5 Forging a Global Partnership

Whether Secretary of State Jim Baker coined the term *global partnership* or not, he was, I believe, the first prominent member of the Bush administration to use it to describe the purpose and spirit of our relationship with Japan. It was an apt and meaningful description. Less a dramatic departure than a shift of emphasis, it signified a desire to enlarge the scope of our bilateral cooperation and to achieve greater equity in the distribution of our respective global responsibilities. During the Reagan years, Ambassador Michael Mansfield had tirelessly underlined the unique importance of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship; now the Bush administration sought to harness Japan's growing power to the achievement of those international objectives we shared. Broadly speaking, both Tokyo and Washington desired a more equal partnership. But Tokyo was more interested in augmenting its influence in formulating the terms of this partnership; Washington in assuring that Japan shouldered a larger share of the burden of implementing it.

The Concept

Both governments recognized that the relationship needed to be adapted to the changed requirements of a post–cold war world. Both acknowledged that Japan needed to translate its growing economic

power into a more ambitious international role. Both realized that since our countries represented roughly 40 percent of the world's economic output, few international issues could be resolved without effective bilateral collaboration. Washington policy makers understood that its growing fiscal deficit made the United States' global leadership more and more dependent on Japan's financial support. Japanese policy makers feared that, in a post–cold war environment, the USA might retreat into isolation if its allies withheld diplomatic cooperation. And leaders in both countries, aware that public support for the U.S.-Japan alliance could decline as the Soviet threat receded, knew they needed to find new ways of demonstrating the practical benefits of an active partnership.

These then were the premises on which the Bush administration set out to enlarge the scope and enrich the content of diplomatic cooperation with Japan. The policy was never formalized in any National Security Council document. It was not conceptualized in great detail. No new institutional infrastructure emerged to guide its development. Yet the idea did focus the activities of both governments, and the term *global partnership* became a slogan for officials on both sides of the Pacific.

The agenda for the partnership was ambitious. The Bush administration hoped to enlist Japan's cooperation in providing economic support for fledgling democratic countries in Eastern Europe and Central America, defining new global rules for trade and collective security arrangements for the post–cold war era, and arranging solutions for pressing transnational challenges, from protecting the environment to exploring outer space. In Washington's view, such a partnership required active U.S. leadership. But administration leaders understood that Japan would resist "taxation without representation" and conceded that increased Japanese support would require more recognition of its status and power in various international organizations and a readiness to adapt our global agenda to Japanese perspectives and purposes.

The Agenda

For purposes of exposition, I have grouped the issues on our cooperative agenda into these broad categories: dealing with the other major Asian powers; resolving regional conflicts; strengthening the economic

underpinnings of fledgling democracies; creating an Asia/Pacific framework for economic cooperation; encouraging closer scientific and technological cooperation; fostering trilateral consultations among the industrialized democracies; and accommodating Japan's desire for a seat in the UN Security Council. The process of policy coordination was never terribly orderly, not least because virtually all these matters were constantly in play, yet each question had its own unique constituencies, deadlines, and rhythm in accordance with events.

Managing Relations with the Other Major Powers in Asia

No challenge taxed the ingenuity of Washington and Tokyo more than avoiding divergent approaches toward Moscow and Beijing. Our policy reflexes toward these nations reflected distinctive historical memories, and our interests did not always converge. Nonetheless, an impressive degree of policy coordination was achieved.

Moscow. Relations with the former Soviet Union enjoyed a high priority in both capitals, though for different reasons. Having contained the Soviets for a generation, the United States was eager to nurture political and economic reforms in Moscow, cooperate in resolving problems left over from a generation of East-West struggle, and integrate the old Soviet Union and its former satellites into the international economy. Japanese leaders recognized the importance of these challenges yet tended to focus more attention on a narrower and more specific aim: recovering the Northern Territories—four small island groups (Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorufu) off the coast of Hokkaido that Stalin had seized at the end of World War II.

Washington regularly sought Tokyo's help in defining a more cooperative relationship between Moscow and the West. This entailed the provision of humanitarian aid, technical assistance, and financial support; promoting the dismantling of nuclear weapons; encouraging the conversion of defense plants to peacetime uses; and a host of other tasks. Tokyo wanted a voice in Western policy toward the Soviet Union, and it periodically requested U.S. help in urging Moscow to apply its much advertised "new thinking" on foreign policy to its approach to Asian issues. In practical terms, this meant putting the Northern Territories issue on the Soviet policy agenda and augmenting Tokyo's leverage in seeking the prompt return of the islands.

Policy coordination was complicated by the fact that the end of the cold war exposed decidedly different policy reflexes in the two capitals. Having spent trillions defending against the Russians, Americans were in principle prepared to offer significant support to a nation evidently seeking to implement political and economic reforms (in reality, these generous instincts were not readily translated into financial support, because of both the U.S. fiscal deficit and a parsimonious public mood). Recalling the debates about who lost China, moreover, U.S. politicians were wary of being accused of turning a blind eye to Russian needs, lest the demise of the reform movement in the USSR invite similar attacks. And U.S. support, urged even by hard-nosed conservatives such as former presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, appeared warranted by the dramatic changes in military/security conditions on the Continent: Eastern Europe was liberated; the Warsaw Pact had disappeared; and the Soviet military threat to Western Europe was at least temporarily eviscerated.

Tokyo, on the other hand, possessed little generosity of spirit toward Moscow. Japanese relations with both imperial Russia and the Bolshevik empire had been at best correct, never cordial. Japanese leaders tended to assume that whatever political shape the former Soviet Union took, Moscow would remain a rival. And vis-à-vis Moscow, the Japanese felt themselves the aggrieved party. After all, Moscow, in their view, had broken a nonaggression pact, entered World War II at the last minute, stolen the Northern Territories, and packed hundreds of thousands of Japanese prisoners off to Siberia. Thus Tokyo, far from sensing any obligation to shower money on even a reformist government in the Soviet Union, felt it was entitled to conciliatory gestures from Moscow.

In any event, few Japanese officials anticipated that aid would have a decisive effect on internal developments in the former USSR, and no major domestic political constituency pressed Tokyo for a more forthcoming policy. The LDP was inclined to drive a hard bargain with Moscow; the business establishment betrayed little interest in Russia; foreign policy professionals accorded priority to Japan's ties with the West and Asia; armchair strategists tended to prefer a weak, even chaotic Russia to a stronger, albeit more liberal country across the Japan Sea; and the Finance Ministry had little interest in writing generous checks to finance aid programs for the Russians—most particularly plans conceived essentially by others.

Nor did the end of the cold war bring as immediate or dramatic

changes in Asia as it did in Europe. Russian military forces in the Far East were not immediately drawn down. The Northern Territories dispute remained unresolved. Worse yet, Gorbachev moved swiftly to relax tensions with the Chinese, while displaying only modest interest in transforming relations with Japan. When Foreign Minister Sousuke Uno visited Moscow in the summer of 1989, Gorbachev, instead of offering to tackle the Northern Territories issue, proposed that the matter be placed on the shelf. Tokyo's apprehension was that Japanese concerns would be neglected as East-West tensions dissipated—an anxiety that was reinforced when U.S.-Russian discussions at the Malta summit in October 1989 scarcely touched on Asia, let alone the Northern Territories issue.

These differences notwithstanding, Washington and Tokyo were generally sensitive to each other's dominant concerns. During the cold war, Washington's support for Japan's territorial claims on the Northern Territories had put Moscow on the spot and kept Japanese policy in line with our own; after 1989 the chances of resolving this long-stalemated issue appeared to improve, and facilitating that result could help elicit Japan's support for positive initiatives aimed at Moscow. Thus the United States readily reaffirmed its support for Japanese claims to the Northern Territories.

We reminded the Russians how our return of Okinawa in 1972 had buttressed our relations with Japan. We echoed Tokyo's assertion that the seizure of the islands had been an expression of Stalinist excess rather than the appropriation of legitimate spoils of war. We accommodated Japanese requests to internationalize the issue by including references to it in G-7 summit communiqués; for example, at the Houston summit in 1990, the political declaration included this statement: "We support the early resolution of the Northern Territories issue as an essential step leading to the normalization of Russian-Japanese relations." The president, secretary of state, and other senior U.S. officials regularly urged Moscow to resolve the issue promptly in a forthcoming way. And key State Department officials—among them Counselor Bob Zoellick, Policy Planning Director Dennis Ross, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Arnold Kanter—signaled a willingness to tackle the problem in an even more active way. There was at least one informal offer to serve as an intermediary.

The Japanese obviously welcomed our help in putting the issue on Moscow's agenda. They solicited our appraisal of the roles and attitudes

of key Russian players on the Northern Territories question. And they appreciated our readiness to explain to Russian constituencies to which they had little access—the military, for example—the potential benefits of an early resolution of the issue. Yet senior Foreign Ministry officials had no evident desire for Washington to take on a more direct role. They presumably did not wish to lose control of the issue and may have feared that Washington would provide unwelcome advice if it assumed the role of intermediary. I once asked senior ministry officials informally whether they had considered submitting the Northern Territories issue to the International Court of Justice. They had a solid legal case; and given the pressures of nationalism in Russia, it would have been easier for Moscow to accept the verdict of an impartial third party than to submit to Japan's claim in a bilateral negotiation. My interlocutors gave the suggestion short shrift, citing the unpredictability of the court's decisions. In any event, they noted, resolution of the issue was properly a test of Moscow's political will and should not be left to the judgment of third parties.

While understandably eager to retain control over the issue, the Japanese were far from passive on the matter. They intensified bilateral contacts with the Russians. Foreign minister–level contacts became routine; vice ministerial–level discussions of a Russian-Japanese peace treaty were commenced. Leading LDP politicians traveled with greater regularity to Moscow. Two major LDP figures—Shintaro Abe and Ichiro Ozawa—undertook missions to Moscow in 1990 and 1991, respectively, to explore possibilities for expanding relations and making a deal on the islands. And Tokyo sought to build pressure on the Russians, as noted, by soliciting the support of their G-7 associates.

The Japanese also injected greater flexibility into their policy. Stung perhaps by Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze's criticism of their insistence on the indivisibility of economics and politics—an interesting reversal of Japan's traditional tendency to separate politics from economics—in the fall of 1989 the Japanese developed a new formula that they called the "balanced expansion of relations." It was designed to permit them the flexibility to provide modest amounts of aid to the former Soviet Union even before a resolution of the territorial issue. The Defense Agency removed language referring to the Russian threat from its annual white paper. The Foreign Ministry resigned itself to the staged reversion of the islands. And despite the Russians' intransigence on the question, the Japanese undertook a variety of

conciliatory gestures toward Moscow, such as aid to the victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the provision of emergency food and medical aid to residents of the former Soviet Far East, the dispatch of technical assistance missions to instruct Russian reformers about Japan's unique brand of capitalism, and a decision not to suspend their aid program when Russian troops sought to suppress local independence movements in the Baltic states.

The high-water mark of Japan's exploration of a deal on the territories came during the spring of 1991. Visiting Moscow in March to prepare the ground for President Gorbachev's visit in April, Ichiro Ozawa sought to determine whether there was any flexibility in Moscow's position and reportedly dangled a sizable aid package as a lure. Some press reports suggested Ozawa sounded out Moscow on an "Okinawan reversion" formula in which Russia would acknowledge up front Japanese sovereignty over all four Northern Territories islands. Subsequently, a peace treaty was to be concluded, whereupon Habomai and Shikotan would revert to Japan. As for the larger islands—Kunashiri and Etorufu—administrative rights would be restored to Japan ten years after the conclusion of a peace treaty. Whatever Ozawa's proposal, however, no breakthrough emerged.

Gorbachev's visit to Tokyo in April 1991—about which Prime Minister Kaifu consulted President Bush in Newport Beach, California, some weeks in advance—proved anticlimactic. There were prolonged talks and a lengthy communiqué. A number of bilateral agreements were signed—none of them earthshaking. But neither leader possessed the political strength to make significant concessions on the Northern Territories issue. The result was ambiguous. All four islands were mentioned by name in the communiqué, and the Russians promised a partial withdrawal of military forces from the territories. Yet Gorbachev refused even to acknowledge Japan's right to Habomai and Shikotan—a concession Moscow had offered as early as 1956. Kaifu promised no new aid to Russian resource development, and no long-term economic cooperation agreement was signed.

Following Gorbachev's ouster in September 1991, the Japanese thought Yeltsin's administration might adopt a more forthcoming posture on the issue. And initially Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Deputy Foreign Minister Genady Kunadze did imply a readiness to address the issue with greater flexibility. But Boris Yeltsin lacked the political capability—and perhaps the desire—to do so. This became

crystal clear in September 1992, when Yeltsin canceled a scheduled visit to Tokyo at the last minute. When he sought to lay part of the blame for the decision at Tokyo's door, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa rejected Yeltsin's innuendos sternly, and the relationship seemed back at square one.

With regard to aid for Moscow, Tokyo and Washington managed generally to synchronize their approaches. Technical assistance was easy; the costs were modest, and each government recognized an interest in helping the Russians acquire greater familiarity with the institutions of a market economy. We shared an obvious stake in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and both capitals contributed sizable funds to facilitate that expensive yet necessary task. Humanitarian aid presented somewhat greater difficulties, if only because the needs appeared more substantial. The prospect of a major food crisis during the winter of 1991 spurred international efforts to provide food and medicine and to help with their distribution. Tokyo pledged $100 million in supplies, but bureaucratic snafus stalled deliveries for several years. Moscow and Tokyo each blamed the other for the delays. Tokyo claimed credit for its pledged assistance; Moscow criticized Japan's failure to disburse it swiftly.

By 1992 U.S. interest in furnishing more substantial economic assistance grew as the fate of Yeltsin's reforms appeared increasingly in jeopardy. Former president Nixon prodded the Bush administration to adopt a more forthcoming stance and chided Tokyo for its alleged parsimony. The G-7 nations put together a $24 billion aid package and in the process pressed Tokyo hard to make a generous contribution. The Japanese complied, though perhaps less out of conviction about the program's merits than from a desire to avoid diplomatic isolation. The gesture required a further modification of Tokyo's stance on the Northern Territories issue: rationalizing this display of economic cooperation as its contribution to a multilateral effort, Japan reaffirmed its resolve to use bilateral economic assistance as a residual lever for negotiating the return of the islands.

Thus a fair amount of parallelism was preserved in our approaches to Moscow. The territorial issue remained unresolved, but Washington demonstrated a genuine readiness to put some diplomatic capital on the line to assist Japan's diplomatic efforts. As for aid, Western promises to Moscow exceeded actual deliveries, and on this score, both Washington and Tokyo talked a better game than they played.

Washington kept the Japanese reasonably well informed about its interactions with the Russians. But there were occasions when the apparent intimacy of U.S.-Russia ties struck a jarring note in Tokyo. Washington's references to its "partnership" with Moscow puzzled the Japanese. With the resolution of long-standing contradictions between East and West, there was an unspoken fear that a new constellation of forces, extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok and embracing North America and all of Europe, might be taking shape. This upset many Japanese, triggering their primordial anxiety about diplomatic isolation—a worry reinforced by the fact that the thaw in Moscow's relations with Washington and the unification of Germany left Japan as the only G-7 country with a major unresolved dispute with the Russians. But in 1992–93 the rising tide of nationalism in Russia began to impose limits on Moscow's connection with Washington as well as with Tokyo, and this development in turn eased the coordination of U.S.-Japanese approaches to Moscow while highlighting the critical importance of our respective relations with Beijing.

China Managing our links with China posed a quite different policy problem. Following the Tiananmen Square incident in the spring of 1989, political forces in Washington—above all the Democratic majority in Congress—sought to place the promotion of democracy and human rights at the center of U.S. policy toward Beijing even if that risked putting American relations with China into the deep freeze. Japan, while prepared to concur in G-7 slaps on Beijing's wrists, was unwilling to countenance enduring restrictions on its ties with China. Thus a disconnect between the United States and Japan became a serious possibility.

President Bush knew China well and valued the relationship with Beijing. While acknowledging the importance of respect for human rights, the administration believed that a constructive relationship with Beijing served U.S. interests by contributing to a stable Asia, a global equilibrium, and the expansion of U.S. commercial opportunities. Still, the administration had to take domestic political realities into account, and these were dramatically affected by the vivid television images in June 1989 of Chinese dissidents defying PLA tanks in Tiananmen Square. With the end of the cold war, moreover, many Americans believed that Beijing's strategic value to the United States had declined

and that the power of information age technology—computers, fax machines, and telecommunication devices—would in time sweep away China's autocratic leadership as it had undermined the authority of Russian Leninists. An array of special-interest groups—e.g., pro-lifers offended by China's widespread practice of abortion, labor unions fearing the competitive power of its low-wage production base, and environmentalists anxious about the environmental consequences of China's polluting industries—joined the chorus of anti-China sentiment. Democratic leaders on the Hill, moreover, recognized a political opportunity, and at least some played a rather transparent political game. Lecturing the Chinese on human rights and proposing legislative conditions on trade and other interactions with China enabled congressional Democrats to score points with voters at home without having to worry about the foreign policy consequences, since they expected President Bush to veto their bills.

The Japanese approached China from a different perspective. Broadly speaking, their strategic concerns were consistent with ours: they shared an interest in seeing that China was neither dominated by, nor aligned closely with, the Russians. They likewise shared our interest in China's embrace of market principles and its opening to the world. A growing China provided an attractive source of raw materials as well as a promising market for Japan's manufactured exports. Japan's political concerns were oriented toward China's stability rather than its democratic evolution. Not that Tokyo was indifferent to the growth of political pluralism in China. On the contrary, sophisticated Japanese analysts expected continuing rapid economic growth to move China over time in directions observable in Taiwan and Korea, where economic development had generated pressures for democratic reforms.

But Japan's government was accustomed to separating economics from politics. Neither its politicians nor its bureaucracy exhibited an inclination to export "their 'gods' to other countries," in Kazuo Ogura's pithy phrase.[1] The thought never crossed their minds. They were accustomed to thinking of Japan as unique; its institutions, consequently, were not exportable. Rather than proselytizing on behalf of

1. Kazuo Ogura, "The Crevice Between 'the Empire of Ideas' and 'the Lost People,'" *Gaiko Forum* (June 1991): 4–11, quoted in Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: Norton, 1995), p. 317.

abstract values, they pursued practical aims while seeking enhanced respect and status. And they recognized that public support for China's political dissidents would merely provoke Chinese lectures about Tokyo's misconduct in the 1930s and 1940s.

Sino-Japanese relations during the years of the Bush administration were by no means trouble free. Beijing regularly complained about the terms of Sino-Japanese trade, Japan's reluctance to transfer technology, its Ministry of Education's treatment of the "Asian Continental war" in Japanese school texts, alleged signs of revived militarism, Tokyo's quasi-official relations with Taiwan, and its claims on the Senkaku Islands. For their part, the Japanese worried, among other things, about the incipient growth of China's defense budget, its purchase of sophisticated military equipment from the Russians, its export of defense technology to North Korea, and the assertiveness of its claims to islands in the South China Sea. Despite these differences, Tokyo and Beijing concentrated mainly on expanding the benefits of cooperation.

Had the Bush administration been allowed to pursue its own instincts regarding China, policy coordination with Tokyo would have been a breeze. Despite congressional pressures, collaboration generally prevailed. The president and his senior advisers agreed with the Japanese that isolating China was undesirable. But the White House needed cooperative gestures from Beijing to preserve some political running room at home. With these considerations in mind, Washington did not object to Tokyo's leaning farther forward in its relations with China and nudging the consensus within the G-7 toward the modification of sanctions. In the meantime, we encouraged Japan to utilize its political capital in Beijing to urge on the Chinese such steps as the termination of martial law and the release of political dissidents. Because of political considerations, however, although our bilateral consultations on China were generally candid and constructive, on occasion we kept the Japanese in the dark about our activities. It was not lost on Tokyo, for example, that they were informed only about the *second* Scrowcroft-Eagleburger mission to Beijing—an omission that may have prompted them to withhold some details of their own policy efforts vis-à-vis Beijing.

Periodically I was instructed to request Japanese intercession with the Chinese leadership on human rights issues. I generally encountered little resistance, and I have no doubt that our Japanese friends

raised these matters as requested. Whether they did so in a determined manner, intending to achieve results, or in a perfunctory way, merely to mollify Washington, I cannot say. But neither my political nor bureaucratic interlocutors in Japan concealed their doubts about the effectiveness of our own diplomatic methodology on human rights issues. Japan's foreign policy professionals criticized the West for overreacting to the events at Tiananmen, privately characterized our human rights diplomacy as bordering on meddlesome interference, and expressed sympathy for Chinese concerns about the potential implications of growing domestic disorder. Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe was particularly forthright in his criticisms of our style. And whereas the United States' forty thousand Chinese exchange students took a leading role in urging sanctions against Beijing, the sixty thousand or more Chinese students in Japan remained curiously mute.

Yet the broad contours of Japanese policy toward China were clear. As the director general of Asian Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Sakutaro Tanino, put it at the time, "We should remember that a more stable, affluent China will benefit not just itself but all of Asia and in fact the world. We need to avoid reacting emotionally and applying only Western values to each new set of political and social phenomena as it unfolds in China. Instead we should direct our efforts to bringing China into the framework of Asian peace, development, and prosperity."[2]

Japan's calculus was informed by its judgment that China's influence and weight in world affairs were growing. In a period when trade frictions with the United States were increasing, China offered a huge market and an opportunity to diversify Japan's external trade links; at a moment when bargaining with Russia over the Northern Territories appeared to enter a new phase, Tokyo saw its relations with Beijing as a source of leverage and a hedge against the failure of those negotiations; and at a time when Tokyo was contemplating a more ambitious and independent policy in Asia, Japanese policy makers recognized its regional policy would not amount to much without substantial links with China.

As noted above, the Tiananmen incident provoked a unified G-7 response—i.e., reduced high-level contacts and the suspension of

2. Sakutaro Tanino, "The Recent Situation in China and Sino-Japanese Relations," *Japan Review of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (spring/summer 1990): 30.

major concessional assistance. While Japan went along with the consensus at the 1989 G-7 summit meeting in Paris, it did so without enthusiasm and enforced the agreed-on restrictions without much rigor. Japanese private-sector activity in China was not curtailed. Disbursements of foreign assistance under existing programs were promptly resumed. Indeed, technical assistance personnel had been sent back to China by the end of August 1989. High-level political contacts resumed within several months, and senior business leaders scarcely interrupted their travels to the Chinese capital. Shortly after Brent Scowcroft's trip to Beijing in December 1989, the Japanese government began discussing technical details associated with the resumption of their third yen loan program to China, though they deferred formal resumption of such assistance until they had secured U.S. acquiescence to the decision at the Houston summit the following summer. Prime Minister Kaifu's display of independence on the China issue at Houston enhanced his political standing back home.

When loans were disbursed under the new program, they were described as "humanitarian." But the definition proved flexible enough to include hydroelectric power dams and chemical fertilizer plants. The overall level of Japan's aid disbursements increased rapidly. And when Tokyo announced new aid guidelines in the spring of 1991 indicating that Japan would look carefully at recipient countries' military budgets, arms exports, and human rights records, China appeared exempt from their application. Prime Minister Kaifu subsequently visited Beijing in August 1991—the first G-7 leader to do so since Tiananmen Square. He used the occasion to announce a further expansion of aid without limiting it to humanitarian projects. For his troubles he was rewarded with China's pledge to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—a not inconsiderable gesture with which Washington was duly impressed.

Thus Japan, without formally breaking the G-7 consensus, pursued its own agenda with Beijing. Tokyo kept us reasonably well informed, and few of Japan's specific policy measures gave Washington heartburn. Yet they clearly set the pace for Western policy toward Beijing, protecting Japan's major foreign policy and commercial equities without breaching solidarity with Washington and other Western capitals. This was in keeping with past practice: Japan had always sought in its policy toward China the maximum autonomy it felt Washington would tolerate.

Resolving Regional Conflicts

As the cold war ended, Japan and the United States shared an interest in cleaning up some of the problems it left behind. Our collaboration was naturally most intense in Asia. Washington continued to shoulder major military burdens in Korea and diplomatic responsibilities for promoting a settlement of the Cambodian problem. Japan was eager to tackle a more substantial role in its own backyard. A familiar pattern appeared. Washington attempted to enlist Tokyo's support in its quest for political settlements in Korea and Cambodia; Tokyo sought to initiate autonomous actions with which to influence events in both areas. This presented opportunities for cooperative action as well as occasional misunderstandings.

Cambodia Throughout the 1980s Japan's diplomacy in Southeast Asia was generally guided by commercial considerations. Its approach to Indochina was largely shaped by its sensitivity to the priorities of ASEAN nations and to U.S. policy guidelines. Thus when Hanoi invaded Cambodia in 1978, Tokyo condemned Hanoi's action, demanded its withdrawal, froze its assistance to Vietnam, refused recognition to Heng Sam Ren's government, and augmented its aid to Thailand as a frontline state. Yet Asian specialists within the Foreign Ministry perceived a strategic interest in promoting a cohesive Indochina that could serve as a check on China's influence in Southeast Asia. So long as ASEAN retained a united front on Indochina issues and the United States regarded Heng Sam Ren as a puppet of Hanoi, Tokyo clung to its low-profile policy in the area.

In the late 1980s, however, Tokyo began to formulate a more independent assessment of the politico-military situation in Cambodia and to contemplate political initiatives of its own. It was encouraged in this regard by adjustments in Thai diplomacy and divisions within ASEAN that provided Japan with greater room for maneuver and, arguably, more persuasive evidence for the necessity of some choice. The Foreign Ministry's long-term objective was to nurture the gradual integration of Indochina into ASEAN. In this connection, the peaceful evolution of Cambodia was a necessary precondition.

Tokyo's heightened diplomatic interest in Cambodia coincided with an increase in the tempo of negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Cambodia—a by-product, among other things, of Moscow's more

accommodating diplomacy. Encouraged by the Thai, the Japanese had invited Prince Sihanouk to Tokyo in August 1988 to convince him that Japan had a serious role to play in promoting a settlement. Senior Foreign Ministry officials concluded from those conversations that Sihanouk planned to break away from the Khmer Rouge and move closer to the authorities in Phnom Penh. In the first meeting of the International Conference on Cambodia in Paris the following summer, Japan was asked to cochair a committee on reconstruction and refugee relief. Tokyo was prepared to shoulder responsibilities for Cambodia's future development, but it had no intention of bankrolling the results of diplomatic efforts in which it was accorded no role. This was an entirely reasonable proposition, which Washington accepted in principle, without necessarily welcoming all of its practical consequences.

The Japanese embarked on a more active phase of diplomacy in early 1990, sending representatives to Phnom Penh in mid-February to reconnoiter the situation and meet with leaders of the Heng Sam Ren government. They concluded that the regime in Phnom Penh was more resilient and possessed more staying power than they had previously thought. They also judged that Phnom Penh authorities genuinely wished to open their economy and limit Vietnam's influence in Cambodia. Equally important, they sensed the widespread fear and hatred of the Khmer Rouge among the Cambodian populace and determined that stronger efforts were required to cut it down to size. The practical result of this review was Tokyo's decision to invite representatives from the four Cambodian factions to a conference on Cambodia in Japan on June 4–5, 1990.

In this conference, organized with the help of the Thai, Japan sought to enhance the position of Sihanouk, diminish the clout of the Khmer Rouge, and encourage support for a supreme national council of Cambodia that would have two rather than four parties. Khieu Sampong, the Khmer Rouge leader, traveled to Tokyo but boycotted the proceedings, leaving Sihanouk and Heng Sam Ren to shape the joint communiqué.

The Chinese were unhappy, and Beijing persuaded Sihanouk subsequently to express second thoughts about the outcome of the Tokyo conference. Washington's reaction to the meeting was tepid; it held no brief for the Khmer Rouge but doubted the efficacy of securing an agreement on Cambodia without Beijing's active collaboration. The reaction among ASEAN countries was mixed; the Thai were under-

standably satisfied with Tokyo's efforts, while others expressed mild irritation that Tokyo was horning in on an ASEAN preserve. All in all, though, Tokyo, was content with the results of its foray into more active diplomacy in Indochina.

The process by which the Cambodian agreement was negotiated, however, irritated the Japanese. The locus of much of the action rested with the so-called P-5 (the permanent members of the Security Council). Japan was not included, and this rankled. Washington regularly invited the Japanese to send representatives wherever P-5 meetings were held and endeavored to consult the Japanese before and debrief them after the negotiations. In fact, Washington would have been happy to have the Japanese participate directly, but others—most notably the French—resisted.

Relegated to the periphery of the negotiations, Tokyo was less inhibited about raising questions about the results achieved and made no effort to conceal its belief that there were ways in which the P-5 draft accord on Cambodia, released in November 1990, could be improved. It promptly sent representatives to Cambodia to engage in shuttle diplomacy, lobbying directly with the Cambodian factions for various changes in the text. In essence, Tokyo wanted tougher measures to prevent recurrence of the Khmer Rouge's genocidal policies, stronger methods for verifying the disarmament of the Khmer Rouge during each stage of the cease-fire, stronger sanctions against groups that were found to have violated the disarmament procedures, and the establishment of a UN body to monitor the activities of the Khmer Rouge. Substantively, I thought the Japanese reservations about the text were justified, and they found some resonance in Congress and the press. Yet they caused some pique in the State Department. Achieving an agreement among so many parties had been a painstaking business, and the negotiators did not relish reopening tough issues—even when, as most conceded, the Japanese had a point. Ultimately, Tokyo's effort came to naught as a result of the unremitting opposition of the Khmer Rouge and the Sonn Sann faction.

In the end, it was the relaxation of tensions between Beijing and Hanoi that opened the door to the Cambodian settlement in June 1991. Nevertheless, Japan took pride in having played a more energetic and visible role. It had highlighted key issues through the Tokyo conference; its promotion of a two-party supreme national council had borne fruit (although it was, of course, neither the only nor the most

influential proponent of this arrangement); it had encouraged the alliance between Sihanouk and Hung Sen. And these contributions enhanced Japan's readiness to take the lead in mobilizing resources for Cambodia's future reconstruction and development needs and to support the UN transitional authority by dispatching election monitors and an engineering battalion.

From the United States' standpoint, Tokyo's contributions were a net plus. Japanese diplomatic initiatives did not always coincide perfectly with Washington's perspectives and tactical judgments, but its efforts generally complemented ours, helped nudge the process to a successful conclusion, and laid the political groundwork for Japan's leadership in pulling together the necessary financial support for Cambodia's reconstruction.

As peace returned to Cambodia, a principal obstacle to more normal relations with Vietnam was removed, and, for both political and economic reasons, the Japanese were eager to move ahead with the resumption of their aid program. Washington, ever sensitive to Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue, embarked on a more leisurely course that, it hoped, would lead to eventual normalization. We consequently urged delay of Japanese initiatives directed toward Hanoi in order to avoid political problems in the United States. The Japanese were reasonably acquiescent, repeatedly delaying the resumption of aid in response to our pleas—right up to and through the presidential election campaign in 1992. Of course, their trading companies were much in evidence in Vietnam, much of the preparatory work for resuming Japanese aid was being laid, and the Japanese kept prodding Washington to move forward steadily in order to accord greater recognition to Hanoi's reform efforts.

Korea The Korean Peninsula was an even more natural focal point for U.S.-Japanese diplomatic cooperation. While relations between Pyongyang and Seoul remained largely frozen in the late 1980s, in other respects the diplomatic setting for tackling the Korean problem was changing dramatically. Moscow and Beijing were constructing new commercial and diplomatic ties with South Korea. As host of the Seoul Olympics in 1988, South Korea had enhanced its international standing at the same that North Korea's economy went into a tailspin. And South Korea, buoyed by its economic success, had embarked on an active "Nordpolitik" and appeared for the first time to welcome

efforts by others to draw Pyongyang out of its diplomatic isolation.

Japan generally approached Korean issues cautiously and pragmatically. Its ties with South Korea were official and substantial. With the North, quasi-official relations were managed principally through LDP Diet delegations, supplemented by warm party-to-party links between the Socialists and the North Korea Workers Party. Some Japanese described this as a "one-and-a-half Korea policy."

With the changing circumstances in Northeast Asia, however, Japanese leaders wanted further to fortify their connection with Pyongyang. Their motives went beyond merely emulating Russia's and China's diversification of relations on the Korean Peninsula. Moscow was entering a period of intense internal reform. In a post–cold war environment, the Japanese anticipated growing pressures on the United States to scale back its security responsibilities in Asia. This could have left China in a position to exert substantially greater influence on the Korean Peninsula. Strategic thinkers in Japan felt this warranted some effort by Tokyo to balance China's influence in Pyongyang as well as in Seoul.

Of course, there were also immediate and practical reasons for upgrading links with the North. The Japanese hoped that an improvement in relations would moderate Pyongyang's vitriolic propaganda attacks on Japan's growing influence in the Asian region. This in turn could relieve Tokyo's problems with the polarized community of Korean nationals in Japan. Commercial benefits also beckoned: North Korea possessed valuable minerals and an ample supply of labor, while it needed the manufacturing skills and technology that Japan possessed in abundance. Finally, the government felt continuing pressure from the public and press to secure the release of Japanese crew members of the fishing vessel *Fujisanmaru*, which had been seized by the North Koreans in 1983.

North Korea had its own incentives for expanding its dialogue with Tokyo. It was groping for ways to escape its diplomatic isolation and to counter Seoul's regional diplomacy. It coveted the benefits of economic cooperation with Japan. It probably expected that an opening to Tokyo might soften U.S. resistance to a more normal relationship. And, recognizing that the cultivation of special ties with the Japanese Socialists had brought few benefits over the years, Pyongyang decided to direct its overtures to the Liberal Democrats.

In the spring of 1989 the Takeshita cabinet put out feelers to North

Korean authorities through a Socialist delegation that was visiting Pyongyang. A year later, Prime Minister Kaifu sent word that Japan was ready to apologize for its colonial rule and to open a dialogue with the North without preconditions. Pyongyang responded by sending word through Socialist leader Makoto Tanabe that they would welcome a visit by a delegation led by a prominent member of the LDP. They hinted that the delegation should be prepared not only to apologize for Japan's past conduct but to discuss compensation and economic assistance. Shin Kanemaru, leader of the LDP's most powerful faction and a personal friend of Tanabe's, was chosen to lead the delegation. The trip was set for late September 1990.

Kanemaru and his entourage, which included a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was accorded a warm welcome in Pyongyang. The delegations got right down to business—which turned out to be more far-reaching than anyone had anticipated. Kanemaru expressed profuse apologies for Japan's past conduct and intimated a readiness to extend reparations not only for the colonial period but for losses suffered by the Korean people in the forty-five years following the end of the war. Indeed he implied that Japan might even make a down payment on reparations before a normalization of relations was achieved. In addition, he agreed to remove the North Korean exclusion clause from Japanese passports and to move toward the establishment of diplomatic relations. In return, Pyongyang agreed to release the Japanese fishermen under detention, to allow the establishment of direct air service from North Korea to Japan, and to set up a bilateral communications network.

Kanemaru's diplomatic venture jolted Seoul and Washington. It was unprecedented for the Japanese to undertake such a wide-ranging initiative in Korea without consulting the countries that bore the principal responsibilities for maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula. Kanemaru's evident readiness to discuss compensation for unspecified sins of commission or omission in the postwar period was even more astonishing. The offer went far beyond Tokyo's reparations agreement with South Korea and overlooked the fact that North Korea's initiation of the Korean conflict had caused unspeakable suffering for South Koreans, Americans, and others. Moreover, reparations in the absence of IAEA safeguards on nuclear activities and military force reductions—not mentioned in the communiqué—could be regarded as indirectly supporting North Korea's threatening military posture.

The Japanese government recognized that the Kanemaru mission had been badly mishandled and moved promptly to make amends. The Foreign Ministry, embarrassed by the sloppy communiqué and irritated over the expropriation of its role by politicians, sought to distance itself from the communiqué's language without repudiating the mission's central objective: initiation of a dialogue with North Korea. The LDP leadership—stung by a chorus of criticism from within its own ranks—scrambled to find prudent policy guidelines for handling the fallout without provoking an open break with the party's most powerful faction leader. LDP leaders evidently agreed to proceed cautiously with normalization talks in order to avoid upstaging or undermining a north-south dialogue in Korea and decided to apply the same principle with respect to reparations as they had utilized with the South—i.e., for the colonial period only. They also reportedly agreed, however, that Japan should give some consideration "in a spiritual sense" to North Korea for the delay in compensating it for the colonial era. This last desiderata was designed to keep Kanemaru on board.

Although Kanemaru had implied to the North Koreans that the initiative had been a party matter, fully authorized by the Japanese government (the North Koreans continue to regard his pledges as official, and this remains one of the issues holding up Japanese–North Korean normalization talks), he flew to Seoul to express his regrets to President Ro Tae U for blindsiding the South Koreans. And on October 9, 1990, he visited my office to apologize for going over our heads. He emphasized that his visit was a party-to-party undertaking designed to pave the way for government-to-government talks by establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust. It was in this context, he said, that he had agreed to a positive reference in the communiqué about compensation for postwar losses. If he had refused, the mission would have collapsed, Japanese crewmen would continue to languish in prison, and normalization talks would have remained an idle hope. I observed that Pyongyang had caused a war that claimed thousands of American lives and had forced us to bear a heavy security burden on the Korean Peninsula for more than forty years. Americans would neither understand nor accept post–World War II compensation to North Korea. Kanemaru acknowledged my point and then informed me that Ichiro Ozawa and Takako Doi would be visiting Pyongyang on the following day to pick up the *Fujisanmaru* crewmen.

Kanemaru made several comments to me regarding North Korea's

nuclear activities that betrayed a rather naive confidence in the veracity of Kim Il Sung, who, he said, had told him that North Korea had no nuclear facilities whatsoever, aside from an antiquated and virtually abandoned Russian research reactor—a claim belied by much hard evidence in the hands of U.S. intelligence. I offered to bring experts from Washington to brief him. He readily agreed. All in all, the conversation left me—along with many Foreign Ministry professionals and not a few LDP Diet members—anxious about diplomatic freelancing by politicians.

Once the Japanese crewmen were safely back in Japan, some of the fire went out of this issue. While the government made clear that it would persevere with the effort to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, responsibility for the negotiations was handed off to the Foreign Ministry professionals who undertook to consult closely with Seoul and Washington as the talks proceeded. The negotiations commenced in January 1991 and were scheduled to address four issues: a Japanese apology, North Korea's claims, nuclear inspection arrangements, and the status of Koreans in Japan. By June 1992 seven rounds of talks had been held. Some progress was registered, but no breakthroughs were achieved.

Throughout the negotiations, Washington and Seoul urged Japan to press North Korea to place its nuclear energy programs under full IAEA inspection. This was a little like leaning on an open door, for Tokyo officials were as distressed by North Korea's nuclear activities as anyone. North Korea's acceptance of such inspection arrangements was made an essential condition for Japanese diplomatic recognition and the economic cooperation that might flow from it. North Korea adamantly refused inspections until January 1992, arguing that the issue was inappropriate for bilateral discussion.

A U.S. initiative provided a means of escaping this impasse. In September 1991 President Bush announced a decision to return all tactical nuclear weapons to U.S. territory and to remove such weapons from American ships and naval aircraft. The inference was clear: any nuclear weapons that might have been deployed in South Korea would be removed. North Korea subsequently agreed in January 1992 to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA—which was subsequently ratified by its parliament in March—and to allow the IAEA's director, Hans Blix, to visit North Korean nuclear facilities. For at least a few months it appeared the nuclear issue was on the

road to resolution. This hope was subsequently dashed, and bilateral talks were suspended in June 1992, as a result of Pyongyang's unequivocal refusal to address issues related to its involvement in terrorist activities.

During this same period Tokyo had undertaken active measures to put its relations with Seoul on firmer ground. Official visits were exchanged, and consultations increased. Japan made progress in regularizing the status of Korean nationals within its borders and offered official apologies for past conduct in Korea. These efforts were welcomed in Washington, and trilateral consultations among Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo were initiated to ensure closer coordination of our respective approaches to the nuclear issue and the promotion of a more significant dialogue between North and South Korea.

In the end, the Kanemaru initiative proved to be an aberration of sorts. I believe that he went with the approval of the government and that his mission was designed to advance a long-standing objective: diversification of Japan's relations on the peninsula. Kanemaru, however, was a powerful politician who felt no compelling need to reveal every detail of his intentions to a new and reputedly weak prime minister. He and his associates evidently exceeded their brief in Pyongyang, caught up in the ostentatious warmth of the North Koreans' reception. Recognizing the dangers of a reputation for improvisation on delicate issues affecting the United States and South Korea, Tokyo swiftly backtracked and, without altering its purpose, placed the implementation of policy in the hands of those who were accustomed to coordinating Korean policy issues more closely with key allies.

Strengthening the Economic Underpinnings of Fledgling Democracies

Since the mid-1980s Washington and Tokyo have consulted regularly in an effort to coordinate our respective aid programs. As undersecretary of state, I had initiated these consultations in 1985. Our objective was to encourage Japan to direct more of its economic assistance to countries of strategic consequence to the West, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. The discussions were straightforward, and a fair amount of parallelism in our aid efforts emerged. With the end of the cold war, the focus of U.S. assistance shifted to

support for friendly governments confronted by acute security challenges and for nations turning away from communism and statist economic practices. The Japanese, whose aid program was expanding rapidly, possessed the capacity to help. And help they did—particularly in the Philippines, Eastern Europe, and Central America.

The Multilateral Assistance Initiative for the Philippines was conceived during the Reagan administration, and Japan's initial response was enthusiastic. The project was formally launched in July 1989 in Tokyo, with Secretary Baker participating in the ceremonies. The purpose was to mobilize financial support to help revive the Philippine economy, devastated by Marcos's crony capitalism. Tokyo and Washington recognized that the aid would be useful only insofar as it provided incentives for Philippine efforts to revitalize its private sector. Collaboration among Japanese, American, and Philippine officials and private-sector representatives was exemplary. The results were at best mixed—not least, because the Aquino administration displayed more zeal for democratization than for economic reform.

As Eastern Europe was liberated from communism, Washington recognized a need to help democratic leaders achieve economic results in order to buttress their legitimacy. This prompted U.S. requests in 1989 for Japanese contributions both to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and to bilateral assistance programs for Poland and Hungary. Tokyo responded affirmatively, despite the fact that Eastern Europe was a remote region about which they knew relatively little and in which they had limited commercial interest; some officials, moreover, were wary of undertaking significant responsibilities there for fear of stepping on Western European toes. Nevertheless, they came up with a pledge of $1.5 billion for Hungary and Poland, composed of humanitarian aid, export/import bank credits, and government guarantees to underwrite loans.

When enterprise funds were subsequently established for various Eastern European countries—e.g., Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania—Japan likewise contributed to those. Soliciting their cooperation for these funds proved somewhat more challenging, however, because senior officials in Tokyo doubted they had the expertise to appraise requests for small loans and because the Foreign and Finance Ministries tended to see their aid priorities elsewhere. Vice President Quayle pressed this issue vigorously during his visit in 1992 and managed to achieve some results. All in all, Japanese support for economic

reform efforts in Eastern Europe, while modest in scope, was impressive, given their limited interest in the region.

A third area of special concern for Washington was Central America. Our interests were huge; Tokyo's were not. It had little strategic stake in Latin America, which was neither a primary market nor a major source of critical raw materials for Japan. But Latin America was an area where Japan could demonstrate its value as a partner to the United States while cultivating friends and mobilizing support for its objectives in wider multilateral forums. Thus Tokyo was surprisingly active in the region, allocating roughly 10 percent of its aid budget to Latin America.

The cessation of the Nicaraguan civil war, followed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro's inauguration as president in 1991, set Managua on a more democratic political course and eased pressures on neighboring Central American governments. Financial stability was needed to underpin the democratic transition under way in the region. Japan recognized that modest assistance could help stabilize a troubled region while netting it political dividends in Washington. Specifically, the Japanese hosted an official visit by President Chamorro to Japan and helped finance bridge loans to Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama that cleared their arrears to the IMF and World Bank and made them eligible for additional loans from international financial institutions. The Japanese understandably wanted the United States to remain out in front on Central American issues, but they proved consistently supportive.

Of even greater consequence, Japan joined in rescheduling Mexico's considerable debts. Japanese Finance Ministry officials collaborated closely with the Treasury Department in arranging the deal, and Japanese banks were among the leading underwriters of the scheme. This was critically important to President Salinas's ability to implement proposed economic reforms that brought renewed prosperity to Mexico. More broadly, the Japanese not only endorsed the Brady plan to tackle Third World debt problems, but they promised sizable monetary contributions to back it. This was somewhat ironic, as a similar plan put forward in 1988 by then–finance minister Kiichi Miyazawa had been openly attacked by Washington. That plan was withdrawn, and the Japanese graciously supported the United States' mildly amended version when it was proposed a few months later.

Japan also was persuaded to contribute to two multilateral efforts

aimed at fortifying democratic reforms in the Caribbean and Central America: namely, the Enterprise for the Americas initiative and the Political Development and Democracy Program. In Peru, the Japanese needed little prodding to provide expanded economic support. Beyond the presence of a substantial Japanese immigrant community there, the election of Alberto Fujimori as president in 1990 caught the attention of Tokyo, because Fujimori was the first person of Japanese descent to become president of any country outside Japan. Cooperation was easily managed until 1992, when Fujimori assumed dictatorial powers in order to cope more effectively with the drug cartels and terrorist groups. Washington suspended its aid and pressed Tokyo to follow suit. The Japanese demurred but used their close contacts with Fujimori to encourage him to moderate his political course to accommodate U.S. political requirements. They issued no public exhortations but applied steady pressure, making it clear, for example, that refusal to provide the International Committee of the Red Cross with access to Peruvian prisons was a genuine impediment to the resumption of international support and the improvement of ties between Washington and Lima. Tokyo also reminded Washington of the need to take more fully into account the delicacy of President Fujimori's own political dilemmas.

Creating an Asia/Pacific Framework for Economic Cooperation

Pressures to institutionalize a framework for Asian regional economic cooperation grew in the late 1980s. Asian interest was stimulated by the emergence of more integrated markets in Europe and North America. U.S. interest was a by-product of the vibrant growth in the Pacific Basin economy. A sharply rising trade deficit with Asia increased Washington's stake in a regional forum in which to promote trade liberalization. The administration calculated that Asian/Pacific regional institutions could remind Europeans that if they cut their deals for regional integration at the expense of non-European trading partners, we could respond in kind. With the end of the cold war, moreover, some in Washington recognized the potential utility of an Asian regional dialogue on security matters. And with Japanese and Chinese power growing rapidly, a political framework in which to channel the restless energies of these dynamic countries exerted a growing appeal.

I had long been interested in promoting Asia/Pacific institutions,

and regarded quasi-official fora like the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council—which included academic and business representatives alongside government officials—as useful but insufficient to meet the growing requirements for regional cooperation. During my preconfirmation calls, I was delighted to discover similar concerns among leading senators. More importantly, Jim Baker was personally interested in the concept, as was his counselor, Bob Zoellick.

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative thus appeared to be an idea whose time had come. By January 1989 the Australians were already busy proselytizing on behalf of a regional initiative that made no provision for U.S. participation, and the Japanese appeared poised to support it. The Bush administration recognized that it had to clarify its own intentions or leave the field to others by default.

The Japanese had exhibited interest in regional institutions since the late 1970s but were reticent to assert a strong lead because of their sensitivities to Asian—and particularly ASEAN—reactions. On top of this, the usual bureaucratic rivalries were in play, with MITI displaying somewhat greater enthusiasm initially than did the Foreign Ministry—arguably because they spotted a bureaucratic vacuum on the issue. Nonetheless, the Japanese government enthusiastically endorsed the establishment of APEC in October 1989 and consistently nurtured its evolution in the years that followed.

The principal challenge for U.S.-Japanese policy coordination arose some months later, when the Malaysian prime minister, Mahatir bin Mohamad, proposed an alternative to APEC: the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), subsequently modified and renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). Whatever Mahatir's motives—and they were invariably complex—he rationalized his proposal as a regional reaction to the perceived failure of the Uruguay round of the GATT talks, to European and North American steps to form regional trading arrangements, and to the growing protectionist inclinations of the U.S. Congress. In practical terms, Mahatir invited Japan to assume leadership of an exclusively Asian forum for economic cooperation.

Washington perceived this proposal as an effort to mobilize Pan-Asian sentiments against the United States. In presenting the proposal, Mahatir's rhetoric was frequently laced with barbed references to the United States, and there were undertones of racism in his exclusion of Australia and New Zealand along with Canada and the United States.

In March 1991 I attended an Asia Society conference in Bali, and

when key State Department officials dropped out at the last minute, I wound up as Washington's only senior official representative. In his keynote address to the conference, the Malaysian prime minister launched a blistering attack on Washington and argued that the EAEG was the most efficacious means of countering the United States' allegedly malign influence on global trade. I was instructed to respond to Mahatir on the following day. At that time, I affirmed U.S. support for regional cooperation but emphasized that we considered the Asia/Pacific region as the logical geographic framework for such cooperation, since the United States remained the prime export market for virtually every East Asian country. I suggested that Asian nations might better devote their energies to assuring the GATT round's success than to adjusting preemptively to its presumed failure. I noted that since the declared objectives of the EAEG were essentially identical to APEC's, their achievement was more likely in a more inclusive forum. I challenged Mahatir's assertion that NAFTA was likely to discriminate against Asians, noting that the United States traded three times as much with East Asia as it did with Latin America. And while acknowledging that the Malaysian proposal had not been a significant feature of our dialogue with the Japanese, I expressed doubt that ASEAN would be well served by an arrangement that might, even inadvertently, encourage more intense economic rivalry between Tokyo and Washington.

Needless to add, I and others registered these concerns on numerous occasions with Japanese friends in the months to come. The Malaysian proposal clearly put the Japanese on the spot. As a global trading nation, they were loathe to encourage regional blocs. Economic ties with the United States counted for much, and in the wake of the political difficulties that had surfaced during the Gulf war, the Japanese were not eager to risk Washington's ire on another issue. Several key ASEAN countries, moreover, had their own misgivings about the Malaysian initiative, and Tokyo preferred not to choose among them. These considerations notwithstanding, the offer of leadership in an Asian regional arrangement exerted an undeniable attraction for many Japanese. Tokyo consequently decided to defer a formal response to Mahatir's proposal until ASEAN had developed a unified response.

By altering his proposal to suggest that the EAEG serve as a caucus within APEC, Mahatir attempted to soften up Asian resistance to his idea and to finesse Washington's outright opposition. But the consultative process within ASEAN and between it and other Asians, ground slowly.

And through the balance of my tenure in Tokyo, the Japanese remained firmly ensconced on the fence. They never said no, but neither did they endorse the Malaysian proposal. But they did find ways to augment their own consultations with Asian nations across the board.

Encouraging Cooperation in Science and Technology

The United States and Japan have long benefited from collaboration in science and technology. Government efforts to encourage such cooperation date back to the 1960s, and over the years Japan has become one of our most valued partners in the fields of space exploration, oceanography, atmospheric sciences, earthquake engineering and prediction, and nuclear energy. Since a comprehensive science and technology agreement had been concluded in 1988, our efforts were concentrated on implementing this agreement and facilitating new forms of collaboration.

The highest profile quest was for Japanese support for the superconducting supercollider (SCC). This ambitious scientific project—whose fundamental aim was to comprehend more fully the nature of matter—had become extraordinarily expensive. Congressional support for the necessary appropriations had consequently become increasingly dependent on the administration's success in securing financial assistance from abroad. Japan was at the top of every fundraiser's list, with Washington visitors highlighting the importance of the project to the future of science, to our political partnership, and to the administration—several of whose most influential members came from Texas.

Enthusiasm for the supercollider within Japanese scientific circles was decidedly limited. The Japanese were just awakening to the deficiencies in their own basic scientific research efforts. University research facilities were primitive and underfunded. Dr. Akito Arima, the president of Tokyo University, had launched a major effort to secure substantially greater Japanese government support for renovating these facilities. Many Japanese scientists consequently saw our request as a threat to their priorities.

Some in Washington expressed the hope that the Japanese might pledge as much as one billion dollars to the supercollider. I considered that quite unrealistic but did not rule out a substantial contribution of cash plus technical support for some of the project's key components.

During President Bush's trip to Tokyo, the SCC was accorded less attention than it had received in some of the advance work for the trip. Nonetheless, in a late-night session during the visit, Brent Scowcroft kept the possibility of a contribution alive by persuading the Japanese government to establish a joint working group to assess the issue of Japan's participation in the project. Senior Japanese officials had complained to me, not unreasonably, that they were being asked to help finance a project without guarantees that they would be assured a substantial voice in its management. The joint working group was, inter alia, to look into methods of assuring donors an appropriate role in managing the project. In the ensuing months, Japanese scientists and officials played an active role in the committee, occasionally even displaying some enthusiasm for it. But whatever slight hope there may have been for Japanese participation faded when the House of Representatives voted down the appropriation for the SCC in June 1992. Though the vote was later reversed, the damage was done, and Congress later killed the project again—this time, for good.

Another of our aims was to encourage through bilateral exchanges the wider internationalization of Japanese science and technology activities. Getting more Americans into Japanese research laboratories was a high priority. The annual reception I hosted for the National Science Foundation's Summer Fellows turned up fifty to seventy-five young American graduate students and post-doctoral candidates who were spending several months in Japanese university, government, and corporate labs. In addition, Vice President Quayle took the lead in urging the creation of manufacturing technology fellowships, which eventually were to bring U.S. engineers and technicians to Japan for firsthand exposure to manufacturing techniques on the shop floors of some of Japan's leading production facilities. We also successfully encouraged MITI, beginning in 1990, to open all of its new industrial research projects to foreign participation. The response of many U.S. companies was understandably guarded in the light of complicated application processes and intellectual property rights provisions. On one such project—the New World Computing Project—the administration even requested that U.S. universities not join until an intergovernmental structure could be established to ensure an equitable balance of benefits. This effort bore fruit, and U.S. and Japanese scientists subsequently collaborated on opto-electronic research.

On at least one project, the Japanese sought our financial support

for their initiative. During Prime Minister Nakasone's tenure, the Japanese launched the Human Frontiers Science Program to support research in molecular biology and explore the functioning of the human brain. By the late 1980s a modest international research program was under way, and it had earned high marks within scientific circles. Key European countries were providing support; we were not. In 1991, however, Dr. Allen Bromley, the White House scientific adviser, managed to cajole several U.S. agencies into putting up $3 million annually to support the program. Some saw it as a sweetener for our own requests that Japan provide much larger financial subventions to the supercollider—a not-inaccurate perception.

In the field of environmental policy, we found ourselves frequently at odds with Japan. On many conservation issues—whaling, driftnet fishing, hawksbill turtles, etc.—Japan's commercial interests brought it into conflict with environmentalists in the United States and elsewhere. But whereas the USA and Japan both initially objected to a proposed fifty-year moratorium on Antarctic mining, Japan subsequently softened its objection, leaving us as the only advanced country not endorsing the ban—a position President Bush subsequently abandoned in mid-1992.

In the run-up to the Rio Conference on the Environment, other differences surfaced. The Japanese, in their search for areas in which to exercise greater international leadership, zeroed in on the environment in the early 1990s. Former prime minister Takeshita—one of the wise men advising Maurice Strong, the secretary general of the Rio conference, was a driving force behind this search for a larger role.

At Rio, Japanese policy visibly diverged from our own on two major issues: (1) the attempt to include in the Climate Change Convention explicit commitments to stabilize CO_2 emission levels; and (2) support for the Biodiversity Convention. On the first, the Japanese were prepared to commit to stabilizing emission levels at 1990 levels by the year 2000, while we ducked that commitment; on the second, they supported ratification of the convention, and we did not. Ultimately, however, neither the United States nor Japan played very prominent roles in Rio, which may have muffled the effects of these disagreements. President Bush made a brief appearance; Prime Minister Miyazawa felt unable to absent himself from the Diet debate on a revised UN peacekeeping bill. The United States was a target of much criticism at the conference; Japan was not a visible presence.

Fostering Trilateralism

The summit meetings of the G-7 nations provided a key forum for policy coordination between the United States and Japan, and the Japanese became more assertive on political as well as economic issues in these gatherings. As noted, they used the summits to internationalize their territorial issue with the Russians and to press for the modification of sanctions against China. But the summit meetings became progressively more routinized and bureaucratized—occasions for signing communiqués laboriously negotiated by "sherpas." There was an evident need for ongoing consultations among senior officials that went beyond the occasional meetings that brought them together each spring to prepare the political declarations issued annually by the heads at the summit.

Undersecretary for Political Affairs Bob Kimmitt was eager to regularize the contacts among political directors of G-7 countries into an continuing consultative process. I encouraged him, thinking this would help incorporate our dialogue with the Japanese more deeply into the institutional framework of the West. Senior Foreign Ministry officials appeared enthusiastic. Yet in the end the effort to create such a U.S.-Japan-Europe forum fizzled, mainly because of resistance from the French.

Of course, the Japanese were not interested in having their relations with Europe confined to multilateral institutions in which we played a dominant role. On the contrary, they undertook successful efforts to diversify their trade with Europe; they bolstered their links with the European Community, negotiating a declaration of principles to guide their relationship; and they intensified bilateral ties with key European countries. Still, the Japan-Europe nexus remained tenuous, and genuine trilateralism continued to be more of a hope than a reality.

Accommodating Japan's Desire for Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council

As East-West tensions faded, the United Nations promised to become the powerful force in world affairs that its founders had envisaged. For Japan to be a genuine global partner, it was essential that its voice in international organizations reflect more accurately its growing power. And it was only natural that Japan would seek a larger role in a revi-

talized UN. As economic concerns appeared likely to supplant military anxieties, Japan's claims to more substantial representation in the Security Council appeared all the more justified; its financial subventions to the United Nations already exceeded the combined contributions of China, the UK, and France.

The United States had been on record in support of Japan's permanent membership on the Security Council since 1972. I had collaborated on papers promoting that policy as a member of the State Department planning staff and felt that enhanced Japanese involvement in the UN would both accommodate a legitimate Japanese claim and encourage Tokyo to assume larger international responsibilities. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the question was whether the USA would move from rhetorical to operational support for Japan's aspirations. To me, this seemed a natural and appropriate trade-off for the expanded help we sought from Tokyo on a wide variety of substantive issues.

Over the years, the Japanese government had expressed its interest in a seat on the Security Council in a somewhat sporadic and diffident manner. During and immediately following the Gulf war, it was inclined to lie low, doubtful that it could secure the requisite support in light of its hesitant performance. The Tokyo political establishment appeared divided over the wisdom and efficacy of an active campaign for a permanent seat. Some felt Japan's credentials spoke for themselves and that an overt quest for the seat would be unseemly. Others feared such a campaign might inadvertently accelerate the dismantling of constraints on Japan's military role while exposing it to new pressures to tackle jobs where sweat and blood were needed along with cash.

Ambassador Yoshio Hatano, Japan's permanent representative to the United Nations, harbored no such reservations. He embarked on an energetic campaign in New York to promote the reform of UN institutions, including the removal of the so-called enemy clauses in the charter and an expansion of the Security Council to democratize its membership. Whether Hatano's activism was encouraged by Tokyo or he took the lead to overcome Tokyo's inertia, I do not know. But his activities made Tom Pickering, the U.S. permanent representative to the UN, nervous and attracted Washington's attention. Pickering feared that Hatano would generate pressure for wholesale change in the membership of the Security Council before we had discussed a game plan for managing Japan's entry.

I was asked to remind the Foreign Ministry that while we supported Japan's claim to a permanent seat on the council, we expected the Japanese to develop a plausible strategy for achieving their objective without inadvertently undermining the council's usefulness—an interest the Japanese were presumed to share. The ministry readily acknowledged the need for a thoughtful strategy and agreed to consult with us before attempting to implement it. Tom Pickering visited Tokyo to review his assessment of the situation in New York and to urge an approach in which the Japanese would concentrate on making the case for their own entry without opening the door to unrestrained logrolling among the many other countries that coveted a permanent seat.

While the Japanese worked to develop a strategy, a related question reared its head: whether Japan's highest-ranking executive within the UN system, Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima (director general of the World Health Organization), would enjoy the United States' backing for a second five-year term. Somewhere along the line Dr. Nakajima had provoked the ire of many representatives to the WHO. He was criticized, among other things, for his management style and his approach to certain international public health questions (e.g., AIDS). The U.S. ambassador accredited to UN organizations in Geneva, Morris Abram, was clearly sympathetic to those who sought to mobilize support for another candidate—an Algerian who had previously served as Dr. Nakajima's deputy.

The Japanese regarded a second term for Nakajima as a matter of face. Few Foreign Ministry officials energetically defended Nakajima's performance, but they argued that since all previous directors general had served two terms, their man deserved comparable treatment. They promised to persuade Nakajima to shake up his staff and improve his management style. They also indicated clearly their determination to call in all the chits to assure Nakajima's reelection.

I had known Dr. Nakajima in the Philippines in the early 1980s and had seen him from time to time during my stint as undersecretary. I had no means of judging his effectiveness at the WHO, and the reports about his performance were troubling. Yet a highly visible U.S. role in a campaign to oust Nakajima was destined to offend Tokyo; I doubted Geneva's estimates of the vote count; and it struck me as a poor issue on which to pick a fight with a government whose support we routinely requested on matters of far greater consequence. I worried espe-

cially about the signal our opposition to Nakajima would convey to Tokyo about the larger issue of Japan's membership in the Security Council.

I expressed these reservations on a number of occasions. But persuading Washington proved to be an uphill task. In the end, Larry Eagleburger, who saw Nakajima in action at the Tokyo Cambodian Donor's Conference in the spring of 1992 made the call and committed the United States to supporting Nakajima's rival. The Japanese were resentful. They pulled out all the stops for Nakajima's reelection, and, as I expected, their campaign succeeded.

President Bush's Trip to Tokyo

President Bush's decision to attend Emperor Hirohito's funeral in February 1989 was genuinely appreciated by the Japanese, and this thoughtful gesture relieved pressure for an early official visit to Tokyo. But the Japanese remained eager to arrange a state visit, which had last occurred when President Reagan had visited Tokyo in 1983. The president repeatedly was invited to visit Japan, and he displayed an evident interest in doing so. Momentous events in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Gulf, however, kept it off the schedule. When the Gulf war ended, the Japanese reconfirmed their invitation and urged an early trip. The president seemed agreeable. Through the summer of 1991, dates were discussed, and eventually it was agreed the trip would take place in late November.

This pleased me greatly, because a state visit offered a chance to affirm the interests the United States and Japan shared after several years of tumult and friction. I shared with members of the embassy and Washington officials who paid close day-to-day attention to Japan the belief that such a visit would provide an appropriate occasion on which to issue a joint declaration outlining the conceptual underpinnings of the global partnership we had been seeking to forge—an occasion for celebrating the collaboration we had achieved while adding new content to it. As plans for the trip took shape through the summer and early fall, no major bilateral issues surfaced that appeared to demand resolution at the summit. The SII talks were by this time on the back burner. An extension of our bilateral agreement on semiconductors appeared achievable without engaging the president and prime minister directly. Discussions between our respective industries

and governments appeared to be generating some movement on Japanese procurement of auto parts.

With a summit in prospect, the number of Washington visitors to Tokyo increased perceptibly. At no time during my tour, in fact, did cabinet members display a greater interest in stopping there. Among those visiting in the fall of 1991 were Vice President Quayle, Secretary of State Baker, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, Secretary of Defense Cheney, Secretary of Commerce Mosbacher, Secretary of Energy James Watkins, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell.

Before the discussions regarding the visit reached a point of decision, however, President Bush's trip was postponed. At first I thought it had been canceled. I heard that surprising news while en route from Kumamoto to Fukuoka in early November. I got the word by phone from my deputy, Bill Breer. Agitated, he told me that the White House had just informed him that the trip was being canceled. I asked why. He said the decision appeared to be a knee-jerk reaction to the results of the Pennsylvania Senatorial election, in which the Republican candidate, former attorney general Dick Thornburg, had been beaten by Harris Wofford in a campaign that included generous criticism of the president's alleged neglect of domestic matters. I asked whether the decision had been publicly announced. Bill said that it had not, but because the television networks evidently had gotten wind of it, the White House planned to go public with their decision shortly. I asked whether the Japanese government had been informed. He said it had not but that he had been instructed to do so by the NSC. He volunteered to call the director general of North American Affairs, Koichiro Matsuura. Since there appeared insufficient time to request reconsideration of the basic decision before it was announced, I told him to call Matsuura immediately.

The decision was publicly characterized as a postponement rather than a cancellation. I assumed this was for the sake of appearances, since a trip postponed for domestic political reasons seemed unlikely to be rescheduled even closer to the election season. I was distressed that a decision of this importance had been made without consulting those on the spot and announced without the courtesy of a presidential telephone call to the prime minister. We reported the disappointment that was evident throughout the Japanese government, but I did not undertake a major effort to reverse the decision, fearing that a presidential trip driven heavily by domestic political considerations

was unlikely to produce a salutary result. I do not claim any prescience about the misfortunes that were about to befall the president.

In any case, within a short time, the president's own second thoughts produced a decision to put the trip back on the schedule. This surprised me as much as it seemed to please my hosts. They would have reason to reconsider before the fourth of January, the newly decided date for the president's arrival.

I got a taste of the changing political realities at home in early December, on a trip to Honolulu where an Asian Chief of Missions meeting was scheduled to coincide with a presidential visit to Honolulu to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor. I was delighted to attend the ceremonies and was impressed by the statesmanlike tone and content of the president's address. In defending to an audience of veterans the U.S.-Japan relationship on such an occasion, he displayed political courage as well as unusual sensitivity to the feelings of both Americans and Japanese.

Following the president's address, the assembled ambassadors met with him for about an hour and a half. Representatives to the countries he was planning to visit—Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan—were asked to summarize their expectations for his visit. When I observed that most of the planning in Washington and Tokyo for his earlier visit had focused on a joint declaration regarding our global partnership, the president asked pointedly, "What do we get out of it?" This took me slightly aback, for, aside from the supercollider project, none of the recent cabinet-level visitors to Tokyo had pressed for specific results at the summit on the bilateral economic and trade issues to which the president now referred. Obviously there was an urgent need to make swift adjustments in our discussions with the Japanese about the visit. To Brent Scowcroft and others I expressed the hope that a senior official sensitive to the changing political climate in Washington could be sent to Tokyo to provide help on the substantive preparations. Happily, Bob Zoellick took on that task and announced his intention to visit Tokyo with a team of senior people from the U.S. trade representative's office and the Departments of Commerce and State on the twentieth of December.

This was rather late to engage the Japanese on what amounted to a new agenda for the visit. Since New Year's holidays are sacred to Japanese officials, by the time Bob arrived in Tokyo, there were only seven working days left before the president arrived in Kyoto. Bob was

extremely businesslike, and when asked what the president's priorities were, he announced, "Auto, autos, autos." The supercollider, if not forgotten, was relegated to secondary status.

Zoellick's arrival was heralded by another unanticipated announcement from Washington: namely, that the president would be accompanied to Tokyo by a group of senior business executives including Lee Iacocca, "Red" Poling, and Robert Stempel from Chrysler, Ford, and GM respectively. I never knew precisely where this suggestion had come from; news reports attributed it to Bob Mosbacher.

Vice President Quayle had been accompanied by three representatives from the private sector during a visit several months before. On that occasion, the business community representatives had maintained a low profile, and their presence had attracted little notice. I was not opposed to the idea of an accompanying business delegation to underline the importance of export promotion. But I doubted the advisability of giving the automobile executives such prominence, since they had not undertaken very impressive steps to crack the Japanese market: for example, none had fielded a right-hand steering wheel model aimed at a mass market, and only Ford had begun to establish its own distribution system.

In light of the inclusion of these CEOs from Chrysler, Ford, and GM, however, Bob Zoellick's emphasis on the importance of expanding sales of autos and auto parts was quite understandable. At his opening meeting with Japanese officials, he comprehensively described the political situation in Washington and the reasons Japan's interests should impel it to help the president achieve tangible and significant results during his visit. His interlocutors appeared shaken by the request virtually to start from scratch in preparing for the visit. Fortunately, the senior Japanese government representatives—Koji Watanabe, deputy minister of foreign affairs; Yuji Tanahashi, vice minister of MITI; and Tadahiro Chino, vice minister of finance—were seasoned professionals who were prepared, despite the short time available and the impending holiday period, to see what could be done.

We swiftly organized a process in which simultaneous efforts were undertaken to complete the so-called Tokyo Declaration and to supplement it with an action program that had both a political and an economic component. The latter was the focus of intense negotiations over the next two weeks. The auto issue was the most important—and the most difficult. Before the scheduled visit of the president in early

November, Japanese auto executives had volunteered announcements of their plans to increase significantly their purchases of American auto parts for their transplants in the United States. Now they were being asked to go back to the well, and they didn't like it.

MITI and the Ministry of Transportation were asked to broker arrangements for streamlining the certification of U.S. cars for Japan's market. It stuck in Detroit's craw that Japanese companies certified the safety of cars they manufactured for export to the United States yet insisted on carrying out inspections on American exports in Japan. The Japanese rationalized this imbalance on grounds that Japan manufactured hundreds of thousands of cars to meet the regulatory requirements of our market and no one doubted that the cars they produced met our standards. Detroit, on the other hand, accorded a much lower priority to exports and sought to sell cars in Japan that had been designed essentially for other markets. The Japanese consequently insisted on overseeing the so-called homologation process through which these cars were adapted to Japan's demanding safety requirements.

Whatever the logic of the arrangement, there can be no doubt that the Japanese had long utilized this system to increase the costs and complicate the problems of market entry for every would-be importer of automobiles. The lack of reciprocity was galling, particularly since Japan sold more cars in the United States in a week than we sold in Japan in a year. But the Transportation Ministry controlled Japan's standards, and it seemed indifferent to these political concerns. It was in charge of the regulations and exhibited little interest in sharing, let alone giving up, its prerogatives.

Washington also wanted help in gaining access to automobile distributors to facilitate sales of finished automobiles in Japan—a point registered strongly by Vice President Quayle during his visit to Tokyo. Since only Ford had the rudiments of an effective distribution system in Japan, this meant leaning on Japanese car companies to open up their own distribution channels. The Japanese had clearly benefited from the readiness of American independent distributors to handle their products alongside Detroit's. In Japan, by contrast, each maker maintained exclusive distribution channels, and each company's sales force was extraordinarily loyal; none of their companies was interested in easing the entree of additional competitors. Relying on them to market U.S. products struck me as akin to McDonald's expecting Burger King to help it increase its market share. It was a manifestation

of Detroit's desperation. Yet the imbalance in market access arrangements was outrageous, and we needed all the help we could get.

I had learned something about the Japanese auto distribution system from an anonymous source in the early months of my tenure. A graduate student from Johns Hopkins University who was spending some time working for Mitsui Bussan sent me a blind copy of the conclusions he had reached in his research on the auto industry. He had wandered around Tokyo asking lots of thoughtful questions about how U.S. auto manufacturers were faring in marketing their products in Japan and had spent considerable time at the Autorama distribution centers where Ford's cars were on display. Though Autorama was a joint venture with Mazda in which Ford owned roughly a 33 percent equity share, the sales force was thoroughly committed to Mazda. When my anonymous friend inquired about Ford products, he was astonished to hear the salesmen repeatedly express utter contempt for Ford products. I sent a copy of his paper to Ben Lever, Ford's resident manager, with the comment that if this was an indication of the enthusiasm of Autorama distributors for Ford's products, he had a more serious problem than I had been led to expect.

There were other issues as well: the conclusion of an agreement on government procurement of computers, understandings regarding the opening of market access for glass and paper products, the right of each side to raise new issues in the ongoing SII talks, and of course, the supercollider. By the time the president arrived, the action plan concerning economic and trade relations had acquired substantial content. Unfortunately, it was to attract little favorable attention during the visit, because the press soon became preoccupied with the president's unexpected illness and the complaints of various members of his business delegation.

The president's arrival in Kyoto was marked by extraordinarily beautiful weather. The city glistened in the winter sunlight, and the initial events—a visit to a famous temple and a luncheon at a traditional Japanese inn—got the visit off to an amiable start.

The first business was the opening of a new Toys R Us outlet near Osaka. In the helicopter en route, the president pulled out remarks that had been drafted for the occasion. He looked distressed and asked Brent Scrowcroft and me to take a look. The reasons for his unhappiness were immediately clear. The remarks had been drafted as if prepared for a domestic American audience; they were lacking in grace

and seemed scarcely presidential. Unfortunately, the helicopter ride was brief, and there was no chance to redraft them. The president improved the remarks in the delivery, but the tone still seemed off.

Things got worse. The visit to Tokyo started well enough. Consultations with Prime Minister Miyazawa went smoothly. The two leaders had enjoyed cordial relations for a long time, and they both were comfortable with the nuances of all the crucial foreign policy issues. At a luncheon banquet hosted by the prime minister on January 5, I detected nothing untoward other than the fact that the president did not eat everything put before him. I assumed that this was perhaps because he and I were scheduled to play tennis with the emperor and the crown prince immediately after lunch. I was unaware that the president was feeling under the weather, and he appeared eager for some exercise. Before the game, the crown prince asked me how we should divide up. I left it up to him, and he paired up with his father. They beat us rather convincingly. After a set, the emperor invited us to have tea, but the president insisted on a chance to even the score. We lost again. After snacks and a pleasant chat with the emperor, empress, and other members of the family, we returned to Akasaka Palace. The president had good color, and again I had no inkling of anything amiss.

When I returned to accompany the president to the prime minister's official residence for dinner, I overheard a White House staff member comment that Mr. Bush was feeling "only about seven on a scale of ten." Yet as Bonny and I went through the reception line, he looked fine. I was consequently surprised when Brent Scrowcroft sought me out a few moments later to say that the president had been forced to leave the receiving line, was feeling poorly, and, though he did not wish to cancel the dinner, hoped it could be accelerated. I found the chief of protocol, explained the situation, and asked that the dinner be speeded up. He readily complied.

When the president entered the dining room, it was clear that he was under the weather. His color was gone, and so was the animation he customarily displayed. I kept a close eye on him from my seat at the table—no more than twenty or twenty-five feet away from him—and I noticed midway through dinner that he looked over his shoulder, as though seeking to locate a door. A beautiful Japanese screen extended from wall to wall behind the head table, however, and denied him any ready means of egress. As he turned back to the table, the awful scene

reproduced hundreds of times on television unfolded: the president lost consciousness, expelled his dinner, and slid to the floor with his head in Prime Minister Miyazawa's lap. Though he regained consciousness swiftly, it did not seem so at the time. My most vivid memory is of Mrs. Bush, who rushed toward the president and then, displaying extraordinary composure, informed the crowd, "He's all right. He's all right. He's all right." She clearly knew more about his condition than anyone else and recognized the symptoms of the flu bug that had been circulating among members of the traveling party.

The president promptly regained his composure—to the extent one can under such circumstances—and was driven back to his quarters. Mrs. Bush remained, and the prime minister asked her to speak after Brent Scrowcroft read the president's formal toast. With an eye to the audience back home, Mrs. Bush cocked her eye at me and extemporized, "It's all the ambassador's fault. He and the president played tennis with the emperor and the crown prince this afternoon. They were soundly defeated, and it just makes George sick to lose!" She looked at me rather severely as she spoke and then broke into a broad smile, to the amusement of the audience. I'm sure it was a source of reassurance to Americans back home to hear the First Lady making light of the spectacle captured on television.

Mrs. Bush's remarks were repeated scores of times on Japanese television over the next several days. Unfortunately the film clip had been edited to omit Mrs. Bush's smile, and many Japanese friends assumed my tenure in Tokyo was about to be drastically foreshortened. When I saw Mrs. Bush the next morning, she said, "Mike, you'll probably never forgive me for my remarks last night." "Well," I said, "what, after all, are ambassadors for?"

"The effect of the president's illness was devastating for the visit. Many commentators blamed the presence of the business delegation for the trip's bad publicity, but I believe his illness had a more profound effect. Since he had to cancel his schedule for the following day, the planned events lost their focus. A breakfast meeting that had been intended to bring the president into contact with Japanese and American business representatives turned into a gripe session, and the U.S. auto executives dominated the next day's headlines with their own press conference remarks. The president's speech, which was to have been delivered to a blue-ribbon audience of several hundred, was read by Treasury Secretary Nick Brady. It received scant coverage in the

press. A visit to the Kodak Research and Design Center in Yokohama, which had been planned to demonstrate how U.S. companies that organized their business properly could achieve impressive results in Japan, became a nonevent. With the president unable to attend, the press bus to Yokahama was canceled. Thus, despite some useful progress on substantive matters, the trip was a public relations disaster that conveyed unfortunate images of the United States to the Japanese people and exacerbated the already sour undertones in the relationship.

In some respects, the 1992 Bush visit to Tokyo was a metaphor for the hope and shortcomings of the still incomplete partnership between the United States and Japan. The personal ties between President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa were exceptionally cordial. The joint declaration they issued captured the breadth of the interests our nations shared. The joint action program demonstrated the wide range of issues on which government-to-government collaboration had became routine. These cooperative links, while centered in Asia, had acquired truly global scope. And the alliance that provided the foundation of this partnership was alive and well. Yet the visit called attention to persisting tensions in the relationship, and in its aftermath, accusations and recriminations were hurled in both directions across the Pacific. Disdainful comments by Diet speaker Yoshio Sakarauchi and Prime Minister Miyazawa about the American work ethic provoked an outcry in the U.S. media and Congress. Senator Hollings responded with a crude and tasteless remark designed to remind the Japanese that some American products (for instance, the atomic bomb) worked perfectly well. Despite the range of shared interests between the United States and Japan, a genuine spirit of collaboration was frequently missing. For Americans, Japan was too often an afterthought—a convenient source of financial support for initiatives about which its views were solicited only after Washington had made up its mind. And too often Japan devoted its energies principally to the pursuit of its own narrow interests within the framework of an international system whose definition and defense it left largely to others.

The coordination of our respective interests was at times a bit ragged, but that was understandable. No new world order had replaced the familiar contours of cold war competition. Many in each country found the emerging terrain of the post–cold war world unfamiliar and unsettling. The resolution of contradictions within Europe and between Europe and North America appeared to open the door for a

new international constellation of forces that was unsettling for Tokyo. Japan's experience during the Gulf war had provided an unpleasant reminder of how dependent Japan remained on the United States. Yet if the USA's performance in the Gulf reassured allies of its military power and political resolution, the L.A. riots in the spring of 1992 reawakened apprehensions that intractable domestic problems would redirect American attention and resources inward. All these concerns reinforced a natural Japanese inclination to hedge their bets; in this case, by provoking interest in a re-Asianization of Japanese policy.

On the U.S. side, questions persisted about Japan's willingness and ability to tackle a more ambitious global role. It possessed the resources for it—of that there was no question. But whether it could overcome the provincialism and passivity, the aversion to risk and the inclination to free riding, that had shaped its diplomatic reflexes for a generation remained uncertain. Doubts on this score prompted many in Washington to encourage a hard-nosed approach that highlighted the competitive more than the collaborative aspects of the relationship.

Thus, while the benefits of collaboration were clear, they could not entirely quell the tendencies in both Tokyo and Washington to regard the other as an incipient rival. These were among the reasons that explained why, when things went wrong, commentators on both sides of the Pacific too often concluded that the relationship was fundamentally in jeopardy. Objectively, the partnership paid large dividends to both sides. But the emotional and psychological underpinnings seemed fragile.

In some respects, the Japanese tackled the problem more forthrightly than we did. In a little noted speech in Atlanta during the summer of 1991, Prime Minister Kaifu proposed a "Communications Improvement Initiative," or CII, to match the SII initiative we had earlier launched. Its purpose was to reciprocate the generosity of the United States' postwar Fulbright and Garioa Programs with a comparably magnanimous gesture: the creation of a Center for Global Partnership, endowed with more than $300 million, to provide support for bilateral education and cultural exchange programs. In setting up the fund, precedence would be given to supporting projects that engaged Americans and Japanese in tackling regional and global problems. The intent was to build a wider human infrastructure to support our official relationship. Commemoration in 1990 of the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and, in the spring

of 1992, of the twentieth anniversary of Okinawa's reversion were likewise undertaken as expressions of Japanese gratitude and efforts to create a less cantankerous atmosphere for our official dealings.

In the end, however, the benefits of collaboration that the global partnership promised were not matched by the spirit of cooperation both governments initially sought. And with the inauguration of President Clinton in January 1993, the concept of a global partnership quietly dropped out of sight.