Dialogues in Arab Politics: Preface

Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order

Michael N. Barnett

Fall 1998

Preface

Albert Hourani, the distinguished historian of the Middle East, once observed that any book on twentieth-century Arab politics must “express a dialectic of unity and variety.” Local interests and geopolitical imperatives pull Arab-speaking peoples apart, while the persistence of inherited traits, historic memories, and the attempt to address certain shared problems of identity bring them closer together. ₁ Hourani was not alone among historians of Arab politics to note how the tension between transnational bonds and territorial divides has produced a rich mixture of conflict and cooperation among Arab states. For many observers, inter-Arab politics can be defined by the search for integration among Arab states and peoples, inspired by the belief that they are members of the Arab nation, only to be undermined by the existence of latent mistrust and manifested conflict. Such antagonisms, however, never fully extinguish the promise of integration, for the Arab states almost always return to solidarity after such conflict. Inter-Arab politics exhibits an inescapable rhythm of conflict and cooperation, itself a product of the dialectic of unity nurtured by the existence of transnational bonds and of the variety generated by rivalries that are part and parcel of territorial possessiveness and personal jealousies.

Scholars of international relations have another way of characterizing inter-Arab politics. Quintessentially realist. Perhaps with good reason. Arab politics has seen more than its share of wars, conflicts, and unfriendly acts. The region boasts of a number of strategically skilled and savvy leaders who are noted for their acumen at exploiting the political environment and regional ideology in order to pursue their goals of state power. Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Hafiz al-Asad of Syria. King Hussein of Jordan. These and other Arab leaders have a well-earned reputation for their survival skills, derived in part from an appreciation of the international and regional forces and the direction in which the wind is blowing, and the flexibility to adjust their policies accordingly. Because security dominates all other concerns, given the prominence and persistence of inter-Arab conflict, transnational loyalties and “unity” slogans do not have any appreciable effect on interstate patterns.

Realism’s view that Arabist sentiments fold in the face of anarchy contrasts decidedly with Hourani’s insistence that Arabism animates the very texture of inter-Arab politics. A consequence of these obverse starting points is that observations of the region and explanations for those observations sometimes are startlingly different. Where Hourani finds an inescapable rhythm to the region that is generated by a dialectic of diversity and unity, realists note cycles of power whose origins reside in anarchy and the self-help behavior that it generates. Where Hourani implies that inter-Arab conflict derives in part from Arabism, realists respond that such conflict is a predictable manifestation of anarchy and power politics. Where Hourani and other seasoned observers of the region imply that what makes Arab politics Arab is Arabism, realist-inspired interpretations usually dismiss the claims that Arabism is causally consequential and that Arab politics has a social or cultural foundation, and instead advance the explanatory power of anarchy and the distribution of power. These substantial differences have led to divergent conversations and, at the extreme, to mutual dismissal: those concerned with theory tend to treat closely observed historical narratives as interesting but ultimately idiographic, and students of the region frequently indict theoretically generated interpretations as offering some important insights but ultimately contorting history. Any effort to narrow these differences must recognize that Arab politics has a social foundation that is culturally distinctive yet theoretically recognizable. This is my starting point. The claim is that doing so can generate an historically intuitive and theoretically inspired account of inter-Arab politics. My reinterpretation of the history of inter-Arab politics aspires to approach that lofty goal.

I view Arab politics as a series of dialogues between Arab states regarding the desired regional order–the ongoing debate by Arab states about the norms of Arab politics and the relationship of those norms to their Arab identities. Since the beginning of the Arab states system, Arab states and societies have been negotiating the norms of Arabism. Can Arab states conclude strategic alliances with the West? Are they expected to work for unification? Is it permissible for them to negotiate or have relations with Israel? Arab states have addressed and debated what the norms of Arabism should be as they have responded to the important events of the day, and as they have done so they have asserted that certain norms are expected or proscribed because of their shared Arab identity. By organizing Arab politics according to the debates about the desired regional order, I am offering a decided alternative to how we typically tend to think about Arab politics–or international relations, for that matter.

Arab states have had strikingly different views of the desired norms. Although such differences might be attributed to principled beliefs, the more prominent reason was regime interests, beginning with but not exhausted by survival and domestic stability. As a consequence, over the years Arab leaders have vied to draw a line between the regimes’ interests, the norms of Arabism, and the events of the day. They attempted to do so through symbolic technologies. A defining feature of these moments of normative contestation was that Arab states competed through symbolic means to control the foreign policies of their rivals and determine the norms of Arabism. Nasser’s ability to define the agenda and to rally the people in the streets in Damascus and Amman in his favor came not from the barrel of a gun but from his ability to deftly deploy the symbols of Arabism. Although students of international relations will probably receive this observation warily because of their tendency to assume that military and economic instruments define the technologies of influence, scholars of the region will quickly recognize this feature of Arab politics. And once the norm of Arabism was stabilized, few Arab leaders possessed the brazenness or recklessness required to defy them. Indeed, the rivalry and sometimes vicious name calling that marked the period of normative contestation usually yielded, however awkwardly, to speeches of solidarity and a general coordination of their policies. The conflicts between Arab governments have concerned the norms of Arabism and not the balance of power; their weapons of influence and control have derived from the symbols of Arabism; and they have impressively demonstrated their solidarity over the years because of their desire for social approval, which comes from being associated with the Arab consensus. To recognize these fundamental features of Arab politics requires an appreciation of the power of Arabism and its capacity to invite both conflict and cooperation among Arab governments, which possess a keen sense of self-preservation.

But Arab politics is not what it used to be. The unity that was defined by the presence of Arabism appears increasingly elusive, and the diversity defined by acreting statism appears increasingly prominent. The post–Gulf War debate in Arab politics about whether some version of “Middle Easternism” is supplanting “Arabism” exemplifies how Arab states are orienting themselves in new directions and identifying new interests that are enabled by the decline of Arab nationalism. Although scholars are in general agreement that a revolution in the organization of the Arab states system has occurred, the debate about its causes is considerable. I argue that how Arab states conducted themselves during these dialogues goes a long way toward explaining the map of the Arab world today. This is a world of their own making and unmaking. Of course, major transformations in regional systems are a product of many different forces and factors, including wars and, most important here, changes in state-society relations. But, surprisingly, inter-Arab interactions have not been given their due.

This book examines the ongoing debates about the desired regional order, how Arab states repaired or revised the norms of Arabism through symbolic exchanges, and how the legacy of those exchanges is the fragmentation that currently defines the Arab states system. I begin the exploration of these themes in 1920 with the establishment of the mandate system and continue through today. Rather than treat the history of the Arab states system as one uninterrupted story, however, I identify five periods defined by different conversations about the desired regional order: from 1920 to the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945; from 1945 through the debate about the Baghdad Pact in 1955; from the 1956 Suez War through the 1967 Arab–Israeli War; from the 1967 war through the 1990 Gulf War; and the post–Gulf War period. The content of these dialogues has changed considerably over time, which suggests nothing less than a change in the underlying structure of Arab politics; by tracing these dialogues since 1920, we can follow the dynamics that have defined, shaped, and transformed the Arab states system.

This narrative is informed by sociological theory and contributes to the growing constructivist scholarship on international politics. Arab politics is generally viewed as realist terrain. But the prominence of identity politics, certainly familiar to even the most casual observer of the region, demands that we move beyond realism to consider other approaches that better recognize the fundamentally social character of global politics. The challenge, however, is to acknowledge this social character without forgetting that actors are frequently strategic and manipulative. Indeed, they could not be strategic and manipulative if there were no social foundations and normative expectations to exploit and use for ulterior purposes. I draw from a reservoir of sociological theorizing, most prominently from the work of Erving Goffman, to explore this relationship between the normative and the strategic as it pertains to the debate about the desired regional order in Arab politics. In this fundamental way, international orders are an ongoing accomplishment and subject to continuing negotiations, which are defined by the strategic and symbolic interactions that are the factory of new environments. Structure through process.

This book goes beyond simply redescribing what scholars of Arab politics already know. Many excellent treatments of Arab politics are available, and I rely heavily on them. But resituating the “facts” of Arab history in an alternative narrative generates a different way of understanding these facts and of providing a systematic way of thinking about Arab politics. This narrative invites us to pull back from the details of the events and reflect on the more enduring processes that have defined how Arab states have conducted their relations, to consider how they have debated and revised the norms of Arabism. It therefore allows us to untangle the meaning of Arabism, to recognize its conceptual elasticity and the social and political forces that are responsible for its changed meaning. We also become more attentive to the ways in which the current climate in Arab politics is a product of the Arab states’ own handiwork; if statism now overshadows Arabism, this is largely because of how Arab states conducted themselves during the heyday of Arabism. These concerns and claims are enduring controversies in Arab historiography, and the focus on inter-Arab interactions and the debate about the desired regional order, I claim, address each of them. The dialectic of unity and diversity that is widely noted by seasoned observers of the region requires a greater understanding of how that rhythm is generated through the strategic and symbolic interactions among Arab leaders that occur within a social context defined by Arabism–and how those interactions did not necessarily return Arab states to the starting point of unity but rather helped to redefine the meaning of unity and, ultimately, generated a path toward greater diversity.

This book also contributes to the emerging dialogue between international relations theory and the study of the Middle East. Scholars of the region write accounts that look idiographic to theorists of international politics, and theorists of international politics frequently compress the history of the region to the point that it looks exotic to scholars of the region. But it need not be that way. By drawing on international relations theory and by listening carefully to the politics of the region, I am attempting to craft an account of inter-Arab politics that is both theoretically informed and historically intuitive. Although scholars of international relations have been somewhat late to recognize that international relations transpire within a social environment, the idea that relations between states are affected by transnational norms is no surprise to students of the Middle East. Although scholars of the Middle East sometimes suggest that theirs is a region that is unique, international relations theory can help us recognize what is distinctive and what is generalizable. International relations theory can learn much from the politics of the Middle East, and Middle Eastern politics can be fruitfully informed by international relations theory.

I have accumulated many debts during the last few years and imposed myself on many colleagues; a real pleasure is being able to acknowledge their assistance and guidance. Alex Wendt and Emanuel Adler have read more versions of some chapters than either I or they probably want to recall. Greg Gause was a patient and generous reader and friend. Marc Lynch, Malik Mufti, and Bruce Maddy–Weitzman read the manuscript in its entirety and offered important correctives to my interpretation of Middle Eastern politics. Marty Finnemore, Andrew Grossman, Roger Haydon, Steve Heydemann, Ron Jepperson, Peter Katzenstein, Baghat Korany, Keith Krause, Jack Levy, Yagil Levy, Joel Migdal, Craig Murphy, Charles Tilly, and Marco Verweij read various portions of the manuscript. Gehad Auda, Laurie Brand, Bud Duvall, Dana Eyre, Ellis Goldberg, Robert McCalla, Avraham Sela, Ellie Podeh, and Mark Tessler offered advice and suggestions along the way. Kate Wittenberg expertly shepherded the manuscript through the various states of the process. Polly Kummel had the unenviable task of copyediting my prose and rose to the challenge.

I delivered portions of this argument in various places over the years: conferences sponsored by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) at Brown University, the University of Minnesota, and Stanford University, as well as at other events at Rutgers University, the University of Washington, the University of North Carolina, Cairo University, Ain Shams University, and the Al-Ahram Press Institute. I have benefited from the criticisms and comments that I received in various corridors, forums, and e-mails.

The book was partially supported by the MacArthur Foundation–SSRC’s International Peace and Security Fellowship. This unique program provided research support and the opportunity to read widely in other disciplines. I spent a year at the New School for Social Research, where Charles Tilly graciously hosted my stay and patiently answered my many questions about sociological theory. The SSRC Fellows’ conferences provided another venue in which I was challenged by others from outside my discipline; I thank those who listened to my presentations in the bars and at the formal panels. I also want to thank the research assistance of Michael Malley in Madison, Wisconsin, Avi Muallan and Dina Cohen in Tel Aviv, and Ashshraf Rady in Cairo.

I immensely enjoyed my abbreviated time in the field because of the good friends who hosted my stay and pointed a khawaga in the right direction. In Tel Aviv the Dayan Center for Middle East Studies provided both tremendous resources and infinite hospitality. In Amman I was taken care of by several friends, including Khalid Mufti. In Cairo Jocelyn Dejong and Tariq Tall generously opened their home to me; I received a home away from home and a trenchant critic in Tariq. At each locale I knocked on the door of many policy makers and scholars. I learned much from them, and I thank them for submitting themselves to my interviews and many questions. I dedicate this book to Victoria. She has offered support, relief, humor, and comfort in various places, through various phases, and in various ways. The joy of her conversation and her many qualities deserve a better return. But this is the book I wrote, and with all its flaws it is Victoria’s.

Endotes

Note 1: Albert Hourani, “How Should We Write the History of the Middle East?” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 1 (February 1991): 133. Back.