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Lisa Anderson (editor)
1999
7. Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe
In much of the literature on transition to democracy, the state and its capacity to carry out basic functions do not assume an important role. Neither in the phase of transition to nor in the phase of consolidation of democracy does the state seem to have much to contribute.
This is a curious omission in view of the place that the state has come to occupy in the political analysis of different types of political systems. In addition to the “interplay of forces,” what matters, as Dankwart Rustow noted, is what politicians actually do, the agreements which are reached, and how they are actually transmitted to the citizenry. Politics, in other words, co-exists with the capacity to realize objectives. 1
The absence of state capacities in the analysis of democratic transitions is probably at least partially owing to the preeminent role that free market, anti-statist ideology has assumed the world over. What has been thought to be salutary for democratic societies has simply been transposed to societies that have recently emerged from authoritarianism and that are seeking to devise democratic procedures and build democratic institutions.
This chapter discusses the relationship between democracy and bureaucratic institutions. It follows the arguments set out by classical theorists maintaining that an intimate link, or dependence, exists between bureaucracy and democracy. Whereas the strong contemporary anti-statist ideology claims that bureaucracy is antithetical to democracy, the classical theorists claimed the opposite: no democracy can be truly anchored or consolidated unless the state has a reliable, competent bureaucratic organization at its disposal.
Bureaucracy and Democracy
All modern states possess a trained, more or less professional civil service organized along hierarchical lines and operating, in Weber’s terms, according to “calculable rules and without regard for persons.” 2 As Weber put it: “The more perfectly the bureaucracy is ‘dehumanized,’ the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue.” 3
The antistatist fervor ascribes little virtue to bureaucracy. This institution is seen as being opposed to democracy, or as irrelevant or nefarious for a free society and an efficient economy. It is, in Ronald Reagan’s famous words, not “part of the solution, but the problem.” Although democratic and democratizing societies have sympathized with or embraced this ideological position, there exists no empirical evidence to support the view that amputation of the instrument of the state advances the cause of democracy or spurs economic development.
Weber maintained that bureaucracies are inevitable instruments in modern and modernizing societies, and that no state can function without an efficient bureaucratic instrument. Schumpeter went even further and identified bureaucracy as indispensable to democracy. He lists the existence of a professional bureaucracy as one of the five conditions necessary for a democratic order. Bureaucracy, he wrote, “is not an obstacle to democracy but an inevitable complement to it. Similarly, it is an inevitable complement to modern economic development.” 4
Schumpeter cautions, however, that “recognition of the inevitability of comprehensive bureaucratization does not solve the problems that arise out of it.” 5 Nonetheless, there is no escaping the fact that no democratic society can preserve itself without a professional bureaucracy. “Democratic government in modern industrial society must be able to command, for all purposes the sphere of public activity to include... the service of a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and no less a strong esprit de corps.” 6
The charge that government is often unable to respond to society’s needs and that it is run inefficiently has become a familiar one. Schumpeter argued that a well-trained bureaucracy “is the main answer to the argument about government by amateurs. Potentially, it is the only answer to the question so often heard in this country: democratic politics has proved itself unable to produce decent city government, how can we expect the nation to fare if everything... is to be handed over to it?” 7
Ours is not the first epoch in which bureaucracies have been attacked for incompetence and for stifling freedom. It is possible—even desirable—to accept Schumpeter’s and Weber’s argument concerning the importance of an efficient bureaucracy for a democratic order without accepting Schumpeter’s view that the bureaucracy “must be a power in its own right.” 8 Nonetheless, bureaucracies have more often operated as forces of modernization than as obstacles to the process. Most of the literature on transitions leaves aside the organization of the state. Some of this literature takes the availability of adequate state structures as given. Transitions can go on for long periods, even if there is always the hope of repeating the “Spanish miracle.” 9
At the very least a consolidated democracy requires a state capable of carrying out its main functions (protection of citizens, collection of taxes, delivery of services) in an orderly, predictable, and legal manner. To do this, the state must have a capable instrument at its disposal. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan are among the first scholars of transitions to democracy to point to the importance of a professional bureaucracy in the consolidation of a democracy. They consider a professional bureaucracy to be as critical to democratic consolidation as an independent civil society, an autonomous political society, and the rule of law. They observe that no matter how one views the state’s role, a modern, professionalized bureaucracy is indispensable to democratic consolidation.
To protect the rights of its citizens, and to deliver some other basic services that citizens demand, the democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory. Even if the state had no other function than this, it would have to tax compulsorily in order to pay for police, judges, and basic services. Modern democracy, therefore, needs the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract. For this it needs a functioning state and a state bureaucracy considered usable by the new democratic governments. 10
Linz and Stepan have essentially updated Schumpeter or, rather, made Schumpeter relevant to the process of democratic transition and consolidation. As this process has gotten underway and been in the making for several years in a number of societies in eastern Europe, the absence of a professional bureaucracy is becoming more evident.
The extent to which bureaucratic instruments of democratizing states need to resemble a strict Weberian model may be an open question. But that such instruments form part and parcel of a state’s authority which is indispensable to the preservation of liberties is indisputable, even if not fully recognized.
A critical element in democratic consolidation is a bureaucracy that begins to operate in an impersonal manner, according to known rules and regulations, and in which the officials are able (or obliged) to separate their own political and personal interests from the offices they occupy. As Jacek Kochanowicz observes, “a bureaucracy plays not only a technical, but also a symbolic role. Like the flag, the national anthem, an army uniform, or a presidential mansion, it is a symbol through which the state—and the nation—is perceived. Citizens who have to deal with inefficient or corrupt officials will not respect the state, and the links tying the national community together will loosen.” Kochanowicz goes on to observe that creating a new, more efficient, more autonomous bureaucracy “could be a way to strengthen the legitimacy of the state.” 11
State authority requires state capacities which assure state legitimacy. All this is merely a means to the protection of individual rights. As Stephen Holmes notes in a perceptive essay on the weakness of the Russian state,
Today’s Russia makes excruciatingly plain that liberal values are threatened just as thoroughly by state incapacity as by despotic power. Destatization is not the true solution, it is the problem. For without a well-functioning public power of a certain kind there will be no prevention of mutual harm, no personal security.... The rights inscribed in the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution went unprotected because of a repressive state apparatus. The rights ascribed in the 1993 Yeltsin Constitution go unenforced because the government lacks resources and purpose. 12
The Russian example Holmes analyzes stresses the importance of endowing a democratizing state with capacities because “authority enhances freedom.” As he puts it, “If the state is to have a monopoly of violence, the monopoly must be vested only in officials whom the public can hold accountable for its use. Liberalism demands that people without guns be able to tell people with guns what to do.” 13
A democratizing regime never starts with a new instrument. Much of what the new regime wants to rectify, propose, and reform depends on the instrument at its disposal, which, in all cases, is the state bureaucracy. That bureaucracy had previously operated under different guidelines, ethics, and ideology. To reach the top of the bureaucratic structure implied embracing a political doctrine and serving the single party that dominated society and political life.
Recruitment and promotion were linked more to loyalty to the party than to any technical expertise, which is, of course antithetical to the Weberian concept of bureaucracy. To be sure, political loyalty among top bureaucratic officials is important in almost all democratic societies. Indeed, today it threatens to compromise the independence and professionalism of the bureaucracies of France, Britain, Spain, and the United States. That there have been strong political influences on the most professional bureaucracies has long been recognized. 14 But in the case of the former single-party states of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, professionalism was almost always secondary to recruitment based on party loyalty.
Bureaucracies and New Regimes
What happens to the main instrument of governing when a regime is overthrown? Is the bureaucracy purged, or does the new regime govern with those who served the old order?
Many new regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, have had to confront this familiar problem from the moment the old order was overthrown. It was Marx who called for smashing the bureaucracy—that instrument of the bourgeoisie—once the revolutionary force took power. Lenin subscribed to this view but had to wait several years before purging the Russian bureaucracy of the last vestiges of its bourgeois elements. His need for a state machine to carry out immediate reforms was greater than the need to purge this machine upon taking power.
To take a very different example, when Clement Attlee became prime minister of Britain’s first postwar Labour government, he was repeatedly warned that he would be unable to govern with what was essentially a conservative bureaucracy long accustomed to serving conservative governments, a “representative bureaucracy,” that represented not society but the ruling elite. Despite being urged to replace the higher civil servants, however, Attlee did not attempt a purge. And indeed he subsequently claimed to have received loyal service from the higher civil service.
In recent times different French governments have had to face the problem of bureaucratic loyalty. The Vichy regime saw a large segment of the bureaucracy adapt rapidly to the Pétanist regime, whereas the Liberation forces had to sanction some of those who had served Vichy. But even in the postwar years, there was no major purge of the bureaucracy. When the left-wing government came to power in France in 1981, after twenty-three years of uninterrupted right-wing rule, it planned to make massive personnel changes in the bureaucracy. After the initial tremors and some changes in personnel at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid, however, all major reforms that threatened the structure, personnel, and promotion process were abandoned.
Although all revolutionary governments plan to overthrow existing bureaucratic structures and replace an ostensibly hostile personnel with a new partisan elite, radical change rarely occurs and the pace of change is almost always slow. For the most part, the case of eastern Europe conforms far more to this pattern than to the pattern of China after the accession of the communist forces in 1949, when scores are settled rapidly, brutally, and without regard for immediate consequences.
Why then in the cases of more gradual and nonrevolutionary changes have plans to effect mass change been so quickly shelved? In large part, the answer is related to (1) the fear of creating further instability; (2) the need to reassure the society of certain continuities; and (3) the absence of a counterelite.
In an examination of regime change and its impact on the bureaucracy in France, Germany, and India, Graham Wilson observed that reality very quickly sets in for the new political leaders and “accommodation is reached.” 15 As Wilson notes, either a bureaucracy can be an initiator and an implementer of policy, or it can be a mere implementer, as occurs under regimes that set clear policy directives. By and large, as Wilson observes, new rulers come to terms with the bureaucracy:
The French example suggests more clearly that counter elites may be forced today more than in the past to come to terms with bureaucracies. The increased scale and complexity of government has made it even less plausible than in the past to pull up a bureaucracy by the roots and plant a new one. The larger and more complex government is, the greater the attraction of maintaining its machinery intact, as in India. 16
Reform and Stability
In the wake of a revolutionary change of regimes (or governments, as in the case of the socialists coming to power in Spain in 1982 or the French Socialist Party taking the reigns of power in 1981), the new rulers face two, often contradictory tasks. First, they need to distinguish themselves immediately from their predecessors by taking radical steps to fulfill the longings of their supporters for reforms long sought and long promised while the party was in opposition. Second, they need to minimize the degree of instability so as to avoid discouraging those who run the key economic, social, and administrative institutions. Severe political instability also leads to capital flight—to an acute decrease in investments—and it ultimately creates a new set of problems that ends up requiring further drastic action on the part of the new government. New drastic actions in turn only serve to heighten the prevalent instability, as happened in France, in 1981–82, when “strong party pressure... compelled the government to continue its innovation campaign in the face of waning authorization and dwindling resources, thus producing increasingly disappointing and counterproductive results.” 17
In the case of eastern Europe, since there had not been any meaningful competitive elections prior to the collapse of the communist regimes, there were no clear reforms or mandates for reform that could serve as guides for the new governments. By any measure, however, the revolutionary change created what some analysts have seen as “policy windows,” that is, an opportunity for major policy innovations. 18 What were the priorities set by the new governments?
On the whole, these priorities were determined in part by the rejection of the old order and in part by the international context in which the transition from communism to democracy took place. It hardly needs emphasizing that “successful dismantlement of the old order does not guarantee a democratic outcome.” 19 Furthermore, it is not clear to students of transitions what it is that guarantees such an outcome.
The priorities of the new regimes in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have generally sought to dismantle the centralized state apparatus. Among the particular policies advocated have been privatization and decentralization. Consequently, the most important policy in the economic area has been the movement away from central planning and regulation toward market-oriented economies. In the administrative area, the most important policy has been, not the restructuring and revitalization of the central administration, but rather the devolution of power toward subnational units. These policies reflect a rejection of the old order characterized above all by centralized bureaucratic power that served neither democracy nor efficiency. As Lena Kolarska-Bobinska notes about Poland, there is an “absence of the any conception of the role [that] the state should play in social and economic life besides a very general call for the reduction of its role.” 20 There is nonetheless a recognition that the state is responsible, in Leszek Bakerowitz’s words, “for the construction of a new economic system.” 21
A reduction in the role of the state, the policy followed in the countries of central and eastern Europe for reasons already explained, has also had the consequence of not according the reform of the state the attention it deserves. As Peter Drucker observes, “downsizing” is not synonymous with reforming or “reinventing” government.
By now it has become clear that a developed country can neither extend big government, as the (so-called) liberals want, nor abolish it and go back to nineteenth-century innocence, as the (so-called) conservatives want. The government we need will have to transcend both groups. The twentieth-century megastate is bankrupt, morally as well as financially. It has not delivered. But its successor cannot be “small government.” There are far too many tasks, domestically and internationally. We need effective government—and that is what the voters in all developed countries are actually clamoring for. 22
Effective government requires developing a competent bureaucratic apparatus, and the first step toward achieving this goal is recognizing the need to train professional public employees.
Undoing the State: Privatization and Devolution
The reduction of state power, considered to be part and parcel of the democratic transition, is being accomplished through two measures: privatization of state enterprises and devolution of state power to local authorities. Both these trends are not unfamiliar to the countries of western Europe, where since the early 1980s the reaction to statism has led to the privatization of state industrial and financial enterprises 23 and to the decentralization of administrative authority.
The privatization of industrial enterprises has been the chief element of the economic reforms in eastern Europe. The extent and modalities of the privatization process have not been uniform across eastern Europe. But regardless of the methods adopted, it remains clear that the government of the former Soviet bloc have sought to end the command economy through the sale of state enterprises. 24
Privatization did indeed remove from the payroll a substantial number of state employees and state organizations responsible for running sectors of the economy. But in every country a new structure had to be created to administer the privatization process. In the Czech and Slovak cases, the process fell to the Privatization Ministry, the Federal Finance Ministry, and the Federal and Republican Funds of National Property. In Poland, a Ministry of Ownership Transformation was created and was charged with selecting and overseeing the transfer of ownership. Hungary, which already possessed a less controlled economy prior to the overthrow of the Communist Party, did not create a Ministry of Privatization and was able to maintain a relatively decentralized privatization process that assigned responsibility for initiating the process to enterprise managers. There is, however, a State Property Agency (SPA), created in 1990, that oversees all privatization and that is headed by a minister without portfolio. 25 As in Western Europe, the process of privatization in eastern Europe also entailed either the creation of a new bureaucratic agency or supervision of existing agencies. It is also likely, as in some West European cases, that privatization will eliminate the agencies and personnel that ran the state enterprises, but will require setting up regulatory agencies. This is particularly likely with enterprises that remain largely monopolistic. In the case of the privatization of gas, water, and telecommunications in Great Britain, the government of Margaret Thatcher had to resort to the creation of additional regulatory agencies for these privatized firms. 26
If the transition to democracy implies a reduced role for the state in the economy, even more does it imply a reduced role for the state in administration and policymaking. This has been an article of faith, such that reform of the state bureaucracy has largely been synonymous with its diminishing role. The state reduces its role by delegating greater functions to local units. One study of the reforms of public administration in Hungary, confined almost entirely to the devolution of power, even went so far as to warn about what it calls the “artificial contrasting,... according to which the central state administration organs are bad ones, necessarily serving state interventions while the local and regional self-governing administrative organs are the title to the democratic public administration, consequently all scope of tasks and authority can be placed on them.” 27
In the Czech and Slovak Republics restructuring public administration has also largely meant altering the relationship between the center and the periphery. Thus, the Czech Republic abolished the level of region, the intermediate administrative level between the central administration and the district level, of which there had previously been seven. There were three such regions in Slovakia, and these too were abolished. There are now seventy-one districts in the Czech Republic and thirty-six in Slovakia. The only difference between the Czech and Slovak administrative structures is that the latter has a subdistrict level. 28 In Poland the reorganization of the administrative structure has resulted in the granting of greater autonomy to local governments. “The twofold subordination of local government under the Communist party bureaucracy and the directives of central government has been broken.” 29 In fact, the local government law drastically restricts central authority over local authorities.
In Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republics, the reforms of the organization of the state apparatus have been largely concerned with altering the balance between the center and the periphery. The report by Hesse and Goetz concludes that “in sum... local governments and administration in Poland have gone through major upheavals during the past two years. The territorial organization of local governance has remained largely unchanged, but there have been far-reaching functional, political administrative and financial reforms which have begun to transform the role of the local level in the governance of Poland.” 30 But it is not only administrative structures that are changed in the devolution of central powers and functions. Lurking in the background are some profoundly political repercussions that may threaten the very structure of a state initiating such reforms.
The devolution of state authority to local units may in particular contexts lead to the rise of strong regional sentiments, as has occurred in western and southern Europe. Hesse and Goetz observe that in the Czech Republic, “there have long been for [sic] the re-establishment of some form of regional government for the historical lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.... Should those regions be reconstituted, it is most probable that they will have the character of self-governing entities, i.e. they would not be part of state administration.” 31
The post-communist phase of the transition to democracy has been influenced by the ideology of the previous regime and by the global context within which transitions took place. The concordance of both led in a single direction: loosening the hold of the state on the economy and on the society. The first implied the policy of privatization; the second led to the devolution of power of the central administration. Both policies have received loud applause, though it is the policy of privatization that has received by far the greater attention. Only the modalities of the move to a market economy have been debated (“shock therapy” versus “gradualism”). To be sure, the regimes of 1989 in eastern Europe were not the same as those of the 1950s or the 1960s, which explains why the communists of the 1980s have been able to return to positions of authority in Poland, Hungary, Romania, and even in the Czech and Slovak Republics. As Przeworski noted:
By the seventies, repression had subsided as the communist leadership became bourgeoisified, it could no longer muster the self-discipline required to crush all dissent. Party bureaucrats were no longer able to spend their nights at meetings, to wear working class uniforms, to march and shout slogans, to abstain from ostentatious consumption. What had developed was “goulash communism,” “Kadarism,” “Brezhnevism,” an implicit social pact in which elites offered the prospect of material welfare in exchange for silence. And the tacit premise of this pact was that socialism was no longer a model of a new future, but an underdeveloped something else... We [did not understand] how feeble the communist system had become. 32
Feeble though the communist system had become, it remained associated with the party-bureaucratic state. Its organization in the transition phase had to be associated with the “undoing” of a strong state apparatus. And yet, if the task facing central and eastern Europe is, as Janos Simon believes, nothing less than what Karl Polanyi called a “Great Transformation,” then it does not necessarily follow that the “undoing” of the state’s capacity is the ideal solution. Simon argues that the transition process in central and eastern Europe is essentially a more complicated one than it was in Latin America and southern Europe, because in the former set of countries it is the entire model of social reproduction that needs to be transformed. The task before these countries is “not only the democratization of an authoritarian political system (as was the case in other transitions), but also the carrying out of a thorough transformation of their economic and political systems.” 33
How is the “Great Transformation” to be carried out? What mechanisms are to be put into effect to ensure the delivery of services and the efficient execution of the extractive tasks that all states perform? How is the state to break with its habits of serving an ideology or a class or a political movement? How, in short, is the state to develop a stable, professional bureaucracy subject to the rule of law and capable of applying the law.
One of the most striking aspects of the transition process in central and eastern Europe is the absence of recognition, at least in the essential phase of the transition, that a professional bureaucracy is crucial to both the consolidation of the democratic process and the imperatives of economic development. As Frydman and Rapaczynski note, the transfer of state assets to the private sector does not obviate the need for a neutral state. Rather, it renders it all the more necessary. “Privatization,” these authors observe,
is a transfer of valuable resources from the control of some parties (state bureaucrats) to others, and one of the primary effects of this transfer is to enfranchise owners and make them more powerful, not merely in the economic, but also in the political sense. This in turn means that the new owners are as likely to make a political use of their new resources as they are to use them in a more conventional, economic fashion. 34
What needs to be guarded against, in other words, are the “effects of the privatized resources that might create new and ever more successful forms of rent-seeking behavior.” 35
Building a Professional Bureaucracy
“The habits of communist bureaucracy run counter to Weberian principles such as the rule of law, meritocracy, or professionalism,” 36 observes Jacek Kochanowicz. But what of the postcommunist regimes? Have they been more inclined to create a professional bureaucracy that transcends political loyalty?
The bureaucracy remains a critical institution because it is both a necessary institution in a democracy as well as the indispensable instrument of the state. Kochanowicz summarizes the role that the state needs to fulfill and the important functions that a state bureaucracy carries out. He observes that the market economy is just as much in need of a “strong state” as a nonmarket economy. The state is needed to set norms and regulations by which society can function. In effect, the state has a modernizing role to play. 37 Consequently, a “revitalized and reoriented state capacity is crucial to the success of both market-oriented reforms and consolidation of democracy.” 38
It is worth raising the question of what might have occurred in western Europe had the state not played the role of instigator, orienter, and planner in the years following World War II. The most accurate and best description of the economic policies undertaken by European governments in those years remains Andrew Shonfield’s. 39 Shonfield showed that the spectacular economic results achieved in western Europe following the devastation of the war were due largely to the role assumed by the state and its bureaucracy. Through the combination of a market economy and “indicative planning,” the economies of western Europe were able to achieve full employment and increased productivity.
The states were able to do this because (1) they assumed control of a key economic mechanism, the credit sector, through the Ministries of Finance and the Treasuries; and (2) they had at their disposal professional bureaucratic structures run by competent, well-trained officials. Both factors allowed for the orientation of investments that were expected to meet production targets.
The states in western Europe were expected to play a role in orienting investments. The French Planning Commission and the way in which the state ensured itself a cadre of highly qualified officials were soon being imitated in Italy, Great Britain, and Germany. The existence of a competent, even elitist bureaucracy was an indispensable complement to economic growth and to democracy, even if bureaucratic stability was often called upon to compensate for political instability.
The countries of central and eastern Europe cannot, of course, be expected to follow the path taken by their neighbors in western Europe. In the first place, the world in which they find themselves struggling to develop economically and to consolidate economic institutions is vastly different from the one that existed in 1945. It is a much more competitive one, and one in which the number of competitors has substantially increased.
Second, the ideological shift within the successful cases of economic growth today precludes an important role for the state. The term “indicative planning” implied a model that offered an alternative to uncontrolled market allocations and to Soviet planning, and gave an important role to the state. Today, such a model, or such a term, would be met with opprobrium. Not surprisingly, as Kochanowicz notes, of all the state functions, whether rectifying the environmental devastation caused by the communist regimes, or investing in human capital, or managing the national debt, “by far the most controversial concerns industrial policy—whether industries need a push from a development-promoting state in order to compete internationally.” 40 Behind this controversy lies an ideological conflict that questions the role of the state, a conflict that had been absent in the countries of western Europe after the Second World War.
Third, the countries of eastern Europe have been left to their own devices to a far greater extent than were their Western neighbors in the postwar period. They have not benefited from a Marshall Plan. Nor did they have an immediate need to ensure the existence of a professional bureaucratic structure to administer such a plan. Besides, the international organizations that exist today to help East European societies develop their economies—IMF, the World Bank, the Bank for European Reconstruction and Development (BERD), the European Union—tend to dictate economic policies.
These are all powerful factors that explain to a very large extent the difficulties faced by East European societies in their quest for economic growth and democracy. What is surprising, however, is that these countries have not chosen to tackle problems that it is within their power to resolve. The development of a central bureaucratic structure that is built on Weberian principles and that is administered by professional officials requires no negotiations and compromises with international organizations. It would allow the state to avoid the pitfalls of privatization that lead to the excessive power of new “rent seekers,” would reduce corruption in the decisionmaking process, and would ultimately strengthen the legitimacy of the state. Despite these immense advantages and possibilities, no state in central and eastern Europe has yet accorded priority to this task.
Reforming State Bureaucracies
Reforming state bureaucracies in central and eastern Europe has not been high on the priority list of any country in the region. Yet, as is now sufficiently recognized, the capacity needed by these states is no less important in today’s era of “rolling back” the state than it was in the past. In fact, it can be argued that between the decentralization of states and the global constraints to which eastern European countries are subject, state power is being eroded. But it is eroded further in the absence of a professionalized bureaucracy.
Bureaucratic reform has largely been limited, as we noted, to the devolution of power. Indeed, devolution and bureaucratic reform have become almost synonymous. Jan Kubik notes, for example, that “Poland carried out the most comprehensive administrative reform in east central Europe thus far. As a result local communities were burdened/blessed with a number of administrative prerogatives and responsibilities. 41 Such far-reaching reforms have been undertaken in Hungary and in the Czech and Slovak Republics. But Kubik recognizes that such ambitious reforms of politico-administrative units themselves come to have an impact on the state’s capacities. “I would also argue,” he says, “that decentralization which led to the decoupling of central and local fields, worked against substantivists’ political ambitions.” 42
Altering the balance of power between center and periphery sidesteps the need for bureaucratic reform. The importance of such a reform is stated succinctly in the mission statement of the OECD’s Sigma (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management of central and eastern European Countries):
The governments of central and eastern European countries (CEECs) are in an unprecedented situation. They have to build up democratic systems of governance and transform to market-oriented economies simultaneously. But they must do this without experienced political/administrative elites, without mature structures to mediate and aggregate interests; and without appropriate social, legal, and constitutional frameworks. 43
“The idea of public service as understood in developed countries is absent” in eastern Europe, states another recent OECD report. Public service is simply held in “low esteem.” In addition, the developing private sector offers more pecuniary advantages, so that public service comes to be reserved for those unable to “make it” in the private sector. This is the case today in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic. The OECD report goes on to note that the “concept of a professional and apolitical public service is slow in gaining acceptance around a region where for decades politics pervaded every decision throughout society, not just in the administrative realms.” 44
No serious attempt has been made thus far either to make wholesale changes in bureaucratic personnel or to prepare a new bureaucratic elite to manage the bureaucratic apparatus. It is rare, as we noted earlier, for a new regime to proceed to make wholesale changes in bureaucratic personnel. “In general,” notes Graham Wilson, “ in the modern state the arrival of a counter elite in power does not result in immediate radical changes in the bureaucracy. The counter elite may remove a significant minority of the bureaucracy, but the remainder stay on giving adequate if not enthusiastic service. The report of officials who have endangered their careers or lives by resisting a new regime is not very high.” 45 But it is not merely the potential resistance of the bureaucrats of the ancien régime that is at stake. It is the willingness of the new regime to maintain those who served the old order. Why is this the case in eastern Europe?
First, the nonviolent nature of the revolutions in eastern Europe dictated that the settling of scores would be kept to a minimum. The refusal of the regimes to hold accountable the elite of the communist regimes extended to the bureaucracy.
Second, in none of the countries of eastern Europe was there a counterelite ready to assume the reins of power. Those most responsible for fighting the former regime, the dissidents, were immensely influential in bringing down communism. But they were ill prepared to assume the reins of the state. Indeed, it is astonishing to see how little they count for in the new world they did so much to pave the way for. Timothy Garton Ash explains it this way:
With remarkable speed, the intelligentsia has fragmented into separate professions, as in the West: journalists, publishers, academics, actors, not to mention those who have become officials, lawyers, diplomats. The milieus have faded, the “circles of friends” have dispersed or lost their special significance. Those who have remained in purely “intellectual” professions—above all, academics—have found themselves impoverished. Moreover, it is the businessmen and entrepreneurs who are the tone-setting heroes of this time. Thus, from having an abnormal importance before 1989, independent intellectuals have plummeted to abnormal unimportance. 46
The dissidents always had a natural ambivalence about holding power, in part, no doubt, because they could not embrace Weber’s “ethic of responsibility” and in part because the “coffee shop” and “the circle of friends” are more conducive to awakening a public to a ruthless regime’s abuses than to managing a society in which “technical” knowledge—law, economics, managerial skills—are prized. 47
It has been argued that wholesale purges were unnecessary in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where the communist regime was in any case undergoing major changes. In these countries “an incremental replacement of elites had already taken place during the dying stages of the old regimes.” 48 Klaus von Beyme distinguishes between the model of “regime collapse” and the “erosion of power” model. In the former, a gerontocracy that refused to renew itself by integrating younger party activists led to the collapse of the regime. This was the case in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. In the latter case, as in Poland and Hungary, there was a gradual renewal of the communist elites in the 1980s, but even here mobility was restricted so that those below the top echelons of the bureaucracy had no qualms about switching sides when the communists were deposed. 49
In no country in central and eastern Europe, with the exception of the GDR, were there wholesale changes in the bureaucratic personnel. Indeed, except at the top, the changes in bureaucratic structures and personnel have been kept to a minimum. Graham Wilson concludes the special number of the journal Governance devoted to this very issue thus: “We may look forward in years ahead to seeing whether the expectation that in modern states the need for bureaucracy outweighs distaste for the past behavior of bureaucrats, or whether drastic changes in bureaucratic personnel occur; so far, there have been few instances of radical personnel changes.” 50 The political elite experienced a far greater renewal than did the bureaucratic elite, and this was the case in almost all the countries of the region. In Hungary, for example, over 95 percent of those in the 1990 legislature were first-time members. “Many of the new insiders were outsiders in the communist era, most of them were simply non-players.” 51 The explanation for the relative stability of bureaucratic elites and the renewal of political elites is to be found in the availability of replacements.
Access to a political career is relatively simple in societies which suddenly experience an explosion of political parties. The number of parties competing in the elections of 1991 and 1992 varied from eleven in Albania to forty-five in Hungary, sixty-seven in Poland, and seventy-four in Romania. 52 No particular skills are called for, and what is required can be acquired on the job. The job is also relatively unconstraining. To be a bureaucrat is vastly different: it requires skills and a high tolerance for routine, anonymity, and subordination. While many were flocking to take up politics, few were seeking to join the bureaucracy.
In short, the regimes can scarcely afford to disturb the only structures that they can use as instruments. It is not at all certain that political leaders who topple regimes have the patience for the process of governing (although the cases of Walesa and Yeltsin may suggest the contrary). But in all cases, the new leaders must rely to a large extent on those who served the previous regime. Nonetheless the question raised by Kolarska-Bobinska remains valid: “can the old bureaucratic structures implement change in the social order to the extent necessary to bring about a system that is a result of negotiations among various interests and social forces?” She observes that “there has been no essential change in the personnel in the state administration at lower levels because of a lack of experts and professionals. How many persons, and in what posts, must be replaced if the bureaucracy is to be inspired with a new spirit?” 53
The Case of the GDR
In the countries that were governed by the Communist Party, many members of the old nomenklatura either began a conversion in the years preceding the demise of the communist regimes or adapted to the new regimes. But in all those countries, as in all postrevolutionary situations, there existed a political “elite vacuum.” 54
In most cases, this vacuum is filled with a combination of a degree of elite circulation and the old (transformed or co-opted) nomenklatura. This does not imply that the relatively kind treatment of the old elite does not pose political and moral problems, as the case of the Lustration Law in the Czech Republic shows. This law prohibits former high officials of the Communist Party from occupying positions of authority for a period of five years. The application of this law—whether to fire people currently holding office or to refuse to hire qualified people—is generally recognized as problematic. 55
Vaclav Havel proclaimed that it was possible to reconcile politics and morality and that all one needed was “tact, the proper instincts, and good taste.” In fact, he said that he had discovered “that good taste is more useful here than a degree in political science.” No sooner had he uttered these words than “fate played a joke on me. It punished me for my self-assurance by exposing me to an immensely difficult dilemma.” This dilemma was the Lustration Law, which many have considered a “morally flawed” law passed by a “democratically elected parliament.” 56 Havel decided to sign the bill and then asked parliament to amend it.
Havel’s dilemma was a moral one: the law did not sufficiently guarantee the civil rights of those who would be affected. But there was a practical side, one that was likely to render the law difficult to apply: the demand for competence, relative as this may be, meant in effect that the vacuum could not be filled by a readily available new elite.
The only case where the old elite was removed is found in the GDR, but this was also the only case where an alternative elite was immediately available. Moreover, as Klaus von Beyme notes, of “all the East European countries currently in transition, only East Germany does not need to change its political and economic systems simultaneously.” 57 Nonetheless, East Germany, like the other East European states, did undergo a revolution, one that meant a new state and new institutions. During this process the economies and most public functions have to continue to operate, which is why no wholesale purges of bureaucracies take place. This was also the case in the early phase of the transition in the GDR.
The GDR entered an entirely different phase when reunification with the West occurred. It was not merely that reunification dissolved the GDR. It was that
the reality of unification gave the decision-makers an additional and unique opportunity: elite transfer. This term refers to a wide and broad deployment of western public servants drawn from the Bonn government, from the western State (Lander) governments, from western municipalities and western specialized agencies and institutions to the new administrative structures of the eastern regimes. 58
Koing shows in his study of replacement of the old East German nomenklatura that from the beginning of the unification process, civil servants from the West were being shuttled to Berlin by the hundreds to keep the administrative machine running. Subsequently, with the transfer of civil servants from the West to the East, what had been a temporary process became permanent. Consequently, as Koing concludes, “It can be safely said that West Germans are represented in all administrative branches and in all public service ranks.” 59
Following the reunification of Germany, the new rules that went into effect permitted the dismissal of officials for a large number of reasons (lack of qualifications, violation of human rights, cooperation with the Stasi, administrative reorganization). Thus, a former bureaucracy that was characterized by what Derlien has referred to as “politicized incompetence” 60 was in fact replaced.
Although several factors may explain the successful replacement of the East German elite, one stands out: the availability of alternative elites. This also explains why the political elites have experienced a greater degree of new entrants in all East European countries than have the bureaucratic elites. The existence of what Derlien call “the reservoir of new elites” and the concomitant “elite import” 61 distinguished the case of the GDR from the other countries that experienced a transition to democracy. Competence is always in short supply and the new political leaders have to confront the urgent task of reforming political institutions while keeping economic institutions running. If administrative incompetence or loyalty to a party-bureaucratic state is to be replaced by a competent bureaucracy based on the rule of law, then measures need to be taken to develop a system of recruitment and training of public officials. The posttransition period may be able to make do with the relics of the bureaucratic apparatus of the ancien regime, but what of the future? How will the needs of a democratic, industrial welfare state be administered? More pertinently, have the countries of central and eastern Europe been hesitant to link the consolidation of their democratic regimes with the creation of a professionalized bureaucratic structure?
The transition has given rise to considerable debate on constitutional issues, economic reform, and the relationship between center and periphery. Absent from these debates has been the creation of professionalized structure. There are both cultural and political reasons for this failure.
The cultural hurdles concern the fact that public service has never been accorded much importance. In fact, its longtime association with the Communist Party has made it an object of scorn. It was a politicized bureaucracy, substantially incompetent and known for its arbitrariness. That this remains the general attitude toward the bureaucratic apparatus may not be surprising. What is surprising, however, is that the political elite itself has been slow to recognize the importance of setting in motion a process of developing a bureaucratic structure that has a legal basis and that is characterized by professionalism. What Hesse and Goetz observe for the Czech and Slovak Republics applies to the other countries of eastern Europe. These countries have not
been able to formulate and implement policies which could be expected to result in major improvements in the personnel sector. The steps which have been taken have principally been directed at alleviating some of the most pressing short-term difficulties, but have failed to tackle more deep-seated structural problems. Moreover, there is little indication that in adopting measures concerning particular elements of personnel policy, sufficient thought has been given to their interlinkages. In other words, isolated steps, without reference to a more comprehensive reform design, have predominated. 62
None of the countries of central and eastern Europe has developed a civil service statute akin to anything that exists in the Western democracies. The development of these statutes was long in coming, and while they may be questioned today in some western democracies, they remain important elements in an orderly process of recruitment that privileges competence over patronage. In the east European countries there is yet no civil service statute in effect. In fact there is no civil service that is recognized as such. Even “the idea of a public service as such does not have a basis in law.” 63
Civil service statutes in the west recognize a legal basis of employment for public servants that is separate from the labor laws that obtain in these societies. They regulate rights and duties, provide protection, and set salary scales for all public servants. There have been discussions and drafts of laws in eastern Europe that are moving toward the creation of a unified civil service. As of now, such a service does not exist. Each minister organizes his ministry according to his own wishes. Hiring is done by the individual ministry and party politics predominates in the process.
A professional bureaucracy requires competent civil servants and tomorrow’s bureaucracies will be the result of the measures taken today to train higher civil servants. Efforts in this direction have not gone very far. “It is difficult,” Writes Lazlo Keri, “to find a trace of an overall concept in the selection and appointment process of executives.” 64 Even less is it possible to find a policy that facilitates the training of those who will run the state apparatus in the years to come. In Poland and Hungary schools exist for the training of middle-level civil servants, but neither carries much prestige or has made progress toward creating a cadre of high-ranking officials.
The OECD has sought to encourage the creation of an SES (senior executive service) group within the bureaucracies of the East European countries. While the American SES reform never materialized in the way that the reformers intended, there are variants of the model (the German model of Beamtpolitische, the ENA model in France). The logic behind the creation of a senior civil service elite is that such a reform would strengthen the bureaucracy, would professionalize it, and would increase the morale of the entire structure because it would show those lower in the hierarchy that the government now valued this institution. But this is unlikely to happen, at least in the near future, because, as two OECD officials have noted, politicians are not interested in issues that affect the bureaucracy, and neither is the public. 65
The creation of a professional cadre of senior civil servants is considered crucial for the efficient working of the government structure because the task of coordination would be facilitated. There are few functions today that can be totally carried out within a single ministry. The policymaking process depends on the capacity of the governmental and bureaucratic machine to coordinate both the making of policy and the implementation of policies. This now represents a new challenge to the bureaucracies of the East European countries, and one for which they find themselves singularly unprepared.
Conclusion: Bureaucracy in the Transition Phase
The transition to democracy in central and eastern Europe is associated with a departure from a repressive state whose chief instrument was a large, politicized, and arbitrary bureaucratic apparatus. Not surprisingly, the transition process in all democratizing eastern European societies has been preoccupied with divesting the state of its all-embracing role in the economy and in society.
While any transition to a democratic order need to concern itself with creating political competition, establishing a new constitutional order, and separating civil and political society, it remains the case that no society is conceivable without a bureaucratic apparatus. Just as the nation-state is the dominant form of territorial organization, so no state operates without the instrument of a bureaucracy.
Democracy requires more than an apparatus. It calls for the development of a competent, legally based, accountable, and professional bureaucratic structure. Creating such an institution has evidently not been a central preoccupation in central and eastern Europe. The new regimes are inevitably reacting against the critical instrument used by the old order. Paradoxically, the instrument of political power (the vast network of bureaucratic institutions) is the object of far more suspicion, mistrust, and derision in the post-communist era than was the locus of power (the party) during the reign of communism. In part this is because of the omnipresence of the bureaucracy, with its multiple police and security forces, in the daily lives of citizens. The reappearance of the party politicians also poses less of a threat than does the reappearance of bureaucrats because the former participate today in the political process without enjoying the monopoly they once possessed. Yet another factor helps drive the antistatist or antibureaucratic fervor of the democratizing societies: the global context within which the transition is taking place. This context, defined mostly by a reaction to statism and to state intervention in the economy, is also characterized by deregulation and privatization of state assets, even of services long provided by the state. Within this global context there is inevitably a considerable degree of emulation, or bandwagoning. Emulation, notes John Ikenberry,
is an important process by which policies spread because states tend to have similar general goals. All states are interested in doing better rather than worse; they prefer economic and political success to any alternatives, and the experience of other states provide lessons and examples of how success might be achieved. The guiding rule is: copy what works. 66
It has become evident by now that the study of postcommunism requires a new vocabulary and a new approach. At the same time, it invites us to reconsider classical principles which have been long entrenched in our liberal tradition. It shows, for example, that less state power does not always mean more freedom. On the contrary, a weak state might be a serious obstacle to the success of economic, political, and social reforms. Liberalization cannot succeed under conditions of state collapse or inefficient bureaucracy. As Stephen Holmes points out, the main problem of postcommunism seems to be the crisis of governance. Administratively weak states prove to be incapable of implementing reform. As Holmes and others have noted, postcommunist studies should shift the agenda away from cultural traditions toward discovering the way in which eastern European countries are being governed. Liberal rights are difficult to implement without effective, administrative, and adjudicative authorities. That is why it is high time to reconsider the role of bureaucracy in the transition to democracy.
Endnotes
Note 1: Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 2 (August 1970), pp. 356–357. Back.
Note 2: Max Weber, “Bureaucracy,” in H. H. Gertz and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 215. Back.
Note 4: Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd edition (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 206. Back.
Note 9: See Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 8. It is worth noting that Spain was endowed with a competent bureaucratic structure that was immediately usable by the post-Franco regime. Back.
Note 10: Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 11. Jacek Kochanowicz, “Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies,” in Joan Nelson, ed., Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p. 202. Back.
Note 11: Kochanowicz, “Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies,” p. 203. Back.
Note 12: Stephen Holmes, “What Russia Teaches Us Now: How Weak States Threaten Freedom,” The American Prospect (July–August 1997), p. 32. Back.
Note 14: See Ezra Suleiman, ed., Bureaucrats and Policy-Making: A Comparative Perspective (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983). Back.
Note 15: Graham Wilson, “Counter Elites and Bureaucracies,” Governance 6 (July 1993), p. 433. Back.
Note 17: John Keeler, “Opening the Windows for Reform: Mandates, Crises, and Extraordinary Policy-Making,” Comparative Political Studies 25 (January 1993), p. 66. Back.
Note 18: See John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little Brown, 1984). Back.
Note 19: Russel Bova, “Political Dynamics of the Post-Communist Transition: A Comparative Perspective,” in Nancy Bermeo, ed., Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 118. Back.
Note 20: Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, “The Role of the State in the Transition Period,” unpublished ms., p. 2. Back.
Note 21: Cited in Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, “The Role of the State: Contradictions in the Transition to Democracy,” in Douglas Greenberg et al., Constitutionalism and Democracy: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 301. Back.
Note 22: Peter Drucker, “Really Reinventing Government,” Atlantic Monthly (February 1995), p. 61. Back.
Note 23: See Ezra Suleiman and John Waterbury, eds., The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990). Back.
Note 24: See R. Frydman et al., The Privatization Process in Central Europe (London: Central European University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 26: Jeremy J. Richardson, “Pratique des privatisations en Grand-Bretagne,” in Vincent Wright Les Privatisations en Europe: Programmes et problèmes (Paris: Acte Sud, 1993) Back.
Note 27: The Reform of Hungarian Public Administration (Budapest: Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, 1991), p. 15. For further information on decentralization in Hungary, see Public Administration in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Institute of Public Administration, 1992). Back.
Note 28: See Joachim Jens Hesse and Klaus H. Goetz, “Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,” (Unpublished report, Oxford and Geneva, July 1992), pp. 31–32. Back.
Note 29: Joachim Jens Hesse and Klaus H. Goetz, “Public Sector Reform in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland” (Unpublished report, Oxford and Geneva, July 1992), p. 37. Back.
Note 31: Hesse and Goetz (note 27), p. 33. Back.
Note 32: Adam Przeworski, “Eastern Europe: The Most Significant Event in Our Time?” cited in Hans-Ulrich Derlien and George J. “Eastern European Transitions: Elite, Bureaucracies, and the European Community,” Governance 6 (July 1993), pp. 306–7. Back.
Note 33: Janos Simon, “Post-Paternalist Political Culture in Hungary: Relationship between Citizens and Politics During and After the Melancholic Revolution (1989–1991),” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 26 (June 1993), p. 227. Back.
Note 34: Roman Frydman and Andrej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away? (New York and Budapest: Central European University Press, 1994), p. 175. Back.
Note 35: Ibid., pp. 175–76. Back.
Note 36: Kochanowicz “Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies,” p. 219. Back.
Note 37: Ibid., pp. 197–203. Back.
Note 38: Joan M. Nelson, “How Market Reforms and Democratic Consolidation Affect Each Other,” in Joan Nelson, ed., Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe, p. 78. Back.
Note 39: Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford University, 1965). Back.
Note 40: Kochanowicz, “Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucracies,” p. 199 Back.
Note 41: Jan Kubik, “Post-Communist Transformation in East Central Europe: Dual (Political-Economic) or Quadruple (Political-Economic-Administrative-Cultural)? A Study of Cieszyn, Silesia, Poland (Manuscript, February 1994), pp. 10–11. Back.
Note 43: OECD, SIGMA, “Mission Statement” (Paris), p. 2. Back.
Note 44: SIGMA, Bureaucratic Barriers to Entry: Foreign Investment in Central and Eastern Europe (Paris: OECD: GD 94, 124, 1994), pp. 16–17. Back.
Note 45: Wilson, Counterelites and Bureaucracies,” p. 433. Back.
Note 46: Timothy Garton Ash, “Prague: Intellectuals, and Politicians,” New York Review of Books (January 12, 1995), p. 40. Back.
Note 47: Ibid, for an interesting discussion of Vaclav Havel’s relationship to power. Back.
Note 48: Klaus von Beyme, “Regime Transition and Recruitment in Eastern Europe,” Governance 6 (July 1993), p. 411. Back.
Note 50: Wilson, “Counterelites and Bureaucracies,” p. 436. Back.
Note 51: Thomas F. Remington, ed., Parliaments in Transition: The New Legislative Politics in the Former USSR and Eastern Europe (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), p. 33. Back.
Note 52: The Economist, p. March 13, 1993. Back.
Note 53: Kolarska-Bobinska, “The Role of the State in the Transition Period,” p. 309. Back.
Note 54: Derlien and Szablowski, “Eastern European Transitions: Elite, Bureaucracies, and the European Community,” Governance 6 (July 1993), p. 311. Back.
Note 55: Nonetheless, the Romanian case shows that any delay in passing a law regulating the access to the files of the former secret police may not be favorable to the political and moral climate of the country. Back.
Note 56: Cited in Ash, “Prague: Intellectuals and Politicians,” pp. 37–38 Back.
Note 57: Von Beyme, “Regime Transition and Recruitment of Elites in Eastern Europe,” p. 410. Back.
Note 58: Klaus Koing, “Bureaucratic Integration by Elite Transfer: The Case of the Former GDR,” Governance 6 (July 1993), p. 389. Back.
Note 60: Hans-Ulrich Derlien, “Matching Responsiveness and Expertise: Political and Administrative Elite in Germany,” in Henry Mendras and Ezra Suleiman, eds., Elites in Democratic Societies (London: Francis Pinter, forthcoming). See the French version of Derlien’s chapter in Ezra Suleiman and Henri Mendras, eds., Le recruitement des élites en Europe (Paris: La Decouverte, 1995). Back.
Note 62: Hesse and Goetz, “Public Sector Reform in central and eastern Europe,” p. 42. Back.
Note 64: Lazlo Keri, “Decision-Making of the Government from the Point of View of Organizational Sociology,” (unpublished manuscript), p. 89. Back.
Note 65: Jak Jabes and Staffan Synnerstrom, “La Reforme de l’administration publique dans les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale,” Revue Française d’Administration Publique, no. 70 (April–June 1995), p. 275. Back.
Note 66: G. John Ikenberry, “The International Spread of Privatization Policies: Inducements, Learning, and ‘Policy Bandwagoning’,” in Ezra Suleiman and John Waterbury, eds., The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 103. Back.
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