Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order

Michael N. Barnett

Columbia University Press

Fall 1998

7. The End of the Arab States System?

 

Arab Politics Since the Gulf War

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S.-led campaign to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty set off a chain reaction of fragmentation in the Arab world. From the moment Iraqi troops rolled into Kuwait on August 2, 1990, government officials and commentators spoke gravely about the future Arab states system. No sooner did the war officially end on March 1, 1990, than those same voices talked about the need for, but unlikelihood of, Arab reconciliation. Arab reconciliation was a polite way of describing what was unrelenting fragmentation, a splintering of the Arab family. Some Arab governments argued that the end of the cold war and the Gulf War demanded a tightening of the ranks; unfortunately, the leader of this camp, Iraq, had just invaded Kuwait. After the war the conversation was dominated by pleas to alter their conduct, free themselves of sentimentality, and base their policies on “realism.” The retreat to the state was unmistakable.

Their post–Gulf War policies paralleled such talk. Arabism had encouraged Arab leaders to coordinate and harmonize their policies, sometimes against their better judgment and personal preferences, but now their collective acknowledgment of Arabism’s dysfunctional qualities led to a wholesale contemplation of new policies based on “interests” and realism. Although none denied the ideal of Arab unity or surrendered its membership in the Arab League, Arab states began contemplating alliances that were once taboo, to imagine the construction of regional organizations that might supersede the Arab League, and even to reconsider the boundaries of the region. The Gulf War had unleashed a tidal wave of inquiry concerning what remained of Arabism.

That Arabism rather than Kuwait was the longer-term casualty of the Iraqi invasion is testimony to Arabism’s already frail condition, the result of years of inter-Arab squabbles. As Arab leaders and commentators singled out the cause of their present condition, they directed their attention to a legacy of hostility seemingly sponsored and permitted by Arabism. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait was only the ultimate and most heinous of such actions occurring between Arab states. Consider Hosni Mubarak’s explanation of why the Arab states were delayed in congregating to discuss their response to the Iraqi invasion:

Our problem in the Arab nation is that if you express your opinion, and this opinion is different from someone else’s, you are considered an enemy. In other words, if someone expresses an opinion that is different from mine, we become enemies. There are different opinions throughout the world. But the principle of difference of opinion is not a basis for enmity. Brother, I tell you my opinion, and you tell me yours. I tell you: Beware, you are an Arab state. Your affairs are of interest to me. I care that your country should not be overthrown. I care about your country’s standard of living. I care about peace in the area. When I express my opinion, this should not provide a basis for you to say that Egypt is hostile. 1

Mubarak’s statement can be read as a sweeping indictment of Arab politics over the decades and a microcosm of the processes that led to the decline of Arabism. In many respects the Gulf War was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. Regardless of whether the Gulf War is best considered a cause or a pretext for existing attitudes, the war represented the most recent and most shocking violence done in the name of Arab solidarity. Because Arabism seemingly brokered only hostility and suspicions, Arab officials began to publicly confess their exhaustion from its demands and its unfulfilled promises. According to one Jordanian official, because of Iraq’s invasion “even Jordan feels liberated. There are no external forces that can dictate to us what we can and should do.” ₂

All this suggests the end of the Arab states system. By “Arab politics” I have meant the existence of certain core issues—the Arab-Israeli conflict, autonomy from the West, and unity among Arab states—that are expressive of the Arab political identity, that help to define the Arab state’s interests and the legitimate means to pursue those interests. A dominant concern of the 1990s has been the need for Arab reconciliation, the possibility and timing of Israel’s integration into the region, and even the possibility of closing the Arab League. To be sure, Israel’s place in the region remains in dispute pending a final treaty with the Palestinians, but the retreat on these “Arab” issues as they directly pertain to inter-Arab action has been impressive, calling into question the organization—indeed, the existence—of Arab politics. This conversation was produced by the insult of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the indifference that marked the 1980s, and decades of an Arabism whose most memorable contributions were injury and rivalry.

 

The Gulf War

The history of the Gulf War has been chronicled exhaustively, and I need to discuss only some basic features. ₃ Catching a second wind after the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War, beginning in 1990 Saddam Hussein engaged in a series of highly aggressive actions that caused considerable alarm inside and outside the region. He hinted at using nuclear weapons against Israel and proclaimed at a February 23 meeting of the Arab Cooperation Council that the Arab states—with Iraq at its helm—should take a more aggressive posture in global politics. U.S. distraction by the fallout from the end of the cold war was providing an opening, he surmised. Saddam Hussein attempted to rally Arab states around him by stating that Arab power would promote (his version of) regional peace and by issuing thinly veiled threats against Israel. ₄ At the all-Arab summit in Baghdad that year Saddam Hussein warned his audience that the end of the cold war was bad news for the Arabs. Israel was growing in strength because of Soviet Jewish immigration to the West Bank, and its patron, the United States, was more powerful than ever. Indeed, the United States no longer had to work through Israel to control the region, for the retirement of the Soviet Union from the Middle East meant that the United States was free to impose a regional hegemony. Some might rejoice at the end of the cold war, cautioned the Iraqi leader, but its demise spells bad times for the Arabs.

Much speculation concerned the motives behind these inflammatory statements and policies so soon after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and while Saddam Hussein was in the midst of postwar reconstruction. Most explanations centered on Saddam Hussein’s need to consolidate his power at home and on his bid for leadership in the Arab world. But the twins drives of consolidation and leadership were founded on a more basic desire to arrest Iraq’s economic crisis. Iraq had accumulated substantial debts during the Iran-Iraq War, and a major economic imperative was to increase the capital available for postwar reconstruction. Saddam Hussein identified two options, increasing revenue from oil exports and persuading Iraq’s largest lenders to extend debt forgiveness. Both options would require cooperation from the neighboring Gulf states, which helped set the quotas on oil production and owned a fair percentage of Iraq’s outstanding debts. The Gulf states were hesitant to oblige Iraq on either course of action, and Iraq soon focused its grievances and allegations against Kuwait, which it accused of not appreciating that Iraq had incurred its war debt in defense of all Arabs in general and Kuwait in particular, of siphoning oil from the al-Rumaylah field that bridged their two countries, and of attempting to wage a war against Iraq through economic means. Soon Iraq and Kuwait were engulfed in a minor crisis. ₅

The Iraq-Kuwait confrontation escalated throughout July 1990, with various Arab leaders attempting to determine the price of a peaceful conclusion. ₆ A flurry of Arab mediation and a highly controversial discussion between the United States and Iraq concerning what the United States was prepared to do if Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait had little demonstrable effect. Iraqi forces overran Kuwait on August 2. Al-Ahram’s headline, “The Arabs’ Blackest Day,” reflected the prevailing reaction in the Arab world. ₇ The international community also was outraged by this unprecedented bid to swallow another sovereign state whole, an act made doubly outrageous in the prevailing opinion that the post–cold war order would be kinder and gentler. The U.N. Security Council quickly convened during the next few days and adopted a series of resolutions (660, 661, and 662) roundly condemning the invasion, demanding an immediate retreat, imposing economic sanctions, and hinting of more robust measures if Saddam Hussein did not heed the Security Council’s warning.

The Arab states were not nearly as quick to respond. Although they issued individual statements condemning the invasion and urging Saddam Hussein to reverse course, the Arab states did not immediately convene an emergency summit to issue a collectively determined response. ₈ Their failure to do so was something of an embarrassment, making them look dazed and confused, as they were well aware that the rest of the world was waiting for the Arab states to act boldly and collectively. ₉ Explaining why the Arabs still had not convened to discuss the crisis a full week after the invasion, Mubarak observed on August 8 that “no one wanted an expanded Arab summit, because the Arabs, by nature, prefer to talk in small groups. At Arab summits, we trade accusations and curses without reaching any results. Therefore, we find that we do not want to meet at Arab summits.” Later he added: “The UN Security Council beat us to a decision, as though we were not Arab and the Arabs were a motionless corpse who could not move, speak up, or react to an invasion of a state by another Arab state. They must have said that we were scared. The worst accusations were levelled at us, and you must have heard them.” ₁₀ The invasion brought not only a crisis within the family but also unleashed anxieties among many Arab states as they imagined themselves as “others” saw them. ₁₁

During these first days many Arab states insisted that the crisis be kept “in the family” and that they be allowed to find an “Arab solution.” Most proposals offered by Arab states were designed to enable Iraq to save face, which meant winning some key concessions from Kuwait in exchange for a complete or partial retreat. The urgency with which they insisted on an Arab solution revealed a widespread fear among Arab states that the internationalization of the conflict, that is, involvement by the West, would make a solution that much more complicated and elusive—and increase the damage already done to Arab politics. The Iraqi invasion, in this reading, was not simply a border dispute between two sovereign states but an unprecedented act by one Arab state against another. An often-heard view was that the invasion endangered all Arab institutions and groupings, with the possibility that Arab politics would suffer a greater setback than it had from the 1967 war. ₁₂ To involve the West would only compound an already devastating situation; it was bad enough that an Arab state had invaded another. It would be far worse if Western intervention became part of the equation.

After considerable delay and much (somewhat) quiet diplomacy, the Arab states held their much anticipated emergency meeting in Cairo on August 9. Although the summit ostensibly was designed to create an environment that might encourage Iraq to soften its hardening position, few predicted that it would be a success. The outbreak of a food fight between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti delegations, appropriately started by Iraq, only symbolized the unlikelihood of resolving the crisis. ₁₃ By most accounts the formal proceedings were only slightly more constructive. The inter-Arab divisions became clearer and went on the record when the summit put to a vote a series of resolutions that condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded an unconditional withdrawal. ₁₄

Twelve Arab states voted for the resolution. Although the reasons for doing so were many—including economic and strategic considerations, a fear that Iraq might become too militarily and economically powerful, and in Mubarak’s case a sense of personal outrage that Saddam Hussein had lied to the Egyptian leader about Iraqi intentions—nearly all justified their vote on the basis of the present and future of the Arab regional order. A sense of foreboding—concern that if the Arab states could not settle the conflict among themselves, Arab politics would be radically and permanently altered—permeated the proceedings. Mubarak captured such sentiments at a news conference at the opening of the summit when he stressed the various principles and norms that were at stake and shattered by Iraq’s invasion. These included the need to preserve a concept of pan-Arab security, which had been part of recent summit discussions at Rabat and Baghdad and was premised on sovereignty, noninterference, and the pledge to settle disputes without force. ₁₅ At stake, in short, were the rules of the game of Arab politics. If Iraq’s invasion was permitted to stand, Arab politics would have a dim future indeed.

Those who opposed the resolution also made clear that theirs was a principled stand informed by Arabism. Algeria and Yemen abstained, Jordan, the PLO, Sudan, and Mauritania expressed reservations, and Tunisia did not attend the summit. Although none publicly embraced the Iraqi invasion per se, all were widely interpreted as giving comfort to Iraq because they consistently clamored for an Arab solution at all costs and refused to be associated with a Western intervention under any circumstances. ₁₆ But behind these pan-Arab considerations were ulterior motives. The PLO’s (mis)calculation that its road to statehood might go through Baghdad was one it would later regret. King Hussein, though opposing the invasion, justified his defiance of the growing international show of support for Kuwait by saying that the problem should, and would most easily, be settled by Arab states. There is little doubt, however, that domestic considerations propelled the king’s stance. With Palestinians a majority of his population and an economy dependent on trade with Iraq, King Hussein calculated that he had more to fear by angering Jordanian society than he did by defying the growing international coalition against Iraq. ₁₇

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria formed the eventual backbone of the Arab coalition aligned against Saddam Hussein and provided the bulk of the Arab forces in the U.S.-led coalition. ₁₈ They might have contributed their troops to the cause for their individual “vital interests.” ₁₉ But they were potentially vulnerable to the charge of collaborating with the West against another Arab and Muslim state. Saddam Hussein attempted to exploit that vulnerability by drawing upon a reservoir of resentments against the West and the economic divisions in the Arab world to attempt to mobilize the Arab streets on his side and thus destabilize his Arab opponents from within. ₂₀ Specifically, he portrayed the Western buildup against Iraq as a modern-day San Remo and called for the liberation of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina from a Western-allied Saudi Arabia. In doing so he linked his actions to long-standing popular causes and grievances against the West, portrayed other Arab leaders as allies with the West against fundamental Arab and Islamic interests, and was able to play into anxieties concerning foreign control of the Arab world that had been heightened by the end of the cold war and the perception of unbridled U.S. power. ₂₁ Arab leaders took seriously his threat to destabilize them from within through symbolic means; they tightened security, discouraged public demonstrations, and unleashed their spokesmen to justify their actions as consistent with an Arabism that Saddam Hussein had defamed. Egyptian leaders attempted to defend their actions and defuse Saddam Hussein’s destructive plea that the Arabs set fire to their leaders, and even Syrian officials spelled out why the Israeli occupation and the Iraqi invasion were not comparable events. ₂₂

The crisis continued through the fall and came to a dramatic conclusion with a series of high-level meetings between the United States and Iraq in Geneva in early January. When these meetings produced their predicted failure, the United States carried out its threat to start the military phase of the war. On January 16 the American-led coalition unleashed a relentless and devastating air campaign against Iraq, which continued for the next several weeks. The ground campaign began on February 24 and ended one hundred hours later on February 28. Kuwait’s sovereignty was successfully restored amid much celebration in Kuwait City and elsewhere. Operation Desert Storm was a military success.

But there was comparably little public cheering throughout the Arab world. ₂₃ The affair had been emotional and heart-wrenching for Arabs on both sides of the coalition. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait represented an unprecedented breach in Arab politics. And the decision by many Arab states to align with the West in a war against fraternal Iraq was, for many, equally blasphemous. These impious acts committed in the name of Arabism created a series of immeasurable divisions in Arab politics. So great was the damage, according to many, that all thoughts of repair should be summarily dismissed for the time being. Boilerplate statements regarding the need for “Arab reconciliation” were eclipsed by a flurry of commentaries that described in unusually candid and hostile terms the fissures and fragmentation in Arab politics. King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, for instance, portrayed a huge rift in the Arab world, one that was created by the willingness of many Arab actors to implicitly or explicitly condone Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait for economic reasons. ₂₄ On the other side of the aisle were cries that the decision by the Arab states to join the coalition against Iraq was a conspiratorial act that gave the West the opportunity to impose a hegemony over the region. Although disagreement about who was to blame for these events was considerable, agreement was widespread that these events had created fragmentation.

Arab nationalism was already in a highly weakened state before the war, and the Gulf War only hastened its demise. As Jordanian journalist Fahd al-Fanek put it, “The Gulf War was Arabism’s bullet of mercy.” ₂₅ Shaykh Zayid of the United Arab Emirates observed that “the Arab nation’s split and fragmentation existed before the Gulf War, but this war has aggravated and deepened this split.” ₂₆ In the recent past Arab leaders had portrayed Arab unity as around the corner and usually left Arab summit meetings declaring their solidarity. The Iraqi invasion, however, provided them with an opportunity to come clean, to declare that Arabism had been sickly before the invasion and may have been dealt a mortal blow by the war. As if to punctuate their divisions and unwillingness to go through canned performances and rituals, the Arab states refused to hold a perfunctory Arab summit after the Gulf War. All calls for an all-Arab gathering were quickly dismissed. The first sign that Arab states might be ready for some sort of reconciliation did not come until late December 1995 when Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt convened a “tripartite” summit. The purpose of the summit, according to the Arab League’s secretary-general, was to go back to the drawing board to discuss “higher Arab interests,” “a unified position on the peace challenge,” and “regional cooperation and its limits.” ₂₇ Such agendas scarcely resembled those of old.

The weakened state of Arabism, coupled with the Gulf War, inaugurated a new chapter in the debate about the Arab order, one unlike any other. Rather than Arab unity, Arab leaders now publicly wondered whether and when “Arab reconciliation” might occur. Instead of a turn to Arabism, Arab leaders now urged the dismissal of policies based on “emotion” and “sentiment” in favor of policies founded on “realism.” ₂₈ These publicized perceptions of fragmentation alongside the demand for realism are testimonials to the decline in Arabism and the rise of interests that no longer flowed from a shared identity. Ideally, I would offer survey research, public opinion polls, and other sorts of attitudinal measures to ascertain the declining weight of Arabism. However, such measures do not exist. But indirect evidence of the decline of Arabism is suggested by the reorganization of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the contemplation of Israel’s integration into the region, new security arrangements and alliances, the reconsideration of the boundaries of the region as exemplified by the controversial concept of “Middle Easternism,” and the debate about the future of the League of Arab States and the region’s other organizations. These developments spell not only the further fragmentation of Arab politics but also the potential demise of the Arab states system.

 

The Reorganization of Arab–Israeli Politics

Most expectations were that the Arab-Israeli conflict would receive renewed attention after the Gulf War, and such predictions came to pass. During the war Saddam Hussein had justified the invasion as a step in his grand plan to focus world attention on Palestine. Although few in the international coalition supported this attempted linkage, U.S. President George Bush tried to placate and strengthen his Arab allies by asserting that he would use the diplomatic capital generated by the Gulf War to obtain progress on the Arab-Israeli front, and the U.S. State Department posited that the conditions for a breakthrough were now ripe. ₂₉ Bush successfully followed through on his pledge. Using various carrots and sticks, he pushed and prodded Israel and the Arab states to gather in Madrid in late October 1991 to reconsider their present and future relations. But some Arab states did not have to be prodded. According to former Jordanian ambassador Adnan Abu Odeh, many Arabs jumped at the chance to come to Madrid and rid themselves of their pan-Arab commitments. ₃₀ Others were less enthusiastic; Syria and Israel were present reluctantly and made their reluctance known in their opening speeches. But they were there. Israel was especially piqued by the composition of the Palestinian delegation, blessed by the PLO and comprised of many members who hailed from Greater Jerusalem. But the PLO-sanctioned delegation was at an international conference with Israel, and the Israeli delegation was forced to listen to its grievances and proposals. For Palestinian leader Faysal al-Husaini this was Madrid’s true accomplishment. ₃₁

The Madrid talks represented a major turning point in the organization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Before Madrid the Arab states, with the exception of Egypt, had adhered to the norm that Arab states should move in lockstep and collectively and avoid any bilateral discussions outside a comprehensive peace. Madrid, however, marked a subtle but important departure from this modus operandi. Although still insisting on coordinating their ranks and rejecting the idea of establishing relations with Israel before signing a comprehensive agreement, the post-Madrid talks continued in two different institutional forums. The first were bilateral talks between Israel and the frontline states. The second were multilateral talks regarding development, refugees, security, water, and the environment. ₃₂ Many Arab states insisted that the “fruits” of the multilateral talks should be denied until after progress on the bilateral front, but most Arab states participated, however halfheartedly, and they made some progress on technical and environmental matters. ₃₃ Although it was easy to dismiss these talks because of their failure to produce any tangible breakthrough, their very existence was taken by the participants as breakthrough enough. The Arab-Israeli conflict was being transformed from an ideological contest into an interstate conflict, and this transformation was altering its very organization.

The absence of a genuine breakthrough on the Palestinian-Israeli front, however, was a brake on the bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the Arab states and Israel. Many core Arab states were quite angered by Yasir Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, and in the immediate postwar period they were signaling that they had tired of his shenanigans, were willing to punish him for his actions, and were more open than ever to a radical transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But they were unwilling to move toward Israel in a public or far-reaching manner until there was movement in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations because the Arab states feared being charged with defecting from the Arab consensus and weakening the PLO’s bargaining position.

That breakthrough was unlikely so long as Yitzhak Shamir remained the Israeli prime minister. The June 1992 Israeli elections, however, rejected Shamir, a hawk who championed the idea of “Greater Israel,” in favor of Yitzhak Rabin, who campaigned on the idea of security within constricted borders. Soon thereafter Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, in which both parties formally recognized each other’s existence and established the parameters for continued negotiations and the settlement of the conflict. The very existence of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, once completely unthinkable, served further notice of the fundamental reorganization of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The changes that were taking place in Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab relations also reflected a decline in the Arab states’ perception of the Israeli threat. This decline was spurred by several developments, though none more important than the radical change in Israeli foreign policy that occurred with the 1992 election of Rabin as prime minister and the subsequent push by Foreign Minister Peres to jumpstart the peace process. Arab states now began to downgrade their perception of the Israeli threat. This change had the additional effect of reinforcing the fragmentation of Arab politics. At a 1994 Arab League meeting, the foreign ministers noted that, although Israel had been the Arab nation’s staunchest enemy for fifty years, from now on each country would identify its own enemy. ₃₄ For years Arab states had proceeded on the assumption that their shared Arab identity generated a common definition of what threatened their interests; the decision to allow each country to determine its own enemy was a nod to the belief that statist and geopolitical interests were now central to each Arab state’s definition of that threat. According to Egyptian foreign ministry official Nabil Fahmy, the decline of the Israeli threat gave the Arab states less reason to hang together: “It makes sense that we are now going more our own way now that the Israeli threat is gone. The Arab-Israeli conflict brought together Arabs into political institutions,” but because the conflict has been transformed it is only natural that Arab states should move in different directions. ₃₅ Theoretically speaking, identity (self) is defined in relationship to a relevant “other,” and that other is frequently viewed as a threat. ₃₆ Accordingly, a self-identified group will tend to construct organizations to mobilize group action against a shared threat. The converse is also likely. In this instance the decline of Arabism altered how Arab states organized themselves to confront Israel, and the perceived decline of the Israeli threat in turn relaxed the impulse for coordination and cooperation. From such developments came a reorganization of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Now that there were productive Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and a decline in the perception of the Israeli threat, Arab officials felt freer to contemplate diplomatic, commercial and economic relations with Israel. Beginning before but becoming a dominant theme after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Arab world debated Israel’s “normalization,” that is, the pace and extent of its integration into the region. Israel and the Arab states began to explore issues of common interests, achieved progress in the multilateral talks, and held an economic summit in Casablanca in October 1994 (with annual conferences each year thereafter). ₃₇ The boycott by Arab states of companies that do business with Israel began to crumble in late 1994. Israeli officials were now routinely meeting with leaders from Oman, Qatar, Morocco, and Tunisia. That Arab states have a collective investment in the peace process and Israel’s eventual normalization was demonstrated time and again, most dramatically at the “Peacemakers Conference” in Sharm al-Sheikh in March 1996 after the wave of terrorist attacks in Israel. Even Syria, which routinely insisted that it carried the flame of Arab nationalism, no longer made a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty conditional on a Palestinian state. ₃₈ In general, Arab states began to intimate that their individual interests were dependent on a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and began to move in ways that encouraged that resolution and to consider how collaboration and cooperation with Israel might be to their mutual benefit. That Arab states might begin to move in this direction, however, was enabled by the decline of Arabism.

The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of October 26, 1994, was the extreme illustration of this new climate, the elevation of state over Arab national interests, and the related willingness to consider relations with Israel now that the PLO was doing the same. As King Hussein defended the treaty, he made gestures toward Arabism but also aggressively asserted Jordan’s interests. “It is meaningless and unjustified to say that Jordan should stand by idly until all the issues are resolved, after which Jordan can address its own issues,” King Hussein commented. “Had this happened, no one would have cared about Jordan’s state of affairs. . . . Having regained our rights, our objective is now to build Jordan, enable its sons to lead a decent life.” ₃₉ Hussein was clearly separating Jordanian from Arab interests. The treaty underscored that state officials felt less beholden to traditional Arab stands and less susceptible to symbolic sanctions of old.

But the debate about the treaty in Jordan also communicated to all who cared to listen that establishing relations with Israel was not uncontroversial. Many Jordanians resented and objected to the treaty: this was a “Hashemite peace,” representing the interests of the palace and not the people; the king had gone too far, too fast, and should have waited for a final settlement to the Palestinian conflict; a peace treaty was acceptable, but relations were an entirely different matter; and many Islamic organizations protested any ties whatsoever with Israel. ₄₀ Such opposition did not deter the palace, as it proceeded to conclude a series of agreements with Israel that included cooperation in commerce and tourism, contemplated unification of the airports and the electrical grids of the towns of Eilat and Aqaba, and even considered the servicing and upgrading of Jordanian F-16s by Israel Aircraft Industries. ₄₁

The reaction to the treaty suggests that although Arab heads of state are willing to contemplate relations with Israel on the ground that it furthers the state’s interests, their societies are not always of the same opinion. Developments in Jordan are not unique. Nabil Fahmy said that a major reason that Egypt remains attentive to the Palestinian issue is that it affects Egyptian domestic politics. Because of the “communications revolution” what transpires in Palestine has an immediate effect on Egyptian society. Therefore, he continued, “for us to have a calm constituency in Egypt, we need peace for Egypt—not for pan-Arabism. Peace is in Egypt’s national interest.” ₄₂ Even when Arab officials discuss their Palestine policy, they explicitly link its transnational character, its influence on domestic politics, and its subsequent impact on their foreign policy.

That Palestine remains a powerful symbol of Arabism limits what is permissible and expected of Arab states. No Arab leader mimicked King Hussein’s complete embrace of Israel; Arab leaders preferred to keep their relations and contacts low key, and even then they frequently came under criticism from other Arab states for giving Israel the “fruits of peace before the facts of peace.” Such concerns informed the debate about the “rush” to normalization. ₄₃ Most Arab states cautioned against premature relations with Israel before peace was an accomplished fact; in a famous exchange Egyptian foreign minister Amr Musa accused King Hussein of “scurrying” to the Israelis.

One stated reason Arab states insisted on a united position was to better the Palestinians’ bargaining position. But many Arab states also worried that their own negotiating position was being undermined by these individual moves toward Israel. ₄₄ Arab states had always held out “recognition” as the ultimate prize that Israel would gain; it was a potent bargaining chip available to Arab states. But if Arab states were “scurrying” to conclude relations, the value of that chip was being reduced. Lebanese prime minister Rafia al-Hariri, for instance, said that the race for normalization was coming at Lebanon’s expense. ₄₅ Syria’s demand that the Arab states decelerate the pace of normalization owed to its fear that its bargaining position was being weakened. ₄₆ Opponents of the economic summits in Casablanca in October 1994 and in Amman in October 1995 raised similar objections. ₄₇ In this respect Arab states were engaged in a strategy reminiscent of the Arab states’ treaty negotiations with the Western powers in the pre-1955 period: they were attempting to use the symbols of Arabism to control the foreign policies of other Arab states in order to increase their own bargaining leverage.

The continuing strength of Arabism in unifying the Arab ranks on Palestine was particularly noticeable in the aftermath of the election of Binyamin Netanyahu as the prime minister of Israel in late May 1996. Netanyahu campaigned on his opposition to Oslo and the negotiations with Syria, and his victory catalyzed the Arab states to convene their first summit since the Gulf War in June 1996 in Cairo. The Arab states had previously tried to organize a summit for a variety of reasons, most notably to formulate the Arab response to Israel’s bombing of Lebanon in 1992 and again in early 1996, but these developments could not force them into the same room. However, the possibility that the new Israeli government might derail the peace process—a process in which they had an individual and collective investment—caused the Arab states to convene a summit and to pass a series of resolutions that expressed their collective resolve to monitor the peace process closely and to make any normalization of relations dependent on Israel’s adhering to the spirit and the letter of the Oslo accords. This development was significant in a number of respects: it was the first collective statement by the Arab governments on the peace process; even Arab states—namely, Jordan, which was not necessarily enamored with having its Israel policy held hostage to collective Arab policies—hardly wanted to be portrayed as defecting from the Arab consensus; and however much Arab states might have come to accept Israel’s presence in the region, a strong suspicion lingers, and it can unify the Arab ranks.

The events since Netanyahu’s election provide vivid testimony to the dependence of Arab-Israeli cooperation on progress in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and the lack of progress in the latter to put a chill in Arab-Israeli relations and encourage Arab states to meet on a regular basis to try to coordinate their Israel policy. The violent clashes between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1996, and the controversy involving the Israeli government’s planned expansion of settlements surrounding Jerusalem at Har Homah, the failure of the Israeli government to keep to the timetable for the redeployment of Israeli troops on the West Bank—these and other events have not only further paralyzed the peace process but also frozen Israel-Arab cooperation and helped to unify the Arab ranks.

In general, the reorganization of the Arab-Israeli conflict reflected a shift from Arabism to realism, from an ideological to an interstate struggle. The Israeli-PLO negotiations continued to set the pace—few Arab states were willing to conclude a far-reaching agreement without progress on the Palestinian front, and many Arab societies remained cool to the idea of close relations with Israel in any event. But the tenor of the debate had shifted radically in a brief period: whereas only a few years earlier Arab states had debated how they should confront Israel, now the question was the pace and pulse of Israel’s integration into the region. As one editorial lamented, “The paradox of the negotiations between the Arabs and Israel are more acceptable—and maybe successful—than the Arabs’ negotiations with one another. And the enmity with Israel has begun to drop to low levels, compared with inter-Arab hostilities. The negotiations with it over the demarcation of its border are much easier than negotiations among Gulf states, on that grounds that Israel is more acceptable.” ₄₈ Arab states seemed to have an easier time sitting down with Israel than they did with each other, reflecting a dramatic decline in Arabism and the rise of statism.

 

The Changing Security Order

These changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict parallel a change that has occurred in inter-Arab security relations since 1990. There are two critical features here, both of which reflect the declining salience of Arabism and the explicit articulation that Arab states view each other as security threats: the first is the candid coupling of security and sovereignty; the second is the demise of pan-Arab security concepts and the emergence of new security alliances and ties that once were viewed as violating the norms of Arabism. ₄₉

The Arab states’ security discussions and preferred security arrangements are emblematic of the emphasis they place on sovereignty. As soon as Iraq was dislodged from Kuwait, Arab states turned to the issue of what security arrangements they should establish to discourage a repetition of this bloody encounter and foster regional security. At the forefront of many discussions was the need to reaffirm that sovereignty underpins the Arab order. The weight of pre–Gulf War opinion favored sovereignty as the basis of regional order, and the Gulf War only intensified such sentiments. During the Gulf War this took the form of the defense of Kuwaiti sovereignty and the refusal to intervene in Iraq during the war lest such an action lead to Iraq’s dismemberment (among several reasons). After the Gulf War the importance of sovereignty imprinted the Damascus Declaration, the first post–Gulf War security agreement. Under the declaration, announced in March 1991 as a pan-Arab security arrangement, the Gulf states, Syria, and Egypt pledged further strategic and military cooperation, with an understanding that Syria and Egypt would be well compensated for their military commitments and troops. ₅₀ Despite the surface rhetoric of the desirability of pan-Arab security and the ongoing conferences and meetings, the declaration has had little operational value. ₅₁ But the intended value of the declaration, according to Abdullah Bishara, former secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), was its recognition of the legitimacy of the Arab states’ borders, the right of each state to arrange its own security, and each state’s exclusive claim to its resources—that is, its sovereignty and exclusivity. ₅₂ Coming on the heels of Iraq’s denial of Kuwaiti sovereignty and the claim that Gulf oil belonged to all Arabs, the GCC states held sovereignty and security as indistinguishable and insisted on institutionalizing sovereignty as the basis of inter-Arab relations. An impressive number of statements during and after the Gulf War centered on the necessity of sovereignty as the basis of the Arab order.

The fate of the Damascus Declaration highlighted the collapse of the concept of Arab national security. Since the establishment of the Arab Collective Security Pact in 1950, Arab states had paid homage to the concept of Arab national security, and it served as a focal point for discussions. Although the concept and its institutionalized expressions had little operational value, the pact did guide many security discussions of the pre-1990 period. The Gulf War all but silenced such talk. For some the Gulf War was such a shock that the concept collapsed. For others, according to former Jordanian ambassador Abu Odeh, the Gulf War provided a convenient pretext for burying a concept that they had long ago considered more debilitating than useful. ₅₃ Whether the Gulf War was cause or pretext, little sustained attempt has been made to resuscitate the concept of pan-Arab security arrangements.

In lieu of pan-Arab possibilities Arab states now began to contemplate alternative regional arrangements, many of which broke some long-standing taboos. Consider the activities of the GCC states. Eschewing notions of cooperative security that were supposedly the foundation of the GCC, and quickly discarding the Damascus Declaration, which was the sole vestige of any notion of Arab security, the Gulf states quickly demonstrated that they had greater faith in the United States and the West than they did in each other. They provided the United States with access for military bases and concluded stockpiling and over-the-horizon agreements. ₅₄ Simply put, whereas once the Gulf states had kept their association with the United States subterranean (if they acknowledged it at all) and did so because they anticipated domestic political repercussions from an alliance with the West, now they were more openly embracing such an arrangement. Arab leaders who once avoided any alliance with the West for fear of inciting instability no longer had the same fears. ₅₅ This outcome nearly reversed the independent security stance that the Gulf states carefully cultivated after their independence beginning in the 1960s and resembled the Western protectorate that dominated much of the area’s pre-independence history.

In general, any notions of Arab collective security lay in ruins after the Gulf War as Arab states began emphasizing individual over Arab security and began demonstrating a strong preference for bilateral security pacts with Western states. ₅₆ The apparent consensus was that Arabism had long outlived its usefulness, that the region should sober up and embrace sovereignty, and that Arab states should be allowed, within reason, to consort with whom they wanted. ₅₇ Normative fragmentation and the declining political salience of the Arab national identity produced a change in regional security patterns. Except for the all-but-defunct Damascus Declaration, concerted attempts to rekindle anything resembling an all-Arab security arrangement were few. ₅₈

 

The Future Arab Order

The decline of Arabism imprinted not only the region’s security arrangements but also the debate about the very boundaries of the region, what if anything remains of an Arab order, and Israel’s place in the region. Such discussions, in short, implicate the more fundamental issue: what remains of the Arab states system? In recent years numerous conferences, newspapers, and articles in the Arab world have considered this theme. ₅₉ A conference at Cairo’s Al-Ahram Center in late 1994 was dedicated to the necessity of Arab reconciliation and maintaining some semblance of an Arab order. The Lebanese-based journal Al-Mustqbal al-Arabi [The Arab Future] has been consumed with the general issue of what remains of the Arab order, and does an “Arab” state exist? What is the social purpose of the Arab state? Do Arab states have distinct interests? And if not, is it defensible to talk about an Arab national identity that has political consequences?

The highly charged discussion over the concept of “Middle Easternism” is a useful vehicle for entering into this debate. The term became current after the Madrid talks of 1991 and largely originated with Egyptian intellectuals and policymakers. Middle Easternism is best understood as embodying a number of tenets. It begins with an implicit and sometimes explicit belief that pan-Arabism’s promise was misspent or misapplied, and in either case pan-Arabism is an inappropriate guide for reconstructing the post–Gulf War order. Instead, the future order should be founded on a realistic understanding of state interests. After all, the problem with past pan-Arab arrangements was that they looked great on paper but diverged from what Arab states were prepared to contribute or implement; the Arab League and other institutional expressions of Arab nationalism were founded on sentiment and emotions and not on interests.

These state interests, however, concern a desire not only for sovereignty but also for economic, environmental, and security cooperation designed to enhance the peace and prosperity for each Arab state. According to Nabil Fahmy, Egypt’s foreign policy must begin with a recognition of its interests, which are primarily economic: “We have to think about region building . . . where our economic interests reside. . . . As we build these institutions we must recognize that we are building them on our interests. Too often we have built them without the solid political foundations, and then these institutions came to naught.” Fahmy emphasized the language of interests and juxtaposed the new Middle Eastern order, founded on interests and thus capable of having practical consequences, with the Arab order, which was based on identity and generated little more than some modest political coordination. ₆₀ In many respects Fahmy’s view is reminiscent of the Egypt-first discourse that defined Egyptian foreign policy before 1948 and since Sadat; in other respects his view is less unique to Egypt and more representative of contemporary political discourse and practice in the Arab world.

But these interests are not necessarily exclusive to Arab states. In fact, because non-Arab states might share these basic interests, and because the ability of Arab states to further their interests might depend on reaching agreement and cooperating with these non-Arab states, the future regional order should embrace Arab and non-Arab states, including Turkey, Iran, and, most controversially, Israel. Those who champion Middle Easternism are at the forefront of suggesting various ways in which Israel might become integrated into the region’s future security, economic, and political institutions. Such proposals are based on a reading of the state’s interests and the understanding that individual self-interest is premised on collective action among the region’s states, not just Arab states. Lotfi el-Khuli, a well-known Egyptian journalist and author of the best-selling and highly controversial book Arabiyya, Aywa. Wa al-Sharq al-Awsat, Kathaleka [Arab, Yes—And Middle Eastern, Too], observed:

There are two schools of thought in the Arab world. The first is Middle Easternism. The view here is that this is an American-Israeli project to try and conquer the region and is against pan-Arabism. Consequently, these people want to see a rebuilt Arab order, to build on the Arab economic market passed at the 1964 [Arab] summit and to confront Israeli hegemony. They are against the peace process and see Israeli imperialism. They have been educated to see Israel as the “other” which is why the peace with Israel is such a shock. . . . The second view sees no contradiction between a rebuilt Arab order and a new Middle East. 61

Khuli stressed how a Middle Eastern system that includes Israel still permits pan-Arab arrangements that are expressive of an Arab identity,

Those who champion Middle Easternism continue to foresee a role for all-Arab organizations and institutions, but their emphasis on Middle Eastern arrangements on issues of central importance leaves them open to the criticism that they are attempting to bury Arabism. According to Nassaf Hitti, an adviser to the secretary-general of the Arab League, Middle Easternism is viewed as an alternative to, if not a denial of, pan-Arabism. ₆₂ In this respect those who oppose Middle Easternism accuse its proponents of attempting to extinguish the Arab identity and of opening the door to Israeli domination; at stake is “whether Israel will be merely a Jewish Quarter in an Arab city or will become like the British East India Company, which ruled the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent.” ₆₃ Syrian information minister Muhammad Salman pledged Syria’s resistance to all efforts to “replace Arabism in the region with Middle Easternism,” which is attempting to reduce the Arab identity and replace it with an Israeli hegemony. ₆₄ Opponents of Middle Easternism are tapping into long-standing fears of the West and Israel.

Part of the controversy surrounding the concept of Middle Easternism stems from its close association with former Israel prime minister Peres’s concept of the “New Middle East.” ₆₅ Peres offered his grand plans for the Middle East based on his reading of contemporary European politics. Not only does he hope that the Middle East’s future will duplicate Europe’s past—where modest experiments in cooperation snowballed into greater interdependence and institution building—but his vision is premised on erasing the cognitive boundaries between Israel and the Arab states, resulting in a Middle East that no longer distinguishes national, religious, and ethnic identities, where borders are open for commercial transactions and exchanges of peoples, and transnational relations provide the underpinnings for peace and prosperity.

Peres’s concept unleashed two principal fears among many Arabs. The first is of Israeli hegemony. Not all trusted Peres’s vision of the future Middle East or believe that it is attainable or even desirable. Many feared that Peres’s vision of peace, prosperity, and equality is nothing more than a cover for Israeli control of the region and, by association, U.S. control. Such fears were particularly noticeable when considering Israel’s future economic relationships. When Peres spoke the language of interdependence, many Arabs heard a future of dependence. Such interpretations were reinforced by Peres’s highly publicized statements at the 1994 Casablanca economic summit that, in the future regional division of labor, Israel contributes the technology and know-how, while the Arab world offers vast markets, cheap labor, and ready capital. ₆₆ In this reading Israel is poised to become the regional core, whereas the Arab states will become the periphery. The underlying fear is that Israel stands to conquer through market power what it could not through military power. ₆₇ A second concern was that Peres’s concept of the New Middle East spelled the end of Arabism. In a series of interviews with former and current Jordanian officials in September 1995, a running theme on the issue of the New Middle East was that Israel was attempting to douse what little remained of the Arab identity. As one former top-ranking official put it, “Israel is now trying to rid Arabism from the Arab states.” ₆₈ To embrace the Middle East means to deny Arabism. If Arabism were alive and well, Peres’s proposals would have evoked laughter and outright dismissal; it is a testimony to the times that they were taken seriously and evoked such fears.

The debate about the boundaries of the region, the future regional order, and what remains of the Arab order have imprinted the discussion surrounding the future of the Arab League. ₆₉ The record of the Arab League is, to be charitable, disappointing. But these recent developments in regional politics, coupled with the league’s dismal history, led to an open debate concerning its future, if any. The commemoration of the Arab League’s fiftieth anniversary in March 1995 left many openly wondering whether and why the league should celebrate its centennial.

According to Ahmed Yousef Ahmed, director of the Institute of the Arab League, Arab states fall into three camps regarding the future of the Arab League. In one camp are those who envision the Arab League subsumed under a Middle Eastern order for all intents and purposes. King Hassan of Morocco and perhaps King Hussein, alongside some other Arab intellectuals, are in this camp. A second view is that the Arabs should adhere to pan-Arabism and reject the concept of Middle Easternism, which is little more than attempted Israeli hegemony. Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Lebanon are included here. The third view, represented by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the PLO, and Algeria, takes an intermediary position, desiring new Middle Eastern arrangements while retaining a semblance of Arabism. In Ahmed’s view, those in the second and third camps are using the Arab League as a tactical device; those in the second camp are attempting to defeat developments that they fear might hurt their foreign policy interests, and those in the third camp believe that the Arab League provides a useful device for increasing their individual bargaining position by maintaining a collective Arab posture.

Although those who support the league might do so for tactical reasons, there is little doubt that the league represents an identity-expressive function that few Arabs want to see disappear. Consider the outcry that greeted Peres’s suggestion that Israel become a member of the League of Arab States. In a well-publicized chance encounter between Peres and Arab League secretary-general Esmet Abdel-Meguid at the Casablanca economic summit in 1994, Peres asked Abdel-Meguid, “And when will we be joining the Arab League?” Somewhat surprised by the question, Abdel-Meguid retorted, “The day you decide to speak Arabic.” ₇₀ Undaunted, Peres continued to suggest that Israel be part of the Arab League; the nearly uniform Arab reaction was indignation and suggestions that Israel was only attempting to “humiliate” the Arabs. ₇₁ The Egyptian ambassador to Israel, Muhammed Bassouni, a supporter of normalization, came close to portraying the future Arab League as little more than a cultural parlor, with higher profile and more central issues handled through bilateral and multilateral channels, but he bristled at Peres’s suggestion that Israel be allowed to join the Arab League, characterizing the request as insulting and offensive. ₇₂ In general, those who oppose Middle Easternism and the New Middle East, and even many why support normalization, have rallied around the Arab League. As one league official put it, “Peres became the greatest friend of the Arab League.” ₇₃ For many the Arab League is a last-ditch defense of the Arab identity.

At present Arab states find themselves largely torn between identity and interests, reflected in the types of organizations and associations that are proposed and constructed. This has been a steady development since the early 1980s. The GCC, the Arab world’s first subregional organization, was founded in 1981, later joined by the Arab Maghrebi Union (AMU) and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC). The move toward subregional organizations reflected the growing salience of localized identities and interests relative to “pan” sentiments. After the Gulf War Arab states began to imagine and organize themselves into alternative and cross-cutting regional groupings that included Arab and non-Arab states; the multilateral talks, the plan for the Organization for Security and Cooperation of the Middle East, the Damascus Declaration, and the Barcelona talks of November 1995 that involved the Arab states of the Mediterranean and Europe; the possibility of a common market of Arab states and non-Arab states; and so on. The common denominator of these conferences, standing committees, and fledgling organizations is that they are based on states that share interests. But in this context to follow interests means to bracket identities and the long-standing demand for all-Arab associations, generating the fear that an Arab order is a thing of the past. The language of interests now rivals the language of identity in justifying and considering the post–Gulf War regional organizations.

The centrality of pan-Arab organizations for mobilizing the sentiments, actions, and interests of Arab states has steadily relaxed. In the beginning was the Arab League, the central location for expressing and organizing political action. But today the Arab League has many rivals, and its agenda has narrowed considerably. On the occasion of the league’s fiftieth anniversary Mubarak reviewed the history of the league and divided it according to four phases: in the 1940s and 1950s its goal was to “deepen our distinguished identity” and to “liquidate all forms of foreign control”; in the 1960s the goal was to strive for social justice and a unified Arab society; in the 1970s and 1980s the goal was liberation of the occupied lands, formulation of a common front on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and assertion of “control over our natural resources”; and since 1992 the goal has concerned the attempt to find justice in Palestine. ₇₄ Arabism, in this reading, has been steadily narrowed to the question of Palestine because the Arab state’s other, and more central, interests are now handled through other mechanisms and institutions.

The steady demise of pan-Arab organizations suggests a decline in the centrality of the Arab identity. “On the whole, men move most easily from those groups or systems where effective and affective commitment, and identification with common symbols which evoke and sustain commitment, is low.” ₇₅ A withering of a shared Arab identity is likely to produce a shift in the definition of the group, the attributes that are required to become a member of the region’s organizations, and the relationship between the region’s organization and the identities of its members. Whereas Arab states once handled many of their most important foreign policy issues in the confines of the Arab League and other all-Arab institutions, the decay of Arabism and the rise of statism have produced a decline in the centrality of the Arab League, consideration of new regional organizations that do not use identity as a criterion for membership, and a proliferation of organizations and institutions that are reflective of state interests and designed to overcome collective action problems and handle functional issues.

The contemporary debate about the regional order raises the possibility of the end of the Arab states system. What were once considered Arab interests—unity, fear of foreign control and the West, and the Arab-Israeli conflict—have receded from view. The debate about unity once pitted the advocates of unification against those who envisioned inter-Arab cooperation based on sovereignty. But this debate ended decades ago and was decisively decided in favor of the latter camp. And even now considerable concern exists that inter-Arab cooperation is not only elusive but also secondary, yielding to realism and statism.

Fear of the West and foreign control remain. In aftermath of the Gulf War and alongside America’s “unipolar moment” many asked whether the destruction of Iraq, the Arab world’s largest military and industrial power, was not part of a conspiracy to keep the Arab world weak and vulnerable to the West. The West remains a source of suspicion, not completely groundless given the long history of imperial tentacles, the ubiquitous power of the oil companies, and the West’s occasional attempt to overthrow Arab regimes. The West looms large in the Arab imagination as a source of threat, and developments since the collapse of the cold war and the Gulf War have not assuaged such fears. Such fears derive not only from Arabism but also from Islam, which tends to view the West as a corrupting influence when it is not actively attempting to undermine either Islamic regimes or Islamic movements. Although some variants of political Islam and Arabism envision the possibility of cooperation with the West, both are unified by a fear of the West. Such cultural artifacts notwithstanding, most Arab states have responded to the end of the cold war and the Gulf War by tightening their relations with the West rather than their own ranks.

Although the question of Palestine continues to reverberate throughout the region and to inspire inter-Arab coordination, the organization of the conflict has altered radically and permitted a growing if grudging acceptance of Israel’s place in the region. Indeed, Arab states appear to be more relaxed and interested in doing business with Israel than they are with each other. But within limits. The election of Netanyahu as Israeli prime minister and the stalled peace process vividly demonstrated that Palestine remains a concern that no Arab leader can ignore; thus it has tremendous mobilizing capacity. Whether because of a genuine concern for the plight of the Palestinians or because of the fear of symbolic sanctions, the Arab states have proceeded cautiously when considering relations with Israel on the ground that the “fruits of peace should not come before the facts of peace.”

The sweeping changes that have occurred in inter-Arab politics, the decline of the Arab political community, and the hardening of the Arab states have led to a diminished responsiveness to core Arab concerns. ₇₆ As Arab states imagine a regional order, it is virtually indistinguishable from what is broadly understood as the basic tenets of international society. Mubarak proposed the Charter of Arab Honor in 1995 and a new Arab order, which call for “rearranging pan-Arab objectives” largely founded on ridding the region of unconventional weapons, furthering economic cooperation, forwarding an Arab cultural renaissance, and achieving Arab reconciliation based on sovereignty. ₇₇ Mubarak is essentially asking Arab states to renew their vows to the original charter of the League of Arab States, because the Charter of Arab Honor, according to the Arab League secretary-general, was designed to “prevent the emergence of destructive differences in the future, to ensure that any dispute is contained in a way that does not allow the situation to explode as seen before, and to get all members of the Arab family to adopt a position that leads to settling the dispute and preventing its aggravation.” ₇₈ Inter-Arab politics more closely resembles the politics of other regions. None of this means the “end of Arabism” or denies the possibility that Arab societies might be mobilized to confront issues that flow from their collective identity, sense of the past and historical injustices, and vision of a shared future. ₇₉ The social processes and political interactions that were responsible for creating a tighter normative fabric and incentives for mutual orientation among Arab states could re-emerge. But for the moment and the foreseeable future Arabism no longer provides the rules of the game of regional politics.

 

Endotes

Note 1: Cairo Domestic Service, “Mubarak Gives News Conference 8 August,” August 8, 1990, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES)-90–153, August 10, 1990, p. 8. Back.

Note 2: Anonymous source, interview by author, Amman, Jordan, September 5, 1996. Back.

Note 3: For reviews of the Gulf War see Lawrence Freedman and Ephraim Karsh, The Gulf War, 1990–91 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Dilip Hiro, From Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War (New York: Routledge, 1992). Back.

Note 4: Iraq News Agency (hereafter INA), “Arab Power for Regional Peace,” Baghdad, June 3, 1990, cited in FBIS, June 5, 1990, p. 16. Back.

Note 5: See Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: Fontana, 1993), for a detailed account of this period and the emerging crisis in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations. Back.

Note 6: See Freedman and Karsh, Gulf War, for an excellent overview of the war. See Stanley Reshnon, ed., The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), for various statements on features of the crisis. Back.

Note 7: “The Arabs’ Blackest Day,” Al-Ahram, August 3, 1990, p. 1, cited in “Papers Regret Iraqi Invasion, Urge Swift Action,” FBIS-NES-90–150, August 3, 1990, p. 10. Back.

Note 8: On August 3 the Arab League Ministerial Council condemned the invasion, demanded Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal, and reminded all its members that the Arab League Charter is premised on sovereignty. Fourteen countries endorsed the resolution, whereas Yemen, Jordan, the PLO, Iraq, Sudan, and Mauritania abstained or voted against it. Middle East News Agency [hereafter MENA], August 3, 1990, cited in “MENA Carries Text,” FBIS-NES-90–151, August 10, 1990, p. 1. Back.

Note 9: See Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, for a detailed account of the confusion and tensions behind the summit meeting. Back.

Note 10: Cairo Domestic Service, “Mubarak Gives News Conference August 8,” August 8, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–153, August 10, 1990, p. 8, 9. Back.

Note 11: Also see Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, p. 281. Back.

Note 12: Ibrahim Nafi, “It Is Not with Soldiers’ Boots That We Determine the Future of Nations,” Al-Ahram, August 4, 1990, pp. 1, 5, cited in FBIS-NES-90–155, August 10, 1990, pp. 10–12. Also see MENA, “Statement by Qatari Cabinet,” August 8, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–154, August 9, 1990, p. 20; Cairo Domestic Service, “A Positive Arab Move Is Imperative,” August 4, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–151, August 6, 1990, p. 19. Back.

Note 13: MENA, “Closed Summit Discussions Held 11 August,” August 11, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–156, August 13, 1990, p. 8. Back.

Note 14: MENA, “MENA Reports Arab Summit Resolutions 10 August,” August 10, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–156, August 13, 1990, pp. 1–2. Back.

Note 15: Cairo Domestic Service, “Mubarak Opens Arab Summit, Gives Speech,” August 10, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–156, August 13, 1990, pp. 2–4. Back.

Note 16: Sanaa Voice of Palestine, “PLO Leadership Issues Statement on Gulf,” August 20, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–162, August 21, 1990, pp. 2–3. The majority of the conference participants agreed that Arab countries should not give a “blanket approval or act as an umbrella for foreign intervention in the region.” Ibrahim Nafi, “The Fruits of the Arab Summit,” Al-Ahram, August 12, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–156, August 13, 1990, p. 10. Back.

Note 17: Marc Lynch, Contested Identity and Security: The International Politics of Jordanian Identity (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming); Adam Garfinkle, “The Nine Lives of Hashemite Jordan,” in R. Satloff, ed., The Politics of Change in the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 99–100. Back.

Note 18: In Illusion of Triumph Heikal paints a Saudi Arabia that was quite fearful of allowing Western troops on its soil for fear of being stained by imperialism but equally hesitant to permit Arab troops on its soil for fear that the costs would prove tremendous. Back.

Note 19: Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 172; Shibley Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion and the Gulf War,” in Reshnon, Political Psychology of the Gulf War, pp. 183–97. Back.

Note 20: Freedman and Karsh, Gulf War, p. 69; Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, p. 8. See, for instance, Bahgdad Domestic Service, “Saddam Calls Arabs, Muslims to Save Mecca,” August 10, 1990, cited in FBIS-NES-90–156, August 13, 1990, pp. 45–46. One of the more stinging criticisms leveled at Saddam Hussein by other Arab leaders was that his invasion of Kuwait had set back the cause of Palestine—that it represented an unexpected gift to Israel and had divided and weakened the Arab world. Saddam Hussein responded to these charges with his notion of linkage, that is, exchanging his withdrawal for an Israeli withdrawal. Freedman and Karsh, Gulf War, p. 100. Back.

Note 21: Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion”; Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 13–15; Emile Nakleh, “Regime Stability and Change in the Gulf: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” in Satloff, Politics of Change in the Middle East, p. 119; James Piscatori, “Religion and Realpolitik: Islamic Responses to the Gulf War,” in J. Piscatori, ed., Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991), pp. 3–18. Controversy has been considerable over how to interpret the so-called Arab street and whether the reaction was in support of Saddam Hussein or whether he became a vehicle for expressing long-standing grievances against the oil-wealthy Kuwaitis, the Arab states, and the West. In the Illusions of Triumph, pp. 286–87, 304, Heikal convincingly argues how the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Western intervention were opposed by those “in the street,” but the latter raised greater anxieties and fears. Back.

Note 22: Cairo Domestic Service, August 11, 1990, cited in “Commentary Views Saddam Husayn Call for Jihad,” FBIS-NES-90–158, August 15, 1990, p. 10; Damascus Domestic Service, August 15, 1990, cited in “Commentary Compares Iraqi, Israeli Withdrawals,” FBIS-NES-90–158, August 15, 1990, p. 44. For a survey of the ideological contestation over the Gulf War see Eli Podeh, “In the Service of Power: The Ideological Struggle in the Arab world During the Gulf Crisis,” Conflict Quarterly (Fall 1994): 7–25. Back.

Note 23: Telhami, “Arab Public Opinion.” Back.

Note 24: King Fahd, interview by MBC Television, London, November 14, 1991, cited in FBIS-NES-91–223, November 19, 1991, p. 15. Back.

Note 25: Fahd al-Fanek, interview by author, Amman, September 1, 1995. Back.

Note 26: “President on Prospects for Arab Unity,” Al-Hayat, cited in FBIS-NES-84–054, March 21, 1994, p. 25. Back.

Note 27: “League Chief Expects Arab Summit ‘Next February,”’ Al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 1, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–002, January 4, 1995, pp. 7–8. Back.

Note 28: Also see Ibrahim Karawan, “Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s: Breaking Taboos and Searching for Signposts,” Middle East Journal 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 433–54; Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), chaps. 4 and 5; Bernard Lewis, “Rethinking the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 99–119. Back.

Note 29: William Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 396. Back.

Note 30: Adnan Abu Odeh, interview by author, Washington, D.C., April 2, 1996. Back.

Note 31: “Faysal al-Husaini on Significance of Madrid,” La Republica, Rome, p. 16, November 7, 1991, cited in FBIS-NES-91–219, November 13, 1991, p. 1. Many in the Arab world who opposed the Madrid talks largely viewed them as selling out the Palestinians. See, for instance, “Muslim Brotherhood Rejects ‘Sell-Out’ Talks,” Al-Shab, October 22, 1991, p. 9–10, cited in FBIS-NES-91–209, October 29, 1991, p. 23. Back.

Note 32: For various statements on the multilateral talks see Steven Spiegel and David Pervin, Arms Control and Regional Security, vol. 1, and The Environment, Water, Refugees, and Economic Cooperation and Development, vol. 2, of Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East (New York: Garland, 1995); Bruce Jentleson, “The Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security (ARCS) Talks: Progress, Problems, and Prospects,” Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Paper, no. 26, September 1996, University of California at San Diego. Back.

Note 33: Algiers Voice of Palestine, “Qaddumi on Arab Coordination for Madrid Talks,” October 31, 1991, cited in FBIS-NES-91–212, November 1, 1991, p. 37. Back.

Note 34: Oded Granot, “The Glue Is Beginning to Come Unstuck,” Ma’ariv, 28 (March 1994): 2; cited in FBIS-NES-94–062-A, 31 March 1994, p. 3. Back.

Note 35: Interview with author, Cairo, March 16, 1996. Also see Yahya Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992). Back.

Note 36: Jeffrey Alexander, “Citizen and Enemy as Symbolic Classification: On the Polarizing Discourse of Civil Society” in Michele Lamont and Marcel Fourier, eds., Cultivating Boundaries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 289; William Connolly, Identity/Difference (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 7. Back.

Note 37: Arab states also were beginning to contemplate the inclusion of Israel within a Middle East common market. See Agence France-Presse, “Impact of Israel on Middle East Common Market,” FBIS-NES-94–085, May 3, 1994, p. 37; “Monetary Fund Official on Cooperation With Israel,” FBIS-NES-94–031, February 12, 1994, p. 2; Sanaa Voice of Palestine, “Arab League Studies Middle East Market,” FBIS-NES-94–055, March 22, 1994, p. 3. Back.

Note 38: Syrian vice president Abd al-Halim Khaddam, interview by Syrian Radio, November 14, 1995, cited in “Khaddam on al-Asad, Peace Process, Amman Summit,” FBIS-NES-95–220, November 15, 1995, p. 61. For an expanded discussion of the change in Syria’s Israel policy see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1995), chaps. 10 and 11. Back.

Note 39: “Text of King Husayn Al-Ahram Interview,” Al-Dustur, Amman, February 19, 1995, p. 28, cited in FBIS-NES-95–034, February 21, 1995, p. 62. Back.

Note 40: Various interviews by author in Amman, August 30–September 10, 1995; “Opposition Figures, Parties Cited on Treaty,” Shihan, October 22–28, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES-94–206, October 27, 1994, p. 30; “Opponents of Peace Accord Escalate Verbal Attacks,” Jordan Times, October 26, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES-94–208, October 27, 1994, p. 32. Also see Lynch, Contested Identity and Security. Back.

Note 41: Interview of Crown Prince Hassan by Oded Granot, Maariv, October 27, 1995, p. 2, cited in FBIS-NES-95–211, November 1, 1995, pp. 70–71. Back.

Note 42: Fahmy interview. Back.

Note 43: See, for instance, Amos Elon, “The Thinking Men’s War,” New York Times Magazine, May 11, 1997, pp. 40–43. Back.

Note 44: Syrian Radio, “Calls for New Middle East, Normalization Criticized,” February 23, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–036, February 23, 1995, pp. 61–62. According to the secretary-general of the Arab League, a Middle Eastern market is possible only after “a comprehensive and just peace.” MENA, “Arab League Chief on Regional Issues,” April 14, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–073, April 17, 1995, p. 1. Back.

Note 45: Prime Minister Rafia al-Hariri, “Al-Hariri on ‘Race’ for Normalization with Israel,” Radio Free Lebanon, November 15, 1994, cited in Radio Free Lebanon, “Al-Hariri on ‘Race’ for Normalization with Israel,” FBIS-NES-94–220, November 15, 1994, p. 43. Also see “Arabs Cautioned Against Rush to Normalize,” Al-Quds al-Arabi, Jerusalem, December 29, 1994, p. 13, cited in FBIS-NES-95–002, January 4, 1995, p. 19. Back.

Note 46: Rose al-Yusuf, October 23, 1995, p. 10, cited in “Minister: No Regional Cooperation with Israel Before Peace,” FBIS-NES-95–207, October 26, 1995, p. 63. Back.

Note 47: Damascus Syrian Arab Republic Radio, “Interview with Tishrin,” November 14, 1995, cited in “Khaddam on al-Asad, Peace Process, Amman Summit,” FBIS-NES-95–220, November 15, 1995, p. 61. Back.

Note 48: Abd-al-Bari Atwan, “Israel and Joining the League,” Al-Quds al-Arabi, December 23, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES, December 30, 1994, p. 3. Back.

Note 49: Dooa el-Bey, “Mapping the Future,” Al-Ahram Weekly, November 10–16, 1994, p. 1. Also see Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,” Security Dialogue 27, no. 4 (1996): 425–36, and the discussions that occurred at the conference sponsored by the Arab Thought Forum in Doha, Qatar, April 19–20, 1995, as described by Ali Oumlil, “Four Questions,” Arab Thought Forum 2, no. 2 (1995): 1–5. Back.

Note 50: For the text of the Damascus Declaration see MENA, “Final Version of Damascus Declaration,” FBIS-NES-91–152, August 7, 1991, pp. 1–2. Back.

Note 51: MENA, “Idea of Arab Force Deployed in Gulf Abandoned,” November 13, 1991, cited in FBIS-NES-91–220, November 14, 1991, p. 1. As noted in Egypt’s Al-Ahram, “We have to acknowledge the apprehensions of the people in the Gulf, or at least some of them, who fear an Arab presence in the Gulf, because the past is not very encouraging.” Ihsan Bakr, “ ‘Sensitivity’ with Damascus Declaration Viewed,” Al-Ahram, June 7, 1992, p. 9, cited in FBIS-NES-92–114, June 12, 1992, pp. 9–10. The secretary-general of the Arab League nearly pronounced the last rites for the Arab Collective Security Pact: “At the same time it must be clear that the concept of security is the biggest responsibility of each individual state. Each state determines the needs and boundaries of its security on its own, because this concerns its people and its future. We should basically assume that there should be no interference in any country’s security. We must acknowledge and proceed from this basic principle,” FBIS-NES-92–232, December 2, 1992, pp. 1–2. See also the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Arab League and the GCC, cited in FBIS-NES-92–034, February 20, 1992, p. 3. Back.

Note 52: Zakariya Nil, “The Abu Dhabi Gulf Summit Face to Face with Most Important Topics of the House,” Al-Ahram, December 12, 1992, cited in FBIS-NES-92–241, December 15, 1992, p. 10–11. Back.

Note 53: Abu Odeh interview. Back.

Note 54: Anwar-Ul-Haq Ahady, “Security in the Persian Gulf After Desert Storm,” International Journal 49 (Spring 1994): 219–40. Back.

Note 55: The dynamics also led to a wide-ranging debate about the boundaries of the region. See, for instance, “Arafat Suggests Formation of Mideast ‘Regional Order,’” Al-Nahar, February 14, 1994, cited in FBIS-NES-94-030, February 14, 1994. Back.

Note 56: Baghat Korany, “National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism,” in D. Tschirgi, ed., The Arab World Today (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 166. Back.

Note 57: The preference for external security guarantees from pan-Arab states rather than the members of the Damascus Declaration became particularly visible in October 1994 when Iraqi troops amassed on the Kuwaiti border. Essentially, the GCC states could not be bothered by either Egypt or Syria and coordinated their military responses with the United States. Back.

Note 58: For a lengthier discussion of these developments in regional security, see Michael Barnett, “Regional Security After the Gulf War,” Political Science Quarterly 111, no. 4 (Winter 1996–97): 597–618. Back.

Note 59: Correspondingly, whereas most regional symposiums before the Gulf War stressed the importance of sovereignty and political unity over democracy, since then the priority has been reversed. Nakleh, “Regime Stability and Change,” pp. 133–34. Back.

Note 60: Fahmy interview. Back.

Note 61: Lotfi el-Khuli, interview by author, Cairo, March 18, 1996. Back.

Note 62: Nassaf Hitti, interview by author, Cairo, March 19, 1996. Back.

Note 63: Ibrahim Nafi, “Article Examines Future of Arab League,” Al-Ahram al-Duwali, January 27, 1995, p. 5, cited in FBIS-NES-95–052, March 17, 1995, p. 5. Back.

Note 64: “Minister Expects Disturbances in the Region,” Al-Muharrir, November 6, 1995, p. 6, cited in FBIS-NES-95–215, November 7, 1995, p. 50. Back.

Note 65: Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (New York: Holt, 1993). Back.

Note 66: Amos Elon, “Crumbling Cairo,” New York Review of Books, April 6, 1996, pp. 32–36; Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, “The Arab League and the Arab State,” Al-Ahram Weekly, April 6–12, 1995, p. 8. Back.

Note 67: See the comments by Ghayth Aramanzi, head of the Arab League’s London office, at the conference on the New Middle East at London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies on December 19–20, 1994. Reported in FBIS-NES-95–022, February 7, 1995, p. 7. Other league officials discounted such fears, saying that such talk revealed not an actual threat posed by Israel but rather a lack of confidence in the abilities of the Arab states. “League Plays Down Fears of Israeli Economic Domination,” Dubai, January 9, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–005, January 9, 1995, p. 4. Back.

Note 68: Anonymous source, interview by author, Amman, September 5, 1996. Back.

Note 69: Sid-Ahmed, “Arab League and the Arab State.” Back.

Note 70: Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, “When Israelis Speak Arabic,” Al-Ahram Weekly, March 30–April 5, 1995, p. 8. Back.

Note 71: “Peres Sees Membership in Arab League as Next Goal,” Ha’aratz, December 21, 1994, pp. A1, 10, cited in FBIS-NES-94–246, December 22, 1994, p. 18; “Israel and Joining the Arab League,” Al-Quds al-Arabi, December 23, 1994, p. 1, cited in “Israeli Request to Join League Shows Arab ‘Humiliation,’” FBIS-NES-94–251, December 30, 1994, p. 2–3. Abdel al-Majid also was reported to have said that “Israel’s joining the Arab League is not serious and belongs in the wastebasket.” MENA, “Abdel al-Majid: No Place for Israel in Arab League,” January 25, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–017, January 26, 1995, p. 2. Back.

Note 72: Muhammed Bassouni, interview by author, Tel Aviv, August 24, 1995. Back.

Note 73: Hitti interview. Also see Egyptian Radio, “League Chief Speaks on the 50th Anniversary of the Arab League,” March 22, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–056, March 23, 1995, p. 1; “Article Examines Future of Arab League,” Al-Ahram al-Duwali, January 27, 1995, p. 5, cited in FBIS-NES-95–052, March 17, 1995, p. 5. Back.

Note 74: Egyptian Radio, “Egyptian President Mubarak Gives Speech,” March 22, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–056, March 23, 1995, pp. 2–6. Back.

Note 75: Percy Cohen, Modern Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 131. Back.

Note 76: Paul Noble, Rex Brynen, and Baghat Korany, “Conclusion: The Changing Regional Security Environment,” in B. Korany, P. Noble, and R. Brynen, eds., The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), p. 281. Back.

Note 77: Egyptian Radio, “Egyptian President Mubarak Gives Speech,” March 22, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–056, March 23, 1995, pp. 2–6. Back.

Note 78: MENA, “Arab League Chief Addresses Meeting,” September 20, 1995, cited in FBIS-NES-95–183, September 21, 1995, p. 3. Back.

Note 79: As a former minister of Jordan put it, “While Arab unity has died, reasons for it still make sense. If not for emotional concepts, then out of necessity. In this regard the idea of Arab unity is similar to Europe. Small states cannot survive unless they are part of a collection of states.” Interview by author, Amman, Jordan, September 5, 1996. Back.