Minorities and the State in the Arab World

Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.)

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

1999

9. The Shi‘is in Bahrain:
Class and Religious Protest
Uzi Rabi and Joseph Kostiner

 

The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 and the establishment of a revolutionary Islamic government have had far-reaching implications for the Arab countries of the Gulf, from Kuwait in the north to the Sultanate of Oman in the south. In particular, these events marked the opening of a new era for the traditionally passive and cautious Shi‘is of the Gulf and signaled a drastic change in their political behavior. For the first time, Shi‘i groups began to raise their own deep-rooted grievances, conveying a strong message of Islamic fervor and antigovernment sentiment.

Shi‘is everywhere have traditionally considered themselves socially and economically deprived ( mahrumin) and generally treated as second-class citizens. Indeed, there are many examples of discriminatory measures against Shi‘is in the Arab Gulf states. In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, for example, they were not allowed to openly perform their ceremonial flagellations during the ‘Ashura observances. And the maintenance of Shi‘i prayer houses has often been neglected by the authorities to such a degree that many have fallen into ruin.

Oil revenues were often not shared fairly with Shi‘i communities. While major Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Bahraini towns grew into flourishing industrial centers, the Shi‘i-populated neighboring settlements lagged behind. Shi‘i participation in political life has also been severely limited. The Shi‘is were excluded from any role in the formulation of policy, including major positions in the armies, security forces, and foreign and defense establishments of all the Arab Gulf states until the 1980s. ₁   The fact that they were underprivileged and politically underrepresented made them a potentially combustible element.

Until 1979, Islam in the Gulf had not triumphed over political and socioeconomic interests and did not constitute a major component in the local ethos. The establishment of a revolutionary Islamic government in Iran changed all that. From its inception, the Khomeini regime posed a threat to the Arab Gulf countries through its direct approach to their Shi‘i communities, many of whose leaders were old acquaintances of the new government in Iran. The Iranians cultivated a network of politically conscious Shi‘a as the potential spearhead for future revolutions. They provided sanctuary, training, and other assistance to a variety of liberation fronts and opposition forces operating in the Gulf. By the fall of 1979, Shi‘a demonstrations had begun in Saudi Arabia. A particularly violent upheaval occurred in the oil-producing eastern province of al-Ahsa, where the population was predominantly Shi‘i. Encouraged by their militant co-religionists in Iran, Shi‘i leaders decided they would march in public during ‘Ashura, in open defiance of a longstanding law banning any public demonstration on that day. ₂   Kuwait was subject to an increasing number of acts of sabotage on a different level, the Shi‘i bombings on 12 December 1983 being the most vivid example. This was followed in May 1985 by an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Kuwaiti ruler, Jabir al-Sabah. In June 1986, saboteurs attacked oil installations, almost paralyzing Kuwait’s oil industry. ₃

 

The Shi‘is of Bahrain

This chapter focuses on the political behavior of the Shi‘is of Bahrain and its development under the rule of the Al Khalifa Sunni dynasty. It will consider the various factors in this development: the socioeconomic status of the Shi‘is, their religious behavior, the political climate prevailing among the Sunnis, and Iran’s postrevolutionary policies. From these factors, two major motivations emerge for Shi‘i political behavior, the first related to class affiliation, the second to religious fervor.

The Shi‘is of Bahrain cannot easily be defined as either rebellious or quietist; the picture is far more complex, particularly against the background of Iran’s revolutionary regime. In the first place, unlike other states in the region, Bahrain carries the burden of an ancient Iranian claim to its territory. The Bahraini-Iranian dispute seemed to have been settled in 1971, when the Shah relinquished the claim of sovereignty over Bahrain and recognized its independence. But the Iranian revolution revived the issue, albeit in a new form.

Second, the religious structure of Bahrain, marked by a high proportion of Shi‘is, is unique in the Gulf. According to the best available estimates, Shi‘is make up 65 percent of the citizen population of 370,000, although no census has ever verified this figure. ₄   Political sensitivities make any census unlikely, for the ruling Al Khalifa family is Sunni. Moreover, the majority of Bahraini Shi‘is follow the principles of the twelver sect (Ithna ’Ashariyya) of Shi‘i Islam. They originate mainly from Iran and southern Iraq and have a history of close ties with their fellow Shi‘is in those states. Many of them were naturally sympathetic to the Iranian revolution of 1979. Shaykh ‘Ali Salman, for example, who came to head the Shi‘i opposition in the 1990s, had been a noted student leader during his university days in Saudi Arabia. Like many other Shi‘i clerics in Bahrain and elsewhere in the Gulf, he completed his religious education in the Iranian holy city of Qom before returning to Bahrain in 1992. ₅

Most Shi‘is belong to the middle and lower classes of Bahraini society; they predominate in the distressed rural areas. No wonder that recent unrest has been centered in Shi‘i communities like Jidd Hafs, a poor and mainly Shi‘i area to the west of Manama, the capital. ₆   By contrast, Sunni Muslims—notably the ruling Al Khalifa family and other leading clans—are mainly urban. ₇   Sunnis dominate Bahrain’s government as well as its military and security establishments.

Originating from Najd, the Al Khalifa family arrived in Bahrain in the eighteenth century. They found a quite prosperous population of Shi‘i farmers, who owed their well-being to the abundant sources of fresh water on the island. The Al Khalifas proceeded to take control through appropriation of much of the islands’ fertile land and an alliance, formed in the nineteenth century, with Britain. ₈   One may assume that many of the Shi‘is—descendants of the original inhabitants—have not, even after two centuries, completely accepted rule by a Sunni dynasty, which they still regard as usurpers.

The Al Khalifa regime inflicted discrimination and hardship on the Shi‘is, including sporadic physical attacks by Sunnis. Sunni groups sometimes attempted to prevent Shi‘is from practicing their religious ceremonies, particularly the ‘Ashura festivities. Shi‘is were barred from land ownership, were not employed by state security bodies, and could not hold supreme ministerial offices. The Sunni-dominated security forces persecuted them continually as prime suspects of subversion. ₉

However, socioeconomic, judicial, and political developments in Bahrain mitigated the discrimination. Between the mid-1920s and the mid-1960s, the Shi‘is were given legal protection for their personal security and property, their separate religious and judicial practices were recognized, and in principle, they were permitted to run their lives without interference. ₁₀

To maintain sociopolitical support and stability, Bahrain’s rulers have utilized the island’s small oil income to develop business opportunities for the elite families and a welfare system for the lower classes. They have also followed a policy of appointing Shi‘is, particularly from notable families, to secondary ministries, while excluding them from paramount positions. Members of the Al Khalifa clan occupy the most prominent (foreign and defense) portfolios, whereas representatives of other elite families, including Shi‘is, can be found in other ministerial and high-ranking administrative posts. For example, in the mid-1970s, Shi‘is held five ministerial portfolios: health; legal affairs; commerce and agriculture; public works, power, and water; and transport and communication. ₁₁

In a similar fashion, the Shi‘is were given opportunities in public administration, the private sector, and the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), primarily in middle-ranking posts. Apparently, as Fuad Khuri remarks, the public sector and business became major outlets for the Shi‘is: although largely barred from owning land, Shi‘is constituted about 70 percent of managers and employees of private companies. ₁₂   The Shi‘is were thereby able to compensate themselves somewhat for their lower status.

Although deprivation tended to unite them emotionally, the Shi‘is of Bahrain are divided along geographic and ethnic lines, by living conditions and even praying styles—all of which have given rise to varied types of political behavior. Ethnically, Shi‘is of Persian origin, collectively known as al-Baharna (the indigenous inhabitants) make up the largest portion of the island’s original population. Among them are several prominent families that form an integral part of the political establishment. In addition, there is a sizable community of Arab Shi‘is, originating from Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, al-Ahsa. Mainly small traders and manual and service workers, they have developed a degree of self-sufficiency. They manage the most important mourning house ( ma’tam), where Imam Husayn’s martyrdom is commemorated in a totally different style to that of the processions staged by the Baharna. ₁₃

Socioeconomically, relatively few Shi‘is are part of the elite. They form a considerable proportion of the bureaucracy, as middle-ranking state and private-sector administrators (though not in the Bahraini Defense Forces), and many are small traders, artisans, and craftsmen. ₁₄   Albeit economically dependent on the Al Khalifa rulers, the Shi‘i middle class has developed its own mode of political bargaining and has occasionally supported opposition movements. Shi‘is predominate in Bahrain’s lower class, including indigenous agricultural workers, peasants, and fishermen. They are mostly Baharna, and have suffered more than the upper classes from the Al Khalifas’ land expropriations, which transformed them into tenants. Much weakened by the country’s rapid urbanization, this group has become marginalized and relatively impoverished in shantytowns such as Jidd Haffs.

It is thus clear that the Shi‘is of Bahrain do not form a compact minority with a cohesive sociopolitical character and a uniform political outlook. Deprivation and compensation had tended to balance each other among the Shi‘is, preventing the emergence of an angry, rebellion-seeking community. Socioeconomic, ethnic, and cultural divisions also worked against a united Shi‘i political response.

What then motivated Shi‘i groups (rather than the entire Shi‘i population) to adopt opposition stands and even turn to violence? The motive was not to topple the government and revolutionize the ruling system: most Shi‘is viewed themselves as patriots. Moreover, the divisions and balances within the Shi‘i population usually prevented majority adoption of extremist positions. The groups involved in opposition activities arose mainly from the middle and lower classes, namely, from among the administrators, students, and town-based manual workers. Their motivations grew out of socioeconomic and political change as well as ideology.

First sparked by British initiatives and later by a relatively small, but significant, oil income, Bahrain went through successive stages of development. Shi‘i groups were involved in all the accompanying processes: occasional labor unrest, the evolution of trade unionism, demands for increased pay, and greater political freedom, notably through the activity of the National Assembly. Adding to the effects of these developments were regional ideologies that either infiltrated Bahrain from the outside or were brought in by foreign (mainly Palestinian) workers. Shi‘is who occasionally took opposition stands over the socioeconomic grievances of the middle and lower classes hardened their positions under the impact of a second factor—regional ideological and socialist-radical influences—and developed a strong class identity. Even if expressed in an antigovernment form, this class identity was not purely Shi‘i separatist or sectarian, which many Shi‘is would have opposed. Rather, it was more inclusive and nationalistic. Indeed, Shi‘is of the middle and lower classes often cooperated with Sunnis on broad issues of reform. ₁₅   For middle and lower class Shi‘is, who formed the majority of Bahrain’s citizens, religious and class identities were interrelated; their struggle for an improved sociopolitical position was combined with preservation of their Shi‘i identity.

Some Shi‘i activists however, despite their participation in broad opposition movements, did not relate to Shi‘i tradition as merely a ritual and communal experience but as their major motivation. Mainly young, relatively well educated, sometimes of a clerical bent, they held opposition views that went beyond class identity and cooperation with the Sunnis against the government. These activists saw themselves as the guardians of Shi‘i values and communal interests, which, they felt, had to be maintained in the face of an assimilating class framework.

Shi‘i opposition activity was thus characterized by contrary sociopolitical tendencies: most of them tended to channel their interests into classlike formations and cooperate with the Sunnis. A small minority, while active in such frameworks, also promoted more purist Shi‘i interests and values. Over the years both tendencies interacted in various opposition groups.

 

The Shi‘i Role in Bahraini Opposition Movements

In the 1930s, Sunni and Shi‘i leaders launched parallel efforts to persuade Bahrain’s rulers to create a representative assembly, in the face of a centralizing administration that had contributed to the growing gap between the ruler and his people. Whereas up to the 1920s, most Bahrainis had been able to approach their ruler personally, they were now forced to go through the mechanism of a government bureaucracy. In addition, both Sunnis and Shi‘is of the middle class complained about the ineffective educational system, which was not producing adequate manpower for either the government or the oil industry—both heavily dependent on foreign labor. They also attacked the Bahrain Petroleum Company’s (BAPCO) employment conditions, which discriminated against nationals. ₁₆

A more serious challenge to the rulers was posed by radical Arab nationalism in the 1950s. Inspired by Nasserist agitation, a general strike took place in 1954. As a result, nationalist activists, including both Sunni and Shi‘i students, administrators, and manual workers formed a Higher Executive Committee (HEC), one of whose goals was to secure a peaceful modus vivendi between followers of both denominations. ₁₇   As a majority of the workers, the Shi‘is stimulated class identity, calling for the formation of a legislative assembly and the right to establish trade unions. Sunnis and Shi‘is alike were careful not to allow the situation to get out of hand and tried to reach a negotiated settlement with the government. At the same time, radical demands for political change were being heard from working-class activists grouped in the National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (NFLB). This persuaded the HEC leaders to rally around the rulers in order to stave off the NFLB threat. A group of Shi‘i zealots based in prayer houses and clubs remained active, however, rioting and demonstrating for several more weeks, until they were arrested and their groups disintegrated. ₁₈

The late 1960s and early 1970s were marked by an upsurge of labor unrest, led by the NFLB and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). Bahrain’s ruler, Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salman, sought to preempt the radical threat in 1972 by establishing a Constituent Assembly and drafting a provisional constitution, which was boycotted by the NFLB and the PFLOAG. Nonetheless, a thirty-member National Assembly ( al-majlis al-watani ) was elected in 1973, and permission granted to form trade unions. ₁₉   Bahrain was the second state in the Gulf (after Kuwait) to create an elected parliament, but the first to suspend it. By May 1975, the experiment had ended. ‘Isa dismissed the assembly and has ruled by decree since then. By the mid-1970s, the government had managed to weaken the radical leftist movements. For the next two decades, Islamist, predominantly Shi‘i groups dominated opposition activity. In the earliest clerical bid for export of the Islamic revolution to other Gulf states, a leading Iranian clergyman, Ayatollah Hasan Ruhani, declared in 1979—even before the fall of Mehdi Bazargan’s government—that Bahrain should be annexed to Iran, unless its rulers agreed to adopt “an Islamic form of government similar to the one established in Iran.” ₂₀   Ruhani’s words were a portent of things to come. Since the summer of 1979, revolutionary Iran had attacked the Bahraini regime with inflammatory rhetoric and hostile actions, fomenting a new wave of demonstrations involving hundreds of people, mainly Shi‘is demanding treatment befitting their majority status. They could now rely on an aggressive regional power with an explicitly antimonarchic and antiexploitative ideology.

Among the more radical groups propagating Islamic resurgence in the Gulf was the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB—al-Jabha al-Islamiyya li-tahrir al-Bahrayn), which was collaborating with the Iraqi-based Shi‘i underground, the Islamic Call (al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya). ₂₁   Led by the Shi‘i cleric Hadi al-Mudarrisi, an Iranian who had fled his country during the reign of the Shah, the IFLB organized public demonstrations that were broken up by police in August 1979. ₂₂   Although their ideas sprang from socioeconomic grievances, such Shi‘i clerics were also receptive to Iranian ideology. They upheld Shi‘i religious symbols and ideas that were more radical than those of class-related opposition movements, and engaged in revolutionary activities. ₂₃   With Iranian support and a new Iranian-inspired ideology that combined universal as well as Shi‘i ideas, the activists of the IFLB did not simply fade away as others had in earlier years. They prevailed and continued to act against the government.

During the 1980s, opposition activity mainly comprised large-scale acts of sabotage committed by small, well-trained underground groups. Obviously, this reflected Iran’s interest in causing harm to the pro-Iraqi Gulf states. The perpetrators themselves had been frustrated over the failure of the first popular wave of Shi‘i demonstrations and believed that a more violent response was called for. On 13 December 1981, the Bahraini security forces announced the arrest of a seventy-five-member group bent on toppling the Al Khalifa regime and announcing the establishment of an Islamic republic. The plot had been organized by the IFLB, with Mudarrisi designated to head the new regime. IFLB members trained in Iran were infiltrated into Bahrain, where they were to take over strategic locations and gain control over the state. ₂₄   Additional attempts to subvert the Bahraini government were made over the next decade. The most notable was another coup attempt in December 1987, again bearing the hallmarks of Iranian support for its proxy, the Tehran-based IFLB, led by Hojjat al-Islam Hadi al-Mudarrisi. ₂₅   However, this strategy, focusing on sabotage and terror directed against the Al Khalifa family, did not enjoy broad support and failed to attract the majority of the Shi‘i population.

Against the backdrop of the second (Iraqi-Kuwaiti) Gulf War, a new phase of Shi‘i-dominated opposition activity began. There were two major causes: the eroding image of the Gulf rulers and economic recession. As in earlier cases, the spark of uprising came from foreign influences that rocked the entire Arab Gulf region. Bahrain’s rulers, along with those of the other Gulf nations, had lost their credibility: they had failed to foresee the Iraqi invasion and succeeded in defending their states only with the help of 500,000 foreign troops. This resulted in a growing demand for the rulers’ accountability to their people and wider political participation. Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia began to take cautious steps in this direction soon after the war. But the Al Khalifa family in Bahrain tenaciously resisted the trend, fearing that a more open political process would increase, rather than contain, pressure on the ruling family. ₂₆

During the postwar era, the continuing frustration of a new generation of young Bahrainis has been exacerbated by economic conditions. ₂₇   Bahrain has virtually exhausted its small oil reserves and become dependent upon richer neighbors for help in building up its industrial and financial base. With its oil position eroded, the government has made an enormous effort to diversify into a service and, to a lesser extent, industrial center for the Gulf region. But this service-oriented economy has slumped as a result of the Gulf’s economic problems. Gross domestic product (GDP) fell by about 2.5 percent in 1994; the government responded by raising tariffs and indirect taxes, and slashing expenditures by a planned 4.9 percent in 1995. The traditional Kuwaiti aid had dried up during the war and Saudi Arabia’s assistance was also on the wane. ₂₈   The large and growing population of young people (an estimated three quarters of Bahrain’s 370,000 nationals are under twenty-five) meant that new jobs should be created rapidly. ₂₉   But because foreigners make up some 65 percent of the workforce, there has been little room for labor market growth. According to opposition sources, unemployment was as high as 30 percent. ₃₀   Particular criticism was directed against Shaykh ‘Isa for continuing to allow an influx of cheap foreign labor rather than provide jobs for Bahrain’s citizens. In July 1994, a petition was signed by 1,200 unemployed youth requesting the government to deal with their problem; the response was to crack down on protesters.

Politics by Petition: The New Wave

The July 1994 protest recalled a case in late 1991, when a Sunni theologian, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Latif al-Mahmud, was arrested after delivering a speech critical of the autocratic Gulf regimes. Shaykh al-Mahmud argued that progress among the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) states would evolve only through domestic political reform, leading to the establishment of elected parliaments, implementation of the rule of law, and freedom of expression. He also demanded a clearer distinction between public finance and allocation of wealth to the ruling families. Shaykh al-Mahmud’s ideas were summed up in a petition calling for restoration of an elected National Assembly. The petition also cast doubt on the Al Khalifas’ nation-building principles: the personal, patronizing contacts of the Al Khalifa family with elite families, their absolute rule, and the exclusion of the majority of the population from the political process. Signed by over 150 public figures representing most of Bahrain’s Sunni and Shi‘i ideological and political movements, and described as “the first joint political action of its kind in Bahrain,” the petition was submitted to Shaykh ‘Isa. ₃₁   Subsequently, nineteen political activists, all Shi‘is, were arrested on charges of belonging to the banned IFLB and distributing antigovernment literature. The accused pleaded not guilty, claiming they were campaigning for democratic rights in Bahrain. ₃₂   In this instance Shi‘is and Sunnis worked together to press for change, in an action that once more demonstrated Shi‘i tendencies to cooperate with Sunnis on broad issues.

The ruling family resisted the demands for reform. After the short-lived experiment of the National Assembly (1973–1975), the government feared re-establishment of an organ that might be used to launch attacks on the ruling family. By the end of 1992, however, the winds of change were sweeping Bahrain, and the political struggle intensified. In November, 300 intellectuals, professionals, and clergymen signed a second petition presented to Shaykh ‘Isa, calling for greater political freedom within the framework of the constitution. The emir’s response was to threaten those involved with imprisonment or exile, effectively suppressing the movement. Not surprisingly, Bahrain then became a focus of attention by human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, which reported that all political organizations had been formally banned, trade union rights severely circumscribed, and all but the most important Shi‘i religious festivities prohibited under the country’s Sunni minority rule. Amnesty called upon the Bahraini regime to improve the country’s “dismal human rights record.” ₃₃

The government did attempt to dissipate political tension and appease the opposition. ₃₄   In December 1992, Shaykh ‘Isa announced formation of a thirty-seat consultative council. ₃₅   Appointed rather than elected, however, this council was limited to an advisory role, and its deliberations were not open to the public. ₃₆   In addition, the regime announced new social welfare benefits to “alleviate hardships faced by the poorer people,” reducing utility and housing costs and subsidizing socially deprived groups. ₃₇

Growing Radicalism

The opposition movement hitherto described has been superseded since late 1994 by a more radical struggle, which brought leading Shi‘i figures to the fore. The arrest on 5 December 1994 of a popular young Shi‘i clergyman, Shaykh ‘Ali Salman, resulted in riots instigated by the actions of several Shi‘i clerics. Shaykh ‘Ali and two other clerics, Hamza al-Dayri and Haydar al-Sitri, had been the leading figures in a campaign to gather signatures for a new petition demanding restoration of the elected National Assembly that had been suspended by the regime almost two decades before. ₃₈   Thousands of Bahrainis, mostly Shi‘is, signed the petition and thereby became the target of government persecution. With strict press censorship in force, they were unable to initiate a political discourse. ₃₉

The clerics’ campaign and its aftermath reflect a new kind of Shi‘i opposition activity. Still motivated to address broad constitutional and economic concerns, Shi‘is continued to cooperate with Sunnis. However, the leaders of the new movement were Shi‘is, and the tone and the pace of events were set by a Shi‘i-led organization. The group of Shi‘i activists that had been marginal to opposition movements in the 1930s and 1950s, and a more important but still marginal part of the terrorist-oriented groups in the 1980s, became the leaders of the opposition in the 1990s. There are two probable reasons for this development. First, younger clerics like ‘Ali Salman, exposed to Iranian indoctrination, had internalized its propaganda, leading them to associate universal ideas of justice and equality with Shi‘i values and motives. Since his return to Bahrain in 1992, Shaykh ‘Ali took a strong line against the Al Khalifa regime, spicing his rhetoric with a heady dose of Shi‘i revolutionary fervor and depicting Shi‘is killed by the security forces during the latest riots as martyrs on behalf of God. ₄₀   Second, the younger clerics’ growing acquaintance with lower-class Shi‘is had bridged the traditional gaps between different ethnic and denominational groups and established a common antigovernment denominator among them. To be sure, most Shi‘is still advocated cooperation with the Sunnis, under the banner of universal ideas. But a group among them, led by more radical, pro-Iranian clerics, had evolved and was building support among the lower classes, stressing clearly identifiable Shi‘i communal interests and grievances.

According to opposition accounts, demonstrations in 1995 constituted an expression of popular anger at growing unemployment and misrule. ₄₁   During the week preceding Shaykh ‘Ali’s arrest in December 1994, protests spread from mosques in Manama to Shi‘i villages surrounding the capital, triggering further police raids and arrests. ₄₂   These villages were at the center of an uprising that climaxed in March 1995, with nightly explosions and arson attacks on targets ranging from petrol stations to banks. ₄₃   The perpetrators called it “the Bahraini Intifada,” and it reflected the strengthening of the more radical activist camp. There was growing cooperation between intellectuals who demanded the return of constitutional rule and unemployed, village-based rioters, led by a group of Shi‘i preachers inspired by ‘Ali Salman and his colleagues. Although ‘Ali and other leaders were deported in January 1995, unrest continued, even after the government had announced the release from prison of 200 detainees. Bahraini security forces responded harshly, sealing off entire districts, raiding many homes, and using tear gas and live ammunition to quell the unrest. Toward the end of May 1995, after fourteen civilians and three policemen had been killed, scores injured, and between 700 and 1,600 imprisoned, the revolt seemed to have lost some of its momentum. ₄₄   The imprint of a more extremist trend was evident in the prominence of Shi‘i leaders in the riots, the slogans stressing discrimination and suppression, and the participation of lower-class members in the actions.

However, the time-honored form of broad, intercommunal operations was not abandoned. To gain more support, the leaders of the radical stream tried to frame their views in a universal language that would convince the more moderate, less partisan groups while also reflecting their concepts of justice and participation. Shi‘i opposition publications stressed that their movement was not religiously exclusive, pointing out that it included both Sunnis and Shi‘is and reflected a broad range of political views, notably Islamist, liberal, leftist, and nationalist. ₄₅   There were reports that a national dialogue was underway among elements representing these trends. ₄₆   They all focused on a common goal: to reinstate the majlis and limit absolute rule. Moreover, they openly claimed that the state intelligence services—headed since 1966 by a British officer, Ian Henderson ₄₇ —were deliberately trying to provoke Sunni-Shi‘i antagonism ₄₈   through the distribution of leaflets attempting “to create fear among the communities and hence justify their repressive campaign.” ₄₉   The Shi‘i hard-liners seemed to be trying to distance themselves from a sectarian profile. The image they now tried to project was that of patriotism. “The confrontation in Bahrain,” lamented a spokesman on behalf of the IFLB, “is between the people of all sorts and the regime.” ₅₀

A most unusual attempt at broad cooperation among opposition groups came in early May 1995, when a group of twenty prominent Bahraini women, in an unprecedented move, sent an open letter to the ruler, Shaykh ‘Isa. ₅₁   They expressed deep concern over the deteriorating situation in the country, in particular the heightening tension and the increasing levels of violence. The signatories were all highly placed professionals from most walks of life in Bahrain. They included lawyers, university professors, and civil servants. ₅₂   By reminding both the regime and its opponents of the rights of women to equality in all spheres of life and their right to obtain full participation in the political process, they underscored the broad character of the opposition movement. ₅₃

The following months saw a number of tentative attempts to heal the breach. In May, the government expressed its determination to find jobs for 4,000 Bahrainis every year in order to reduce unemployment, one of the underlying causes of the unrest. Some of the positions would be created by “Bahrainization,” a strict scheme to replace foreign workers with nationals, of which the Shi‘is were a majority, and forcing many of the country’s 250,000 expatriates to leave, especially low-skilled workers from the Indian subcontinent. Talks between the government and opposition leaders were resumed.

As in the past, however, the government pointed to outside instigation as the source of internal trouble. ₅₄   It accused “extremist organizations” supported by an unidentified “foreign party”—apparently an allusion to Iran. ₅₅   Although it was seldom stated publicly, Bahrain held Iran primarily responsible for the riots. Indeed, statements by Iranian leaders and media suggested that Tehran would prefer a different regime in Manama. Maintaining an official posture of impartiality, senior Iranian officials have refrained from direct public comment on unrest in Bahrain, claiming that “the crisis [there] was a domestic issue.” ₅₆   Instead, they emphasize Tehran’s desire for the victory of an indigenous Islamic opposition, referred to as the “Muslims” who were “clashing with the police” in “some Arab countries” (i.e., Bahrain), adding that “[they] are much closer to victory than we were in the mid-1970s in Iran.” ₅₇   The Iranian media, more keenly supportive of the Muslim reformists of Bahrain, regarded a change of regime as ideologically and strategically advantageous for Tehran. No wonder then that the Bahraini government claimed the upheaval was not related to jobs or internal politics but fomented by a group of young Shi‘i clerics recently returned from Iran. ₅₈   Dismissing opposition activists as a minority of troublemakers, the Bahraini government downplayed all outbreaks of unrest.

Since 1991 both trends within the Shi‘i opposition have also been active in London. The leading groups are the Bahrain Freedom Movement (BFM) and the IFLB. ₅₉   The BFM, originally set up in 1982, represented constitutionalist views and had its roots in the parliamentary experiment of the 1970s but was barely active for many years. Inspired by the 1994 petition, it began a struggle for restoration of the National Assembly and the suspended key articles of the constitution. Its leaders struck a balance between liberal and religious views, encouraging Sunni-Shi‘i cooperation. Their propaganda material did not mince words, calling the Al Khalifa clan tyrants and attacking the British government for supporting the Bahraini ruler. When interviewed, UK-based leaders like Mansur al-Jamri and ‘Ala al-Yusuf claimed to respect the popular will. ₆₀   They offered to come to terms with the Al Khalifas if they would ease their iron grip over society and hold elections. ₆₁   A statement issued by the BFM listed the demands of the organization as follows:

1. Release Shaykh ‘Ali Salman and all those arrested in the uprising.

2. Implement Bahrain’s constitutional order and set a date for elections. ₆₂  

3. Allow exiled politicians to return to the island without any restrictions. ₆₃  

4. Revoke the ill-reputed state security law.

5. Deport the British commander of the intelligence apparatus, Ian Henderson, and the foreign team operating with him. ₆₄  

But the BFM has been superseded by the more radical IFLB. Western observers and the Bahraini authorities have long regarded the Front as an Iranian proxy, operating from Tehran and bent on toppling the Al Khalifa regime. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Radi, a member of the Front’s General Congress, who echoed the BFM in terming the riots an “intifada,” argued that the “nature of the system is intrinsically anti-democratic” and that events had gone too far to merely restore the 1973 National Assembly. ₆₅   The shaykh had clarified that the Al Khalifa clan had to be overthrown. Furthermore, in contrast to the BFM’s claims, ₆₆   the IFLB stated that the latest wave of demonstrations had nothing to do with the constitutional petition campaign. ₆₇

These differences were, however, not manifested on the ground. In Bahrain itself, the Shi‘i opposition movement paraded universal principles but in fact had clerical Shi‘i leaders, some of them inspired and others supported by Iran, and altogether dominated by Shi‘i identity and interests.

The Shi‘i character of the movement was evident in the response of Sunni intellectuals. Caught between a Sunni regime and a protest movement that was mostly Shi‘i, Sunni intellectuals and administrators, mostly from the middle class, were left in an acute dilemma. Excluded from any real political role by the Al Khalifa family’s dissolution of the National Assembly in 1975, they had been sponsoring petition campaigns (in 1991 and 1992) calling for restoration of constitutional government. Sunni opposition sources nevertheless regarded leaders of the Shi‘i community, like the exiled Shaykh ‘Ali Salman, as having been too heavily influenced by Iranian radicalism. Some Shi‘i leaders were therefore viewed as seeking to emulate Khomeini’s mass protest tactics, thereby alienating their erstwhile Sunni allies. A Sunni human rights’ activist complained of what he called the Shi‘i dedication to martyrdom, which undermined the developing reform movement. ₆₈

In November 1995, after a six-month hiatus, disturbances flared up again, with a spate of bombings, arson attacks, and other acts of sabotage. Two homemade bombs exploded at two luxury hotels, injuring three people and causing property damage. A third bomb exploded at a commercial complex on New Year’s Eve, causing panic but no injuries. Another went off, apparently prematurely, in a car parked at a commercial market. Scores of people, mainly from the majority Shi‘i community, were arrested in a huge government crackdown. Bahraini newspapers and other Arab media adhering to the official Bahraini line emphasized that some of those detained in connection with the bombings had confessed that they had been trained to prepare explosives in the Iranian city of Qom or in Hizballah camps in Lebanon.

The Shi‘i leaders now issued more extremist propaganda and at the same time tried to associate themselves with other groups—liberals and Sunnis alike—as signatories of a statement declaring that the “Bahraini people will not surrender, no matter how severe the repression and terrorism.” ₆₉   Shi‘i leaders also were pressing the government to release the detainees. A deal was struck, and several hundred individuals detained during the unrest were freed beginning mid-August. But the opposition leaders were demanding the immediate release of hundreds more who, under the deal, were to be freed by the end of September. They also called for a halt to the trials of detainees, the return of deportees, and the launching of talks on political reforms—in particular, restoration of the constitution suspended in 1975 and reinstatement of Parliament.

Shi‘i religious institutions—privately funded religious centers or mourning houses—had long provided a political hub for Bahraini Shi‘i preachers, who continued to foment unrest. Addressing his worshipers at Friday prayers in the village of al-Diraz, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Amir al-Jamri, a member of the dissolved Parliament who emerged as the de facto leader of the opposition, warned that the dangerous situation would get more complicated if the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld a death sentence against one of the protesters, Ahmad Hasan Kambar. Al-Jamri declared that any solution to the crisis in Bahrain should be comprehensive, depicting attempts by some businessmen to improve the living conditions of the Shi‘i community as a shortsighted initiative. Detained following the first wave of unrest and released in September, al-Jamri also stressed that any solution lacking constitutional legitimacy would be incomplete.

As for government plans to bolster the Shura council, a consultative assembly appointed by the ruler in December 1992 after he had rejected calls to reinstate the disbanded Parliament, al-Jamri said that in order to receive popular support “such a body must be elected by secret ballot and it must have the power of an independent legislature.” ₇₀   The Shi‘i opposition therefore seemed to have a wider resonance also with the Sunni middle and lower classes.

In response to al-Jamri’s activities, the Bahraini security forces raided mosques, and the government banned Friday prayers altogether at several mosques. The re-arrest in January 1996 of the established leaders of the opposition movement—from Shi‘i cleric ‘Abd al-Amir al-Jamri to Sunni lawyer Ahmad Shamlan—served to indicate the government’s resolve.

But the Bahraini regime found itself in a dilemma, for its policy appeared only to be provoking more resistance. In March 1996, an arson attack at a restaurant left seven Bangladeshis dead and struck fear into the large expatriate community. ₇₁   In another development, the execution of a Shi‘i convicted of killing a policeman sparked a fresh round of violent protests in Manama’s Shi‘i suburbs. The Bahraini security forces then sealed off the Shi‘i districts of al-Diraz and Sanabis. ₇₂   As events escalated, the number of participants in the riots rose to hundreds. The conflict was now between Shi‘i youths—mostly in the villages but also in some urban areas—and government forces. The Bahraini regime found the disturbances difficult to quell precisely because they were loosely organized and involved the increasingly radicalized younger generation.

 

Conclusion

The point of departure of this chapter was that Bahraini Shi‘is do not constitute a separatist group easily prompted to rebel. To be sure, they harbored feelings of political and socioeconomic deprivation, inflicted on them by the Al Khalifa-led Sunni regime. But these grievances were counterbalanced by government policies aimed at protecting Shi‘i lives and property, and helping them earn reasonable livelihoods in the private and public sectors. In addition, their own internal ethnic, socioeconomic, and even religiously based divisions prevented their appearance as a uniform grouping in Bahraini politics. In fact, Shi‘is form a majority of Bahrain’s population and regard themselves as being among the founders of the state. Consequently, despite their severe criticism of the government, they developed feelings of patriotism and loyalty to the state.

They therefore tended to cooperate with Sunnis in support of all-embracing, universal ideas, including economic improvement and constitutional government. The Shi‘is were active primarily in class-based opposition activities. Class provided intercommunal cooperation, an arena in which to pursue universal goals, and a framework for organizing political action where they could also uphold their religious identity. However, not all the Shi‘is were satisfied with this framework. The successive waves of opposition in Bahrain since the 1930s gave rise to small groups of zealous Shi‘is, made up or led by clerics, who rallied around Shi‘i interests, religious values, and identity. For them, the “Shi‘i cause” had a higher priority than adherence to more universal, class-based or nationalist ideas. They were part of the broader opposition movements but took their cue from specific Shi‘i grievances and religious perceptions. These groups, however, remained marginal, isolated from most of the Shi‘i population, which regarded them as fanatical and unprepared for compromise.

The Iranian revolution of 1979 brought about a change in Shi‘i political activity. Iran’s new regime provided organizational support and an ideological package that wedded universal ideas of justice and equality to the Shi‘i focus on martyrdom and the fight against oppression. Moreover, the Iranian government prepared a continuous flow of Bahraini clerics who had been cultivated in Shi‘i schools. From 1979 to 1985, fervent Shi‘i groups emerged to lead Shi‘i activities with Iranian support. But their use of terrorism, which most Shi‘is opposed, subjected them to government persecution (or exile) and isolated them from the Shi‘i majority.

In the 1990s, against the background of growing economic difficulties, demands to restore constitutional practice all over the Gulf, and the declining image of the Gulf monarchs, the role of Bahrain’s zealous Shi‘i groups became more evident. Most Shi‘is were again organized in a broad, class-based movement that upheld constitutional ideas. But this time, Iranian-inspired clerics and zealous Shi‘is did not settle for a marginal role but took over leadership of the opposition movement as a whole. They used universal terms, spoke on behalf of all Bahrainis, and encouraged cooperation with Sunnis in fighting the government. The role of Shi‘i clerics was dominant in activating and setting the pace and the breadth of the movement, and members of the Shi‘i lower class made up the rank and file. Their goals were comprehensive, focusing on major changes in the regime, and even its overthrow. The Shi‘i activists were thus leading Bahraini society, alongside Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, into a vehement struggle for power and constitutional rights, which may well determine the nature of future regimes in the Gulf.

Their struggle attests to the fact that the present mode of state building in the Gulf—underpinned by social change, urbanization, education, and welfare, along with a prevalence of tribal and Islamic values in society—has exhausted itself. State funds are insufficient to provide for social services and mass employment, and the political arrangements can no longer satisfy a growing drive for democratization. Gulf states will need to reform their regimes, and, as part of this process, the role and position of the Shi‘is will have to be altered.

 

Endnotes

Note 1: The Middle East, July 1980; Financial Times, 5 May 1981, 24 April 1984.  Back.

Note 2: International Herald Tribune, 4 December 1979; Financial Times, 4 December 1979.  Back.

Note 3: See, for example, al-Qabas, 11 June 1986.  Back.

Note 4: These figures were provided by the Agence France Press (AFP) and should be regarded as estimates. See AFP, 19 December—Foreign Broadcasting Information Service: Near East and South Asia: Daily Report (DR), 19 December 1994. According to another estimate, Shi‘is were said to constitute more than 70 percent of the citizen population of 240,000 during the mid-1980s.  Back.

Note 5: Andrew Rathmell, “Opposition in the Gulf—Further Insights,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 7, no. 7 (July 1995), p. 309.  Back.

Note 6: Financial Times, 24 December 1994.  Back.

Note 7: The homonym Al attests to the Arabic term for extended family.  Back.

Note 8: See, for example, Andrew Wheatcroft, The Life and Times of Shaykh Salman Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Ruler of Bahrain, 1942–1961 (London: Kegan Paul, 1995), pp. 39–77.  Back.

Note 9: Fred Haley Lawson, Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 27–31.  Back.

Note 10: Ibid., pp. 9–11.  Back.

Note 11: Fuad I. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 154–173.  Back.

Note 12: Ibid., pp. 128–131.  Back.

Note 13: Ibid., pp. 167–168.  Back.

Note 14: The rapid social change among the Shi‘i community is best understood by reading accounts of Shi‘i village life as it was but a few decades ago. For such an account, see Henry Herald Hansen, Investigations in a Shi‘i Village in Bahrain (Copenhagen: National Museum of Denmark, 1968).  Back.

Note 15: Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 95–140; Milton G. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (eds.), “The Study of Ethnopolitics in the Middle East,” in Esman and Rabinovich, Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 3–28.  Back.

Note 16: Ian J. Seccombe, “The Persian Gulf,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 25 (July 1938), p. 357.  Back.

Note 17: Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 54–58.  Back.

Note 18: For further details on the HEC leaders’ demands, see Muhammad Ghanim al-Rumaihi, Bahrain: A Study on Social and Political Changes Since the First World War (London: Bowker, 1975), pp. 289–290.  Back.

Note 19: Akhbar al-Khalij, 24 December 1992.  Back.

Note 20: Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 48–49.  Back.

Note 21: Al-Dustur (London), 6 May, 1 July 1985.  Back.

Note 22: Al-Ra’y al-‘Amm, 31 August 1979. Mudarrisi was given Bahraini nationality, of which he was stripped in September 1979 as the result of his activity to undermine the rule of the Al Khalifa family.  Back.

Note 23: For a study dealing with the impact of the Islamic revolution, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, “Socio-Political Change in the Gulf: A Climate for Terrorism,” in S. H. Richard and J. E. Peterson (eds.), Crosscurrents in the Gulf: Arab Regional and Global Interests (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1988), p. 136.  Back.

Note 24: Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, pp. 50–51.  Back.

Note 25: Al-Dustur, 11 January 1988.  Back.

Note 26: Al-‘Alam (London), May 1995.  Back.

Note 27: Middle East Economic Digest, 27 April 1992.  Back.

Note 28: Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 21 December 1994.  Back.

Note 29: Middle East International, 28 April 1995.  Back.

Note 30: See, for example, Mideast Mirror, 14 December 1994.  Back.

Note 31: Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 21 November 1992.  Back.

Note 32: Middle East Economic Digest, 6 March 1992.  Back.

Note 33: Gulf States Newsletter, 10 February 1992.  Back.

Note 34: Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 21 November 1992.  Back.

Note 35: Akhbar al-Khalij, 24 December 1992.  Back.

Note 36: Akhbar al-Khalij, 28 December 1992.  Back.

Note 37: Middle East Economic Digest, 8 May 1992.  Back.

Note 38: For a full account of the petition, see al-‘Alam, May 1995. For more on the suspended National Assembly, see Le Monde (Paris), 20 December 1994.  Back.

Note 39: Sawt al-Bahrain (London), January 1995.  Back.

Note 40: Speaking on behalf of the opposition, the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement was naming the latest “martyrs,” Gulf States Newsletter, 22 May 1995.  Back.

Note 41: A. Rathmell, “Opposition in the Gulf,” p. 309.  Back.

Note 42: Al-Salama al-Mamnu‘a (London), February 1995.  Back.

Note 43: Sawt al-Bahrain, January 1995.  Back.

Note 44: Al-Majd (Amman), 20 April 1990.  Back.

Note 45: Al-‘Alam, May 1995.  Back.

Note 46: Mideast Mirror, 3 April 1995.  Back.

Note 47: Al-Majd, 20 February 1995.  Back.

Note 48: The IFLB secretary-general, Muhammad ‘Ali Mahfuz, went as far as to blame Britain for allowing “its nationals to head the intelligence services in Bahrain and keeping quiet about the crimes” of the authorities. See AFP, 14 December—DR, 15 December 1994.  Back.

Note 49: Mideast Mirror, 3 April 1995.  Back.

Note 50: Al-Safir, 27 December 1995.  Back.

Note 51: Sawt al-Bahrain, January 1995.  Back.

Note 52: Al-‘Alam, May 1995.  Back.

Note 53: Women were also reported to have taken part in the demonstrations that occurred in February and March. See, for example, al-Majd, 6 February 1995.  Back.

Note 54: On a different level, “foreign circles” were accused of “spreading untrue reports about what is happening in Bahrain.” See, for example, al-Sharq al-Awsat, 21 December 1994.  Back.

Note 55: See, for example, al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), 27 December 1994. See also Mideast Mirror, 19 April 1995.  Back.

Note 56: Jumhuri-ye Islami, 8 January—DR, 12 April 1995.  Back.

Note 57: See, for example, ‘Ali Khamene’i’s speech, Radio Tehran, 3 February—DR, 12 April 1995.  Back.

Note 58: Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 24 January 1995.  Back.

Note 59: A monthly newsletter published in London by the movement is called Sawt al-Bahrain ( Voice of Bahrain ).  Back.

Note 60: The BFM’s broad popular basis is indicated by the backgrounds of al-Jamri and al-Yusuf. Jamri is the son of a well-known Shi‘i cleric, whereas Yusuf is a former International Monetary Fund official.  Back.

Note 61: See also an interview given to al-‘Arabi, 2 January 1995 by ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Nu‘aymi, a leading figure in the BFM.  Back.

Note 62: See, for example, an interview given by Shaykh ‘Ali Salman to al-‘Alam, May 1995.  Back.

Note 63: Al-Hayat, 13 January 1995.  Back.

Note 64: Al-Quds al-‘Arabi (London), 3 January 1995.  Back.

Note 65: Al-Istiqlal (Gaza), 23 December 1994.  Back.

Note 66: See, for example, an interview given to al-Safir (Beirut), 27 December 1994, by Shaykh Muhammad ‘Ali Mahfuz, secretary-general of the IFLB.  Back.

Note 67: Al-Majd, 8 May 1995.  Back.

Note 68: Gulf States Newsletter, 22 May 1995.  Back.

Note 69: Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 12 March 1996.  Back.

Note 70: See, for example, the heir apparent’s interview to al-Sharq al-Awsat, 7 March 1996.  Back.

Note 71: WAKH, 14 March—DR, 14 March 1996.  Back.

Note 72: AFP, 15 March—DR, 15 March 1996.   Back.