Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order

Michael N. Barnett

Columbia University Press

Fall 1998

 

The Arab states entered 1945 with a loose association and weak set of norms and ended a decade of debate about the desired regional order with a tighter normative fabric that more carefully and closely defined the practices that were and were not consistent with Arabism. As always, the precursor to such developments was a series of important events that unleashed a symbolic competition among Arab leaders to define the situation in ways that were consistent with their various ambitions, accumulate symbolic capital, deploy symbolic sanctions against their rivals in order to control their foreign policies, and align their policies with the norms of Arabism in fits of impression management and attempts to stave off domestic and regional sanctions. Symbolic rather than military politics and the imperatives of regime rather than state survival were responsible for tightening the normative web between Arab states and holding them more fully accountable to each other.

The events surrounding the Zionist challenge, the continuing debate about unification, and the relationship between the West and the Arab states stirred the dialogues in Arab politics. The Arab states’ response to the Zionist challenge can be divided into three distinct phases: from 1945 through the fall of 1947, when they limited their involvement to various resolutions and diplomatic forays; from the fall of 1947 through May 1948, when they engaged in symbolic competition, which ultimately drove their decision to invade Palestine when the mandate expired at midnight on May 14; and from late 1948 through April 1950, when they conducted bilateral negotiations with Israel and debated whether and under what conditions they might have dealings and relations with the Jewish state. These postwar discussions culminated in the normative prohibition against making peace with Israel, codified by the League of Arab States in April 1950. For the next several decades the idea of any sort of relations with Israel became the taboo of Arab politics.

Arab nationalism had brought the Arab states to Cairo and caused them to construct a regional association with a charter that acknowledged that its force owed to its insistence that sovereignty was the cornerstone of inter-Arab politics. Still, a stratum of society, particularly in the Fertile Crescent, contended that these states were artificial entities that should erase their territorial boundaries, and some Fertile Crescent leaders gestured in this direction, if only to score some easy points and keep their rivals off balance. The decade’s most promising unification effort occurred in the fall of 1949, when Iraq and Syria made unity noises. Egypt led the antiunification coalition and ingeniously dangled a collective security pact to discourage Syria from joining forces with Iraq. Thus the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950 was born; an institutional wave at collective security, it was in fact a multilateral brace for sovereignty. Although calls for unification percolated during the next decade, unification remained relatively low on the political agenda.

The third and ultimately transformational issue pertained to the unsettled and unsettling relationship between Arab nationalism and the West. Arab nationalism of the period has been described as a “protest movement,” the Arab version of anticolonialism. ₁ There is much truth to this. Arab nationalism during the interwar period was largely expressed through opposition to the mandates and the 1936 treaties and the demand for full, complete, and uncompromised independence. Yet such demands did not necessarily envision autarchy or neutrality but rather a revised relationship with the West, one that secured for Arab states material and political advantages without the humiliating concessions associated with colonialism. The West was intent on stabilizing its place in the region and enlisting the Arab states for its various defense plans and containment schemes. The dramatic finish to the debate was the 1955 fight over the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Turkey, a yearlong duel between the seasoned Nuri al-Said of Iraq and a rising Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, each of whom had strategic, political, and personal reasons for his position on the pact. Nuri wanted the Arab states to accept it, whereas Nasser wanted them to reject it. Nasser won, which meant that Arab nationalism was defined by neutrality and nonalignment. The Arab states now publicly subscribed to a norm of Arabism that prohibited a close relationship with the West. The pact was the decade’s transformative event because it established the prohibition against a strategic relationship with the West, launched Nasser on his pan-Arab career, and fundamentally changed the parameters of Arab politics for the next decade by shifting the ground from conservatism to radicalism. In general, the decade-long debates about the relationship of Arab nationalism and sovereignty, Zionism, and the West deposited a set of norms that increasingly made Arab states more dependent on each other for social approval, and thus susceptible to symbolic sanctions, and more closely bound together, and thus more oriented toward one another.

 

Palestine and Israel

The struggle in Palestine between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs had become a struggle between Arab nationalism and Zionism. But not because many Arab leaders viewed the Zionists as an immediate military threat. Rather, the confrontation with Zionism became a test of their Arabism. Arab officials eventually staked their prestige on Palestine not only from a sense of solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs but “also from the fact that the Arab nationalists regarded the Zionist effort in Palestine as a particularly significant test and challenge.” ₂ An attempt to balance their various interests alongside their desire to be seen as making a good show on Palestine eventually led them to cast their lots with a military intervention; that is, a desire to defend their images rather than the Palestinians led to the campaign. Although the military showing was designed to answer their critics at home and bolster their Arab credentials, their lackluster performances only added to the chorus of criticisms and made it politically untenable for Arab leaders, regardless of their private thoughts, to entertain relations with Israel.

The Infectious Slide Toward War

From 1945 through the fall of 1947 the Arab states continued the pre-1939 pattern of policies toward Palestine in three respects. First, they wanted to make a good showing on Palestine for a complex set of reasons, including a sense of obligation; a desire to distract their populations from troubles at home; and a desire to display their commitment to Arabism to their watching publics. But Arab officials had to balance their Palestine policy with their other foreign policy interests and domestic objectives. Egypt, for instance, attempted to use Palestine to maintain and protect its leadership in Arab politics but feared that becoming too entangled might jeopardize its more immediate goal of dislodging the British from Egypt. Although Arab governments wanted to give a good accounting of themselves on Palestine, few wanted to expend scarce capital and resources, lest they jeopardize their regime’s other goals and objectives or find themselves involved in a war unwanted and unjustified by strategic imperatives.

Second, the Arab League provided the perfect cover for Arab states to maintain a limited, somewhat low-cost involvement. ₃ Whereas before 1945 they had used informal and somewhat ad hoc arrangements to debate the Palestine issue, after they established the Arab League, Arab states used it to respond to a series of crises in Palestine and commissions of inquiry being sent by the West and the United Nations to formulate a resolution to the conflict. Yet Arab officials used the league not only as a debating parlor but also as the principal mechanism for protecting their individual interests while promoting the image of collective involvement. Such considerations explain why the league’s resolutions were long on support and concern but short on concrete action.

Third, Arab governments used Palestine to score easy political points against their rivals, and their ability to do so increased as the crisis dragged on and obtained a centrality in Arab politics. A defining feature of the Arab governments’ policy on Palestine both before and after the creation of Israel was the desire to use Palestine to display their allegiance to Arabism and to call into question the credentials of a rival. For instance, at the Arab League meeting in June 1946 Iraq, motivated by domestic political concerns and an opportunity to embarrass Saudi Arabia and Egypt, urged the Arab states to censure Britain and the United States for their support of the Zionists. But Iraq knew that Egypt and Saudi Arabia would oppose any such move, which they did, and thus would suffer the inevitable political fallout, which they did. ₄

The ability of the Arab governments to preserve their images while protecting their other interests through mere resolutions became increasingly difficult after February 18, 1947, when Britain announced its decision to turn its mandate over to the UN, and in the fall of 1947, when the General Assembly began debating a two-state solution. Such developments made it more difficult for Arab states to convince their publics that mere resolutions and diplomacy exhausted their obligations. In some respects they had only themselves to blame for their societies’ demands for more robust action; after all, they had been ratcheting up the visibility and centrality of the conflict by holding a series of high-level and well-publicized meetings that were nearly always followed by strongly worded resolutions with calls to action and then celebrated as providing a definitive and effective response to the crisis. ₅ Now they were being asked to make good on their promises.

The Arab governments continued to resist various calls from their publics and the occasional Arab official for more military action through the early part of 1948. At a conference in Sawfat, Lebanon, in September 1947 the league’s political committee clashed over whether it should implement its earlier resolutions advocating an oil embargo against the West. Saudi Arabia argued against doing so, saying it only would disadvantage the Arabs. Iraq, which would continue to use the Haifa pipeline through May 1948, attempted to embarrass Saudi Arabia by urging the immediate implementation of the embargo. No oil embargo followed. In October the Council of the Arab League voted to increase the financial assistance to the Palestinian Arabs but rejected the recommendation of the technical committee to establish a pan-Arab unified command. ₆

Once the U.N. General Assembly approved the partition plan on November 29, 1947, however, the Arab governments came under greater domestic pressure to make good on their pledges. ₇ At a conference in Cairo in early December the Iraqi delegate, responding directly to domestic demands, urged the league to punish those states that supported the Zionists and to order the Arab armies into Palestine. Most Arab governments bristled at this suggestion and instead opted to double their financial assistance and expedite their military assistance. ₈ Egypt was so resistant to the idea of military involvement that it abstained from the initial military discussions, and other Arab officials, most notably those from Palestine and Transjordan, feared having other Arab armies on their soil. ₉ For the time being cautiously worded resolutions would be the limit of their involvement.

The Arab states were unable to slide by with resolutions alone after March 1948. With war looming, the UN’s recognition of a two-state solution, the British withdrawal imminent, and the Jewish state ready to proclaim its independence, the Arab governments were being forced to take concrete action to demonstrate their commitment to Palestine and to Arabism. But even under these increasingly tense circumstances a stalemate between the Hashemite and non-Hashemite states emerged regarding the necessity of military intervention because of the absence of a strategic threat. The Hashemites hardly wanted to find their armies embroiled in a war in Palestine but were at the forefront among Arab states calling for a military response. Iraq argued forcefully for military confrontation, a stance motivated largely by domestic politics and its related desire to bolster its Arab nationalist credentials. ₁₀ From Jordan Abdullah also demanded military intervention—but hardly because of a highly developed empathy for the Palestinians. While he was pleading with his fellow Arab statesmen to enter Palestine to confront the Zionists, behind the scenes he was conducting secret negotiations with his supposed nemesis regarding their future relations, the division of the spoils, and the conduct of the coming military campaign. ₁₁ Although Abdullah and the Zionist leadership never initialed a formal agreement, the general understanding was that Abdullah’s Arab Legion would enter Palestine under cover of a confrontation with the Zionists but that the Jordanian troops would advance only so far, leaving the Zionists with what remained.

On April 10 Abdullah unilaterally shattered the stalemate between the Arab states regarding military intervention when he announced that the Arab Legion would enter Palestine upon the expiration of the mandate to protect the Arabs and to confront the Zionists. ₁₂ Although few Arab countries wanted to follow in his footsteps, neither did they enjoy the idea of Abdullah’s becoming the patron saint of Palestine, perhaps making a grab for Arab Palestine, and calling into question their own commitments. ₁₃ Abdullah’s announcement therefore left the other Arab states scurrying to keep pace and made military intervention a near certainty. On April 12 Egypt announced that it too would send its troops to Palestine. But symbolic rather than strategic factors prodded this decision. Many Egyptian officials warned that becoming too embroiled in Palestine might undermine Egypt’s central goal of ridding its soil of the British. ₁₄ During the parliamentary debate Ismail Sidqi, a prominent Egyptian politician, argued against intervention on the grounds that Egypt’s strategic interests were not at risk and that it did not have the same obligations to Palestine as did the other Arab states. ₁₅ King Faruq overruled these and other objections because of his belief that failing to intervene would cost him dearly in prestige and leave him vulnerable to both the Muslim Brotherhood at home and King Abdullah abroad. Simply put, his domestic and regional standing depended on sending his military across the Sinai and into Palestine. ₁₆ Despite similar reservations, most Arab states also calculated that to abstain from the military campaign would subject them to domestic disturbances. ₁₇

Symbolic rather than strategic considerations led the Arab states to resolve on April 16 to send their armies into Palestine once the mandate ended the following month. Few Arab leaders argued vigorously in private that the Zionists were an implacable military threat, but many readily acknowledged that failure to confront the Zionists would leave them vulnerable at home. In fact, many Arab military officials warned their governments that they might not have the military wherewithal to confront the Zionists; such military dangers, however, paled in comparison to the domestic threats that Arab leaders feared they might face should they fail to go to war. ₁₈ After years of drawing attention to the Zionist challenge and delivering little more than vaguely worded resolutions, the Arab governments sent their militaries into Palestine in an act of impression management.

The armies of Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and a ceremonial Saudi contingent entered Palestine as the mandate expired on May 14. But from the start their military operations were permeated and undermined by the same inter-Arab rivalries and mixture of political interests that sent them tumbling into Palestine. Although the Arab states pledged to coordinate their military operations and the irregular volunteers under the direction of the Arab League’s military committee, each national army was under the direction of its government. ₁₉ The result was confusion in the field, bickering between Arab leaders, agreement on coordinated invasion routes that were ignored during the campaign, and a generally disorganized and ineffectual military effort. ₂₀

Indeed, although the Arab League’s plan was designed to prevent partition, Abdullah’s military plans were designed to effect it. ₂₁ Abdullah’s intentions toward Palestine were often considered to be less than honorable, and there were strong hints that his army had entered Palestine not for the Palestinians but for the king’s glory. Consequently, the Jordanian and Egyptian armies were as wary of each other as they were of the Israelis, and their military operations were sometimes tailored to keep an eye on each other’s military positions and intentions. The Israelis were a prime beneficiary of such inter-Arab suspicions.

Nor did the Arab governments throw their military weight behind the campaign. ₂₂ Explanations for this result vary. A halfhearted military effort was consistent with their previous concern with impression management and also reflects the belief that Arab governments did not view the new Jewish state as a military threat. Domestic politics, which accounts for why they decided to mobilize in the first place, also helps to explain their weak resolve when they did: a fear that deploying their best military contingents to Palestine might leave them vulnerable to domestic insurrection at home and the basic inability of the states to mobilize the troops required. How the Arab states conducted the military campaign mirrored the processes that led them to war.

The Postwar Prohibition of Peace

The splintered way in which the Arab states fought in Palestine carried over into the postwar negotiations and armistice talks. They were in general disarray over whether, in what manner, and on what terms they should politically and diplomatically engage Israel. The backdrop to that debate and a powerful force leading to their eventual decision was the bitter legacy of and political fallout from their dismal campaign in Palestine. The loss of Palestine, which became known as al-nakba [the catastrophe], represented a tremendous psychological blow that rippled and ripped throughout the Arab world.

All those even remotely associated with the defeat became the target of wrath and ire. Many Arabs who once expressed concern about Palestine but were unwilling to commit resources and energies to the cause were now fully anti-Israel. If Arab leaders entered the battle because of domestic political considerations and the desire to save face, they probably did not anticipate that their shallow effort and subsequent defeat would radicalize the military and society—an outcome they had hoped to avoid by doing battle in the first place. The loss of Palestine suggested that the immediate causes of Arab weakness stemmed from irresoluteness, incompetence, corruption, and disunity and “served to confirm pre-existing beliefs about the perennial backwardness of Arab society.” ₂₃ The masses, the military, and the intelligentsia were now more opposed than ever to the regimes in power and had greater reason to indict their leadership and legitimacy. Military officials returning from Palestine, and intellectuals and the masses watching from the capitals, concluded that “the enemy is us.” ₂₄ Nasser later said that he returned from war “convinced that the real enemy was in Cairo.” ₂₅

Although this radicalized climate meant that Arab officials wanted to carefully avoid any hint of consorting with the enemy, the immediate and practical need for a formal armistice remained; cease-fire lines had to be established and patrolled. ₂₆ A defining subtext to the armistice negotiations, however, was whether Israel and one or more of the Arab states might build on an agreement to conclude a formal peace treaty. In fact, the armistice discussions nearly always contained the implicit and sometimes explicit expectation that a separate peace might be struck at the right price. ₂₇ But Arab officials ultimately calculated that they would be cutting their own political throats if they negotiated a peace with Israel.

During the first few months of 1949 Egypt followed a separate negotiation path and proceeded without any reference to the Arab League or other Arab states; Egypt’s unilateralism was widely rumored to be linked to peace with Israel. ₂₈ In the end, however, Egypt concluded that any benefits that might be gained from a separate peace were not worth the substantial political costs. ₂₉

Syria, though it lagged behind Egypt and Jordan in the armistice talks, also flirted with a separate peace. Syria’s dramatic reversal in attitude was a consequence of a military coup led by Colonel Husni Za’im in March 1949. Za’im’s decision to contemplate a permanent peace with Israel is attributable to a number of factors, including Za’im’s belief that the “right” peace treaty might help establish him in Syria, the region, and global politics; the fear that the other Arab states were concluding separate agreements and would leave Syria to face a militarily superior Israel alone; the understanding that the army was the mainstay of the regime, and he was well advised to shield it from Israel; the keen interest in instituting political and economic reforms, which would be more easily accomplished if Israel were removed from the top of the agenda; and, finally, that he was strikingly free from ideological politics and outside the mainstream of Arabist sentiments. ₃₀ Itamar Rabinovich has identified this last factor—that Za’im was out of touch with the currents of Arab public opinion—as allowing Za’im to propose a peace treaty. Still, Za’im determined that any treaty would have to come at the right price so that he could defend himself against his domestic and regional critics, as his aides constantly reminded him. Israel ultimately determined that the price, including territorial concessions of strategic water rights, was too high. ₃₁ These negotiations had already faltered when Za’im was overthrown by a coup engineered by Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi in the fall of 1949. Significantly, the participants in the coup failed to name Israel, the armistice agreements, or the peace negotiations as among their grievances. Rabinovich has speculated that the reasons for the absence of these elements were that those involved in the coup were participants in the armistice agreements, Syria wanted to avoid needlessly escalating the conflict with Israel, and perhaps that the Syrian military and society were just not preoccupied with Israel. ₃₂

Jordan came closest to concluding a separate peace with Israel. “For Abdullah,” wrote Avi Shlaim, “peace negotiations with Israel posed not so much a question of principle but a problem of timing.” ₃₃ Abdullah used the armistice negotiations to continue his prewar discussions about the possibility of commercial dealings, a nonaggression pact, and a peace treaty. Abdullah’s desire for a peace treaty stemmed from his belief that Israel would help Jordan gain political access to the United States, the world’s rising and principal power; his concern that Jerusalem would be internationalized and his belief that a peace treaty with Israel would prevent this; his desire for an outlet to the sea and expectation that trade would nurture Jordan’s economic development; and his assumption that the right treaty might elevate his prestige in the Arab world. Abdullah’s immediate objective, however, was to complete his annexation of the West Bank. The Jericho Congress of December 1948 was the first step in that direction, but Abdullah still sought to imbue his acquisition with the trapping of legality that would come through recognition and annexation. ₃₄ There was little Abdullah was not prepared to sacrifice for the prize of Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Israel and Jordan neared a nonaggression pact in the early months of 1950, and to prepare for this possibility Abdullah attempted to force his council of ministers to accept the principle of commercial relations with Israel. This ultimatum produced a government crisis. On March 2 three Palestinian members of the council resigned in bitter opposition to Abdullah’s plan, and soon thereafter Prime Minister Abu al-Huda also tendered his resignation. Abdullah’s plans for a separate peace with Israel and annexing the West Bank now became a badly kept secret. The response from other Arab governments was swift and severe. Egypt led the charge, a stand born not only from principles but also from the fear that a separate Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty would threaten Egypt’s leadership in Arab politics and harm its negotiations with Britain. ₃₅ To halt the Jordanian-Israeli negotiations Egypt took to the airwaves and portrayed Jordan as an enemy of Arabism and Israel’s coconspirator. Cairo got some timely help from a Jordanian official who had been privy to Jordanian-Israeli negotiations during the 1948 war. Jordan’s private discussions were now part of the public record. ₃₆

Egypt’s portrait of an Abdullah who was nearing a peace with Israel and annexation of the West Bank and publication of the secret negotiations had their intended effect: Abdullah was vilified throughout the region. Many recommended Jordan’s expulsion from the league if Abdullah concluded a separate peace treaty or annexed the West Bank, and Syrian prime minister Khalid al-Azm threatened to close the Syrian border if Abdullah proceeded as planned. Abdullah attempted to deflect the criticism by claiming that his approach alone would solve the refugee crisis and produce a just peace. But his justification convinced few. Abdullah was swimming against the tide of Arabism and subjected to a tirade of accusations that questioned his standing as an Arab. ₃₇

Arab leaders gathered in Cairo for the twelfth Arab League session from March 25 through April 13, 1950, and atop the agenda was what action should be taken if Abdullah concluded a peace with Israel or annexed the West Bank. At stake, however, was not only what Abdullah might do but perhaps the future of the Arab League. Much commentary at the time focused on the Arab League’s ineffectiveness in confronting the Zionist challenge, the Arab states’ decision to negotiate separately rather than collectively after the war, and the appearance that now Abdullah, and perhaps others, were about to conclude a separate peace treaty with Israel. Under such circumstances, many wondered, what was the point of the league? ₃₈

For the next several days the Arab states jostled over how to respond to Abdullah’s challenge. Should they, as Egypt initially proposed, expel Jordan from the Arab League or offer a more measured response that communicated their anger but left the door open for Jordan to remain a member? The Arab states eventually settled on a strongly worded resolution prohibiting any separate peace. Adopted unanimously on April 1, the resolution prohibited any Arab state from negotiating or concluding “a separate peace or any political, military or economic agreement with Israel.” ₃₉ A few days later the Arab League determined that a suspected violation would be referred to the political committee to consider whether a violation had in fact occurred, that such a decision would be binding if four states agreed to the decision, and that the penalties would include severing political and diplomatic relations with the violator, closing any common borders and economic dealings, and prohibiting all financial or commercial transactions. Relations of any kind with Israel were now taboo.

Abdullah bristled at this intrusion on his foreign policy, but his ministers warned him against rebuking the league’s decisions lest he invite further domestic and regional abuse, which would in turn jeopardize his ultimate goal of smooth elections on the West and East Banks—if not also his crown. ₄₀ Abdullah therefore bowed to the barrage of Arab public opinion on the issue of a separate peace with Israel and announced that he had no such intent. As aptly observed by Moshe Sasson, one of Abdullah’s Israeli negotiating partners, although Abdullah had the will to make peace, he did not have the way. ₄₁ Abdullah bemoaned the constraints placed on him by his rivals, but he could not proceed without their approval.

Now Abdullah set his sights on his ultimate ambition of the West Bank. He wasted little time. On April 11, the day after the Arab League meeting adjourned, Jordan held elections, a precursor to Abdullah’s planned annexation. Then on April 24 Abdullah announced the unification of the two banks under the Hashemite crown, citing Arab League resolutions and a plebescite on the West Bank as legalizing his actions and portraying his decision as a step toward “real union.” ₄₂ His annexation was met by widespread disapproval, charges of betrayal, calls for his expulsion from the league, and claims that he was motivated not by Arab nationalism but by territorial expansion. ₄₃ Abdullah, nonplussed by the response, dared the other Arab leaders to mete out their punishment and even to evict him from the league. ₄₄

Egypt called Abdullah’s bluff and pushed for expulsion, a stand informed by its desire to solidify its Arabist credentials and the assumption that the other Arab states would oppose such a severe sentence. To try to heal the rift between Egypt and Jordan and in order to formulate a compromise position, the league's political committee delayed its decision for a month. In the interim Egypt retreated from its earlier demand for expulsion, not only satisfied that its credentials were now established but also fearful that Jordan’s expulsion might give Abdullah a free hand to conclude a peace treaty with Israel. ₄₅ A compromise position was struck, and on June 12 the Council of the Arab League charged that Jordan’s decision was a product of expediency dictated by the situation and that the territories should be held in trust until the liberation of all the pre-1948 territories. In the end the other Arab states resigned themselves to Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank, though none ever formally acknowledged the move. ₄₆

Although the Arab states did not punish Abdullah for his actions, he met a harsher fate and the most violent of sanctions on July 20, 1951, when he was assassinated at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. The assassins were clearly and decidedly punishing Abdullah for his negotiations with Israel, his annexation of the West Bank, and his betrayal of the Palestinians. Indeed, the subsequent trial revealed a web of conspiracies involving various ethnic and nationality groups in Jordan, each of which was rumored to have received significant assistance from rival Arab regimes that had designs on Jordan or wanted to check Abdullah’s territorial ambitions. ₄₇ The assassination left an indelible mark on King Abdullah’s grandson, the future King Hussein, who was at the king’s side when he was slain. Now it was clear that making peace with Israel risked political sanctions from the Arab League and even worse from those in the street.

Relations with Israel were now a taboo of Arab politics. This taboo emerged because of the dynamic between Arab leaders who wanted to maintain their regional and domestic standing and found Arabism and a strong stand on Palestine a useful way to do so, who used Arabism as a symbolic sanction to undermine their rivals and control their foreign policies, and who engaged in symbolic competition. These symbol-laced decisions, rather than any overarching strategic or military imperative, compelled the Arab states to enter Palestine and later to prohibit relations with Israel. Little evidence exists that the decision to intervene in Palestine was driven by strategic considerations; nor does a preponderance of evidence suggest that Arab leaders were so fearful of the Israeli military threat that they were ready to use military means to contain it. Understanding the dynamics that led Arab states to commit their forces abroad requires recognizing how Arab leaders had increasingly staked their prestige on Palestine as a way to maintain their support at home and compete with their rivals abroad for symbolic capital—and how this symbolic competition led to their symbolic entrapment, that is, drove them to intervene to maintain and manage their impressions, even though they privately feared it might undercut their other objectives.

Let me briefly expand on these points. Arab governments, though not exactly embracing the Zionists, also did not expend tremendous resources on confronting them early. Instead, they limited their involvement to the diplomatic field either because of a lack of commitment and/or fear that becoming entangled would jeopardize their other objectives. If Arab public opinion compelled them to take a stand, Arab leaders nudged each other closer to the edge of intervention as they continued to use Arabism to stabilize their positions back home and to undermine their rivals abroad. The pressure to intervene became greater as the mandate came to a close and Arab states decreed the necessity of strong action but delivered only empty resolutions. The tipping point for intervention was already reached, then, when King Abdullah declared his intent to deploy the Arab Legion to protect the Palestinian Arabs and confront the Zionists. All the other Arab states followed suit to avoid the shame of being left behind, decisions sometimes made over the outright objections of their military advisers. Symbolic rather than military politics pushed the Arab armies toward the borders of Palestine.

Although the Arab states hoped that this show of force would impress their watching publics, in fact their halfhearted efforts and subsequent defeat only encouraged nationalist fervor, increased accusations against them, and hardened the opposition to Israel. Arab officials now faced a new set of constraints as they debated how far they could go individually and collectively in dealing with Israel. Many Arab leaders contemplated making a separate peace with Israel—if the price was right. But they set the price quite high because of the constraints imposed by Arabism. Abdullah was alone in calculating that the anticipated rewards outweighed the potential damage to his reputation, but an Egyptian-led campaign easily framed his actions as an affront to Arabism. The result of the diplomatic and political outcry was the creation of the norm prohibiting a separate peace with Israel. And Abdullah, though angered by this intrusion on his foreign policy, understood that to proceed with his plans might cost him his crown. In fact, it cost him his life.

For reasons that had less to do with strategic calculations and more to do with their rivalries and fear that their Arabism would be found deficient, the Arab states established the norm prohibiting peace with Israel. As one Israeli commentator astutely noted: “Had peace depended on the conflicting interests of the Arab states, then the peace prospects would have been much brighter than they were now. However, each of the Arab states as well as the Arab League cannot free themselves from their public opinion, the fruit of their own agitation.” ₄₈ Symbolic competition had left them more vulnerable and dependent on each other for social approval and led to the norm that prohibited them from considering any relations with Israel whatsoever. This norm was now a social fact, a central tenet of Arabism, and a defining feature of their identity.

 

Arab Nationalism and Sovereignty

The Arab states had already vetted the question of unification during their negotiations regarding the Arab League, and their response was contained in its architecture and constitution, which reinforced the principle of sovereignty. But a body of public opinion, particularly in the Fertile Crescent, continued to champion the idea of unification and to view these states as artificial entities. Thus Iraqi and Jordanian leaders were at the forefront of expressing sentiments for unification if only to score easy political points, raise havoc, or embarrass their rivals. Iraq’s interest in unification had various sources, including personal aggrandizement of the palace, domestic politics, and a desire to cast a longer shadow over Arab politics. Always ready to forward a Greater Syria plan with himself crowned king in Damascus, Abdullah had an impulse toward unification that derived from a desire to break out of his desert kingdom; a belief that the Hashemite thrones in Iraq and Transjordan should be united and that by all rights Syria also should have been Hashemite; the goal of elevating his stature in Arab politics and bolstering his domestic fortunes; the wish to fulfill his Hashemite family’s long-standing goals; the concern that his heir apparent, Talal, was unfit to rule; and perhaps the dream of reconquering the Hijaz and settling an old debt with the Saudis. ₄₉ Abdullah had more reasons than not to trumpet unification. In both the Iraqi and the Jordanian cases the unity theme derived from a mixture of regime survival and nationalism, but the Iraqis’ and Jordanians’ ability to use unification as a means to extend their influence or absorb new territories can be attributed only to the enabling conditions of Arabism.

Various unification proposals were floated between 1945 and 1955, but none was more credible than a Syrian-Iraqi unification proposed in the fall 1949. ₅₀ Unification had become a more frequently mentioned goal after the Palestine war. In the debate about the causes of the loss and how to increase the power and security of the Arab world, one candidate was unification, which offered the promise of both answering the challenge posed by Israel and fulfilling a long-standing goal of Arab nationalism. Then came the first post-1945 coup in the Arab world: on March 30, 1949, Husni Za’im, chief of staff of the Syrian army, overthrew President Shukri al-Qwattli; Za’im was motivated by various reasons, including personal ambition, nationalist goals, defense of the army against charges of corruption, and maintaining the army’s material privileges. ₅₁ Until Za’im’s coup Syria had been ruled by politicians and parties that originated in the National Bloc, the corpus of the nationalist movement in Syria during the interwar period. Increasingly discredited, it began to rely on the military for support; the military meanwhile was becoming increasingly disenchanted with the ruling politicians, caused in part by the government’s lackluster performance in Palestine. The result was an awkward standoff and constant friction between the military and the government. Za’im’s coup shattered the uneasy truce. ₅₂

One of Za’im’s first actions was to propose that Iraq and Syria conclude a defense treaty; he was motivated largely by his desire to strengthen his hand vis-à-vis Israel at the armistice talks in Rhodes and against any domestic criticism that he was deficient on Arab nationalism. ₅₃ Although Syria and Iraq never concluded a defense agreement, its prospect stimulated a round of discussions concerning future regional arrangements and competition among Arab states for Syria’s favor. ₅₄ Unification talk reemerged after the overthrow of Za’im by Hinnawi on August 14, 1949. ₅₅ Soon thereafter Hinnawi recommended that Syria and Iraq unify, a proposal motivated by Arabist sentiments and fear of Israel. ₅₆ Their negotiations proceeded cautiously through the fall. Syria’s principal objections were to Iraq’s monarchical form of government and Iraq’s treaty commitments to Britain; republican sentiment was strong, and much of the military and society, having won Syria’s independence from France, were reluctant to be associated with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. ₅₇ Therefore, as a precondition for any unity agreement the Syrian National Party, among others, demanded that Iraq abrogate its alliance with Britain. ₅₈ Because Iraq was not about to meet this demand, Syrian and Iraqi negotiators turned their attention to the possibility of a defense treaty. But the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty once again stood in the way. ₅₉

These obstacles notwithstanding, unification talk filled the airwaves. The debate shifted from the newspapers and the Syrian-Iraqi negotiating table to Cairo for the Arab League meeting in October 1949 at which Iraq presented the proposed union to the Council, emphasizing its consistency with Article 9 of the league’s charter. ₆₀ Jordan, a long-time proponent of unification, came to Iraq’s side and said that a lesson of Palestine was the need for unity:

[The] essential subject . . . is the regional reorganization of the Middle East Arab countries. This means first and foremost lifting the frontiers that separate parts of the single homeland. Syria must be reunited in its parts in order to acquire the stability and strength to face Israel. The next logical step would be to unite Syria with Iraq in a firm and clear military, economic, and political alliance so that the two Arab forces form two jaws of the iron pincers that would close in on Israel. 61

The Palestine war placed another arrow in the quiver of those supporting unification, even those who been negotiating with the enemy.

If the Palestine war created some momentum for unification, it did not alter the coalition arrayed against it. Egypt and Saudi Arabia expressed their doubts about the plan, and Lebanese president Camille Chamoun said that unification depended on the will of each state’s population, whether it honored the Arab League Charter and whether it was inclusive rather than exclusive. ₆₂ But no Arab official could oppose unification outright; after all, as Arab states they were publicly committed to Arab nationalism and the idea of unification. As the Iraqi newspaper Al-Nida wondered, how could Egypt oppose a plan that was designed to confront Israel and realize the aspirations of the Arabs? ₆₃ To stop the drive for unification the antiunion forces would have to find another device.

Egypt attempted to defeat the plan by ingeniously proposing a collective security pact. ₆₄ Building on nationalism, the desire for unity, a reluctance to rely on Britain for defense assistance, and fear of Israel, Egypt proposed that the Arab states construct a regional security arrangement. With this motion injected into the debate, the meeting became a contest between Iraq’s unification plan—an Iraq closely tied to Britain and a plan that was restricted to Syria—and Egypt’s defense plan, which would be inclusive and perhaps a better solution to Syria’s defense concerns because it included Egypt, the Arab world’s largest state and one that also bordered Israel.

Egypt’s strategy worked. The all-Arab military agreement became the focal point of the meetings. The Arab League subsequently adopted the military plan forwarded by Egypt, which the league compared to the Atlantic Pact, and decided not to “touch the question of Iraqi-Syrian rapproachement since it is an internal affair which should not be interfered with.” ₆₅ Egypt used the idea of collective security to defeat a unification plan and to institutionalize sovereignty, and the decision by the Arab League not to formally consider the unification proposal under the guise of the principle of noninterference worked to the same end. This was not unlike the talks that had led to the creation of the Arab League. Egypt used the idea of a multilateral forum to frustrate Iraq and its goal of unification and then to reinforce the principle of state sovereignty and territoriality. The head of the 1949 Saudi delegation, visibly pleased with the result, endorsed the collective security plan, implicitly rejected the proposed union, and added that Saudi foreign policy is “established on an unshakable basis: the necessity of preservation of the independence of every Arab state.” ₆₆

Iraq’s pitch for unification had been thwarted. Visibly bitter about the league’s deliberations and conclusions, Nuri al-Said characterized the military pact as a substitute for action and an attempt to block the proposed Iraqi-Syrian unification. He lamented that “nations with no ties of language or religion or history [are] joining together through pacts and treaties [that are] stronger than those between the Arab League states.” He proceeded to observe that the Arab League was founded on and continued to perpetuate “chaos,” citing the recent example of the lack of coordination among the Arab states in Palestine. Not only did Arab states lack a union, he argued, but they even lacked any “operative military alliance.” He then issued a challenge. Either

we cooperate in a manner compatible with our Governments’ responsibilities . . . or we lay down another charter for our League under which every Arab government will openly give up some of its rights and authority as an independent sovereign state. A combination of these two alternatives is nothing but a kind of chaos which will lead us into stumbling upon one failure after another and going from bad to worse. 67

Said dared Egypt and other Arab states to stop using institutional devices and the cloak of collectivism to preserve their independence and frustrate inter-Arab cooperation.

Most important, now Syrians who opposed unification and/or saw the Iraqi unification proposal as a mechanism to increase Syria’s security against Israel grabbed onto the proposed collective security pact as a viable alternative to unity with Iraq. Syrian premier Hisham al-Atasi announced that Syria would cease its negotiations with Iraq, citing public opinion that favored the republic and concerns about the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Army chief Sami al-Hinnawi announced that he favored the military pact and that it was essential that Syria not limit its dealings with Iraq but include all Arab states. ₆₈ And Syrian politician Faris al-Khuri stated that unification was unlikely and unnecessary and advocated moving first with a military alliance between Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan—the real lesson of the Palestine war. ₆₉ And then on December 17 and 18, one day after the proponents of closer ties with Iraq had used a major political occasion—the debate about the oath of the constitution—to pledge movement toward unity, Hinnawi was overthrown by Colonel Abid Shishakli, a Syrian nationalist and critic of unification. ₇₀ Syria’s flirtation with unification was over.

The Arab League meetings further institutionalized sovereignty and led Arab states to contemplate security cooperation as a way of maintaining their independence. For the next several months the league’s subcommittee considered various permutations of collective security (including a federation of sorts) but focused on an Egyptian plan, which called for unification of military commands and guarantees of security from Arab states regardless of the source of aggression; an Iraqi plan, which forwarded an “offensive-defensive plan” and specifically identified Communism and Zionism as the threats to the Arab states; and a Syrian plan, which called for a common foreign policy and a strengthening of economic relations as a consequence of a military unity. ₇₁ The Egyptian proposal implied a continuation of Arab League practice under a new guise, whereas the Iraqi proposal represented a more demanding alliance, defined the enemies as Zionism and communism, and made Iraq the home to the pan-Arab general staff because of its proximity to the Soviet Union. ₇₂

The Egyptian proposal emerged victorious and provided the foundation for the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Among the States of the Arab League, better known as the Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP). The Arab states signed the pact on April 13, 1950, pledging to settle their conflicts through nonviolent means (Article 1), engage in collective defense (Article 2), and integrate their military and foreign policies (Article 5). ₇₃ The Arab states never implemented the conditions of the treaty, which was not too shocking because Egypt had proposed the treaty as a way to block unification and not because it was a strong supporter of closer and more encumbered ties between Arab states.

But the pact left a mark on inter-Arab politics in three ways. It reinforced the collective ethos that as Arab states they had common security interests. Whereas during the preparatory talks leading to the creation of the Arab League they had considered and ultimately rejected a security element, they were now acknowledging that they had interdependent security interests. Also, the pact rejected Iraq’s proposal that the Soviet Union be included as a potential threat—a geostrategic issue—and concentrated instead on Zionism, which was an identity issue. In other words, the Arab states concluded that Israel was a threat to the Arab nation, whereas the Soviet Union was not. Finally, the meaning and function of the treaty were not to fulfill the goals of collective security but to frustrate any unification drive and reinforce the principle of sovereignty. ₇₄ By offering Syria a collective security pact as an alternative to unification with Iraq, Egypt successfully enticed Syrian politicians to seek their security through more conventional means. The significance of the treaty was, in short, that it urged Arab states to coordinate their security policies while honoring their sovereignty.

In the end the debate between Arab nationalism and state sovereignty was momentarily resolved in favor of sovereignty. Although on several occasions during the next few years Iraq, Syria, and Jordan again raised the banner of unification—in early 1951 Syrian premier Nazim al-Qudsi made a highly spirited call for a united Arab state, and in January 1954 Iraq proposed another Fertile Crescent scheme—these proposals were religiously sent to the Arab League, where they were tabled and quietly died at the hands of the Egyptian-led antiunification bloc. ₇₅ Rivalry, suspicion, and regime survival, as one commentary observed, undermined any prospect for unification. ₇₆

Although the proponents of unification were frustrated, the idea of unification lingered and reminded Arab states of their common past, present, and future. “The Arab League,” observed veteran Iraqi politician Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, “is as much a truce between [its] leaders as it is the result of the movement of Arab unity for which we older Arab patriots have worked.” This truce, he continued, was far better than the alternative, which was collapse. ₇₇ If the Arab League was not exactly empowering the unification movement, at least its hallways created a place for Arab states to congregate, express their preferences, channel their grievances, and, most important, symbolize their commitment to Arab nationalism. This process nearly guaranteed that Arab nationalism would become expressive of their national identity, and compelled “every Arab state to become ‘unity-minded.’” ₇₈

 

Arab Nationalism and the West

Arab states held mixed feelings toward the West. They had good reasons for viewing the West as a source of insecurity. Britain had promised the Arabs their independence if they joined the war against the Triple Alliance in World War I and then divided the territory between itself and France. The West was an early supporter and sometime champion of the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Britain promised independence to Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt in 1936 but delivered an arrested sovereignty through unequal treaties that preserved colonial privileges and prerogatives for Britain. For many in the region these treaties were a major part of their long-standing grievances against the West, and for many nationalists they became part of their definition of, a defining vehicle for expressing, their Arabism.

Yet Arab officials were not uniformly opposed to the West. Many Arab political elites and military officials emulated the West; after all, they were educated at European schools and trained at European military academies and saw themselves as reformers and modernizers, something on the order of Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. The West also possessed the financial and military resources that Arab governments required to bolster their regimes, undertake reforms, modernize their militaries, and confront threats like Israel. Moreover, the Arab economies were inextricably linked to the West through trade, commerce, and finance, and therefore Arab elites had a vested interest in maintaining those ties. Although Western resources might be necessary for regime maintenance and other goals, to obtain these resources on unsavory terms might trigger the threats to the regime that those resources were supposed to address. ₇₉ Regardless of their alignment orientation, all Arab officials were highly sensitive to any association that smacked of the colonial past and insulted their nations’ current status as sovereign states. ₈₀ The West was a mixture of temptation and threat.

Britain was the West’s representative in the Middle East until the early 1950s when the cold war descended on the area. Because of its financial and strategic exhaustion and because of demands from the Arab states, after World War II Britain forwarded various proposals intended to renegotiate its Middle Eastern treaties while maintaining its strategic position for reasons of pride and power. ₈₁ Until the late 1940s the United States, though not totally comfortable with Britain’s colonial past and neocolonial diction, was reluctant to become involved in the region and willing to let Britain handle the Middle Eastern account. But in the late 1940s the United States became more interested in establishing its own relations with the Arab states and forwarding its own defense proposals. The reasons for the activism by the United States were many, though they largely revolved around geostrategic considerations: the Soviets had become active in Turkey and Iran in the late 1940s, the Middle East contained tremendous oil reserves, the Arab world was strategically located on the periphery of the Soviet Union, and the United States was not wholly convinced that Britain was up to the task of protecting Western interests. ₈₂ Although the first formal effort by the United States to enlist the Arab states in its strategic plans came in October 1951 with the proposed Middle East Command (MEC), the United States began to aggressively press its power in the region under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was armed with a zero-sum view of the world and an extensive and intensive vision of containment. Although the United States and Britain might have had somewhat similar objectives—to secure the Arab states in a strategic arrangement with the West—they occasionally clashed over goals and because of the U.S. belief that it was a fresh force and untainted by a colonial past.

Various Arab governments, then, were under countervailing pressures from Britain and the United States to become part of the Western alliance system and from their societies to revise their ties to the West. Egypt held a central place in this emerging debate about the Arab states’ future defense ties to the West. The West courted Egypt heavily because of its strategic position and because the other Arab states were unlikely to accept the West’s strategic invitation until Egypt gave its blessing. But such approval was dependent on a successful conclusion to Egypt’s highly publicized treaty revisions with Britain for control of the Suez Canal and the Sudan. Other Arab states were willing or felt compelled to await Egypt’s permission and a conclusion to the treaty negotiations because they viewed the Suez Canal as a symbol of the Arab nations’ continued subordination to the West. ₈₃ In fact, the Arab League’s resolutions coupled the canal negotiations to the issue of Middle Eastern defense. ₈₄ This meant that an Arab country would find it politically risky to ally with West before successful conclusion of the canal negotiations. ₈₅ Arab states faced the ongoing dilemma of having to “choose between the promotion of their own interests and the maintenance of Arab solidarity, which in this case, at least, served the interests of the senior sister-state.” ₈₆ Regardless of their private desires, Arab officials reluctantly waited for Egypt.

A few instances dramatize the strategic and symbolic connection between Egypt, the canal negotiations, and the unwillingness of other Arab states to join the West without Egypt’s permission. When the U.S. proposed the MEC, it offered Egypt full membership and other Arab states associate status. ₈₇ Egypt, however, would not consider the proposal until after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty had been revised to include the transfer of the Suez Canal from the British to the Egyptians and other conditions had been met. ₈₈ When the Arab states debated and then rejected the MEC at an Arab League meeting, they concluded that although they favored a strategic arrangement in principle, this was not the right time. ₈₉ The MEC soon gave way to the proposed Middle East Defense Organization, but it too died quickly because of the question of treaty revision in various Arab countries and inter-Arab rivalry. Iraq, which had a long-standing desire to establish a tighter strategic relationship with the West and was critical of Egypt’s Britain policy, flirted with but ultimately rejected various proposals from the West because it did not want to be viewed as undercutting Egypt’s bargaining position. The Syrian public generally marched with Egypt and was against its participation in these early proposals for similar reasons. ₉₀ The linkage between the canal negotiations and the Arab world’s strategic relations to the West was a testimony not only to the diplomatic acumen of the Egyptian government but also to the centrality of Egypt in Arab life and the framing of the canal as an Arab issue.

Egypt’s relationship to Arabism, and Arabism’s relationship to Egypt, underwent a profound change on July 23, 1952, when King Faruq was deposed by the Free Officers in a bloodless coup. The Free Officers were hardly revolutionaries when they came to power. Their immediate goal was to secure their domestic base, and their foreign policy tenets were Egyptian, loyal to Faruq’s Arabism with an emphasis on ridding Britain from Egypt, open to some sort of defense arrangement with the West under the proper conditions, and even willing to negotiate with Israel. ₉₁ That the Free Officers were reformist rather than revolutionary accounts for why many in the Arab world gave them a lackluster reception and judged them weak on Arabism. ₉₂

Was Nasser a committed Arab nationalist or simply an appropriator of Arabism’s language for his goals of regime survival and extending Egyptian power? There is little question that Nasser was concerned with regime survival and furthering Egyptian power. Who would expect anything less from a head of state? Yet such concerns can accommodate the possibility of Nasser as a nationalist. As someone of his generation, trained in the military, witness to British prerogatives, and a participant in the Palestine war, he possessed the experiences likely to infuse him with nationalist sentiment. Those experiences informed his desire to restore al-istiqlal al-watani [national independence], dignity, and respect to the Egyptians and the Arabs; his view that Egypt’s fate and security could not be separated from those of the other Arab states; and his understanding that unity was the best method for augmenting Egyptian and Arab power. ₉₃ Arab states, in his view, should not only assert their independence but also espouse nonalignment. His defiant and uncompromising attitude toward the West was, in short, consistent with both Egyptian and Arab nationalism. I assume that Nasser was committed to Arab nationalism, Egypt, and himself and that these commitments were not necessarily contradictory but in fact could be consistent.

But Nasser’s definition of Arabism evolved over the years. ₉₄ As Nasser prophetically and astutely put it, “It seems to me that within the Arab circle there is a role wandering aimlessly in search of a hero.” ₉₅ What he did not predict was that this role would evolve as a consequence of the interaction between the demands of regime survival, symbolic exchanges, changing circumstances, and perhaps his own self-understandings. At the outset of his political career he maintained a minimalist understanding of Arabism, advocating independence and anticolonialism. ₉₆ Nasser came to realize the discursive power of Arabism during the struggle over the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet arms deal in the fall of 1955, and the fight over the Suez Canal. But, according to Mohamed Heikal, Nasser was unprepared for the “tidal wave of enthusiasm which swept the country and spilled over into the whole Arab world” as a result of his spirited speeches surrounding the canal negotiations. ₉₇ As Nasser later confessed at the 1963 unity talks, he did not take seriously the idea of unification until after the 1956 Suez War. ₉₈ Nasser’s Arabism exhibited elements of concept creep.

At each moment that Nasser shaped the meaning of Arabism—from his stand against the West in 1955 and 1956 to his embracement of unification in 1958 to his leadership in organizing the Arab challenge to Israel in 1964—he did so because of a combination of reasons involving regime maintenance, security, and nationalism. Yet once he helped to define the norms associated with Arabism, he was committed to following them in order to maintain his prestige. To fulfill the role generated by Arab nationalism meant that he had to abide by its expectations even when he thought better of it. Call it a sorcerer’s apprentice effect. Nasser used and cultivated Arab nationalism for his own purposes, but his creation could—and would—circumscribe and constrain his future actions. Although politicians might be distinguished by their acumen at exploiting the normative environment for ulterior purposes, they also want to be viewed as honoring those norms, lest they be accused of being duplicitous and manipulative and thus suffer a fall from grace. Nasser’s desire to save face occasionally dragged him down a perilous path: the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 1958, his intervention in the republican revolt in Yemen in 1962, and his deliberate escalation of hostilities that precipitated the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Nasser engaged in these and other actions in order to be viewed as acting in a manner expected of someone who was an Arab nationalist. Sometimes this meant that he cursed the role that was partially of his own making.

In general, Nasser stirred the imaginations and the desires of the masses because of his vision of an Arab nation that was restored to greatness. His acts of daring, his defiance of the power of the West, were roundly cheered and celebrated throughout the region, and secured his place as the leader of Arab nationalism. ₉₉ Through words and deeds Nasser signaled to the Western powers that the Arab world would cease to be their political backyard. But it was not only the Western powers who found his message of independence to be insurgent and troubling. Other Arab leaders who had formally and informally aligned with the West found equally, if not more, disturbing his challenges and call for revolutionary change; after all, Nasser would challenge not simply their strategic interests but their very fitness to rule. The yearlong debate over the Baghdad Pact became Nasser’s dress rehearsal for the leadership role he would soon own.

Baghdad Pact

1955 was the decisive turning-point in the post-war history of the Arab world, and the Baghdad Pact was the start of it all.

—King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 83

Few scholars or politicians would have predicted in late 1954 that a British-backed alliance between Turkey and Iraq would become the maelstrom of the Middle East. After all, most key players in the region already had some sort of strategic relationship with a Western power, generally were open to persuasion regarding the benefits of a more formal association, and subscribed to a meaning of Arab nationalism that accommodated a guarded relationship with the West. But the debate about the Baghdad Pact defied all predictions. The yearlong debate about the pact shifted the rules of the game of Arab politics away from conservatism and toward radicalism, found Iraq increasingly alienated from the currents of Arabism and Egypt at its forefront (which caused other Arab states to shift their positions in order to keep their footing), and led to a general normative prohibition against allying with the West. ₁₀₀ This outcome was probably as much a surprise to Egypt’s Nasser as it was to Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Said. It also was testimony to Nasser’s deft deployment of the symbols of Arabism as he mobilized the societies across the region to support his image of an Arab nation that was unified and finally free of colonialism and its remnants.

The clash over the Baghdad Pact could be told through its two central characters, Said and Nasser. Nuri al-Said was an Arab nationalist of long standing, educated under the Ottomans, a participant in the original Arab revolt, a veteran of various tussles and conflicts with Britain in the fight for Iraqi and Arab independence, present at the creation of the League of Arab States, and a champion of various unification proposals over the years. In Said’s view being an Arab nationalist and cooperating with the West was not contradictory. ₁₀₁ Although not all Iraqis shared this interpretation, he steadfastly sought a strategic tie to the West because of the conviction that such an alignment and its accompanying assistance were necessary for domestic stability, building a more powerful army, discouraging a potential encroachment by the Soviets to the north, and confronting Israel. ₁₀₂ His previous attempts to forge an alliance were frustrated by domestic and/or Egyptian opposition. Iraqi nationals scrutinized any suspected association lest it compromise Arab nationalism and Iraqi sovereignty. For instance, when Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement in March 1946 that resembled a security alliance, the signing prompted widespread domestic opposition on the ground that it contradicted Iraq’s obligations to the Arab League; this opposition delayed the ratification of the treaty until April 1947. ₁₀₃ When U.S. Secretary of State Dulles invited Iraq to join the northern tier, his hopes were quickly dashed because, in his view, Iraqi society would not permit such an agreement. ₁₀₄ Egypt too objected to Iraq’s accession to a Western-led security alliance, though its opposition largely derived from its rivalry for leadership and the concern that such an alliance would weaken its bargaining position during the canal negotiations.

Nasser, though generally pro-West, and more than willing to talk to the United States because of his attraction to its capital and arms, differed from Said in a number of respects. First, Nasser was more sensitive to any agreement that hinted at Egypt’s and the Arab world’s subordination to the West. Nasser’s nationalism came from the military barracks and emerged from a series of defeats and humiliations at the hands of Israel and the West; thus any relationship should not compromise Egypt’s independence or insult the Arabs’ dignity. In this respect Nasser and Said had very different conceptions of the desired strategic order. ₁₀₅ Second, Said believed that the Soviets represented a threat to Iraq, whereas Nasser could see little immediate danger from them but much from Israel. ₁₀₆ Third, Nasser was more insistent that the Arab states approach the West collectively and with a singular voice, lest the West attempt to divide and rule. But such a collective approach would be best handled with Nasser at the helm. ₁₀₇ In general, the duel between Said and Nasser was waged between different generations of Arab nationalism and views of what sort of relationship was possible and desirable between the Arab states and the West.

The prelude to the Baghdad Pact was the declaration of the Turko-Pakistani agreement of April 1954. Although it did not include an Arab state, it did involve two Muslim states and was widely seen by the Arab states as the West’s “calling card” to the region. Egypt and Iraq took the lead in the regionwide debate about the Arab states’ position on strategic relations with the West. Egypt’s initial position was that any discussion was premature until the Suez Canal dispute was settled; this obstacle was overcome with the initialing of an agreement on July 27, 1954 (formally signed on October 19). Still, Nasser and Egyptian public opinion remained cool to the idea of participating in a Western-led defense arrangement. Indeed, Nasser and British minister of state Anthony Nutting held a series of talks on the subject after the signing of the Suez Canal treaty, and Nutting concluded that although Nasser might eventually warm to the idea, Egyptian society would not be ready for some time. ₁₀₈

Nuri al-Said, however, welcomed the idea of an alliance and began seeking Arab allies who would join him, or at least not block his path. With the aims of eliminating bilateral tensions, formulating a common policy in Arab-West relations, and obtaining Egypt’s approval for Iraq’s accession, Said initiated a series of meetings with Egypt. The first was with Interior Minister Salim Salim at the Iraqi royal resort of Sarsank in August 1954. ₁₀₉ The results of the talks were inconclusive at best and generated greater misunderstandings at worst. Said subsequently claimed that he received a green light to ally with the West, although within the context of a modified Arab Collective Security Pact (ACSP), and Salim contended that he gave no such signal and insisted that Egypt would need time to overcome its long-standing suspicions of the West. ₁₁₀ Said, still seeking greater clarification and assurances, had his sole meeting with Nasser in mid-September in Cairo about the Baghdad Pact. ₁₁₁ While Said asserted that Iraq had special geostrategic circumstances because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, Nasser informed Said that Egypt was unlikely to join a Western alliance because of domestic opposition. ₁₁₂ Although Said gained a greater appreciation for Nasser’s position, evidence exists that he left Cairo with the (perhaps mistaken?) impression that he was free to pursue his dream of a Middle Eastern alliance. ₁₁₃

The Egyptian and Iraqi discussions were the prelude to the Arab foreign ministers’ meeting in Cairo in December 1954, when the Arab governments hoped to hammer out some guidelines concerning their future relationship to the West and the conditions under which an Arab state might join a Western-led alliance. ₁₁₄ As Nasser welcomed the delegates, he urged them to follow Egypt’s example by constructing resolutions that reflected the needs of the Arab nation, pledging not to join any outside alliance, and emphasizing their reliance on the collective security pact. ₁₁₅ This they did. The foreign ministers crafted two resolutions: “that no alliance should be concluded outside the fold of the Collective Arab Security Pact,” and “that cooperation with the West was possible, provided that a just solution was found for Arab problems and provided the Arabs were allowed to build up their strength with gifts of arms.” ₁₁₆ Egypt, which had overseen the writing of the Arab League Charter with an eye toward stopping unification and preserving sovereignty and then designed the ACSP as a way to halt the discussion of Syrian-Iraqi unification in 1949, now used the ACSP to slow down Iraq’s planned alliance with the West under the Baghdad Pact. Echoing the neutrality that became a hallmark of Nasser’s foreign policy, the foreign ministers proclaimed that the “burden of the defense of the Arab East should fall on the states of the area alone, and that the question of putting the Collective Security Pact into effect has become timely and inevitable if the Arab States are to form a united front in political affairs and defense against any foreign danger that may threaten any or all of them.” ₁₁₇ The foreign ministers publicly proclaimed that they must coordinate their policies because they were Arab states.

No sooner had the meeting adjourned than rumors swirled that Iraq would sign the Baghdad Pact. That Said should so quickly and defiantly disregard the highly publicized decisions of the foreign ministers’ conference is something of a curiosity, and there are more speculations than explanations: a secret agreement with Nasser recognized Iraq’s special geographic circumstances and condoned Said’s plan; Said’s perception of the Soviet threat; Said’s need for cooperation with Turkey on the Kurdish issue to maintain Iraq’s internal cohesion; and Said’s belief that he could survive any public outcry that was sure to follow and that other Arab states were likely to follow his lead and thereby lend him political cover. ₁₁₈ Although his motives were many, Said had good reason to believe that he might be able to sell the alliance at home and to other Arab states.

Nasser responded to the rumors of a security pact by unleashing a media tirade against Iraq. His stated objections centered on the claim that any alliance would only safeguard the interests of the West and harm those of the Arab nation and that Arab states should seek neutrality and security in their unity. ₁₁₉ But such an alliance also would harm Egypt’s standing, leaving it isolated and perhaps facing the threat of Israel on its own. ₁₂₀ Nasser’s prestige was entangled as well. Nasser, observed King Hussein, “had to attack the [Baghdad] Pact if only to prevent other Arab states from joining and so diminishing his prestige.” ₁₂₁

Egypt’s efforts had little apparent effect, for on January 13, 1955, Iraq and Turkey announced that they soon would sign a defense agreement. In presenting his case to the Iraqi people and the Arab world Said claimed that the Baghdad Pact was consistent with the Charter of the League of Arab States and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and that it furthered the goals of the Arab world. He further asserted that the foreign ministers had acknowledged Iraq’s “special geographic position” (a reference to the Soviet Union) at their recent meeting. ₁₂₂ Said used the unveiling of his planned alliance to present a series of arguments concerning why the alliance was consistent with Arabism and why Iraq’s move should be emulated, not chastised.

The Arab world responded with outrage to the news, and Nasser led the battle cry. Cairo’s persistent and emphatic message was that the Baghdad Pact undermined and represented a grave challenge to Arab nationalism and Arab security. The headline of one Egyptian daily proclaimed: “Iraqi Government Demolishes All Efforts to Strengthen the Arab League and Bolster the Arab Collective Security Pact.” ₁₂₃ The Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram wrote that Nuri al-Said’s actions “touched a sensitive part in the heart of Egypt and, no doubt, of five other Arab states”; by defiantly rejecting the recent resolutions of the foreign ministers who pledged to coordinate their foreign policies on alliances with non-Arab states and to make the ACSP the center of their defense positioning, Iraq’s actions were a threat to the Arab family. ₁₂₄ Voice of the Arabs broadcast that:

While the Arab States are preparing to hold a meeting of their Foreign Ministers to consider and agree on the unification of their foreign policy, the consolidation of the Collective Security Pact, and the strengthening of the Arab League, the Arab World is taken unaware by a communique issued by two countries. . . . How can it be justified that Iraq took part in this communique and indeed did so on her own when the meeting is about to be held? 125

Nasser was deftly tying the meaning of the Baghdad Pact to both the security of the Arab states and the future of Arab nationalism. Egyptian interior minister Salim, who was one of Egypt’s point men in the campaign against Iraq, responded to whether sovereign Iraq had the right to enter into any treaty it wanted by saying, “Although Iraq is an independent sovereign state, she nevertheless has obligations and responsibilities toward the League of Arab States and the Arab Collective Security Pact. Is there any state, in the Atlantic Pact, for example, free to make any decisions it chooses even it be contrary to that pact?” ₁₂₆ If Arab states could not honor the decisions of the most recent conference and coordinate their foreign policies before making any formal agreement with the West, Arab nationalism and the Arab League were finished. ₁₂₇ In a later statement Salim drew the current challenge dramatically: “The Arab World is now standing at a crossroads: it will either be an independent and cohesive unit with its own structures and national character or else each country will pursue its own course. The latter would mean the beginning of the downfall of Arab nationhood.” ₁₂₈ Egypt was framing the pact as a challenge to Arab nationalism.

To try to forge a common front against Iraq and to stop the treaty from being signed, Nasser hosted the other Arab leaders from January 22 though February 6, 1955. The Arab representatives filed into Cairo publicly proclaiming their outrage at Iraq’s actions but privately were less exercised, and some even contemplated following Baghdad rather than Cairo. Saudi Arabia’s position was closest to Egypt’s, for it feared that its traditional Hashemite rivals in Jordan and Iraq would use their newfound resources and prestige to launch another bid for Fertile Crescent unification; that is, the Hashemites threatened Saudi Arabia’s external and internal stability. ₁₂₉ Yemen too came out against the pact.

Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan were less appalled and somewhat approving. Syrian officials were divided over whether to join the pact. Although espousing neutralism in the early 1950s, Prime Minister Faris al-Khuri and Foreign Minister Faydi al-Atasi were both relatively pro-West and therefore somewhat attenuated in their position: although they might not sign the pact, they were unwilling to condemn Baghdad. ₁₃₀ Khuri said that he could give only his personal view that Syria should not sign the pact, that Damascus might have a different mind. ₁₃₁ Lebanon was neutral to the point of being slightly encouraging. ₁₃₂ The Lebanese prime minister commented that he “could not see what the fuss was all about” because there was nothing new here; Iraq, after all, already had a similar agreement from its treaties of 1937 and 1948. ₁₃₃

King Hussein was publicly cool to the idea but privately in favor, a stance informed by strategic, dynastic, and symbolic concerns. As a Hashemite monarch with close political and military ties to the British, the Jordanian king was something of a natural partner and generally disposed toward signing the pact. Yet he was not oblivious to the rising tide of Arabism in Jordan and the region, believed that any joint Arab-Western defense network might be best realized by first working through the Arab League, worried that siding with Cairo’s campaign against Iraq meant exacerbating the already inflamed inter-Arab tensions, and feared alienating Egypt and Syria, on which Jordan would rely in the event of an Israeli attack. ₁₃₄

Nasser attempted to convince Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon to condemn and censure Baghdad. In an early address to the heads of state he framed the pact as representing a stark alternative between an Arab nationalism based on unity and one premised on disunity: “Egypt proposes to the Arab states a foreign policy based on developing Arab unity and independent stature and offers to put all its economic, military, and moral resources at the disposal of Arab nationalism. Nuri al-Said, on the other hand, proposes a policy under which each Arab state would act alone and decide its own future, which would make it easy for the West to swallow them.” ₁₃₅ Later Nasser challenged his fellow Arab leaders to answer Baghdad with strong action, including the “establishment of a unified Arab army under one command along the same lines as the proposed European army.” ₁₃₆ The other Arab states, however, remained unconvinced.

Irritated that the other Arab leaders were not following his dictates, Nasser threatened to go to the press and suspend Egypt’s relations with them. ₁₃₇ Nasser’s ultimatum and threatened symbolic sanctions apparently worked. Although Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon refused to follow Nasser’s admonitions and directives, the conferees passed several resolutions condemning Iraq’s actions, pledged not to sign the pact, and decided to send a delegation to Iraq to try to convince Said of the error of his ways. Significantly, however, the conference adjourned without issuing a final statement. ₁₃₈ If the Arab governments filed out of Cairo publicly declaring their abhorrence of the pact and their unwillingness to follow Iraq’s deviation from the Arab fold, in private some felt less strongly about Iraq’s actions and were seriously considering signing. The fight had just begun.

Iraq and Turkey formally signed the pact on February 24. As Said unveiled the pact to a waiting and watching Arab world, he took great pains to detail what was and was not contained in it, to defend himself against Nasser’s accusations, and to portray his actions as consistent with the UN, the Arab League, and Arab nationalism. Said’s speech was highly defensive, reflecting a sensitivity to the charges raised by Nasser and to the public’s concern that his actions had isolated Iraq from the Arab fold. To defend himself against Nasser and to reassure the public, he spent considerable time detailing various tenets of the pact and emphasizing its link to the Arab past, present, and future. ₁₃₉

Now Said and Nasser would mobilize all their energies and tools, symbolic and otherwise, to fight for the hearts, minds, and votes of the Arab world. Syria represented the first stop in the debate about the pact, which became a sign and cause of its increasingly nationalist and neutralist leanings. ₁₄₀ Initially, many Syrian nationalists had welcomed the pact because it might generate aid, increase security against Israel, and perhaps even professionalize the military and keep it in the barracks and out of politics. ₁₄₁ Syria’s attitude changed slightly when Faris al-Khuri resigned and was replaced by Sabri al-Atali in early February, a change only modestly related to the pact. ₁₄₂ To steel these antipact forces Egyptian minister Salim arrived in Damascus on February 26 to propose a “federal union” with a joint military command and unified foreign policies in lieu of the now-defunct collective security pact. The Syrians, however, viewed the proposal with suspicion. ₁₄₃

In his lobbying efforts Nasser got some timely and unintended help from Israel. On February 28, just four days after the signing of the pact, Israel attacked a military installation in Gaza. Nasser quickly capitalized on the assault by claiming that it was coordinated with and enabled by the Baghdad Pact. ₁₄₄ Nasser found himself riding a tide of popular support as protests erupted against the pact throughout the Arab world. ₁₄₅ In Syria, Israel’s attack increased the domestic pressures against the pact and in favor of an alliance with Egypt as a deterrent to Israel. ₁₄₆ The army was now so determined to create a defensive alliance against Israel that several Syrian military officers threatened a coup d’état unless Syria joined an alliance with Egypt. ₁₄₇

On March 6 Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia pledged to create their own alliance, which they called the Tripartite Alliance; included among its provisions was a rejection of the Baghdad Pact and the strengthening of the collective Arab defense. ₁₄₈ Syrian foreign minister Khalid al-Azm noted that Jordan could not join the alliance because its army was controlled by Britain and therefore was ineligible to serve in the Unified Arab Command. ₁₄₉ But Azm nevertheless insisted that the pact not “exclude Iraq or preclude the possibility of member states joining the Iraq-Turkey Pact.” ₁₅₀ The value of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance from the Egyptian and Saudi perspective was not its deterrent effect but its ability to stop Syria from following in Iraq’s footsteps. ₁₅₁

Yet Syria’s future relationship to the Baghdad Pact remained a matter of debate. The tripartite discussions continued through May 1955, though with little resolution, given that Saudi Arabia and Egypt refused to allocate 10 percent of their budgets to a unified army and to effect economic unity with Syria. Nor would they leave the door open to Iraq’s participation in the pact. ₁₅₂ The Syrian presidential elections of August 1955 provided another opportunity for rival Arab states to try to influence Syria’s foreign ties; Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Egypt each opposed Syrian foreign minister Azm for their own reasons, some of which had to do with the pact, and the nomination of Qwattli provided some evidence that Syria was drifting toward the Egyptian camp. ₁₅₃ Many Syrian politicians, however, voiced concerns about the Tripartite Alliance and the exclusion of Iraq, a move they feared would harm Syria’s political, economic, and strategic interests. ₁₅₄ Such developments pushed Syria back on the fence and delayed its accession to the Tripartite Alliance.

Nasser’s arms deal with Czechoslovakia on September 27 radically transformed the climate and shifted the ground toward Nasser in the fight over the pact. ₁₅₅ The arms deal electrified the region, and the response was unanimously positive; editorials and government officials throughout the Arab world applauded Nasser’s audacity and courage, and even King Hussein observed that he was impressed by the boldness of the move. The arms deal had several dramatic implications for Nasser’s immediate and future standing and the Baghdad Pact. First, it fundamentally transformed the West’s perception of Nasser; whereas before he was a nationalist who was playing hard ball, now he was a nationalist who was flirting with the Soviets. Still, the Americans refused to write him off. ₁₅₆ Second, the arms deal boldly demonstrated to the Arab world that it did not have to be subservient to the West; this action, then, rendered anachronistic strategic arrangements such as the Baghdad Pact. Third, Nasser’s move, though not intended for this purpose, rescued the nearly moribund Tripartite Alliance; it was signed on October 20 (an Egyptian-Saudi mutual defense pact was signed a week later). ₁₅₇ The arms deal convinced many Syrian officials that, by joining Egypt, Syria could vastly increase its security through an alliance and a parallel arms deal with the Soviet Union that would also allow Syrian officials to be identified with Arab neutrality, independence, and power. Syria was now solidly in the Egyptian camp.

The final battle over the pact would be waged in and over Jordan. Hussein’s initial opinion of the pact was generally positive, but through the fall no amount of outside pressure from Britain, Turkey, or Iraq could convince him that he should antagonize Egypt and Arab popular opinion by signing the pact. Hussein abandoned his position of neutrality in November because of two principal events. The first was the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, which according to Hussein, “changed everything.” ₁₅₈ The arms deal reignited the debate about Jordan’s participation in the pact and increased both neutralist sentiments in the region and pressure from the West for Jordan to sign the pact as a countermeasure to the perceived growth of Soviet influence. ₁₅₉ Second, in early November President Celal Bayar of Turkey visited Amman and told Hussein that Britain might provide the strategic assistance he needed to expand the Arab Legion if he signed the pact. A similar message was conveyed by Lebanese leader Camille Chamoun. ₁₆₀ Hussein now decided to sign the pact. ₁₆₁ In mid-November Hussein informed Britain that he would sign the pact at the right price, replaced one prime minister who was unwilling to steer Jordan into the arms of the West (Huda) with another who would (Said al-Mufti), and asked Nasser not to destabilize his regime once he made his pro-pact intentions known.

Hussein must have known that he was asking the impossible from Nasser. Emboldened by the military pact with Syria and angered that Britain had seemingly reneged on its spring agreement to stop recruiting other Arab states, Nasser unleashed a fierce media campaign against Jordan and framed the pact as undermining Arab nationalism and linking any Arab state that supported it to imperialism. ₁₆₂ In the midst of an increasingly furious debate, in early December Britain sent a top military official, John Templer, to persuade Hussein to sign the pact. ₁₆₃ This highly publicized and controversial visit by a British official in the midst of Nasser’s campaign against the pact played right into Nasser’s hands. Hussein, who braced himself for some political opposition, now confronted fierce rioting. “Hundreds of thousands of Jordanians,” Hussein reflected, “listening avidly to the propaganda on Cairo Radio, saw in Nasser a sort of mystical savior.” ₁₆₄

Despite the domestic turmoil, Hussein pressed ahead with his vision of Jordan as a member of the Baghdad Pact. The Jordanian cabinet continued to debate whether to sign, but the cabinet fell as a result of the divisions over the pact. ₁₆₅ Hazza al-Majali became the new prime minister on December 13 and faced the difficult task of steering Jordan into the pact. ₁₆₆ He was equally unsuccessful and now faced some of the worst rioting in Jordanian history. Demonstrators were calling for the resignation of this recently formed government and a public pledge to cease any further discussions of signing the pact. As Hussein later wrote, “We were virtually helpless. . . . All hell broke loose. Riots such as we had never seen before . . . disrupted the whole country. This time bands of fire-raisers started burning the Government buildings, private houses, foreign properties. I had no alternative but to call out the Legion. . . . That was the end of the Jordan and the Baghdad Pact.” ₁₆₇ The riots left a deep impression on the king. The streets of Amman were solidly behind Nasser, and Hussein was nearly an outcast in his own kingdom. After losing two prime ministers and experiencing a near civil war in a few short weeks, Hussein, though blaming the riots on Communist organizers and a constitutional technicality, reluctantly decided not to sign the pact. He declared a state of emergency, the Majali government resigned, and soon thereafter the new Jordanian government proclaimed a “no new pacts” pledge.

Hussein, reeling from the challenges to his rule, attempted to repair his stained image through various actions during the next several months. He reluctantly accepted an offer from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to replace his British subsidy. ₁₆₈ Then he dismissed John Glubb, the long-time and legendary commander of the Arab Legion. During the December riots Nasser had turned Glubb into a symbol of Jordan’s ties to imperialism. ₁₆₉ Recounting the events that led to his dismissal, Glubb wrote: “The King had been enthusiastically determined to enter the Baghdad Pact, and had thereby incurred the hostility of Egypt and of Jordanian extremists. The policy had failed. . . . To perform some act of defiance towards Britain and to dismiss me would immediately re-establish his popularity.” ₁₇₀ Glubb’s dismissal represented Hussein’s attempt to distance himself from the past and to transform the image of his army from an agent of imperialism into a representative of the Arab nation. ₁₇₁ The failure of the Templer mission suggested that Britain’s day in the Middle East was nearing the end, and Glubb’s abrupt eviction was an unmistakable sign. The demise of the British position in Jordan was the clearest signal that Arab states would now adhere to the norm of no alliances with the West.

As Nasser predicted at the outset of the debate about the Baghdad Pact in December 1954, the Arab world had to choose between two visions of Arab nationalism and Arab politics. The pact represented a challenge not to the balance of power per se but to Arab nationalism and its contested norms by unleashing a debate among Arab states concerning what behavior was and was not proper for Arab states. That Said and Nasser favored rival schools cannot be disconnected from their interests in regime and state security, but neither were they wholly derivative of them. And which version would stand at the end of the debate could not have been predicted by material power alone. That Nasser’s vision carried the day was not a foregone conclusion, could not be predicted from strategic or material considerations, and in fact Said could realistically calculate that regional forces would favor him and his version. Nasser was able to defeat the pact and win the debate because of some timely events—including Israel’s occasional raids on Syria, Jordan, and Egypt and Britain’s insistence on sending the Templer mission to Jordan in early December—but, most important, because of his ability to frame the Baghdad Pact as a violation of Arab nationalism and link it to an imperialist past and an equally divided and dependent future. Nasser’s successful ability to frame the pact in this way accounts for the symbolic sanctions that ultimately convinced Arab leaders to cut their ties with the West and strengthen them with Nasser, although these were the very leaders who had every reason to maintain an alliance with the West and to oppose Nasser’s growing power.

Arab leaders dueled with symbols and images and not with militaries and attempted to portray themselves as expressing and furthering the aspirations of the Arab nation and their rival as potentially injuring those interests. In the end Said’s nationalism was out of step with the politics of the period, as he held the West out as a model and source of resources; Nasser offered a vision of Arab politics in which the West was and remained under suspicion and stressed that Arab states were best served by maintaining neutrality and independence. By offering a vision of the future and outlining those policies that were viewed as harming the Arab nation, Nasser shaped the contours of Arab politics and the meaning of Arab nationalism.

Egypt had forged a series of alliances with some Arab states that concurred with Nasser’s brand of Arabism (Syria) and others that did not (Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia), and the latter states chose to ally with Nasser’s vision of regional life rather than risk a decline in regional standing or a domestic backlash. Egypt’s ability to mobilize a fierce media campaign or engineer a coup against the Arab leaders if they signed the Baghdad Pact convinced them that they should not sign, even though this meant solidifying Nasser’s brand of Arabism, which “constituted a permanent challenge to the very legitimacy of these existing states.” ₁₇₂ In other words, Arab leaders interpreted Nasser’s growing ability to define the events of the day as a potential threat to their own regimes’ survival, but to publicly oppose him would only open questions regarding their credentials and thus invite domestic challenges. Nearly damned if they did and damned if they did not, Arab leaders publicly aligned themselves with Nasser but privately looked for ways to protect themselves.

The Baghdad Pact was a transformative event in Arab politics. This was the moment that Nasser found his footing, sharpened his message, and inaugurated a decade in which he possessed the rare ability to set the political agenda for an entire region and generation. The West was now on the decline and the Soviets on the rise. The conservative Arab leaders looked anachronistic and increasingly feeble, out of step in these changing times and the radicalization of politics. But, more indelibly, the dialogue about the Baghdad Pact changed the parameters of Arab politics and redefined the practices that were consistent with Arabism. “Nasser was able to change the rules of the game,” recalled a former top-ranking Jordanian official. “The Baghdad Pact reshaped the entire region.” ₁₇₃

The League of Arab States was in many respects created to smother the tendencies that emerged during the course of the decade. The league’s charter envisioned an association in which members were accountable to each other in name only, but they had become much more mutually vulnerable to each other since the end of World War II. By the close of 1955 Arab states were more tightly coupled than ever before, and even those leaders who wanted to ignore the norms of Arabism could hardly do so because of the political implications of such neglect. Whereas no prohibition against relations with the Jewish community existed in 1945, five years later such relations were taboo. The strategic efforts of some Fertile Crescent leaders to tap into the popular support for unification notwithstanding, a coalition of Arab states continued to defeat the move toward territorial unification. But even here the price for keeping unification at bay was forging a collective security pact that formally acknowledged that their security was interdependent. Whereas many Arab political elites felt that their future relations with the West were in need of repair and reform, the aftermath of the Baghdad Pact deposited a strong prohibition against relations with the West and a strong force for positive neutrality.

This web of normative integration was woven through symbolic competition between Arab states. Arab leaders felt little hesitation in appropriating the symbols of Arabism in their search for regime stability and regional influence, recognizing that such symbols were ripe for accumulation and highly effective in controlling the foreign policies of other Arab states because their populations more readily identified with the symbols of Arabism than with the symbols of the state. Arab leaders attempted to further their goals through symbolic exchanges and competition, and the result was a radically transformed context to Arab politics. Few Arab leaders wanted to be encumbered by the norms of Arabism, but their willingness to use the symbols of Arab nationalism in the service of their various goals nurtured that very outcome. Arab leaders were increasingly beholden to the norms that they once feared; that they were now more tightly integrated and thus found themselves more oriented toward each other was a product of their willingness to use the symbols that Arabism made available to them to maintain their standing at home and control their rivals abroad.

 

Endotes

Note 1: Leonard Binder, “Nasserism: The Protest Movement in the Middle East,” in M. Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics, pp. 152–74 (New York: Wiley, 1962). Back.

Note 2: Itamar Rabinovich, The Road Not Taken (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 3. Also see Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–48 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), p. 163. Back.

Note 3: See Mohammad Iqbal Ansari, The Arab League, 1945–55 (Aligarh, Pakistan: Aligarh Muslim University, 1968), pp. 63–74, and Leila Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine Problem, 1936–50, 1964–66 (Beirut: PLO Research Center, 1966), for a review of the Arab League’s decisions on Palestine. Back.

Note 4: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Crystallization of the Arab State System (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1993), p. 36; Michael Eppel, The Palestine Conflict and the History of Modern Iraq (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 154–56. Back.

Note 5: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 15–16; Eppel, Palestine Conflict, p. 193. Back.

Note 6: Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences, pp. 52–54. Back.

Note 7: Ibid., p. 55. Back.

Note 8: Ibid., p. 56; Eppel, Palestine Conflict, pp. 156, 171–72, 178–79. Back.

Note 9: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 50; Philip Mattar, The Mufti of Jerusalem (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Back.

Note 10: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 57; Eppel, Palestine Conflict, pp. 181–83. Back.

Note 11: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 44–45; Avi Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan: A Political Study, 1948–57 (New York: Asia Publishing, 1965), pp. 26–39. Back.

Note 12: Abdullah was the lone Arab leader who was willing to entertain partition, leading other Arab states to be suspicious of his motivations. Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 95–104. Back.

Note 13: Ibid., pp. 128–29, 167; Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 51. Because of the belief that Abdullah was about to invade Palestine to further his territorial objectives, on April 12 the league passed an Egypt-sponsored resolution that insisted that any land acquired should be turned over to an Arab League committee and the Palestinian Arabs. Martin Sicker, Between Hashemites and Zionists: The Struggle for Palestine, 1908–88 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989), p. 103. Back.

Note 14: Mohamed Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (New York: Arbor House, 1987), p. 16. Back.

Note 15: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 170–71. Back.

Note 16: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 61; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 171; Adel M. Sabit, A King Betrayed: The Ill-Fated Reign of Farouk of Egypt (New York: Quartet, 1989), p. 165; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 173. Back.

Note 17: Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), pp. 34–35; Eppel, Palestine Conflict, pp. 183–85. Back.

Note 18: Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences, p. 85. Back.

Note 19: Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 172–73, 197–201; Mary Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 173. Back.

Note 20: Mohamed Heikal, Secret Channels (London: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 78. Back.

Note 21: Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 202. Back.

Note 22: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, pp. 66–69; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 196–205. Back.

Note 23: Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences, p. 85. Back.

Note 24: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 19. Back.

Note 25: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 17. In Egypt the loss of Palestine led to renewed debate about its national identity, a withdrawal from Arab politics, and even some demands for withdrawal from the Arab League. See Ali Abdel Rahman Rahmy, The Egyptian Policy in the Arab World (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), p. 20; Ghada Hashem Talhami, Palestine and Egyptian National Identity (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 62–66; Anwar Chejne, “Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism,” Middle East Journal 11, no. 3 (Summer 1957): 260. Back.

Note 26: The armistice negotiations were conducted bilaterally, mediated by the U.N.’s Ralph Bunche, and resulted in four separate agreements in 1949. A principal reason that the armistice agreements were concluded at all was Bunche’s dogged determination and insistence that the Arabs negotiate on an individual rather than collective basis, which encouraged them to serve their own particularistic interests. Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 16–17. Back.

Note 27: Israeli officials were somewhat optimistic that the Arab governments would reconcile themselves to the Jewish state. Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 4–5. Indeed, previous contacts between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt had led some Israelis to contemplate a “Ligue Orientale” to include Israel and the other Arab states and render the Arab League moribund. Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 89. Back.

Note 28: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, pp. 101–103. Back.

Note 29: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 154. Back.

Note 30: Ibid., chap. 3. Also see Moshe Maoz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Oxford, England: Clarendon, 1995), pp. 20–26. Back.

Note 31: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken. Back.

Note 32: Ibid., pp. 107–108. Back.

Note 33: Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 359. Back.

Note 34: Ibid., pp. 359–60; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 118–19. Back.

Note 35: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 153; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 552. Back.

Note 36: “Al-Tal Requests Trial of Jordan Rulers,” Al-Misri, Damascus, March 28, 1950, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter FBIS), no. 63, March 29, 1950, PP6–7. Back.

Note 37: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 139–41. Back.

Note 38: “League’s Future Hangs on Cairo Session,” Tunis, in Arabic, March 26, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 60, March 28, 1950, PP3. Jordan initially refused to attend the meetings, citing a hostile Egyptian press and Egypt’s failure to honor the previously brokered understanding between Egypt and Jordan that Egypt was to become the caretaker of Gaza and Jordan the guardian of the West Bank. Soon thereafter, however, Jordan determined that it would lose more by staying away from the league meetings than by going to Cairo and facing a hostile crowd. “Amman States Position on Arab League,” Jerusalem (Jordan), March 28, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 63, March 29, 1950, PP1. Back.

Note 39: o. 63, March 29, 1950, PP1. 39. “Arab League’s Resolution,” Beirut, March 30, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 63, March 31, 1950, PP14. Also see Egyptian Home Service, “League Approves Defense, Economic Pact,” Cairo, April 14, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 74, April 17, 1950, PP1. Back.

Note 40: Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 554–55; Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, pp. 130–35; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 148–9; Abidi, Jordan pp. 77–78. Back.

Note 41: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 147. Back.

Note 42: “Jordan Announces Official Annexation,” Jerusalem (Jordan), April 24, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 80, April 25, 1950, PP9. Also see Abidi, Jordan, pp. 75–76; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, p. 558. Back.

Note 43: Egyptian Home Service, “Abdullah’s Real Motive Held Expansion,” Cairo, April 24, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 81, April 26, 1950, PP10; “Syria States Case Against Annexation,” Damascus, April 22, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 79, April 24, 1950, PP1–4. Back.

Note 44: “Abdullah Scorns League,” April 22, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 79, April 24, 1950, PP5. Also see Sicker, Between Hashemites and Zionists, p. 108. Back.

Note 45: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, pp. 138–41. Back.

Note 46: However, evidence exists that King Faruq and King Abdullah made a backroom deal—that Abdullah would abandon his search for a separate peace with Israel in exchange for being allowed to annex the West Bank. See Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 184. Back.

Note 47: Robert Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 30–32. Back.

Note 48: Herzl Berger, “Arabs Refusal to Negotiate Explained,” Jerusalem (Israel), April 7, 1950, cited in FBIS, no. 70, April 11, 1950, PP5. Back.

Note 49: Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, pp. 19–20; Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 41; Wilson, King Abdullah; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 5. Back.

Note 50: For instance, in March 1946 on the occasion of the first Parliament and again in the fall of 1946 and early 1947 King Abdullah raised the idea of a Greater Syria, which would include Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan. See Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 13; Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, pp. 85–86; Wilson, King Abdullah, pp. 157–60. This debate, like others that would transpire for the next decade, ended at the Arab League. Meeting in late November 1946, the Arab states agreed to honor each others’ sovereignty and to cease all discussion of the Greater Syria proposal. Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 39. In April 1947 Jordan and Iraq were rumored to be preparing a draft unification agreement but ultimately signed only an alliance. See Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 14; Sharq al-Adna, “Iraq and Transjordan Sign Alliance,” April 14, 1947, cited in FBIS, no. 37, April 15, 1947, II1. In the fall of 1947 Abdullah once again raised the idea of Greater Syria, though his timing (the U.N. was debating Palestine) caused many Arab states to publicly ponder whether a link existed between Abdullah’s proposals and British and Zionist interests in the region. Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 42. Back.

Note 51: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 105; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, pp. 93–96. Back.

Note 52: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 19; Gordon Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945–58. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964), p. 137 Back.

Note 53: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 107: Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 134–35; Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 48. Back.

Note 54: Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 51–52. Egypt and Iraq had a tendency to play out their rivalries on Syrian soil, each buying Syrian politicians and competing for advantage in Syrian politics. Cairo and Baghdad tried to break this dynamic by drafting an agreement in December 1949 that pledged them to respect Syria’s political integrity. The Iraqi architects of the agreement, who also pledged to help Syria forge a proper constitution that would facilitate stability, were accused of being weak on Egypt and had to resign as a consequence. Eli Podeh, The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact (New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), p. 82. Back.

Note 55: See Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 47–56, for a discussion of these talks. Back.

Note 56: Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 153–54; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 77–83. Back.

Note 57: Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 3; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 15, 79–81. Back.

Note 58: “Syrian Party Calls for Union with Iraq,” Tel Aviv and Baghdad, September 29, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 189, September 30, 1949, PP1. Back.

Note 59: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, pp. 115–18. Back.

Note 60: “Iraq Press Comments on Council, Union,” Al-Nida, Baghdad, October 19, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 203, October 20, 1949, PP2. Back.

Note 61: “Al-Huda Says Iraq, Jordan Agree,” Beirut, October 17, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 201, October 18, 1949, PP1. Also see “Unity Is Solution to Arab Problems,” Jerusalem (Jordan), September 23, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 186, September 26, 1949, PP9. Back.

Note 62: “Shamoun States Arab Unity Conditions,” Damascus, September 7, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 173, September 8, 1949, PP1. Lebanon expressed its reservations about the plan, including that it not intrude on Lebanon’s sovereignty, not impose any military or financial obligations, and that it facilitate economic relations. “Lebanese Reservations,” Jerusalem (Jordan), November 6, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 212, November 7, 1949, PP4–5. Back.

Note 63: “Egypt Blamed for Anti-Union Campaign,” Baghdad, October 20, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 204, October 21, 1949, PP4. Back.

Note 64: Egypt also submitted a memorandum asking the Syrian government to reject the proposed agreement until after the elections because it did not represent its people. “Arab Political Discussions Cancelled,” Tel Aviv, September 18, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 181, September 20, 1949, PP12. Back.

Note 65: Sharq al-Adna, “Committee Adopts Military Plan,” October 23, 1949, cited in FBIS, no, 205, October 24, 1949, PP1–2. For the text see Sharq al-Adna, “Clauses of the Arab Security Pact Revealed,” October 29, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 209, October 31, 1949, PP1–2. Also see Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 90–91; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 46. Back.

Note 66: Egyptian Home Service, “Yusuf Yassin Favors Egyptian Proposal,” Cairo, October 25, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 207, October 26, 1949, PP4. See also Egyptian Home Service, “Saudi Arabia Defines Attitude on Syria,” Cairo, December 24, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 248, December 27, 1949, PP9. Back.

Note 67: “Nuri: League Chaos Causes Problems,” Beirut, October 24, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 206, October 25, 1949, PP1–3. Back.

Note 68: “Syria Tells Iraq Union Impossible Now,” Beirut, in Arabic to London and the Near East, December 8, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 237, December 9, 1949, PP4; “Hannawi Thinks Security Plan Essential,” Beirut, in Arabic, October 28, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 209, October 31, 1949, PP4. Other reports, however, stated that the army was divided. See Egyptian Home Service, “Syrian Army Divided on Iraqi Union,” Cairo, November 7, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 215, November 8, 1949, PP7. Back.

Note 69: Egyptian Home Service, “Faris al-Khuri Speaks on Arab Unity,” September 21, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 184, September 23, 1949, PP4. Also see “Al-Khuri Says Defense Alliance Needed,” Jerusalem (Jordan), October 26, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 208, October 27, 1949, PP3. Back.

Note 70: Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 84–85, 124; Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 124; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 20. Back.

Note 71: “Subcommittee to Sift Security Plans,” various sources, November 17, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 223, November 18, 1949, PP2–3. Back.

Note 72: “Real Unity for Arabs Held Unthinkable,” radio series “What Happens in Arab Countries,” Tel Aviv, in Hebrew, November 30, 1949, cited in FBIS, no. 233, December 5, 1949, PP9. Back.

Note 73: See Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 90–91, for a discussion of the events leading to the pact. See Alan Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power System (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1982), pp. 125–27, for the text. Back.

Note 74: Jordan, which refused to become an original member of the Arab Collective Security Pact because of Egypt’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of Abdullah’s annexation of the West Bank, became a member in January 1952 when Prime Minister Abu al-Huda determined that “while the Pact can do no good, it can do no serious harm.” Cited in Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, p. 45. Back.

Note 75: “Al-Qudsi Proposes a United Arab State,” Damascus, in Arabic, January 26, 1951, cited in FBIS, no. 24, January 30, 1951, NN1–7. Also see Ansari, Arab League, p. 96. For Iraq’s various political and economic motives concerning these unification moves, see Eberhard Kienle, “The Limits of Fertile Crescent Unity: Iraqi Policies Toward Syria Since 1945,” in D. Hopwood, H. Ishaw, and T. Koszinowski, eds., Iraq: Power and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 361–63. Back.

Note 76: “League Committee Hears Arab Union Plan,” Cairo, January 12, 1954, cited in FBIS, no. 8, January 13, 1954, MM1. Back.

Note 77: Cited in Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 54. Back.

Note 78: Ansari, Arab League, p. 123. Back.

Note 79: See Abidi, Jordan, pp. 122–23, for a survey of the positions of the individual Arab governments concerning relations with the West. Back.

Note 80: For instance, when Jordan achieved its independence on March 22, 1946, many in the region perceived the accompanying treaty as maintaining Britain’s colonial privileges and therefore representing independence in name only. This resulted in various attacks from Arab circles; Syria symbolically closed its border with Jordan for a day, and other Arab states withheld their immediate recognition. Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, p. 31. Back.

Note 81: Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 186–92. Back.

Note 82: Wm. Roger Louis, British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–51: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). Back.

Note 83: J. C. Hurewitz, “The Historical Context,” in W. R. Louis and R. Owen, eds., Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 25. Back.

Note 84: Ansari, Arab League, p. 54. Back.

Note 85: See Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, and Faiz Abu-Jaber, “The Egyptian Revolution and Middle East Defense: 1952–55,” Middle East Forum 45, no. 4 (December 1969): 25–56, for discussions of the question of Middle Eastern defense from 1952 through 1955. Back.

Note 86: Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 17. Back.

Note 87: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 50–51; Rabinovich, Road Not Taken, p. 193. Back.

Note 88: Egyptian Home Service, “Salah al-Din Interviewed by U.S. News,” Cairo, October 10, 1951, cited in FBIS, no. 203, October 11, 1951, NN1–5; Egyptian Home Service, “Arab Nations Confer on Defense Plan,” Cairo, October 14, 1951, cited in FBIS, no. 205, October 15, 1951, NN1. Back.

Note 89: “Arab States Outline League’s Policy,” Beirut, November 14, 1951, cited in FBIS, no. 227, November 15, 1951, NN4. Syria and Saudi Arabia, however, were piqued that Egypt unilaterally rejected this proposal without first consulting the other Arab states; indeed, the Syrian paper Al-Jil al-Jadid reported that Syria and Saudi Arabia interpreted Egypt’s decision as signaling that “each Arab country must work out its own policy in light of its own interests.” “Syria Scores Egypt Defense Stand,” Paris, October 17, 1951, cited in FBIS, no. 208, October 18, 1951, NN2. Back.

Note 90: Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 111. Back.

Note 91: On sympathy for an alliance, Amin Hewedy, interview by author, Cairo; Anthony Nutting, Nasser (London: Constable, 1972), p. 74. On relations with Israel see Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 338–39. Back.

Note 92: Rashid Khalidi, “Consequences of the Suez Crisis in the Arab World,” in Louis and Owen, Suez 1956, p. 377; Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 168; Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–67 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 24. Back.

Note 93: Anonymous source, interview by author, Cairo, Egypt; Gamal Abdel Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo, N.Y.: Smith, Keynes, and Marshall, 1959), pp. 28–29; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 193–94; Taylor, Arab Balance of Power, p. 30; Ali Hillal Dessouki, “Nasser and the Struggle for Independence,” in Louis and Owen,Suez 1956, p. 32; Malcolm Kerr, “Regional Arab Politics and the Conflict with Israel,” in P. Hammond and S. Alexander, eds., Political Dynamics in the Middle East (New York: American Elsevier), pp. 39–41. For an attempt to sort out the authenticity of Nasser’s commitment to Arabism, see P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin’s: 1978), pp. 225–34. Back.

Note 94: See Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Random House, 1968), chaps. 6 and 7; Adeed Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab World: Elements of a Foreign Policy (New York: Wiley, 1976); James Jankowski, “Arab Nationalism in ‘Nasserism’ and Egyptian State Policy, 1952–58,” in J. Jankowski and J. Gershoni, eds., Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, pp. 150–68 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). Back.

Note 95: Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution, p. 87; Back.

Note 96: Binder, “Nasserism”; Rahmy, Egyptian Policy in the Arab World, p. 31. Back.

Note 97: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 32. Back.

Note 98: Kerr, Arab Cold War, p. 32. In fact, the Egyptian Constitution of January 16, 1956, only belatedly asserts that Egypt is part of the Arab nation and notes Egypt’s integral relationship to the Arab nation. See Abdel-Malek, Egypt, p. 253; Chejne, “Egyptian Attitudes Toward Pan-Arabism,” pp. 265–66. Back.

Note 99: His dramatic effect on the region was attributable not only to the fact that he “had the right message at the right time” but also to his charisma and ability to speak in colloquial terms that transcended local dialects, rather than the classical Arabic preferred by most Arab leaders. Moreover, he carried his message through a new medium–radio–with his Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs) broadcasts, which allowed him to go over the heads of other Arab leaders and speak directly to the masses. That Nasser was broadcasting from Cairo, the heart of the Arab nation’s culture, learning, and power, meant that his message carried more appeal than if, for instance, he had been in Beirut or Baghdad. Back.

Note 100: For an explicit discussion of the Baghdad Pact and the development of the norm-prohibiting alliances with the West see Michael Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” in P. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 415–22. Back.

Note 101: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 33. Back.

Note 102: Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 200. Back.

Note 103: Maddy-Weitzman, Crystallization of the Arab State System, pp. 28–29; Eppel, Palestine Conflict, pp. 174–76. Back.

Note 104: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 69. Back.

Note 105: Kerr, “Regional Arab Politics,” p. 43. Back.

Note 106: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 39. Back.

Note 107: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 33. Back.

Note 108: Ibid., p. 96. Back.

Note 109: Ibid., pp. 83–87; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 204–205. Back.

Note 110: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 83–87. Back.

Note 111: Ibid., pp. 87–90; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 206–208. Back.

Note 112: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 88; Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 53, 57; Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, p. 272. Back.

Note 113: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 90. Back.

Note 114: These regional discussions about the West’s overtures had domestic implications; for instance, they were a major topic of the Syrian elections in September 1954. Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 164. Back.

Note 115: Egyptian Home Service, “Egypt to Depend on Arab Defense Pact,” Cairo, December 10, 1954, cited in FBIS, no. 239, December 10, 1954, A1. Back.

Note 116: Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 211. Also see Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 98–99. Back.

Note 117: Egyptian Home Service, “Middle East Defense Talks Discussed,” Cairo, December 7, 1954, cited in FBIS, no. 237, December 8, 1954, A2. Back.

Note 118: On the secret agreement see Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 89, 99. On the Soviet threat see Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 363 and Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 53, 57. On the Kurdish issue see Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 199–201. On the likelihood that other states would follow Iraq, see Kerr, Arab Cold War, p. 4, and Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 54. Back.

Note 119: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 66. Back.

Note 120: Ibid., p. 111; Fawaz Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–67 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), p. 25; Dessouki, “Nasser and the Struggle for Independence,” p. 36. Back.

Note 121: King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head (London: Heineman, 1962), p. 84. Back.

Note 122: Iraqi Home Service, “Iraq Reaffirms Adherence to Arab League,” Baghdad, January 18, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 13, January 19, 1955, A5. See also Iraqi Home Service, “Iraq to Sign Defense Pact with Turkey,” Baghdad, January 13, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 9, January 13, 1951, A2; Iraqi Home Service, “Iraq Denies Disagreement on Pact,” Baghdad, January 21, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 16, January 24, 1955, A10. In a later attempt to defend himself against the criticism of having violated the norms of Arabism, Nuri al-Said claimed that Egypt had prior knowledge of and consented to Iraq’s alliance with Turkey. Iraqi Home Service, “Premier Reviews Defense Talks with Egypt,” Baghdad, February 6, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 26, February 7, 1955, A6–10. Back.

Note 123: FBIS–Middle East–South Asia (hereafter FBIS-MES), January 14, 1955, A1–2. Back.

Note 124: Egyptian Home Service, “Press Criticizes Turkish-Iraq Accord,” Cairo, January 14, 1944, cited in FBIS, no. 10, January 14, 1955, A2. Back.

Note 125: Al-Ahram, Cairo, January 13, 1955, cited in FBIS-MES, January 14, 1955, A4. Back.

Note 126: Egyptian Home Service, “Salim Answers Questions,” Cairo, January 16, 1955, cited in FBIS-MES, no. 11, January 17, 1955, A7. Back.

Note 127: Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, vol. 2 (Beirut: Khayat’s, 1962), pp. 229–30; Egyptian Home Service, “Arab Premiers Called to Discuss Iraqi Action,” Cairo, January 16, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 11, January 17, 1955, A1–2; Egyptian Home Service, “Iraq Action Endangers Arab Nationalism,” Cairo, January 17, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 12, January 18, 1955, A1; Egyptian Home Service, “Iraqi Moves Seen as a Plot Against Arab Unity,” Cairo, January 18, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 13, January 19, 1955, A2. Back.

Note 128: Quoted in Khalil, Arab States, vol. 2, pp. 236–37. Back.

Note 129: Egyptian Home Service, “Amir Faysal’s Statement,” Cairo, January 22, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 16, January 24, 1955, A5; Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 78–79; Gerges, Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 25; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 193, 206. Back.

Note 130: Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 101; Gerges, Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 28; Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 194–96, 273–74; “Communique Issued by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faidi al-Atassi, on Syrian Policy at the Arab League Conference,” cited in Khalil, Arab States, vol. 1, pp. 237–38. Back.

Note 131: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 56–58. Back.

Note 132: Egyptian Home Service, “Khuri Again Rejects Foreign Alliances,” Cairo, January 21, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 16, January 24, 1955, A3; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 105–106. Back.

Note 133: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 56–58. Back.

Note 134: Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, pp. 105, 185; Dann, King Hussein, p. 25. Hussein claims to have warned Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderes that to sign an agreement with one Arab country alone and without consultation would “be disastrous.” He continues: “When the formation of the Baghdad Pact was announced the Arab world was stunned. The immediate reaction—whether it was correct or not is immaterial—was that Britain . . . had ‘got at’ Iraq.” Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 84. Back.

Note 135: Egyptian Home Service, “Press Comment,” Cairo, February 7, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 26, February 7, 1955, A2. Back.

Note 136: Sharq al-Adna, “Nasser Presents Joint Defense Plan,” Limassol, Cyprus, January 26, 1955, cited in FBIS-MES, no. 18, January 26, 1955, A1. Back.

Note 137: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 56–58. Back.

Note 138: The delegation was unsuccessful in its attempt to convince Nuri al-Said not to sign the pact. Salim Salim later recalled how Nuri al-Said greeted the delegation by proclaiming, “I am no longer one of you. I have become a Zionist; I have no relationship with the Arabs any more.” Egyptian Home Service, “Salim Reports on Meeting with Nuri,” Cairo, February 9, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 28, February 9, 1955, A1. Back.

Note 139: Iraqi Home Service, “Premier Reports on Pact with Turkey,” Baghdad, February 26, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 40, February 28, 1955, A3–5; Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1964), p. 72; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 124. Back.

Note 140: Seale, Struggle for Syria, chap. 17. Back.

Note 141: Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, p. 270. Back.

Note 142: Gerges, Superpowers and the Middle East, pp. 28–29; Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 273–76. Back.

Note 143: Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 223. Back.

Note 144: Voice of the Arabs, “Israeli Attack the Result of Turko-Iraqi Pact,” Cairo, March 1, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 41, March 2, 1955, A3–4. Back.

Note 145: The Bandung conference took place during the debate about the pact in mid-April. Its spirited rhetoric of anticolonialism, independence, and rejection of alliances with the West had a major influence on Nasser as he became more insistent on the importance of neutrality. Podeh convincingly argues that the conference reinforced Nasser’s understanding of the logical connection between neutrality and Arab nationalism, that nationalism could be best served through a policy of neutrality. Quest for Hegemony, p. 149. Also see Georgiana Stevens, “Arab Neutralism and Bandung,” Middle East Journal 11, no. 2 (Spring 1957): 139–52. Back.

Note 146: Egyptian Home Service, “Syria Supports United Army Plan,” Cairo, February 28, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 40, March 1, 1955, A1–2; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 129; Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 130–31. Back.

Note 147: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 144. Back.

Note 148: Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 279–80; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 129; “Communique on Talks Between Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia,” cited in Khalil, Arab States, vol. 2, p. 240; “Three Arab States Sign New Alliance,” Damascus, March 6, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 45, March 7, 1955, A1–3. Soon thereafter Yemen announced its support for the alliance. “Yemen Announces Support of New Arab Pact,” Damascus, March 10, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 48, March 11, 1955, A7. Back.

Note 149: “Azm Comments on New Arab Alliance,” Damascus, March 10, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 49, March 11, 1955, A7. Back.

Note 150: Quoted in Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 144. Back.

Note 151: Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 224–25. Back.

Note 152: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 156. Back.

Note 153: Ibid., p. 162. Back.

Note 154: Ibid., pp. 132–33. Back.

Note 155: Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 233–34. In his speech unveiling the dramatic arms deal Nasser emphasized his inconclusive negotiations for arms with the West and his desire to fulfill a defining principle of the Egyptian revolution: a strong national army. Egyptian Home Service, “Nasir Reveals Arms Contract with Czechs,” Cairo, September 27, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 189, September 28, 1955, A1–5. Back.

Note 156: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 83. Back.

Note 157: See Gerges, Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 48; Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 89; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 166; Dann, King Hussein, p. 24. See Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 165, for an outline of the agreement. Back.

Note 158: Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 106. Back.

Note 159: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, p. 88. Also see Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, p. 100. Back.

Note 160: Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 89–90; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 178. Back.

Note 161: James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 22. Back.

Note 162: Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tail, pp. 88–89; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 181, 191–92. Back.

Note 163: Egyptian Home Service, “Imperialist Plot in Jordan Revealed,” Cairo, December 14, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 243, December 15, 1955, A1–3; Voice of the Arabs, “ ‘Voice of Arabs’ Attacks Baghdad Pact,” Cairo, December 22, 1955, cited in FBIS, no. 249, December 23, 1955, A1–2; Dann, King Hussein, p. 27. Back.

Note 164: Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, p. 88. Back.

Note 165: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 185. Back.

Note 166: In a later statement on the pact Majali said that he supported it because he believed that it would reward Jordan for its obligations to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty; that the pact would curtail the duration of the treaty to four years; that Jordan would receive economic aid; that regardless of whether Jordan joined the pact, it was still morally bound to it because of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty; and that Jordan had little choice because the army was controlled by Britain. Cited in Abidi, Jordan, p. 128. Back.

Note 167: Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, pp. 92–93. Back.

Note 168: Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, p. 133; Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, pp. 187–88. Back.

Note 169: Salibi, Modern History of Jordan, p. 189. Back.

Note 170: John Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1957), pp. 425–26. Back.

Note 171: See P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: 1921–57 (London: Frank Cass, 1967), p. 124; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, chap. 8; Dann, King Hussein, p. 31; A. Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, p. 363; J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), pp. 318–19: Salibi, Modern History of Jordan, p. 189. Back.

Note 172: Podeh, Quest for Hegemony, p. 35. Back.

Note 173: Anonymous source, interview by author, Amman, Jordan. Back.