

# Declaration of Common Objectives

*The declaration below was endorsed by the CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century and released on June 19, 2002.*

We have established this Commission because of our concerns that current trends on both sides of the Atlantic may jeopardize the community of interests between the United States and the states of Europe. The end of the Cold War has created many new realities, but the central thrust of our relations has remained fundamentally unchanged. With the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) as the two critical institutions of its core, the transatlantic relationship defines a widening community of interests that rests on levels of economic interaction and on degrees of political and security cooperation that are now even more important.

While acknowledging the core strengths of the transatlantic relationship, we are concerned that increasing differences in U.S. and European policies and capabilities could have serious consequences for future relations. We are releasing this declaration to affirm a shared commitment to reversing these trends and containing these differences. We fear that failure to do so might leave both sides of the Atlantic increasingly isolated from each other and less able to attend appropriately to the security needs we share.

Admittedly, such concerns are longstanding, but that cannot be ground for complacency. Our economic intimacy, political commonalities, and security ties create mutual dependencies that need to be nurtured. Indeed, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, as well as their dangerous aftermath of complex military campaigns and political crises, confirm that we need to act. We no longer possess the luxury of time between the recognition of a security problem and the launching of an appropriate response that can effectively counter or even preempt it. In short, we need a true transatlantic partnership, and we need it now.

Our current and past responsibilities make us especially sensitive to the urgent need to sustain our defense cooperation as a key dimension of the transatlantic partnership to which we all continue to aspire. Defense technologies and investment initiatives that are pursued separately are creating conditions that encourage separate and even incompatible results. Reducing the formal and informal barriers that interfere with the ability of U.S. and European defense and aerospace companies to work together could go a long way toward renewing our partnership. Unless progress on this front is achieved quickly, a Fortress Europe/Fortress America men-

tality could exacerbate our differences and limit our ability to counter common threats.

We recognize that many of the current national regulations governing defense trade and cooperation are rooted in government policies designed to meet legitimate security objectives. We support these objectives, but we also believe that some of these restrictions are the residue of the Cold War, made obsolete and counterproductive by the internationalization of industrial operations and the commercialization of defense components. We firmly believe that the vision of a global transatlantic defense market, characterized by a less restrictive flow of goods and services within it and by effective common safeguards against unauthorized transfers to third parties, should guide our action.

We are convinced that any unilateral approach would be unrealistic and unwise, and that the twin hallmarks of any successful efforts to pursue this vision are cooperation and reciprocity. There must be cooperation among defense companies and governments on both sides of the Atlantic so that obsolete or ineffective procedures are removed, effective safeguards are put in place, regulations are implemented efficiently and updated regularly, and new scientific and engineering talent is identified and employed productively. There must also be real reciprocity, fostered by a “level playing field” with equivalent access to one another’s markets, the abandonment of “national champion” industrial policies by governments, and an end to legal requirements and cultural norms that amount to “Buy American” or “Buy European” practices.

We met in Paris, France, on April 2, 2002, to begin a six-month process aimed at defining, later in the year, concrete proposals that will permit governments and industry to reassess past assumptions and take steps to reverse the current drift in transatlantic relations. We look forward to working cooperatively with governments and industry on both sides of the Atlantic to develop and implement ideas that can make our goals a reality.

Unlike other sectors of the Euro-Atlantic economies, the transatlantic defense sector is unable to respond to the pressures of the marketplace and shareholders for more integration. Therefore, our common objective is to help reverse this anomaly and build the cooperative future we know we need if we are to continue to survive and prosper.