

NOTES

BOOK I. THE ORIGINS

1. See A. W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: the Enduring Balance* (New Haven: Yale University, 1979), p. vii.
2. See John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
3. On German unification see Philip Zelikow and Condoleeza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
4. Philip Zelikow, "NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out," *International Herald Tribune*, August 10, 1995.
5. See "Memcon from 2/9/90 meeting w/USSR Pres. Gorbachev & FM Shevardnadze, Moscow, USSR." This exchange is also described in Zelikow and Rice, pp. 182–83.
6. See Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993); and Julij A. Kwizinskij, *Vor dem Sturm* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1993).
7. The argument that Baker and Gorbachev were talking in their capacity as representatives of the Quadripartite powers with residual responsibility for Germany resulting from World War II was underscored by Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, John Kornblum. See the memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John Kornblum and acting S/NIS Director John Herbst entitled "NATO Enlargement: Russian Assertions Regarding the Two-plus-Four Agreement on

German Unification. The memo was sent to our U.S. Embassies in Europe as the official U.S. position in February 1996.

8. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, "Polska I Sojusz Atlantycki w latach 1989–1991," *Sprawy Międzynarodowe*, no. 1 (1999), p. 18.

9. See Adam Michnik's 1976 essay entitled "The New Evolutionism" reprinted in Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 135–148.

10. See Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe," *The New York Review of Books*, April 26, 1984.

11. See "Letter from Gdansk Prison" in Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays*, pp. 96–97.

12. See Gyorgy Konrad, *Antipolitics: An Essay* (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich, Publishers, 1984), pp. 1–10.

13. See Vaclav Havel's essay on Central and East European attitudes toward the peace movement in his essay "The Anatomy of a Reticence" in Vaclav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965–1990* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 291–322.

14. The Prague Appeal was issued on March 11, 1985 as a message to the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament scheduled to take place in Amsterdam that summer. It was signed by the then Charter 77 spokespersons Jiri Dienstbier, Eva Kanturkova, and Petuska Sustrova. It is reprinted in the *East European Reporter* (London) 1, no. 1 (Spring 1985): 27–28.

15. For an eyewitness account of the 1989 revolution, see Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

16. For further details on the Polish-Soviet troop negotiations and how these shaped overall Polish thinking at the time on broader security issue, see Grzegorz Kostrewa-Zorbas, "The Russian Troop Withdrawal from Poland" in Allan Goodman, ed., *The Diplomatic Record 1992–1993* (Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 113–138.

17. For press coverage of the Budapest conference, see Blaine Harden, "Warsaw Pact Disbands Military Union," *The Washington Post*, February 26, 1991. See also Celestine Bohlen, "Warsaw Pact Agrees to Dissolve its Military Alliance by March 31," *The New York Times*, February 26, 1991.

18. With the exception of Romania, the former members of the Warsaw Pact refused to agree to this language bringing negotiations to a deadlock that was not broken until after the failed Soviet coup attempt in the fall of 1991. For further details see F. Stephen Larrabee, *East European Security After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1993), pp. 154–156.

19. See "Warsaw Pact Now Part of History," *The Chicago Tribune*, July 2, 1991.

20. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Budapest Summit, December 5–6, 1994. The official title took effect January 1, 1995. The European Community (EC) member states and their territories agreed on November 1, 1993 to be subsequently be known as the European Union (EU). For the purposes of this book, the OSCE and EU will be used throughout.

21. See "Memorandum on the European Security Commission" by the government of Czechoslovakia, Prague, April 6, 1990.

22. According to Havel. "It seems that NATO, as a more meaningful, more democratic and more effective structure, could become the seed of a new European security system with less trouble than the Warsaw Pact. But NATO, too, must change. Above all, it should—in the face of today's reality transform its military doctrine. And it should soon—in view of its changing role—change its name as well. The present name is so linked to the era of the Cold War that it would be a sign of a lack of understanding present-day developments if Europe were to unite under the NATO flag." For the Vaclav Havel speech at The Council of Europe, Strasbourg, May 10, 1990, see "Responsibility, Safety, Stability: Vaclav Havel Concerning NATO," *Selected Speeches, Articles and Interviews 1990–1999*, pp. 6–14. Authors signed private copy.

23. See Jiri Dienstbier, "Central Europe's Security," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1991, p. 121.

24. For a firsthand account of U.S. policy toward Europe during the period 1989–1992 see Robert L. Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider's Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989–1992* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

25. See "Charter of Paris for a New Europe," Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1990 Summit, Paris, November 19–21, <<http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.htm>>. The Paris summit agreed to create a standing Council with accredited Ambassadors, which would meet once a year in Ministerial session; a Committee of Senior Officials that could be convened in the interim; and a secretariat. It also created special offices to monitor elections as well as a new conflict prevention center.

26. For further details see James B. Steinberg, *An Ever Closer Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).

27. See "Dans un entretien à Radio-France internationale Les pays d'Europe centrale n'adhéreront pas à la CEE avant 'des dizaines d'années déclare M. Mitterrand,'" [Mitterrand declares in a Radio-France international interview that the countries of Central Europe will not become CEE members for dozens of years], *Le Monde*, June 14, 1991. See also William Drozdiak, "France Clouds EC Prospects; Mitterrand Urges Confederation Plan," *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1991.

28. In his speech at the conference Havel said that the security link across the Atlantic "is and will remain inevitable, logical and legitimate on the historic and geopolitical level." He added: "Even if it proves, over time, that it is possible to loosen it, even if the alliance transforms itself into a looser treaty, even if one day there is no reason for a last American soldier to remain in Europe, this would change nothing in the spiritual and political closeness across the Atlantic and the need for a close connection." See Henry Kamm, "Havel, in Rebuff to Paris, Backs U.S.-Europe Ties," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1991.

29. Alexandr Vondra—confident of Havel, former dissident, Deputy Foreign Minister and subsequently Czech Ambassador to Washington—described Czech motivations to join NATO in the following terms: "We trusted America as a nation—and

we felt our aspirations were understood in the White House. We did not trust the West Europeans. NATO enlargement was as much about involving the Americans in our part of the world to achieve a balance within Europe as it was about balancing the Russians.” Interview with Alexandr Vondra, November 25, 2000.

30. A good summary of the discussion at that conference is contained in Ronald D. Asmus and Thomas S. Szayna, *Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing Europe* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991).

31. See Jiri Dienstbier, *From Dreams to Reality: Memoirs from the Years 1989–1999*, p. 32 (Prague: Lidove Noviny, 1999).

32. For Vaclav Havel speech at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, March 21, 1991, see “Responsibility, Safety, Stability: Vaclav Havel Concerning NATO,” *Selected Speeches, Articles and Interviews 1990–1991*, pp. 15–24. Author’s signed private copy.

See also <http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1991/2103_uk.html>.

33. See Clifford Krauss, “Bush Greeted Walesa With Debt Relief,” *The New York Times*, March 21, 1991. See also Andrew Borowiec, “Soviets’ ex-satellites warming up to NATO,” *The Washington Times*, March 25, 1991.

34. As quoted in Robert Kupiecki, “Atlanticism in Post-1989 Polish Foreign Policy” in Roman Kuzniar, *Poland’s Security Policy 1989–2000* (Warsaw: Foundation of International Studies/Scholar Publishing House, 2001), p. 245.

35. See Michnik’s interview entitled “I am immensely afraid of an Epidemic of Populism,” in *Lidove Noviny*, June 15, 1993 reprinted in JPRS-EER-93-081-S, August 11, 1993. See also his article “Nationalism,” *Social Research*, No. 4, (Winter 1991): 757–763.

36. For a description of the failed coup, see Chapter 10, “The Revolution,” in Leon Aron, *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 439–493.

37. See Skubiszewski, “Polska I Sojusz Atlantycki,” p. 11.

38. See the “Declaration of the Highest Representatives of the Triangle,” adopted at their Prague Meeting on May 6, 1992.

39. See Kupiecki, “Atlanticism in Post-1989 Polish Foreign Policy,” p. 253.

40. See “Speech by the Secretary General of NATO at the Seminar on Security in Central Europe, March 12, 1992. Author’s private copy.

41. See “Statement By Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger,” North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Oslo, June 4, 1992. Author’s private copy.

42. Interview with Robert Hutchings, November 15, 2001 At the time Hutchings was working as a Director for European Affairs on the National Security Council with responsibility for Central and Eastern Europe.

BOOK II. THE DEBATE BEGINS

1. See Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 36.

2. See “The Three Pillars of U.S. Foreign Policy and Support for Reform in Russia,” Address Before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Executives’ Club of Chicago, and the Mid-America Committee, Chicago, Illinois, March 2, 1993, reprinted in Christopher’s *In the Stream Of History*, pp. 40–60. The quote is from p. 46.

3. See "A Strategic Alliance with Russian Reform," Prepared Remarks of President William J. Clinton to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Annapolis, Maryland, April 1, 1993, <<http://clinton6.nara.gov/1993/04/1993-04-01-presidents-speech-to-am-soc-of-newspaper-ed...o>>.

4. As Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Ash Carter later described the work of the GCC: "These twice-yearly meetings, begun in 1993 under the auspices of U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Russia's Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, were remarkable affairs. Virtually the entire U.S. cabinet would sit along one side of a giant meeting table and their Moscow counterparts would sit along the other: the U.S. secretary of health and human services across from Russia's health minister, the head of NASA across from the head of the Russian space program, the secretary of energy across from the minister of atomic energy, the director of the Environmental Protection Agency across from the environment minister and so on. Each pair would report on their progress in crafting joint projects that pooled the technology of each country for the good of both." See Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 25.

5. See U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, *Confirmation Hearing for Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) as Secretary of Defense*, Afternoon Session, *Federal News Service*, January 7, 1993.

6. See Richard C. Holbrooke, "America: A European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 40.

7. Clinton compared Bush's policy on the former Yugoslavia to his "indifference at Tiananmen Square and his coddling of Saddam Hussein" and stated, "once again the administration is turning its back on violations of basic human rights and our own democratic values." See "Governor Bill Clinton, Democratic Presidential Nominee Speech on Foreign Policy Before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council," Los Angeles, California, *Federal News Service*, August 13, 1992.

8. See Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Declines to Back Peace Plan as the Balkan Talks Shift to UN," *The New York Times*, February 2, 1993. For Owen's recollections, see David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995).

9. There is a growing literature on the development of the Clinton Administration's policy on Bosnia and the Balkans, including just how chaotic and erratic foreign policy decisionmaking on Bosnia was in the early months of the Administration. See Ivo Daalder, *Getting To Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Elisabeth Drew, *On The Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); and David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace* (New York: Scribner's, 2001).

10. Drew, *On the Edge*, p. 150.

11. See Colin L. Powell, *My American Journey* (Random House, 1995), p. 576.

12. Drew, *On the Edge*, p. 156.

13. As quoted in Raymond Seitz, *Over Here* (London: Phoenix, 1998), p. 329.

14. See Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 228.

15. See Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Administration Rushes to 'Clarify' Policy Remarks by 'Brand X' Official," *The Washington Post*, May 27, 1993.

16. See James Chace, "Exit, NATO," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1993.
17. See "Address by Elie Wiesel at the Dedication of the Holocaust Memorial Museum," Washington, DC, April 22, 1993.
18. An interesting account of the atmosphere surrounding the Holocaust Memorial Museum opening and how the Holocaust and the history of the region shaped the discussions regarding Central and Eastern Europe's future is contained in an oral history recorded by State Department diplomat J.D. Bindenagel. In the spring of 1993 Bindenagel was the Director of the Office of Central Affairs. Ambassador Bindenagel was later prompted to be the Department's Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues. See the transcript of Bindenagel's oral history recorded on September 24, 1999 and contained in the State Department's archives.
19. See "President Clinton's Meeting with President Havel," State 137029, May 5, 1993.
20. See "Meeting with President Lech Walesa of Poland," State 134465, May 4, 1993.
21. Interview with Anthony Lake, July 10, 2000.
22. Interview with Sandy Berger, December 20, 2000.
23. See "The President's News Conference," June 17, 1993 in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, Book 1, January 20 to July 31, 1993*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), pp. 867–875.
24. Dutch Ambassador Adriaan Pieter Roetert Jacobovits de Szeged presented his credentials to the President on June 23, 1993. J.D. Bindenagel was in the meeting and wrote up a note summarizing what the President had said for Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman.
25. See Anthony Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement," Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993. Author's private copy. For background on the Administration's efforts to define a post-containment doctrine during this first year see Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy* 106 (Spring 1997): 111–127.
26. See "Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi," September 17, 1993.
27. The one exception is when Morris, in the spring of 1995, at his own initiative and without consulting the President, included a question on enlargement in a poll testing what concessions Americans might be willing to support in order to get Russia to stop its nuclear cooperation with Iran. That poll was conducted in the spring of 1995 prior to Clinton's visit to Moscow. The results showed that the American public strongly opposed postponing enlargement. According to Morris: "One of the great myths about NATO enlargement is that the President cared about it for domestic political reasons." Interview with Dick Morris, August 8, 2000.
28. Interview with Sandy Berger, December 20, 2000.
29. Interview with Tony Lake, July 10, 2000.
30. See Janne E. Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
31. See Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense*, pp. 23–24.

32. See, for example, the memo from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Tom Niles to Secretary of State Christopher entitled "Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner Brussels, Belgium, February 26, 1993, 9:15 AM," February 11, 1993; and the cable "Your February Meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers, USNATO 00790, February 15, 1993. For Christopher's NAC discussions see "February 26 Special NAC Ministerial—Interventions by Ministers and SYG Woerner; Secretary's Closing Remarks," USNATO 001019, March 3, 1993.

33. See Les Aspin, Department of Defense, *Report on the Bottom Up Review*, October 1993, Washington, D.C.

34. See "NATO: June 6 Permreps' Lunch Details Athens Ministerial Agenda," USNATO 002532, June 8, 1993.

35. See "Letter from the Secretary to NATO Foreign Ministers," State 170901, June 6, 1993.

36. See "Intervention by Secretary of State Warren Christopher Before the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting," Nafsika Hotel, Athens, June 10, 1993.

37. See the "Talking Points" used by Secretary Christopher at the Foreign Ministers lunch at the Ministerial.

38. See "Bosnia, NATO & American Leadership," Excerpts from Secretary Christopher's Press Conference After NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting," June 10, 1993, *Foreign Policy Bulletin* (September/October 1993): pp. 23–24.

39. For Weisser's recollections see Ulrich Weisser, *NATO ohne Feindbild* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1992), pp. 158–159.

40. Ruehe explained his support for NATO enlargement in a Bundestag debate on enlargement in the following terms: "The opening of the Alliance to the East is in our vital interests. One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. I have often been surprised how little our debate on this issue has been guided by a clear analysis of German interests. A situation where we are at the border of stability and security—stable here but unstable east of us, prosperity on this side but poverty on the other side of the border—such a situation is not tenable in the long-run. It is for this reason that Germany's eastern border cannot be the border of NATO and the European Union. Either we will export stability or we will end up importing instability." See Ruehe's speech delivered in the parliamentary debate on the NATO summit in the Bundestag in January 1994; reprinted in *Das Parlament*, No. 3, January 21, 1994.

41. As Ruehe once put it: "We owe them in a negative sense for what we did to them during the war. And we owe them in a positive sense for their courage in the 1970s and the 1980s. Their liberating themselves was really the key to overcoming the division of Europe. We need to understand that there would have been no Leipzig without Gdansk." As quoted in Frederick Kempe, *Fatherland: A Personal Search for the New Germany* (New York: Putnam, 1999), pp. 111–112.

42. See Volker Ruehe, "Shaping Euro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a new Era," *Survival* 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993): pp. 129–137.

43. As quoted in Ulrich Weisser, *Sicherheit fuer ganz Europa*, (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), p. 34.

44. See Senator Richard Lugar, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business. A Call for U.S. Leadership to Revive and Redefine the Alliance," Overseas Writers Club, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1993.

45. See Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a new NATO," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 4 (September–October 1993): 28–40.

46. See the draft "Framework Paper" prepared by the State Department's European Bureau for the IWG and circulated on July 2, 1993; as well as the NSC paper circulated by NSC Senior Director Jennone Walker on July 4 as a guide to discussions on NACC outreach, entitled "NATO, NACC and Security in the East."

47. A variety of proposals were floated in these brainstorming meetings. They included upgrading the NACC into a semi-autonomous pan-European body with its own Charter with which NATO, and potentially other regional subgroups, would co-operate; creating a new senior slot in the NATO structure to be filled by an East European charged with peacekeeping. A good overview of the state of play and thought in the interagency process can be found in the paper entitled "NATO Summit Preparations," circulated by State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Weston as comments on the NSC summit concept paper and in response to the Defense Department's proposal for a NACC "Charter of Association with NATO" circulated on July 23 in anticipation of an IWG meeting on July 29, 1993.

48. General Shalikashvili's thinking is reflected in a paper outlining his views circulated interagency on August 2, 1993, entitled "Strengthening Outreach to the East."

49. As Charlie Kupchan, who worked in the NSC's European Directorate at the time, later wrote: "The Partnership was deliberately designed to enable member states to put off questions of formal enlargement and of NATO's ultimate disposition in post-Cold War Europe." See Charles Kupchan, "Strategic Visions," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 11 (Fall 1994), p. 113.

50. Interview with Thomas Donilon, July 28, 2000.

51. Hans Binnendijk was Principal Deputy Director of Policy Planning and one of the earliest U.S. advocates of enlargement. See Hans Binnendijk, "NATO Can't Be Vague About Commitment to Eastern Europe," *International Herald Tribune*, November 8, 1991. Flanagan had stayed on in the Policy Planning staff after the Clinton Administration took office. He, too, was an early supporter of NATO enlargement, having laid out his views publicly in the spring of 1992. See Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 141–151.

52. See Oxman to Christopher, "NATO Expansion to the East," July 23, 1993.

53. See Oxman's address before The Atlantic Council of the United States, "NATO: In Business to Stay," Washington, DC, August 12, 1993.

54. See Davis to Christopher, "Expanding and Transforming NATO," August 12, 1993.

55. See "Russian foreign minister warns of consequences of Eastern Europe joining NATO," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, August 26, 1993.

56. The Joint declaration was signed August 25, 1993. For key excerpts from the Russian-Polish Declaration, see "Officials Seek To Clarify Position on NATO Expansion," *FBIS Trends*, September 29, 1993, p. 45. See also Sergei Parkhomenko,

"Neighbors: Russia Gives Poland Leave to Join NATO," August 27, 1993, as translated in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, September 22, 1993.

57. Press Conference, "Polish and Russian presidents welcome signing of agreements," as translated in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts* from Polish TV1, Warsaw, in Polish 0901 GMT, August 25, 1993.

58. Interview with Richard Lugar, July 24, 2000. See also "NATO-Mania Greeted Senator Lugar in Poland," Warsaw 12545, August 27, 1993.

59. For U.S. Embassy coverage of this event see "Russia Will Not Oppose Poland in NATO," Warsaw 12390, August 25, 1993; and "The Yeltsin Visit: Remembering the Past, Looking to the Future," Warsaw 12734, September 1, 1993.

60. As quoted in Jane Perlez, "Yeltsin 'Understands' Polish Bid for a Role in NATO," *The New York Times*, August 25, 1993.

61. For Yeltsin's comments see "Yeltsin would not bar Czech Republic from NATO, *CTK National News Wire*, August 26, 1993.

62. See "Suchocka on Delay in NATO Membership," FBIS-WEU-93-168, September 1, 1993, p. 36.

63. The U.S. eventually decided to leave it to NATO Secretary General Woerner to perform the awkward task of answering the Polish President. Woerner finally wrote Walesa on September 23, 1993 on behalf of all allies. He stated that he had received Walesa's letter with "great interest" and appreciated Walesa sharing his views with him on Poland's desire to join NATO "with all clarity." The Secretary General simply noted that "The issue addressing in your letter of still further enhancing the ties between NATO and Poland will be carefully considered in the Alliance" in the run up to the NATO summit. See Woerner's letter to Polish President Walesa, September 23, 1993.

64. See "The Secretary's Meeting with Manfred Woerner, March 3, 1993," State 67584, March 3, 1993.

65. See "NATO SYG Manfred Woerner Discusses the NATO Summit," US NATO 03245, August 6, 1993.

66. Interview with Klaus Scharioth, September 16, 2000.

67. See "Woerner on Expanding Membership," USNATO 03586, September 3, 1993.

68. See speech by Manfred Woerner entitled, "NATO's Role in a Changing Europe," September 10, 1993 delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies 35th Annual Conference, "European Security After the Cold War," Brussels, September 9-12, 1993. Author's private copy.

69. Davis's memo to Secretary Christopher is from September 7, 1993, entitled "Strategy for NATO's Expansion and Transformation."

70. Gati's paper was dated September 3, 1993 and entitled "Apropos Polish Elections: Central Europe's Uncertain Future and What We Can Do About It."

71. Davis' paper was officially circulated to the interagency process on September 14, 1993. See the memo from State Department Executive Secretary Marc Grossman to his counterparts entitled "State Department Paper on the NATO Summit," September 14, 1994.

72. Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 95.

73. In a January 8, 1999 letter to Prof. George Grayson, author of a book on NATO enlargement entitled *Strange Bedfellows*, Talbott wrote: "I believed that while new members were an important part of the new NATO, they were not the only dimension; there was also the issue of new missions—and new relationships with former adversaries. . . . I felt that the arguments in favor of admitting new members outweighed those against. But I believed that enlargement should be pursued in parallel with the development of cooperative relations with Russia and Ukraine in particular." Author's private copy of the letter.

74. Edelman wrote up his arguments and sent them to Talbott as a memo in September 1993 entitled "Phone Notes for Strobe on NATO expansion."

75. See Talbott letter to Grayson, January 8, 1999.

76. See, "NATO Expansion: Now is Not the Time," Moscow 31886, October 8, 1993.

77. As quoted in "NATO Expansion and the FSU," Ankara 11443, September 14, 1993.

78. See the description of the meeting in the memo from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Steve Oxman to Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff, "Your Deputies' Meeting on the NATO summit Wednesday, September 15, 1993, 11:00 A.M.," September 14, 1993.

79. See "Christopher-Kozyrev Meeting on September 13," State 284802, September 17, 1993.

80. See "Talbott/Burns Delegation: Meetings At NATO," USNATO 003804, September 21, 1993. See also Talbott's memo and trip report to Secretary of State Christopher entitled "My September Trip to the Caucasus and Central Asia," September 20, 1993.

81. See Hurd's speech entitled "The Role of NATO in the Post Cold War World," the Carlton Club Political Committee, London, June 30, 1993.

82. See Rifkind's comments from the House of Commons Hansard debate of October 18, 1993 on the Ninth Report from the Defence Committee on the Statement on the Defence estimates 1993 at <[http://www.parliament.the-stationer . . . 3/cmhan-srd/1993-10-18/Debate-1.html](http://www.parliament.the-stationer...3/cmhan-srd/1993-10-18/Debate-1.html)>, pp. 9-10.

83. As quoted in David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 112-113.

84. See "NATO: Ambassador Hunter's 9/16 Lunch with French PermRep Blot," US NATO 03764, September 17, 1993.

85. See "Meeting with Helmut Kohl," Bonn 27340, September 30, 1993.

86. See "Possible Yeltsin Letter on NATO," Moscow 028107, September 3, 1993.

87. See "Early Visegrad-Four Membership in NATO: Russia's Likely Response," Moscow 028212, September 7, 1993.

88. See "Kozyrev on Possible NATO Expansion: Russia First," Moscow 029067, September 13, 1993.

89. See "Russian President Boris Yeltsin's Letter To US President Bill Clinton," September 15, 1993, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Yearbook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 249-250.

90. For excerpts of the study, see "NATO Report Summarized," FBIS-SOV-93-226, November 26, 1993.

91. For Primakov's public statement, see "Head of Foreign Intelligence Service's report on plans to expand NATO," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, November 30, 1993.

92. See "Yeltsin-Woerner Bilateral—Russia Should Join NATO or EE States Should Stay Out," USNATO 005029, December 9, 1993.

93. An overview of the state of play on the enlargement issue is contained in the memo background materials prepared for the DC meeting on September 15, 1993. See A/S Oxman to Undersecretary Peter Tarnoff "Your Deputies' Meeting on the NATO Summit, Wednesday, September 15, 1993, 11:00 A.M.," September 14, 1993.

94. See the OSD paper circulated interagency in mid-September entitled "Partnership for Peace with General Link to Membership."

95. See Walker's note to Lake simply entitled "To: Tony" and "From: Jennone," dated September 23, 1993.

96. See "Secretary Christopher's Lunch with NATO SYG Woerner and German FM Kinkel," October 5, 1993," State 309312, October 8, 1993.

97. Davis's Note to the Secretary is dated October 15, 1993.

98. See the updated talking points based on the results of the Saturday meeting included as an attachment to a memo from Assistant Secretary of State Steve Oxman to Christopher dated October 18, 1993.

99. See Hunter's cable entitled "The NATO Summit and the Eastern Question," USNATO 004194, October 16, 1993.

100. Talbott's memo to Christopher is simply entitled "Note To: the Secretary" and dated October 17, 1993.

101. See "Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee, October 18, 1993" circulated on October 27, 1993.

102. See "Letter from the Secretary to NATO FONMINS," State 319425, October 20, 1993.

103. See "Aspin News Conference of 10/20/93," Travemuende, Germany, EUR405, Tracking Number 308616.

104. See the paper entitled "Partnership for Peace" distributed by the U.S. delegation at the Travemuende informal Defense Ministers meeting on October 20, 1993.

105. See Weisser, "Sicherheit fuer Europe," pp. 49–51.

106. See "NATO ministers back 'partnerships' idea," *The Washington Times*, October 22, 1993.

107. See Lippman's account in Thomas Lippman, *Madeleine Albright And The New American Diplomacy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 311–312.

108. For Lake's remarks, see "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official," October 22, 1993, <[http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/1 . . . di://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/10/22/3.text.1](http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/1...di://oma.eop.gov.us/1993/10/22/3.text.1)>.

109. The letter was delivered to the White House on October 6, 1993. See "Letter from President Antall to President Clinton on NATO Enlargement," State 310005, October 9, 1993.

110. "Christopher, Jeszenszky Hold Joint Press Conference," Budapest, Hungary, EUR504, Tracking Number 308839.

111. See Christopher, "In the Stream of History," pp. 92–93.
112. See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with President Yeltsin, 10/22/93, Moscow," Secto 17027, October 25, 1993.
113. See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, pp. 93–94.
114. See David B. Ottaway and Peter Maass, "Hungary, NATO Grope Toward New Relationship," *The Washington Post*, November 17, 1993.
115. See Jeszensky's lecture, "The Lessons of Appeasement," delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, December 6, 1993, as reprinted in *The Hungarian Observer*, January 1994.
116. See Budapest 11646, "A/S Oxman Briefs Visegrad Four on Partnership for Peace," October 29, 1993.
117. Interview with Andrzej Ananicz, May 3, 2000.
118. For two essays that capture the Central and East European mood in the summer and fall of 1993, see Przemyslaw Grudzinski and Andrzej Karkoszka, "East Central Europe in an Uncertain World," pp. 9–38, and Martin Palous "Weaving A Security Net: East Central Europe and the Structures of International Peace and Security," pp. 39–60, in Jeffrey Laurenti, ed., *Searching for Moorings: East Central Europe in the International System* (New York: United Nations Association of the United States of America, 1994). The quote from Grudzinski and Karkoszka is on p. 38.
119. As quoted in Daniel Williams, "U.S. Trying to Sell NATO Partnership; Ex-East Bloc Countries Want Full Seat," *The Washington Post*, January 1, 1994.
120. This objective is reflected in a "non-paper" circulated by Warsaw in late November 1993. See "Polish Non-Paper on Partnership for Peace," Warsaw 017122, November 29, 1993. (A non-paper is term used to describe a "food for thought" paper that does not [yet] have official status.)
121. See "The Secretary's Meeting with Polish FM Olechowksi," State 383575, December 23, 1993. Olechowski made these points in public as well. See his statement entitled "Seven Statements on Poland's Security" delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on December 15, 1993.
122. As quoted in "Central Europe's Disappointment and Hopes," Alfred A. Reisch, *RFE/RL Research Report* 3, no.12, March 25, 1994, p. 25.
123. See Olechowski's letter to Secretary of State Christopher dated December 22, 1993.
124. Interview with Nicholas Rey, April 23, 2000.
125. See Jan Nowak, *Courier From Warsaw* (Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1982).
126. See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Ghost of Yalta," *The Washington Post*, November 22, 1993.
127. For the role of ethnics in the NATO enlargement debate, see Bruce Stokes, "NATO's Facing a Winter of Discontent," *The National Journal* 25, no. 43 (October 23, 1993): 25–41. An overview of the Polish American Congress' lobbying campaign can be found at <www.polamcon.org/poland%20%20nato.html>.
128. This description of the conversation is drawn from a memo of the discussion written by Dr. Brzezinski following the meeting.

BOOK III. ACROSS THE RUBICON

1. For further background see James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: Brookings University Press, 1999); and George W. Grayson, *Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East* (University Press of America, Inc., 1999).
2. Interview with Sandy Berger, December 22, 2000.
3. See "Secretary's Letter to Central and East European Foreign Ministers, State 0019, January 3, 1994.
4. See "Polish Foreign Minister on Prague Summit," Warsaw 00121, January 4, 1994.
5. See John Pomfret, "Walesa Warns Communism Could Reemerge in Europe: Polish President pleads for West to Include E. Europe in NATO," *The Washington Post*, January 3, 1994.
6. See "Special White House Briefing With Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili," The Press Room, The White House, Washington, D.C., *Federal News Service*, January 4, 1994.
7. See "Walesa Waffles on PFP with Albright Delegation; Urges NATO to 'Leap Now' to Expand," See Warsaw 00308, January 7, 1993.
8. See "Amb. Albright's Meeting with Polish FM: GOP Seeks Predictability, Fears Abandonment," Warsaw 00312, January 8, 1993.
9. Geremek's Democratic Union was created in 1990 and later merged with the Liberal-Democratic Congress to form the Freedom-Union Party in 1994.
10. See "Ambassador Albright's January 7 Dinner with Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski," Warsaw 00490, January 11, 1994.
11. For Gore's speech, see "Remarks By The Vice President in Foreign Policy Speech," Pabst Theater, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, January 6, 1994, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/1/6/2.text.1>>.
12. As Berger subsequently recalled the Milwaukee meeting: "Fried and I met with a rather skeptical and extremely sophisticated coalition of leaders from the ethnic communities. I knew then that the President wanted to enlarge. But they never believed we would do it. They believed that in the final analysis the Russian card would trump the enlargement card. They believed that as a matter of power in the final analysis Central Europe would once again be sold out like it had been sold out before. We went on for hours and we still did not convince them. They were also pressing quite hard on questions such as 'who would come in' and criteria questions to which we did not yet have answers." Interview with Sandy Berger, December 22, 2000.
13. Obtained from Strobe Talbott's personal papers.
14. See "Remarks By the President to Multinational Audience of Future Leaders of Europe," Gothic Room, Hotel De Ville, Brussels, Belgium, January 9, 1994, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/1/9/6.text.1>>.
15. See "Remarks by the President at Intervention for the North Atlantic Council Summit," NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, January 10, 1994, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/1/10/1.text.1>>.

16. See "Polish Statement Accepting PFP Participation," Warsaw 000393, January 10, 1994.
17. See the Memcon entitled "The President's Meeting with Czech Leaders," January 11, 1994 5:30 P.M., -7:00 P.M., Prague Castle.
18. See "Press Conference by the President With Visegrad Leaders," U.S. Ambassador's Residence, Prague, Czech Republic, January 12, 1994, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/1-pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/1/13/3.text.1>>.
19. See President's Bilateral With Polish President Walesa, Premier Pawlak," Bonn 00904, January 12, 1994.
20. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "President's Dinner With President Yeltsin, January 14, 1994."
21. See "Press Conference by President Clinton and President Yeltsin," Kremlin Press Center, Moscow, Russia, January 14, 1994.
22. Interview with Anthony Lake, July 10, 2000.
23. Interview with Bill Perry, August 21, 200.
24. See Albright to the President, "PFP and Central and Eastern Europe," January 26, 1994.
25. For a good summary of PFP's start up see Gebhardt von Moltke, "Building a Partnership for Peace," *NATO Review* 42, no. 3 (June 1994): 3-7; and George A. Joulwan, "NATO's Military Contribution to Partnership for Peace: The progress and the challenge," *NATO Review* 43, no. 2 (March 1995): 3-6.
26. For a list of PFP signature countries and dates, see NATO Partnerships: Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document, <<http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm>>.
27. As quoted in Rick Atkinson, "Poland Hosts Mission Improbable—NATO Games with Ex-Warsaw Pact," *The Washington Post*, September 13, 1994.
28. As quoted in Jane Perlez, "Biedrusko Journal; the Cold War Armies Meet, Just to Link Arms," *The New York Times*, September 15, 1994.
29. See Ivan Rodin, "NATO's Program is Not Entirely to the Liking of the State Duma," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, March 18, 1994. As summarized in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, April 13, 1994.
30. See Ivashov's interview conducted by Vyacheslav Kockerov and published under the title of "Partnership—for What?" in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, March 25, 1994. Summarized in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, April 20, 1994. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported frequently on the depth of Russian opposition to PFP during the spring months of 1994. For Washington's guidance on how to respond see "Russian Concerns About PFP," State 109220, April 26, 1993.
31. See "Secretary/Kozyrev Memcon of March 14, 1994," State 076059, March 24, 1994; and Christopher's Note to the President entitled "My Meeting with Kozyrev in Vladivostock," March 15, 1994.
32. See "May 12 Kohl/Yeltsin Talks," Bonn 11493, May 13, 1994; and "Yeltsin's May 11-13 Visit to Germany: Kozyrev's Comments on PFP," Bonn 12613, May 26, 1994.
33. On the Perry-Grachev relationship see Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy For America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutions Press), pp.26-27.

34. Interview with Ashton Carter, November 6, 2000.
35. See Fred Hiatt, "Russia Speeds Plan for Link to NATO," *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1994.
36. For the text of Grachev's speech see "Meeting of Defense Ministers with Cooperation Partners, 25 May 1994: Statement by Russian Defense Minister Grachev," USNATO 02177, June 2, 1994.
37. See "NATO: May 30 PermReps' Lunch—the NATO/Russian Relationship," USNATO 002105, May 31, 1995.
38. See "Secretary's Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, June 10, 1994, Istanbul, Turkey," State 160602, June 16, 1994.
39. For Kozyrev's NACC intervention, Author's private copy. See also "NACC Istanbul Ministerial—June 10, Morning Session," USNATO 002360, June 16, 1994. For the afternoon session see "NACC Istanbul Ministerial—June 10, Afternoon Session," USNATO 02372, June 16, 1994.
40. As quoted in Bruce Clarke, "Russia looks to closer western ties soon: meeting of NATO and former Warsaw Pact Ministers becomes trench warfare," *The Financial Times*, June 11, 1994.
41. See "Summary of Conclusion," Discussions between the North Atlantic Council, and the Foreign Minister of Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, Brussels, June 22, 1994, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49095/c940622a.htm>>. Shortly thereafter, Kozyrev wrote an article in *NATO Review* detailing his proposals for NATO-Russia cooperation. See Andrei V. Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Russia and NATO: A Partnership for a United and Peaceful Europe," *NATO Review* 42, no. 4 (August 1994): 3–6.
42. See Steven Greenhouse, "Russia and NATO Agree to Closer Military Links," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1994; and Daniel Williams, "Russia Joins NATO Plan," *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1994.
43. See "NATO: Russia Signs PfP Framework Agreement," USNATO 002458, June 22, 1994.
44. As quoted in Daniel Williams, "Russia Joins NATO Plan; Clinton-Yeltsin Summit in DC is Set," *The Washington Post*, June 23, 1994.
45. Graham Brown, "Russia signs NATO's partnership for peace," *Agence France Presse*, June 22, 1994.
46. For a summary of the briefing see, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," *Survival* 37 (Spring 1995): 7–33.
47. Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, "The Crooked Timber: A Carpenter's Perspective," Address at All Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England, January 21, 2000, <http://www.state.gov/www.policy_remarks/2000/000121_talbott_oxford.html>.
48. See "Official Informal: Uncleared Memcon of Deputy Secretary's Meeting in Warsaw with President Walesa," Warsaw 005124, April 12, 1994.
49. Interview with Nicholas Rey, April 23, 2000.
50. I was one of several individuals to whom Talbott reached out to discuss enlargement strategy. Although I had declined a job offer to work for the State Department, I did become a consultant to him and our exchange of ideas on NATO and

European security issues continued. It was clear to me that Talbott was increasingly open to the argument that NATO enlargement could help build a more unified Europe and was looking for the way to reconcile it with the Administration's approach to Russia. We stayed in touch and corresponded regularly. That relationship would grow and by the spring of 1997 I would go to work for him.

51. As Holbrooke recalls in his book: "When I laid out this 'lose-lose' dilemma to Strobe, he laughed. 'We assumed you will be aggressive,' he said. 'That's why we need you. We'll back you up.' This time it was my turn to laugh. How long have you been in Washington? I asked, amused. 'Anyway,' Strobe said, 'I'll back you up—and you'll finally be part of our team.'" See Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), p. 57.

52. Holbrooke wrote in a letter-to-the-editor in the *World Policy Journal* that "When I arrived in Germany in September 1993, I believed that EU membership was more important and would arrive first. What turned me around was the realization that the EU, mired in its own Euro-mess . . . was not going to invite any of these countries in, at the earliest, before 2003. . . . In short, they were vulnerable to a number of different scenarios that would have sent them back into new darkness. I concluded it would be irresponsible and potentially dangerous to leave these countries outside the "West" for so long after the fall of communism." See Richard Holbrooke, "Marooned in the Cold War"—An Exchange, *World Policy Journal* (Winter 1997/98): 100.

53. Holbrooke, "Marooned," p. 101.

54. See Talbott memo to Christopher entitled "The Future of European Security," September 12, 1994.

55. Interview with Sandy Berger, December 22, 2000.

56. See "Foreign Minister Urges President Clinton to Focus on Polish Security During Visit," Warsaw 009178, June 24, 1994. Olechowksi would be even more emphatic on this point when he met Christopher on the margins of President Clinton's trip several weeks later. There was a danger that they would turn to the East if the western option was seen as failing again. He said that his country's trust in the U.S. and the West was at risk and that there was growing talk in Poland of looking for alternatives to integration with the West. See "The Secretary's Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski; Warsaw, July 7, 1994," SECTO 014005, July 11, 1994.

57. See "New Polish Ambassador Urges Polish Membership in NATO to Acting Secretary," State 166385, June 22, 1994.

58. See "Remarks by the President to the Sejm," Parliament Building, Warsaw, Poland, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, July 7, 1994.

59. See "Remarks by President Clinton and President Walesa After Their Meeting," Residential Palace, Warsaw, Poland, July 6, 1994, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/1...pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/7/8/13.text.1>>.

60. Interview with Anthony Lake, July 10, 2000.

61. The President traveled to Berlin following Warsaw. In a press conference with Chancellor Kohl and French President Jacques Delors, he stated in response to a question on enlargement: "To the Poles I will say to you what I said to them directly—they have certainly shown the greatest interest in this issue, the greatest determination to do their full part, and I think they have virtually assured that they are at the front of

the line as NATO will be expanded. We just have to get together and work out the details." For full text of remarks, see "Remarks By President Clinton, Chancellor Kohl, and President Delors in Press Availability," East Hall, Reichstag, Berlin, Germany, July 12, 1994, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/1...di://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/7/15/11.text.1>>.

62. See the memo from Alexander Vershbow to Tony Lake entitled "NATO Expansion—Next Steps," July 15, 1994.

63. Roth, for example, introduced a resolution as early as February 1992 supporting NATO enlargement. See Senate Concurrent Resolution 90—Relative to the Role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., S.Con.Res. 90, Congressional Research, (February 4, 1992). This resolution was the first evidence in Congress of a member pushing for NATO enlargement. Several months later Senator Lieberman joined Roth in a second proposed resolution that called for NATO to step up its role in Central and East European countries as well as to reorient its mission to deal with future contingencies outside of Europe. In September, Roth and Lieberman proposed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (bill S. 3114, *supra*). See Roth (and Lieberman) Amendment No. 3055, Congressional Record (September 18, 1992): p.S14129. All three amendments died in Committee.

64. Interview with Newt Gingrich, September 8, 2000.

65. The NATO Participation Act passed the House and Senate as Title II of the International Narcotics Control Corrections Act of 1994, and became law on November 4, 1994. See NATO Participation Act, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., part II, Congressional Record, (October 7, 1994): S14883, <<http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/query/D?r103:4:./temp/~r103Tkqo::>> .

66. See Senator Brown's Floor Statement in the Congressional Record, "Is Congress Irresponsible? You Be The Judge," S. Amendment No. 2248, (July 14, 1994), <<http://www.congress.gov/cgi-lis/query/D?r103:1:./temp/~r103DkXyax:e465751:>> .

67. See Congressman Gilman's "Dear Colleague" letter from April 22, 1994 in which he invites other Congressmen to co-sponsor H.R. 4210 entitled the NATO Expansion Act of 1994.

68. See House Rep. Benjamin Gilman of New York speaking before the Committee on Rules Regarding Amendments to H.R. 4426, Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1995, 103rd Cong., Congressional Record (May 24, 1994).

69. NATO Revitalization Act (Introduced in the House), 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., H.R. 4358, Congressional Record, (May 5, 1994), <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c103:H.R.4358:>> . The bill died in Committee.

70. See Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans, *Contract With America: The Bold New Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans, To Change the Nation* (New York: Time Books and the Republican National Committee, 1994).

71. *Contract With America*, pp. 112–113.

72. The Republican Party Platform statement issued in Philadelphia in July 2000 states that "As the new democracies of Central Europe chose freedom, America was ready to respond. Republicans made the enlargement of NATO part of our Contract

With America. Their firm stand before the American people and in the Congress finally succeeded in bringing Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary into the North Atlantic Alliance.” Author’s private copy.

73. Interview with Newt Gingrich, September 8, 2000.

74. Ibid.

75. See Roger Cohen, “Taming the Bullies of Bosnia” *The New York Times*, December 17, 1995.

76. See “Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Confirmation of Richard Holbrooke to be Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs,” August 10, 1994.

77. See Vice President Al Gore, “U.S.-German Relations and The Challenge of a New Europe,” Conference on New Traditions, Berlin, Germany, September 9, 1994. Obtained from the US Department of State Dispatch, Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. 5, pp. 1–2.

78. See Ruehe’s remarks at the U.S.-Embassy sponsored “Conference on New Traditions” in Berlin on September 9, 1994. Obtained from the U.S. Department of State Dispatch, Bureau of Public Affairs, vol. 5. For press coverage see Josef Joffe, “Nach dem Zapfenstreich Neue Traditionen,” *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, September 13, 1994.

79. The paper was entitled “NATO Expansion: Concept and Strategy” and was circulated to members of the IWG on September 19, 1994.

80. See the “Memcon of Meeting with Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, September 21, 1994.”

81. See Boris Yeltsin, *Midnight Diaries* (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), pp. 134–135.

82. According to a senior U.S. official, Clinton planned to tell Yeltsin that he “is fully committed to the integration of Europe and a Europe that is undivided and whole but one in which the question of NATO expansion is something that we contemplate and indeed expect to occur.” See “Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” September 21, 1994, < <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/12R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/1994/9/21/3.text.1>>.

83. See Prime Minister John Major’s letter to President Clinton dated September 25, 1994.

84. See the Memcon entitled “Second Clinton/Yeltsin One-on-One,” 1:00 P.M.–2:30 P.M., September 28, 1994.

85. See “British Thinking on NATO Expansion,” London 014877, September 19, 1994.

86. See “British Discuss NATO Expansion with A/S Holbrooke,” London 016422, October 17, 1994. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Political Director Pauline Neville-Jones told Talbott in Washington shortly thereafter that London was willing to go along with what she called a “Russia-friendly” discussion of enlargement so long as it avoided the issues of timetable, candidates or criteria. See “The Deputy Secretary’s October 20 Meeting with FCO Political Director Neville-Jones,” London 016663, October 21, 1994.

87. See "Undersecretary Davis' July 20–21 Paris Discussions: NPT Extension, Fissile-Material Cutoff, North Korea, NATO Expansion, Ukraine Rwanda," Paris 20200, July 25, 1994.

88. See "U/S Tarnoff's Paris Visit: Discussions on Haiti, NATO, EU Stability Pact, Aegean Issues," Paris 25538, September 19, 1994.

89. See "French Thinking on NATO Expansion," Paris 28401, October 14, 1994.

90. See "Chancellor Kohl: NATO and EU Enlargement, The Future of Europe," Berlin 002793, September 10, 1994.

91. See the NSC paper entitled "Moving Toward NATO Expansion," October 12, 1994.

92. See, for example, "British Reactions to USG Presentation on NATO Expansion," London 017382, November 2, 1994; "Inter-Agency Presentation on NATO—Germany," Bonn 26966, November 3, 1994.

93. For further details on the rift in the Alliance in general in the fall of 1994, and the issue of Bihac in particular, see Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, pp. 31–34.

94. See, for example, Dmitry Gornostayev, "Republican Control on Congress Could Lead to Cooling of Relations Between Washington and Moscow," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, November 10, 1994, as summarized in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, December 7, 1994.

95. See "NATO: Ambassador Churkin Zeroes In on NATO Expansion in Courtesy Call on Ambassador Hunter," USNATO 004251, November 14, 1994.

96. See Christopher's Night Note to President Clinton from October 20, 1994.

97. This quote comes from a Talbott memo to Secretary of State Christopher, excerpts of which Christopher, in turn, attached to his own Night Note to the President from October 20, 1994.

98. See "Final Communiqué" issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 1, 1994, < <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c941201a.htm> >.

99. See "Secretary's meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski, December 2, 1994," SECTO 028008, December 4, 1994. For the positive remarks of other Central and East European Foreign Ministers see "Secretary's Meeting with Central European/Baltic Foreign Ministers," SECTO 028010, December 4, 1994.

100. Interview with Andrzej Olechowski, December 18, 2000.

101. See "Foreign Minister on NATO Expansion," *CTK National News Wire*, December 2, 1994.

102. NATO and Russia were also scheduled to officially sign Russia's so-called Individual Partnership Program (IPP) in PfP as well as a second paper entitled "NATO-Russian Relations Beyond PfP."

103. See "Russia Fails to Approve IPP and NATO-Russia Relationship in 16-plus-1 Ministerial, USNATO 04586, December 2, 1994. For coverage of Kozyrev's public remarks see Leonid Velekhov, "Russia-NATO Betrothal Didn't Happen: Andrei Kozyrev Awaits Explanation of 'Ambiguous Communiqué' From Counterparts in North Atlantic Alliance," *Sevodnya*, December 3, 1994. As summarized in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, December 28, 1994.

104. See Mikhail Karpov, "The Ceremony That Wasn't Held: After Russia's Renunciation of Program for Cooperation With NATO, Success of Budapest Forum is Problematic," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 3, 1994. As summarized in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, December 28, 1994.

105. For Yeltsin's speech at the CSCE summit in Budapest, see "At CSCE Summit, Yeltsin Warns of 'Cold Peace,'" as translated from *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, December 7, 1994 in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, January 4, 1995.

106. Asked if Russia would view NATO enlargement differently if it were asked to join, he responded: "You know we have already discussed this issue several times in our Security Council, at the ministry and with the Foreign Minister and it is our opinion that at some point we may become ready for the political part of NATO." Asked by the interviewer if Russia was not ready now, Yeltsin responded: "Not as yet. Not for the political part. It is quite possible that we shall enter a political alliance with NATO and then at least we have not been kept apart from the issues which all European countries will be discussing if they all suddenly become members of NATO. We too must prepare some way of retreat." Interview by Sergey Medvedev with President Yeltsin during the "Vesti" newscast on Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network, 1800 GMT, December 10, 1994 as reprinted in FBIS-SOV-94-238, December 12, 1994.

107. See "December 15 Talbott-Ryurikov Meeting on NATO, Chechnya," Moscow 036374, December 16, 1994.

108. Talbott's conversations with Kozyrev are summarized in a long private memo to Christopher describing his Moscow trip entitled "The Vice President's trip to Russia," December 19, 1994.

109. See "Vice President-Chernomyrdin Breakfast 12/15," Moscow 036923, December 23, 1994.

110. Gore gave this account of that meeting in the White House on December 21, 1994. This description is drawn on notes taken by NSC Senior Director Nick Burns. For further details, see Talbott memo, pp. 144-145.

111. Interview with William Perry, August 21, 2000.

112. For Perry's recollection of the meeting see Carter and Perry, *Preventive Defense*, pp. 31-32.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

114. Interview with William Perry, August 21, 2000.

115. See the notes from the December 21, 1994 meeting taken by NSC Senior Director Nick Burns.

116. See Talbott's untitled memo to Christopher dated January 2, 1995.

117. See President Clinton's letter to President Yeltsin dated December 24, 1994.

118. See the letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton dated December 29, 1994.

BOOK IV. ESTABLISHING THE DUAL TRACK

1. See "NATO Expansion: Getting from Here to There," USNATO 000287, January 25, 1995.

2. See President Clinton's "Remarks at the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe in Cleveland, Ohio," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, January 12, 1995. See also "Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the John F. Kennedy School of Government," Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 20, 1995, <<http://dosfan.lib.ic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1995/9501/950120dossec.html>>. See also Remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the Wehrkunde, Munich (Germany) Conference on Security Policy, "The Enduring, Dynamic Relationship That Is NATO," Feb. 5, 1995, <<http://www.defenselink.mil:80/speeches/1995/s19950205-perry.html>>, and Remarks by Perry at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany, "Beginning the World Anew Through Partnership for Peace," May 24, 1995, <<http://www.defenselink.mil:80/speeches/1995/s19950524-perry.html>>.
3. See Richard Holbrooke, "America; A European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 38–51.
4. See Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," *The New York Review of Books*, August 10, 1995, pp. 1–6.
5. See "January 18 US-UK Security Talks: MOD Views on NATO Expansion and other European Security Issues," London 000542, January 11, 1995.
6. See "Secretary's Meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Hurd, January 16, 1995, Washington, DC," State 016931, January 23, 1995.
7. See Foreign Secretary Hurd's speech before the London Business School on January 19, 1995. See "Bilateral Meeting, SecDef, UK MOD Rifkind, Wehrkunde Conference, 4 February 1995," State 043701, February 22, 1995.
8. See the Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting Between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bill Clinton, February 9, 1995.
9. See "Moving Ahead on NATO Enlargement," State 042708, February 19, 1995.
10. One anonymous French diplomat was quoted as saying: "NATO enlargement is a mistake but no one wants to say 'No' because of the bad experience over Bosnia and the need to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe." As quoted in Lionel Barber, "Europe steps up efforts to strengthen ties with US," *The Financial Times*, February 20, 1995.
11. French Foreign Minister Juppé was the representative of the EU Presidency which France held during the first six months of 1995. See "The Secretary's Meeting with EU Presidency/Foreign Minister Juppé and European Commissioner Brittan, January 26, 1995 at the State Department," State 025603, February 1, 1995.
12. See speech by Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, "20ème Anniversaire du Centre D'Analyse et de Prevision-Intervention du Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères, M. Alain Juppé," Paris, January 30, 1995, <<http://www.doc.diplomatie.fr/BASIS/epic/www.doc/DDW?W=CLE=980107267>>.
13. See "NATO Enlargement Study: Where Are We?," USNATO 000842, March 2, 1995.
14. See, for example, the joint paper produced by Principal Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Miller entitled "NATO Expansion—Nuclear Aspects," March 17, 1995.

15. See "NATO Expansion: U.S. Views on Military Implications," State 052655, March 3, 1995. See also "NATO: NMA Contributions to Chapter III, V and VI of Enlargement Study, USNATO 000906, March 6, 1995.

16. The outstanding issues included France's objection that the study explicitly stated that new members should join NATO's integrated military structures; the precise language to be used on the issue of NATO conventional or nuclear forces on the territory of new members; and whether Russia should be explicitly ruled in or out as a candidate for membership. There were also disagreements over NATO's strategy to deal with these countries not included in the first round of enlargement and, specifically, whether new members should pledge not to block the accession of possible subsequent candidates for membership, a reference to the strained relations between Hungary and Romania. See "NATO Enlargement Study: Where Are We?," USNATO 000842, March 2, 1995.

17. See Holbrooke's note on the memo from Jim Cunningham to Holbrooke and Kornblum from March 30, 1995 updating him on the status of the enlargement study.

18. See the "Memorandum of Conversation between President Clinton and NATO Secretary General Willy Claes, March 7, 1995."

19. The Foreign Ministers communiqué simply noted that the allies were "satisfied" with progress on the study and that it would be completed in accordance with the agreed upon timetable. See the "Final Communiqué," as issued by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session at Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 30, 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c950530b.htm>>.

20. See "NATO Enlargement: September 28 Collective Briefing to Partners," USNATO 003817, September 29, 1995.

21. See the NSC paper entitled "NATO Enlargement: Road Map for 1996" circulated on September 22, 1995 for the Deputies Committee on October 2, 1995. The results of the meeting are contained in "Summary of Conclusions" issued by the NSC on October 6, 1995.

22. See "Memorandum of Conversation: The President's Working Lunch with Prime Minister Kok, February 28, 1995."

23. See "Deputies Committee Meeting on NATO-Russia Relationship and Christopher-Kozyrev Meeting" dated January 7, 1995.

24. See Talbott's Memorandum of Conversation of his discussion with Mamedov in Brussels, January 10, 1995.

25. See Talbott's note to Secretary Christopher from January 11, 1995.

26. See Talbott's memo to Secretary Christopher entitled "Preparing for Geneva" dated January 12, 1995.

27. See "Hurd Meeting with Kozyrev in Stockholm, February 14," London 002522, February 16, 1995.

28. See the speech by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry at the Wehrkunde Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 5, 1995. Author's private copy.

29. For an excellent account of the shift in Russian attitudes against NATO in the spring of 1995, see the paper delivered by Alexei Pushkov at the 1995 NATO symposium in Washington, D.C., entitled "NATO Expansion: A Russian Perspective." See

also Alexander Velichkin, "NATO As Seen Through the Eyes of the Russian Press," *NATO Review* 43, No. 2, March 1995.

30. Obtained from Strobe Talbott's personal papers.

31. See "Mamedov Visit: February 22 Sessions of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Stability Group," State 062120, March 14, 1995.

32. See the letter from President Clinton to Yeltsin dated March 15, 1995.

33. According to Russian press reports, Yeltsin criticized the Foreign Ministry for focusing too much on the conditions under which Russia would accept enlargement. See Alexei Pushkov, "When A Minister Refutes the President," *Moscow News*, no. 19, March 19–26, 1995. See also "Presidential Aide Says Yeltsin Angered Over MFA Mishandling of NATO Expansion Issue," *Moscow* 009356, March 21, 1995.

34. See "Mamedov Reiterates Russian Sensitivities Over NATO Expansion," *Moscow* 009127, March 18, 1995.

35. See the Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Geneva, March 23, 1995.

36. See Christopher's "Night Note," March 23, 1995.

37. See Steven Erlanger, "Russia Says Sale of Atom Reactors To Iran Is Still On," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1995; and Charles Hecker, "Perry Visit Marked by Rebuffs," *The Moscow Times*, April 5, 1995.

38. See Thomas Urban: "Yesterday's Enemy, Tomorrow's Enemy," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, April 19, 1995; and "General Lebed threatens third world war if Czechs and Poles join NATO," Czechoslovak Press Agency, as translated in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, April 14, 1995.

39. See Talbott's untitled Memo to Christopher from March 24, 1995.

40. *Ibid.*

41. See "Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on NATO Enlargement and NATO-Russian Relations," April 25, 1995.

42. See "Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Working Lunch with Prime Minister Major," April 4, 1995.

43. Obtained from Strobe Talbott's personal papers.

44. *Ibid.*

45. See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Andrei Kozyrev, April 26," State 106418, May 12, 1995.

46. *Ibid.*

47. See the transcript of the telephone conversation between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from April 27, 1995.

48. See Talbott's note entitled "May 10: The Moment of Truth."

49. See the transcript of the conversation between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Moscow, May 10, 1995.

50. See "Remarks By President Clinton and President Yeltsin In a Joint Press Conference," Press Conference Hall, The Kremlin, Moscow, Russia, May 10, 1995, <<http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-...oma.eop.gov.us/1995/5/10/10.text.1>>.

51. See President Clinton's letter to Yeltsin from May 23, 1995.

52. See, for example, the press conference with Oleg Lobov, Russian Federation

Security Council Secretary, on the results on the Security Council meeting of May 24 entitled "NATO expansion and other Topics," *Staraya Ploshchad Press Center*, 13:30, May 24, 1995. For comments in U.S., see U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Wednesday, March 24, 1995.

53. See Pavel Felgengauer, "Russia's Defense Ministry Has Got The Upper Hand Over The Foreign Ministry," *Segodnya*, May 31, 1995.

54. Yeltsin's letter confirming the understanding is contained in "Letter from President Yeltsin," Moscow 016992, May 26, 1995.

55. See the English language text of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev at the 16+1 Meeting with the North Atlantic Council at Noordwijk, The Netherlands, May 31, 1995, distributed by the Russian delegation.

56. See "A Russian grunt," *The Economist*, June 3, 1995.

57. See Christopher's Night Note to President Clinton entitled "Note from the Netherlands," May 3, 1995.

58. The conference was held June 24–25, 1995, and was co-sponsored by the Institute for East-West Studies and the Russian Center for National Security Problems and International Relations. See "Russian Policymakers Send Sharp Message on NATO During Moscow Academic Conference," Moscow 020252, June 28, 1995.

59. The so-called "Karaganov Theses" were first published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on June 21, 1995. They were signed by more than forty Russian academics and policymakers. For the full text in English see "Russia and NATO: Theses of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy," *Comparative Strategy*, No. 15, 1996, pp. 91–102.

60. See "Karaganov Elaborates on His Russia-NATO Theses: But No Give on Expansion," Moscow 020261, June 298, 1995.

61. For Senator McConnell's (R-KY) questioning of Talbott see his February 9 hearing, "Hearing of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee," Chaired by Sen. Mitch McConnell, *Federal News Service*, February 9, 1995. See also "Prepared Opening Statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell Before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Operations," *Federal News Service*, February 16, 1995.

62. As quoted in William Safire, "Baltics Belong in a Big NATO," *The New York Times*, January 16, 1995.

63. For remarks by Rep. Gilman, see "National Security Revitalization Act," House of Representatives, January 4, 1995 <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:44:/temp/~r104mm7sEZ::>>. For a summary of the NSRA see "H.R. 7—The National Security Revitalization Act: Congress's Defense Contract with America," January 19, 1995.

64. See McConnell's hearing, February 9, 1995, cited above, note 61. On March 23, 1995, Brown tabled the NATO Participation Act Amendments of 1995, S. 602. This legislation would have expanded eligibility to participate in the NATO Participation Act of 1994 to any country emerging from communist domination that participates in the Partnership for Peace program. See Senator Lugar's speech delivered at the CSIS Conference on "NATO's Role in European Security," March 3, 1995. Lugar chaired the first Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee (SFRC) hearing on the future of

NATO on April 27, 1995. He chaired the second hearing on May 3, 1995, which explored the paths and impediments to NATO enlargement, and the interests of Allies, Russia, and aspirant countries.

65. See the Memcom "Working Lunch with Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene of Belgium." February 11, 1995.

66. See "Winning the Peace: American Leadership and Commitment," Remarks by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy conference, March 1, 1995.

67. See the press release from Senator Helms' office on March 20, 1995 entitled "Helms Calls Decision to Attend Moscow Summit a Mistake."

68. Henry Kissinger, "For U.S. Leadership, a Moment Missed," *The Washington Post*, May 12, 1995.

69. See "Ambassador Nitze on NATO: The Case Against Expansion," *SAIS Calendar*, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, February 1995. See also Fred C. Ikle, "How to Ruin NATO," *The New York Times*, January 11, 1995.

70. See Harold Brown, Transatlantic Security," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 4 (Autumn 1995): 77–86. See also Lee H. Hamilton, "Don't Rush NATO Enlargement," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 30, 1996.

71. The original letter addressed to Secretary of State Warren Christopher is dated May 2, 1995. This group sent Secretary Christopher additional letters throughout the spring and summer of 1995 as their number grew from 15 to 18. As former U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Richard Davies, wrote on July 5, 1995, "the eighteen signatories represent over 550 years of services in the international-relations and national-security agencies of the government and over 150 years of experience in significant executive and policy-making positions in these agencies." Author's private copy.

72. See Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 9–13; Michael Brown, "The flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," *Survival* 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 34–52.

73. See Charles A Kupchan, "It's A long Way to Bratislava," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 1995.

74. See "NATO, Then and Now," *The New York Times*, May 9, 1995.

75. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Eye On the Prize," *The New York Times*, May 10, 1995.

76. See "Testimony May 03, 1995 Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Senator Senate Foreign Relations European Affairs: Enlarging the Size of NATO," Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony.

77. See "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World," Speech to the SACLAN'T Seminar 95, June 22, 1995, Norfolk, Virginia. Author's private copy.

78. See "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Kohl," May 26, 1995.

79. One example of this nervousness was the "Poland-NATO: Report," by Andrzej Ananicz, Przemysław Grudzinski, Andrzej Olechowski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Henryk Szlajfer (Warsaw: Institute of Public Affairs, 1995).

80. Interview with Ambassador Jerzy Kozminski, December 19, 2000.

81. Bartoszewski had been quoted in *The Financial Times* on July 18, 1996 saying that “all progress on relations with Russia has been made under Republican Presidents—from Nixon, Reagan and Bush—not the Democrats.” See “Demarche: Polish FonMin Bartoszewski on NATO,” State 172376, July 19, 1995. Bartoszewski claimed to have been misquoted. See “Bartoszewski and the Clinton Administration: What the Foreign Minister Meant to Say,” Warsaw 009923, July 19, 1995.

82. See “Clinton-Kohl Telcon of September 23, 1995,” State 233388, September 30, 1995.

83. See “Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and President Havel of the Czech Republic on October 21, 1995.”

84. See statements by Senators Hutchinson and Nunn, “NATO Expansion,” October 10, 1995, <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?1104:8:/temp/~1104X3Ligm:eo:>>.

85. Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War* (New York: The Modern Library, 1998), p. 365.

86. See Ian Davidson, “Unwrap the Package: The political effects of the Bosnian Peace Plan should force a rethink of the agenda for the intergovernmental conference,” *The Financial Times*, November 29, 1995.

87. For detailed accounts of U.S. policy on Bosnia, see Ivo Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War*; Anthony Lake, *6 Nightmares: Real Threats in a Dangerous World and How America Can Meet Them* (New York: Little, Brown 2000); Bob Woodward, *The Choice* (New York, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, And the Generals* (New York: Scribner's, 2001).

88. As Lake recalls, the President was “furious at what was happening on the ground, frustrated by the restrictions imposed by the UN and our NATO allies, embarrassed by congressional attacks on his policies in both parties and pushed by his political advisors who reported that Bosnia was hurting his standings (in the polls) on other issues.” *6 Nightmares*, pp. 145–146.

89. Holbrooke, *To End a War*, p. 70.

90. See Woodward, *The Choice*, p. 261.

91. As quoted in Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, p. 114.

92. For Holbrooke's personal account of the accident, see Holbrooke, *To End a War*, pp. 10–14.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

94. See Dawid Warszawski, “Menetekel fuer Osteurope” [The Handwriting is on the Wall for Eastern Europe], *Die Zeit*, July 28, 1995.

95. See Donald Blinken, “How NATO Joined Hungary,” *European Security* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 111.

96. Interview with Laszlo Kovacs, February 5, 2001.

97. See Blinken, “How NATO Joined Hungary,” pp. 109–129.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

99. On Hungarian public opinion and the impact of the IFOR deployment, including on the region around Taszar see the essay by Ferenc Somogyi, “NATO

Accession and Hungarian Public Opinion" in Rudolf Joo, ed., *Hungary: A Member of NATO* (Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), pp. 70–87.

100. See Carla Anne Robbins, "Hungary's NATO Bid Illustrates the Hopes, Risks in Central Europe," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 2, 1996.

101. See Steven Erlanger, "Politics on His Mind, Yeltsin Warns West on Bombing in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, September 8, 1995.

102. As quoted in Talbott's memo to Christopher on his conversations with Kozyrev, September 14, 1995.

103. Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 38.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45. General Shevtsov wrote his own account of these events in "Russia-NATO Military Cooperation in Bosnia: A Basis for the Future?," *NATO Review*, March 1997, pp. 17–21.

107. See George A. Joulwan, "When Ivan Meets GI Joe," *The Washington Post*, April 28, 1996.

108. See "Remarks by the President at the Harry S. Truman Library Institute Legacy of Leadership Dinner," National Building Museum, October 26, 1995.

109. See the "Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom," November 29, 1995.

110. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, p. 188.

BOOK V. TOWARD A NEW NATO

1. See "Intervention By Secretary of State Warren Christopher At The North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, December 5, 1995," <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1995/9512/951205dossec1.html>>.

2. See Christopher's "Night Note from Brussels," December 7, 1995.

3. As French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette told the North Atlantic Council on December 5th, "France has decided from now on to participate much more fully in all NATO bodies." See "Session ministérielle du Conseil de l'Atlantique nord—Intervention du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hervé de Charette," Bruxelles, 5 Decembre 1995, in *La Politique Étrangère de la France, Textes et Documents*, Novembre–Decembre 1995 (Paris, France: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères), pp. 185–186.

4. *Ibid.*

5. For a good overview of the factors behind this shift in French policy see Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 58–60.

6. See "France weighing Greater Participation in NATO," Paris 25201, October 18, 1995.

7. See Address by Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, as Delivered before the Congress of the United States (Washington, D.C., Vital Speeches 269, City News Publishing Company Inc.).

8. See "Memorandum of Conversation of the Presidents: February 1 Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France," State 030140, February 15, 1996.

9. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana," February 20, 1996.

10. See "February 28 U.S.-French Consultations on NATO," Paris 5031, March 6, 1996.

11. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana," February 20, 1996.

12. As the December Foreign Ministers had defined them: "Interested Partners will learn more about the specific and practical details of Alliance membership; they can review their efforts in terms of the various precepts and principles included in the enlargement study. NATO, in turn, will learn more about what individual partners could or could not contribute to the Alliance and could begin to identify areas for additional work." See Final Communiqué from the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 5, 1995, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c951205a.htm>>.

13. The 1996 *Congressional Budget Office (CBO)* study, "Congressional Budget office Estimates on the Cost to Expand to Visegrad States: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, 1996-2010" estimated that over a ten-year period, the total costs of the first round of enlargement would rise above the \$100 billion mark. See also Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Richard L. Kugler, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?," *Survival* 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 5-26.

14. See the memo from Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs John Kornblum to Christopher entitled "Berlin NAC—Adaptation as Message from May 4, 1996. See also Ambassador Hunter's cable entitled "The Berlin NAC Ministerial," USNATO 002222, May 31, 1996.

15. See "Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the North Atlantic Council," Intercontinental Hotel, Berlin, Germany, June 3, 1996, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1996/9606/960603dossec2.html>>. See also Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Berlin, Germany, June 3, 1996, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-063e.htm>>.

16. According to de Charette: "France is satisfied because for the first time in alliance history Europe will really be able to express its personality. . . . If this process is completed, France regards with interest this new alliance and declares itself ready to participate fully according to a new status." See "Conseil ministériel de l'OTAN—Intervention du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Hervé de Charette, Berlin, 3 Juin 1996, and "Conseil ministériel de l'OTAN—Point de presse du ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Herve de Charette," in *La Politique Etrangere de la France: Textes et Documents*, Mai-Juin 1996 (Paris, France: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères).

17. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between President Clinton and Yeltsin on 1/26/96," State 19590, February 12, 1996.

18. See the Letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Clinton delivered on January 26, 1996.

19. See President Clinton's letter to Russian President Boris Yeltsin from February 8, 1996.

20. See Talbott's assessment of Primakov, and how different he was from Kozyrev, in his untitled Memo to Christopher from March 16, 1996.

21. Ibid.

22. See "Secretary's Conversation with FM Primakov," State 003144, January 11, 1996.

23. Obtained from Strobe Talbott's personal papers.

24. See the strategy paper entitled "Managing U.S.-Russian relations in a Year of Challenge," January 23, 1996.

25. See "The Secretary's Helsinki Meetings with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, February 9-10," State 29302, February 14, 1996.

26. See Christopher's Memorandum to the President entitled "Note on Helsinki Meetings with Primakov," dated February 12, 1996.

27. See "Chancellor Kohl Suggests More Deliberate Approach to NATO Enlargement," Bonn 01572, February 5, 1996.

28. See the memo to Christopher from Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Hecklinger entitled "Your Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl," February 9, 1995.

29. See "British Suspect Germany is Slowing Down on NATO Enlargement," USNATO 000849, February 9, 1996.

30. See "February 14 Dinner with Foreign Secretary," London 001951, February 16, 1996.

31. See "Chancellor Kohl's Russia Policy Turns Cautious," Bonn 001892, February 9, 1996.

32. See "Secretary's Conversation with Chancellor Kohl," State 028088, February 13, 1996.

33. See "German Chancellor's Visit to Moscow; Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin address news conference after talks," *The British Broadcasting Corporation*, February 21, 1996.

34. As quoted in "Public Statements by Kohl and Yeltsin on NATO Enlargement during Kohl Visit to Moscow," Bonn 02426, February 20, 1996.

35. See "Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany," February 28, 1996.

36. See "Chirac: Protector of Russia," Paris 00761, January 12, 1996.

37. On May 1, President Chirac told Ambassador Pamela Harriman that NATO enlargement should not move forward without an agreement on adaptation and a NATO-Russia agreement in place. See "Responding to President Chirac's Call for an Agreement with Russia Prior to NATO Enlargement," State 092972, May 4, 1996.

38. Talbott met with Primakov on March 12, 1996. See his memo on the talks dated March 16, 1996.

39. See the memo from Rudolf Perina, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and John E. Herbst, Acting S/NIS entitled "Primakov's Recent Statements on NATO Enlargement," March 15, 1996.

40. See the Memorandum from Acting S/NIS John Herbst to Secretary Christopher entitled "Scope Paper—Your Trip to Moscow," March 18, 1996.

41. Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 399.

42. See Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, "A Democratic and Undivided Europe in Our Time, Cernin Palace Prague, Czech Republic March 20, 1996, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1996/9603/960320dossec2.html>>.

43. See "Secretary's Lunch with Central European Foreign Ministers, March 20, 1996, Prague," State 059734, March 27, 1996.

44. See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 399.

45. See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Russian FM Primakov, March 21, 1996," April 3, 1996.

46. See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 401.

47. See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, March 22, 1996," State 068798, April 3, 1996.

48. See the memo to the President from Warren Christopher and Strobe Talbott entitled "Your Meeting with Yeltsin," April 18, 1996.

49. See the "Memcon of Conversation Between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, April 21, 1996.

50. See "Remarks at the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe in Cleveland, Ohio," *Public Papers of the Presidents*, January 12, 1995.

51. See "Ambassador Holbrooke's Meeting with Foreign Minister Zieleniec," Prague 006126, August 18, 1994.

52. See "Czech Foreign Minister Zieleniec Addresses NATO Membership with PermReps," USNATO 001259, March 29, 1995.

53. For example, George Schoepflin, one of the West's leading scholars on the region, had called the Hungarian minority issue "the second most sensitive security issue in Central and Eastern Europe after the war of Yugoslav succession." See George Schoepflin, "Hungary and Its Neighbors," *Chaillot Papers*, No. 7 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the West European Union, May 1993), p. 1.

54. See "PM Horn Welcomes NATO Expansion Plan and Asks that Russia's Concerns be Considered," Budapest 002061, March 3, 1995.

55. See "Holbrooke and Kovacs: A Meeting of the Minds," Budapest 002063, March 3, 1995.

56. See "Dialogue with Prime Minister Horn at Spanish Embassy," Budapest 002116, March 6, 1995.

57. See "EUR A/S Holbrooke's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Melescanu," Bucharest 002061, February 27, 1995.

58. See "EUR Assistant Secretary Holbrooke's Meeting with President Iliescu," Bucharest 002218, March 2, 1995.

59. See "Memcom of Conversation: The President's June 6 Meeting with Gyula Horn," State 143442, June 13, 1995. See also *The Washington Post*, "Hungary in NATO in 1997?," June 7, 1995 and "President [Iliescu] outlines Romanian reforms in Washington speech," *BBC Summary of Word Broadcasts*, September 30, 1995.

60. See "Memcom: President Clinton's Meeting with President Iliescu," State 234298, October 3, 1995.

61. On the Drawsko affair, see Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military

Relations and NATO Expansion," National Defense University, *Strategic Forum*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, March 1995, No. 22.

62. See Olechowski's interview with Adam Michnik and Edward Krzemien in the leading Polish daily, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, "Russian Fists & Polish Scissors," January 19, 1995.

63. See "A/S Holbrooke Sketches Out NATO Expansion Process for Walesa; Warns on Democracy," Warsaw 02289, February 17, 1995.

64. See "A/S Holbrooke Briefs PM Pawlak on NATO Expansion; Urges Greater Political Stability," Warsaw 001304, January 30, 1995. See "US For Poland's Joining NATO," *Polish News Bulletin*, January 27, 1995. See also "Holbrooke Tells Pawlak About U.S. Support for Joining NATO," *PAP News Wire*, January 26, 1995.

65. See "the Secretary's Meeting with Polish PM Pawlak," State 031006, February 7, 1995.

66. See, for example, the editorial entitled "Remembering Auschwitz," *The New York Times*, January 26, 1995. See also Gustav Niebuhr, "Whose Memory Lives When the Last Survivor Dies?," *The New York Times*, January 29, 1995.

67. The letter was signed by Senators Bob Dole (R-KS), Jesse Helms (R-NC), Claiborne Bell (D-RI) and Thomas Daschle (D-SD), as well as by Representatives Newt Gingrich (R-GA), Richard Gephardt (D-MO), Ben Gilman (R-NY) and Lee Hamilton (D-IN). It stated that the response of Central and East European countries on this matter "will be seen as a test of their respect for basic human rights and the rule of law, and could have practical consequences on their relations with our country." As quoted in Jay Bushinsky, "E. Europe Bristles at D.C. Demand," *Chicago Sun-Times*, April 24, 1995.

68. Jankowski had gained international fame during the heyday of Solidarity but had become increasingly nationalistic and anti-Semitic by the mid-1990s. In his sermon he had stated that the "Star of David is implicated in the swastika as well as the hammer and sickle" and that Poles could no longer "tolerate" governments made up of "people who have not declared whether they come from Moscow or Israel"—a slight that many assumed was directed at Walesa's opponent in the upcoming Presidential election, the socialist candidate Alexander Kwasniewski. See "Walesa urged to condemn priest's remarks on Jews," *The Jerusalem Post*, June 15, 1995. See also "Walesa Disappoints Clinton," *Sacramento Bee*, July 20, 1995.

69. For Walesa's statement see "President: Star of David is Great Sign of Jewish Faith," PAO, June 20, 1995. See also Jane Perlez, "10 Days Later, Walesa Rebukes Anti-Semitism, but Not Priest," *The New York Times*, June 22, 1995.

70. See the AJC's Press release "American Jewish Committee Meeting with Polish President 'Inconclusive;' Walesa Broadly Condemns anti-Semitic Message but not the Messenger," June 27, 1995. On the President's meeting with Walesa see "Memcom of President Clinton's Meeting with President Walesa in San Francisco, June 26," State 159630, July 3, 1995.

71. At the top of that list were the issues of communal and private property that had been first taken by the Nazis and then nationalized by the communists. Negotiating an agreement on communal property would take nearly three years and a final agreement

would be reached only in February 1998, shortly before the U.S. Senate was scheduled to vote on NATO enlargement ratification.

72. See "Telcon with Polish President Lech Walesa," November 21, 1995.

73. See "Walesa, Kwasniewski hold TV Debate," *PAP News Wire*, November 13, 1995.

74. See "Telcon with President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski of Poland," November 21, 1995. See "Change in Style Not Substance in Poland's Campaign for NATO Membership," Warsaw 016130, December 8, 1995.

75. See Kwasniewski's statement before the North Atlantic Council from January 17, 1996. Author's private copy.

76. See, for example, "Rosati Pledges No Changes in Polish Foreign Policy: Seeks Early Kwasniewski Trip to U.S.," Warsaw 00412, January 11, 1996.

77. See "Foreign Minister Rosati's U.S. Visit: Heavy on Security Questions," Warsaw 004254, April 16, 1995; and "Polish ForMin Rosati and Acting Secretary Talbott Discuss NATO Enlargement and Regional Relations," State 0979984, May 11, 1996.

78. Interview with Nick Rey, April 23, 2000.

79. See "Memorandum of Conversation with President Kwasniewski of Poland," from July 8, 1995. See also *PAP*, July 9, 1995.

80. See "Slovak PM Meciar: 'I Know a Club Member Must Respect Its Rules,'" Bratislava 000425, February 28, 1995; and "A/S Holbrooke's Dinner with Slovak PM Meciar: NATO Expansion, Russian Concerns," Bratislava 000426, February 28, 1995.

81. See "5/24 Meeting of DoD Deputy Assistant Secretary Kruzel and NSC Senior Director Fried with Slovak President Kovac," Bratislava 001179, May 25, 1995.

82. See "Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Michal Kovac of Slovakia," October 21, 1995. That message was reinforced on Capitol Hill when Senator Jesse Helms introduced an amendment noting that consideration of Slovakia for NATO should be judged based on the country's political performance. On July 31, 1995, Senator Helms submitted Amendment No. 1927 to the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995, S.908, which he introduced to the Senate on June 9, 1995. Helms' amendment stated that "future consideration of Slovakia for accelerated NATO transition assistance should be evaluated in terms of its government's progress towards freedom of press, representative government and privation." The bill S.908 went to the Senate floor on December 14, 1995, <<http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r104:1:/temp/~r1040Mizss::>>.

83. If the EU or NATO decided to expand in 1996, he told them, "we still have enough time to deal with our internal problems." See Marian Lesko, "Story of Self Disqualification," in Martin Butora and Frantisek Sebej, eds., 1998, *Slovensko v sedež zone*), p. 42.

84. U.S. Department of State, "The Slovak Republic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996," released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, January 30, 1997, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_reports/slovakre.html>.

85. See "Slovakia: Kramer Tells Kuchar No Benefit of the Doubt for Slovakia on NATO Enlargement," Bratislava 001046, June 17, 1996; as well as "Slovak President to

A/S Kramer: Don't Punish the Country for the Government's Flaws," Bratislava 001048, June 17, 1996.

86. Meciar himself subsequently stated that he had told Albright he knew of such a deal on July 6, 1996. See Martin Butora and Frantisek Sebej, eds., 1998, *Slovensko v sedej zone?*, p. 51.

87. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership." *Foreign Affairs*, 72, no. 2 (March–April 1994): 80.

88. On Ukrainian views see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," *Survival*, 38, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 143–165; and Sherman W. Garnett, *Keystone in the Arch* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

89. Foreign Minister Udovenko's comments were made to Deputy Secretary Talbott in a meeting in the State Department on October 21, 1996.

90. As First Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk told a senior U.S. diplomat in late February 1995, Ukraine's public position was not to block membership. In private, however, they were much more open to NATO membership. According to Tarasyuk: "No matter what we say publicly, I can tell you that we absolutely want to join NATO." See "DFM Tarasyuk Discusses PFP, GOU Internal Problems, Kiev 01752, March 6, 1995. But as Tarasyuk said in an interview, it did not make sense for Ukraine to ask for NATO membership at a time when NATO's answer would clearly be negative: "Seeking membership now would only devalue our position in Europe: the door is not opening so why should we lose respect and ask for membership? If we can be sure that the door will open, then we can think about membership. But that process will take time and we should [meanwhile] find a proper form of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO." See the interview with Boris Tarasyuk, "A New Concept of European Security," *Transition* 1, no. 13 (July 28, 1995): 19.

91. As one Western scholar noted: "Deep down, many Europeans are unsure whether Ukraine is a 'real country' or not. They are reluctant to invest major resources in trying to stabilize Ukraine, especially given their own mounting economic problems. Others are concerned that too visible a Western interest in Ukraine could antagonize Russia and complicate relations with Moscow at a time when Russia's relations with the West are already strained over NATO enlargement." See Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," p. 144.

92. See "Ukrainian Views on NATO Expansion: Ukraine and PFP," USNATO 000633, February 15, 1995.

93. See the interview with Boris Tarasyuk, "A New Concept of European Security," *Transition* 1, no. 13 (July 28, 1995): 18.

94. See "NATO: Meeting of SYG Claes with Ukrainian President Kuchma, June 1, 1995" US NATO 002513, June 16, 1995.

95. They included regular bilateral consultations in a 16+1 framework, creating a NATO presence in Kiev, as well as joint cooperation in nonproliferation, arms control, and other defense-related areas. See the draft agreement presented by Foreign Minister Udovenko at NATO headquarters on September 14, 1995. Author's private copy. 16+1 refers to the then-16 NATO member states plus Ukraine.

96. Udovenko's letter is dated August 26, 1996.

97. See "Deputy Secretary's 9/16 and 9/29 Meetings with Ukrainian NSDC Secretary Horbulyn," State 205479, October 2, 1996.

98. Ukrainian Ambassador Offers Draft Agreement on "Special Partnership" between NATO and Ukraine," USNATO 003872, November 6, 1996.

99. Carl Bildt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (September/October 1994): 72-85.

100. Estonian President Lennart Meri would often tell visitors the story how, while visiting Washington prior to Estonia regaining its independence, he went to look at his nation's flag flying in the lobby of the Department of State. It was the only Foreign Ministry in the West where it was on display.

101. See "Remarks by Mr. Lennart Meri, President of the Republic of Estonia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 17, 1996, Washington, D.C." Author's private copy.

102. At a conference held on the Swedish island of Visby in June 1995, German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe stated that the Baltic states would not be included in an enlarged NATO and should instead seek close security cooperation with the Nordic states. See the article by Siegfried Thielbeer, "Klare Worten an die Baltischen Republiken" [Clear Words Addressed to the Baltic Republics], *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 30, 1995. In his IISS Alastair Buchan Lecture of March 28, 1996, the British Foreign Secretary suggested a similar approach to Baltic security.

103. Whereas the collapse of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe had created a *de facto* "double buffer" between Western Europe and Russia, it had paradoxically made Northern Europe more important to Moscow in strategic terms. See Krister Wahlbaeck. "Der unwaegbare Osten: eine schwedische Sicht neuer Sicherheitsprobleme," *Europa Archiv*, no. 3, 1993, p. 10.

104. See "Secretary's Meeting with Martii Ahtisaari, President of Finland, February 8, 1996," SECTO 03030, February 10, 1996.

105. See "Undersecretary Tarnoff's Meeting with Swedish MFA Rep Eliasson on European Security, CTBT," State 030285, February 15, 1996.

106. In his Tallinn speech, Gore stated that "President Clinton is leading the way toward the integration of Europe's new democracies into a growing transatlantic community of secure, prosperous and peaceful nations. This will be a community without spheres of influence or arbitrary lines, a community rooted in the values for which you struggled so hard and so successfully." See "Remarks by Vice President of the United States Al Gore," Town Hall Square, Tallinn, Estonia, The Embassy of the United States of America, Kentmanni 20, 15099 Tallinn, Estonia, March 13, 1995, <<http://www.usislib.ee/algore.html>>.

107. See the memo from ROM Director Christopher W. Dell, to Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke entitled "Baltic Policy" and dated April 14, 1995.

108. See Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," *Survival* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 121-42.

109. See the article by Lt. Gen Dementyev and Anton Surikov in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 11, 1996.

110. See Max Jacobsen, "Envisioning a Possible Deal with Russia on NATO Expansion," *International Herald Tribune*, February 23, 1996.

111. See Anatol Lieven, "Baltic Iceberg Ahead: NATO Beware," *The World Today*, pp. 175–79.
112. See Joint Declaration of the Baltic Presidents on Partnership for Integration, Vilnius, May 28, 1996.
113. See "Latvian President Discusses NATO Enlargement, Urges President Clinton to Meet Baltic Leaders in June," Riga 001672, June 3, 1996.
114. As quoted from the diary of Ambassador Ojars Kalnins.
115. See Fred Hiatt, " . . . And the Three Presidents," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1996.
116. See "Acting Secretary Briefs Baltics on Action Plan," State 186058, September 7, 1996.
117. This excerpt from Ambassador Kalnins's diary is quoted with his permission.
118. See "Copenhagen Seminar: Secretary Perry, UK and German Defense Ministers say "Not Yet" to Baltic NATO Membership: Russians Don't Show," Copenhagen 005129, October 11, 1996.
119. See "Memorandum of Conversation with Former President of Poland, Lech Walesa," June 7, 1996.
120. See the NSC paper entitled "NATO Enlargement Game Plan: June 96 to June 97," dated June 5, 1996 and circulated interagency on June 7, 1996.
121. See "Summary of Conclusions, Restricted Meeting on NATO Policy, July 29, 1996," July 31, 1996.
122. For transcript of news conference, see "Webwire-Holds News Conference With Speaker Gingrich, Former Polish President Lech Walesa and Others on NATO Expansion," June 4, 1996 (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., FDCH Political Transcripts, 1996).
123. Ibid.
124. See Bob Dole, Republican candidate for President of the United States, "Leadership for a New Century," Philadelphia World Affairs Council, June 25, 1996.
125. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between President Clinton and President Yeltsin on 7/5/1996."
126. See "The President's Meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov of Russia," July 9, 1996.
127. The same language is contained in the letters to President Chirac, Prime Minister Major and Chancellor Kohl, dated August 7, 1996.
128. According to Christopher: "President Clinton had considered making the statement himself, but in the thick of his reelection campaign we were concerned that critics at home and abroad would view his announcement of NATO expansion as a political ploy. We hoped that my delivering the speech would help remove our policy from the context of Presidential politics." Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 452.
129. See the speech by Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Stuttgart, "A New Atlantic Community For the 21st Century," September 6, 1996, <<http://www.usislib.ee/wchrist.html>>.
130. President Chirac gathered his advisors after the Berlin Ministerial and congratulated them on the "victory for France, Europe and trans-Atlantic solidarity"—a

formulation that French officials subsequently used with the press as well. See "Berlin NAC: French Views on Next Steps." Paris 12927, June 12, 1996.

131. See the "Memorandum of President's Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France," June 27, 1996.

132. French officials involved in these negotiations insist that the Berlin package itself was never sufficient for Chirac. Their American counterparts, on the other hand, underscore that they were surprised by the more ambitious proposals France now demanded, including positions that were unacceptable to Washington and most European NATO allies.

133. See "Consultations With the French MFA on European Security, August 22," Paris 19272, August 27, 1995.

134. See President Chirac's letter to President Clinton dated August 28, 1996.

135. See "Secretary Christopher's Working Lunch with Foreign Minister de Charette, September 5, 1996, State 187939, September 10, 1996.

136. See "President Chirac and NATO SYG Solana Discuss NATO Adaptation, Post-IFOR, NATO Summit," Paris 20377, September 26, 1996.

137. See "Informal Defense Ministers Meeting in Bergen, Norway, SecDef Bilateral with French MOD Millon," USNATO 003452, September 27, 1996.

138. See "Informal Defense Ministers Meeting in Bergen, Norway, SecDef Bilat with SYG Solana, 24 Sep 96," USNATO 003439, September 27, 1996.

139. See President Clinton's letter to President Chirac from September 26, 1996. When the U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission in Paris, Don Bandler, handed Clinton's letter to Chirac's diplomatic advisor, Jean-David Levitte, he was asked whether there was any daylight in the U.S. position. Bandler said that the U.S. was willing to consider making other key positions in the Southern Command European, but not the AFSouth commander. Levitte responded: "Then we have a real problem." See "Initial French Reaction to President's September 26 Letter to Chirac on NATO," Paris 021877, September 30, 1996.

140. See President Chirac's letter to President Clinton of October 10, 1996. A copy of Chirac's letter was subsequently leaked the press. See Reuters, December 2, 1996.

141. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "Lake Meeting with President Jacques Chirac of France," November 1, 1996.

142. See "The Secretary's Breakfast Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana," State 248137, December 4, 1996.

143. See Talbott's Note to Christopher from July 9, 1996.

144. The first version of this paper was sent to Christopher on July 9, 1996. Modified versions were sent on July 12 and on July 18, the latter entitled "NATO/Russia: A Framework for the Next Phase."

145. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy of State Strobe Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Moscow, July 15, 1996.

146. See the paper dated July 29, 1995 and entitled "NATO-Russia: Objectives, Obstacles and Work Plan."

147. See Talbott's summaries of his conversations with Mamedov contained in his untitled memos to Secretary of State Christopher from August 28, 1996 and September

13, 1996, respectively. The framework paper was entitled "Common Elements for the Conduct of a NATO-Russia Dialogue and an Eventual NATO-Russia Charter," and dated September 12, 1996.

148. See Talbott's note to Christopher on his meeting with Mamedov dated August 28, 1996.

149. In the spring Chirac had told U.S. Ambassador Pamela Harriman that NATO should not enlarge until it has a NATO-Russia agreement in hand. Over the summer French officials repeated that view and claimed that it was shared in Bonn. As Ambassador Harriman wrote: "It is precisely the French temptation to play friend in court to Russia that is a potential source of difficulty. We have sought to convince the French that if NATO allies appear divided on enlargement, Russia will exploit these differences to increase its demands. However, Russia, is a deeply personal subject for Chirac. He may well calculate that with Russia, as well as with Iraq, a measure of independence from the United States will win France a special place—without undermining the GOF's special strategic relationship with Washington." See "Scenesetter for Deputy Secretary Talbott's September 11–13 Visit to Paris," Paris 20153, September 10, 1996.

150. As President Clinton had written in his letter to Chirac, Kohl, and Major in early August, Moscow was "looking for signs of divisions or uncertainty on our part in order to slow down or even stop enlargement if they can. . . . The best way to ensure that the Russians work constructively with the Alliance," President Clinton concluded, "is to proceed with enlargement in the steady, unpredictable and transparent way we have done to date. Allowing the Russians to delay the next step would only encourage those in Moscow who still favor a hard line approach."

151. See the Memorandum of the conversation between Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Waldorf Towers, September 23, 1996.

152. *Ibid.*

153. The idea that Moscow might prefer to slow down NATO-Russia talks until after enlargement to avoid the appearance that it was acquiescing to the Alliance was floated by Presidential foreign policy advisor Dmitriy Ryurikov. See his comments to departing U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering as reported in "Ambassador's Farewell Call on Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Ryurikov," Moscow 030332, October 29, 1996.

154. See "Clinton Remarks to People of Detroit," October 22, 1996, <<http://www.usemb.ee/clitond.html>>.

155. As quoted in John F. Harris, "Clinton Vows Wider NATO in Three Years; Foreign Policy Stands Defended as challenger Alleges Foot-Dragging," *The Washington Post*, October 23, 1996.

156. The Principals Committee meeting was held on November 15, 1997. See "Summary of Conclusions on NATO Policy," circulated interagency on November 21, 1996.

157. See Talbott's memo to Christopher on his talks with Primakov dated December 4, 1996.

BOOK VI. THE NATO-RUSSIA ENDGAME

1. See Clinton's State of the Union Address, February 4, 1997.
2. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Norton, 1969).
3. See "Statement By Secretary of State-Designate Madeleine Korbelt Albright Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Wednesday, January 8, 1997.
4. The study was commissioned by the Pew Trust and released in the fall of 1991. See Donald S. Kellerman, Andrew Kohut, and Carol Bowman, *The Pulse of Europe: A Survey of Political and Social Values and Attitudes* (Washington, DC: Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press).
5. See Albright's January 8, 1997 testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
6. See Albright's handwritten comments on Grossman's note to her entitled "Thinking About 1999" and dated January 15, 1998.
7. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Address to the People of Prague, Obecni Dum, "A Moment of Celebration and of Dedication," Prague, Czech Republic, July 14, 1997, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970714.html>.
8. The book was James Chace's *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created The American World* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998).
9. As Albright put it in her first speech as Secretary of State at NATO Headquarters in Brussels: "Today we are privileged to live in a time of relative stability and peace. But we know from history that we cannot take the extension of these blessings for granted. Peace is not a gift. It must be earned. And if it is to last, it must be constantly reinforced." See "Statement By Secretary Madeleine Albright At The North Atlantic Council Special Ministerial Meeting," NATO Headquarters, Brussels, February 18, 1997.
10. See "Commencement Address by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright at Harvard University," Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 5, 1997.
11. Ibid.
12. In his memoirs, former Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov writes that he was initially worried about Albright as U.S. Secretary of State but was pleasantly surprised to discover that she, while a vigorous defender and promoter of American interests, was committed to finding common ground with Russia as well. See Yevgeny Primakov, *Gody v Bolshoy Politike* (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1996), p. 272.
13. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "The Secretary's Meeting with President Yeltsin," February 21, 1997.
14. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Opening Statement at the Carnegie Roundtable Discussions," Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, May 2, 1997.
15. These quotes come from my notes from the meeting.
16. See Madeleine K. Albright, "Why Bigger is Better," *The Economist*, February 15, 1997.
17. Kohl's National Security Advisor, Joachim Bitterlich provided a read out of the conversation to Talbott as well as to the U.S. charge in Bonn, J.D. Bindenagel. See

"Kohl's Telephone Call with the President on January 6"; and "Kohl's suggestion on NATO-Russia Relations," Bonn 00102, January 6, 1997.

18. The phone call took place on January 6, 1997. See Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, January 13, 1997.

19. See "Report Card on Primakov: B Plus on Process, C Minus on Substance," Moscow 01151, January 17, 1997.

20. See "February 21 Meeting with Communist Leader Zyuganov, State 032968, February 22, 1997.

21. The article was written by the pro-communist Duma staffer and security expert Anton Surikov in the January 15 edition of *Pravda Pyat*. See "Duma Staffer Surikov Describes Recent Presidential Meeting on Response to NATO Expansion," Moscow 001403, January 22, 1997.

22. See "SYG Solana on AFSouth, Ministerials, Bosnia," USNATO 003863, November 5, 1996.

23. See "Senator Roth's 11/26 Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana on NATO Expansion," USNATO 000307, January 31, 1997.

24. See the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Clinton and Chirac from January 30, 1997.

25. See "Deputy Secretary's 1/13 Meeting with Foreign Secretary Rifkind and Foreign Office Officials," London 000657, January 17, 1997.

26. See Memorandum of the Conversation between Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and French President Jacques Chirac, January 14, 1997.

27. See Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, January 15, 1997.

28. Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 2002), p. 224.

29. See Talbott and Fuerth's Memorandum for the President and Vice President dated January 24, 1997.

30. See Yeltsin's letter to Clinton dated January 30, 1997.

31. See "Primakov Publicly Commits to Negotiations with NATO," Moscow 003619, February 14, 1997.

32. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Clinton and Gore with Chernomyrdin, entitled "Meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin: March Summit, GCC Results, European security, START, Economics," The Oval Office, February 7, 1997.

33. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, p. 233.

34. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 6, 1997.

35. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "The Secretary's Meeting with President Yeltsin," February 21, 1997.

36. See Henry Kissinger, "Helsinki Fiasco," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 1997.

37. See Talbott's Note to Albright dated March 14, 1997 and entitled "The NATO-Russia Charter as time-released medicine."

38. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy of State Strobe Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, Moscow, July 15, 1996.

39. See the Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 6, 1997.

40. See the scorecard entitled "A NATO-Russia Understanding" dated January 27, 1997. See also the updated written version from February 8 entitled "From Helsinki to Madrid: A Scenario" which lays out internal U.S. thinking on how to bring NATO-Russia talks to closure in the run-up to the Madrid summit.

41. For background on how NATO strategy has evolved see Richard L. Kugler, *Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993).

42. For an example of Moscow's attempt to define "offensive infrastructure" see "Russians Identify 'Infrastructure'," Vienna 001791, March 11, 1997.

43. See *Final Communiqué* issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, December 10, 1996.

44. See also NATO/CFE: Feb. 17 HLTF Agrees on NATO Position on Adaptation," USNATO 000509, February 19, 1997.

45. This sentence went through a number of iterations. The version Vershbow wrote on March 5 is quoted verbatim from Talbott's memo to Albright from March 7, 1997. See "My Meeting with Primakov—and Yours," March 7, 1997.

46. Ibid. See also the Memorandum of Conversation between Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 6, 1997.

47. As quoted in William Drozdiak, "Poland Urges NATO Not to Appease Russia: 'The Smell of Yalta is Always with Us,'" *The Washington Post*, March 17, 1997.

48. See "The Secretary's Meeting with Polish Foreign Minister Rosati," State 056869, March 27, 1997.

49. Speaking before the press with Rosati, Albright underscored that Poland would be a full NATO member: "They will be full allies in every sense of the word. Every important decision which will be made by NATO's 16 allies is made in full consultations with our partners. And there will be nothing about you without you." See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, Remarks at photo opportunity, Washington D.C., March 13, 1997, <<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970313a.html>>.

50. See "Statement by the North Atlantic Council, March 14, 1997," <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-027e.htm>>.

51. See Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, March 15, 1997. This description also draws on Talbott's notes of the meeting.

52. See Talbott's typed up notes of the meeting between Berger and him with Mamedov on the morning of March 16, 1997.

53. Obtained from Strobe Talbott's personal papers.

54. See Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov on March 17, 1997.

55. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, p. 237.

56. See the memcon entitled "Morning Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin: NATO-Russia, START, ABM/TMD," March 21, 1997.
57. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, pp. 241–242.
58. See "Press Conference of President Clinton and President Yeltsin," Kalastafa Torppa, Helsinki, Finland, March 21, 1997. Author's private copy.
59. See "Russian Reaction to Helsinki," Moscow 007281, March 25, 1997.
60. Finnish President Ahtisaari briefed U.S. Ambassador Derek Shearer on his conversation with Yeltsin in Finnish-Russian talks the day after the U.S.-Russian summit had concluded. See "The Morning After: Russian/Finnish Post-Summit Bilaterals Focus on the Baltics," Helsinki 001550, March 26, 1997.
61. Naumann was in Moscow March 23–26, 1997. See "NATO-Russia: CMC Chairman Briefs the NAC on his Russia Visit," USNATO 01212, April 14, 1997.
62. See "Russia's Foreign Policy Malaise," Moscow 010483, April 25, 1997.
63. See "SYG Solana's Debrief of His 4/15 Meeting with FM Primakov," USNATO 1231, April 15, 1997.
64. See Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control* (New York: Random House, 1984).
65. See the paper entitled "A Menu of Scenarios for Your May Day in Moscow: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly," April 25, 1997.
66. Talbott called Albright from Moscow to convey this message to her during the flight. It is also contained in a memo drafted summarizing the first day of talks in Moscow and sent to Albright's plane. See Memorandum to the Secretary From Strobe Talbott in Moscow, April 30, 1997.
67. See Talbott's "NATO-Russia Midnight Update" faxed to Albright on her plane en route to Moscow, April 30, 1997.
68. See "Secretary's Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, May 1, 1997, Moscow," State 084836, May 6, 1997.
69. See Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, pp. 244–245.
70. See "Secretary's Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, May 1, 1997, Moscow," State 84836, May 6, 1997. The results of the Albright-Primakov conversation on May 2 are described in a confidential summary of their conversation. Albright also describes the meeting in a Night Note to the President sent later that day. See the Secretary's "Night Note" sent to the President on May 2, 1997.
71. "Night Note," Ibid.
72. See "NATO/HLTF: May 6 HLTF Meeting—Allies Support Albright Primakov Paper on CFE," USNATO 085231, May 6, 1997.
73. See "NATO-Russia: NAC Discusses NATO-Russia relationship Before SYG Meets Primakov," USNATO 1506, May 6, 1997.
74. See "Deputy Secretary's Letter to DFM Mamedov," State 084033, May 6, 1997.
75. See "NATO-Russia: Debrief of May 6 Solana-Primakov Meeting," USNATO 1531, May 7, 1997.
76. For the U.S. instruction to Hunter for the final NAC on May 13 see "NATO-Russia: Guidance on Section V for 5/13NAC," State 088990, May 13, 1997.

77. See "Letter from the Deputy Secretary to DFM Mamedov," State 86892, May 9, 1997.

78. See the Official Informal from Tefft to Talbott entitled "For Deputy Secretary Only from Chargé," May 12, 1997.

79. See the guidance sent to Vershbow following the Vershbow-Edelman conversation entitled "NATO-Russia: Guidance to Close on March 14 Language/Flank Agreement." State 090106, May 14, 1997.

80. See "Statement by the President on NATO Expansion," The White House, The Rose Garden, May 14, 1997, <<http://www.allied.be/usa/president/s19970514b.html>>.

81. See "Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials," The Briefing Room, May 14, 1997. Author's private copy.

82. See Yeltsin's letter to President Clinton from May 19, 1997.

83. See Memorandum of Conversation of a Dinner Meeting Between Secretary Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, State 110688, June 12, 1997.

84. See "Remarks by President Clinton at the Signing Ceremony of the NATO-Russia Founding Act," Paris, May 27, 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/usa/president/s970527.a.htm>>.

85. See "Remarks by Russian President Yeltsin at the Signing Ceremony of the NATO-Russia Founding Act," Paris, May 27, 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970527e.htm>>.

86. See the Memorandum of Conversation of the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting held at the American Ambassador's Residence in Paris on May 27, 1997.

BOOK VII. HEAD-TO-HEAD AT MADRID

1. This did not mean that the U.S. had given up on Slovakia. In the spring of 1997 Albright asked Talbott to come up with a strategy to encourage Bratislava to return to a reformist track. See Deputy Secretary Talbott's memo entitled "A Strategy for Slovakia" dated April 21, 1997.

2. In a memo to the NATO Ambassador in February, Solana wrote: "In order to avoid a prolonged public debate before the summit, there should be no formal discussion either in Council or at the spring Ministerial and no recommendations on which country or countries to invite at the summit to start accession negotiations with the Alliance. We should rather aim at a late and quiet process of consensus building between the Sintra Ministerial and the summit. I would be prepared, if you agree, to sound out nations individually by mid-June and present a consolidated overview to Permanent Representatives at a private luncheon or an informal meeting which would allow nations to consult bilaterally on different views. A few days before the summit we should aim to arrive, in an informal meeting, at unanimous recommendations to be submitted to heads of state and government. Any leak or advance notice to the "selected" countries or to the "non-selected" must be strictly avoided." See "NATO: Enlargement Preparations for the Madrid Summit, USNATO 000430, February 12, 1997.

3. At the NATO December 1996 Foreign Ministers Ministerial, the U.S. had been unable to gain acceptance of the relatively anodyne statement: "The first shall not be

the last." See Hunter's assessment of the weakness of allied support for the "open door" policy in "NATO in 1996: Beyond Architecture to Action," USNATO 000056, January 6, 1996.

4. Speaking before the NAC in Brussels on February 4, 1997, President Constantinescu said that his government had promised the Romanian people three things: democratic stability, economic prosperity, and Euro-Atlantic integration. He concluded his speech by saying that if any of these goals were not achieved, quoting Titus, "the day is lost." See "Romanian President Constantinescu Meets the NAC," USNATO 000426, February 12, 1997.

5. But Chirac also noted that "the greatest difficulty" would be to convince the United States to support Romania's candidacy. See "Chirac Visit to Bucharest," Bucharest 001247, February 27, 1997. For an internal assessment of French thinking on Romania in the spring of 1997 see "France and NATO: Plugging for Romania," Paris 010053, May 2, 1997.

6. See "NATO in 1997," USNATO 001053, March 28, 1997.

7. On Perry's trip to Ljubljana see "What A Difference Ten Months Makes: Secretary Perry's July 3 Visit to Slovenia," Ljubljana 000756, July 5, 1996.

8. In order to avoid leaks, these meetings were kept smaller and less formal than normal Deputy Committee meetings and were referred to as "rump DCs." My description draws on my own notes from these meetings.

9. Since these meetings were not official DC meetings, an official "Summary of Conclusions" of the DC process was never produced. The rationale for the U.S. decision is nonetheless contained in the paper entitled "Principals' Checklist of NATO Summit Issues," May 20, 1997.

10. See Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "NATO, Russia and Transatlantic Security in the 21st Century," The Atlantic Council, May 20, 1997.

11. See Hunter's cable "The Sintra Ministerials," USNATO 001804, May 26, 1997. See also my note to Albright entitled "What to Watch Out for on Enlargement Issues" dated May 23, 1997.

12. See "Talking Points on Small First Group," May 28, 1997.

13. Albright emerged from the lunch somewhat shaken and angry that she had so little support. Talbott sent me off to draft a memo listing the reasons why we were still in good shape. See my note to Albright entitled "Thoughts on Your Lunch and Aftermath."

14. See Albright's Night Note from Sintra dated May 30, 1997.

15. In a meeting with Italian Defense Minister Andreata, Cohen replied that if Slovenia had not been included by others with Romania, the U.S. decision might have been different. See "Defense Ministers Meeting at NATO HQ, Italian Bilateral, 12-13 June 1997," USNATO 002120, June 19, 1997.

16. The conversation took place on May 22, 1997. Clinton said: "The challenge at Madrid is to make sure the countries invited to join NATO can fulfill their obligations, so that it will be a credible alliance and not purely political." The two leaders agreed on the merits of such an approach in general, but did not discuss individual candidacies. See the "Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of Germany," State 107309, June 7, 1997.

17. See "Bitterlich June 5 Readout," State 120928, June 26, 1997.
18. The rationale for the President's decision was contained in "NATO Enlargement—U.S. Decision on New Members," State 111475, June 13, 1997.
19. See DoD New Briefing, "Secretary Cohen: En route Interview with Traveling Press," June 11, 1997, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun1997/to6131997_t611enrt.html>.
20. See also "U.S. Statement on NATO Enlargement," by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers' Session, June 12, 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/usa/dod/s970612c.htm>>.
21. See "Deutsch-franzoesischer Motor im Leerlauf," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, June 14, 1997.
22. As Védérine subsequently put it to U.S. chargé, Don Bandler, "You have to accept that there will be discussion of this at Madrid." See "FM Védérine on Denver Summit NATO, Europe and Mideast Issues," Paris 13923, June 19, 1997."
23. As quoted in the brief news summary in the *Wall Street Journal* entitled "NATO" on June 6, 1997.
24. See "SYG's Enlargement Conversations with PermReps," USNATO 002139, June 20, 1997.
25. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and French President Chirac on June 20, 1997, June 25, 1997.
26. See "Chancellor Kohl and Romania's NATO Candidacy," Bonn 7047, June 12, 1997.
27. See "Secretary's Conversation with German Foreign Minister Kinkel," State 111238, June 13, 1997; as well as "Secretary Albright's Meeting with German Foreign Minister Kinkel," State 119427, June 25, 1997.
28. See "NATO Enlargement: Kinkel Underscores Consensus on Three Initial Entrants, Open Door Policy," Bonn 07834, June 27, 1997.
29. See "Slovenians Grapple with U.S.-European Standpoints on NATO Enlargement," Ljubljana 001318, June 3, 1997.
30. See "Letter to President Clinton from Slovene Prime Minister Drnovsek," Ljubljana 111408, June 11, 1997.
31. To complicate matters, the U.S. Ambassador had not received his official instructions explaining the reasons for the U.S. decision due to a communications error. He was therefore not armed with the latest in Washington's official thinking. See "PM Drnovsek Reacts to Slovene Exclusion from NATO First Round," Ljubljana 001427, June 13, 1997.
32. See "Text of Letter from Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to President Clinton," Ljubljana 01537, June 26, 1997.
33. See "Slovenian Officials Register Disappointment Over U.S. Decision on NATO Enlargement," Ljubljana 001431, June 13, 1997.
34. See "Kucan Cites Slovenian Missteps on NATO," Ljubljana 001483, June 19, 1997.
35. See "Visit To Romania by Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe," Bucharest 000175, January 13, 1997. The quote comes from a diary kept by Ambassador Moses and is quoted with his permission.

36. Ibid.

37. See "The Secretary's Meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Severin," State 097074, May 23, 1997.

38. See "Romanian Foreign Minister Expresses Views/Feelings on U.S. Enlargement Decision," Bucharest 003778, June 16 1997.

39. See "Romanian Prime Minister's Meeting with the Secretary, Deputy Secretary," State 133663, July 17, 1997.

40. See "Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks and Question and Answer Session at Vilnius University, Vilnius University, July 13, 1997.

41. See the Speech by Talbott entitled "The End of the Beginning: The Emergence of a New Russia," Stanford University, September 19, 1997. See also my speech at a conference in Helsinki, Finland on "The New Hanseatic League" on October 8, 1997.

42. See my note to Talbott from July 16, 1997 entitled "The Baltic Hanseatic Strategy."

43. For further details see Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels* (Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1993), pp. 443-444.

44. As quoted in "From the Grapevine: Baltic News Trends and Perspectives," *City Paper*, no. 28, May/June 1997, pp. 7-8.

45. See "Memcon of Deputy Secretary Talbott's Meeting with Estonian President Lennart Meri and Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis, May 28, The Hague." State 110550, June 12, 1997.

46. See "The Deputy Secretary Briefs Baltic Ambassadors on U.S. First Tranche Position," June 13, 1997. State 114913, June 18, 1997.

47. The language in dispute was a description of the U.S. interest in the Baltic states. The Balts wanted to use the phrase "direct and material interest" that Vice President Gore has used in a speech in Estonia in 1995. But putting that phrase in the Baltic Charter was seen as running the risk that it could be interpreted as an actual security guarantee. The second issue was whether the Charter would state that we "supported" Baltic aspirations to join NATO or whether we simply said we "welcomed" their aspirations and "supported" their efforts. See my note to Talbott summarizing these differences on June 17, 1997.

48. See "Positive Estonian Reaction to Draft of Baltic Charter," Tallinn 02159, June 23, 1997; "Latvians Respond Positively and Pragmatically to Draft U.S.-Baltic Charter, Copenhagen 003601, June 30, 1997; and "Initial Lithuania Reaction to U.S.-Baltic Charter Positive." Copenhagen 003463, June 25, 1997.

49. See my note to Talbott, entitled "Baltic Success" from June 27, 1997.

50. For the proposed U.S. draft communiqué language see "Proposal for Close Allies Meeting in Washington Prior to the Denver Summit on NATO Madrid Summit Issue," State 111311, June 12, 1997.

51. The German used in the press release was "baldiger Eintritt" or "early entry."

52. See "German Support for Romania: Finding a Way Toward Consensus at Madrid," Bonn 008087, July 3, 1997.

53. See "President's July 3, 1997 Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl," State 127943, July 9, 1997. In Bucharest, Ambassador Moses met with Constantinescu

following his return from Bonn. The Romanian President said that he had told the Chancellor he didn't want Romania to become the focal point of dissension in the Alliance but that he needed a specific reference in the communiqué. Otherwise—in his words—"I will have achieved nothing. Romania will be in the same position as Bulgaria. And I will have failed as a leader." See "President Constantinescu's Meeting with Chancellor Kohl," Bucharest 004204, July 3, 1997.

54. See the Memorandum of Conversation entitled "Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana," July 7, 1997.

55. For a summary of the opening plenary session see "NATO Summit—Plenary Discussion of NATO Enlargement," SECTO 021007, July 10, 1997.

56. See "EAPC Summit, July 9," Secto 021020, July 14, 1997.

57. See "Memorandum of Conversation: President Clinton's Meeting with Romanian President Constantinescu," State 144970, August 22, 1997.

58. See "Remarks by President Clinton and President <<http://clinton5.nara.gov/textonly/WH/New/Spain/19970714-15453.html>>.

59. See "Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and German President Herzog on July 24, 1997," State 146743, August 6, 1997.

BOOK VIII. THE POLITICAL BATTLE

1. For example, in the summer of 1996 the Senate passed the "NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act" by a vote of 81–16. See Vote Summary, July 25, 1996 on S.Amdt. 5058 to H.R. 3540, <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:h.r.03654>>.

2. See "Memorandum of Conversation, Expanded Meeting with Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy, May 6, 1998, 11:50 A.M.–12:30 A.M., Cabinet Room."

3. On the changing role of the executive branch and Congress see Stanley Sloan, Mary Locke, and Casimir A. Yost, *The Foreign Policy Struggle* (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2000).

4. See George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," *The New York Times*, February 5, 1997.

5. See John Lewis Gaddis, "History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement," *Survival* 40, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 145–151.

6. See Jeremy D. Rosner, *The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995).

7. See William Stull Holt, *Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933).

8. See Jeremy D. Rosner, "The Perils of Misjudging Our Political Will," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (July 1996): 9–16. On public support for enlargement see Steven Kull and Jeremy D. Rosner, The American public, Congress and NATO enlargement, Part I: "Is there sufficient public support?" and Part II: "Will Congress back admitting new members?" in *NATO Review* 45, no. 1 (January 1997): 9–11 and 12–14, respectively. For the original Kull poll, see Principal Investigator Steven Kull, "Americans on

Expanding NATO: A Study of US Public Attitudes Summary of Findings," Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), October 1, 1996.

9. See Rosner's memo to Berger entitled "Legislative, Public Affairs and Diplomatic Priorities for the Next Six Months," January 16, 1997.

10. See Rosner's memo to Secretary Albright, National Security Advisor Berger, Deputy Secretary Talbott, and Deputy National Security Advisor Steinberg entitled "Initial Thoughts on NATO Enlargement Ratification Strategy," February 26, 1997.

11. Helms's then chief-of-staff, retired Rear Admiral Bud Nance, would play a key role in convincing the Senator to support enlargement. Nance had served at NATO SACLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. He often remarked to visitors that one lesson he had learned while serving at SACLANT was that NATO's role was not only to deter the Russians, but to keep the peace among the European countries as well.

12. See Trent Lott, "The Senate's Role in NATO Enlargement," *The Washington Post*, March 21, 1997.

13. For a portrait of Julie Finley see Jill Abramson, "The Belle of the Soft Money Soiree," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 20, 2000.

14. The U.S. Committee to Expand NATO was incorporated as a 501 (C) (4) corporation on November 1, 1996 in the District of Columbia. Jackson's role as President and his ties to Lockheed Martin led to accusations that it was a front for the U.S. defense industry to sell weapons to the region. The Committee's article of incorporation and bylaws emphasized the *pro bono* nature of the organization and a prohibition against accepting contributions from corporations or foreign nationals in accordance with the belief of its founders that it was an organization of individual American citizens supporting NATO enlargement. For an example of accusations that the U.S. defense industry was a major supporter of enlargement see Katherine Q. Seelye, "Arms Contractors Spend to Promote an Expanded NATO," *The New York Times*, March 30, 1998.

15. On Jackson's views see Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, "The Conservative Case for NATO," *Policy Review*, no. 94 (April/May 1999): 45–57.

16. See Jackson's memo from March 1997 entitled "A Political Strategy for NATO Expansion" contained in the archives of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO.

17. Interview with Bruce Jackson, August 16, 2001.

18. Craig's fax went on to say: "You will be pleased to know that this morning I received a call from the Slovenian Ambassador who told me that his Foreign Minister would be in town next week and was free for dinner on Tuesday. I went ahead and scheduled him in—and then, to my shock, recalled that yesterday, I had told the Ambassador from Slovakia, whose Prime Minister is also in town next week, that Tuesday could be his night at the house. Fortunately, the Slovaks—being particularly eager to please—were willing to reschedule to Wednesday. And just now, I got another call, this time from the Estonian Ambassador who was so excited he could hardly get the words out. He wanted to tell me that half the cabinet of Estonia was coming to town, that they were eager to talk to the Committee about NATO enlargement, and that they were free for dinner late Thursday night." Craig's fax to Finley dated March 6, 1997 is contained in the archives of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO.

19. See the memo from Jackson to the USCEN's Board of Directors dated June 9, 1997 summarizing the USCEN's activities November 1, 1996–May 31, 1997 contained in the archives of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO.

20. See the transcript of the debate between Richard C. Holbrooke and Michael E. Mandelbaum entitled "Expanding NATO: Will it Weaken the Alliance?" December 9, 1996.

21. See also Richard Cohen, "Endangered Expansion," *The Washington Post*, December 12, 1996.

22. As quoted in "NATO or Tomato?," *The New York Times*, January 22, 1997.

23. See the notes from the meeting by Cameron Munter dated March 5, 1997.

24. This idea came from RAND President Jim Thomson. See Jim Thomson, "Perspective on NATO; Back to Square 1 With Einstein," *Los Angeles Times*, March 21, 1995.

25. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's Prepared Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "NATO Enlargement," Washington, D.C., April 23, 1997, <<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970423.htm>>.

26. See Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on NATO Enlargement, Senator John Warner (R-VA), April 23, 1997, <<http://www.fas.org/man/nato/congress/1997/s970423t-warner.htm>>.

27. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Held Hostage," *The New York Times*, April 28, 1997.

28. See Henry Kissinger, "Helsinki Fiasco," *The Washington Post*, March 30, 1997 and "The Dilution of NATO," *The Washington Post*, June 8, 1997.

29. See Vaclav Havel, "NATO's Quality of Life," *The New York Times*, May 13, 1997.

30. See "Remarks By the President At The United States Military Academy Commencement," Michie Stadium, West Point, New York, May 31, 1997, Office of the Press Secretary, <<http://clinton6nara.gov/1997/05/1997-05-31-president-at-west-point-graduation.html>>.

31. See "Dear Mr. President" letter dated June 11, 1997.

32. This account is based on Rosner's notes from the meeting.

33. See John Keegan's *Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6–August 25, 1994* (New York: Viking Press, 1982), Chapter Seven, 'A Polish Battlefield,' pp. 249–282.

34. For further details on the Judge Waters event see George W. Grayson, *Strange Bedfellows: NATO Marches East* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), pp. 109–112.

35. See Remarks by President Bill Clinton at Veterans' Event, "NATO Enlargement," The White House, The East Room, Washington, DC, July 3, 1997, *Federal News Service* (Washington, DC: Federal News Service Group, Inc., 1998).

36. See "The Open Letter to the President," June 26, 1997, <<http://www.cpss.org/nato/ople.htm>>.

37. See "Center for Political and Strategic Studies News Conference on NATO Enlargement," Speakers: Richard Davies, IISS Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University; Stanley Rieser; Jack Matlock, Former Ambassador To The Soviet Union; Michael Mandelbaum, Professor,

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, National Press Club, Washington, DC, June 26, 1997, *Federal News Service* (Washington, DC: Federal News Service Group, Inc., 1997).

38. See "Letter to the President" by Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and others, June 25, 1997.

39. See Senator Jesse Helms, "Enlarging the Alliance: New Members, Not New Missions," *Wall Street Journal*, July 9, 1997.

40. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton's Folly," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1997.

41. See the memo from John Isaacs from the Council for a Livable world dated July 14, 1997, entitled "Senate Vote Count on NATO Enlargement."

42. Memo circulated by the Committee to Expand NATO also warned that the Administration was in danger of losing key Republican supporters. See Jackson's memo entitled "The NATO Debate After Madrid," July 30, 1997.

43. The letter was sent from Senator Lugar to Berger on July 28, 1997 and included a 14-page memo entitled "Strategy for Securing Senate Ratification of NATO Enlargement."

44. See Rosner's memo of July 25, 1997 entitled "Update on NATO Enlargement Ratification."

45. See New Atlantic Initiative statement on NATO Enlargement, September 9, 1997.

46. See memo from Jeremy Rosner to Secretary Albright entitled "Strategy for Achieving Ratification" dated August 27, 1997, and Rosner's outline for the meeting with Albright on August 28 entitled "MKA Meeting: Road Ahead on NATO+ Ratification."

47. See memo from Steve Biegun and Beth Wilson to Senator Helms entitled "Suggested Schedule of Hearings on NATO Enlargement, September 2, 1997.

48. See the memo from Steve Biegun, Beth Wilson and Marc Thiessen to Senator Helms entitled "NATO Enlargement," September 8, 1997.

49. See the letter from Senator Helms to Secretary Albright, September 17, 1997.

50. See the fax sent from Steve Biegun to Jeremy Rosner dated, October 6, 1997 and contained in the S/NERO archives.

51. See Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee: "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?," *Survival* 38, no 3 (Autumn 1998): 5-26. See also Ivan Eland, "The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance," Congressional Budget Office Paper prepared for the House International Relations Committee, March 1996.

52. See "Report to the Congress on the Military Requirements and Costs of NATO Enlargement, February 1998, <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/nato/>>.

53. The Madrid Communiqué stated: "Admitting new members will entail resource implications. It will involve the Alliance providing the resources which enlargement will necessarily require. . . . We are confident that, in line with the security environment of today, Alliance costs associated with the integration of new members will be manageable and that the resources necessary to meet those costs will be provided." See Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation as Issued by the Heads of State and Government, July 8, 1997, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm>>.

54. See memo from Ronald Asmus and Jeremy Rosner to the Secretary, entitled "Strategy (and one-liners) for SFRC Testimony," October 3, 1997.

55. See Madeleine Albright, "Statement of Hon. Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State," *The Debate on NATO Enlargement, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*, October 7, 1997, 105 Cong. 1st sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998), pp. 6–39.

56. As quoted in Pat Towell, "Albright Argues NATO Expansion Would Buttress Democracy," *Congressional Quarterly*, October 11, 1997, p. 24.

57. See statement of Dr. Michael Mandelbaum, *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, October 9, 1997, 105 Cong., 1st sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 72–89.

58. See Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO-Russia Relationship-Part I," *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, October 30, 1997, 105 Cong., 1st sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 183–206.

59. When U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jim Collins briefed senior Russian officials informally in late February on the Senate resolution of ratification they were furious about the language. See "Mamedov Reacts Strongly Against Senate NATO Document," Moscow 004932, February 28, 1998.

60. Hickenlooper had asked Acheson whether, under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty in which the parties pledged via mutual assistance to help develop the capacity to resist armed attack, the U.S. was "going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries capacity to resist?" Acheson had replied that: "The answer to that question is a clear and resolute 'No.'" To be fair to Acheson, this exchange took place at a time when the U.S. had no intention of forward deploying U.S. troops in Europe. It was not until a year later that NATO started to think of a unified command structure that could include U.S. defense forces. For Acheson's account see Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 285.

61. Cohen's argument was buttressed by an op-ed that appeared the morning of this hearing in which UK Defense Minister George Robertson stated that London would pay its fair share of additional enlargement costs. See George Robertson, "Redesigning NATO," *The Washington Times*, October 21, 1997.

62. See William S. Cohen, "Statement of Hon. William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense," *NATO Enlargement Costs, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations*, October 21, 1997, 105 Cong., 1st sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 1, 30, 35–41.

63. See "Public Views on NATO Enlargement," *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, November 5, 1997, 105 Cong., 1st sess. (Government Printing Office, 1998) pp. 261–330, 537–552.

64. See letter from Senators Helms and Biden, dated November 10, 1997.

65. See "EUR Assistant Secretary Grossman's Remarks at Bergen Nordic/Baltic Foreign Ministers Meeting," Oslo 04013, September 5, 1997. See also the memo from Grossman to Secretary Albright, "Our New Northern Strategy," August 27, 1997. See also my public remarks on "The New Hanseatic League" delivered at a conference in Helsinki Finland on October 8, 1997 sponsored by the U.S. Embassy and Nordicum.

66. See President Clinton's "Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Baltic Nations-United States Charter of Partnership," January 16, 1998, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, 34, no. 4 (January 26, 1998): 85–86.

67. See David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America and Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

68. See Ronald D. Asmus, "Double enlargement: redefining the Atlantic partnership after the Cold War," in Gompert and Larrabee, *ibid.*, pp. 19–50. See also Ronald D. Asmus, Robert Blackwill, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Can NATO Survive?" *The Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 79–101.

69. Craig view's are contained in a memo to Albright entitled "What Kind of NATO Do We Really Want?," January 8, 1998.

70. See my memo to Grossman "Defining U.S. Interests: The Mega-Question" from September 8, 1998.

71. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement at the North Atlantic Council," Ministerial Meeting, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, December 16, 1997, <<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/971216a.html>>.

72. See Grossman's memo to Secretary Albright entitled "Thinking About 1998," January 6, 1998.

73. Grossman's briefing to Albright was entitled "NATO After the First Round of Enlargement: Next Steps?"

74. See Grossman's Note for the Secretary entitled "Thinking about 1999," January 15, 1999.

75. See the memo from Samuel Berger and John Hilley to the President entitled "Strategy for Completing Ratification of NATO Enlargement" dated December 17, 1997.

76. See "Clinton Letter Transmitting to the U.S. Senate Protocols to NATO Treaty," The White House, February 11, 1998, <<http://fb1ocdrom.fb1o.uni-bremen.de/cd/infousa/usiaweb/utis/clinlet.htm>>. Senator Biden would recall the discussion with the Vice President later that day in a statement on the Senate floor. See *Congressional Record*, February 11, 1998, p. S076.

77. See AFL-CIO endorsement, "A Declaration of Support for NATO Enlargement," January 20, 1998.

78. "The upcoming Senate vote," the statement read, "is fundamentally a test of whether the U.S. will remain engaged in the Europe of the 21st century. Since the end of World War II, our nation has extended an enormous effort to build a Europe of free and democratic states at peace with one another. For the first time there is a realistic possibility of achieving this goal. Now is not the time to turn our back on this great project." See Statement of 60 Retired Military Officers, February 3, 1998.

79. See "Founding Declaration of the Coalition against NATO Expansion," Council for a Livable World Education Fund, *Briefing Book on NATO Enlargement* (Washington, D.C.: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, April 1998), pp. 69–72.

80. See the memo from Rosner and Asmus to Talbott entitled "NATO+ Resolution of Ratification" dated February 21, 1997.

81. See Rosner's memo "Initial Comments and Issues on SFRC's NATO Enlargement Resolution of Ratification, Draft #2," February 23, 1998.

82. See Rosner's e-mail to Ron Asmus, Dan Fried, Jamie Rubin and others, entitled "New NATO+ pollings #s," February 23, 1998.

83. See Howard Baker, Jr., Sam Nunn, Brent Scowcroft and Alton Frye, "NATO: A Debate Recast," *The New York Times*, February 4, 1998.

84. Senator Warner first indicated publicly his support for a "pause" amendment in a statement he put in the Senate record on February 10, 1998 in connection with the NATO expansion amendment. See *Congressional Record*, February 10, 1998, p. S584.

85. In her speech before the New Atlantic Initiative on February 9, 1998, Albright had stated: "This Administration opposes any effort in the Senate to mandate a pause in the process of NATO enlargement." See Albright's "Remarks Before the New Atlantic Initiative Conference: NATO Expansion."

86. See Statement by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on NATO Enlargement," February 24, 1998.

87. See our memo to Albright entitled "Today's SFRC Hearing on NATO enlargement and the Road Ahead," March 3, 1998.

88. See the memo from Rosner and Asmus to Albright entitled "Status of NATO Enlargement Debate," March 12, 1998.

89. See "NATO Myopia," *The New York Times*, March 5, 1998.

90. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Ohio State II," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1998.

91. See "The NATO Dispute," *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1998.

92. The *Chicago Tribune* initially took a position opposing enlargement in an editorial on February 1, 1998 entitled "A case of less is more with NATO." On March 13, it reversed itself. See "The Case for NATO Expansion," *The Chicago Tribune*, March 13, 1998.

93. See the letter from former Senators Sam Nunn and Howard H. Baker, Jr. addressed to Senators Thurmond and Levin.

94. See "Dear Mr. Leader" letter from President Clinton, The White House, March 14, 1998.

95. See Jesse Helms, "The New NATO: NATO Expansion Has All the Safeguards it Needs," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 23, 1998.

96. In early April Rosner noted that S/NERO knew of 23 potential amendments. See his memo entitled "Update on Timing of Amendments," April 6, 1998.

97. Albright wrote Ashcroft on March 12 explaining her views and making it clear that Ashcroft had misrepresented her thinking. See Rosner's memo "Letter to Senator Ashcroft (and Contingency Letter to Senator Helms) on NATO Enlargement," March 9, 1998. Ashcroft ignored the letter and instead continued to attack the Administration. Speaking on the Senate floor on March 19, Ashcroft stated: "I will be submitting an amendment for consideration by the Senate to make it clear that collective security will remain the heart of NATO, and that this is the only mission allowable under the treaty." See *Congressional Record*, March 19, 1998, S2284.

98. See the memo from Asmus and Rosner to Secretary Albright entitled "NATO Enlargement and the Ashcroft Amendment," April 23, 1998. See also the paper entitled "Why the Ashcroft Amendment is Harmful to the U.S. and NATO," which was circulated to both Senate staff and influential members of the foreign policy establishment.

99. The description of this meeting is taken from Rosner's notes from the meeting.
100. See the "Dear Colleague" letter signed by Roth, Lieberman and McCain dated April 24, 1998.
101. As quoted in *Reuters*, April 23, 1998.
102. In the run-up to the final vote on April 30, Tom Friedman had dubbed enlargement "Gulf of Tonkin II" and likened enlargement to "a car with no brakes on a slippery slope to trouble." See Thomas L. Friedman, "Gulf of Tonkin II," *The New York Times*, March 31, 1998.
103. See "NATO and the Lessons of History," *The New York Times*, April 29, 1998.
104. See Madeleine K. Albright, "Stop Worrying About Russia," *The New York Times*, April 29, 1998.
105. See, for example, David Gompert, "A Vote Against NATO," *The Washington Times*, April 29, 1998.
106. See Senator Moynihan's statement in the *Congressional Record*, "Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on Accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic," Senate, April 27, 1998, p. S3610, <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?r105:/temp/~r105GLJkUF>>. See also Senator Moynihan's speech entitled "Could NATO Expansion Lead to Nuclear War?" delivered to the 150th Anniversary Annual Meeting of the Associated Press in Dallas, Texas on April 20, 1998.
107. For the final vote totals on the amendments see "US. Senate Roll Call Votes," 105th Congress—2nd Session (1998) in *Thomas*, <http://www.senate.gov/legislative/vote1052/vote_menu.html>.
108. See Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright "Statement on the Senate Ratification to NATO Enlargement," Washington, D.C., April 30, 1998, <<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980430d.htm>>.

CONCLUSION

1. See President Truman's "Address on the Occasion of the Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949," *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman 1949* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 196–98.

