Minorities and the State in the Arab World

Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.)

Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

1999

7. The ‘Alawis, Lords of Syria:
From Ethnic Minority to Ruling Sect
Eyal Zisser

 

On 15 June 1936, six ‘Alawi notables signed a petition addressed to French prime minister Leon Blum. The petition declared that the ‘Alawi people were different from the Sunni Muslims and that the ‘Alawis refused to be annexed to Muslim Syria because the official religion of the Syrian state is Islam, and according to Islam, the ‘Alawis are considered infidels. ₁

Among the ‘Alawi notables who signed this petition was ‘Ali Sulayman, a member of the Kalbiyya tribe from the small town of Qardaha. ₂   Four decades later, on 16 November 1970, his son, Hafiz al-Asad, seized power in Syria and since 22 February 1971 has served as president. There could be no clearer evidence of the ‘Alawi community’s departure from its separatist path in favor of integration into the Syrian state and society. Moreover, this once isolated minority group has been transformed into the ruling community of Syria. Under ‘Alawi rule, Syria has evolved from a feeble and unsettled state, whose very viability was in doubt, into a regional power with aspirations to hegemony in the Middle East.

The story of the ‘Alawi sect is unprecedented and to a great extent unique in the history of the Middle East. Whereas most minority sects in the region have, indeed, managed to integrate into the modern Middle Eastern state, in most cases they have not been able to entirely overcome the sectarian barriers, certainly not to the extent of attaining veritable positions of power.

The case of the ‘Alawis is unique not only because this sect ascended to a position of power, but also because of its humble origins. For many years, the ‘Alawis were a separatist minority sect, socially and economically deprived, geographically isolated, and, moreover, considered heretical. Throughout its history, this sect lacked a tradition of a self-rule (even on its own territory) and had always been governed by others.

The history of the ‘Alawi sect gives rise to a host of questions concerning their climb to the top. Why, for example, did the ‘Alawis choose to coalesce with the Syrian state? How did they become its overseers and the guarantors of its stability? Most crucially, is their merger with the Syrian state irreversible, or is ‘Alawi status in Syria, and by implication the future of the Syrian state, still uncertain?

 

The ‘Alawis in Syria: Square One

The ‘Alawi community is Syria’s largest minority group. It constitutes approximately 12 percent of the state’s population—more than two million people. Most—more than 70 percent—are concentrated in the ‘Alawi Mountains, also referred to as Jabal al-Nusayriyya. ‘Alawi concentrations can also be found along the Syrian coast, in the interior lowlands east of the ‘Alawi Mountains, and in rural areas around the cities of Hama and Homs. About a quarter of a million or more ‘Alawis now reside in Damascus and Aleppo. ₃

For many years, the ‘Alawi community was regarded as contemptible and inferior by the surrounding Sunni society. ₄   The ‘Alawi Mountain region, where most members of the community dwelled, was a remote area lacking economic or political significance. The main difficulties that faced the ‘Alawi community stemmed from religious friction. In the eyes of the Sunni majority, the ‘Alawis (Nusayris), who broke away from the Shi‘is some thousand years ago, were (and remain) non-Muslim, heretical, and idolatrous. A formal ruling handed down by Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) determined that spilling ‘Alawi blood is permissible if the ‘Alawis fail to repent and return to Islam. ₅

One salient feature in the life of the ‘Alawi community through the years was a lack of internal cohesion, manifested by factionalism and individualistic orientations. The ‘Alawis were and remain organized as a four-part tribal confederation of the Kalbiyya, Haddadin, Khayyatin, and Matawira/Numilatiyya. However, this tribal configuration was loose and unstable and in some regions, such as the coastal plain, there was no tribal framework whatsoever. ₆

The community also lacked any recognized, legitimate religious establishment. Clerics operated within an individual tribe or clan, and only rarely was an individual cleric’s authority recognized by more than one tribe. The community was also divided into a number of religious groups: the Qamariyya, Shamsiyya, Ghaybiyya, and, in this century, the Murshidiyya.

 

The ‘Alawis Under the French Mandate: From Isolationism to Integration

A change in the status of the ‘Alawi community came about only in the early 1920s with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the French entry into Syria. French divide-and-conquer policy encouraged separatist tendencies in Syrian society in order to weaken the Sunni majority and cripple its capacity to actualize nationalist aspirations to an independent Arab or Syrian state. ₇   In 1920, France established “the Autonomous District of the ‘Alawis” in the ‘Alawi region along the Syrian coast. In 1922, they made the district into “the State of the ‘Alawis,” also known as “The Territory of the ‘Alawis” (Territoire des Alaouites in the French documents, or Dawlat al-‘Alawiyyin in the Arabic). Since 1930 the French used the less provocative name, “Government of Ladhiqiyya.” An ‘Alawi entity existed until 1936 and then was re-established upon the outbreak of World War II, lasting from 1939 to 1942. The French also sought to reinforce ‘Alawi communal identity. They recognized the ‘Alawis as a discrete religious group and installed a separate court system as they had done for the other religious communities in the state. ₈

‘Alawi response to French policy was not uniform. Many took issue with the French authorities and feared for the integrity and preservation of ‘Alawi autonomy. Thus, from the end of 1918 until mid-1921, Shaykh Salih al-‘Ali led a rebellion against the French in the region. The rebels used Arab nationalist slogans in their appeals to the population and were in contact with Ibrahim Hanunu, who led the anti-French revolt in northern Syria, and with Faysal’s regime in Damascus. ₉   Once the al-‘Ali revolt had been quelled, many ‘Alawi notables changed their allegiances and joined the ranks of the supporters of France. The ‘Alawis seem to have felt no sense of obligation to a pan-Arabist or pan-Syrian ideology, but they were grateful to the French for having elevated their economic and political status. ₁₀

 

Toward Integration Within Syria

How, then, did the ‘Alawis make their way into the Syrian state? The accepted assumption is that the French themselves were responsible for this by abolishing the ‘Alawi state in 1936 and coercively incorporating it into Syria, as part of the agreement they had reached with the Syrian “national bloc” leaders. ₁₁   The Syrian-French Agreement was not ratified by the French legislature in Paris, but it was enough to strike a death blow to the separatist tendencies of the ‘Alawi leaders and notables.

It would nevertheless appear that despite the decisive role of the French and of the Syrian national bloc leaders in transforming the political status of the ‘Alawi community, the ‘Alawi “decision” to unite with the Syrian state involved a number of additional factors.

There were, to begin with, geopolitical reasons for unification. In the framework of the Mediterranean new order that emerged in the 1930s, and especially after World War II, the geopolitical status of the ‘Alawi district actually fostered Alawi integration into Syria and not the other way around. There were at least four reasons for this. First, the ‘Alawi district lacked an economic infrastructure capable of supporting an independent state. Its sole prospect for economic development was its conversion into Syria’s commercial gateway to Europe. Second, because of the region’s negligible political and economic import, few European powers were interested in its lot, especially when their attention was focused in the south, on events in Lebanon and Palestine. Third, the ‘Alawi majority in the ‘Alawi district was not absolute, unlike the Druze majority in the Druze Mountains. Moreover, in some of the coastal towns that made up the political and economic center of the ‘Alawi region, they were actually a minority. ₁₂   Fourth, in 1939, the Turks annexed the Alexandretta District as stipulated in an agreement they had struck with France. Thousands of ‘Alawis vacated the area, resulting in hostility against Turkey among the Syrian ‘Alawis, who feared that Turkish expansionism would reach southward along the Syrian coast. ₁₃

Another factor behind ‘Alawi unification with the Syrian state was the absence of Western support: in contrast to other minorities in the Middle East during the Ottoman period, primarily Christian communities and even the Druzes, the ‘Alawis did not forge any special relationship with a Western power. The French, who were the first to demonstrate interest and become actively involved in the community’s affairs, were motivated mainly by political interest. Thus, after signing the agreement with the national bloc in 1936, France informed the ‘Alawis that it could not guarantee the preservation of an independent ‘Alawi entity. The British, who ruled the Levant in tandem with the French from 1941 to 1945, endeavored diligently to merge the ‘Alawis into Syria. It seems that the British and Americans regarded the area as possessing marginal strategic significance. In the 1930s the British established Haifa as the port for their Iraqi pipeline, whereas in the mid-1940s, the Americans chose the Lebanese port of Tripoli for receiving the Tapline pipe from Saudi Arabia.

‘Alawi social structure was not conducive to autonomy. As already noted, the community lacked internal cohesion and even exhibited individualistic tendencies. In addition, the ‘Alawis had no organized religious establishment and thus lacked both religious and educational institutions. Because they were a remote community with scant contact with the West, they were not exposed to the influence of Western ideologies. These seem to be some of the reasons why the ‘Alawis, like the Druzes and unlike the Maronites, did not turn their tribal and communal identification into a separatist nationalism. ₁₄

Finally, it seems that the “Syrian option,” that is, entry into the framework of the Syrian state, was the only way not to miss out on the fruits of modernity that were being harvested in the Levant: cultural enrichment, material wealth, social betterment, political emancipation, and ideological sophistication. For example, in the sphere of education, the ‘Alawi areas suffered from a dearth of schools capable of providing professional training. Thus ‘Alawi youth interested in upward mobility had no choice but to attend the Syrian public schools. As a result, they encountered and adopted Arab and Syrian nationalist views. Hafiz al-Asad’s own background typifies this. He left the home of his birth, Qardaha, at age fourteen and moved to Ladhiqiyya, where he received his high school education. There he began to participate in anti-French demonstrations and by age sixteen had already joined the Ba‘th Party. ₁₅

 

Onward and Upward

With Syrian independence, some members of the ‘Alawi community began the process of meshing their co-religionists with the Syrian state. The two most practical paths to this end (which eventually brought ‘Alawis to the summit of power in Syria) were the army and the radical political parties, especially the Ba‘th and the Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS).

The army was already a means of upward mobility for the ‘Alawis, other minority communities, and rural Sunnis at the time of the French Mandate. The ‘Alawis found a common language with these similarly underprivileged groups and sometimes a basis for collaboration in the struggle against social and economic discrimination. Following the decline of the Sunni officer class, which had dominated the army as a result of their intensive involvement in politics that generated personal, regional, and ideological struggles, the ‘Alawi officers formed a more cohesive and coordinated group than officers from other backgrounds. ₁₆

The young ‘Alawis who were exposed to the radical worldviews circulating in Syria in schools or in the army were eventually swept up by them. These views apparently reflected the latent wishes and aspirations of that generation of ‘Alawis, enabling them to envision their role in the emerging political, social, and economic order in Syria and in the region at large. They found in the radical ideologies (especially in their socioeconomic aspect) an answer to their feelings of alienation and deprivation. The nationalist dimension of these ideologies (whether Arab nationalist as in Ba‘thist doctrine, or Syrian nationalist as in the creed of the PPS) held out the promise of a full merger as equals with the surrounding Syrian or Arab nation.

The ‘Alawis’ role in the “struggle for Syria” in the 1950s was marginal. They did not oppose the efforts made by successive Syrian governments to restrict ‘Alawi representation in the Parliament and amalgamate the community into the Syrian state. The ‘Alawis were scattered among various political forces, most of them radical, which were controlled at that time by non-‘Alawis. ₁₇

 

After the Ba‘th Revolution of 8 March 1963

On 8 March 1963, the Ba‘th revolution overturned the political establishment and, in fact, terminated an entire political system, which was the only one Syria had known until that time. The main force behind the coup was “the Military Committee,” a group of army officers who were close to the Ba‘th Party but not formal members. The leadership of the Military Committee comprised five officers, all of minority stock: three ‘Alawis (Salah Jadid, Muhammad ‘Umran, and Hafiz al-Asad) and two Isma‘ilis (‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi and Ahmad al-Mirr). ₁₈

Despite ‘Alawi dominance of the Military Committee, the ‘Alawi officers needed additional partners to pull off the coup, both within the Military Committee itself and among the army ranks. Moreover, after the coup, the Military Committee appealed to the veteran leaders of the Ba‘th Party, Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah al-Baytar, requesting their sponsorship. Thus between 1963 and 1966, they, alongside senior Sunni officers such as Amin al-Hafiz, served as window dressing for the Ba‘th regime.

One must ask why the ‘Alawi officers balked at revealing the extent of their role to the Syrian public. First, they were quite young, inexperienced, and lacking in self-confidence. Second, the officers seem to have feared that the Syrian public was not prepared to accept ‘Alawi hegemony. Third, in light of the challenges facing the Ba‘th regime from the outset, it was imperative that the officers muster as broad support as was possible, even if this meant sharing power. Fourth, the ‘Alawi cabal was insufficiently crystalized and had no leader acceptable to all members in the group. Finally, the ‘Alawi officers regarded themselves as Arab-Syrian nationalists, and not representatives of the ‘Alawi community, and therefore attempted to avoid the appearance of operating qua ‘Alawis and in pursuit of ‘Alawi interests.

Between 1966 and 1970 as well, once the ‘Alawis indisputably held the Syrian reigns of power, Salah Jadid, the man in control and an ‘Alawi, declined to serve as president. He preferred to remain behind the scenes, as assistant to the secretary-general of the regional command of the Ba‘th Party, and left the titular offices of power to a Sunni president, Nur al-Din al-Atasi. Only with Hafiz al-Asad’s ascent to power, on 16 November 1970, following the corrective revolution he conducted against Salah Jadid and his supporters, was the veil lifted. On 22 February 1971, Asad was elected president of Syria, thereby revealing unambiguously the ‘Alawi hegemony over the army and the Syrian state.

It is appropriate to note three central elements in the process of ‘Alawi mastery over Syria, which became more salient with Asad’s triumph, and which preserve the regime he has continued to lead through the late 1990s. They are the consolidation of the ‘Alawi community, especially within the army and the Ba‘th Party, behind the universally accepted leadership of Hafiz al-Asad; the metamorphosis of the ‘Alawi community into the main support of the regime; and the arranging of a covenant between the ‘Alawis on the one hand and other minorities and rural Sunnis on the other.

The need to unify the ‘Alawi community behind Asad’s leadership became apparent soon after the Ba‘th coup of 1963, when an acute conflict erupted among the three ringleaders of the Military Committee, Salah Jadid, Muhammad ‘Umran, and Hafiz al-Asad, over control of the ‘Alawi community and over that of Syria. The struggle was conducted along ideological lines, such as over differences between Salah Jadid’s radical domestic and foreign policies and Hafiz al-Asad’s more moderate and pragmatic policies. Yet there were also personal, family, and even tribal dimensions to the dispute. Asad hailed from the Kalbiyya tribe, ‘Umran from the Khayyatin, and Jadid from the Haddadin.

In 1965, Hafiz al-Asad and Salah Jadid joined forces to depose Muhammad ‘Umran. He was exiled from Syria and eventually assassinated by agents sent by Asad on 4 March 1972, in Tripoli, Lebanon. Between 1966 and 1970, Asad and Jadid constantly vied for advantage. Asad won this protracted feud, and after his corrective revolution on 16 November 1970, Jadid and his circle were imprisoned. Even in jail, Jadid was considered a threat to the regime, and for this reason he remained incarcerated until his death on 18 July 1993. ₁₉

After Asad seized power in Syria and became the de facto leading figure in the ‘Alawi community, he turned his attention to strengthening his grip on this community. His first step was to bolster his position within his family and tribe. It is as a result of this effort that the core of Asad’s regime has been composed of members of the Kalbiyya tribe, headed by members of the Asad family: his brothers Rif‘at and Jamil (until the mid-1980s), his son Basil, and, since his death, Bashshar and Mahir. Alongside them in the highest echelons of the regime are members of the Makhluf family, the largest and most prominent in the area of Asad’s birth. Asad is married to Anisa Makhluf, whose cousin, ‘Adnan Makhluf, was the commander for many years of the Republican Guard, the elite force responsible for the regime’s security. ₂₀

Asad’s second step in consolidating his hold on the ‘Alawi community was to arrange a system of alliances among its families, tribes, and clans by means of marriage and the appointment of family and tribal representatives to important posts in the regime. For instance, Asad appointed members of leading families from other tribes to key positions: ‘Ali Duba, whose family comes from the Matawira/Numilatiyya tribe, was appointed head of the Military Security Department; and ‘Ali Haydar, from the Haddadin tribe, was appointed commander of the Special Forces. There are also strategic marriages between the Asads and those prominent families of the ‘Alawi community whose members command crucial posts in the army, including the match of Rif‘at Asad’s daughter with the son of the then Third Division commander Shafiq Fayyad (now commander of the Third Corps), in an attempt to cool passions aroused in the 1983–1984 struggle over government succession. ₂₁

Once he secured the allegiance of the ‘Alawi community, or at least the recognition by most of its members of his leadership, Asad turned it into the main prop of the regime. The ‘Alawis gradually gained sway over the army and internal security forces. Today, they fill most of the commanding positions in the elite units of the Syrian Army and supervise most organs of state security. Three out of the four bodies of internal security are in the hands of ‘Alawis: ‘Adnan Badr Hasan heads Political Security, Ibrahim Huwayji heads Air Force Security, and ‘Ali Duba heads the Military Security Department. ₂₂   In the government and party, ‘Alawis such as Minister of the Interior Muhammad Hirba, Minister of Information Muhammad Salman, and Ahmad Dighram, a member of the regional command, hold many of the vital offices. ‘Alawi domination of high political posts, however, is not as absolute as that of the army and internal security. ₂₃

With the ‘Alawi community firmly behind him and its members serving as the engine of his regime, Asad directed his efforts to building bridges between ‘Alawis and others. The ‘Alawis are cognizant of their weaknesses; therefore, ‘Alawi officers have always sought partners along their road to power and today endeavor to broaden the base of support for their policies and ideology as much as possible. Other minority groups, principally the Druzes and Isma‘ilis, are longtime confederates. Thus, the leadership of the Military Committee comprised two Isma‘ilis and later a Druze in addition to ‘Alawis. The ‘Alawis, however, did not require Druzes and Isma‘ilis as ruling partners, but rather as supporters and assistants, and when the non-‘Alawi members of the Military Committee attempted to preserve and fortify their standing in the mid-1960s, a power struggle ensued in which the non-‘Alawis were toppled. ₂₄

No less important was the coalition between ‘Alawis and rural Sunnis. Their understanding was originally based on a common interest in extirpating the old regime, in effect the entire old order in Syria, and in implementing a just distribution of power and resources. Provincial Sunni officers and politicians proved to be convenient and loyal confederates, as they rallied around the regime without reservation in its most trying hours. The present configuration of Syria’s political leadership reflects this relationship. The vice president, ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, is a Sunni from the town of Banyas. Prime Minister Mahmud al-Zu‘bi and Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar‘ are Sunnis from Dar‘a, and the minister of defense, Mustafa Talas, is a Sunni from the village of Rustan near Homs. ₂₅

Since the early 1990s, a new pact has been in effect—this time between the ‘Alawi officers and the urbanized Sunni economic elite, prompted by the “economic openness” policy recently adopted by the regime. This is a symbiotic covenant between Sunnis, whose priority is political stability as a means of achieving economic stability, and ‘Alawis, who deliver political stability in exchange for recognition of the regime’s political legitimacy from the erstwhile foes of Ba‘th hegemony and ‘Alawi power. ₂₆   One manifestation of this covenant was the expansion of the representation of the Sunni economic elite in the Syrian People’s assembly following the elections to the Assembly that took place in May 1990 and in August 1994 and, consequently, the expansion of the authorities of this assembly, especially in the social and economic spheres. ₂₇

 

Is ‘Alawi Integration Irreversible?

Many observers claim that the ‘Alawis are so firmly meshed into the fabric of Syrian state and society as to be permanent. This opinion is founded on two main arguments: at present, there is no real threat to the ‘Alawis’ sway over Syria, and as a result, they continue to regard their integration with the rest of Syria as their best option, perhaps their only one. So far, the sect has managed to preserve stability in Syria. For the time being, the community is successful as well in preserving its internal unity, and the regime acts to reinforce it as much as possible. ₂₈

Furthermore, the large migration of ‘Alawis into Syria’s large urban centers, which followed the community’s ascent to power, would seem to strike a demographic coup de grace to notions of ‘Alawi separatism. Many settled in Aleppo, and a larger number settled in Damascus, where more than a quarter of a million reside today. They constitute in great measure the political and economic elite of the ‘Alawi community, although the ‘Alawi Mountains remain their center of gravity and source of communal power. ₂₉

 

The ‘Alawis and the Syrian State: “The Other Option”

Nevertheless, one cannot overlook the fact that the ‘Alawis’ integration into the Syrian state and their rise to the status of its dominant community paradoxically carry the seeds of their own destruction and a reversion to the separatist option. To begin with, the success of the ‘Alawis aggravated tensions between them and other segments of the Syrian population, chiefly the urban Sunnis. What is more, this success changed the face of the ‘Alawi community and of its territorial base in ways that could expedite adoption of the separatist option in the future, in the event that the Sunnis move to dismantle ‘Alawi hegemony.

Such a move is by no means inconceivable. For one thing, the Sunni majority still regards the ‘Alawis as socially inferior. While recognizing the ‘Alawis’ political and military puissance and appreciating the economic strides they have made, the average Sunni still harbors feelings of condescension and contempt toward them. There is much evidence of an abiding Sunni unwillingness to accept ‘Alawi integration into Syrian society. Intermarriage between the two communities, for example, is rare. ₃₀

Furthermore, the Sunnis still see the ‘Alawis as heretics and illegitimate as Muslims, as the Muslim Brotherhood stressed in the revolt that began in 1976. ₃₁   The regime’s efforts to win religious legitimacy for the ‘Alawi community have failed. The Syrian regime also encouraged relations between ‘Alawis and Shi‘is throughout the Muslim world, with emphasis on Iran, and even arranged for Iranian religious activity in Damascus. However, despite their political alliance with the ruling Ba‘th Party in Syria, the Iranians refused to give religious accreditation to the ‘Alawi community. ₃₂

Because the ‘Alawis became fully identified with the Ba‘th regime, the entire community has been further stigmatized by Ba‘thist secularism and its putative anti-Islamic ideology. The community was also tainted by the regime’s harsh suppression of its opponents and seen as guilty by association of the Ba‘th’s radical social and economic policies that hurt the middle and upper classes of urban Sunni society.

During the Muslim Brotherhood Revolt of 1976–1982, the fury against both the regime and the ‘Alawi community was plainly evinced as the rebels attacked ‘Alawis who had no connection to the regime, and made efforts to frustrate the integration of ‘Alawis into the Syrian state and society. These deeds provoked the ‘Alawis to respond in kind, for example at Ladhiqiyya in mid-1981, because they perceived the regime’s reaction as inadequate. According to a number of reports, the revolt prompted population transfers of ‘Alawis from Sunni areas and vice versa. ₃₃   Indeed, following the suppression of the rebellion, the Islamic movement in Syria was effectively crushed and suspended all organized activity. It would, nevertheless, seem that Islamic sentiments in Syria have remained as they were, although they are now submerged. ₃₄

Additionally, the ‘Alawis’ climb to the apex of Syrian government induced fundamental changes in their community and heartland that cannot but help shape the ‘Alawi future in Syria.

First of all, ever since Asad took power, the regime has channeled a substantial portion of the state’s resources to the ‘Alawi region for its development. Its transportation and communication systems have been retooled, and its ports—Ladhiqiyya, Banyas, and Tartus—enlarged. A comprehensive economic infrastructure, including factories, refineries, and power plants, was installed. Education and health care systems were significantly improved. ₃₅

The newfound prosperity of the ‘Alawi region in itself will not necessarily reawaken separatism, but if such a tendency resurfaces in the future for whatever reason, the region might well be capable of supporting a viable independent entity, whereas earlier in the century isolationist plans had to be abandoned, in part, because of the region’s economic helplessness.

Second, the integration of the ‘Alawis with Syria did not erase or weaken the ‘Alawis’ sense of ethnic identity, that is, the internal communal cohesion cemented by notions of duty and loyalty, but rather revitalized it. The advantages of this sense of unity were evident during the struggle for control of the country. The banding together of the community was accompanied by the emergence of a legitimate leadership over it: that of Hafiz al-Asad and his family. Such features as communal unity under a common leadership stand in sharp contrast to the conditions of ‘Alawi society of the 1930s and 1940s. A prominent symbol of ‘Alawi communal coordination was the founding, in 1980, of a political-military organization for the ‘Alawi region to support the government’s efforts in combating the Muslim Brotherhood. Called ‘Ali al-Murtada, at one point it numbered tens of thousands of members and was headed by Asad’s brother, Jamil al-Asad. The association crumbled in the mid-1980s, however, during the conflict over the succession between Asad and his brother, Rif‘at. ₃₆   Another example of communal cohesion was the rallying of ‘Alawi officers who opposed the coalition of the president’s Sunni protégés around Rif‘at al-Asad during the president’s illness and before he recovered in November 1983. ₃₇

It is worth mentioning in this context the argument made by Alain Chouet in his article “‘Alawi Tribal Space Tested by Power: Disintegration by Politics.” According to Chouet, with the second generation of ‘Alawi power, the internal forms and external contours of the community have already lost their traditional structure. The transformation appears irreversible, whatever happens in the future to the dominance of the ruling family and community. Among the ‘Alawis, the notion of tribe, still of primordial importance to Hafiz al-Asad’s strategies when he was establishing his authority, is disappearing in favor of two vaguer concepts, the extended family (at the more immediate level) and the nation (in a higher sense). Nevertheless, Chouet continued by arguing:

In fact, what we have witnessed is a social transition from a defensive organization centered on a geographically anchored tribal affiliation, to a conquering and aggressive organization based on the tactical capacity of skillful “godfathers” to manage their relations with the rest of the country, even the region, and to instrumentalize their clients. The notion of “ ‘Ashira”, exclusionist clan solidarity founded on family proximity and blood ties in a closed isolated economy, is thus giving way, without losing the operating models, to that of “ ‘Asabiyya”, an inclusive solidarity founded on the functional benefits that members can bring to the “band” (“ jama‘a”) in an urban context open to the larger world. ₃₈

Thus, it seems that the arguments made by Chouet support our assumption that the sense of ethnic identity among the ‘Alawis (‘Asabiyya) was strengthened, although as Chouet remarked, not any more on a familial or a tribal basis, but on a different one.

There is no doubt that President Asad’s leadership and the convergence of the ‘Alawi sect around it are the true keys to ‘Alawi control of Syria. This being the case, one must question the future of the Syrian regime when Asad departs the scene. Indeed, the re-eruption of the struggle over succession since the mid-1990s has already generated cracks in the stability of ‘Alawi rule and especially in the cohesion of the ‘Alawi top leadership. As this stability and cohesion constitute the major source of power for the sect, the continuation of ‘Alawi rule over Syria depends, to a large extent, on their preservation.

Since 1990, President Asad has clearly been making efforts to ensure the continuation of his dynasty, especially in view of his increasing awareness of his age and state of health. ₃₉   Asad had tried to promote his elder son Basil as an heir, but after Basil’s death in a road accident in January 1994, he transferred this goal to his second son, Bashshar. These efforts were accompanied by Asad’s attempt to revitalize Syria’s military and security ranks in order to boost his son’s chances. ₄₀

Asad’s measures led to the re-emergence of the succession issue and to the continuation (albeit moderate, at this stage) of the struggle over the succession, whose roots extend back to the previously mentioned conflict of 1983–1984, when Asad suffered a heart attack and his brother Rif‘at tried unsuccessfully to exploit his brother’s convalescence to promote his own chances to be heir. ₄₁   Furthermore, it seems that high-ranking ‘Alawi officers felt threatened by Asad’s effort to revitalize the top ranks, as well as by his desire to promote his son, who is both young (in his thirties) and inexperienced. Asad’s response to this dissatisfaction was typified by the arrest of ‘Ali Haydar (the former commander of the Special Forces and one of the props of the Syrian regime) in July 1994, after he spoke against Asad. ₄₂

Although in 1998 the regime seems to have contained the crisis, it is clear that its stability and the appearance of cohesion that it has projected for many years have been eroded. Moreover, there are doubts as to whether members of the sect would be able to maintain cohesion once Asad departs the scene and a struggle over the succession ensues (e.g., between his son Bashshar; his brother Rif‘at, who returned from exile in 1992 and is now in Syria; and other ‘Alawi officers). A brothers’ war, or perhaps one between Asad’s family and other families and tribes, might lead to the disintegration of the regime and, subsequently, to the end of ‘Alawi dominance. ₄₃

 

Conclusion

In the late 1930s, the ‘Alawis decided to throw in their lot with that of Syria. The attractions of such a move, such as the prospects of social and economic mobility for ‘Alawi youth, were irresistible for several reasons: the nonfeasibility at the time of the separatist option due to the lack of Western sponsorship, the absence of a common ideology and an economic infrastructure to support an independent ‘Alawi entity, and the debilitating infighting among rival circles.

The ‘Alawis did well in the path they chose for themselves. They succeeded in becoming a vital part of the Syrian state, ultimately mastering it and contributing in return the blessing of a stable central government. Under Asad, the ‘Alawis managed to consolidate a coalition of forces that represent wide sectors of Syrian society, among them other minorities, rural Sunnis, and some parts of the Sunni urban elite. These forces support the regime because it is worthwhile for them to do so or because they have no better alternative. As a result, Syria has been able to develop from its unsteady and feeble origins into a regional power.

In view of the aforementioned, one may ask whether the rise to power of the ‘Alawis in Syria heralded a new era in sect-state relations and intersectarian relations in Syria. This, indeed, seems to be the case, as Syria, since the 1970s, appears to have undergone a novel experience in which minority sects endeavored to integrate into the state (or the state manages to impose its control over the various sects) and cooperated among themselves within the framework of the state, if only on a provisional basis.

Thus, the possibility that the ‘Alawis would once more embrace, willingly or otherwise, the separatist option, seems remote and purely speculative. However, as has already been demonstrated here, the integration of the sects into the state did not abolish the sectarian frameworks or the sectarian identity and affiliation of Syrian citizens; nor did it do away with the psychological and other barriers standing between the sects. It would thus seem that the fortunes of the ‘Alawi sect in Syria since this country gained its independence constitute a separate and independent chapter in the history of this sect, but by no means the concluding one. Indeed, the ‘Alawi road to integration with the Syrian state was littered with the resentments created by friction with other communities. Moreover, changes in the ‘Alawi community and region make the separatist option workable if the desire or need for it were to arise. Moreover, as previously noted, ‘Alawi communal loyalty remains as strong as ever. When Patrick Seale interviewed the mayor of Qardaha about ‘Alawi identity during his research for his biography of Asad, the mayor was quick to wave the flag of Arab nationalism: “We have neither tribes nor families, for we are all members of the Ba‘th family under the direction of Hafiz al-Asad.” When Seale pressed him on the point, however, the mayor confessed to his city’s links to Kalbiyya, Asad’s tribe and the leading ‘Alawi tribe, which constitutes the basic and perhaps strongest affiliation for ‘Alawis. ₄₄

From this it follows that the process of ‘Alawi integration with Syria and the rise to hegemony produced the potential for its own collapse. Indeed, certain indications and even outright threats issued by Sunnis about the fate awaiting the ‘Alawis if the Sunnis depose them—threats that were partly realized during the revolt of the Muslim Brotherhood—prompted ‘Alawi counterthreats that, in such an event, the ‘Alawis would secede from Syria and withdraw to the ‘Alawi region where they constitute the majority, and which they have turned into a formidable economic and political base during their rule of Syria. ₄₅

Moreover, despite the stability of the Syrian regime, there have recently been signs that may attest to a danger to its cohesiveness in the event of Asad’s departure and to a possible eruption of a struggle over the succession. In such a case, the shackles binding the coalition led by Asad may disintegrate. Sunni sectors, such as the rural Sunnis and Sunni businessmen, who now support the regime (and implicitly ‘Alawi hegemony in Syria), regarding it as the key to stability in the country, might change their mind. This could lead to the deterioration of the ‘Alawi regime or encourage opposition groups that have so far been submerged. As in the past, Sunni pressure against the ‘Alawis might induce ‘Alawi counterpressure. It may be reasonable to assume that all sides would wish to avoid escalation, but in time of crisis, such as the scenario described previously, all boundaries might be crossed.

It would therefore seem that although the ‘Alawis have crossed the Rubicon in merging with Syria, they left some bridges intact. If, for one reason or another, the ‘Alawis lose their position of supremacy in Syria, or if separatist aspirations reassert themselves, the ‘Alawis will have come full circle, completing a long journey that brought them out of their isolation in the ‘Alawi district into the thick of Syrian affairs, only to lead them back again. One cannot predict what Syria would be like were this to occur, but it is safe to assume that it would be profoundly different than it is at present, under the ‘Alawis.

 

Endnotes

Note 1: For the full text of the petition, see Matti Moosa, Extremist Shi‘ites: The Ghulat Sects (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 287–288.  Back.

Note 2: ‘Ali Sulayman was appointed in 1926 by the French Mandate authorities to the committee for drafting a constitution for the ‘Alawi state. See Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), p. 20. It should be noted that according to some sources, Asad is of the Matawira tribe and not the Kalbiyya. See Moshe Ma‘oz, Asad—The Sphinx of Damascus (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988), pp. 33–34. See also Bassam Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation State in the Modern Middle East,” in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 138–140.  Back.

Note 3: For more on the ‘Alawi community, see Mahmud A. Faksh, “The Alawi Community of Syria: A New Dominant Political Force,” Middle Eastern Studies 20, no. 2 (April 1984), pp. 133–135; Peter Gubser, “Minorities in Power—The Alawites of Syria,” in R. D. McLaurin (eds.), Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 17–48; Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria,” Middle Eastern Studies 25, no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 429–450.  Back.

Note 4: Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the ‘Alawis were known eponymously as Nusayris, after Muhammad bin al-Nusayr, who was among the founders of the ‘Alawi faith. It was only after the establishment of the French Mandate that the Nusayris began to call themselves and be referred to by others as “‘Alawis,” although this appellation was already used by Shi‘i Muslims to denote the followers of ‘Ali. See Moosa, Extremist Shi‘ites, pp. 255–256.  Back.

Note 5: Moosa, Extremist Shi‘ites, p. 414; Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and the Shi‘ism,” in Martin Kramer (eds.), Shi‘ism: Resistance and Revolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), p. 238.  Back.

Note 6: Gubser, “Minorities in Power,” pp. 22–23, 26.  Back.

Note 7: In this context, see Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 59–61; Faksh, “The Alawi Community,” pp. 136–138.  Back.

Note 8: For French policy toward the ‘Alawis, see Itamar Rabinovich, “The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–45,” Journal of Contemporary History 14, no. 4 (October 1979), pp. 693–712.  Back.

Note 9: For more, see Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 99–102; Moosa, Extremist Shi‘ites, pp. 282–284; and Pipes, “The ‘Alawi Capture of Power,” p. 438.  Back.

Note 10: The case of Sulayman al-Murshid (1900–1946) is a conspicuous instance of this type of collaboration with the French; al-Murshid established and led a social-religious movement to promote ‘Alawi separatism. Al-Murshid became an ardent advocate of an independent ‘Alawi state under French auspices. After the ‘Alawi district was annexed to Syria, al-Murshid succeeded in being elected to the Syrian Parliament in 1943 but was hanged in 1946 by the central government in Damascus on charges of subversion. After his death, his son Mujib took up his cause, inciting a failed uprising against the central government in 1952. The Murshidiyya movement exists to this day as a religious sect and perhaps as a sociopolitical association as well, focused on Murshid’s sons, Saji and Mujib. See Gitta Yaffe, “Suleiman al-Murshid: Beginning of the Alawi Leader,” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 4 (October 1993), pp. 624–640; Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 478, 524–525; Moosa, Extremist Shi‘ites, p. 418.  Back.

Note 11: See Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 485–493.  Back.

Note 12: Gubser, “Minorities in Power,” p. 19.  Back.

Note 13: See Seale, Asad, pp. 27–30. On the question of Alexandretta, see also Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp. 494–514; Robert B. Satloff, “Prelude to Conflict: Communal Independence in the Sanjak of Alexandretta, 1920–38,” Middle Eastern Studies 22, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 147–180; Yosef Olmert, “Britain, Turkey and the Levant Question During the Second World War,” Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 4 (October 1987), pp. 437–452.  Back.

Note 14: Bassam Tibi goes even further, claiming that the “national ideology of Arabism serves as a legitimizing formula in the tribal set-up in Syria.” Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous,” p. 142.  Back.

Note 15: Seale, Asad, pp. 11–13; Tishrin, 9 March 1988.  Back.

Note 16: See Michael van Dusen Hillegas, Intra- and Inter-Generational Conflict in the Syrian Army, Ph.D. dissertation, the Johns Hopkins University (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1991).  Back.

Note 17: For example, following the 22 April 1955 assassination of the army’s second in command, ‘Adnan al-Maliki, by an ‘Alawi sergeant and PPS member, Yusuf ‘Abd al-Karim, forces throughout the spectrum of Syrian politics united to eliminate that party. Salah Jadid, for instance, belonged to the Ba‘th Party, whereas his brother, Major Ghassan Jadid, was the senior representative of the PPS Party in the Syrian Army. Ghassan Jadid fled to Lebanon where he was murdered in 1957. For more see Gubser, “Minorities in Power,” p. 40; Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 183–184, 268–273.  Back.

Note 18: See Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba‘th 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis (Jerusalem: Israeli University Press, 1972).  Back.

Note 19: Le Monde (Paris), 24 August 1993; Gubser, “Minorities in Power,” p. 41. See also Seale, Asad, pp. 183–184.  Back.

Note 20: Al-Muharrir, 30 March 1992; al-Majalla, 20 March 1994. See also Eyal Zisser, “The Renewed Struggle over the Succession,” The World Today 50, no. 7 (July 1994), pp. 136–139.  Back.

Note 21: See Seale, Asad, pp. 428–430; Eyal Zisser, “The Succession Struggle in Damascus,” Middle East Quarterly 2, no. 3 (September 1995), pp. 57–64; see also Alain Chouet, “Alawi Tribal Space Tested by Power: Disintegration by Politics,” Maghreb-Machrek, no. 147 (January–March 1995), pp. 93–119—Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Middle East and North Africa, Daily Report (DR), 3 October 1995, pp. 13–14.  Back.

Note 22: Al-Muharrir, 26 September 1994; Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 38–53.  Back.

Note 23: Tishrin, 30 June 1992; see also Eyal Zisser, “Syria,” Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), vol. 16 (1992), pp. 727–728.  Back.

Note 24: Nikolas van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Religion and Tribalism in Politics, 1961–1978 (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp. 71–82.  Back.

Note 25: For more on Syria’s political leadership, see al-Watan al-‘Arabi, 26 August 1988; al-Sharq al Awsat, 18 January 1993.  Back.

Note 26: Raymond Hinnebusch, “State and Civil Society in Syria,” Middle East Journal 47, no. 2 (spring 1993), pp. 243–257.  Back.

Note 27: Al-Hayat (London), 25 August, 3 September; Tishrin, 24, 25 August 1994. See also Eyal Zisser, “Syria,” MECS, vol. 15 (1990), pp. 654–655.  Back.

Note 28: See Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba‘thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990).  Back.

Note 29: See Seale, Asad, pp. 492–495, 441–460.  Back.

Note 30: Interviews with Syrian academics, Paris, 20 August 1989; Geneva, 24 April 1995.  Back.

Note 31: For more on this, see Umar F. Abdallah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1982), pp. 42–47; Thomas Mayer, “The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961–1982,” Orient 24, no. 4 (December 1983), pp. 588–609.  Back.

Note 32: Kramer, Shi‘ism, pp. 250–252. Additionally, see Yair Hirshfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba‘thist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” in Avner Yaniv, Moshe Ma‘oz, and Avi Kuver (eds.), Syria and Israeli Security (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Ma‘arachot Press, 1991), pp. 187–198.  Back.

Note 33: Seale, Asad, pp. 421–440; Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 8–21. See as well, Eli Fridman, The Muslim Brothers and Their Struggle with the Regime of Hafiz al-Asad, 1976–1982 (in Hebrew), Master’s Thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1989, p. 57; Samuel J. Pickering, “Pedagogia Deserta: Memoirs of a Fulbright Year in Syria,” American Scholar 50, no. 2 (spring 1981), pp. 179–196.  Back.

Note 34: See al-Hayat, 28 September 1994; interview with Syrian academics, Paris, 24 March 1995.  Back.

Note 35: Middle East Economic Digest 38, no. 20, pp. 2–3; The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile—Syria 93–94 (London, 1993). See also Faksh, “The ‘Alawi Community,” p. 140.  Back.

Note 36: Seale, Asad, p. 427.  Back.

Note 37: Ibid., pp. 423–425.  Back.

Note 38: Chouet, “Alawi Tribal Space,” p. 14.  Back.

Note 39: Al-Wasat (London), 10 May 1995.  Back.

Note 40: Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 7 March 1994; al-Dustur, 12 September 1994. See also Zisser, “The Renewed Struggle over the Succession”; “The Succession Struggle in Damascus.”  Back.

Note 41: Seale, Asad, pp. 421–440.  Back.

Note 42: Al-Muharrir, 9 September 1994; Yedi‘ot Aharonot, 25 November 1994.  Back.

Note 43: See Zisser, “The Succession Struggle in Damascus,” pp. 63–64.  Back.

Note 44: Seale, Asad, p. 9. For more on the interrelationship between the ‘Alawis and the Syrian state, see Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous,” in Khoury and Kostiner, pp. 125–152.  Back.

Note 45: Interviews with Syrian academics, Paris, 20 August 1989, Oxford, 25 February 1990.   Back.