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Cambodia and the International Community: The Quest for Peace, Development, and Democracy
Frederick Z. Brown and David G. Timberman (eds.)
Asia Society
1998
Logging in Cambodia: Politics and Plunder
by Kirk Talbott
Introduction
Cambodia’s forests are a critical national asset for the country’s political, social, and economic development. They provide tens of millions of dollars worth of annual revenue from logging, a wealth of biodiversity, and a range of ecological services. Cambodia’s "Great Lake," the Tonle Sap, and the Mekong River, which are both central to the Cambodian economy and to the welfare of millions of Cambodians, are dependent upon surrounding forest cover.
In spite of the best efforts of many well-intentioned government officials, international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and thousands of citizens from local communities, Cambodia’s forests today are under threat as never before. And, in many respects, the political and economic future of the country is held in the fragile balance between natural resource management and destructive plunder.
While accurate information about the current state of forests in Cambodia is exceedingly difficult to obtain, most estimates of forest cover in the country range from 30 to 40 percent, approximately one-half of what existed 40 years ago. Although some of Cambodia’s forests are cleared by farmers obtaining household fuel and practicing shifting agriculture, deforestation is predominantly caused by commercial logging, much of it either illegal or uncontrolled. Cambodia already has one of the world’s highest rates of deforestation and this is likely to accelerate, with 24 logging concessions covering almost 7 million hectares, approximately 40 percent country’s area.
The list of ecological and socioeconomic problems associated with excessive logging and deforestation in Cambodia is long. Landslides are increasingly common along many sections of riverbanks, often causing the loss of dwellings and occasionally life. As rivers and lakes in the Mekong basin become shallower from siltation, heavy rains cause flooding in areas not ordinarily inundated. Conversely the shallowness of these same rivers and lakes causes them to dry up more quickly since water recedes more rapidly without the forest to act as an absorbent. There have been increasing reports of previously unknown storms in interior areas of the country where forests no longer act as natural barriers against strong winds.
Recent forest cutting around the Tonle Sap and the Mekong River has led to a disturbing reduction of fisheries. During the rainy season the inundated forest normally provides a system of root structures that shelter the myriad of fish species as well as abundant food. Absent these trees fish populations in both lakes and rivers are decreasing. This trend has serious consequences for the future of Cambodia because fish is the main source of protein for its citizens. Deforestation is also causing serious water shortages in many parts of the country. These shortages are a threat to the welfare of Cambodia’s rice farmers in particular and to the productivity of the agricultural sector in general.
The money that has been made from legal and illegal logging and the political influence that it represents is staggering. The official figure for revenue from timber sales between January 1996 and April 1997 was less than $15 million. However, the estimated value for logs and sawed timber exported or illegally sold within Cambodia is well over $100 million for the same period. 1 When the value of cut wood waiting in stockpiles along many rural Cambodian roads is included, the figure rises by nearly $30 million.
The plunder of Cambodia’s forest is viewed by many as close to spiraling out of control. The resulting damage to the country’s natural resource base is huge, as is the loss of revenue to its government. And less tangible, but also important, is the concomitant loss of the government’s credibility as the protector of the common good. As a result how Cambodia deals with logging is vital to the country’s economic and political future. This chapter will look at the ecological and economic importance of Cambodia’s forests, outline the political dimensions of logging since 1989, and provide scenarios for sustaining this critical national resource.
Cambodia’s Forests: A Critical National Asset
Cambodia has been blessed with an immense and rich forest cover. As recently as the early 1970s primary tropical forests covered much of the entire country. According to the World Bank, until the mid-20th century, forests totaled over 13 million hectares, or approximately 75 percent of the country’s entire land area. 2 A report prepared by the UN Development Program (UNDP) and the World Wildlife Fund for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro indicates that 73 percent of the country was forested as recently as 1965. 3 These figures suggest that Cambodia was one of the best-endowed countries in the world in terms of forest cover and the myriad of benefits this represented.
Cambodia’s tropical forests have provided a wide range of important and beneficial ecological functions. They protect rich tropical soils, stabilize watersheds, and regulate water flows and local weather systems. They help prevent both flooding and drought--scourges of many tropical countries. The 1992 Earth Summit report for Cambodia described the country’s "exceptional qualifications to develop as a ‘green lung’ of Southeast Asia."
Cambodia is particularly dependent on its forest systems given its hydrological makeup. The Tonle Sap, in the middle of the country, and the lower Mekong River represent a unique water system that plays a critical role in the country’s and the region’s economy and ecology. The lake is the largest freshwater body in all of Southeast Asia, with a surface area of 2,700 square kilometers in the dry season. For three months a year, starting in June, the increase in the volume of water in the Mekong River causes a reversal of the flow of the Tonle Sap River. During this time the lake acts as balancing reservoir for the flooding Mekong. This wet-season phenomenon is a fundamental cause of the immense flooded forest system around the Tonle Sap. It is an important contributing factor to the unique biodiversity of the ecosystem. The merging of freshwater and organic matter creates a richly productive biological milieu.
By virtue of this complex and unique system, the Tonle Sap provides a rich aquatic resource for fish production and rice farming, and, together with the Mekong, offers crucial hydrological functions to surrounding forest and agricultural areas. The system also harbors a great diversity and quantity of flora and fauna. Of great importance are the fish populations harbored in the Tonle Sap. Fish represents approximately 60 percent of the protein source for the people of Cambodia.
The forests surrounding the Tonle Sap, in turn, are essential to the effective functioning of the ecosystem. They protect the lake from siltation and eutrophication and play a predominant role in regulating the hydrology and water tables in the heart of Cambodia. Without the forests ringing the Tonle Sap, the fish population, the water level, and many other important natural features of the lake would be undermined to the detriment of the entire country.
Forests in Cambodia have perennially offered millions of Khmer villagers a vast array of local economic benefits. This is no small matter in a country ravaged by war, undermined by grinding poverty, and, until recently, long isolated from international assistance. In many provinces of the country, particularly in the heavily forested provinces of Ratanikiri, Mondonikir, Siem Reap, Preah Vihear, and Battambang, the forests provide many essential livelihood benefits, including materials for home construction, medicines, market goods, and a range of agricultural products and services.
Moreover many of the forests’ benefits are difficult to quantify in tangible, economic terms. They are of profound historical and cultural importance to the Khmer people. Cambodian Buddhism places great value on the forest as part of the natural order of existence. Among Cambodia’s many tribal peoples, especially in the northeast, local forests are central to world view and livelihood. They are seen as a source of both spiritual and material sustenance and are widely recognized as critical to protecting the soils, wildlife, and building materials of traditional societies.
At the same time forests are viewed as one of this impoverished country’s most valuable economic assets, as well as an important source of revenue for the government. In purely economic terms the potential value of timber that can be utilized on a sustainable basis has been estimated by the World Bank and other groups to be at least $100 million a year. Given current patterns of rampant and illegal logging and the concomitant demise of forest resources, however, how much longer forests remain a Cambodian treasure is in doubt.
The Political Economy of Plunder: 1989-97
The fate of Cambodia’s forests has been determined largely by the political situation within the country, as timber plays a critical role in determining the fortunes of the country’s competing political and military leaders. Cambodia’s timber stocks have been and continue to be exploited to finance the political and military rivalries that continue to plague the country.
Not surprisingly the political economy of logging in a poor, vulnerable, and conflict-torn country like Cambodia is largely shaped by the interests of domestic and foreign timber barons, influential politicians and government officials, and powerful military commanders. Time and again logging--or the ability to grant or withhold the opportunity to engage in logging--has been used to build personal fortunes, finance political activities, buy the loyalty of officials, and finance personal armies and the Khmer Rouge. Shadow economies based on illegal logging (as well as mining and narcotics trafficking) have proliferated across the country.
The Domestic Dimension
Reliable data is scarce, but many experts on forestry in Cambodia feel that the advent of the Lon Nol regime in 1970 triggered the country’s first significant increase in deforestation. The political and economic corruption during this period (1970-75) set a precedent for resource extraction patterns without consideration of sustainability. Even less is known about logging during and immediately following the Khmer Rouge era (1975-79), but it may be that the rate of deforestation slowed owing to the combination of internal upheaval and international isolation.
It is clear that the pace of forest exploitation began to accelerate greatly in the late 1980s. The Hun Sen government, the Khmer Rouge and Thai military officers, and businessmen all engaged in the unsustainable cutting and export of Cambodian timber. In the rush to cash in on these forests, ideology and nationality were put aside and a complex set of rules of trade and finance developed around the cutting and sale of valuable species of tropical hardwood.
By 1992 there were reports of widespread and rampant logging throughout Cambodia. In June 1992 the Far Eastern Economic Review cited a UNDP estimate that 1.2 million cubic meters of logs--four times the amount of the year before--might be cut that year. According to the Review, "Past ravages may pale alongside the full-fledged attack on the forests now planned by the country’s four once-warring factions.... [E]ach needs funds to prepare for next May’s election of a national government, and the forests provide an easy answer." 4 This situation was further exacerbated by the decision of the interim Supreme National Council in September 1992 to impose a moratorium on log exports. The moratorium was set to begin on January 1, 1993, at which time only processed wood could be exported from Cambodia. In anticipation of the moratorium logging intensified. The situation in late 1992 was aptly described by a knowledgeable Thai businessman who observed, "They are chopping away like mad." 5 And in early 1993 the Washington Post reported a burgeoning trade in logs between the opposing factions. "We’re talking serious commerce," a well-informed diplomat said about cooperation between the central government and the Khmer Rouge. "This is not ideology. This is money in the pocket. They’ve got cooperative arrangements." 6
Given the isolation and dangerous conditions that existed at that time in much of the countryside, particularly in remote forest areas, it was nearly impossible to document the players and arrangements involved in this plunder. Clearly, however, all three of the major political forces vying for control of Cambodia--Hun Sen’s Cambodia Peoples’ Party (CPP), the royalist FUNCINPEC party, and the Khmer Rouge--were deeply involved in logging in the areas they controlled. The Khmer Rouge, who ended up not participating in the 1993 elections, were estimated to be making between $10 million and $20 million a month on logging in areas they controlled. Only since the defection of Ieng Sary and the disintegration of the Khmer Rouge as a military force have the guerrillas been forced to relinquish their control over much of the timber and logging in northwestern Cambodia. It is important to note, however, that as of late 1997 large areas along the Thai border rich in timber and gems remained under the effective control of the remnant factions of the Khmer Rouge.
The International Dimension
There were other groups reaping even larger profits from Cambodia’s vulnerable forests. The web of arrangements among the various Cambodian factions has entailed the complicity of many individuals and groups from Thailand, Vietnam, and other Asian countries. In the period between the signing of the Paris Accords in October 1991 and the holding of elections in May 1993 the rampant exploitation of Cambodia’s valuable and vulnerable forests in a trade with neighboring countries began in earnest. With the end of Cambodia’s isolation after almost two decades, businesses in neighboring and other countries began to take great interest in its forests and other exploitable resources, particularly minerals and gems. 7
The economic stakes in this timber trade are high indeed. According to some reports, foreign companies have paid as little as $40 per cubic meter to the Cambodian government for valuable tropical species. The World Bank has determined the minimum fair economic rent for Cambodian timber--that is, what the RGC should charge concessionaires--to be $75 per cubic meter. This wood can be worth several hundred to a few thousand dollars per cubic meter on the world market. At these prices the estimates of standing stocks of timber ready for harvest and logs awaiting transport from stations are in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Thailand, once a famed exporter of teak and other tropical hardwoods, has played a major role in extracting timber from its mainland Southeast Asian neighbors since the early 1980s. Thailand’s rapid economic growth caused it to suffer some of the world’s highest deforestation rates during the 1970s and 1980s. Since the early 1980s Thailand has had to import increasing amounts of timber to satisfy its rapidly growing domestic demand for construction materials and furniture production. In 1989, after flooding and landslides caused by deforestation led to hundreds of deaths, the Thai government imposed a belated logging ban. To make up for their deficit in timber supplies, Thai businesses, with the backing of their government, have increasingly sourced timber from Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. 8
Yunnan Province and the rest of southern China also play an important role in determining the demand for Cambodia’s timber. China’s population and the recent rise in the economic status of its citizens creates an enormous demand for Southeast Asia’s forests and other natural resources. Cambodia does not border China as do Burma, Laos, and Vietnam. However, the close relations between the two countries, the many ethnic Chinese businessmen who live in Cambodia, and the vulnerability of Cambodia to its larger neighbors make for a strong Chinese influence on logging and other economic enterprises.
In the two years following the 1993 elections 11 foreign firms were given logging concessions totaling approximately 2.4 million hectares. The most prominent of the international logging companies gaining access to Cambodia’s forests were the giant Samling Corporation of Malaysia and the Indonesian Panin Group. In August 1994 Samling was granted an 800,000-hectare concession, approximately 4.5 percent of the entire area of Cambodia. In summer 1995 the Samling deal was dwarfed by the Panin Group concession of 1.5 million hectares. At the end of 1997 just under 7 million hectares had been allocated as concessions.
International involvement in the logging of Cambodia’s forests has not been limited to the Thais, Chinese, Malaysians, and Indonesians. There have been repeated reports of Japanese, Taiwanese, French, Korean, and U.S. companies becoming involved in logging ventures. Vietnam and Laos share long and porous borders with Cambodia, and their military forces, in particular, have been involved in a number of logging deals. Global Witness estimates that a minimum of 260,000 cubic meters of logs, worth $130 million were illegally imported to Vietnam in 1997 and early 1998. According to Global Witness, all of those exports took place with the complicity of senior Cambodian officials and the Vietnamese military. Reports in 1997 suggest that Laos is taking effective action to arrest the flow of illegal logs crossing its far southern border.
Domestic and International Responses
Mok Mareth, the minister of environment, has been a principled and vocal critic of the country’s deforestation "catastrophe," predicting the demise of Cambodia’s forest resources within years. The last three and a half years have witnessed a near frenzy of political pronouncements from the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), logging bans, and sanctions against illegal logging. At the same time, however, logging deals and deforestation have proceeded at an equally feverish rate.
Particularly controversial was the government’s decision in June 1994 to give control of timber exports to the Ministry of National Defense. This grant was part of an ill-conceived strategy to use timber revenues to finance the Royal Cambodian Army’s campaign against the Khmer Rouge. An official of the newly formed Environmental Secretariat (which was to become the Ministry of Environment) warned that "this move is dangerous for democracy and the government’s stability." 9 Some elements within the newly constituted government took a stand against the continued plundering of Cambodia’s forests. In October 1994 the Ministry of Finance sent a confidential memorandum to King Sihanouk in response to "new procedures" authorized by the two co-prime ministers to grant exceptions to the logging ban of 1993. The memorandum states:
These new procedures gave exclusive authority to the two prime ministers to approve any export license at the request of the Ministry of National Defense. The subsequent decisions of the prime ministers have shown a high degree of irresponsibility and inconsistency leading to considerable confusion and bringing about a huge loss of revenue to the state and very serious damage to the environment.
The minister of finance, Sam Rainsy, eventually resigned from his position in the government, in part in protest over the illegal logging and the siphoning of tens of millions of dollars in logging revenues from state coffers.
The government’s unwillingness or inability to control logging became an issue for the international donor community for financial as well as ecological reasons. After the 1993 elections the international community made sizable commitments of financial and technical assistance to Cambodia. Nearly half the 1994 government budget, or about $170 million, was funded with foreign assistance. When the donor community became aware of the magnitude of logging revenues being diverted from the national government--and the pervasiveness of the corruption that made this possible--it began to express concern. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the first international organization to respond to the diversion of logging revenues from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of National Defense. In November 1995 the IMF postponed making a $20 million loan to Cambodia, citing inadequate forest management and protection and the government’s failure to channel official logging fees to the central budget.
Reports by the British environmental NGO, Global Witness, and stories in the Phnom Penh Post and the Far Eastern Economic Review underscored the scope and seriousness of Cambodia’s corrupt logging practices. Global Witness, which has played a leading role in mobilizing the international community to take action, joined with other groups to successfully persuade the U.S. Congress to toughen the U.S. stance on the Khmer Rouge and force Thailand to tighten its border controls. In February 1996 Global Witness exposed "documents signed by Cambodia’s co-prime ministers permitting 18 Thai companies to export 1.1 million cubic meters of felled timber, mostly from Khmer Rouge territory." 10 This was an extraordinary event, since the potential revenue of this deal represented approximately $380 million, more than 50 percent of the entire Cambodian national budget.
This exposé led to a freezing in May 1996 of the $20 million IMF loan that had been postponed in November 1995. A June 1997 Global Witness report described the situation in Cambodia as at a crisis point with illegal logging escalating at an alarming rate. Legal concessionaires are illegally cutting both inside and outside of the country; timber is flowing into Vietnam and is being exported by sea; and vast revenues are being diverted into a parallel budget. Most of these activities are carried out with the active support of the co-prime ministers. 11
At the July 1996 meeting of the international donors engaged in Cambodia, a number of the 21 delegations pressed the Cambodian government to address the logging crisis. Some called for a ban on log exports and a review of logging concessions. The World Bank initiated a series of detailed studies of forest management in Cambodia. The Cambodian government promised action. But absent a change in the political environment or a genuine commitment to curb corruption, there was little cause for optimism.
On December 31, 1996, in response to growing international pressure, the co-prime ministers promulgated a decree banning the export of all logs. However, this was and remains a decree--not an act of legislation--and there is little evidence that it has slowed the flood of illegal exports. The decree was followed by RGC Decision No. 17 in April 1997, which continued the ban on the export of round logs but legalized the export of rough cut logs if they were from legal concessions in licensed cutting areas and exported through exit points designated by the RGC. According to Global Witness, the co-prime ministers continue to authorize "virtually every concession and illegal timber export" and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces conduct logging operations anywhere they choose, "including legal concessions, national parks, and forests devoted to community use." Moreover, the Department of Forestry is denied access to many concession areas, making forest management impossible. 12
The Current Logging Drama: Challenges and Opportunities
With the elections scheduled for July 1998 looming large on the political horizon, Cambodia’s forests continue to play a pivotal role in financing political and military outcomes. Not much has apparently changed in terms of ongoing and, in many areas, unchecked logging throughout substantial areas of Cambodia. If anything, given the halving of Cambodia’s forest stocks in recent years, those areas of valuable timber still standing are more valuable than ever, and the pressure to cut and sell mounts. A Cambodian official recently noted that the demand for timber in Kompong Cham was so great that illegal loggers had begun to cut down trees in the rubber plantations. 13 At the same time, although the logging problems in Cambodia may appear overwhelming, especially in terms of recent trends, there are abundant resources and a growing reservoir of experience, interest, and good will to draw on to turn the current situation around.
Positive Developments
There continues to be an opportunity for identifying and perhaps addressing the root causes of rampant and destructive logging in Cambodia. To begin with information is power. In Cambodia the power of the press--particularly the foreign press--remains considerable though tenuous. The Phnom Penh Post and the Far Eastern Economic Review have provided in-depth coverage of the political and economic dealings related to logging Cambodia’s forests. Their stories have exposed logging deals, scandals, and environmental degradation in Cambodia. They have been joined by other foreign media, particularly Thai English-language newspapers, such as the Bangkok Post and The Nation. Thailand’s own recent experience with environmental degradation and consequent flooding and localized drought has made deforestation a hot topic.
Another positive development is that the logging situation in Cambodia has taken on an overtly political veneer since Sam Rainsy quit his post in 1994. He has formed his own political party, the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) and made the issue of the country’s deforestation an important plank of his party and his campaign. Whether the 1998 elections will include the issue of logging will depend, in large part, on the success of Sam Rainsy’s campaign and if his commitment to sustain Cambodia’s forests is adopted by other political leaders. Sam Rainsy was nearly assassinated on March 30, 1997, during a peaceful demonstration on the steps of the National Assembly in Phnom Penh, by a grenade attack that killed 20 of his supporters and injured 150. Evidence collected by the FBI is said to implicate elements in the CPP and military.
Mok Mareth also has continued to take an active and sometimes bold stance on trying to arrest illegal logging in Cambodia. Although his ministry is relatively weak compared to others, he has been able to effectively draw attention to the problem and take limited action. For example, the U.S. ambassador joined him in flying over areas of illegal logging inside of one of Cambodia’s new national parks. The minister appealed successfully to the highest levels of government to have the logging operations shut down. With support from USAID and other bilateral donors, NGOs, such as the WWF, the UNDP, and other international agencies, the Ministry of Environment has matured rapidly and is in the process of developing some significant institutional and technical capacities in forest monitoring, park planning, and environmental education, among others.
There is a nascent National Committee on Cambodia’s Forestry Policy that provides an institutional base for interagency collaboration in forestry, although it remains to be seen how effective or politically viable the committee will be--particularly since the July 1997 coup. The Royal Government of Cambodia, with encouragement from the World Bank, among others, is pursuing a program with four major assistance assignments: management of forest concessions, development of forest-policy process, legal review of forest utilization contracts, and log monitoring and verification. Each area is key to Cambodia’s developing an operational, effective, and sustainable forest-management system.
The situation in the provinces remains tenuous, and control is often out of the hands of the central government. But there have been important recent steps in the right direction. For example, the Asian Development Bank, UNESCO, international environmental NGOs, and some community groups are joining with the Ministry of Environment to improve natural resource management and planning for the Tonle Sap.
The experiences of other Southeast Asian countries and regions of the world have shown that community-based resource-management systems are successful in protecting forests from uncontrolled logging and agricultural conversion. Granted tenurial rights as an incentive to responsibly manage local natural resources and assets, residents of forested areas often prove to be the most effective stewards and enforcers of sustainable forest management. While there are very few, if any, indigenous, forestry-focused Cambodian NGOs, a small but effective group of international NGOs has introduced community-based forest management in Cambodia. The Mennonites, for example, have worked for several years on building community-based forestry initiatives with some on-the-ground success in forest regeneration. A growing number of individuals and communities are taking a stand to protect their local forest resources. However, they face a long, uphill battle against powerful businessmen, government officials, and military officers who are prepared to use any means to gain and exploit forest concessions and discourage community-based activism.
Finally there is a trend toward a more aware and aggressive stance on environmental issues by many of the donor countries that comprise the International Consultative Group on Cambodia (CGC). In the 1996 and 1997 meetings of the CGC, representatives of the donor countries were outspoken in tabling their concerns. Moreover some groups are campaigning with some effect to use more leverage in the CGC process to drive reforms in the logging sector. Global Witness has asserted that "the economic leverage currently possessed by the international community is possibly the only factor that can influence the RGC’s future approaches... to the logging crisis." 14 They may well be correct given Cambodia’s recent history, current tensions, and the nascent nature of the government’s structure and the rule of law.
A Logging Ban?
A key debate concerning forest management in Cambodia revolves around the question of whether or not the RGC should impose a national logging ban. Global Witness advocates the enactment and enforcement of an immediate logging ban as the first goal for Cambodia’s forest policy. According to this argument the current situation in Cambodia is altogether unacceptable in terms of protecting the country’s forests for future generations, and a stopgap measure is required. In a June 1997 report, Global Witness unreservedly recommended that the RGC immediately suspend all concession activity and halt all exports of logs and processed timber until the World Bank-funded technical assistance projects are put in place and completed. 15
The World Bank takes the stand that a logging ban is not the answer to Cambodia’s unsustainable logging travails. Instead it advocates a policy framework for sustainable-forest management to be put in place with the requisite enforcement capacities and mandate. Realistic or not in a country as volatile as Cambodia today, the approach presented in the bank’s 1996 Cambodia Forest Policy Assessment is based on extensive international experience and careful in-country financial and policy analysis. The assessment proposes policy initiatives and specific technical and financial interventions that can ameliorate the current economic conditions driving excessive logging. It offers several strategic actions backed by the assurance of financial and institutional support given government commitment. 16 These include:
While these and other multilateral organizations’ prescriptions are highly technical in nature, they are broad-based and potentially significant in implication. For example the bank’s forest policy assessment represents a large-scale collaboration among the government of Cambodia and the World Bank, the UNDP, and the Food and Agriculture Organization--if nothing else a promising sign for Cambodia given its recent history of isolation. The assessment represents not only the beginnings of political will, albeit on the part of only a few key government leaders, but also the financial resources to support in full the recommendations offered in the document. But the World Bank and other international organizations are constrained by the limitations of the UN system and the requirements of working with government agents whose intentions might not be legitimate.
An international forestry expert, Gerry Hawkes, provides a counterpoint to the World Bank’s prescription for the current challenge of addressing logging in Cambodia:
To put it bluntly, suggestions for improved concession management and harvesting are virtually pointless given the widespread corruption, civil unrest, and the vested interests in escalating illegal timber harvesting. Given an ideal political situation, there are many management and harvesting techniques which can be introduced to minimize resource damage and maximize societal benefits from timber exploitation, but none are truly sustainable at the levels of exploitation demanded by modern economies, particularly in countries plagued by the historical and political dilemmas of a country like Cambodia. 17
Many people familiar with the challenge to sustainable-forest management of overcoming political and commercial constraints would agree with Hawkes’ analysis and recommendations. He is joined by many others in advocating the transformation of many forested areas in Cambodia into community-based resource-management areas. Only after the functioning rudiments of civil society and commerce are in place can Cambodia responsibly open up to foreign concession arrangements.
Conclusion: Future Scenarios
Cambodia is at a critical moment. Enough of its original forest cover is intact that, given appropriate policies and actions now, its forests could be logged for decades to come while providing tens of millions of dollars in revenue to the nation’s government and citizens. Crucial ecological functions provided by biologically diverse forest cover and necessary for sustainable development can still be maintained. Much progress has been made in developing the political awareness (if not political will) and technical and financial assistance (if not capacity) to manage this precious national resource. International pressure has had a substantial impact on the situation along the Thai border, the demise of the Khmer Rouge is promising, and the World Bank, Global Witness, and other international organizations continue to work constructively and effectively on these issues.
In 1997, however, the shattering of the fragile political coalition and the resulting damage to the Cambodian economy do not bode well for the transparent management of Cambodia’s forest resources. According to a June 1997 World Bank report, there is
a continued granting of forest concessions, annual harvesting licenses and authorizations for collection of logs outside concession areas. These awards are not market-based, transparent, or based on satisfactory technical, environmental, or other assessments. This is clearly inconsistent with the RGC’s adoption of the strategy recommended in the Forest Policy Assessment and should therefore cease.
The next couple of years may well be critical to determining the fate of Cambodia’s forests. While one cannot predict the future--especially during this particularly uncertain time in Cambodia--the following three scenarios are directions the country could take in terms of logging and forest management.
Scenario 1: The Worst Case
This scenario assumes that either Cambodia descends into civil war or essentially authoritarian elements remain in control of the government. This would likely result in a serious decline in foreign investment and economic assistance. In this crisis environment the value of Cambodia’s timber would increase and the domestic and international constraints on plunder would be reduced. Rampant logging would accelerate in some areas. (When the IMF threatened to withdraw its $20 million loan in 1996 Hun Sen threatened to simply sell off Cambodia’s remaining forests.) A few protected areas and parks would be showcased to the international community; however, the country would be effectively cleared of its remaining forest areas leaving less than 10 percent forested within 10 years.
Severe ecological damage would ensue, including the collapse of fisheries in the Tonle Sap and much of the Mekong and its tributary system. Desertification could begin in significant swaths of the country, and rice and other key agricultural product levels would plummet. Poverty, inequity, and civil unrest would be exacerbated. Cambodia would be reduced to a beggar state despite billions of dollars worth of multilateral and bilateral foreign assistance.
Scenario 2: The Mixed Case
In this scenario it is assumed that credible elections are held in Cambodia, a new government is formed (perhaps another shaky coalition), and there continues to be a degree of political pluralism and openness. This would result in increased political stability and renewed foreign investment and aid flows. An improvement in the economy would reduce the need to engage in logging. But as long as Cambodia’s political leadership feels compelled to keep their bank accounts and war chests well stocked--and can do so with impunity--Cambodia’s forests will be vulnerable. The boundaries between legal and illegal forest extraction would continue to be blurred. Various rogue factions and the more mainstream political and military forces would continue to control different logging areas and operations. There would be some success in slowing the illegal, rampant logging that has taken place along so much of the Thai border area, particularly during the last decade. Over the next decade the remaining forest area would decline to 10 to 20 percent of the country, from the current 35 to 40 percent. As a result there still would be severe ecological and socioeconomic implications. The people hurt most would be the country’s predominant population of villagers and farmers.
Scenario 3: The Best Case
This scenario assumes the emergence of a coalition of political forces committed to democracy, good governance, and sustainable natural resource management. Existing logging concessions would be reviewed and canceled or changed based on sound management practices and the rule of law. A new set of logging concessions would be implemented along the legal, financial, and operational lines suggested in the World Bank’s Forest Policy Assessment. Illegal logging would be largely stamped out by the new government in concert with local communities. Thousands of communities across the provinces would act as stewards of their local forest resources with support from a variety of government ministries and agencies. Cambodia’s bloated armed forces would be reduced, and many of these soldiers would be retrained to monitor and protect the country’s forest resources.
The Cambodian and international press would provide a steady stream of accurate information regarding natural resource use in Cambodia and the regional dimension to resource extraction and trade. This reporting, coupled with the reports of domestic and international NGOs, would foster the increased involvement of the international community. International donors would coordinate to support legitimate forest management policies and practices. Foreign assistance would include substantial equipment, training, and capacity building for forest management. Significant income would be generated for national government coffers as well as for local communities.
Many individuals and organizations inside and outside of Cambodia are trying to move the country in the direction of the third scenario. The roles played by Cambodia’s neighbors and the international community are key to the future of Cambodia. It is hard to imagine how Cambodia’s forests can be saved for future generations without the implicit or at least partial support of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Malaysia as well as Japan, China, and the United States. The Cambodian diaspora in America, Europe, Australia, and elsewhere is an important constituency in this regard.
The many constructive contributions of Cambodia’s citizenry, well-intentioned government officers, and representatives of the international community promise at least the possibility of an improved forestry situation. The stronger the political elite’s adherence to the rule of law, the more vital Cambodia’s civil society becomes, and the healthier its economy, the better the human and institutional environment becomes for forest management and logging that is neither rapacious nor destructive.
Endnotes
Note 1: "Just Deserts for Cambodia: Deforestation and the Co-Prime Ministers’ Legacy to the Country," (London: Global Witness, June 1997), p. 3. Back.
Note 2: World Bank, 1996 Cambodia Forest Policy Assessment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), p.3. Back.
Note 3: John V. Dennis and Gregory Woodsworth, Report to the UN Conference on Environment and Development: Environmental Priorities and Strategies for Strengthening Capacity for Sustainable Development in Cambodia (Washington, DC: World Wildlife Fund, April 1992), p. ii. Back.
Note 4: "Cambodian Assault," Far Eastern Economic Review, June 4, 1992, p. 64. Back.
Note 5: "Thais Blamed Most for Rape of Forests," Bangkok Post, November 15, 1992, p. 1. Back.
Note 6: "Phnom Penh Said to Undercut UN Effort to Save Forests," Washington Post, February 3, 1993, p. 11. Back.
Note 7: For several specific examples of foreign concessionaires, RGC officials, Khmer Rouge cadres, and Thai military officers involved in a series of timber cutting and exporting ventures, see "Forests, Famine, and War--The Key to Cambodia’s Future" (London: Global Witness, March 9, 1995). Back.
Note 8: Burma offers one of the most compelling parallels to Cambodia in terms of the political and economic underpinnings to logging patterns and rates. Burma holds almost 50 percent of the remaining forest cover in Southeast Asia. In recent years, however, its forests have been threatened, primarily by the intensive regional demand for its teak and other valuable hardwoods. Between 1989 and 1993 over 30 concessions were granted by the military regime to Thai businesses. By the time that these concessions were canceled, much of the county’s southeastern forests had been largely degraded. In the last several years logging has tripled along the Chinese border, and there are reports of accelerating cutting along the vast Indian border and the southern border with Bangladesh. Deforestation rates nationwide have doubled, with most of the timber being exported illegally. As is reported to be the case in Cambodia, heroin is often exported on logging trucks. Burma holds approximately 70 percent of the world’s teak and dominates the heroin export business, providing some 60 percent of the world’s supply. Back.
Note 9: Phnom Penh Post, July 29-August 11, 1994, p. 3. Back.
Note 10: "Activists at Loggerheads with Timber Traders," Asian Business, April 1996, p. 11. Back.
Note 11: "Just Deserts for Cambodia: Deforestation and the Co-Prime Ministers’ Legacy to the Country" (London: Global Witness, June 1997), p. 30. Back.
Note 12: "Going Places... Cambodia’s Future on the Move" (London: Global Witness, March 1998), p. 3. Back.
Note 13: "To Control Cambodia, Rivals Are Stripping It Bare," New York Times, December 22, 1996, p. 3. Back.
Note 14: RGC Forest Policy and Practice and the Case for Positive Conditionality (London: Global Witness, May 1996), p. 4. Back.
Note 15: "Just Deserts for Cambodia: Deforestation and the Co-Prime Ministers’ Legacy to the Country," (London: Global Witness, June 1997), p. 1. Back.
Note 16: World Bank, 1996 Cambodia Forest Policy Assessment (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996), pp. 39-41. Back.
Note 17: Gerry Hawkes, personal correspondence, January 10, 1997. Back.
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