a society must have to be considered to possess the rule of law. Such a society would have certain institutional attributes, such as an efficient and trained judiciary, a noncorrupt police force, and published, publicly known laws.

These two different ways of defining the concept are often conflated and confused. Current definitions of the rule of law used by organizations working to create it abroad tend toward ad hoc laundry lists of institutions to reform, mixed with high-flying rhetoric about the ends that the rule of law is expected to accomplish.[14] It is easy to accuse attempts at closer definition as pedantic, academic exercises. After all, even if current practitioners have not precisely defined their terms, they will know what they want when they see it.

If institutional reform led directly to improvements in rule-of-law ends, that would be true enough. Yet, because achieving such ends requires reform *across* institutions while institutional reforms are generally carried out *within* single institutions, institutional reform can be undertaken with no significant effect on rule-of-law ends. At the same time, definitions based on institutional attributes lead practitioners to measure the wrong things to determine success. Worse, poorly devised reforms of rule-of-law institutions can undermine rule-of-law ends. Therefore, the slant toward definitions based on institutional attributes or which amalgamate ends and institutions has serious repercussions for the success (or lack thereof) of rule-of-law building strategies. Improving our definitions is crucial to advancing our understanding of what it is we are trying to build and our ability to implement reforms. Before we can improve definitions, however, we must first consider each definition in turn.

ENDS-BASED DEFINITIONS

Already, in discussing the "ends" of the rule of law, I have gotten ahead of the general use of the phrase. In ringing policy pronouncements and membership criteria for exclusive "clubs" such as NATO and the EU, the rule of law itself is the desired end—singular. States can have more or less rule of law, and more is always better. Yet as the elephant metaphor indicates, by the time the field of rule-of-law building had gained steam, the concept was being used to imply at least five different goals: making the state abide by law, ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing efficient and impartial justice, and upholding human rights.

Because these ends were never clarified or separated, practitioner organizations did not fully appreciate their distinctiveness. In their written definitions, practitioner organizations tend to mention some ends and forget others—often with little consistency in which they include and which they leave out from definition to definition. For instance, in the various USAID definitions cited in this paper, predictability appears in only one, while another leaves out law and order and touts a market-based economy as inherent to the concept.[15]

Clarity on the five end goals is important, however, because they are not the same: One cannot be reduced to another. On a theoretical level, some of these end goals have become generally accepted in Western legal and political philosophy over the last few thousand years. Others remain hotly disputed. Reining in the state by forcing it to govern through a known set of laws has been accepted as a goal of the rule of law since the ancient Greeks.[16] Meanwhile, whether human rights is an end of the rule of law—or whether the phrase merely implies technocratic procedures and institutions—has

been contested from Aristotle to the present day. For modern practitioners, these disputes still affect the success of reforms but are often unrecognized: For instance, the kleptocrats in a transitioning country might happily accept limiting the power of a previously autocratic state (thereby enhancing their own economically based power), but they may balk at equality before the law.

In other words, clarity on the five ends we are now seeking from the pursuit of the rule of law is also important because each end goal touches on different cultural and political issues. Each is thus likely to meet different pockets of resistance from different portions of society in countries being reformed. Aid practitioners often talk about the importance of finding "political will" for rule-of-law reforms and overcoming resistance. Clarifying the actual ends being sought from various rule-of-law reforms highlights the fact that different elements of society are likely to have "will" for different sorts of reforms and that those resistant to one reform may be supportive of another.

Because rule-of-law ends are so contested and historically determined, they cannot simply be stated as given. They must be understood as varying greatly by context, culture, and era. Simply describing the ways in which the term is currently used lacks depth and provides no heft to argue against certain ways of using the term that are erroneous or unhelpful. Thinking about rule-of-law ends requires realizing that they are historically and culturally determined concepts. New ends can be discovered by reinterpretation or reemphasis of old ideas, but creating a new end is a lengthy and intellectually weighty proposition, not something that can simply be declared by practitioners.

I will therefore look at each of the current ends in turn, first describing their historical precedent and the societal goals they are expected to uphold. I will then consider which of the primary rule-of-law institutions (laws, courts, and law enforcement)—as well as which nonorganizational cultural and political structures—would need to be reformed to accomplish the end. Finally, for each goal I will discuss the power centers it affects, and the possible resistance for reform. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate why it is useful for practitioners to consider their reforms end by end, rather than institution by institution, so that they can accurately gauge the likelihood of their success.

Government Bound by Law

When the idea of the rule of law was first conceived, the original end was to make the state subordinate to law in order to prevent arbitrariness. Aristotle considered whether it was better for kings to rule with discretion or according to law, and determined that in a state governed by law "God and reason alone rule," whereas "passion perverts the minds of rulers, even if they are the best of men."[17] Solon provided Athens with laws so that they would have "the certainty of being governed legally in accordance with known rules."[18] The idea, naturally enough, fell out of favor during centuries of monarchical absolute rule, particularly in Europe. The Magna Carta introduced the concept in England, and the celebrated English Petition of Grievances of 1610 emphasized the basic notion of a government subordinate to law when it claimed that the most prized traditional right of English subjects was

> to be guided and governed by the certain rule of law, which giveth to the head and the members that which of right belongeth to them, and not be any uncertain and arbitrary form of government…[and that people should not be subject to any punishment] other than such as are ordained by the common laws of this land or the statutes made by their common consent in parliament.[19]

The idea that the monarch needed to act through parliament to suspend or create laws was enshrined in the English Bill of Rights of 1689.[20]

A government bound by law must act through pre-written laws in executing its decisions and change laws through established legislative means. Absolute governments, from Caligula to modern-day Myanmar, have taken the property of subjects without recompense, killed citizens at will, and destroyed economies on vanity projects and silly ideas. Governments bound by law must, at the very least, follow pre-written laws or pass general laws through separate legislative organs before undertaking such destructive activities. Under this end alone, however, governments would still be able to abrogate individual rights as long as they followed correct legal procedures: Upholding rights is a separate end and requires additional means to accomplish.[21]

Binding the government to rule *by* law is the sine qua non of the rule *of* law. Some would even argue that this end alone is enough to constitute the rule of law—although most scholars, lawyers, and rule-of-law practitioners hold a more expansive definition.[22] Regardless, this concept can hardly be described as technical; after all, restricting the powers of an otherwise absolute government is a highly political activity. In countries where the rule of law is being reformed, strong or absolute executives have usually held sway quite recently, either in communist or authoritarian systems. So real powers are being taken away from powerful individuals when judiciaries are strengthened and procedural laws that bind the executive are passed. Reformers would be naïve not to expect recalcitrance and evasion of reforms meant to achieve this end from those who stand to lose power. However, these reforms also strengthen other power centers—particularly the judiciary, which is often weak and subservient, commanding little respect under absolute regimes. For reforms that bind the government to rule by law, the judiciary is often a reform ally. Such a face-off does not necessarily make the judiciary more "reformist" than the government across the board; it simply means that on this dimension of the rule of law, the judiciary tends to benefit from supporting reform.

Often, binding a government to rule by law is treated as an issue of judicial independence and is therefore considered an issue of court reform. Obviously, as stated above, power plays a far greater role than mere court organization in limiting the government, although well-organized courts with self-confidence can play a strong role in curtailing government power. Laws must also codify the concept. Law enforcement is generally ignored in achieving this end, yet in any absolute government or captured state, one of the mainstays of extralegal power is having law enforcement bodies that answer to the government, not the people. In fact, the transfer of military and police allegiance from the regime to the citizens is often the first essential step in moving autocratic governments toward becoming governments bound by law.

Equality before the Law

Equality before the law also hearkens back to disputes among the Greeks. Plato insisted on a hierarchical society buttressed by an original myth, but Solon gave Athens, "equal laws for the noble and the base." Again, centuries of hierarchical monarchy halted further development of the concept, which revived during the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. When A.V. Dicey crafted his seminal modern definition of the rule of law, one of his three "kindred conceptions" was the idea that all people are equal before the law, and that all, particularly government officials and clergymen, must be tried under the same laws and in the same courts as ordinary men.[23]

Equality before the law ensures that all citizens—no matter how well-connected, rich, or powerful—are judged for their actions by the same laws, equally applied. Equality before the law is one of the core ways in which citizens can ensure that government officials, the rich, the powerful, and the well-connected do not become a caste apart. It is also essential for upholding the rights of marginalized groups, such as women and racial and religious minorities, who must also be treated as equal before the law. In transitional and developing countries, the lack of equality before the law—the feeling that there are not "equal laws for the noble and the base"—is a prime complaint and is often believed so strongly that ordinary people do not even attempt to test the principle with a time-consuming and expensive court case.

As with reining in the government, creating equality before the law changes the balance of power in a society, giving far more power to ordinary people at the expense of the rich and powerful. It is therefore likely to meet with political resistance when it becomes successful enough to really threaten power holders. Nor is such resistance entirely self-serving: Those in politics are often most likely to be accused of misdeeds by political rivals; if equality before the law is not enforced by courts that are truly independent, politicians can face punishment for wrongs they may not have committed. Equality before the law can also meet cultural resistance. In many Islamic societies, giving women equality before the law is opposed by most interpretations of *Sharia*, the Islamic code. In other cases, equality before the law is de jure, but different justice prevails de facto. For example, even though India has formal equality before the law, caste concepts in villages remain strong; the idea that a low-caste person should be treated as the equal of a high-caste person is "unjust" in such contexts, as well as irreligious. The idea of equality would be seen as nearly inhuman in less individualistic societies. For example, the notion that a policeman should treat his mother caught in a crime as he would a stranger would be seen in the West as personally difficult but nonetheless a just ideal, whereas elsewhere it would be seen as manifestly unjust. [24]

Real equality before the law requires courts that are strong and independent enough to enforce it. It also depends particularly on a lack of corruption within the judiciary, because the rich can use bribes to escape equal justice. It is highly dependent on cultural factors that reinforce the notion and on a government strongly committed to upholding minority rights in this area. In other words, promoting equality before the law requires change across laws, courts, and even law enforcement, as well as alterations in the cultural and political fabric. Not only does it require a good system, but it also requires citizens who are willing to test the principle. Bringing a case to court is time consuming and expensive (just in opportunity costs alone); in many countries, the poor or marginalized will not risk bringing misdeeds of their "betters" before a court if they believe the courts will simply uphold the power structure of society. Thus, access to justice programs has proliferated as a means of helping to create de facto equality before the law.

Law and Order

Law and order did not form a major portion of the political thought of ancient Greek philosophers. Enlightenment thinkers, however, were influenced by the brutality of the English civil war and entranced by the idea of the newly explored "savage" America.[25] They began considering the origins of the state by contrasting it with the brutality of the state of nature. Hobbes stated that escaping the anarchy of a "nasty, brutish, and short" life subject to the crimes and whims of one's fellow human beings was the main reason people joined the state. In perhaps one of their few points of agreement,

Locke assents: Why would people give up absolute liberty and be subject to a government? Because although they have the natural rights of freedom, property, and so on, "Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasion of others… the enjoyment of the property [they have] in this [state of nature] is very unsafe, very unsecure." People join society for the "mutual *Preservation* of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name, *Property*."[26] Protection from one's fellow citizens—or law and order, as we would say today—thus became one of the ends that government was supposed to provide.[27] Law and order is central to the popular understanding of the rule of law. Most citizens within weak states see law and order as perhaps the main good of the rule of law. Law and order is essential to protecting the lives and property of citizens—in fact, it is a prime way of protecting the human rights of the poor and marginalized, who often face the greatest threat from a lack of security.[28] In this end goal, the rule of law is often contrasted with either anarchy or with a form of self-justice in which citizens do not trust in the state to punish wrongdoers and to right wrongs but instead take justice into their own hands and use violence to enforce the social order.

Law and order, however, came to the concept of the rule of law through the back door. As described above, it was never part of the philosophical basis of the rule of law but emerged from the way in which Enlightenment thinkers groped toward their political ideals. Although it pervades the common use of the term, it elided with the rule of law rather than finding a comfortable situation within Western jurisprudential definitions. Dicey, for example, left it out of his first modern attempt to pin down the meaning of the rule of law.

This "poor-cousin" historical status has had direct effects on the place of law and order in modern rule-of-law building efforts. Despite its importance to the popular conception of the rule of law, and its essential role in attracting foreign investment, ensuring the well-being of the poor, and promoting global security, law and order tends to be outside mainstream rule-of-law building projects. Ironically, although U.S. and EU rule-of-law assistance disproportionately flows to police reform and equipment (reflecting the fact that such aid serves donor countries' own security interests ranging from combating drug trafficking to countering terror), these programs tend to be separate from legal and judicial reform programs in the minds of scholars and practitioners; they are also administered by different agencies and farmed out to different contractors.[29] Police reform efforts are often oriented more toward border security or solving law-and-order problems that spill over and affect other states, such as smuggling and human trafficking, than they are geared toward promoting domestic law and order per se. Insofar as rule-of-law programs do consider the police, their focus tends to be human rights training, not law and order.

In the United States, part of the isolation of law and order from the mainstream rule-of-law building agenda can be attributed to U.S. law: Congress banned foreign development aid from being used for police training after U.S.-trained police in Latin America were found to be committing human rights abuses in the 1960s. Although the rules have been relaxed and many loopholes admitted, the stigma still remains. Professional balkanization likely plays a part as well: Lawyers, who make up the bulk of rule-of-law practitioners, tend to be different types of people and move in different circles from the security officials who focus on reforms more directly related to law and order.

As with the other ends discussed earlier, law and order requires more than institutional change; it also has political and cultural components and can meet resistance from any of these areas. States

want the police strong enough to do their bidding and fend off threats to their power, but they do not want the police (who are often paramilitary in developing countries) to *become* threats to their power. Unless power backs a strong, professional police force, such a force is unlikely to emerge without a fight. Although law and order might appear to be a universal good, it also depends heavily on citizens' acceptance of laws and on the government's legitimacy to make laws that bind them.[30] Customs such as blood feud traditions can also undermine the imposition of a state-based law and order.

The split between law and order and other rule-of-law ends is pernicious for two reasons. First, because this end conflates easily with an institution, law and order is often viewed solely as police reform efforts. But as with the other ends, improving law and order requires cooperation across all rule-of-law institutions. Police reform alone can do nothing to quell crime if police capture criminals and then corrupt judges release them, if prisons allow prisoners to enlarge their criminal empires while behind bars, or if laws do not exist to keep them in jail for significant periods of time.[31]

Second, high degrees of crime tend to undermine other rule-of-law reforms. Crime is often better remunerated than magistracy in many developing countries, and criminals try to bribe judges to evade imprisonment. In many countries with law-and-order problems, judges are afraid to dispense equal justice to members of the military, organized criminals, or gangs for fear of reprisal or that they will not survive the sentencing.[32] At its worst, criminals buy politicians to gain security for their enterprises or buy political seats to gain immunity to distort the system. Moreover, organized criminals and drug gangs can abuse human rights on just as wide a scale as any government. Thus, high crime rates not only harm law and order, but can also corrupt or overwhelm all rule-of-law institutions and undermine all other rule-of-law ends. By treating law and order as an institutional reform of the police and leaving it to the police and security reformers, those working on other rule-of-law goals practically ensure that they will not achieve their own ends.[33]

Predictable, Efficient Justice

The idea of efficiency had been implicit since the Magna Carta, which first hinted that justice would neither be denied nor delayed.[34] In 1693, William Penn wrote, "Our law says well, 'To delay justice, is injustice.'"[35] By the time the famous aphorism "justice delayed is justice denied," was (mis)attributed to Gladstone and the first legal case cited it as precedent, the idea that the rule of law required some form of efficiency in decision making was fairly settled.[36] In part, efficient justice was seen as a way to uphold other rule-of-law ends, such as discouraging the tried-and-tested method of delaying cases to extort bribes from those who most wanted a decision. Delay could also be used to subvert justice, such as when delays intrinsically favored one party and therefore acted as a penalty to the other party before a judgment was even announced.[37]

Hayek, meanwhile, did the most to revive the notion of predictability, hinted at by the earliest Greek thinkers, as a stand-alone element of the rule of law. Although Hayek's writings stress that the rule of law is about binding the government to rule through legislated laws, his underlying interest is in how the rule of law buttresses the market economy. One of the primary by-products of the rule of law, in Hayek's mind, is that it provides predictability—it allows one to "plan one's individual affairs."[38] But Hayek's antipathy to judicial discretion meant that predictability gained a prominent place in his argument.[39] Hayek's followers cemented the idea. What had been part of the outcome of the rule of law, in Hayek's definition, had become an element of the rule of law by the time Ronald

Cass defined the concept in 2001 as: (1) fidelity to rules, (2) *of principled predictability*, (3) embodied in valid authority, (4) that is external to government decision makers.[40] (emphasis added)

A predictable, efficient legal system allows businesses to plan, enables law-abiding citizens and businesses to stay on the correct side of the law, and provides some level of deterrence against criminal acts. It enables a free market by providing for efficient adjudication of contract disputes. Efficiency is relative and differs widely in countries that see themselves as having the rule of law. What is important in both cases is that the majority of people see the judicial system as a viable means for solving disputes so that they are not forced to use extrajudicial means—ranging from only doing business with trusted family members to hiring contract killers—to attain the same ends. Predictability and efficiency are thus closely linked with law and order and with equality before the law. A lack of either law and order or equality can harm predictability and efficiency, while a lack of predictability and efficiency can undermine law and order by forcing citizens to bypass courts and take justice into their own hands.

Predictability and efficiency are typically seen by practitioners as attributes of the judiciary alone. However, laws and law enforcement are also needed to support the end goal. If laws are not relatively known and settled, it is difficult for courts to rule with predictability. Overzealous legal reform, such as occurred in Romanian commercial laws, can wreak havoc on predictable decisions—not only because the laws are changing, but because it is difficult for overtaxed and understaffed judges to keep up to date on these legal changes. Moreover, judges are not the only possible source of legal delay; clerks can "lose" files, and law enforcement agencies can delay investigations for bribes just as easily. In Moscow during the roaring 1990s, for example, the going rate for stalling a criminal investigation was claimed to be $50,000.[41]

Current rule-of-law building organizations such as the World Bank, with a vested interest in making the concept as technocratic and apolitical as possible, have further elevated the ideas of predictability and efficiency as central pillars of the rule of law.[42] When the World Bank pushes the rule of law for development, for instance, they couch their thinking in Hayek and label their internal think-tank Legal Institutions for the Market Economy. Many of their legal development specialists fail to consider whether, for instance, rampant law-and-order problems might be dampening foreign investment in Africa or Russia more than a weak system of commercial law.[43] Development technocrats push for predictability and efficiency as their primary—and often only—rule-of-law goal, hoping that the more political issues such as limiting government or the more cultural issues such as human rights will come in on the same tide. Yet these are separate ends, and although there are relationships among them, as discussed above, there is no reason to assume that pushing one will help all of the others.

In fact, predictability and efficiency are often used by local power brokers as code words to achieve their own goals, which can undermine other rule-of-law ends. Ministries of justice can advance predictability, for instance, by holding anticorruption drives that let them purge courts of independent judges, or they can promote efficiency by delivering computers to those justices who promise them allegiance. Although real reform would reduce the executive's control over the judiciary, a reform that only half accomplishes its goals will often increase executive control—hence the support many ministries of justice give to these programs and the waffling that can occur later. Judiciaries tend to balk at these reforms because, when successful, they reduce chances for corruption, patronage, and the less pernicious but often equally Byzantine immemorial customs

that judiciaries the world over uphold. Determining exactly who is balking at what reform can be difficult in such circumstances. For example, a Romanian minister of justice who appeared to this author and to many Romanian liberals as genuinely committed to helping the judiciary reduce its case backlog, improve its skills, become less corrupt, and promote younger, more honest and liberal judges, used means that were nearly the same as those used by his successor—an ex-Communist who was, by all accounts except her own, attempting to regain executive control over the judiciary and reduce its independence.[44] Predictability and efficiency are important and accepted rule-of-law ends. But they, in particular, show the hazard of not recognizing the tension between ends, and their irreducibility.

Lack of State Violation of Human Rights

The Enlightenment revival of the rule of law expanded the idea of individual rights nascent in the previously cited English Petition of Grievances. Locke asked the question: Why should rulers not have absolute power over their subjects—why should rulers not be arbitrary? Because all humans have natural rights that proceeded his rule, he answered. People join the state voluntarily to protect those rights, and thus it makes no sense for the state to be able to abrogate them. Making a ruler bow to law thus became intertwined with the end goal of individual rights, including the right to preserve "lives, liberties, and estates."[45] By positing natural rights, Enlightenment thinkers added substantive content to the procedural ideals of the rule of law. The importance of individual rights was upheld in Dicey's first modern conception of the term, which lauds the common law as a way of ensuring that individual rights are not only established but also enforced.[46] Because the modern rule-of-law building field grew in large part out of a desire to improve human rights in Latin America in the 1980s and to create liberal democracy in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, getting states to recognize and not violate human rights was from the beginning a core reason for undertaking rule-of-law reforms.[47]

Yet human rights are the most contested end of the rule of law. A debate has raged for centuries between substantivists, who believe the rule of law must contain some content and some limits on what the government can *ever* legally do, and formalists, who claim that the rule of law is simply about procedure, not content. Formalists such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia have argued that there "are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all."[48] Experience in countries where the government is above the law, where anarchy has taken hold, or where laws change so frequently that businesses cannot plan and individuals cannot even know what justice would be gives this view weight. For formalists, the rule of law is useful because it provides the four goods mentioned above. Insofar as it provides justice, it does so procedurally, through efficiency and equality before the law. The rule of law cannot be expected to provide just outcomes such as human rights. Human rights may be a laudable goal, but they are seen as separate from the rule of law.[49]

Substantivists believe the formalist definition amounts to rule *by* law, which strengthens the government, not a rule of law meant to bind it to certain acceptable ways of treating citizens.[50] Aristotle was the first substantivist, stating that his *Politics* showed nothing more than that "laws, *when good*, should be supreme" (emphasis added), raising the question of what a "good" law entailed.[51] Locke's definition of rule-of-law institutions quoted above concludes with the statement, "all this is to be directed to no other *end* but the *Peace*, *Safety*, and publick good of the People."[52] This definition suggested that the rule of law was intended to have content that would protect the citizens of a state; therefore, states such as Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa (which were run by law

but used that law as an instrument to deprive some citizens of peace and safety) were not governed by the rule of law at all.

Those rule-of-law practitioners who include human rights in their goals are thus taking a side in this debate—they are not promoting a technocratic ideal, but a cultural idea with substantive, values-driven content. The problem with human rights as an end, of course, is that different cultures—and different countries, even within the developed world—differ on what they see as human rights. Even when general concepts can be universalizable, particulars, such as the death penalty, social and economic rights, or even the practice of female genital mutilation, are disputed. Some in the United States see a Scandinavian-style system of social and economic rights as undermining property rights through excessive taxation. Europeans see the U.S. death penalty as a human rights violation. In Romania, the EU pushed very hard for the legislature to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality—a human rights issue essential to the rule of law to the European Commission, but a moral issue that had nothing to do with the rule of law to the indignant Romanians.

As with all the other ends, human rights require reforming many rule-of-law institutions, as well as establishing new cultural norms. Laws can and must be established to promote these rights, but laws are among the weakest instruments for protecting human rights. It was precisely because laws alone are such poor defenders of human rights, particularly when they get ahead of social and government intuition, that Dicey championed the common law—which by definition enforced rights at the time they are proclaimed. Police must be trained to uphold human rights and watched to ensure that they do so. Unfortunately, they are often among the worst abusers of human rights. The judiciary has traditionally been a bastion for the protection of individual liberties and minority rights against encroachment from the government and the uncaring majority, but in developing countries, the judiciary can only serve this function to the extent that its members uphold liberalism over traditional or majoritarian values.[53] Culture generally matters a great deal in proclaiming and promoting human rights. Governments can get ahead of their citizenry, as occurred in the American south with *Brown v. Board of Education*, but they rarely go too far outside culturally set boundaries, and when they do, these rights tend to be de jure alone.

A Note on Ends-Based Definitions

As shown above, defining the rule of law based on the ends it is intended to achieve within a society provides more clarity and focuses practitioners more on their end goals than defining it by institutional attributes, which are just means to these ends. Moreover, achieving any end requires reform across multiple rule-of-law institutions. Reforming a single institution or even reforming laws and courts but not law enforcement will rarely be able to further rule-of-law ends.

Considering rule of law by its ends also illuminates one of the major difficulties with rule-of-law reform: All good things do not go together. These ends are not part of a unified concept that emerged whole; rather they grew piecemeal in response to different historical needs over a period of millennia. They represent distinct societal goals, and work toward one goal will not necessarily lead to success in the others. Moreover, these ends are often in tension: Improving one can often make success in another more difficult—a point to which I will return when discussing implications.