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Cambodia and the International Community: The Quest for Peace, Development, and Democracy
Frederick Z. Brown and David G. Timberman (eds.)
Asia Society
1998
Building Democracy in Cambodia: Problems and Prospects
by Lao Mong Hay
Introduction: Cambodia's Unstable Democracy
Democracy was born in Cambodia in 1947 when the country adopted its first constitution, which transformed the age-old absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy with multiparty democracy. Democracy started at a promising level in 1947 and remained there until 1955. In that year King Norodom Sihanouk, who had just succeeded in his crusade for Cambodia's independence from France, abdicated and formed a movement called Sangkum Reatr Nyum (People's Socialist Community), which, under the banner of "guided democracy," subsumed all political parties. The prospects for democracy began to decline when no other political parties were allowed to operate, press freedom was curbed, and genuine, competitive elections ceased to be held. Democratization continued to decline for a decade, as Sihanouk exercised autocratic power. The situation changed sharply in 1966, when Sihanouk no longer hand-picked parliamentary candidates, and all Cambodians were free to stand for the general elections. Power then shifted away from Sihanouk for several years, and hopes for a stable democracy remained high until Sihanouk succeeded in wresting back power.
In 1970 it appeared that Cambodia's democracy would reemerge when General Lon Nol toppled Sihanouk, and leading intellectuals seemed to have persuaded the new ruler to embrace multiparty democracy. But then Lon Nol became a dictator. In 1975 democracy's prospects bottomed out when the Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon Nol regime, assumed power, and brutally imposed their brand of radical agrarian communism. Hopes remained flattened following the ousting of the Khmer Rouge by the Vietnamese troops and during the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the State of Cambodia (SOC).
Cambodian democracy began to revive in 1991, when the Paris Peace Accords gave it a new lease on life. In 1993 the Cambodian people bravely participated in free and fair elections organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The ascent of democracy was buttressed by the adoption of a new constitution that enshrined liberalism, pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law. Cambodian democratization remained at that level for a couple of years, then began to dip yet again when conflict intensified between the two major political parties, FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). It fell almost flat, beginning on July 5, 1997, when Second Prime Minister Hun Sen used force to settle the contest and ousted the democratically elected first prime minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Hun Sen has since become the de facto paramount leader of Cambodia.
This chapter examines the problems of and prospects for building democracy in Cambodia. It is written at a time at which democracy has been dealt a severe blow by the July 1997 coup. But it is also a time at which the prospects for national elections (scheduled for July 1998) hold the possibility, though not the promise, of a return to democratic politics and governance. The chapter takes a short- to medium-term perspective and suggests a number of ways the international community can help restore democracy in Cambodia.
The Immediate Challenge: Restoring Democracy Through Competitive Elections
Many Cambodians have been adversely affected by the events of July 1997. The direct victims include Cambodians who were killed or wounded, arrested or intimidated, or had their property stolen or damaged. Indirect victims have seen their livelihoods affected and now feel less secure because of the use of violence and the abuse of human rights. Factories and shops in the fighting areas were badly damaged. Thousands of jobs were lost overnight. Many foreign residents have left the country, and there are virtually no new investors coming in. Business enterprises have seen a decline in their activities, slowed their operations, and laid off employees. A wait-and-see attitude has prevailed in this climate of uncertainty. Tourists have not come; as a result, thousands of jobs in the tourist industry have disappeared.
Since the July coup the government and National Assembly no longer reflect the will, wishes, and aspirations of the Cambodian people as expressed in the 1993 elections. The state organs are almost completely under the control of Hun Sen and the CPP, the losers in the last elections. FUNCINPEC, the winner of the 1993 elections, has disintegrated and some of its members have allied themselves with the CPP. Ung Huot, the unconstitutionally appointed first prime minister in replacement of Ranariddh, has no independence from Hun Sen. To many he is Hun Sen's puppet.
Despite the ouster of Prince Ranariddh and the evisceration of FUNCINPEC, Hun Sen and the CPP have not been completely successful in their grab for power. King Sihanouk has acceded to, but not approved, their takeover. Ranariddh and the other political leaders who fled Cambodia have mounted an international campaign to isolate the Hun Sen government. The international community has not condoned Hun Sen's use of violence to overturn the outcome of the 1993 elections. The Hun Sen government was unable to occupy Cambodia's seat at the UN. ASEAN has postponed Cambodia's admittance into the regional grouping until after the elections. The IMF and the World Bank have suspended their lending programs, and some countries have reduced or suspended their bilateral aid to Cambodia.
Diplomatic efforts have been made to ensure the safe return of the opposition politicians who fled the country in July as well as their freedom to carry out political activities. The UN has sent a small group of monitors to help in this effort. Sam Rainsy, the leader of the Khmer National Party, returned first and commenced straight-away to mobilize crowds to support him. An advance team of the Union of Cambodian Democrats (UCD), a loose coalition of opposition politicians who fled in July, returned to Cambodia in December 1997 to "test the waters." Prince Ranariddh returned in March 1998.
The focus now is on the upcoming elections. Before July 1997 these elections had been thought of as the way to resolve the escalating conflict between FUNCINPEC and the CPP; now they are seen as the means to restore democracy in Cambodia and as the solution to the present political and economic crisis. Preparations for them have been under way for over two years, and special efforts are being made to finalize them. The National Assembly has finally passed political party and electoral laws and a National Election Commission has been established. Technical and logistical preparations also are under way.
There have been positive developments with the return of opposition politicians and some degree of humility and flexibility on the part of Hun Sen after his government's failure to occupy Cambodia's seat at the UN. Hun Sen has yielded to pressure to strengthen the independence of the National Election Commission and to return to FUNCINPEC the control of its radio and TV stations seized during and after the July event. So far the returning opposition politicians have been safe and able to work without hindrance.
But a number of important issues remain unresolved. Fighting continues between forces loyal to Ranariddh and government troops loyal to Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge continue their armed struggle and are reported to be allied with the Ranariddh forces. The CPP has virtually complete control over the state administrative apparatus and all security forces, which suggests that the elections will not be administered impartially and free of intimidation. The opposition parties do not have enough time to organize and prepare themselves for the elections. Doubts have been raised about whether Hun Sen and the CPP would be willing to relinquish power should they lose the elections--despite their reassurances of respect for the results.
The Long-Term Challenge: Building a Democratic Culture in Cambodia
The events of 1997 show that perhaps the greatest obstacle to democracy in Cambodia is the anti-democratic behavior of the nation's political elite. However, history, culture, and a low level of socioeconomic development are also obstacles--though not insurmountable--to building a democratic political culture.
Over the last century Cambodians have been ruled by a centralized and authoritarian French colonial administration, by an even more centralized and authoritarian communist system, and by a sometimes autocratic monarch. Until the end of the Second World War Cambodian rulers used the chakrawatti system to rule their country. This system was characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of one absolute ruler who tolerated no opinions different from his own. All viceroys and other officials had to submit unquestionably to his rule and serve as his servants or instruments. These viceroys and other officials were, in turn, potentates in their respective domains. The Cambodian people were subjects of the king and serfs of the local potentates.
This dictatorial system could not fight off encroachments by Cambodia's neighbors or Western colonialists, and in 1863 Cambodia fell under French colonial rule. The French ruled Cambodia as despots; no Cambodians dared to challenge them. But the French did not remove or reduce the king's power over his subjects--even though in 1789 the French themselves had participated in an epoch-making revolution to overthrow royal absolutism. Thus Cambodia was under two layers of dictatorial rule: Cambodian royal absolutism overlaid with French colonial rule.
After the shock of World War II the French began to loosen their grip on their colonies, including Cambodia, by allowing them some degree of autonomy within the French Union. At the same time Cambodian elites who had been trained in France began to appreciate democratic ideas and some--in particular Prince Sisowath Youtevong--introduced them to Cambodian society when they returned home after their studies.
In 1946 King Sihanouk granted his people several democratic rights, including the right of association, the right of assembly, and the right to free speech. Political parties were formed, and elections were held for a constituent assembly. The Democratic Party headed by Prince Youtevong won and drafted the country's constitution. The 1947 constitution transformed the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy and contained a chapter guaranteeing and protecting the fundamental rights of all Cambodians. Though still under French rule, Cambodia began to have liberal democracy.
However, soon after the county's independence from France in 1955, King Sihanouk began to curtail Cambodia's fledgling liberal democracy, and from 1955 to 1970 it was replaced by a guided democracy characterized by a one-party system of government. An attempt was made to restore liberal democracy in the early 1970s, but Cambodia's political leadership and government were so defective, and the strength of the Communist forces so overwhelming, that democracy was nipped in the bud. As a result a new layer of dictatorial rule, this time much more oppressive, brutal, and pervasive--that is, totalitarianism--took hold with all its savagery on Cambodia, claiming over a million lives and destroying or damaging all aspects of Cambodian society.
This history of autocracy explains--but does not justify--the rigid, uncompromising, and dictatorial attitude of many of the current political elite. While these leaders may have compassion (in the form of pity felt by a person in a superior position for a person in an inferior position) for the Cambodian people, they have little or no tolerance for any views or ideas that differ from their own or might challenge their position of authority. Given the absence of a tradition of tolerance, for the ruling elite the notion of "national reconciliation" means submission to their rule rather than compromise.
This problem with Cambodia's ruling elite is compounded by the fact that virtually an entire generation of Cambodians--those under the age of 35--has been deprived of an education and cut off from the outside world. And for the few who were able to attend school prior to 1993, their schooling was more indoctrination than education. As a result almost all of the nation's moral and ethical values have perished or been damaged. Now the focus of education, even at the primary school level, is on human resource development, which emphasizes developing Cambodians as economic resources rather than as thinking human beings and citizens. (There is a painful irony here in that under the Khmer Rouge, individually and collectively Cambodians became "labor units" to be used ruthlessly by those murderers.) Fortunately a small number of educated and skilled Cambodians survived the Khmer Rouge massacre, and many more have been trained since their downfall. But pervasive poverty, the persistence of traditional approaches to education, and the limited resources available for civic education have made it difficult to educate the majority of Cambodians about their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Until this happens the Cambodian elite will not be held accountable to the Cambodian people and democracy will remain vulnerable.
Finally it is often argued that the low level of Cambodia's socioeconomic development, particularly its low levels of income and literacy, make the country ill-suited for democracy. However, poverty is not an insurmountable hindrance to democracy in Cambodia, any more than it is in India or the Philippines. The main obstacle and danger to Cambodia's democracy is not the poor; rather it is the current ruling elite that undermines democracy and uses its wealth and power (and guns) to protect and enhance its position. This group is not keen to establish the system of checks and balances enshrined in the country's constitution. It breaks the law with impunity. One only need ask who in July 1997 resorted to the use of force to resolve a political conflict, causing the brutal deaths of over 40 Cambodians and severe damage to the livelihood of many others? It was not the Cambodian people who used force, violated others' human rights, and dispensed with democratic procedures.
Despite these obstacles and setbacks, there has been progress in building a democratic culture in Cambodia--especially when compared to the situation that existed before the UNTAC period. Not long after the adoption of the 1993 constitution, there were charges that democracy and human rights were Western values and could not fit in Cambodian culture. There were claims that democracy could only be achieved after economic development, raising the controversy whether efforts should be devoted to building democracy or economic development first. These two questions have now been largely resolved. It is acknowledged by most of the country's leaders that democratic values have Cambodian origins, in Buddhism, Cambodian literature, and even folk stories, and that democracy and development go hand in hand.
There is also a breakdown--though only partial to be sure--of the culture of silence inherited from the police states of the past. The print and electronic media have proliferated. Some newspapers are very critical of the government and its leaders. Cambodians can and do make representations on public issues (and personal problems) to government officials and members of parliament. Nongovernmental organizations have access to the state-owned radio and television stations to broadcast their educational programs, including debates on public issues. Some of these debates are critical of government policies. Finally there are also some signs of democratization at the local level. Democratic elections are being used to establish village development committees under the aegis of the Rural Development Ministry. And increasingly associations and nongovernmental organizations, including those at the grassroots level, are using democratic elections to choose officers and make decisions.
The Continuing Struggle to Enshrine Human Rights and the Rule of Law
Given Cambodia's history, it should not come as a surprise that reestablishing and strengthening the commitment of Cambodia's political leaders to human rights and the rule of law is a long-term struggle. Respect for human rights was officially stipulated in Cambodia's 1947 constitution, before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. But over the last 50 years human rights in Cambodia have been routinely violated. During the Khmer Rouge era Cambodians inflicted upon their fellow countrymen some of the worst human rights abuses to have occurred during the twentieth century. The Vietnamese invasion and subsequent communist government ended the autogenocide, but human rights (as defined by the Universal Declaration) were viewed by the government as a hindrance to the country's much-needed national reconstruction at best and as a threat to the regime's power and the communist political system at worst.
The first substantial efforts to revive respect for human rights were made mainly by noncommunist anti-Vietnamese resistance forces. At a conference in Australia in January 1989 three of the four warring factions (except the Khmer Rouge) unofficially agreed to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the end human rights were accepted by all of the factions, and respect and observance of them were incorporated into the 1991 Paris Peace Accords.
Under the Paris Accords Cambodia was to respect human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments on human rights. The agreements state, inter alia, that "Cambodia's tragic recent history requires special measures to assure the protection of human rights and the nonreturn to the policies and practices of the recent past." An annex to the agreements fixed the principles to be included in Cambodia's constitution. According to the annex, the constitution will
contain a declaration of fundamental rights, including the rights to life, personal liberty, security, freedom of movement, freedom of religion, assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions, due process and equality before the law, protection from arbitrary deprivation of property or deprivation of private property without just compensation, and freedom from racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual discrimination.... This declaration will be consistent with the provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments. Aggrieved individuals will be entitled to have the courts adjudicate and enforce these rights.
The annex also stated that Cambodia will
follow a system of liberal democracy, on the basis of pluralism. It will provide for periodic and genuine elections. It will provide for the right to vote and to be elected by universal and equal suffrage. It will provide for voting by secret ballot, with a requirement that electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process.
Unfinished Institution Building
In Cambodia power tends to concentrate in the hands of one powerful man or a group of powerful men (politicians, generals, and businessmen). This concentration of power is an obstacle to the separation of powers and the workings of the system of checks and balances. Based on past experiences of Cambodia and a number of other developing countries, overreaching power is an enemy of political and economic development.
Cambodia's 1993 constitution mandates the establishment of a number of institutions, which, if they work properly, should provide ample checks and balances. These include the executive, the National Assembly, the judiciary, the Supreme Council of the Magistracy, the Constitutional Council, the king, and the National Congress. However, in practice there has not been an effective institutional separation of powers and to date the Supreme Council of Magistracy, the Constitutional Council and the National Congress are not operational or do not exist.
Many see the National Assembly, as it currently functions, as the rubber stamp for the executive. With very few exceptions members of parliament or the ruling parties have been coerced to toe the party line dictated by the party leaders. Very few have the courage to dissent. There is no order of importance and priority of laws in this new society in the making. Influential special-interest groups see laws that meet their demands enacted, while core laws to ensure law and order and regulate relations among citizens, such as criminal and civil laws, or laws determining the functioning of the constitutional institutions, have been relegated or neglected altogether. As a result there is almost complete anarchy in making and enforcing laws. The government and judges still apply old laws whether they are constitutional or not. As a result there are "a number of gaps, inconsistencies, and contradictions." 1
King Sihanouk, as constitutional monarch, is expected to "reign but not rule." However, rather than being overly interventionist, as might have been expected, the aging and infirm king has been unwilling or unable to exercise many of his constitutional duties. For example, he has been unable to protect the rights and freedoms of his citizens or to ensure the independence of the judiciary, all of which are his constitutional responsibilities. More recently Hun Sen bypassed him altogether with the appointment of Ung Huot as first prime minister.
The delay in establishing the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Council of the Magistracy has undermined democracy and the rule of law in Cambodia. The Constitution delegates to the Constitutional Council the authority to interpret the Constitution, ensure the constitutionality of laws enacted by the National Assembly, and adjudicate electoral conflicts. Without the council there has been no mechanism for challenging the constitutionality of the actions of the Cambodian government or reviewing that of existing laws or new legislation. The Constitutional Council is supposed to be composed of nine members: three appointed by the king, three by the National Assembly, and three by the Supreme Council of the Magistracy.
The Supreme Council of the Magistracy is a judicial body responsible for ensuring the independence and quality of the judiciary. Chaired by the king, the Supreme Council has the authority to appoint and discipline judges. But more than a year after a law was passed establishing it, this body still has not been formed. In its absence there has been a lot of criticism of the judiciary, especially of the judges themselves, for their lack of expertise and impartiality. All of Cambodia's sitting judges have been appointed by the communist regime; only some have formal legal training, mostly in the communist legal system. Moreover the failure to constitute the Supreme Council means that there are no members to serve on the Constitutional Council, as required by the constitution. With both Councils existing only on paper many seemingly unconstitutional laws and regulations remain in effect and few people have confidence in the independence of the judiciary.
Finally the National Congress is supposed to be a channel for the Cambodian people to voice their concerns over public issues and express their wishes and aspirations to public authorities, including their leaders. It could check the power of the government to some extent and make leaders more responsible to the public and accountable for their actions. But the political leadership has done little to establish the National Congress, and few Cambodians are aware that it is mandated by their constitution.
Political Parties and Democratic Competition
Another serious challenge to democracy in Cambodia has been the ongoing, recently bloody, contest for power between the CPP and FUNCINPEC, the two largest political groupings in Cambodia. Although nominally partners in the ruling coalition since 1993, these two political parties have continued to view politics as a "zero sum" game, wherein if one gains the other loses. Because of this they have remained fierce rivals, and each has sought advantage over the other rather than cooperation and compromise. Moreover both parties are highly personalized and factionalized, and few of the leaders of either have demonstrated a commitment to democratic decision making.
The rivalries between the two main parties have contributed directly to one of the major problems facing the nation: the bloated and corrupt government sector. Party-driven patronage and rivalry have contributed to the swelling of the bureaucracy to some 150,000 people and the maintenance of an army of more than 100,000 soldiers. (Programs intended to demobilize soldiers and reform the civil service, conceived at the beginning of the coalition government, have not been implemented.) This is far in excess of what is needed or can be financed. As a result civil servants and soldiers are paid subsurvival salaries, which leads to moonlighting, corruption, and worse still, extortion and other criminal activities. Equally important, moral and ethical values, a sense of duty, and loyalty to the government have largely disappeared from government service.
Still worse for the country has been the politicization and polarization of the civil service. Prior to the July coup most civil servants were loyal to their respective parties. Some superiors made decisions that served their party's rather than the national interest. Down the chain of command civil servants tended to obey and implement orders and decisions from superiors of the same party. This was prevalent from the national to the grassroots levels. Cambodia seemed to have three governments and administrations. Two were party governments, and the third was the Royal Government of Cambodia, in which both parties agreed on policies and implemented decisions together.
The 1998 elections are crucial to ensuring a multiparty system, a genuinely democratic National Assembly, and an effective government. Many Cambodians have enjoyed the new democratic system and want to continue along that road. While civil society groups are working to create a political climate and environment conducive to free and fair elections, the leaders and members of political parties need to do their part. Over the past five years politicians and political parties have laid bare their colors and spots. Some have lapsed into their old dictatorial ways, including the use of force, while others have been making efforts to prevent the return to serfdom.
With free and fair elections, the proportional representation system, and the participation of all opposition politicians, including Ranariddh, it will be very hard for a single party, however united and well endowed, to lawfully dominate Cambodian politics. The Constitution requires the support of two-thirds of those elected to parliament to form a government, and the quorum for meetings of the National Assembly is a high 70 percent of its members. As a result a party that may be dominant but short of the two-thirds in the National Assembly needs to mobilize the support of as many parties as possible to muster that requirement. A coalition may need to be hammered out, and even small parties with relatively few seats in the National Assembly may have bargaining power. However, the effective functioning of a coalition government and a multiparty parliament depends on the neutrality of the civil service and the security and military forces. It also depends on the independence of the judiciary, which can be brought about only by the activation of the Constitutional Council and the Supreme Council of the Magistracy. Democratic political competition will not survive for long in Cambodia if one side can use the power and resources of the state against its rivals.
The Role of Civil Society
Although still young and vulnerable, Cambodia's civil society--consisting of a variety of nongovernmental organizations, unions and professional associations, and the media--so far has shown some significant achievements. Cambodians, especially those at the grass roots, have appreciated the major contributions Cambodian and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have made to socioeconomic reconstruction and development. Given the inability or failure of the government to provide basic social services, many Cambodians owe their survival or improved standard of living to these NGOs.
A number of Cambodian and international NGOs are also working to strengthen human rights and democracy in Cambodia. Many Cambodians were unaware of their human and political rights before 1992, when UNTAC started training and information programs to disseminate these values. Since 1993 Cambodian and international NGOs have built on these programs by carrying out activities designed to strengthen human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. They have included judicial, legal, and human rights training, disseminating information about human rights, the rule of law and democracy, and advocating and monitoring human rights.
Human rights training and information dissemination has been conducted through a variety of channels, including television and radio programs. It has been targeted at all sections of the population: the masses, civilian officials, the military and police, teachers and students, and even prisoners. As a result many Cambodians have come to know and understand the meaning of human rights and other democratic values and have asserted their rights through NGOs.
Throughout the country Cambodians are talking about the elections scheduled for 1998 and justifiably asking whether they can be held and be free and fair. Without some knowledge of democratic values, they would not be able to talk about elections in this way. Many of the NGOs concerned with human rights have joined forces in order to participate in the administration and monitoring of the 1998 elections. Two NGO coalitions have formed: the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections (COFFEL) and the Committee for Free and Fair Elections (COMFREL). Both groups are cooperating in their efforts to provide voter education and poll monitoring. They are busy making preparations to provide such services to help ensure free and fair elections. But both need technical and financial assistance and support to do their work effectively.
Many Cambodian NGOs have continued to work hard to uphold the integrity of the pluralistic liberal democratic order that the international community helped establish in Cambodia--even in the difficult political environment following the July coup. With the suspension of some bilateral and multilateral economic assistance to the government following the coup, channeling humanitarian assistance to the Cambodian people through NGOs has proved an effective way to avoid punishing the poor. (These people and Cambodians in general are able to identify clearly who the international community "punished" for misconduct and deviation from that liberal order.) The role of civil society can be enhanced further by channeling more assistance to the Cambodian people through NGOs. These NGOs cannot undertake major economic and social infrastructure projects, but they are more effective and efficient than the bureaucratic machinery of the government, and they are capable of managing smaller projects that directly benefit the Cambodian people at the grassroots level. With more resources NGOs could undertake more projects to contribute to socioeconomic development and to the democratization process.
The Role of the International Community
The Cambodian people have benefited greatly from the sizable economic and technical assistance provided by the international community. Moreover the presence and support of international organizations, such as the UN Center for Human Rights and human rights and development NGOs, have helped to constrain the behavior of those in Cambodia inclined to disregard human and political rights. The actions taken by the international community during and immediately following the July coup--protection of threatened political figures, suspension of aid, and diplomatic interventions--helped to curb the violence and save lives. Without such prompt action the violence would have continued and there would have been more bloodshed and destruction.
The actions subsequently taken by some countries--the imposition of economic sanctions, the postponement of Cambodia's ASEAN membership, the decision to leave vacant Cambodia's seat at the UN, and continued diplomatic pressure--all have yielded positive results in the form of a degree of relaxation of control over the population, the openness to opposition politicians, and more liberal electoral and political party laws. These encouraging developments need to be nurtured and expanded upon in order to get Cambodia back on the track of full-fledged pluralistic liberal democracy.
The principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states cannot and should not be applied strictly to Cambodia. Cambodia and the international community are bound together by the country's tragic history and the obligations inherent in the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and the 1993 UN-administered elections. Cambodia is at risk of slipping back to the autocracy and corruption that has characterized much of its past. The international community has both the right and the responsibility to keep this from happening. The international community can and should take action in the following areas to restore and strengthen democracy in Cambodia.
In the short run, ensure free and fair elections in 1998. The international community can and should play a major role in ensuring that the elections scheduled for 1998 are free and fair. To accomplish this the international community should take an active role, including using aid conditionality, as follows:
In the long run, assist the development of democracy. As the experience of 1993 shows, elections are a critical first step in the process of democratization, but elections by themselves do not ensure that democracy will take root. It is therefore essential that the international community look beyond the elections and continue to support Cambodian democracy in the following ways:
Conclusion
In the wake of the July 1997 coup the prospects for pluralistic liberal democracy in Cambodia look bleak. But one needs to bear in mind that Cambodia has tried a variety of regime types and political systems: Sihanouk's absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy with multiparty democracy, Lon Nol's republic with dictatorship, and Pol Pot's and Heng Samrin's republic with communist dictatorship. Sihanouk's constitutional monarchy with multiparty democracy ensured peace, security, and some prosperity for Cambodians; all the republics with dictatorship led Cambodians to war and disaster.
Many Cambodians are speaking up against the deterioration of democracy in their country and are working to uphold the pluralistic liberal democratic order established by the 1991 Paris Peace Accords and the 1993 constitution. They are putting pressure on their leaders to honor what they had themselves agreed upon when they signed the Accords and adopted the country's constitution. They are mobilizing like-minded Cambodians to join in these efforts.
However, with leaders who are willing to use force and manipulation to stay in power, the intervention of the international community is still needed to convince Cambodia's leaders to respect the rule of law and embrace pluralistic liberal democracy. Absent sustained international assistance and pressure, it will be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, to return Cambodia's democratization to the upward path envisioned in the Paris Accords and desired by the majority of the Cambodian people.
Endnotes
Note 1: World Bank, Cambodia: From Recovery to Sustained Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), p. 23. Back.
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