The Philippines: New Directions in Domestic Policy and Foreign Relations

David G. Timberman (ed.)

Asia Society

1998

Introduction: The Philippines' New Normalcy
by David G. Timberman

 

The late 1990s is an exciting time for both the Philippines and the study of Philippine society and politics. It is an exciting time for Filipinos because it appears the country has finally escaped the self-inflicted economic and political crises that traumatized it for the better part of a decade, from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. This is a very positive development as the Philippines begins its second century of nationhood. And it is exciting for those who study the Philippines because, with the dust of that tumultuous decade finally settling, it is now possible to get a clearer view of both the changes that have occurred (and are occurring) in the Philippines and the aspects of Philippine society and politics that are more enduring.

In retrospect, the 1992 elections marked the end of the Philippines’ decade of crisis--in part because of the generally credible way they were conducted and in part because of the outcome. The elections were highly competitive (there were seven candidates for president), and with the closure of the huge U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in 1992, they were the first elections in which the issues of American influence on Philippine politics and Philippine-U.S. relations were not major factors. The elections were not free of controversy, cheating, and violence. But the independence and integrity of the Commission on Elections, combined with credible monitoring of the voting and counting by nonpartisan citizens groups and sophisticated public opinion polling, ensured that the close outcome in the presidential contest was considered legitimate by the vast majority of Filipinos.

The outcome, of course, was that General Fidel Ramos, Corazon Aquino’s trusted secretary of defense and her anointed successor, was elected president with only 24 percent of the vote--just four percentage points more than the second-place finisher, Miriam Defensor-Santiago. Ramos moved quickly and effectively to restore political stability and to promote economic recovery and reform. His government took a number of much-needed initiatives, including addressing the severe shortage in power generation, opening the telecommunications industry and other protected sectors to domestic and foreign competition, seeking negotiated settlements to the armed conflicts that had plagued the country through the Marcos and Aquino years, expanding and deepening the economic reforms begun during the Aquino era, and assiduously cultivating foreign investment. In pursuing these and other initiatives, President Ramos has wisely used compromise and inducements more often than confrontation and penalties. His administration has successfully cultivated the support of significant portions of the political and business elite at the same time that it has sought to work with the country’s vital and increasingly sophisticated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

In pursing its agenda, the Ramos administration has both contributed to and benefited from the resolution of a number of fundamental issues that had divided Philippine society in the past. For example, there no longer is any serious argument over the basic form of government: the use of force to overturn the existing system (by either the military or the communists) has been roundly rejected, and few Filipinos would dispute the desirability of representative democracy--although the most appropriate institutional arrangement is still being debated. Furthermore, there is no longer a fundamental crisis of governance: leadership succession occurred smoothly in 1992; President Ramos has restored a degree of confidence in the national government; the relationship between NGOs and the government has become less contentious and more productive; and on the local level, the Local Government Code has given local governments much greater authority and resources. With the achievement of several years of respectable economic growth, there appears to be a growing consensus in support of essentially market-driven and internationally oriented economic policies--although here too, there are and will continue to be disputes over specific policies and priorities. And finally, as Filipinos look at their place in the world, a natural shift is occurring in the orientation of government officials and the business community toward Asia and away from the United States. However, it is less clear that public attitudes, still influenced by American media and relatives residing in the United States, are shifting as quickly.

As a result, the Philippines appears to have entered a period of political and economic normalcy it has not enjoyed since the 1960s. It is important to note, however, that this normalcy is a new normalcy, for there has been significant change in the Philippines. The sources of this change are many. To begin with, there is inexorable generational change, both in terms of the political elite and across society more broadly. As of 1995, almost half of all Filipinos were under the age of twenty (and two-thirds of the total population was under the age of thirty), which means they have little or no recollection of the Marcos era. Elite and mass attitudes have been altered in a variety of ways (though some would say not enough) by the country’s tumultuous recent history. Significant socioeconomic change is being driven by globalization, improving living standards, urbanization, higher levels of education and the spread of mass communications. Politically, the devolution mandated by the 1991 Local Government Code has resulted in an important shift in the locus of power. Finally, fundamental change has occurred in the international context with the end of U.S. military presence in the Philippines, the rise of China as a regional power, the demonstration effect (both positive and negative) of the Philippines’ economically dynamic neighbors in East Asia, and the growing pressures and opportunities created by the forces of globalization.

Entering this period of normalcy does not suggest “the end of history” for the Philippines--far from it. There will continue to be significant change, and plenty of bumps--such as the current economic turmoil in Southeast Asia--along the way. But at least for now this change is no longer crisis-driven. Nor is it driven by the dictates and needs of an authoritarian ruler. Nor is it heavily influenced by the United States or the Philippines’ ties to the United States. As a result, it is becoming possible for analysts of the Philippines to begin to assess what is truly intrinsic to the Philippines as the country approaches its second century of nationhood. This might seem like a mundane exercise--on the face of it economic crises, coup attempts, and colorful, personality-driven politics might seem more exciting. But a lively debate is occurring over a number of intriguing and highly significant questions.

For one, what is the most appropriate paradigm to understand and analyze Philippine political behavior (on both the local and national levels) at the end of the twentieth century? The dominant model (first formulated by Carl Lande in his classic study, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics), which emphasizes highly personalistic patron-client bonds, was developed in the 1960s. Are contemporary Philippine politics still driven by personalism, clientelism, patronage, and pork barrel? In what ways and to what extent are traditional political relationships and behavior changing? What is replacing them? Interest-group or issue-driven politics? Or politics driven by political machines, money, and the media?

On a more institutional level, how representative, responsive, and effective is Philippine democracy more than ten years after its restoration by Corazon Aquino? Is there meaningful democracy in the Philippines? Or is it, as some critics claim, still essentially elitist or formalistic? Is the Philippine state, historically “weak,” any more able to fend off the predations of powerful families and narrow special interests and implement policies and programs that are in the broader national interest? Are the Congress and the judiciary becoming any less penetrated by special interests? How influential and effective is the Philippines’ oft-lauded civil society?

How far-reaching and significant are the economic reforms begun under Aquino and vigorously pursued by Ramos? How committed is the political and economic elite to continuing the economic reform process? Has a constituency for reform developed that is sufficiently broad-based and influential enough to ensure the continuation of the reform program?

With the foundations for respectable economic growth apparently in place, who will benefit from this growth? Will the primary beneficiaries be the old economic and political elite? Is a new economic elite being created? What is the impact on the urban middle and lower classes? On the rural poor? What is the Philippines’ model for development? Is adequate and effective attention being paid to rural development and the environment? Can the Philippines avoid the developmental mistakes made by other “tiger” economies such as Thailand and Indonesia?

Finally, with the cold war and the presence of U.S. military bases a thing of the past, how are Philippine perceptions of the world and its place in it changing? As Southeast Asia’s most robust democracy, how well will the Philippines fit into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the nine-country regional grouping that includes a number of nations ruled by authoritarian governments? How will the Philippines respond to its vulnerability to diplomatic, economic, and military pressure exerted by its larger Asian neighbors, particularly China? To offset its weaknesses and vulnerabilities, will Manila once again look to the United States as the guarantor of its security?

The contributors to this volume address many of these issues. Taken together, the chapters in this volume, which were written in 1997, suggest that while there has been considerable progress, significant challenges remain. Paul Hutchcroft warns that the admirable economic reforms pursued under the Ramos administration have not been matched by the strengthening of political institutions and by the advent of a new form of politics. Drawing on an expanding body of research on local government since the implementation of the 1991 Local Government Code, Steve Rood offers a more optimistic assessment of the prospects for democracy and development on the local level. Emmanuel de Dios, writing at the outset of the Asian currency crisis, concludes that the “boom-bust” pattern of economic growth in the Philippines appears to have ended, but he cautions that achieving “second-generation” economic reforms will not be easy and is in no way assured. Likewise, while Solita Collas-Monsod gladly acknowledges that there has been significant progress in the war on poverty, she warns that many important battles remain to be fought before victory can be declared. Her warning is all the more pertinent given the slower economic growth expected in the wake of the regional financial crisis. Jose Almonte’s description of the geostrategic environment--with its heavy emphasis on regional economic relations and China’s emergence and its more limited discussion of Philippine-U.S. relations--is a striking example of the dramatic reorientation of Philippine foreign relations over the last five years.

This brief synopsis suggests a general consensus among the contributors that significant economic and political progress has been made in the Philippines since the early 1990s. They share the view that the Ramos administration deserves considerable credit for restoring political stability, building on the foundations for economic reform laid during the last years of the Aquino government, implementing the Local Government Code, and reorienting Philippine foreign relations. However, they also would agree, I think, that political reform has lagged behind economic reform, that the next generation of economic reforms will present new and more difficult challenges, and that insufficient attention has been paid to rural poverty and agriculture. And with regard to the Philippines’ foreign relations, several of the contributors have underscored the increasing importance of regional and global relations, particularly economic relations.

This volume also includes a chapter on the Filipino American community, an increasingly important force in domestic U.S. politics and in relations between the United States and the Philippines. The authors of this chapter, Mona Lisa Yuchengco and Rene Ciria-Cruz, describe the relative newness (and youthfulness) of the Filipino American community, its divisions, its concerns, and its increasing activism. In doing so, they make the larger point that the community is only now coming into its own in terms of playing a major role in American society and in U.S.-Philippine relations. The potential of the community is considerable, but achieving it will require leadership, resources, and a long-term commitment.

This volume seeks to provide a timely and comprehensive look at key aspects of the Philippines. However, space and other constraints do not allow us to adequately address every significant topic. Most noticeably absent is a discussion of the important issues of environmental protection and natural resource use. The Philippines has severe environmental problems ranging from rapid deforestation, to erosion and siltation, to severe air pollution in urban areas. It also faces serious challenges with regard to the sustainable use of natural resources such as fresh water, forests, and fisheries. Environmental and natural resource management issues obviously have a major impact on the prospects for sustainable economic growth and development; but they also play a role in local and national politics, and increasingly in the Philippines’ international relations.

A second issue deserving attention is the role of the Philippines’ vibrant and complex civil society. Although this volume contains numerous references to NGOs and other civil society groups, it does not include an in-depth look at the full range of organizations and groups that make up civil society, including grass roots “people’s organizations,” NGOs and NGO coalitions, professional associations, labor unions, the media, and the Catholic Church. These groups play an important role in shaping national economic and social policies, in enforcing a degree of transparency and accountability in government, in grass roots development, and in encouraging citizen participation in public affairs. Although the capabilities, scope, and impact of Philippine NGOs is sometimes overstated, they are no doubt a critical dimension of democracy in the Philippines--all the more in contrast to the marginal role of such traditional groupings as political parties.

Despite the end of crisis and the advent of the Philippines’ new normalcy, the nation’s future is far from certain. The Philippines remains vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the international economy, to the actions of larger regional powers like the United States, China, and Japan, and, of course, to the behavior and choices of its own leaders and citizens. With regard to the last of these, the country’s future will in no small part be determined by Filipino responses to the following questions.

What, if any, changes will be made to existing political institutions, and will these changes be made in a way that most Filipinos consider to be legitimate? Recently there have been controversial attempts made to overturn constitutionally mandated term limits. There also has been a recurring debate over the merits of shifting from a presidential to a parliamentary system. In the event that these or other changes are made, will the process by which they are made be principled as well as legal, so that it does not damage constitutionalism in the Philippines?

In addition to possible institutional changes, what changes will occur in other aspects of Philippine politics? Will the future see the development of meaningful political parties? Are traditional electoral politics on the way to being replaced by politics driven by big business, celebrity politicians, and the media?

Will there be meaningful reform of the institutions of government? Will a serious effort be made to improve the ability of the state to perform essential functions including ensuring security, levying and collecting taxes, monitoring and enforcing regulations, and impartially administering justice? And with the 1998 elections in prospect, will the credibility and capabilities of the Commission on Elections be restored to the high levels of both it had at the time of the 1992 elections?

How will policymakers and the private sector respond to the economic and social challenges posed by the regional economic slowdown? Will the consensus in favor of economic reform and liberalization be sustained?

Will there be more and more effective government and private sector attention to rural development, poverty alleviation, and environmental protection? Will the benefits of economic growth be distributed throughout the archipelago? Will this finally break the decades-long cycle of violence in the Philippines, fueled by poverty and injustice? Will there be lasting peace in Mindanao?

Finally, as the Philippines shifts its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, and to ASEAN in particular, will the nation, with its blend of Asian and Western influences, offer a new model for democracy and development to the rest of Asia?

In sum, major challenges face the Philippines. Although the country appears to be out of the woods, it now faces the exciting but daunting task of choosing in which direction it will head.

I would like to close with a personal expression of gratitude. As a staff member of the Asia Society in the mid-1980s, I played a small role in the production of another volume on the Philippines, edited by John Bresnan and entitled Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond. More than a decade later, I am very pleased both to continue to have an association with the Asia Society and to be able to edit a successor volume on the Philippines with a considerably more optimistic title and message. This would not have been possible without the support and cooperation of a number of people in the Philippines and the United States. Washington SyCip, Edilberto de Jesus, Nicholas Platt, and the late Paul Cunnion, to whom this book is dedicated, all made a major commitment of time and energy to the Focus on the Philippines project, of which this volume is a part. My thanks also go to all of the contributors to this volume for their diligence and patience. And finally, I want to thank my friends and occasional colleagues at the Asia Society--Marshall Bouton, Kevin Quigley, Kate Simpson, Karen Fein, Andrew Thornley, and Connie Custodio--for their assistance and forbearance.