade (only $25 million in 1985). 96 The joint trade committees were also reactivated, cooperation rose again in transport and banking, and travel restrictions were formally lifted in November. 97 In December 1985 it was reported that Jordan had been supplying Syria with Saudi oil for the past two months, something Damascus had perhaps been seeking through the improvement in bilateral ties. 98
In July 1984 as bilateral economic ties were being reenergized, it was announced that the Syrian-Jordanian Industrial Company's $52.6 million white cement plant near Zarqa would start production trials in September. 99 And, despite the renewed chill in official relations following Jordan's September 1984 restoration of diplomatic ties with Egypt, a delegation from the Syrian National Petroleum Company arrived in Amman on December 8 for a four-day visit to the Natural Resources Authority to exchange information with the Authority's oil exploration specialists.
Summary
Although the Jordanians attempted reconciliation with Syria in 1983 as a way of trying to ease the financial strain on Iraq, and by extension themselves, the Syrians did not respond positively until, apparently, their economic relations with Iran deteriorated and Jordan appeared to offer the prospect of economic (as well perhaps as political) relief. While this study is not intended to be a definitive statement on Syrian policy it would seem that if political considerations had been primary, Syria might well have sought reconciliation with Jordan earlier since following its humiliation in its 1982 confrontation with Israel, it was left militarily weakened and strategically vulnerable. It is true that, in 1984, after a renewed reconciliation had been set in motion, even economic problems with Iran would not allow Syria to excuse Jordan's rapprochement with Egypt and its warming relations with the PLO. This was simply too great a threat to Syrian political security. However, after sufficient fury was demonstrated, the return of Rifa'i to the Jordanian prime ministership seemed to open the way for the improvement in ties that Jordan sought in order to lay the basis for an end to inter-Arab feuding and to reenergize trade. As a result, the two sides held serious discussions aimed at reviving bilateral trade and revitalizing the joint companies, although the unity discussions of the mid-seventies were not resurrected.
The New Reconciliation?: 1986 -1990
Political Developments
The events of this period indicate that although relations had been restored, Jordan would not in the near future move fully into a Syrian camp. The kingdom's political and economic relationship with Iraq had grown too strong and important to jeopardize. In the face of the domestic economic difficulties that Jordan confronted as direct or indirect results of the Gulf war, it made sound economic sense to repair ties with Syria, for the reasons outlined in the previous section. It also made political and economic sense to work toward an Arab consensus to try to end the war. Jordan's reconciliation with Syria certainly helped ease Syria's regional isolation (based on its support for Iran). It also lay the groundwork for moving toward a unified Arab approach to the Gulf war, with an eye to bringing the conflict to an end, something from which all parties stood to benefit by that time. Clearly, all the while Jordan was striving for good relations with the Syrians and engaging in mediation to repair strained inter-Arab ties, the primary state in its calculations was Iraq, at least when Syria and Iraq were the two countries in the balance.
The 1986-1990 period witnessed a number of fluctuations in Jordanian-Syrian ties, but nothing that dramatically changed the course of the relationship. Diplomatic representation between the two was restored in early April 1986 and Asad made his first visit to Jordan in nine years on May 5. This followed the collapse of a planned Arab summit and the demise of the February 11, 1985 Jordanian-Palestinian Accord (thus putting Jordan and Syria both in the anti-'Arafat camp). The exact substance of the talks was not officially reported, but Kuwait's al-Qabas reported that military issues were at the heart of the talks: at the time there were rumors that a Syrian-Israeli confrontation was imminent. 100
As part of the larger aim of improving inter-Arab ties and ending the Gulf war, Jordan embarked on another round of mediation between Syria and Iraq in the spring of 1986. Accompanied by Rifa'i, Minister of the Royal Court 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah, and Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri, Husayn, who had been in Baghdad only nine days earlier, made a surprise visit to Damascus the evening of May 24. On July 27 Husayn was back in Syria; however, the composition of the delegation that accompanied him indicated that economic topics were prominent on the agenda of this fourth Syrian-Jordanian summit of 1986.
Husayn made four visits to Syria in the spring of 1987: one in early February, two in April, and one in May. These discussions were no doubt also a part of the king's mediation efforts. He was back in Damascus on June 24 and September 1 for one-day meetings, while Rifa'i traveled to Damascus in early July and in mid-August. Rifa'i also made two secret visits to Damascus as part of the mediation efforts between Iraq and Syria. 101
By the time of Husayn's September visits to Syria at least one topic of conversation was the proposed November Amman Arab League summit conference, which had been postponed for several years and which aimed at forging a unified Arab position on the Gulf war. Syria had two major reservations about attending such a meeting: that the Gulf war would be the single agenda item and that its long-standing position of supporting Iran would leave it isolated in the inter-Arab gathering; and that the summit would readmit Syria's nemesis Egypt to the Arab League, an eventuality that Syria hoped to postpone as long as possible. In the event, the Gulf war was the major focus of discussion, but Egypt was not readmitted, one of the quid pro quos for Syrian attendance. Husayn made one more visit to Syria, in late November, to discuss the summit resolutions and ways of speeding up the Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation. 102
In early 1988, there were numerous consultations between the Jordanians and Syrians regarding the Palestinian uprising, which had begun in December 1987, and regarding the subsequent visit by U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz to the region. In mid-summer Asad, who had his own interests in seeing the Palestinians pried away from the Jordanians, praised the king's controversial July 31, 1988 decision to disengage legally and administratively from the West Bank. 103 However, in the Syrian view at that time, more pressing were the developments in Lebanon, where the deteriorating security situation made scheduled elections increasingly unlikely. Asad and Husayn met on November 22, 1988 to discuss Iraq's support of Michel 'Awn, the anti-Syrian renegade Lebanese army general who had claimed the Lebanese presidency, and to discuss the implications of the PLO's then-recent declaration of a state. 104 The two continued to differ on Lebanon: the king stated on numerous occasions the need for all foreign troops (including Syrian) to leave Lebanon. Not surprisingly, this position was in line with the Iraqi stance, and Jordan was rumored to be permitting the movement of weapons across its territory bound for 'Awn's forces.
On another front, at this stage Jordan and Saudi Arabia were reportedly mediating between Syria and Egypt. Periodic contacts had taken place since the Islamic Conference Organization meeting in Kuwait in January 1987, but because of the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the subsequent signs that Iraq intended to play a more active role in the politics of the Arab East, a Syrian rapprochement with Egypt became more pressing for Asad. This was especially the case since, although not formally readmitted to the Arab League, Egypt formed part of the Jordanian-Iraqi-Egyptian axis that had evolved since the early 1980s. Since the 1987 Amman summit had given the green light to Arab states to reestablish ties with Cairo, Egypt was clearly on its way to returning to the Arab fold. Syria was the only obstacle to Egypt's formal return, but it had to find a face-saving way of restoring ties.
Whatever political currency Jordan may have gained with Syria for its mediation efforts with Egypt was probably lost with the announcement of the formation of the Arab Cooperation Council, a regional grouping including Jordan, Iraq, North Yemen, and Egypt, in February 1989. Syrian relations with Egypt had not yet been restored and now the region's two most powerful states, Egypt and Iraq, had formally joined forces. It is unlikely that any of Husayn's reassurances to Asad could have eased the Syrian president's concerns over these developments. 105 At the same time, the respective countries' views on Lebanon continued to differ, and relations grew strained as Jordan insisted that a negotiated, Arab solution was the answer for Lebanon and that a military solution should be ruled out, despite Jordan's role in enabling Iraqi arms to reach 'Awn.
But Husayn was soon distracted from regional developments as economic riots in April 1989 forced him to direct his attention more fully to the domestic scene. Relations with Syria had certainly not reached the breaking point, nor were they expected to, but the king's support for the Arab consensus on Lebanon at the May Casablanca summit (a position that refused to give the Syrians carte blanche in Lebanon) angered Asad, and the appointment of Mudar Badran as Chief of the Royal Court, and, subsequent to the November 1989 elections, his selection as prime minister, was a sign that improving relations with Syria was not a priority. (It will be remembered that the Syrians had accused Badran of having allowed the training of Syrian Muslim fundamentalists in Jordan in the late 1970s and early 1980s.) Husayn did, however, continue to serve as a mediator between Asad and Egyptian President Mubarak in an attempt to achieve a Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement, efforts that finally bore fruit in late December 1989.
Economic Developments
TRADE
Despite some important differences in regional policies noted above, economic relations during this period continued without major setbacks or interruptions. The joint economic committee met in March 1986 to discuss means of facilitating the flow of national products into the markets of both countries. The minutes of the meetings set the trade target for each country at $58.2 million per year (after an average of about $14.6 million in the past few years). 106 In the third week of June Trade and Industry Minister Mu'ashshir and Undersecretary of Agriculture al-Lawzi made visits to Damascus to discuss trade cooperation. A payments agreement, a standing problem for Jordan in its relations with Syria, was then reached by Jordan with the Syrian Central Bank covering bilateral trade of $40 million in 1986. However, the Jordanian Ministry of Supply, Trade, and Industry stated on June 18 that goods imported from Syria would be cleared through customs only if they had import licenses and payment documents from commercial banks cleared by the Central Bank of Jordan. 107
Syria also arranged a barter agreement with some of its Jordanian creditors. The deal covered Syrian trade debts to the public and private sectors in the amount of $40 million, accumulated between 1983 and 1986. Syria was to supply glass, cotton thread, fruit, barley, and chick peas. The deal also reportedly involved reexports to Jordan of Syrian phosphates to cover $7 million of the debt owed to the Jordanian government, Royal Jordanian Airlines, and private pharmaceutical and agricultural industries. Two-way trade in 1988 was also expected to be covered primarily by barter arrangements. 108 In a February 1989 meeting the Joint Higher Committee set a trade target of $65 million each in 1989; bilateral trade in 1988 had reached about $39 million. 109
In early December 1989 the Federation of Jordanian Chambers of Commerce hosted its Syrian counterpart, the Syrian Federation of Chambers of Commerce, for discussions of developing trade and establishing joint projects. The Syrians also met with the ministers of trade and industry, planning, and the president of the Chamber of Industry. At the end of the visit the two sides signed a cooperation protocol designed to boost trade and promote investment in the joint free zone. 110
INDUSTRY AND JOINT PROJECTS
The two countries began 1986 by announcing the opening of the joint industrial zone on the common border, and by resuming Alia's and Syrian Air's daily flights between the two capitals. In a series of meetings on transportation-related issues the two governments agreed to set aside a sum of $8.73 million to be shared equally by the two, to overhaul the fleet and update the work of the Land Transport Company. They also renewed the customs exemptions for the land and maritime transport companies, which had continued to flourish, for another ten years. 111 The Joint Land Transport Company had made its first profit in 1986 ($780,000) after four years of losses, 112 while the Maritime Transport Company reported profits of $6.5 million in 1987. 113
When relations were normalized in the fall of 1985 there was renewed talk of reviving the Maqarayn dam project, which had lain dormant during the period of political feuding. The Syrians had recently constructed dams and artificial lakes to divert water from the tributaries of the Yarmuk and to develop agriculture along the southern border with Jordan and Israel. On various occasions the Jordanians had had lengthy discussions with the Syrians on this issue, 114 but the Syrians continued to have objections to the dam project because of its strategic location on the shared border with Jordan so close to Israel. 115
In mid-August 1987, Rifa'i went to Damascus to renew the discussions and by September 3 the two sides had reached an agreement according to which Jordan would build a dam and a reservoir near the Maqarayn station on the Yarmuk. The water behind the dam in the reservoir was to be used to irrigate Jordanian lands and for other Jordanian projects. It was also to be used to irrigate Syrian lands and to generate power. 116 However, some analysts argued that the agreement had been reached at the expense of Jordan's riparian rights, since the project, originally planned for Syria, was to be built in Jordan. Their view was that Jordan had accepted the terms of the agreement because of its desperate need for water and because Syria had finally accepted an American-brokered arrangement according to which Israel would have a share in utilizing the Yarmuk water. 117 Moreover, Jordan was slated to fund the dam project, although sources of financing had not yet been settled.
An October 1988 report noted that international financing of up to $260 million was expected for the $440 million dam. Syria was to receive 75 percent of the power generated, but would not contribute to construction costs. The dam was to have a storage capacity of 225 million cubic meters of water and was to be used to irrigate 3,500 hectares in the Jordan valley and 500 hectares in the highlands; 50 million cubic meters of water annually were also be supplied to greater Amman. 118
As Syrian-Jordanian relations took a negative turn during the spring of 1989, work on the dam was completely suspended and Jordan removed all the facilities it had established in Syria for the project. Syria had allegedly increased its pumping of water in violation of the agreement between the two. In addition it had established eighteen barricades on the river before the water reached the Jordanian side. 119 As of July 1990, Jordan had decided to turn to Arab and Islamic organizations for funding for the project. The World Bank and USAID had refused to commit funds because of Israeli objections regarding the issue of riparian rights. 120
Summary
The period following the reconciliation was somewhat rocky for the political bilateral relationship. Jordan and Syria continued to differ over policy in Lebanon, and Jordan allowed Syria's archenemy, Iraq, to ship arms to its erstwhile ally in Lebanon, Michel 'Awn. Economic relations seemed to recover, particularly in the realm of trade, although by the end of the period Jordan's own austerity measures made clear the need to cut imports. Moreover, even though trade volume and value increased, Jordan continued to suffer from Syria's need to arrange barter agreements to pay for bilateral exchange.
The joint companies continued to function, but there were no discussions of additional joint ventures. The key joint project at this stage that was again put on hold was the Maqarayn dam. This was both politically and strategically more sensitive than any of the joint industrial projects. Even when political relations have been good, progress has been, probably deliberately, slow. In periods of less than full cooperation, as relations developed between the two by 1988-89, work on the dam has been suspended.
Conclusions
This chapter has covered several critical changes in the Jordanian-Syrian bilateral relationship: the rapprochement of 1975-77, the deterioration of 1979-80, a failed attempted rapprochement in 1983, a second rapprochement of 1985-86, and somewhat rocky relations in 1988-89. The role of economics, specifically budget security, in driving alliance decisions has been shown in several instances and will be summarized below. First, however, some conclusions or generalizations regarding the use of economic statecraft as a means of reinforcing or building economic security will be reviewed.
One of the lessons that emerges from the examination of economic relations between the two countries is the diversity and effectiveness of economic tools of statecraft used. What economic instruments of foreign policy may a relatively resource poor country such as Jordan use with another aid dependent (if militarily stronger and economically more diversified) country? Jordan was the first Arab state to suggest and actively use as part of its inter-Arab foreign policy the practice of encouraging the establishment of joint economic committees. This has both an ideological and a pragmatic base, probably closely linked. Jordanian policymakers stress the importance of developing greater integration among Arab states as a natural fulfillment of their belief that the Arab world is at base a single unit. Most also stress, however, that Jordan is weak relative to its neighbors and that only through developing strong economic and political ties with them that can it ensure its survival. In the case of the joint committees, the ideological and pragmatic goals merged.
Such committees later served as a model, not only for Jordan in its other Arab bilateral relations, but for other Arab states as well. Jordanian economic policymakers repeatedly stated that, having witnessed the failed attempts at political unity undertaken by various Arab states in the 1950s and 1960s, they decided a better strategy was to begin with more modest projects, and on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral, basis. In this way, the Jordanians argued, they were building the basis for more extensive unity in the future. At very least the benefits from the expanded economic relationship as well as the sunk costs would force Syria (or any other state for that matter) to think twice before attempting to cut all relations, as Syria had done in 1970.
The very first committee formed following Husayn's visit to Damascus in 1975 was a joint economic committee-not a committee to draft a joint constitution, form a joint military command, or discuss unification of security measures, although those measures came later. Economic discussions were prominent among the early attempts at restoration of relations in 1984 as well. Moreover, despite the very real obstacles to greater economic cooperation-the differing role and restrictions on the private sector, currency controls, the competitiveness rather than complementarity of the products produced, exchange rates, problems in financing trade (leading to barter or countertrade agreements), hard currency shortages, differences in the political systems, lack of hard currency, various kinds of bureaucratic red tape, and so on-the two began work almost immediately on another economic instrument, a series of joint ventures, cutting across economic sectors.
The record makes clear that the joint ventures were far from overwhelming successes. The Free Zone Company and the joint Commercial Bank failed to become operational at all. Nonetheless, policymakers take pride in the relative success of the two transport companies, the white cement factory, and the carpet factory. Moreover, one official who had been very closely involved in the joint companies from the beginning said that one of the reasons for the failure of certain joint ventures had to do with the enthusiasm of the moment leading the planners to move too quickly, and not think through all the potential problems. 121 The companies were established on the basis of slogans derived from ideological enthusiasm, without the prior completion of careful feasibility studies. The Free Zone Company was noted as an example: it was placed on the border for no reason other than it seemed appropriate. In fact, it would have made more sense to locate it in an area where the necessary support services were already in place. Another example was the Syrian-Jordanian Commercial Bank. Advance studies had indicated that the Syrian banking system had serious problems, but the Syrians reportedly thought they could benefit from the Jordanians' experience. Unfortunately, the banking systems were incompatible, and Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam was reportedly opposed to the project. 122 The cement company, although it became fully operational, nevertheless was not a complete success story because Syria never contributed its full share of the capital; it took cement but often failed to repay its debts. 123 However, one official involved in the joint companies also stressed that the success of such companies required a real commitment to the idea of the company and to integration, implying that some managers or administrators simply did not have sufficient interest in or devotion to the projects. 124
In addition to joint companies and committees, in the Syrian-Jordanian relationship we have encountered attempts at development planning coordination, increasing trade, lowering or abolishing certain tariffs and taxes, linking electricity grids and communications networks, exchanges of visits by members of the private sector, and so on. The success of these other tools of economic statecraft, aside from contributing to the general atmosphere of cooperation, is less clear. As was the case with joint ventures, Jordan's main purpose was to build functional economic ties that would make a complete cut in relations more difficult in the future. It also, of course, sought to expand the market for Jordanian products.
Jordan had long been concerned with the size of inter-Arab trade, only about 7 percent of total Arab trade (although Jordan's percentage of trade with the Arab world is much higher). Syrian-Jordanian trade certainly increased during periods when relations were good, but suffered (although it was not cut off completely) when relations deteriorated. Part of the problem with trade was related to continuing differences over customs duties, exchange rates, foreign currency reserves, and competitive, rather than complementary, products. However, a major obstacle to increased exchange also resulted from the strong, if gradually decreasing, role of the Syrian state in trade. On the Syrian side political decisions from above could much more easily shut off markets to Syrian importers or exporters than was the case with largely free-market Jordan.
Another obstacle to effective cooperation with the Syrians, according to those interviewed, was that the Syrians stressed development of self-reliance over importing. More problematic, several former policymakers generalized about the Syrians saying that they were very easy to deal with, but no sooner had one concluded an agreement than the Syrians embarked on ways of getting around it. Their payment record was particularly poor. What generally happened was that at some point, when Jordan needed something, it would obtain it on barter terms from Syria, in order to settle the debt. However, even then, the Syrians usually artificially raised the price and altered the exchange rate so that Jordan lost in the end. 125
In closing it is important to keep in mind that aside from the attempt to carve out a larger share of the Syrian market in 1984, the uses of economic statecraft were primarily aimed at building a stronger general base of relations with Syria. The memory and pain of the border closing with Syria in 1970 was still fresh in many policymakers' minds. Constructing more extensive economic ties, whether in the form of trade, joint companies, or a shared dam, was, in addition to whatever economic and developmental needs they fulfilled for Jordan, also intended to serve the political/ economic goal of making the cutting of ties a much less likely step in the future.
Economics and Alignment
What of the larger question, the importance of economics and specifically, sources of budget revenue, for driving or influencing foreign policy decisions? This chapter has detailed a number of cases that support the argument, as well as few others that are not so clear.
In the case of the rapprochement of 1975, Rifa'i contended that the idea to make common cause with Syria was primarily motivated by the desire to constitute a common front to elicit funds from the Gulf states. Mudar Badran confirmed that the Gulf states had not forwarded their promised contributions following the Rabat summit in 1974 and that the Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians literally went begging together. These countries' annual budgets were drawn up with the assumption that such substantial aid would be forthcoming. Hence, Gulf state balking at forwarding the promised contributions threatened them with potentially serious financial shortfalls.
Rifa'i played down the importance of traditional explanations for the Syrian-Jordanian alignment, such as the need to form a common front against Israel; yet it would be hard to believe that the policymakers' calculations ignored Jordan's desire to end its political outcast status or Syria's perceived need to strengthen its regional position as Sadat appeared to be pulling away from the Arab consensus. 126 Nonetheless, the timing of the rapprochement and the leading role of economic committees in its early days strongly suggest that the economic factors were the primary considerations.
At this stage one might ask why Jordan sought to coordinate with Syria as opposed to Egypt, since all three evidently sought to convince the Gulf states to forward the promised Rabat aid, and since Husayn's political orientation was more in line with Sadat's pro-Western tilt. The economic explanation, that of the need to build economic ties with Syria to prevent a repeat of 1970, makes most sense. Egypt clearly represented a large potential market, but it was not a key to Jordan's overland trade, as Syria was, nor had Jordan had a 1970-like experience with Egypt. Syrian receptivity to Jordanian overtures in the face of its post-1973 war feuding with Egypt may also have played a role. In any case, a balanced relationship would have been almost impossible: the Cairo-Damascus rivalry forced Jordan to choose between the two.
In the matter of the 1979-80 deterioration, the case is much clearer. Iraq simply had much more to offer than did Syria, and it was courting Jordan economically and politically. Given the near impossibility of Jordan's maintaining close relations with both states (except during the rare periods when Iraq and Syria are not feuding), it sacrificed the Syrian connection. Other factors, such as the cooling of relations between the two because of Jordan's initial failure categorically to condemn Sadat, or the deterioration in the domestic front in Syria, certainly played exacerbating roles. However, the timing of the shift is best explained by Jordan's drive for more, and more secure, economic backing.
In the case of the 1985-86 rapprochement, the usual explanation is that Jordan wanted to end attacks against its diplomats and establishments abroad, and to try and expand influence with Syria in the Arab world so that Syria would work to convince the Iranians to end the Gulf war. However, timing is critical, and the Jordanian rapprochement initiative came in early 1983, at about the same time that the Jordanians were trying to expand ties with Egypt. Although the Egyptian market is far larger, there is every reason to suspect, especially given that the first overtures were economic ones, that the Jordanians, burned by the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war and Iraq's inability to continue its aid payments or many of the contracts it had awarded earlier, were seeking relief by expanding their activity in other regional markets. Here, because of proximity, relative wealth (or lack thereof), and market size, Egypt and Syria made the most sense. The Jordanians were also hoping, of course, that Syria might reopen the oil pipeline from Iraq, thus providing Iraq and, by extension Jordan, some needed economic relief.
Of course, the other side of the equation is Syrian concerns, the role that economic factors played in driving Syrian foreign policy. This chapter was not intended to be a study of the Syrian economy or Syrian foreign policy, so only tentative conclusions can be drawn. The argument about constituting a united front to present the Gulf states with demands for more financial assistance may well have been an important Syrian motive in 1975 for joining forces with Jordan. However, it would be seem unwise to overlook some obviously political or strategic factors that must also have figured into Asad's calculations: the fears over a defection by Sadat, the beginning of the civil war in Lebanon, concern for stability in the Levant, and keeping the PLO in tow.
In 1979-80, again it appears that domestic stability and concern over Iraq's regional position played a major role in the deterioration of relations, although from the account of the deterioration pieced together from oral sources it seems that it was ultimately Jordan's choice of Iraq that sealed the fate of the relationship with Syria, not a Syrian "expulsion" of Jordan from the relationship. The rapprochement of 1985 is a better candidate for the economic argument from the Syrian side. Recall that in 1983, Jordan made initial overtures, but was rebuffed. Then in 1984, as there appeared to be progress, again with economic delegations in the lead, Husayn's restoration of ties with Egypt alienated the Syrians. However, by 1985, the Syrians were again interested. Is it coincidental then that by the spring of 1985 the Syrians were having trouble with their oil supplies from Iran and were in need of improved ties with the other Arab states? Or, was the state of the war such that the Syrians were hoping for an end and hence wanted to terminate their relative isolation? Could it also have been that Syrian policy in Lebanon, which by spring 1985 was sponsoring an Amal-led proxy attack against the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, was also in need of whatever additional support it could secure? All of these factors may have played a role. Only a thorough study of Syria's economic relations with these states is likely to provide more definitive answers regarding to what extent budgetary considerations may have driven Damascus' foreign policy.
What does seem clear is that in the Syrian-Jordanian relationship the traditional maxim about politics always winning over economics does not hold. Economics have been shown to play a central role both in lower-level (daily exchange) and in state-level (external aid-related) action and decisions. However, the key to understanding the role of economics in this case lies in focusing not only on what the bilateral economic relationship is, but also-because of the absence of aid in the bilateral equation-on what it is not. In the case of Syrian-Jordanian ties, the aid dependence of the two on third party states, not on each other, best explains or accounts for the role of economic factors. When the oil states failed to provide the expected assistance, there was a clear Jordanian drive for stronger ties with Syria. In other cases, cordial ties with Damascus were certainly desirable, but only so long as they did not impinge upon the primary aid relationships. Hence, Jordan's relations with Syria were largely financially driven, but are comprehensible only in the context of the two countries' respective relations with the Gulf states and Iraq, the "Arab financial assistance club."
Note 1: Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 66. Back.
Note 2: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 132 and 151. Back.
Note 3: This section is taken largely from Masirat al-Takamul bayna Suriya w-al-Urdunn: 'ala Darb al-Wahdah [The March of Integration between Syria and Jordan: On the Path of Unity], a publication of the Syrian and Jordanian News Agencies, Damascus, 1977. Hereafter, Masirat. Back.
Note 4: Interview with former prime minister Zayd al-Rifa'i, July 11, 1992; interview with Muhammad Saqqaf, former adviser on economic unity affairs and Director of the Social Security Corporation, October 23, 1991. Back.
Note 5: Rifa'i interview. Back.
Note 6: Masirat, pp. 48-49. Back.
Note 8: QER: Syria and Jordan, no. 4 (1975): 12. Back.
Note 9: Masirat, pp. 106 and 108. Back.
Note 10: MECS, 1976-77, p. 155. Back.
Note 11: MEED, June 11, 1976. Back.
Note 12: Interview with former Chief of the Royal court and Prime Minister Mudar Badran, July 19, 1992; interview with Rifa'i. See also Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 275 and 295. Back.
Note 13: Masirat, p. 150. Back.
Note 14: FBIS, March 4, 1977. Back.
Note 15: FBIS, March 25, 1977. Back.
Note 16: FBIS, February 10, 1978; FBIS February 15, 1978. Back.
Note 17: FBIS, March 2, 1978. Back.
Note 18: Rifa'i and Badran interviews. Back.
Note 19: "Agreement on Agenda, March 4, 1975," in Majmu'at, Part 1, pp. 200-202. Back.
Note 20: Alistair Drysdale, "Political Conflict and Jordanian Access to the Sea," The Geographical Review 77 (1): 97. Back.
Note 21: "Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Organization of Trade Exchange, April 6, 1975," in Majmu'at, 1: 203-208. Back.
Note 22: "Commmunique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, July 30, 1975," in Majmu'at, 1: 212-218. Back.
Note 23: "Communique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, October 27, 1975," in Majmu'at, 1: 221-226. Back.
Note 24: "Communique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, August 26, 1976," in Majmu'at, 1: 238-241. Back.
Note 25: FBIS, January 3, 1977. Back.
Note 26: "Agreement on Agenda, March 4, 1975," pp. 200-202. Back.
Note 27: "Communique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, August 26, 1975," in Majmu'at, 1:238-241. Back.
Note 28: The shares in the company were owned in equal numbers by the two governments. The company's capital exceeded 60 million Syrian Lira from the two sides and the council running the company was composed of six people. The general assembly of the company was composed of the board of directors and the ministers of economy and foreign trade of the two countries. Back.
Note 29: Masirat, pp. 50-51. Back.
Note 30: "Communique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, May 15, 1976," pp. 234-237 and Communique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, August 26, 1976," pp. 238-241; and "Communiqe of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee," November 22, 1976, pp. 242-248; in Majmu'at, 1. Back.
Note 31: FBIS, January 18, 1977. Back.
Note 32: FBIS, May 31, 1977. Back.
Note 33: Ewan Anderson,"Water: The Next Strategic Resource," in Joyce R. Starr and Daniel C. Stoll eds., The Politics of Scarcity: Water in the Middle East (Boulder: Westview with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1988), p. 7. Back.
Note 34: Selig A. Taubenblatt, "Jordan River Basin Water: A Challenge in the 1990s," in Ibid., p. 47. Back.
Note 35: "Agreement on Agenda, March 4, 1975," Back.
Note 36: "Communique of the Joint Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee, August 26, 1975," in Majmu'at, 1: 238-241. Back.
Note 37: MEED, June 10, 1977. Back.
Note 38: QER: Syria and Jordan, no. 3 (1980): 15. Back.
Note 39: FBIS, March 9, 1978. Back.
Note 40: FBIS, September 21, 1978. Back.
Note 41: Comprising Libya, Algeria, Syria, the PLO and the PDRY, this grouping gathered in Damascus on September 20, 1978, in the wake of Camp David, to determine ways of confronting the results of the September meetings and to explore the possibility of setting up a unified military command. Back.
Note 42: FBIS, November 3, 1978. Back.
Note 43: Badran interview. Back.
Note 44: Interview with former Chief of Jordanian Intelligence and Former Prime Minister Ahmad 'Ubaydat, July 14, 1992. Back.
Note 45: Badran interview. Back.
Note 46: 'Ubaydat interview. Back.
Note 47: MEED, December 7, 1979. Back.
Note 48: Badran interview. Back.
Note 49: FBIS, May 19, 1980. Back.
Note 50: Rifa'i interview. Back.
Note 51: Rifa'i interview. Back.
Note 52: FBIS, May 22, 1980. Back.
Note 53: Jordan Times September 16, 1980. Back.
Note 54: FBIS, November 19, 1980. Back.
Note 55: FBIS, November 21, 1980. Back.
Note 56: The numbers of troops deployed vary from account to account. These figures are from The New York Times of November 26, 1980. Back.
Note 57: FBIS, December 4, 1980. Back.
Note 58: "Syria, Taking a Hard, Long Look at the Economy," MEED, May 22, 1981. Back.
Note 59: Interviews with Rifa'i and Badran. Back.
Note 60: QER: Syria and Jordan, no. 4 (1980): 14. Back.
Note 61: Badran interview. Interview with former Foreign Minister and former Prime Minister Tahir al-Masri, July 14, 1992. Back.
Note 63: Amatzia Baram, "Baathi Iraq and Hashemite Jordan: From Hostility to Alignment," Middle East Journal, 45 (1): 55. Back.
Note 64: MEED, March 11, 1983. Back.
Note 65: QER: Syria and Jordan, no. 3 (1983): 17. Back.
Note 66: Department of Statistics, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Statistical Yearbook, 1983. Back.
Note 67: MEED, May 16, 1980. Back.
Note 68: MEED, December 5, 1980. Back.
Note 69: "Jordanian-Syrian Trade Survives War of Words," MEED, February 20, 1981. Back.
Note 70: "Syria, Taking a Hard Long Look at the Economy," MEED, May 22, 1981. Back.
Note 71: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Department of General Statistics, Annual Statistical Report, 1983. Back.
Note 72: MEED, November 12, 1982. Back.
Note 73: MEED, July 21, 1978. Back.
Note 74: MEED, January 6, 1978. Back.
Note 75: MEED, November 3, 1978. Back.
Note 76: MEED, June 30, 1979. Back.
Note 77: MEED, May 14, 1982. Back.
Note 78: MEED, September 3, 1982. Back.
Note 79: Patrick Seale uses this phrase in Asad of Syria (p.465), but attributes it to Gerard Chaliand, note 3, p. 519. Back.
Note 80: For a study of the economic effects of the border closure in 1970 see Bassam al-Sakit, "Tahlil al-Athar al-Iqtisadiyyah li-Ighlaq al-Hudud al-Suriyyah ma'a al-Urdunn," unpublished study of the Central Bank of Jordan, no date. Back.
Note 81: FBIS, June 6 and 15, 1984. Back.
Note 82: FBIS, July 24, 1984. Back.
Note 83: FBIS, July 31, 1984. Back.
Note 84: FBIS, November 7, 1984. Back.
Note 85: MEED, November 25, 1984. Back.
Note 86: MEED, September 21, 1985. Back.
Note 87: "The Asad Factor," The Middle East, January 1986. Back.
Note 88: MEED, July 27, 1985. Back.
Note 89: FBIS, October 22, 1985. Back.
Note 90: FBIS, November 12, 1985. Back.
Note 91: FBIS, May 24, 1984. Back.
Note 92: FBIS, April 27, 1984. Back.
Note 93: FBIS, May 1, 1985. Back.
Note 94: FBIS, May 1, 1985. Back.
Note 95: FBIS, September 24, 1985. Back.
Note 96: FBIS, December 13, 1985. Back.
Note 97: MEED, December 14, 1985. Back.
Note 98: FBIS, December 11, 1985. Back.
Note 99: MEED, July 20, 1984. Back.
Note 100: Middle East International, May 16, 1986. Back.
Note 101: FBIS, August 19, 1987. Back.
Note 102: FBIS, November 27, 1987. Back.
Note 103: Al-Dustur, August 16, 1988. Back.
Note 104: MEED, December 2, 1988. Back.
Note 105: FBIS, February 17, 1989. Back.
Note 106: FBIS, March 25, 1986. Back.
Note 107: MEED, June 28, 1986. Back.
Note 108: MEED, August 12, 1988; and FBIS, July 28, 1988. Back.
Note 109: Statistical Yearbook, 1990; FBIS, August 2, 1989. Back.
Note 110: Federation of Jordanian Chambers of Commerce, "Annual Report for 1989," (in Arabic) (Amman: April 1990), p. 75 Back.
Note 111: FBIS, February 25, 1986. Back.
Note 112: MEED, June 27, 1987. Back.
Note 113: MEED, January 23, 1988. Back.
Note 114: MECS, 1987, p. 647. Back.
Note 115: FBIS, August 19, 1987. Back.
Note 116: FBIS, September 4 and 8, 1987. Back.
Note 117: Middle East International, September 12, 1987. Back.
Note 118: MEED, October 21, 1988. Back.
Note 119: FBIS, September 5, 1989. Back.
Note 120: MEED, July 27, 1990. Back.
Note 121: Saqqaf interview. Back.
Note 122: Saqqaf interview. Back.
Note 123: Interview with Bassam al-Saket, former economic adviser to the Crown Prince, October 8, 1991. Back.
Note 124: Saqqaf interview. Back.
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